Measuring Statehood on a Sub-National Level

A Dialogue among Methods

Edited by Angela Heucher, Luisa Linke-Behrens, and Leon Schettler
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Abstract:
Statehood can vary greatly within and across countries. For this reason, we find it problematic that the national level most often serves as the main unit of analysis when measuring statehood, thereby neglecting the sub-national level. To address this shortcoming, the authors of this working paper present five options for measuring statehood on a sub-national level, asking: What are the advantages and disadvantages of different methods to measuring and comparing statehood on a sub-national level?

All contributions proceed in three steps, each discussing i) data sources, as well as methods for data collection and analysis, ii) illustrative examples, and iii) the advantages and challenges to each respective approach. While there is no silver bullet for collecting and analyzing data on statehood, we find that a combination of different methods is particularly promising for achieving more fine-grained results and a more complete picture of statehood on the sub-national level.

Zusammenfassung:
Staatlichkeit kann innerhalb und zwischen Ländern stark variieren. Deswegen finden wir es problematisch, dass die Messung von Staatlichkeit zumeist auf der nationalen Ebene ansetzt, wohingegen die sub-nationale Ebene vernachlässigt wird. Hieran anknüpfend stellen wir fünf Wege zur Messung von Staatlichkeit auf sub-nationaler Ebene vor und fragen: Was sind die Vor- und Nachteile verschiedener Methoden um Staatlichkeit auf sub-nationaler Ebene zu messen und zu vergleichen?

Alle Beiträge gehen dabei auf drei Aspekte ein: i) Datenquellen, sowie Methoden der Datenerhebung und -auswertung; ii) Anwendungsbeispiele, und iii) Vorteile sowie Herausforderungen des jeweiligen Ansatzes. Während es keinen Königsweg gibt um Daten zu Staatlichkeit zu sammeln und auszuwerten, erscheint uns gerade die Kombination verschiedener Methoden vielversprechend um Staatlichkeit auf sub-nationaler Ebene zu messen.
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1. Introduction

By Angela Heucher, Luisa Linke-Behrens, and Leon Schettler

The concept of statehood drives our understanding of and analytical approach to contemporary phenomena in International Relations (IR). Both practitioners and academics have delved into the topic of statehood, as is evident in the vast literature surrounding failing or failed states (Lambach/Bethke 2012; Rotberg 2003, 2004; Schneckener 2004; Zartman 1995). In this working paper, we build on the observation that consolidated states in the Westphalian sense are not the rule, but rather that areas of limited statehood are characteristic for most parts of the world (Risse 2011a). As statehood can vary immensely within official state boundaries, we base our research on territorial, social, and sectoral areas of limited statehood as units of analysis. In our understanding of statehood, we follow the definition set forth by the “Collaborative Research Center 700 – Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood”. Accordingly, two components are constitutive of statehood, namely (a) the ability to control the means of violence (henceforth: monopoly of force) and (b) the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions (henceforth: administrative capacity) (Draude et al. 2012; Risse 2007, 2012). Through this minimalistic conceptualization and the analytical distinction between statehood and governance, one can investigate governance activities by different types of actors including but not limited to the state (Krasner/Risse 2014; Risse 2011b).

The literature on measuring statehood is rich and draws on different data sources. Lee et al. (2014), for instance, use both the Political Instability Task Force’s (PITF) data set and data from the Institutional Profile Database (IPD) on fiscal capacity to capture challenges to the state’s monopoly on the use of force and to measure the ability to enforce rules and regulations, respectively. Schäferhoff relies on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) for evidence of the state’s monopoly on the use of force and as concerns basic administration (2013). Others employ indicators in the dimensions of coercive, extractive, and regulatory power (Soifer 2006, 2008; Soifer/vom Hau 2008). These analyses draw on different methods ranging from qualitative expert assessments (e.g. BTI and IPD) to annual, quantitative data (e.g. PITF). Overall, scholarly debates and attempts to measure statehood have proven quite fruitful and have furthered our understanding in this regard immensely. Yet, we see a challenge in “methodological nationalism” (Risse 2011a; Zürn 2002), with the national level most often acting as the main unit of analysis. This gives the misleading impression of a uniform presence of state authority across the entire territory, when, in fact, statehood can vary greatly within one country and across countries – which is why we find this trend problematic. While there are numerous research questions that can be addressed by drawing on national-level data, we also find that there are numerous research questions that cannot be answered comprehensively without explicitly taking the sub-

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1 This paper is the product of the workshop “Residual Statehood on a Sub-National Level and Governance by External Actors” in Berlin, November 13, 2015. The workshop took place at the Collaborative Research Center (SFB 700) “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood”, which is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). We thank the DFG for its continuous support. The authors further wish to thank Bernhard Metz (World Bank) for his valuable comments on early versions of the paper’s contributions.

2 Defined as “institutionalized modes of social coordination aiming at the provision of collectively binding rules and the delivery of services” Draude et al. (2012).
national level into account. In an attempt to overcome this shortcoming in the discussion on statehood, we discuss a variety of options for measuring statehood on a sub-national level in this working paper. In this respect, this paper seeks to answer the following research question: What are the advantages and disadvantages of different methods to measure and compare statehood on a sub-national level?

To answer this question, this working paper presents several ways to measure and compare statehood on the sub-national level, each developed and applied by researchers working at the Collaborative Research Center (for other approaches cp. Harbers 2015; Schäferhoff 2013; Soifer 2006). In doing so, we explicitly address the practical difficulties that arise with this task. Above all, reliable data on sub-national or even cross-regional degrees of statehood are a rarity, and their collection is inherently complex, especially as concerns issues of time, resources, territorial access, and security. But precisely because of these difficulties, we hold that reflecting upon which methods allow for analysis on the sub-national level – and which do not – is long overdue.

All five contributions develop their approach in three steps. First, they present the method used to measure statehood. This comprises the data sources and the methods for data collection, as well as methods for data analysis, with each contribution focusing on those methodical issues most relevant to their individual approach. The authors continue by illustrating their measurements with examples from their empirical research in areas of limited statehood. Finally, they discuss the advantages of and challenges to their approaches, reflecting upon that which their respective approaches allows them to observe of sub-national statehood. While all authors address these three aspects separately, some of the challenges can be overcome precisely by integrating or combining different methods. The contributions are ordered by the degree of aggregation, starting with the meso level and proceeding to the micro level. Eric Stollenwerk employs a quantitative measurement of statehood on the level of federal states in Nigeria, based on data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics on theft. Luisa Linke-Behrens presents an alternative quantitative measure of statehood, also using ACLED-data but drawing both on indicators different from those used by Stollenwerk and on data on the size of the public service from Tanzania’s National Bureau of Statistics. Angela Heucher and Leon Schettler conduct a qualitative content analysis of international organizations’ official documents and expert interviews, conducted at headquarter and country level, to explore organizational perceptions of statehood. Using geo-referenced data including satellite imagery, Lisa Pech highlights how a perspective from (high) above is able to unravel how land-use and statehood change in the Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finally, Tim Glawion contrasts the perspective from above with a bottom-up approach, using qualitative tools, such as participant observation and interviews in Somaliland and the Central African Republic.

This working paper, we believe, offers a rich and diverse menu of possibilities for measuring statehood on a sub-national level. Most importantly, this menu opens up unique pathways to further explore the relationship between statehood and governance. For example, we know that the degree of statehood and the degree of the provision of public goods and services do not correspond as strongly as has been asserted in the past – at least with regard to the national level (Lee et al. 2014). Yet, we do not know how this relationship manifests itself on the sub-national
or local level or which features of statehood might be most important for the effectiveness of alternative governance actors. In sum, this working paper strives to lay the groundwork for future multi-methodical research on measuring and comparing statehood in areas of limited statehood throughout the world.

