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# Regional Parliamentary Institutions: Diffusion of a Global Parliamentary Organizational Design?

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Michael Giesen

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# REGIONAL PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS:

## DIFFUSION OF A GLOBAL PARLIAMENTARY ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN?

**Michael Giesen**

### Abstract

In the last three decades Regional Parliamentary Institutions (RPIs) have experienced a rapid increase and spread across all regions around the globe. They represent a unique parliamentary phenomenon of international affairs that first and foremost exhibits a genuine legitimacy nexus between local constituencies and the international area. This paper builds on this characteristic and elaborates a legitimacy approach that identifies three legitimacy mechanisms that may help to conceptualize the establishment of specific design features of RPIs. To this end, a concise typology of RPIs with two disjunctive criteria – election mode and connection to a parent regional organization – provides the grounds for a systematic analysis of their organizational design. Building on a newly created dataset of 68 globally spread RPIs, the empirical analysis generates two main findings: (1) the rapid increase of RPIs after 1989 is empirically corroborated for all regions and most types of these institutions; (2) two standard applications of the developed legitimacy mechanisms – functional and normative legitimacy arguments – are not significant in explaining the choice of specific design features of RPIs. Therefore, the observed rapid increase and global spread of these institutions provide tentative evidence to support a diffusion analysis of their emergence and design, making the paper call for a more thorough conceptualization of RPIs' organizational design and processes of inter-dependent decision-making.

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## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Since the late 1980s, Regional Parliamentary Institutions (RPIs) have experienced a rapid increase in all regions around the globe (Costa et al. 2013; Rittberger/Schroeder 2016; Sabic 2008).<sup>2</sup> In contrast to other international and regional organizations (IOs and ROs), RPIs establish a genuine link between the international or regional scene on the one hand and local constituencies on the other hand via directly or indirectly elected national or sub-national parliamentarians who generally constitute the core membership of RPIs. Given this direct relationship as well as the mentioned increase in numbers, purely rational-functionalist explanations have a hard time accounting for the recent emergence and design of RPIs since they fail to conceptualize the underlying currents of legitimacy that effect the relations between the international or regional scene and local constituencies (see for instance Clark 2005; Zaum 2013).

In fact, in the context of the EU's prime example it has been argued that "the functionalist model fails almost completely at predicting the powers delegated to the European Parliament, including its legislative and its budgetary powers" (Pollack 1999: 2). From a functionalist perspective, these institutions seem to work on the rationale "to counteract or at least slow down" (Slaughter 2004: 107) the forces and powers of regional (inter-) governmental integration and may hinder the collective action problem-solving efficiency of these regional institutions.

Therefore, this puzzle might open the door to different explanations for the establishment and spread of these kinds of organizations without rational-functionalist informed variables pertaining to collective action problems. In this sense, explanations based on a legitimacy approach might additionally provide a different perspective on RPIs, their global expansion and institutional design in various regional environments (for the general aims of these research programmes see Acharya/Johnston 2007).

Therefore, the aim of this paper is to apply some hypotheses grounded in research on legitimacy to RPIs. The question driving the paper is what kind of legitimacy conceptions might fit for the analysis of RPIs and whether they are sufficient in explaining the emergence and design of these kinds of regional institutions. In so doing, the paper finds that diffusion yields some explanatory power in regard to the growing numbers and specific design features of ROs underlining the vast room for further research on this topic.

Although legitimacy has garnered quite some attention in the international relations literature, research has not paid much regard to gaining more insight concerning the connection between legitimacy on the one hand and the development and design of RPIs on the other. The recent debate about legitimacy gained some traction with Franck (1990) who uses the term "compliance pull" to show the workings of legitimacy

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1 The research on this paper was conducted in the framework of the project course "Comparative Regionalism" held at Freie Universität Berlin and was generously supported by the E.ON Ruhrgas Mobility Grant (for studies at the University of Oslo) funded by the Research Council of Norway and the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft. The author would also like to thank Thomas Risse, Tanja A. Börzel, Frank Schimmelfennig, and Natalia Rojas as well as the participants of the project course "Comparative Regionalism" for their very helpful and encouraging comments and suggestions.

2 To clarify, this study builds on the existing research program on International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) but focuses on RPIs understood as a regional (supra-national) phenomenon within the (not substantially) larger field of truly international parliamentary organizations. See Section 3 for further clarification.

in politics “among Nations.” Hurd (1999) shows – as Franck does – that legitimacy matters for the research on international institutions, and so does Suchman (1995: 571) who “synthesizes the large but diverse literature on organizational legitimacy.” This strain of literature has been enriched by Reus-Smit (1997) and Clark (2005). The latter combines the concept of international society (inter alia Bull 1995 [1977]) with legitimacy and elaborates this analytical framework in a historical perspective. Buzan (2004) develops the original concept of international society largely put forth by Bull (1995 [1977]) further into an analytical framework that fits today’s world of not only inter-state relations but also of relations between transnational and non-state actors. Connecting this work to conceptions of legitimacy promises to be fruitful for research on legitimacy and RPIs.

In contrast, research concerned with Regional (and International) Parliamentary Institutions is an under-exploited field of study. Early works including Klebes (1988) and Kuper (1991) only offer some preliminary definitions and descriptions. More recent differentiated typologies, functions, and conclusions concerning International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) can be found in Cutler (2001), Sabic (2008), and Cofelice (2012). The last begins to further discuss definitional and conceptual problems such as typologies, and develops hypotheses concerned with the empowerment of IPIs vis-à-vis their affiliated regional organizations by focusing on ten globally spread cases. Most recent works include Costa et al. (2013) who provide a research agenda framed in terms of globalization and regionalization as well as an in-depth analysis of several types of IPIs ranging from supranational parliaments to inter-regional institutions. Furthermore, Cutler (2013) links the current research program on IPIs to organizational understandings of ROs, which provides fertile grounds for further research on the interplay between RPIs and their regional environment.

The paper is divided into two parts: the first part develops a theoretical and analytical framework for legitimacy research on RPIs, and the second part applies this framework to the empirical cases while focusing on the design of these institutions. The first part provides the theoretical framework focusing on conceptualizations of legitimacy theory in international relations as well as a typology of RPIs with two disjunctive criteria: election mode and connection to a regional parent organization. The second part focuses on two independent variables (depth of integration and regime type) in order to map the universe of cases and tests two hypotheses concerning the creation and design of RPIs. Finally, the results are discussed, and the conclusion summarizes the paper.

## 2. Legitimacy and Diffusion

### 2.1 Legitimacy as an Analytical Category

Legitimacy as an analytical category is understood as “social validity as rightful” (see also Dingwerth 2007: 14; “soziale Geltung als rechtens,” Kielmansegg 1971: 367).<sup>3</sup> This understanding helps to distinguish between

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3 This definition highlights an analytical understanding of legitimacy because it seizes the middle ground between describing prevailing legitimacy perceptions and prescribing guiding standards for a legitimate social order. In so doing, it seeks to identify the underlying currents legitimacy rests on and affects international order.

authority as a categorical element and its normative dimensions.<sup>4</sup> The social validity of political institutions describes an individual experience of a social order as valid (“Geltungserfahrung,” Kielmansegg 1971: 367-369), which is an experience of normative ligation. This human experience combines a self-perception of being able to decide freely while simultaneously being bound to (external) validities that are independent of the free will and yet exert an ultimate obligation. In political institutions, this validity is transported via the category of (political) authority (*Autorität*). Authority is understood as a personalized quality derived from an experience of social validity connected to personal positions (in a specific social order shaped by non-personalized structures) that is expressed through recognition to do something (Kielmansegg 1971: 368f). As a consequence, political institutions exert “authority when the addressees of their policies recognize that these institutions *can* make competent judgements and binding decisions” (Zürn et al. 2012: 83, emphasis added). Therefore, this understanding of authority in the context of legitimacy highlights the differences between legitimacy-based approaches and purely functional and power-based concepts (Hasenclever et al. 1997; March/Olsen 1998).

On the other hand, the second dimension of legitimacy is highlighted in the experience of a political institution exerting a social validity as rightful, which is related to its normative status. This dimension expresses a validity of a social order that is often described as having the “right to rule” (Buchanan/Keohane 2006: 405) or as carrying the belief that a rule “ought to be obeyed” (Hurd 1999: 381). This basic acknowledgement of the rightful exercise of authority is situated in “the context of a given stock of normative beliefs in a community” (Zürn et al. 2012: 83). In other words, it is based on “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574). This experience of rightful social validity leads to consenting on a status quo or a particular change thereof.

Based on the discussion above, this study understands legitimacy as an undercurrent in international relations and relations between ROs and IOs. In addition, this perspective fosters a conceptualization of legitimacy as a dynamic process better expressed as a practice of legitimacy which

*describes the political negotiation amongst the members of international society as they seek out an accommodation between those seemingly absolute values [that is: authority claims by institutions] and attempts to reconcile them with a working consensus to which all can feel bound (Clark 2005: 29f).<sup>5</sup>*

These practices facilitate the construction of strategies of legitimation embodied in the membership and conduct of organizations. All three may be termed as arguments, since legitimacy understood as a social practice needs to be “claimed, sustained, and recognized” and requires agency which involves both “the rulers and the ruled” (Zaum 2013: 10).<sup>6</sup>

4 In this respect, this understanding of legitimacy in (international) order shares a core concept with the recent politicisation literature in international relations (Zürn 2012; Zürn et al. 2012).

5 For a more elaborated and embedded understanding of practices as international social action see Adler/Pouliot (2011: 4): “practices are socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world.”

6 Note that labelling these logics as arguments does not presuppose an ideal speech situation that is free of



In conclusion, members of international society employ various legitimacy arguments as practices of legitimacy in order to communicate and justify the authority of their legitimacy claims vis-à-vis certain members of the international society that materialize in the establishment and certain design of organizations. These members may split in various audiences distributed either vertically (from below to the organization or downward from the organization) or horizontally (to other members not subject to the organization's hierarchical structure) in the organization's environment (Zaum 2013: 10-19). In turn, social scientist can detect these audiences and arguments and trace them to their grounds of validity or explore the consequences of their perceived validity. The latter approach will be employed in the study at hand.

## 2.2 Legitimacy and Three Mechanisms of Diffusion

For the purpose of this study, the complex interaction of legitimation between organizations and different national, regional, and international scenes is analyzed through the lens of three logics of social actions: the logic of expected consequences, the logic of appropriateness (see March/Olsen 1998), and the logic of arguing (Risse 2000). The study furthermore considers the findings on direct and indirect diffusion mechanisms, namely competition, lesson drawing, socialization, persuasion, and mimicry (Börzel/Risse 2011: 5-10). Taken together, three categories of practices of legitimacy or legitimation mechanisms can be identified (see Table 1).

Table 1: Categories of Practices of Legitimacy

Legitimacy Argument	Direct Mechanism	Indirect Mechanism
coercive legitimacy argument	<i>force of legal imposition</i>	
<i>'Herrschaft'</i>	legitimate use of force legal coercion	
functional legitimacy argument	<i>instrumental rationality</i>	<i>functional emulation</i>
<i>maximize the (own) anticipated legitimacy function – legitimacy-demand hypothesis</i>	Politicization / Gap Authority-Legitimacy Internal Norms Demand	(legitimacy) Competition Lesson Drawing
normative legitimacy argument	<i>normative or communicative rationality</i>	<i>normative emulation</i>
<i>acting in accordance with obligations carrying a social validity as rightful</i>	Socialization / Habitualization Persuasion	Mimicry

Source: Author, using Börzel/Risse (2011).

The first mechanism is the coercive legitimacy argument. Actors use these arguments either by virtue of the legitimate use of force or (legitimate) legal coercion mechanisms given to them. Yet, these arguments

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asymmetric power relations. In contrast, legitimacy enables and constrains power since it is "only within the context of power relations that legitimacy becomes relevant at all" (Clark 2005: 20). Therefore, it would be a mistake to assume that the working consensus as a result of a legitimation process "is somehow established and maintained in processes that are completely independent of the existing relations of power within the society" (Beetham 1991: 104). In fact, the practices of legitimacy as well as their resulting institutions reflect existing power relations.

will not be in the focus of the study at hand since the legitimate use of force to establish and design ROs is rarely observed in a society of sovereign members forming (most of) today's ROs. Legal coercion is more likely to occur within legal hierarchical systems, which are also mostly absent in today's ROs.

The second mechanism is the functional legitimacy argument. This logic can be deduced from the logic of expected consequences and applied to legitimacy theory. Actors employing these arguments use legitimacy beliefs to justify structures and practices embodied in the strategies of legitimation *because* they maximize the anticipated legitimacy of their own preferences against the arguments of their opponents. Accordingly, this practice of legitimacy can be seen as "negotiation among rational actors pursuing personal preferences or interests in circumstances in which there may be gains [of legitimacy] to coordinated action" (March/Olsen 1998: 949). These gains can be justified on the grounds of shared principles that carry a social validity as rightful and, therefore, further the validity of the actors themselves as rightful. In contrast to the pure logic of expected consequences, this approach also emphasizes informal, cultural values and norms besides shared interests as grounds for strategic actors to define standards of legitimacy and to act accordingly during the processes of cooperation. In doing so, this logic facilitates the production of a legitimate order "in the absence of an interest-based equilibrium or centralized enforcement" (Rittberger/Schimmelfennig 2006: 1159). In connection to the existing literature, one type of this kind of arguments can be understood as the legitimacy-demand hypothesis which summarizes the direct mechanism pertaining to the processes of politicization (see for example Zürn et al. 2012) or internal norms arguments (see for example Rittberger 2012). Functional legitimacy arguments can also include indirect mechanisms such as competition over legitimacy perceptions and lesson drawing.