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2. Measuring Statehood on the Sub-National Level in Nigeria

By Eric Stollenwerk

Statehood has been a key concept in the social sciences for many decades (see e.g. Lane 1979; Levi 1988; Tilly 1990). However, despite its prominent role, measuring statehood has remained a conceptual and methodological challenge (D’Arcy/Nistotskaya 2016; Hendrix 2010). Most of the commonly used statehood measurements focus on country-level data and thereby allow for important but limited perspectives on statehood (Bertelsmann Foundation 2016; Hendrix 2010; Lee et al. 2014; Teorell et al. 2016). Statehood has two components: the state’s ability to control the means of violence, and its ability to make and implement rules (cf. the definition of statehood in the introduction); however, degrees of statehood vary both between countries and within a nation. While one region of a country may display a fairly high level of statehood, other regions may display much lower degrees of statehood. Yet, there are hardly any measurements available that allow for sub-national assessment of statehood. This is particularly the case for areas of limited statehood and for quantitative data. This contribution to this working paper uses a quantitative approach to measure statehood on the sub-national level for Nigeria as an area of limited statehood. It introduces a new measure, which captures the degree of statehood for the different Nigerian federal states and thus allows for a look into the black box of the state, revealing sub-national statehood variation within Nigeria.

Areas of limited statehood present a particular challenge to measuring statehood on the sub-national level for at least two reasons. First, it has been noted in past research that data availability and quality in areas of limited statehood are often problematic (see Jerven 2013). Second, statehood on the sub-national level might shift significantly over time, for example due to violent conflicts that challenge the state’s monopoly of force (see Hagmann/Péclard 2011). Thus, capturing such changes adequately is another challenge to any data collection effort. Both challenges render measuring statehood on the sub-national level in areas of limited statehood complex but not impossible.

Nigeria is a most interesting case in point. Statehood patterns within Nigeria have shifted many times in the country’s history (Falola/Heaton 2008). The severe violent conflicts in some parts of the northern states, after introducing Sharia law in 2001, are one example where the state has lost or at least struggles to retain its monopoly of force in an entire region of the country (Ojie/Ewhrudjakpor 2009). The resettlement of Nigeria’s capital city from Lagos to Abuja in 1991, with the intention to create a more effective, legitimate, and inclusive state apparatus in a central location for all Nigerians, is another example of how Nigeria has been and still struggles to achieve consolidated statehood (Falola/Heaton 2008). Based on these examples and despite obstacles to capturing statehood sub-nationally, it is necessary to continue consistent data collection and analysis efforts – not only because there is a scientific and practical need to generate the best data possible, while simultaneously acknowledging its shortcomings, but also because it is important to be able to underline and point out such flaws in the data and
thus to strive for improvements. Next, the data and methods applied for this contribution will be introduced, followed by an illustration of examples of possible applications and analysis of the data. Lastly, the advantages of the presented approach and the challenges that remain will be discussed.

2.1 Methods and Data Sources

To measure the degree of statehood of the 36 Nigerian federal states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), data has been taken from two sources: The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2010) to capture the monopoly of force and the National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria (NBS) (Federal Republic of Nigeria NBS 2012) to assess the administrative capacity of the individual federal states.

While ACLED codes a wide range of events of political violence \(^3\), including their location, time, the interacting parties involved\(^4\), and the type of event\(^5\), only indicators that take violent conflicts into account, which threaten the state’s monopoly of force directly, were considered. While Linke-Behren’s contribution to this working paper also uses ACLED data, the measurement presented here is a stricter measurement of infringement of the monopoly of force. It is stricter, since it includes only battle types that challenge the state’s monopoly of force directly but excludes events of political violence that only potentially challenge the monopoly of force, as well as where ACLED information is deemed too vague to clearly categorize these events as an infringement of the state’s monopoly of force. Examples for data too vague for evaluation include protests where it is not clear whether such protests challenge the state’s monopoly of force. Also not included is the establishment of a headquarter by a non-state group, where it is equally unclear whether this has any effect on the state’s monopoly of force. While this approach allows for a clear point of determination as to which occurrences of violence should be included, it may not be suitable for all country contexts, where such acts of violence have, for example, not been recorded but where limitations of the monopoly of force still exist. For such cases, other selection criteria may have to be developed (see Linke-Behrens, in this paper). Thus, the monopoly of force is assessed through a negative proxy. In detail, three battle types have been included: 1. battle-non-state actor overtakes territory, 2. battle-no change of territory, and 3. battle-government regains territory. While the first two battle types are immediately plausible, since they capture conflicts where a non-state actor overtakes or tries to overtake territory from the state, the third battle type where the government regains territory

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3 A politically violent event is defined as “a single altercation where often force is used by one or more groups for a political end” (with some exceptions; Raleigh/Dowd 2016: 7).

4 In order to qualify as an actor, an organization must have an official name (with the exception of protesters/rioters) and a political purpose, i.e. direct their actions at political authority, and must use violence or protest for political means. Organizations must be cohesive, and their events must be connected with their political purpose. These actors include: governments, rebel groups, political militias, identity militias, protesters/rioters/civilians, and a category for “unidentified armed groups”. For definitions, see Raleigh/Dowd 2016.

5 The event types include: battles (no change of territory; non-state actor overtakes territory; government regains territory), headquarter or base established, strategic development, riots/protests, violence against civilians, non-violent transfer of territory, and remote violence. For definitions, see Raleigh/Dowd 2016.
requires some explanation. While the outcome of such a battle might signal consolidation of the state’s monopoly of force when projected into the future, it has still been included as a challenge to the state’s monopoly of force, since at the time of battle and prior to the battle, this territory either no longer belonged to the state or was at least in dispute. All three battle types have been considered and combined into one indicator measuring the monopoly of force as a negative proxy. To increase robustness, a mean value accounting for the last three years has been calculated for each year. A higher number of conflicts per year therefore signals a lower monopoly of force.

Effective administrative capacity as the second statehood component has been calculated using data from the Nigerian NBS, observing the number of vehicles stolen, the number of vehicles recovered, and the number of vehicles not recovered by the given federal state. The indicator was created by calculating the ratio of vehicles stolen to vehicles recovered by federal state. Again, to increase robustness, a mean value accounting for the last three years has been calculated, per year. This indicator is thought to reflect the administrative capacity of the federal states, since it not only shows their ability to record stolen vehicles but also those recovered, while keeping records of both. Thus, a higher ratio of vehicles recovered to vehicles stolen signals greater administrative capacity, since it also shows that laws against theft were successfully implemented.

The two single indicators for monopoly of force and administrative capacity have been combined into one equally weighted index to measure statehood by federal state. The index has been standardized to range from 0 to 1, with 0 signaling the lowest level of statehood and 1 the highest level possible. Consequently, values higher than 0.0 but lower than 0.9 indicate areas of limited statehood. The measurement is currently available for the years 2003 to 2009.

2.2 Application

The map of Nigeria displaying the level of statehood per federal state (see Figure 1) shows the wide variation of statehood one finds within Nigeria. While Edo state displays the highest level of statehood with a score of 0.83, Rivers shows the lowest level with 0.27. This is not only remarkable because it underlines the wide variation one finds within Nigeria with regards to statehood, but also because both states are located in southern Nigeria. Thus, even federal states in geographical proximity to one another may display very different levels of statehood. Besides those extreme values, two regions stand out: The Niger Delta region in the South as with the North of Nigeria exhibits many federal states with low levels of statehood. Both regions have been particularly plagued by long-lasting, violent conflicts. The Niger Delta has been affected by conflicts often connected to oil, other natural resources, and the control over these resources. The North has been affected by conflicts related to violent groups, such as Boko Haram (see Kingsley 2013). Besides the geographical variation, one also finds varying levels of statehood across time. For example, while the FCT’s level of statehood was at 0.48 in 2003, it increased to 0.65 in 2009. In the same time period, Bauchi’s level of statehood fell from 0.69 to 0.56.
Figure 2 reveals additional insight regarding statehood patterns, as it provides more detailed information on the distribution of statehood values among the federal states and allows for a more fine-grained analysis than Figure 1. No state in Nigeria reaches a score of 0.9 or higher (i.e. consolidated statehood), and in no federal state is the state completely absent (i.e. with a score of 0.0). In fact, most of the federal states range between 0.5 and 0.7 with regard to their respective levels of statehood. This further underlines the observation that only few federal states could be described as areas of extremely limited statehood, but that an equally low number of states reach high statehood values and come close to what could be considered a consolidated federal state. While limited statehood is pervasive in Nigeria, the degrees of statehood limitation vary immensely. Another interesting finding is the FCT score. Even though the FCT contains Abuja as the national capital and could therefore be expected to display a particularly high level of statehood, it in fact displays a mid-range level of statehood with a score of 0.65. Numerous other states show significantly higher levels of statehood.