The third mechanism is the normative legitimacy argument. This kind of practice of legitimacy is in line with the logic of appropriateness and arguing. Actors employing these arguments use legitimacy beliefs *because* they are "in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated, and accepted" (March/Olsen 1998: 952); hence, because they are widely perceived to carry an obligation rooted in their social validity as rightful. Direct mechanism of this strain of arguments may work through either normative rationality or communicative rationality. On the one hand, this involves a process of socialization which leads actors to voluntarily redefine their interests, values, and identities in order to meet social expectations given in a certain situation, and is often accompanied by social learning (see for example Checkel 2001) or habitualization. On the other hand, actors employing these arguments may have been involved in persuasion. They may act in an environment where a norm is contested and try to "adjudicate which norm applies" (Risse 2000: 6). Here, in contrast to socialization, "actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and [...] seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action" (Risse 2000: 7). Indirect mechanisms include arguments related to mimicry.

From an empirical perspective, all mechanisms may occur simultaneously, which poses a challenge to the research design. Yet, this does not rule out the possibility to hypothesize about the workings of these mechanisms and to differentiate between them not only theoretically, but also methodologically and analytically. Furthermore, (indirect) normative legitimacy arguments are better suited to showing the independent and significant effect of legitimacy in international society than functional (or coercive) legitimacy arguments. Legitimacy understood as the validity of (elements of) social order as rightful can best be seen in these

cases because of a validity *erga omnes* that is inherent to the status of the endorser and not based on self-interest or strategic calculation but judged content-independently.<sup>7</sup> Practices pertaining to socialization, learning, or even mimicry uncover therefore most effectively the underlying currents that legitimacy rests on in international society. Before applying some of the mechanisms to the empirical research on the establishment and design of RPIs, the paper will first address the understanding of RPIs as such.

### 3. Bringing Regional Parliamentary Institutions in

RPIs are transnational collegial organizations within a given, regionally confined geographical scope and with parliamentary principles of operation composed of at least some either directly or indirectly elected members. These organizations are understood as regional if they are located between the national and global scene – i.e., in a region defined as “*social constructions that make references to territorial location and to geographical or normative contiguity*” (Börzel/Risse 2016: 7, original emphasis). This definition builds on the various approaches elaborated by Sabic (2008), Cofelice (2012), Costa et al. (2013), and Rocabert et al. (2014). Yet, note that this study uses the terms IPIs and RPIs interchangeably. The term IPI is used when drawing connections to the existing literature, which consensually established this expression, and turns to RPIs when analyzing the institutions at hand from a regional perspective.

Firstly, IPIs are explicitly transnational institutions. This demarcates them from purely intergovernmental arrangements. Secondly, the introduced definition borrows from an organizational understanding of institutions, which provides several advantages (for an extensive elaboration see Cutler 2013). It allows attributing to the institutions an independent and significant effect (Ellis 2010) and it points the research design to the organization’s environment to search for causes determining the institutional design because – as a very basic proposition – the environment composed of its values and practices “enhances the social legitimacy of the organization or its participants” (Hall/Taylor 1996: 949). In addition, this understanding sets IPIs apart from hierarchical or bureaucratic organizations by assigning them a rather horizontal and deliberative practice of decision-making, which is more in line with the present perspective on legitimacy and its practices. Moreover, it avoids the pitfall of previous functional understandings defining IPIs on taken-for-granted sets of characteristics while simultaneously wanting to study “what they do” (Sabic 2008: 258). Thirdly, it relaxes some representational demands when opening the spectrum of institutions to directly as well as indirectly appointed or elected parliamentarians (that is, members of IPIs).


The definition at hand also provides the ground for developing a typology of RPIs (see Figure 1). Building on the works of Kissling (2011) and Cofelice (2012), the typology distinguishes between two disjunctive criteria: (1) election mode and (2) connection to a parent regional intergovernmental organization. The criterion “election mode” derives from membership as one cornerstone of the validity of social order as rightful since the validity of regional parliamentarians as rightful members of a regional society depends to

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<sup>7</sup> This has already been expressed in an understanding of legitimacy as “a general compliance of the people with decisions of a political order that goes beyond coercion or the contingent representation of interests” (Nanz/Steffek 2004: 315).

a significant extent on the mode of delegation that created them in the first place. The typology regards the election mode creating membership in RPIs as one value on the dependent variable and codes it nominally as elected either directly or indirectly. On the one hand, the legitimacy of directly elected parliamentarians of RPIs pertains to a practice of legitimacy rooted in *transnational* principles of legitimacy.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, the legitimacy of indirectly elected parliamentarians (mostly members of national legislatures) is characterized by a practice of legitimacy rooted in national principles of legitimacy. Since RPIs are understood as transnational organizations, a mode of delegation connected to transnational legitimacy practices is assigned a higher degree of legitimacy than a practice pertaining to national norms.

Figure 1: International Parliamentary Institutions – Typology, Classification, and “Incremental Pyramid”



Source: Author, using Cofelice (2012: 15, 26); Kissling (2011: 13-46).

The criterion “connection to a parent RO” derives from the conduct as the other cornerstone of legitimate regional order. In this typology, conduct is understood as the potential degree of rightful exercise of authority vis-à-vis a parent RO and is treated as one value on the dependent variable coded nominally as either having a connection or not. Theoretically, this treatment assigns RPIs connected to a parent RO a higher level of authority to issue legitimate outcomes than RPIs without a (official) connection to an RO. This assumption builds specifically on the works of Kissling (2011) and Cofelice (2012). Kissling distinguishes between two types of RPIs, International or Regional Parliamentary Organizations (RPOrganizations) and Parliamentary Organs of International or Regional Organizations (RPOrgans), based on their connection

<sup>8</sup> Defining this mode as something “beyond-national” already shows the deep-seated principles of legitimacy creating primary institutions such as sovereignty or nations/nationalism in contemporary international society; see Buzan (2004: 182-187).

to an IGO/RO. Additionally, each type also has one subtype: Inter-Parliamentary GRINGOs (Government Regulated and Initiated NGOs) and Regional Parliamentary Specialized Agencies (RPSAs), respectively. The former has no status of international personality, whereas the latter is characterized by free selection of member countries that does not necessarily correspond to membership in the parent RO.

Cofelice uses this differentiation and hypothesizes about an “incremental pyramid [...], where each layer [...] [the types of RPIs mentioned above] adds something to the functions and powers of the previous ones” (Cofelice 2012: 15). Therefore, the research design does not consider the effectiveness of RPIs on the ground but rather their potential efficacy vis-à-vis an RO. Consequently, it assigns RPIs with connections to a parent RO a higher degree of rightful authority than RPIs without such connection.

This typology employs a macro-institutional perspective with a nominally code grid. It is useful for preliminarily mapping the universe of cases and testing hypotheses at a first glance. A meso-institutional perspective, on the contrary, would enable the research design to elaborate more on the inner institutional dimensions of the dependent variables while still using membership and conduct as starting points. However, the focus of this paper rests on the macro-institutional level as a first step in research on legitimacy and RPIs.


## 4. A Global Diffusion of Regional Parliamentary Institutions?

### 4.1 *The Global Spread of Regional Parliamentary Institutions*

As a first step, the study codes 68 globally distributed RPIs that have been established since 1949 (see Table A4). The data mainly builds on Kissling (2011: 54-82) and own research. It leaves aside *issue-related* Inter-Parliamentary GRINGOs and interregional RPIs.

Figure 2 depicts the development of the selected organizations in time differentiated according to macro-regions. As a first finding, the number of RPIs globally demonstrates a rapid increase after 1989 (for a similar finding see Sabic 2008). This finding also holds for the developments in the specific macro-regions: first and foremost for Europe, but also for Asia and less intensively for the Americas. For Africa, there is a delay of about ten years leading to a rapid establishment of nine organizations in twelve years' time.


Figure 2: Number of Regional Parliamentary Institutions in Macro-Regions since 1949



Source: Author.

As Figure 3 shows, this development can also be observed with varying degrees for all types of RPIs.


Figure 3: Number of Types of Regional Parliamentary Institutions since 1949



Source: Author.

Additionally, and in more detail, the second finding also holds true for three elements of the two-dimensional dependent variable: indirect election mode, connection to an RO, and no connection to an RO (see Figure 4). Due to the very small number of cases, a valid statement concerning the direct election mode is not possible.

Figure 4: Development of the Number of RPIs with Indirect Election Mode and with and without Connections to ROs



Source: Author.

Moreover, the overall share of different types of RPIs has not changed significantly at least since the 1980s (see Table A1). In 1980, seven percent of all 14 existing RPIs were GRINGOs, about 21 percent RPOrganizations and RPSAs, and half of them RPOrgans. Ten years later, in 1990, the overall number increased to 21 RPIs, with RPOrganizations gaining a share of about 29 percent and RPSAs declining to about 14 percent – all other types staying roughly the same. Thus, the relative share of different types of RPIs among the overall 49 institutions in 2000 as well as among the 68 cases ten years later remains relatively similar as in 1980, with GRINGOs slightly increasing to 12 percent and RPOrgans decreasing to 44 percent. This finding indicates that supposed collective action problems demanding specific types of institutions did not change significantly during the general rapid increase of RPIs. Although there is a significant increase in numbers of all types of RPIs after 1989, no specific institutional setting responding to a certain collective action problem had been established disproportionately more often.

In conclusion, functional approaches referring to a rapid, substantial, and lasting increase in or change of global or regional collective action problems as an explanatory factor fall short of accounting for the

sudden growth in the number of RPIs after 1989. From a legitimacy perspective, these findings give rise to a first basic conjecture:

*It is the diffusion of norms requiring the establishment of regional parliamentary fora and not a sudden increase of specific collective action problems that triggers the global spread of RPIs.*

These norms triggering the global spread of RPIs prescribe the enlargement of the range of audiences that have an indirect or direct legitimate voice in talk, decisions, and actions in regional integration schemes. The audiences can be located on a vertical dimension of the RO (parliamentarians or constituencies) or horizontally (other RPIs or organizations in the same or different region). In the same line, the practices of legitimacy accompanying this spread of norms may pertain to either functional legitimacy arguments or normative legitimacy arguments. On the one hand, functional arguments require actors to establish RPIs as strategies of legitimation on the basis of shared legitimacy beliefs *because* this maximizes the anticipated legitimacy of their own preferences vis-à-vis the arguments of their opponents (legitimacy-demand). On the other hand, normative arguments speak to a diffusion of principles of legitimacy requiring actors to establish RPIs *because* they are appropriate and in accordance with the norms of the regional and international society which are widely perceived to carry an obligation rooted in their social validity as rightful. The next section builds on this finding and uses the typology of RPIs developed above to elaborate two hypotheses referring to either functional or normative legitimacy arguments.

#### *4.2 Hypotheses: Two Legitimacy Arguments*

By mapping all cases according to the two theoretically deduced values of the dependent variable, one can identify substantial variation, as Figure 5 shows. Firstly, most cases (93 percent) are located on the “indirectly elected” dimension, of which over half (63 percent) are also connected to or officially affiliated with an RO. There are no RPIs that have been directly elected and are not connected to or affiliated with an RO. Yet, there are five cases (seven percent) of RPIs connected to an RO and elected directly.



Figure 5: Empirical Distribution of RPIs According to Types

Election Mode		Connection to RO
Indirect Election	Direct Election	
Regional Parliamentary Organs (RPOrgans) N= 30 (44%)		Yes N= 45 (66%)
Indirect Election N= 26	Direct Election N= 4	
Regional Parliamentary Specialized Agencies (RPSAs) N= 15 (22%)		
Indirect Election N= 14	Direct Election N= 1	
Regional Parliamentary Organizations (RPOrganizations) N= 15 (22%)		No N= 23 (34%)
Indirect Election N= 15	Direct Election N= 0	
Transregional Networks of Parliamentarians / Inter-Parliamentary GRINGOs N= 8 (12%)		
Indirect Election N= 8	Direct Election N= 0	
Indirect N= 63 (93%)		
Direct N= 5 (7%)		

Source: Author.