Beyond these first applications, the data can potentially also be used for a wide range of other analyses. One example would be the inclusion of different degrees of statehood as a sub-national explanatory factor in complex regression analyses, such as multilevel modeling, in order to consider statehood’s effect on state legitimacy or governance effectiveness (see e.g. Hox 2010 on multilevel modeling). In sum, Figure 1 and 2 defy any notion of statehood as being...
generally on a low or high level within Nigeria. The country is neither monolithic nor constant over time, regarding its level of statehood. Sub-national variations of statehood exist within Nigeria and ought to be taken into account.

Figure 2: Statehood by federal state in Nigeria, 2009.
Source: Author’s illustration based on own statehood calculation with ACLED and NBS data.

2.3 Advantages and Challenges

The presented measure of statehood offers many advantages and potential for further research beyond its application to Nigeria. First, it helps to open up the black box of the national level of analysis and allows for examination below the national level, when analyzing statehood. It therefore creates a perspective that has often been overlooked or was previously hard to access. Second, the possible applications and use of such data are broad. The presented applications are only first suggestions and could, for example, be expanded to dynamic mappings of statehood over time. Third, the clear analytical definition of statehood and the indicators used could be applied to other country contexts. While the used ACLED data is available for numerous other countries, data from other national statistical offices would have to be gathered. However, capturing administrative capacity through data similar to the data used here is, in principal, also a possibility for other contexts (see Linke-Behrens in this paper for another measurement of administrative capacity).

Despite the insight and advantages this approach offers, several challenges remain. First, the quality and availability of data from areas of limited statehood may be problematic (Jerven 2009). For the data presented here, this mainly applies to the data of the NBS or data on administrative capacity, in general. While this is a valid point of criticism, there are ways to increase the reliability of the data at hand. The approach suggested here is to calculate the mean over time to increase robustness. Additionally, the data presented underwent qualitative reliability checks
through field research in Nigeria, and the results and mappings were discussed with Nigerian scholars and other experts on the topic. Through both field research and external review, the data generated was widely perceived to give a largely adequate picture of sub-national statehood patterns in Nigeria. Second, while breaking up national borders and looking below the state level is a highly relevant perspective, analyzing federal states shifts the problem to the next level, since federal states are also bound by their territorial borders (see also Linke-Behrens in this paper). Thus, even further disaggregation of levels of statehood on the sub-national and cross-national level is a desirable effort, achievable, for example, through more fine-grained quantitative data, qualitative approaches (see Glawion in this paper), or the use of satellite-image-driven methods (see Pech in this paper).

References


3. Combined Qualitative and Quantitative Data at the Sub-National Level

By Luisa Linke-Behrens

If statehood is defined as the monopoly of force and administrative capacity (see introduction), we can assume that these two components can arise in different configurations – a stronger or weaker monopoly of force may be paired with either stronger or weaker administrative capacity. States which hold the monopoly of force do not necessarily have the resources in terms of staff, money or infrastructure – to implement rules. Take China for example – a country whose government experiences great difficulty in implementing certain bodies of legislation, e.g. as concerns the environment, even though the government does not possess the monopoly of force. While it is difficult to imagine how a state could exhibit administrative capacity without possessing the monopoly of force, I contend that it is an empirical question whether higher administrative capacity can be paired with a lower monopoly of force. My research examines these variations.

One can certainly find different configurations of statehood when comparing countries by means of national data. Yet I believe, as do the co-authors of this working paper, that the analysis of the variation of statehood at the sub-national level promises more refined results. I therefore adopt a meso-level approach, using quantitative data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), which Stollenwerk introduced in the previous section, as well as data on the size of the public administration from the National Statistics Bureau Tanzania. I illustrate this measurement with examples from my research in mainland Tanzania. The next paragraphs explain the methods of data collection and analysis in more detail and illustrate these methods with examples from research on mainland Tanzania. I conclude with an assessment of the advantages and challenges which this approach entails.

3.1 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

First and foremost, the monopoly of force is operationalized as the control over the means of violence on state territory and is measured with the ACLED dataset, which codes events of political violence. In this context, political violence is defined as a single event where force is used by an actor with a political purpose or motivation (with some exceptions; Raleigh/Dowd 2016: 7). In contrast to Stollenwerk’s conservative measurement, I employ a broader operationalization of the monopoly of force, which includes categories beyond battles (cf. footnote 5). This choice was deliberately made with the case of Tanzania in mind, where no battles took place in recent years; but to say that the government’s monopoly of force is uncontested seems imprecise. The activities of the Al-Shabaab militia in the North of the country certainly interfere with the monopoly of force; heavily violent poachers and bomb attacks are equally clear in contesting the government’s rule, and milder forms of contestation, such as large-scale riots, lead to temporary loss of control by government authorities. I suggest that the mere inclusion of these types of events allows for a nuanced and adequate picture, not only in Tanzania but beyond this case as well (cf. Glawion, this paper). Most of the coded event types in the dataset challenge the monopoly of force, though not all. I exclude protests because they usually do not pose a
threat to the state’s monopoly of force. Events of violence against civilians are excluded, if the aggressor is a representative of the state itself, such as “police use tear gas to disperse Chadema supporters gathered for a peaceful political rally” (event 459TAZ; Raleigh et al. 2010). Strategic developments are included only if the initiating party is not the state itself. For example, police increasing security in Zanzibar after a grenade attack does not qualify as a challenge to the monopoly of force (event 457TAZ; Raleigh et al. 2010), although the actual attack does qualify (event 456TAZ; Raleigh et al. 2010).

Second, the operationalization of administrative capacity is a vexing challenge because many options rely on a measurement of some sort of governance (e.g. Rotberg 2004, 2013), or the data collection is highly difficult, as will be mentioned subsequently. To use a proxy for the regulatory aspect of law making and enforcement, I rely on the number of public officials in ratio to population size (National Bureau of Statistics Tanzania 2014). As Soifer (2008) has pointed out, measuring capacity or capability via resources available to the state, such as the number of police officers, soldiers, or tax collectors, or its financial resources, is one of the most widely used approaches. Furthermore, interviews with international actors hint at the importance of this indicator: the number of available staff was named one of the most important issues for developing guidelines, negotiating projects, and implementing national policy at the local level. While skill levels, political willingness, and financial resources are oftentimes an issue as well, the decisive factor seems to be the size of the administration. Besides, the measurement of skill level and political willingness is hardly possible beyond a micro-study.

### 3.2 Application

After aggregating the ACLED data events in mainland Tanzania from 2013 at the sub-national level, we see that the monopoly of force encounters the most challenges in the Arusha region, with ten events of political violence (see Figure 3). These events include several instances of violent extrajudicial justice by vigilante militias, two bomb attacks by an Islamist militia, and politically motivated riots clashing with the police. Eight events occurred in the Dar es Salaam region, five regions did not witness any kind of event (Katawi, Morogoro, Ruvuma, Shinyanga, and Singida regions), while one to five events occurred in all other regions. The severity of these events differs largely, ranging from the spontaneous eruption of riots with no fatalities to a nine-day long dismantlement of an Al-Shabaab training camp by the police, involving fighting and the rescue of almost 90 captives. By a measure of event numbers, the monopoly of force is relatively stable across the country, with the slight exception of Arusha, especially when compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries. For example, Sudan witnessed almost 1,000 events in 2013 with around 7,000 fatalities, although 2013 was admittedly an extreme year (Daoust 2015; Raleigh et al. 2010).

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6 Interviews with international organizations and donors in the field of public health were conducted in the course of a research stay in South Africa and Tanzania from January to March 2016.