This leads to the conclusion that the two values of the dependent variable are empirically connected. It appears to give rise to a functional legitimacy argument: the higher the level of competences of an institution, the higher the demand for actors to legitimize it with members chosen on the basis of a higher legitimacy norm. This proposition is strongly supported by the finding that there are no RPIs with direct election modes but no connections to an RO. Yet, this effect is only very small for RPIs that are connected to an RO and directly elected (eleven percent). Additionally, the variable only measures the competences of an RPI vis-à-vis an affiliated RO on a nominal scale. To validate this finding, the research design needs to employ a more fine-grained scale to measure the actual competences of the RPI that has connections to an RO as an explanation for its election mode (see next section). Cases with a high value in this regard should have a higher likelihood to be designed according to functional legitimacy arguments. Cases that do not fall into this category are more likely to be explained by normative legitimacy arguments. Consequently, this finding gives rise to a second basic conjecture:

*The variation of the institutional design of RPIs can be explained with different legitimacy arguments for institutionalized regional integration.*

Accordingly, the first variable of interest is the depth of integration in a specific regional society. This variable builds on several institutions such as sovereignty, nationalism as well as transnationalism and multilateralism (Buzan 2004: 182-186). The more a regional society pursues deep integration, the more it will need to relax its principles of legitimacy pertaining to sovereignty and nationalism and emphasize more and more the norms of transnationalism or supra-nationalism. In order to express the validity of this process of integration as rightful and to properly take into account the new competences of its parliamentary organization, the society will have a demand to adapt its strategies of legitimation embodied in RPIs. Therefore,

the first hypothesis builds on the findings derived from the mapping of all types of RPIs on the theoretically deduced typology (connection between election mode and competences). It is informed by a functional legitimacy argument stating a legitimacy demand to design RPIs connected to ROs according to the level of integration of the prevailing RO in the region. The hypothesis rests on the assumption that actors creating these kinds of RPIs employ this organizational structure because it maximizes the anticipated legitimacy of their own preferences against the arguments of their opponents.

*H1<sub>1</sub>: Types of RPIs with an official connection to an RO and/or elected on the basis of direct suffrage are more often connected to ROs with predominantly supranational characteristics.*

*H0<sub>1</sub>: The supranational characteristics of an RO are independently distributed across the types of RPIs connected to an RO.*

The second variable of interest is the national regime type prevailing in the regional society. This variable builds on the institution of nationalism and, more precisely, on democracy and popular sovereignty (Buzan 2004: 184f). It intersects with direct functional and normative legitimacy arguments. On the one hand, the hypothesis expresses a demand for a certain type of institution in a region based on a perceived gap between an RO's authority and its legitimacy or an internal demand by parliamentarians, for example. On the other hand, it describes a process of socialization that leads actors to design RPIs in accordance with their own prevailing regional norms. From a functional legitimacy perspective, the hypothesis rests on the assumption that governmental or parliamentary actors as well as the concerned public demand a specific organizational design that fits the RPI's or its corresponding RO's competences with the prevailing (democratic) national institutions. In this sense, it assumes a legitimacy demand because this design maximizes the anticipated individual preferences of the actors that are informed and shaped by national regime types. From a normative legitimacy perspective, the hypothesis rests on the assumption that actors shaping the design of RPIs use and refer to legitimate national norms of political institutions they have been socialized in and, hence, regard it as appropriate to employ them in similar contexts. Therefore, it assumes that national regime types socialize and condition actors, and that these actors employ national norms when arguing in favor of a specific RPI design or use them because they are widely accepted or even habitualized in their national and regional environment.

*H1<sub>2</sub>: The more the prevailing regime type in a regional society tends to parliamentary democracy, the more the RPI in that region tends to be directly elected and to gain more authority by the virtue of being connected to an RO.*

*H0<sub>2</sub>: The prevailing regime type in a regional society is independently distributed across the types of RPIs.*

The last variable of interest is trade in a specific region (Buzan 2004: 183f). The intensity of trade serves as a control variable for the theoretical construct of a region focusing on the density of trade interactions in a specific region. It rests on the assumption that a region is characterized by transnational interactions of various kinds, which is, partially, reflected in its trade relations. In so doing, this variable helps to eliminate outlier regions with small (trade) interaction as well as regions with a (comparatively) extremely high interaction. Regions with almost only intra-regional trade and a low dependence on extra-regional trade

may have a lower likelihood of exhibiting diffusion of legitimacy norms. In contrast, regions with a very low intra-regional trade interaction may not qualify for the theoretical construct of a (at least somewhat integrated) region at all.

*H1<sub>control</sub>*: Types of RPIs with an official connection to an RO and/or elected on the basis of a direct universal suffrage tend to be more distributed across cases with a high intra-regional trade index.

*H0<sub>control</sub>*: The intra-regional trade index of an RPI is independently distributed across the types of RPIs.

In order to test these hypotheses, the study applies simple cross-tabulation and the Fisher's exact test to determine significance levels. The Fisher's exact test is chosen because for some of the pairs the conditions for a Chi-square-test with a cell frequency of  $f_{ij} > 5$  are not fully met. The test is run in STATA and always returns the two-tailed p-value; the significance level is set at a p-value of  $\alpha \leq 0.05$ .

### 4.3 Empirical Findings

The data for the first variable (depth of integration) and the first hypothesis are taken from Hooghe/Marks (2015), Lenz (2013), and own research. For the purpose of this research design, the data is transformed into an ordinal scale measuring the competences of ROs, with zero being the lowest level and two the highest. The cases are then tabulated according to the two empirical types of RPIs that H1<sub>1</sub> relates to, that is all RPOrgans and RPSAs as well as a separated calculation for directly and indirectly elected RPIs.

The data provides no support for H1<sub>1</sub> and functional legitimacy arguments stating a demand to legitimize RPIs based on higher legitimacy norms because of supranational competences of the parent RO. That is to say, considering all 45 cases that H1<sub>1</sub> relates to, there is no statistically significant relation between the level of authority of an RO and the institutional design of RPIs (election mode and general competences vis-à-vis the RO). The two-tailed Fisher's exact returns a p-value of 1.00 for the two different types and 0.262 for the election mode (see Tables 2 and 3, significance level  $\alpha \leq 0.05$ ), which provides no grounds to reject H0<sub>1</sub> and thus does not further support H1<sub>1</sub>. Therefore, the distribution of all types of ROs with different levels of integration is independent from the distribution of RPIs according to the institutional design. These findings also hold for all RPIs established after 1989 (p-value: 0.663 and 0.607 – see Tables 4 and 5). Yet, this finding does not state that direct functional legitimacy arguments have never come into play. For the cases studied, they are just not statistically significant to explain the distribution and may cover up other (indirect or normative) legitimacy arguments. Additionally, this mapping may facilitate the selection of RO cases with a low degree of authority and thus assist further research into the possible influences of these practices of legitimacy pertaining to diffusion.

The data for the second variable (regime type) and the second hypothesis build on the database of the democracy indicator from Cheibub et al. (2010) and own research. The dataset identifies the membership of all RPIs and assigns each state a value for regime type on a five-digit ordinal scale ranging from parliamentary democracy to military dictatorship. The median for all member states indicates the regime type

value for the region (and RPI). Note that this does not assess the democratic quality of the RPI (and RO) but rather the prevailing quality of democracy of national regimes in the region according to the variables enumerated above. Therefore, it is an indicator of prevailing (democratic) norms in the region, which should (from a theoretical perspective) predict the institutional design of an RPI via (functional and normative) practices of legitimacy.

*Table 2: Depth of Integration of RO Distributed across RPI Types*

	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
RPOrgan	14	13	3	30
RPSA	8	6	1	15
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>45</b>

**0** = low; **1** = medium; **2** = high

Fisher's exact p-value: 1.00

Source: Author.

*Table 3: Depth of Integration of RO Distributed across Election Mode*

	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
Direct	1	3	1	5
Indirect	21	16	3	40
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>45</b>

**0** = low; **1** = medium; **2** = high

Fisher's exact p-value: 0.262

Source: Author.

*Table 4: Depth of Integration of RO Distributed across RPI Types after 1989*

	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
RPOrgan	10	10	1	21
RPSA	8	4	0	12
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>33</b>

**0** = low; **1** = medium; **2** = high

Fisher's exact p-value: 0.663

Source: Author.

*Table 5: Depth of Integration of RO Distributed across Election Mode for RPIs after 1989*

	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
Direct	1	2	0	3
Indirect	17	12	1	30
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>33</b>

**0** = low; **1** = medium; **2** = high

Fisher's exact p-value: 0.607

Source: Author.

The mapping of the regime types and statistical analysis also refutes  $H_{1_2}$  since there is no reason to reject  $H_{0_2}$ . The clustering of regions with prevailing civilian and military dictatorships that have RPIs with a high degree of authority clearly speaks against internal norms, (direct) functional legitimacy arguments as well as socialization or habitualization arguments as explanations of a significant effect for the macro distribution of the institutional design. This statement is supported by the two-tailed p-values of Fisher's exact (0.416 and 0.445, see Tables 6 and 7). The distribution of various types of regimes across the types of RPIs does not significantly deviate from the expected standard distribution of all cases across the types of RPIs. Moreover, this also holds for all RPIs established after 1989 (p-value: 0.652 and 0.497 see Tables 8 and 9). Yet, this finding shows that direct normative legitimacy arguments may also cover up indirect arguments.

*Table 6: Regime Type Distributed across RPI Types*

	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
RPOrgan	9	6	5	6	4	30
RPSA	6	4	3	2	0	15
RPOrganization	1	3	6	4	1	15
GRINGO	2	3	3	0	0	8
<b>Grand Total</b>	18	16	17	12	5	68

**0** = Parliamentary Democracy; **1** = Mixed Democracy; **2** = Presidential Democracy; **3** = Civilian Dictatorship; **4** = Military Dictatorship

Fisher's exact p-value: 0.416

Source: Author.

*Table 7: Regime Type Distributed across Election Mode*

	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
Direct	1	0	3	1	0	5
Indirect	17	16	14	11	5	63
<b>Grand Total</b>	18	16	17	12	5	68

**0** = Parliamentary Democracy; **1** = Mixed Democracy; **2** = Presidential Democracy; **3** = Civilian Dictatorship; **4** = Military Dictatorship

Fisher's exact p-value: 0.445

Source: Author.

*Table 8: Regime Type Distributed across RPI Types after 1989*

	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>Grand Total</b>
RPOrgan	4	4	4	6	3	21
RPSA	4	4	2	2	0	12
RPOrganization	1	2	2	4	0	9
GRINGO	1	2	3	0	0	6
<b>Grand Total</b>	10	12	11	12	3	48

**0** = Parliamentary Democracy; **1** = Mixed Democracy; **2** = Presidential Democracy; **3** = Civilian Dictatorship; **4** = Military Dictatorship

Fisher's exact p-value: 0.652

Source: Author.

Table 9: Regime Type Distributed across Election Mode for RPIs after 1989

	0	1	2	3	4	Grand Total
Direct	0	0	2	1	0	3
Indirect	10	12	9	11	3	45
<b>Grand Total</b>	10	12	11	12	3	48

0 = Parliamentary Democracy; 1 = Mixed Democracy; 2 = Presidential Democracy; 3 = Civilian Dictatorship; 4 = Military Dictatorship

Fisher's exact p-value: 0.497

Source: Author.

The data for the third, control variable (trade intensity) is aggregated from the Regional Integration Knowledge System (RIKS) database published by UNU-CRIS (De Lombaerde/Van Langenhove 2005). In order to measure trade intensity, the study uses the Intra-regional trade intensity index (ITII), which is the ratio of the intra-regional trade share to the region's share in the world's total trade. The index determines whether the intra-regional trade share is greater or smaller than would be expected based on the region's overall trade share in world trade. An index below '1' indicates a lower intensity and importance of the intra-regional trade than the intensity of the region's trade with the rest of the world. Accordingly, an index above '1' indicates that intra-regional trade is more important and intense compared to the extra-regional trade flows. This indicator is employed to neutralize the varying geographical and economic size of the regions. The study transforms all metrical values of the index into a five-digit ordinal scale<sup>9</sup> and tabulates them with all cases.

The mapping shows a substantial variation of intra-regional trade intensity across all types of RPIs. Therefore, this mapping provides the study with an understanding (to at least some extent) of the density of regional society from the perspective of trade. In addition, treating the trade of a regional society as a control variable is justified since there is no significant relation between the intra-regional trade intensity and the institutional design of RPIs as the one-tailed Fisher's exact test returns p-values of 0.559 and 0.108 (see Annex for Tables A2 and A3).

## 5. Discussion

The analysis of the country-level variables (national regime type) as well as the functionally-informed variables (competences of parent ROs) shows that these factors are not statistically significant in explaining certain design features of RPIs. Although these factors may have some explanatory power in certain individual cases, the macro analysis of 68 globally spread cases provides a more complex and nuanced picture. This finding is particularly relevant in the light of the existing literature focusing on the development and empowerment of RPIs (see Cofelice 2012; Costa et al. 2013; Navarro 2010; Rocabert et al. 2014; Sabic 2008).

<sup>9</sup> The respective values are: 1 = 0,01-1,00; 2 = 1,01-5,00; 3 = 5,01-10,00; 4 = 10,01-100,00; 5 = >100,01.

Focusing on this explanatory gap, the observed significant increase of RPIs after 1989 might carry some explanatory power for specific design features of globally spread RPIs. This finding points to processes of diffusion among these particular kinds of ROs – that is, an inter-dependent decision-making process where the adoption and specific design of an RPI in a certain region is influenced by other regions that earlier created specific types of RPIs (see in general Risse 2016). From this perspective, the establishment and specific design of an RPI is neither independent from its regional environment and other RPIs that have been established globally, nor only influenced by inherent characteristics of its very own region, as the analysis of national regime types or the ROs' competences shows.

The variables and mechanisms studied in this paper are established and powerful explanations in the literature. Yet, the finding on potential interdependent decision-making procedures in the design of RPIs offers only first tentative conclusions that call for more in-depth research. In this sense, this paper highlights the need for a more nuanced analysis of the development of organizational design features that RPIs possess. However, this paper does not provide a complete conceptualization and research design to pursue a diffusion-based analysis of organizational design features within the context of regionally organized parliaments. Nonetheless, the developed typology proved to be a useful tool to study the different design features of RPIs. It joins findings from previous research (Cofelice 2012; Kissling 2011) and makes them applicable to the IPI literature on causes of organizational designs. A further development of this typological understanding promises to be fruitful for a more in-depth study of RPIs' design features. Additionally, as the conceptual part has shown, specific attention should be paid to the inherent quality of legitimacy that is incorporated in the specific legitimacy nexus of this kind of parliamentary organizations, as Sabic (2008) already mentioned in early research.

## 6. Conclusion

This paper starts with the observation that purely functionalist approaches have a hard time explaining the emergence and the institutional design of RPIs. Therefore, the first part provides a theoretical framework to analyze organizational designs of RPIs by assembling existing theoretical building blocks concerned with an institutional legitimacy perspective and concludes on the working mechanisms of legitimacy as an underlying current inherent in regional societies. Moreover, it shows that various sets of practices of legitimacy lead to strategies of legitimation that are embodied in the institutional design of RPIs. In this vein, RPIs provide an influential case to show the underlying working mechanisms of legitimacy for international institutions. They also represent a typical case for the analysis of legitimacy in IOs because it is possible to isolate purely functional, collective action problem-solving explanations as well as – due to their wide variation in cases – internal norms arguments. RPIs may have weak influences in the regional arena, but exactly that and their genuine parliamentary working mode pave the way to observing the effects of legitimacy beliefs they embody in their institutional design.

With this in mind, the second empirical part observes a rapid global spread of RPIs after 1989, which gives rise to a conjecture about the global diffusion of legitimacy norms prescribing the establishment of RPIs – that is, the widening of a legitimate audience in the regional society and regional integration schemes. The

subsequent analysis of 68 globally spread RPIs rejects internal and functional legitimacy arguments as sole explanations for the design of these organizations. In addition, the findings also support the basic conjecture about the diffusion of legitimacy norms concerning RPIs, since their emergence after 1989 indicates processes of inter-dependent creation and development of these kinds of ROs. This data helps to isolate cases that may be best explained with processes of socialization, learning, and mimicry (or short: types of diffusion) which show most effectively the workings of legitimacy in organizations.

The purpose of this paper has been to provide an analysis of factors causing the development and influencing some design features of RPIs. In so doing, it has highlighted the weaknesses of the existing (mostly) functional as well as country-level perspectives and has provided some building blocks for a diffusion- and legitimacy-based approach. This analysis aims at raising awareness for new paths in the research program on RPIs. Additionally, this research supports these aims by providing a newly compiled dataset on 68 reasonably selected, globally spread organizations that offers a more nuanced picture on RPIs from a global perspective and can be amended for further research purposes.



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## Annex

Table A1: Share of Types of RPIs According to Cohort

Year/Type	GRINGO	RPOrganization	RPSA	RPOrgan	Grand Total
until 1960	0 %	0 %	50 %	50 %	4
until 1970	11.11 %	22.22 %	33.33 %	33.33 %	9
until 1980	7.14 %	21.43 %	21.43 %	50.00 %	14
until 1990	9.52 %	28.57 %	14.29 %	47.62 %	21
until 2000	15.22 %	21.74 %	21.74 %	41.30 %	46
until 2010	11.76 %	22.06 %	22.06 %	44.12 %	68

Source: Author.

Table A2: Intra-regional Trade Intensity Index Distributed on RPI-Type

	1	2	3	4	5	Grand Total
RPOrgan	3	14	6	2	5	30
RPSA	1	10	0	2	2	15
RPOrganization	2	8	2	3	0	15
GRINGO	0	6	1	1	0	8
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>68</b>

1 = 0,01-1,00; 2 = 1,01-5,00; 3 = 5,01-10,00; 4 = 10,01-100,00; 5 = >100,01

Fisher's exact p-value: 0.559

Source: Author.

Table A3: Intra-regional Trade Intensity Index Distributed on Election Mode

	1	2	3	4	5	Grand Total
Direct	0	1	1	2	1	5
Indirect	6	37	8	6	6	63
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>68</b>

1 = 0,01-1,00; 2 = 1,01-5,00; 3 = 5,01-10,00; 4 = 10,01-100,00; 5 = >100,01

Fisher's exact p-value: 0.108

Source: Author.

Table A4: List of Globally Distributed Regional Parliamentary Institutions in the Dataset

No.	NAME of the RPI	RO connected to, affiliated, mostly working with (excluding Inter-Parliamentary Institutions)	Type	Election Mode	Year established	Integration	Regime Type	Trade
1	ACP Consultative Assembly (ACP-CA)	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP (Group))	RPOrgan	indirect	2005	0	2	3
2	ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA)	Cotonou Agreement	RPSA	indirect	2003	0	2	2
3	African Parliamentary Union (APU)	African Union (AU), African Economic Community (AEC)	RPOrganiza-tion	indirect	1999	---	3	3
4	Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPU)	League of Arab States	RPOrganiza-tion	indirect	1974	---	4	4
5	Arab Transitional Parliament (ATP)	League of Arab States	RPOrgan	indirect	2005	1	4	4
6	ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA)	Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)	RPOrganiza-tion	indirect	2007	---	3	4
7	Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum (APPF)	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Pacific Island Forum, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC)	GRINGO	indirect	1993	---	2	2
8	Asian Forum of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (AFPPD)	---	RPOrganiza-tion	indirect	1981	---	2	2
9	Asian -Pacific Parliamentarians' Union (APPU)	---	RPOrganiza-tion	indirect	1965	---	2	2
10	Asian Parliamentary Assembly (APA)	---	RPOrganiza-tion	indirect	2006	---	3	2
11	Assemblée parlementaire de la Francophonie (APF) / Francophone Parliamentary Assembly	Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)	RPSA	indirect	1967	2	2	1
12	Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP)	Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)	RPSA	indirect	1996	0	0	5
13	Association of Pacific Island Legislatures (APIL)	---	RPOrganiza-tion	indirect	1981	---	1	1
14	Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians*	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)	GRINGO	indirect	1992	---	0	4
15	Baltic Assembly (BA)	Baltic Council of Ministers (BCM)	RPSA	indirect	1991	0	0	2
16	Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC)	Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)	RPSA	indirect	1991	0	0	2

17	Barents Parliamentary Conferences	Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR)	GRINGO	indirect	1997	---	1	2
18	CEMAC Parlement Communautaire / CEMAC Community Parliament (CEMAC-CP)	Communaute Economique et Monetaire d'Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) / Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa	RPOrgan	indirect	2010	1	4	5
19	Cetinje Parliamentary Forum	Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe (SEE)	RPOrganisation	indirect	2004	---	1	3
20	Comite Interparlementaire de l'Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine / UEMOA Interparliamentary Committee (UEMOA-IC)	Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) / West African Economic and Monetary Union	RPOrgan	indirect	1998	1	2	5
21	Committee of Members of Parliament of the EFTA Countries (CMP) – advisory	European Free Trade Association (EFTA)	RPOrgan	indirect	1977	0	0	1
22	Committee of Members of Parliament of the EFTA States Party to EEA (MPS) – consultative	European Free Trade Association (EFTA)	RPOrgan	indirect	1994	0	0	1
23	Conference des organes specialises dans les affaires communautaires et europeennes des Parlements de l'Union europeenne (COSAC)	European Union (EU)	RPOrgan	indirect	1989	2	0	2
24	Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR)	Arctic Council	RPSA	indirect	1993	0	1	2
25	Conference of Speakers of the European Union Parliament*	European Union (EU)	GRINGO	indirect	1963	---	0	2
26	Conference of Speakers of West African Parliaments*	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	GRINGO	indirect	1999	---	2	3
27	Conseil Consultatif de l'Union du Maghreb Arabe / Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union	Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) / Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)	RPOrgan	indirect	1989	0	4	2
28	Conseil interparlementaire consultatif de Benelux / Benelux Consultative Interparliamentary Council (Benelux Parliament)	Benelux (Benelux Economic Union)	RPSA	indirect	1955	1	0	2

29	East African Legislative Assembly of the East African Community (EALA)	East African Community (EAC)	RPOrgan	direct	2001	1	3	5
30	EEA Joint Parliamentary Committee (EEA-JPC)	European Economic Area (EEA)	RPOrgan	indirect	1994	1	0	2
31	Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA)	Union for the Mediterranean	RPSA	indirect	2004	1	1	2
32	European Parliament (EP) (of the European Union)	European Union (EU)	RPOrgan	direct	1976	2	0	2
33	European Conference of Residents of Parliaments*	Council of Europe (CoE)	GRINGO	indirect	1988	---	1	2
34	Forum of Portuguese Speaking Parliaments (FPLP)	Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)	RPOrgan-ization	indirect	1998	---	2	1
35	GUAM Parliamentary Assembly (GUAM-PA)	GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development	RPOrgan	indirect	2004	0	1	3
36	IGAD Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU-IGAD)*	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)	RPSA	indirect	2007	1	3	5
37	Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States (IPA-CIS)	Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	RPOrgan	indirect	1992	0	3	2
38	Interparliamentary Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community (IPA EurAsEC)	Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)	RPOrgan	indirect	2000	0	3	2
39	Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (IAO)	---	GRINGO	indirect	1993	---	1	2
40	Interparliamentary Committee on the Dutch Language Union (NTU)	Dutch Language Union (NTU)	RPOrgan	indirect	1980	0	1	2
41	Inter-Parliamentary Forum of the Americas (Foro Interparlamentario de las Américas, FIPA)	Organization of American States (OAS)	GRINGO	indirect	2001	---	2	2
42	NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA)	NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)	RPSA	indirect	1955	1	0	2

43	Network of Parliamentarians of the Economic Community of Central African States (REPAC)	Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)	RPOrgan	indirect	2002	1	4	5
44	Network of Parliamentary Committees for Woman and Men in the European Union (NCEO), (CCEO)	European Union (EU)	RPOrgan	indirect	1997	2	0	2
45	Nordic Council	Nordic Cooperation	RPOrgan	indirect	1952	0	0	3
46	OECS Assembly	Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States	RPOrgan	indirect	2010	1	0	5
47	OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE-PA)	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)	RPOrgan	indirect	1991	1	1	2
48	PACE enlarged debate on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (PACE-OECD)	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)	RPOrgan	indirect	1962	1	0	2
49	Pacific Parliamentary Assembly on Population and Development (PPAPD)	Pacific Island Forum (PIF)	RPOrgan	indirect	1997	---	0	2
50	Pan-African Parliament (PAP)	African Union (AU)	RPOrgan	indirect	2004	1	3	3
51	Parlamento Amazónico / Amazonian Parliament	Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO)	RPOrgan	indirect	1989	---	2	2
52	Parlamento Andino (Parlandino) / Andean Parliament	Comunidad Andino (CAN) / Andean Community	RPOrgan	direct	1979	1	2	4
53	Parlamento Centroamericano (Parlacen) / Central American Parliament	Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA) / Central American Integration System	RPSA	direct	1991	1	2	4
54	Parlamento del MERCOSUR (Parlasur) / MERCOSUR Parliament	Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR)	RPOrgan	direct	2006	0	2	3
55	Parlamento Latinoamericano (Parlatino) / Latin American Parliament	Comunidad Latinoamericana de Naciones (CLAN)	RPOrgan	indirect	1964	---	2	2
56	Parliament of the Economic Community of West African States (Community Parliament)	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	RPOrgan	indirect	2000	1	2	3
57	Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (PA-CPLP)	Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)	RPOrgan	indirect	2007	0	1	1



58	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)	Council of Europe (CoE)	RPOrgan	indirect	1949	1	1	2
59	Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM)	---	RPOrgan-ization	indirect	2006	---	2	2
60	Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC)	Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)	RPSA	indirect	1993	0	1	2
61	Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty (PA-OCST)	Organization of the Collective Security Treaty (OCST)	RPOrgan	indirect	2006	0	3	2
62	Parliamentary Assembly of the Russia-Belarus Union State	Union State (of Russia and Belarus)	RPOrgan	indirect	1997	0	3	2
63	Parliamentary Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe (SEE)	South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECF)	RPSA	indirect	2008	0	1	2
64	Parliamentary Dimension of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII)	Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII)	RPSA	indirect	2001	0	0	2
65	Parliamentary Dimension of the Central European Initiative (CEI)	Central European Initiative (CEI)	RPOrgan	indirect	1990	0	1	2
66	Parliamentary Union of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference Member States (PUIC)	Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC)	RPOrgan-ization	indirect	1999	---	3	2
67	SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF)	Southern African Development Community (SADC)	RPSA	indirect	1993	1	3	4
68	South Caucasus Parliamentary Initiative (SCIP)	---	RPOrgan-ization	indirect	2003	0	1	4

\* Speakers' Conference

Source: Author.

### **The Kolleg-Forschergruppe - Encouraging Academic Exchange and Intensive Research**

The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) is a funding program launched by the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft - DFG) in 2008. As a Research College, it is intended to provide a scientifically stimulating environment for innovative research within a small group of senior and junior researchers.

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- The EU and Regional Institutions in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia
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