7 2013 is the most recent year for which data on public officials in Tanzania are available; to ensure internal consistency of the indicator, all other data are also from 2013. All data are for mainland Tanzania, excluding Zanzibar. Please note that the results are preliminary.
In Mainland Tanzania, the distribution of public officials is extremely uneven when measured against the size of population (see Figure 4). In Katavi region, we find the most unfavorable ratio, with one public official per 303 inhabitants, while in Geita region, there is one public official per 31 inhabitants. In seven regions, the ratio lies between 1:102 and 1:165, and in the remaining 16 regions, it lies between 1:33 to 1:87. Given these strikingly large discrepancies, the assumption that the size of public service effectively translates into differing levels of assertiveness of rule seems justified. With such an unfavorable ratio of public officials to inhabitants as can be seen in the Katavi region, lawmaking and enforcement would need to be much more effectively organized than in the Geita region, in order to attain the same level of administrative capacity. This is highly unlikely, and the conclusion itself suggests that the level of administrative capacity of the Tanzanian authorities varies immensely between these two regions, as well as throughout the country.

**Figure 3: Events of political violence in Tanzania, per region, 2013.**
Source: Author’s own illustration based on ACLED.
When putting together the components of statehood, we see some interesting variation. There are cases where both components of statehood are at high levels. Morogoro region, for example, has one of the best ratios of public officials to inhabitants (1:33) and has not witnessed any event of political violence. Some other regions also follow this pattern. Then, there are two regions with relatively high law enforcement ability, albeit with some challenges to the monopoly of force. In the Arusha and Dar es Salaam regions, where most events of political violence occurred in 2013, the ratio of public officials to inhabitants is quite favorable (1:70 and 1:52, respectively). On the other hand, in the region with the most unfavorable ratio of public officials to inhabitants, not a single event of political violence has occurred (Katavi region). Finally, there are a few regions with a relatively unfavorable ratio of public officials to inhabitants with some events of political violence, such as the Rukwa region (1:108; three events) and Mtwara region (1:113; five events). What we see is that the level of statehood varies within Tanzania to quite an extent, and that the components of statehood can indeed come together to form different configurations.

3.3 Advantages and Challenges

Overall, I believe this approach is capable of delivering a fairly adequate picture of statehood and its variation throughout a state's territory, which circumvents national aggregation. However, the proxies and data sources pose a few challenges, which I will review here. First, the ACLED
data are collected from reports of (local) media or political actors and are thus biased toward areas that are in the interest of the public. On the upside, these data are very comprehensive and allow for analysis even at the village level. The soft operationalization that I have employed can be accused of blurring the dividing line between the monopoly of force and security governance; however, this approach does capture smaller, non-battle events that contest the monopoly of force – events which I consider to be equally important.

The most serious problem with the second indicator, i.e. the size of the public administration, is that similar ratios of public officials to inhabitants may not translate into similar levels of administrative capacity, since public officials may not be willing to act, possibly because of adverse incentives. They may also lack the necessary skills or the financial resources to carry out their tasks. This problem is especially aggravated in political systems where “everything is negotiable”. Large-scale, political corruption and everyday bribery seriously undermine the function of public service and may distort the validity of this indicator. Yet, staff is a highly important resource for the state in making and enforcing law and is one on which the proper functioning of the administration critically hinges. While by no means perfect, this indicator does make a very good impression on the administrative capacity of the state.

Turning to a more general discussion of such a meso-level approach, the most difficult challenge is arguably the substitution of one level of aggregation with another. While I criticize country-level analyses for overlooking important inner-country differences of statehood, the level of statehood may vary also within a given region. In other words, this approach is guilty of methodological sub-nationalism. However, I submit that it constitutes a viable compromise between country-level data – assuming uniformity throughout a state's territory, and thus potentially oversimplifying – and micro-level analyses at the very local level, with their problems of generalizability and data collection (see Glawion, this paper, for a different view). Settling on the meso-level is a way of avoiding the important pitfalls of both. This approach allows us to zoom in and assess statehood at the sub-national level. It also makes possible comparisons between levels and configurations of statehood within one country and even across countries.

References


4. International Organizations’ Perceptions of Statehood on a Sub-National Level: A Qualitative Approach

By Angela Heucher and Leon Schettler

How can we assess statehood on a sub-national level by drawing on perceptions of actors external to the state? Our contribution provides an answer to this question. For our research project “Talk, and Action: How International Organizations React to Areas of Limited Statehood”, we collect and analyze data on the perceptions of international organizations (IOs) concerning the state’s monopoly of force, as well as on its administrative capacity in different areas. IOs are important external governance actors providing a range of fundamental public goods (e.g. food, education, water, or shelter). Their presence on the ground, combined with their global perspective, make them excellent sources of information on degrees of statehood. Working with state actors on all levels in their daily operations on the one hand, and yet standing outside the state system of a given country on the other, allows them to adopt the perspective of an “involved outsider”. In order to gain access to these stocks of knowledge and their perceptions, we conducted interviews with four international and three regional organizations in their respective headquarters, as well as in five countries. To analyze these interviews together with IO documents, we have employed a qualitative content analysis. Below, we will first elaborate on our methods of data collection and data analysis. We will then provide some examples for that which our approach allows us to see, drawing on our own research. Finally, we will reflect upon the advantages and challenges of our approach for measuring statehood on a sub-national level.

4.1 Methods and Data Sources

Our research project builds on two main data sources: documents published by the organizations themselves, such as annual reports, country strategies, or project reports and evaluations and interviews conducted with staff of IOs (for further insights on interviews, cf. Glawion, this...)

8 In the following, we use international organizations in reference to both international and regional organizations.

9 We identified seven different organizations of interest for our research project (in alphabetical order): ECHO (Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection of the European Commission); FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations); IDB (Inter-American Development Bank); IICA (Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture); NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development); WB (World Bank) and the WFP (World Food Programme). Our case selection thus covers: a) organizations focused on different types of activities (emergency relief, as well as more long-term development, e.g. in agriculture); b) different types of organizations (development banks, UN-specialized organizations and UN-programs); and c) different memberships (global as well as regional).

10 We chose five different countries in which we conducted interviews with the staff of international organizations in country offices: Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Niger, and Sierra Leone. This country selection was based on varying degrees of statehood on the national level building on indicators such as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI).

11 Interviews with international organizations were conducted in the course of research stays in Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, Niger, and Sierra Leone from January to March 2016. Interviews at IO headquarters (Brussels, Johannesburg, Rome, San José, and Washington) were conducted in May, June, and September 2015.
paper). Combining such different sources allowed us to crosscheck and verify the information we gathered where and when necessary. We gathered our interview material at the IOs’ headquarters and at select country offices. We used different sources to identify interview partners, including official websites, social media (e.g. LinkedIn), project documents, and “snowballing” among colleagues (cp. Goldstein 2002; Welch et al. 1999). We derived structured questions on statehood and governance from the conceptualizations developed at the Collaborative Research Center 700 (see introduction; Draude et al. 2012). These questions provided the basic infrastructure for our interview guidelines, as well as of the coding scheme we built to analyze our material (see below). To leave space for the experiences and points of view of individual interviewees, we combined these questions with open questions in a semi-structured interview guideline (cp. Aberbach/Rockman 2002; Bryman 2012; Gläser/Laudel 2004; Leech 2002; Pfadenhauer 2005). To cover perceptions on statehood among IO staff, we asked: *To what extent do you observe limitations of the state to control the territory? To what extent do you observe limitations of the state to design and implement rules?* To account for sub-national variation, we included the question: *Do you observe any regional variation? How do different degrees of statehood affect your work?*

Regarding the collection of organizational documents, we specified the timeframe and the types of documents. In addition, a guideline detailed how the process of collecting documents was to be conducted, gave examples for types of documents, and established rules on how to proceed, where the attribution of documents to a certain document category was unclear. We discussed, tested, and revised the guideline for document research along with the interview questions to enhance their quality and to ensure an unequivocal application.

We analyzed the data by means of qualitative content analysis (cp. e.g. Früh 2011; Mayring 2008, 2010; Schreier 2012, 2014). To build a coding frame for the analysis, we combined concept-driven and data-driven strategies – such a combined strategy being the strategy most commonly applied in qualitative content analysis (Schreier 2012). We derived codes deductively from our definition of statehood, and we developed codes inductively by taking a sub-sample of the overall material (approximately ten percent), adding codes accordingly to cover additional relevant dimensions mentioned by interviewees and in documents. For example, we included a code on “restricted access”, as many interview partners described the challenge of gaining access to territories controlled by non-state, armed groups. While this may be linked to a limited monopoly on the use of force, it may also be the government that restricts access. Hence, we needed a separate code. To increase inter-coder reliability (Schreier 2012), we coded the same material individually and then compared the results, then wrote memos for each code and deleted those of minor relevance for the project – a time-consuming but crucial process.

**4.2 Application**

What does this particular method of data collection and analysis allow us to see with regard to statehood on a sub-national level? We illustrate this point with examples from Colombia. Regarding the monopoly of force, IOs observe that the government does not have full control of several regions, particularly along the Pacific Coast and along the borders with Venezuela and Ecuador. While IOs recognize that statehood is limited to different degrees on a sub-national level, this does not necessarily mean that they cannot work in these areas. For instance, one
IO-official reported that restrictions in terms of security and access are the source of the most severe limitations. However, where a minimum understanding between the IO and an armed non-state actor exists, the IO in question can go in and provide humanitarian assistance and development. A monopoly of force is thus not necessarily required for the IO to become active. Nonetheless, IOs act on behalf of the respective state, and the linkages between IOs and the government can still be close: Even though IOs work in certain areas of Colombia on their own, they seek approval and coordinate with government bodies on a strategic level.

Regarding the second dimension of statehood – the capacity to implement and enforce rules – there even exist “two Colombias”, according to one interviewee: one of them “with very sophisticated rules and legal frameworks”, the other one exhibiting “[an] absence of [the] state”. In the latter Colombia, these “very sophisticated rules” are not enforced. For instance, indigenous communities may have obtained formal titles and rights to land but cannot actually return to the land, due to illegal occupation by armed groups. While the Colombian government thus has the capacity to draft rules and regulations, its administrative capacity is nonetheless limited, as it cannot enforce rules on land rights in certain parts of the country.

IOs are very aware of the varying capacities they encounter in different regions of a country. For instance, in addition to the “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment” (CPIA), which assesses the institutional capacity of a state on the national level, World Bank staff in country offices also conduct more informal and qualitative assessments, which take varying state capacities in different regions, municipalities, and communities into account. In fact, regional and local capacities to coordinate different actors and to control corruption are evaluated on a permanent basis by World Bank staff, even in the framework of projects that are explicitly national by design. Because IOs generally understand well that de jure responsibilities (e.g. the state is responsible) are not necessarily equivalent to de facto responsibilities (e.g. who is actually in charge) in a given context, they conduct formal and, most often, informal assessments on the sub-national level. Perceptions resulting from these assessments then inform IO behavior, as they allow the IO to work through de facto authorities on the sub-national and local levels (e.g. local chiefs).

In sum, limitations of the monopoly of force as the first dimension of statehood on a sub-national level are not an issue, per se, for IOs working primarily on humanitarian aid, as a minimum level of security and access enable their operations. At the same time, IOs do have minimal requirements vis-à-vis the state, even in humanitarian settings. At the very least, they need the state’s consent to work in the country. IOs working in the field of long-term development, on the other hand, view limitations of a state’s administrative capacity – the second dimension of statehood – in a given area as more worrisome. In their work, IOs have to consider carefully where and how they can work with which state actor, even if capacities are limited, so as to not endanger long-term objectives – for example, that the government should take over responsibilities from IOs in the long run.
4.3 Advantages, Limitations, Challenges (and How to Deal with Them)

We are convinced that our methodological approach offers valuable insights concerning degrees of statehood on a sub-national level, which could not be observed otherwise. The largely qualitative data collection and analysis enables us to assess how the monopoly of force, as well as administrative capacity, are judged by IOs who work in contexts of limited statehood on a daily basis, both at the national and at the sub-national level. Arguably, this assessment of IO staff has advantages over assessments by alternative experts: IO staff provides valuable sources of knowledge, because they work directly with state actors (unlike experts based in research institutes), without being part of the state structure (unlike public officials). The former aspect allows them to assess practical deficits (e.g. the gap between the design and implementation of a reform, despite sufficient resources on paper). The latter aspect usually implies distance from the state institutions in question, forming a comparative perspective assessing countries and a global network of analytical support. Of course, some of these advantages also hold for a number of other actors who are part of the “governance-constellation” within a given country. Our approach could thus be applied relatively straightforwardly to other governance actors, such as bilateral development agencies, international or national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), foundations, public-private-partnerships (PPPs), and so on. Furthermore, in comparison to close-ended questionnaires or surveys, our approach – semi-structured interviews as a method for data collection – allows us to explore more in depth the weight and role of perceptions of statehood on a sub-national level, as compared to other factors that shape the governance activities of IOs.

However, our approach comes with certain limitations. To begin with, we focus on organizational perspectives and thus on “subjective” points of view rather than “objective” indicators. These perspectives need not necessarily relate closely to the “actual situation on the ground”, whichever way this can be identified. As we strive to assess the perspective of an IO in a given context, we are obliged to show that our interviews are, in fact, fairly representative of the IO as a whole. As with all studies reliant on interviews, our access to interviewees was partly based on personal contacts and subsequent snowballing, which raises the question of generalizability. Nonetheless, we controlled for this source of bias by choosing interview partners as systematically as possible, by leading several interviews in each organization, and by cross-checking our interview results with the analysis of organizational documents.

Further limitations concerning our approach are equally typical for studies based on interviews (Anfaran 2002; Bryman 2012). For example, we are two researchers with two distinct personalities – a factor that may influence how questions are asked and at what point during an interview we delve deeper. We dealt with this challenge by conducting interviews together during our first round of interviews at IO headquarters and during our second round of interviews at IO country offices. However, the possibility to conduct interviews together and to evaluate the obtained results between research trips in our team created opportunities for in-depth reflection, which are rarely available to researchers working on their own. Next, we sought to record our interviews wherever possible. Interviews that could not be recorded entered the analysis in the form of notes taken during the interview. Nuances in formulations are extremely difficult to derive from these notes. The problem of validity is mitigated where
we conducted the interview together and were hence able to compare and complete our notes directly afterwards. Despite these challenges, we see our approach overall as a promising one to appear on this Working Paper's “menu of possibilities” for measuring statehood on a sub-national level.

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5. Development of an Urban Area of Limited Statehood Observed from Above: The Case of Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo

By Lisa Pech

Statehood can vary immensely – ranging from consolidated statehood on the one end to extremely limited statehood, often combined with civil conflict, on the other. Along this continuum, research in areas of civil conflict poses particularly daunting problems: field research is often not possible or is possible only in a very limited way because of insecurity and difficulties in accessibility. Furthermore, time-series data is needed, if development during protracted conflict and the impact of protracted conflict shall be measured over time. Therefore, alternatives to measuring statehood in regions of extremely limited statehood and a volatile security situation are needed.

In my contribution, I will thus address this gap and demonstrate how state decline and conflict can be analyzed and documented “from above”, using satellite imagery. Remote-sensing-based land use assessments are combined with expert and field knowledge to support detailed and spatially explicit mappings of land use development in conflict areas.

Empirically, this contribution examines changes in urban land use in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with a focus on Goma, the capital of North Kivu province. The observation period from 1986 to 2015, depicted in Figure 5, covers the effects of the Rwandan civil war (1990–1994) and its aftermath, as well as the escalation of violence in the DRC, including the three Congo Wars, starting in 1996 and officially ending in 2009.

The time periods between 1986 and 1999 (Figure 6) and 2002 and 2006 (Figure 7) will be described in more detail, showing examples of the satellite imagery used.

5.1 Data and Methodology

High-resolution (HR) satellite imagery from the Landsat program, which is downloadable from the US Geological Survey (USGS) Earth-Explorer, was used for this study (US Geological Survey 2015). This joint NASA/USGS program provides the longest continuous space-based record of the earth’s surface (since 1972). Landsat sensors have a moderate spatial resolution that ranges between 15 and 60m, which is an appropriate resolution for broad coverage yet still detailed enough to analyze human-scale processes, such as urban development (NASA 2015). The Landsat system is designed to collect up to ten bands or channels of reflected energy. These bands are used to discriminate between earth surface materials through the development of spectral signatures (Chuvieco Salinero 1996). For any material, the amount of reflected radiation varies by wavelength. There are many possible combinations of spectral bands depending on the feature one wants to detect and illustrate (Chuvieco Salinero 2002). To better distinguish urban from non-urban land use during visual interpretation, I depict each dataset using two different band combinations: natural color and a false color combination, comprising the shortwave infrared (on the red cannon), near infrared (on the green cannon), and red band (on the blue

12 I conducted interviews with the local population, international and local organizations active in the fields of urban planning, humanitarian aid, and security during research trips to Kinshasa and Goma between January and September 2016.
cannon). In this combination, vigorously vegetated areas are depicted in light green tones; less vigorous vegetation in brownish green or light brown tones; clear water in black; built-up areas in purple to brown; and bare soil in grey, brown, and black tones, which makes it sometimes difficult to distinguish soil from built-up areas on the basis of tonality (Chuvieco Salinero 2002). These difficulties make contextual knowledge and features other than tonality crucial to visual interpretation, such as:

- **Texture**: is the arrangement and frequency of tonal variation in particular areas of an image. Rough textures consist of a sprinkled tone, where the tonal levels change abruptly, whereas smooth textures would have very little tonal variation. Smooth textures are the result of even surfaces, such as fields, asphalt, grasslands, or water (without waves); examples for rough surfaces are forest canopies and turbulent water.
- **Shadow**: is also helpful in interpretation. It may provide an idea of the profile and relative height of an object.
- **Association**: takes into account the relationship between other recognizable features.

I realized image interpretation visually, by considering gross distribution of objects and apportionment of the area. For recognition of regional particularities and details, areas are considered individually and objects are recognized and compared to aerial imagery and very high-resolution (VHR) satellite imagery (Google Earth), a limited choice of topographic maps, field comparison, and expert interviews, in order to verify uncertain interpretation results. The visual interpretation and the digitization of urban areas were carried out manually in ArcGIS 10.1. The last step is constituted by the adequate depiction of the results through thematic mapping, carried out in QGIS.

### 5.2 Application/Results

Goma covered an area of 7 km² in 1986, increasing to 8 km² in 1989, with a temporal peak of 21.3 km² in 1995, including refugee camps after the Rwandan civil war. At present, Goma covers an area of 57 km². Armed conflicts in the Great Lakes region strongly influenced Goma’s development. Two different types of urban development were identified: a continuous westward directional growth of built-up area and fragmented development through the appearance and disappearance of settlements on Goma’s outskirts.

The insecurity in Goma’s rural environs constitutes an important push factor for rural-urban migration. Relative security and economic prosperity in Goma constitute pull factors. Linked to the security situation, a large number of international humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel and an increasing number of national military personnel contribute to Goma’s population. The emergence of immense refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, including their closure and reopening, causes intermittent and fragmented development in Goma’s outskirts, intensified by a volcanic eruption in 2002. The following timeline (Figure 5) briefly depicts Goma’s spatial development from 1986 to 2015 and the sequence of events that has had an important impact on this development, followed by two more detailed examples, depicting satellite imagery in section 5.2.1. and 5.2.2.
Figure 5: Goma – Urban land change and influential events 1986–2015.
5.2.1 Goma and the Congolese Monopoly on the Use of Force

Since the beginning of armed conflict in the African Great Lakes region, certain impacts of civil war on the development of the city of Goma are clearly visible, such as like the expansion of built-up area and a change to the townscape through the construction of immense refugee camps. Other impacts, like war related economies in the outskirts of Goma that lead to economic growth and hence constructions of new neighborhoods, are also visible.

The regime shift after the end of the Rwandan civil war and genocide in 1994 triggered an influx of 800,000 Rwandan refugees into Goma and its surroundings (Deibert 2013, Johnson et al. 2016). In addition, the new population around Goma included 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers of the former Armed Forces of Rwanda, as well as almost all of the politicians of the former Hutu regime (Prunier 2008). The effects of this displacement, like the increase in Goma’s built-up area in general and the emergence of substantial refugee camps, are detectable on the satellite imagery in the upper segment of Figure 6.

The extent of built-up area in Goma increased from 14 km² in 1989 to 19 km² in 1995, comparing images from the respective years (see the middle of Figure 6): Built-up areas exhibit a rather rectangular character and a mixture of grayish/brownish/purple tones, and non-urban land use/vegetated areas appear in light green tones. Several refugee camps have sprouted up around Goma. On the left side of the image, Mugunga camp, housing about 800,000 refugees at peak times (Prunier 2008), measured roughly 2.5 km. Despite the relative coarse resolution of the imagery, the size of this campsite permits the recognition of infrastructural patterns, such as paths and parcels. The recognition of the campsite near the lakeshore, which housed the former Rwandan military covering about 100 m², required several expert interviews to identify its exact location.

The presence of the large Rwandan, Hutu-dominated and partly militarized refugee camps led the new Rwandan leadership to invade Congolese territory in the second half of 1996, marking the beginning of the First Congo War (1996/97). The retreating Congolese army during this invasion (Prunier 2008) serves as an example for the deficiency of the Congolese military at the time (Büscher 2011). On November 13th, Mugunga and other camps were forcibly closed by Rwandese mortar and infantry attacks, leading to the dispersal of up to one million refugees (Prunier 2008). According to interviewees present at the time, only days later, no trace of the camps remained. Unfortunately, the earliest imagery available (due to cloudy conditions) dates from 1999 (lower segment, Figure 6). Despite this dispersion, the urban area of Goma, measured on the imagery, expanded from 19 km² in 1995 to 25 km² in 1998/99.
Figure 6: Goma 1986, 1995, 1999, the built-up area expands, and several camps, housing refugees from Rwanda, sprout up around the city (1995). By 1999, the camps have disappeared, and Goma's built-up area has expanded further.
5.2.2 The Congolese Government’s Capacity to Implement and Enforce Rules

With the first war transitioning almost seamlessly into the Second Congo War (1998–2003), on January 17th of 2002, an eruption of the nearby volcano Nyiragongo caused the destruction of a third of Goma’s buildings and left 14,800 families homeless (Kanene 2014). The lava flows that affected the city center are clearly visible on the image taken in 2002 (Figure 7).

As both the invasion of the Rwandese army and the inaction of the Congolese army shed light on the ineptitude of the Congolese military, the consequences of the volcanic eruption indicate the failure of Congo’s central government and the RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy) rebel government, in charge of Eastern Congo at that time (Johnson 2014), in different public sectors – namely, the capacity (or lack thereof) to manage urban planning, (re)construction, and the organization of humanitarian measures. The absence of central planning in this urgency left the urban population to its own devices (Büscher 2011). According to an interviewee (Ngoboka Furaha, personal interview, 15.01.2016), the government did not arrange any measures concerning communication, evacuation, or humanitarian aid after the eruption, which lead to an influx of humanitarian aid workers comparable to that of the aftermath of the Rwandan civil war.

Spatial consequences of the eruption and the state’s incapacity to react are already visible in the image taken in 2003, Figure 7. The city began expanding westward, due to population displacement from the destructed city center. This initiated the genesis of two new districts on the outskirts of Goma: Mugungu, in place of the Rwandan refugee camp, and Lac Vert, South of Mugunga.

Caused by the destruction of the city center, Goma continued to expand westward in a largely informal fashion. According to an interviewee, the city center was rebuilt at the same location, despite the hazardous position due to the lack of urban planning, visible in the image taken in 2006 (Figure 7) – with strips of lava almost completely covered by buildings. Furthermore, districts that were not affected directly became densely populated (Büscher/Vlassenroot 2010).
Figure 7: The 2002 volcanic eruption destroyed a third of Goma's buildings. In 2003, the lava is partly covered by buildings. In 2006, the density of built-up area has increased, and the city has expanded further westward.
5.3 Advantages and Challenges of Earth Observation Data

The transformation of urban governance at the center of violent conflict over the last 25 years has turned the city of Goma into a fragmented urban space – politically, socioeconomically, and spatially. Earth observation data can show and quantify land use and its changes, shedding light on the spatial component of armed conflict, insecurity, and the absence of public institutions responsible for (urban) planning – above all by depicting processes that took place decades ago. Furthermore, this method is able to illustrate these processes in a way different from mere description through words. It also offers the possibility to “inspect” areas where the security situation temporarily does not allow field studies or where areas are simply too far away or too difficult to access, such as rural areas, woodlands, or mountainous regions.

Thus, while the satellite imagery used for this study does actually document certain developments, it cannot explain the reasons for these changes all by itself. Ground-truthing and expert-interviews are essential to finding explanations for what was observed from above, though this becomes more difficult the further the analysis reaches back in time. But without this crucial step of investigation, the results from image analysis remain unreliable. To improve results and reliability, it would make sense to complement this work with other approaches, such as quantitative analysis (see Stollenwerk, this paper) and in-depth qualitative studies (see Glawion, this paper; Heucher, Schettler, this paper).

References

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6. Field Research in Conflict Environments: Interviews, Focus Groups, and Observations in Somaliland and the Central African Republic

By Tim Glawion

Qualitative field research on statehood necessitates a degree of flexibility, reminding us that abstractions are there to aid in understanding reality and not vice versa. This contribution will discuss the challenges of case selection and the gathering of qualitative data on statehood (cf. the definition of statehood in the introduction) on a sub-national level. A highly common simplification in the study of statehood is the usage of violent events as a proxy: if violence occurs, statehood is limited, when not, it is consolidated. This is misleading in most cases, as it neglects non-violent assertions of authority and non-violently-expressed contestations of a monopoly of force. It also furthers the common confluence of fragile statehood and civil war. Qualitative research can further our understanding by asking not what is absent, but rather which forces are present. Intriguing new forms of or alternatives to statehood can be the outcome of such an inquiry. I would go even further: statehood’s attributes of monopolization and legitimacy are subjective attributes at least as much as they are objectively observable through actions and capacities. In the following contribution, I first turn to the data gathering process, as collected through interviews, focus groups, and observations. I will then show how qualitative insights can be analyzed through comparison, across cases. Finally, I will illustrate these steps through two intriguing comparative results on statehood in Somaliland and the Central African Republic (CAR).

6.1 Security Constraints for Case Selection, Data Gathering, and Analysis

The first step in conducting qualitative research is the selection of cases. Often, the absence of a monopoly of force is due to contestation by various groups, thereby creating security constraints for the researcher. Logistical issues – often linked to security threats, such as illegal road blocks – further reduce the number of possible research localities. Case selection confined by security and logistics impacts research design, such as avoiding cases with high levels of violence or latent instability risks. Key dynamics of limited statehood can thereby be overlooked that can even translate into positive bias and optimism toward non-state alternatives. Overcoming logistical constraints, i.e. by aerial route, is often facilitated by large non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), or private companies accompanied by heavy outside influence, which again impacts statehood on the ground. To mitigate these effects, the researcher could distinguish her or himself through, for example, the following steps: staying at the local church or guest house, rather than at a UN or NGO compound; taking local transportation through town (if security permits), rather than continuously hitching rides in large SUVs;

13 However, during qualitative research, the concept can and should be investigated with a great degree of flexibility.

14 The author expresses his gratitude to the Collaborative Research Centre 700 and the German Research Foundation (DFG/SFB700) for the means to conduct field research in the Central African Republic (February/March 2015, January to March 2016) and Somaliland (April to June 2015, April/May 2016).
and, finally, by making the effort to clarify the research mission after every new encounter. To avoid being stuck with narratives presented by locals to international actors (in the hopes of impacting goods and project distribution), it can help to “latch on” to local experts, rather than internationals. I’ve hedged my bets with (former) university students and local journalists.

After case selection, data gathering within field sites of limited statehood faces further difficulties. With no monopoly of force in place – that is, in oligopolistic settings (Mehler et al. 2010) – research access must be negotiated with numerous actors. To gain access, it can help to climb the ladder from top to bottom. For example, if local policemen are the research subjects, a letter or stamp of approval from the Inspector General is key. If it is a local rebellion, their official leader is oftentimes also found in the capital. With these letters in hand, lower-level individuals will feel freer to speak their mind. Nevertheless, some actors, such as armed contraband groups, can refuse an exchange, or state forces can deny access to opposition areas, making the gathered data necessarily biased toward certain actors and inhabitants. Surveys are thus rarely an option, as they would necessitate a wide and representative selection of participants (Kapiszewski et al. 2015). Gaining a local or national partner with access beyond the researcher’s reach, as well as having large budgets to spare, can nonetheless make the exceptional survey possible (Bastedau/Köllner 2007). To gain wider perceptions on statehood, focus groups can enable some measure of approximation (Ryan et al. 2014): Participants can discuss and attempt to converge on who controls what means of violence and how, as well as on the degree to which rules can or cannot be enforced. Continuously asking for real-life examples can help guide such a theoretic discussion. It can be particularly interesting to have numerous focus groups discuss the same recent example of a key event – i.e. the arrest of an armed group leader – to gauge different interpretations of the event in question. However, in a situation without security guarantees, self-censorship in front of other participants can bias data. Individual interviews must thus complement group discussions (Rathbun 2008). In an interview setting, it becomes easier to provide a secure and private environment. While staying open to all events and issues raised by the interviewees is important, arriving well-informed will open many doors. Demonstrating knowledge of key actors, names, and events when they are raised by interviewees can bring discussions to the next level, as the researcher will more likely be accepted as an insider. Media reports and early talks with well-informed locals can grant such prior access. In my research, I have hired a local person in each research locality to keep me informed during my absence, through monthly reports. The triangulation between these varying sources – interviews, focus groups, and third-party reports – can unveil individual biases. At the same time, these individual biases – e.g. on who started an attack and who emerged the victor – are themselves a source of information on statehood, as they describe the perceived capacities of certain actors and their legitimacy. Finally, it can help to observe the monopolization (or lack thereof) of force, personally: Seeing and hearing discussions between actors in everyday life, listening in on mediation meetings, or sitting next to a roadblock can all grant the chance to cross-check that which has been said with that which has been done.

15 This, of course, does not lessen the researcher’s responsibility to treat the discussion with absolute confidentiality AAA (2012).
Since case selection in areas of limited statehood requires ad hoc flexibility and since data generation methods are often limited and approximate, the analysis must make extra effort to get to the heart of what constitutes statehood. First, qualitative research should ask not what is absent but which institutions and forces are present. These forces and institutions could be beyond traditional European expectations — that is, official state forces, such as the police and army, and its institutions settled into concrete buildings. State forces themselves might form an oligopoly of competing poles, while non-state actors and institutions need equal appreciation. Certain questions that guide theory and field work can assist in grasping these complexities, such as the following: The international boundaries of the state are not the only possible containers of statehood — thus what other type of monopoly is or could be at play? Even in Western European states, multiple institutions and actors always co-exist. Thus, who are the actors involved and how must they relate and interact, in order to constitute a monopoly? What forms of order exist that have more than one power pole? As the answers to these questions will vary over time, how do actors’ roles, constellations, and resources change? Researching institutions, actors, constellations, and resources (Hagmann/Péclard 2010) can bring a given analysis closer to measuring what is present – different ongoing negotiations of oligopolistic settings – rather than what is absent – a pure monopoly of force. The final analysis of statehood can then take on multiple forms. The information could be simplified and assimilated into a large dataset for quantitative analysis (see Linke-Behrens, this paper; Stollenwerk, this paper), or single case studies could delve deeper into one particular setting. My preferred avenue, comparison of a small number of cases, allows for complexity, while at the same time searching for theoretical generalizations across cases (Basedau/Köllner 2007). However, as always, the final research method depends on the topic of inquiry.

6.2 Specific Findings on Statehood through Qualitative Research

As an exemplification of all these steps, I will describe the data generation process for the cases of Bangassou in the Central African Republic and Gumburaha Banka in Somaliland. Secondly, I will explain why my analysis judges the former’s statehood to be highly fragmented among multiple poles, while the latter shows a degree of monopolization, despite a similarly high number of actors.

In the case selection, practical and theoretical issues went hand in hand. In the CAR, I was searching for any case that was an administrative center greater than the size of a village but far from Bangui. Practically speaking, Bangassou was one of very few cases possible, due to its relatively secure environment for research and the possibility to take a UN flight that would avoid road cutters barring the ground route. However, this meant that I had to accept the presence of UN forces in the locality, which was a variable I wanted to avoid. A down-side to selecting Gumburaha as a case was its proximity to the capital, Hargeisa, which stretched its commercial and administrative connections into this rural area. Research access to Bangassou was negotiated with the UN and the highest local authority, the Prefect. However, contact to some of the alleged menaces in the region, such as the ex-Séléka rebels and the Lord’s Resistance Army, was not possible, thereby biasing the research. In Gumburaha, my access was negotiated both through state channels – i.e. I had to be accompanied by state security personnel at all
times – and by clan leaders. This meant that access to disgruntled clan members, which could cast a bad light on the state or clan leaders, was only seldom and by chance possible. In both regions, statehood was assessed through focus groups, interviews, and observations, unveiling each locality’s complex web of actors. The UN was a highly resourceful institution in Bangassou, which supported state forces, but at the same time, the population organized itself into auto-defense groups, making it often impossible for the unarmed police and gendarmerie to assert its official state authority. In Gumburaha, nine sub-clan leaders negotiated different issues of security and society for their respective clans, and the police in the nearby town of Baligubadde would intervene on specific occasions.

The analyses of both cases suggest a strong variation of statehood. Despite the UN mission’s resources in Bangassou, which outpaced any local security actors’ capacity twentyfold (in numbers, vehicles, weaponry), peacekeepers did not create a situation of a monopoly of force, because both their mandate and military tactics led them not to assert their authority on everyday matters. Thus, multiple conventional and non-conventional actors continued to hold authority over different areas and subjects in Bangassou and its surroundings, at times competing violently. In the terminology of the Research Center 700, statehood was limited. In Gumburaha, on the other hand, the multiple poles had very clear and habitual patterns of interaction: in the event of conflict, the police intervened to halt the violence, then clan leaders of the respective parties came together to negotiate a contract of compensation and cohabitation, after which the police would release the culprits. Thus, force was monopolized in one institutional setting that was seen as legitimate by most interviewed inhabitants. Statehood was, in a specific form, relatively consolidated in Gumburaha Banka – a finding numerous authors have established before me in other areas of Somaliland (e.g. Ali et al. 2008; Höhne 2011; Leonard/Samantar 2011).

6.3 Advantages and Challenges of Flexibility

In summary, qualitative analysis of statehood necessitates a large degree of flexibility on the side of research design: case selection, accessibility, and data gathering tools have to adapt to the contested environment found on the ground, even if this translates into a risk of falling short of theoretic standards of analysis. These practical adaptations – when taken with care and regularly reflected upon – could contribute to methodological standards of the future, as they call for more honest case appreciations, stronger local guidance, and put the emphasis back on the research object rather than its tools. Theory development itself benefits when researchers begin looking for what is present, rather than for what is absent. Qualitative research concerning the monopoly or oligopoly of force includes results on state institutions deliberately perpetuating crisis and contestation (de Vries/Justin 2014), alternative institutions that coordinate between multiple poles (Höhne 2011), and even entirely new and innovative ideas of what statehood locally signifies, beyond the herein proposed definition (Leonard/Samantar 2011). Field research in areas of limited statehood, while fraught with methodological and practical constraints, is thus a very rewarding endeavor in the search for a deeper understanding of statehood.
References


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7. Conclusion

By Angela Heucher, Luisa Linke-Behrens, and Leon Schettler

Our objective with this Working Paper was to offer a “rich and diverse menu of possibilities” for measuring statehood on a sub-national level. So what is now on the menu? Stollenwerk and Linke-Behrens demonstrate how quantitative data can be used to map and analyze varying degrees of statehood within a country, thus enabling a comparison across sub-national units in Nigeria and Tanzania. While Stollenwerk and Linke-Behrens both construct quantitative composite indicators to establish an overall picture of statehood, they choose different approaches for operationalization and set distinct foci. Their approaches exemplify how quantitative measures enable comparisons between federal states or provinces within a state. Through a qualitative content analysis of documents and interviews with international organizations (IOs), Heucher and Schettler illustrate how IOs perceive statehood in Colombia and thus introduce a perception-based approach to measuring statehood. They conclude that it is not perceptions per se that matter, but perceptions by experts on the ground. Pech brings satellite imagery to the menu, an approach that permits the researcher to identify changes in land use and to grasp developments in particular areas detached from human-made borders or administrative units. Pech emphasizes the importance of combining satellite imagery with other methods, such as interviews, in order to make sense of and explain these observations. Glawion, finally, shows how ethnographically-inspired field research yields in-depth results of different actors’ statehood perceptions in Somaliland and the Central African Republic. Glawion uses different qualitative approaches for data collection, ranging from interviews to focus groups to observation. He then triangulates the data to arrive at a more nuanced picture of varying degrees of statehood.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, we find that there is no silver bullet for collecting and analyzing data on statehood. The approaches for measuring statehood on a sub-national level discussed in this working paper all have their specific merits, while presenting their own challenges and practical constraints. We hope to have shown that, despite these limitations, our methods do offer promising possibilities to tackling this task and – most importantly – that they lead to more fine-grained results and thus to a more complete picture of statehood on a sub-national level. In particular, we find the combination of different methods in systematic, mixed methods research design promising. In her contribution to this working paper, for instance, Pech proposes a combination of different methods: While she can detect significant changes in land-use via earth observation data, she underlines the necessity to draw on qualitative approaches to explain these findings. Hence, satellite imagery can be used to identify particular developments over time and can thus serve as an entry point for what to investigate more closely. Furthermore, the different approaches could prove particularly useful for analyzing areas of limited statehood in their territorial, social, and sectoral dimensions, thus leading to a more nuanced picture overall, by combining methods. The quantitative measures discussed by Stollenwerk and Linke-Behrens therein offer insights into territorial areas of limited statehood, as does the method presented by Pech, which takes a view from above to identify particular distinctive features of a certain territory. The qualitative methods including interviews, focus groups, and observation...
introduced by Glawion offer the opportunity to study social areas of limited statehood, as they allow the researcher to analyze the state's capacity in local contexts and from the point of view of particular social groups, e.g. in certain rural areas as compared to urban areas. Sectoral areas of limited statehood, finally, could be studied through exploring organizational perceptions of the state's capacity in particular sectors, for example. As international organizations in the field of development most often work closely with government entities, and as they do so within concrete policy fields, the qualitative, perception-based approach presented by Heucher and Schettler could also be applied to the realm of sectoral areas of limited statehood, in addition to the application to the territorial areas of limited statehood the authors present in their contribution.

Hence, the overarching objective of our contribution is to encourage more dialogue among researchers from different methodological camps – something we have already begun in this working paper through cross-references in our individual contributions. With this in mind, we hope that this working paper opens up avenues for future multi-methodical research on the role of (limited) statehood for governance on the sub-national level.
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Governance has become a central theme in social science research. The Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood investigates governance in areas of limited statehood, i.e. developing countries, failing and failed states, as well as, in historical perspective, different types of colonies. How and under what conditions can governance deliver legitimate authority, security, and welfare, and what problems are likely to emerge? Operating since 2006 and financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG), the Research Center involves the Freie Universität Berlin, the University of Potsdam, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) and the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA).

**Research Framework**

**Partner Organizations**

- Host University: Freie Universität Berlin
- University of Potsdam
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- German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA)