

# **Understanding modalities of climate partnerships and their contribution to climate governance**

Svetlana Frenova

Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), VU University Amsterdam

## **Abstract**

Climate change is one of the priority issues on the current sustainability agenda and a malign type of problem (Gupta, 2010) with various conflicting interests that requires a collaborative solution. Public-private partnerships are a specific form of transformative governance as they provide linkages to more benign issues and therefore increase the problem solving capacity of the overall governance system. Three modalities of public-private partnerships are identified in this paper: instrumental, institutional and regime, characterized by specific inputs to climate governance and hence requiring different approaches to measuring their effectiveness. For instance, climate partnerships perceived from the instrumental perspective are frequently evaluated in terms of fulfilling the target or functions, while studies of the institutional modality of partnerships rely on assessment criteria derived from organizational science, which are mainly concerned with organisational capacities and operational accountability. Finally, studies on the overall climate regime (as a form of meta-partnership) are often linked to questions of legitimacy and accountability.

The paper analyses different approaches to measuring effectiveness of climate partnerships and proposes an assessment framework addressing variations of climate partnerships contributions within identified modalities. The proposed framework is based on three effectiveness standards, which allow assessing each modality of partnerships from various analytical perspectives established in conjunction with the type of partnership contribution, i.e. goal attainment, accountability, legitimacy. The study also provides comparison across the modalities in an attempt to understand competitive advantages of each modality and provide insights on which climate partnership modality delivers more tangible results for tackling climate change issues.

## **1. Introduction**

According to Mayntz (2004:66), the notion of governance relies on the broad idea of multi-actor steering as in "totality of interactions in which government, other public bodies, private sector and civil society participate, aiming at solving societal problems or creating societal opportunities". There are a variety of partnerships, which contribute to climate governance through the different means and functions implemented.

The study makes an initial attempt to differentiate partnership categories (ontologies) by introducing three key modalities based on variations in partnerships' structure,

organizational approaches and orientation. The idea of classification remains a challenge due to ambiguity of partnerships as a concept, which is widely understood within specified narratives. The proposed classification is based on taxonomic approach deriving from empirically observable partnerships characteristics, which however presents a social construct relying on an individual perception. Therefore I have no intention to claim that modalities present definitive approach to partnership typologies. However, development of partnership typologies will support research on general understanding of partnerships, their competitive advantages as governance tools and partnerships' role within climate governance.

The study recognises various analytical discourses within the research on partnerships and is illustrative in terms of how lack of common definitions can deliver conflicting conclusions on partnership contribution and effectiveness to climate governance.

Three partnerships modalities can be identified within climate governance arena, i.e. partnerships utilized as a governance instrument (Börzel and Risse, 2005; Runde and Wise, 2011), partnerships as governance institutions or agents (Biermann and Siebenhuner, 2009) and partnerships as a form of governance regime (Kooiman, 2003; Klijan and Koppenjan, 2000; Borzel and Risse, 2005; Meuleman, 2008; Andonova 2009B) with a potential to contribute to the most advanced form of steering - meta-governance (Meadowcroft, 2007).

Each modality of partnerships is characterized by specific input to climate governance and hence approaches to measuring its effectiveness. Partnerships perceived from the instrumental perspective are frequently evaluated in terms of fulfilling the target or functions (OECD 2006, Leach et al 2002), studies of institutional modality of partnerships rely on assessments deriving from organisational science, which are mainly concerned with organisational capacities and operational accountability (Backstrand, 2006, Wettestad, 1995; Grant and Keohane, 2005; Gupta, 2010), studies on contribution of partnerships regimes are often linked with the extent of legitimacy (Lederer, 2011; Hahn and Pinkse, 2014; Backstrand, 2006; Kankaanpaa and Young, 2012).

The paper analyses different approaches to measuring effectiveness of climate partnerships and proposes an assessment framework addressing variation of partnership contributions within identified modalities. The proposed framework is based on three effectiveness standards, which allow assessing each modality of partnerships from various analytical perspectives. Each modality is assessed across three effectiveness standards, established in conjunction with the type of partnership contribution, i.e. goal attainment, accountability, legitimacy. The study also provides comparison across the modalities in an attempt to understand competitive advantages of each modality and provide insights on which modality delivers more tangible results for tackling specific environmental issues looking at the example of climate change.

## **2. Methodology**

### **2.1 Analytical framework**

Attempts to differentiate partnerships have been made by a number of authors. For instance, Glasbergen (2007) distinguishes partnerships as collaborative arrangements, partnerships as governance mechanisms, partnerships as governance structures. Lehmann (2006:238) lists three levels of partnering based on the level of commitment and number of partners involved: (1) collaborative projects (2) learning systems (3) governance networks. Bakstrand (2007) categorises partnerships per functions implemented: advocacy, rule and standard setting, rule implementation and service provision. Von Malmberg (2003:142) distinguishes 3 types of partnerships based on their orientation, i.e.: sharing knowledge and experience, joint venture arrangements aiming at organisational capacity building, project implementation. Selsky and Parker (2005) list four different categories of the partnerships based on various combinations of involved actors, i.e. business-government, business-civil society, government – civil society and business-government-civil society. Sorensen and Torfing (2009) refer to the following types of multi-stakeholder arrangements: set from bottom up or top down, formal or informal, intra or inter organizational, open or closed, tightly knit or loosely coupled, short or long lived. Witte (2003) identifies three ideal types of networks: negotiation, coordination and implementation.

The instrumental<sup>1</sup> use of partnerships implies that partnerships are applied by certain actors for achieving specific outcomes. Studies on partnerships as an instrument are frequently examined from the actors' perspective implying that every partner represents a particular interest, comes with specific expectations and stands for its own rationality (McInerney, 2000). The contribution to this type of partnerships is actor specific and range from funding, market access and access to technology and specific knowledge from private partners to reach with the governments and expertise from public partners (Runde and Wise, 2011). Partnerships created in conjunction of Kyoto Protocol within Clean Development Mechanism are regarded as innovative instrument for emission reductions involving both developed and developing countries (Streck 2004). In such a way partnerships created under CDM assist in implementation of the Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol and aim at achieving cost-effective GHG emissions reductions at a chosen project locations. According to Bäckstrand (2007), most of the 673 registered CDM projects can be described as multi-sectoral partnerships involving project investors (governments or private actors), multilateral institutions, non-profit organizations and carbon brokers and developing countries.

---

<sup>1</sup> The notion of instrument is based on Lascoumes and le Galès (2007:1) definition – “a device that is both technical and social and organizes specific social relations”.

The institutionalised partnerships are examined in terms of the roles and functions they may fulfill in the global environmental governance regime (Huijstee et al, 2007). Among possible functions characterizing institutionally set partnerships are standard-setting and norm creations, knowledge dissemination/technology transfer, technical implementation, building institutional capacity and innovations (Glasbergen, 2001). Ward (2002) sees institutionally set partnerships as consciously designed structures chosen by individuals to produce stability, while the process of institutionalization with continuing process of negotiation among actors and capacity of these processes to serve the interests of actors seeking maximization of utility. Institutionally set partnerships have defined and centralized structures with the governing mechanisms in place (boards, steering committees etc). Within climate governance arena, this modality is distinctive in terms of implemented functions, scale of operations and regulative rules in place. Such partnerships as, REEEP, GWEP, WWEA, have established reporting system, product and service orientation, national/international level of operations, presence of accountability mechanisms and funding strategies.

The studies on partnerships as regimes focus on inter-linkages among the single institutions, investigate how various partnerships interact with large international organisations and are embedded into governmental architectures and examine the issues related to network governance based on multi-actor involvement. Depending on type of linkages between the actors, Considine (2005) distinguishes 3 types of involvement: interorganisational networks (linking private and public actors), inter-actor networks (linking leaders and advocates) and inter-agency networks (linking various actors and agents in provision of services). The idea of regime formation can be linked to advantages delivering by such extended multi-actor structures which relate to: flexibility, openness to innovation, superior information and knowledge sharing capabilities Sorensen (2006). UNFCCC presents a top-down negotiated arrangement and based on close cooperation among various number of stakeholders. The process of development targets for GHGs emissions reductions required multi-stakeholder involvement in which the states had significant input on how the GHGs goals shall be met (Andresen et al 2014).

The studies on all modes of partnerships outline importance of organisational aspects (Andonova 2009A, Miles et al (2002), Andresen and Rosendal (2009) etc). The following common organizational issues can be identified:

- **Level of institutionalization** vary from one mode to another and refers to extent of formalized rules, standards and mechanisms. Biermann and Siebenhuner (2009) claim that introduction of moderate bureaucratic mechanisms minimizes power asymmetries in complex relationship of multi-actor engagements. Although, over-

institutionalisation may considerably reduce flexibility of the partners and result in weak performance. (Glasbergen, 2007)

- **Degree of embedding** into broader policy contexts (Andonova, 2009; Biermann et al, 2007B). It is worth noting, that instrumental mode has the highest degree of embedding as it can be used within two other modalities of partnerships (refer to the chapter on dichotomy for more details). Furthermore, institutionally set partnerships can be embedded within regimes as institutional component lies within any regime and many regimes are served and managed by an organization (Miles et al, 2002)
- In terms of the **structure**, each mode of partnerships can be approached in accordance with Deutschman (1995), who distinguishes 5 organizational types including simple structure, machine beneficiary, professional bureaucracy, divisionalised form and adhocracy. Each type of structure is defined by regulative mechanisms which include mutual adjustment, direct supervision and standardization. Another factor is degree of specialization and formalization. The simple forms of multi-actor structures develop on partners mutual adjustment and adjust themselves through everyday communication. With growing scope of the agenda and programs, number of partners and increasing communication, partnerships need to introduce some standards for instance through formal organisation (setting boards of managers, advisory committees), communication standards (regular meetings, conference calls, meeting of partners and donors etc), products and services standards (projects appraisal criteria, monitoring and evaluation etc).
- **Orientation** is defined by the objectives set within each multi-actor arrangement. For instance, each mode of partnerships can be specialized in different subject areas. For instance, EIA projects covering natural resources, transport and infrastructure. ENPI is specializing in environment, energy, gender and education. Also all the above mentioned modes can be policy or market oriented (Glasbergen et al, 2007). Policy oriented partnerships aim at regulatory changes, development, lobbying and adoption of political proposals. Market oriented partnerships strive towards development of products and services that meet market needs. Young (1994) distinguishes between those focused on a single issue area and those whose concerns extend to broad spectrum of issues.
- Partnerships can also be oriented towards and operate across different **scales**. Many authors (Biermann and Siebenhuner, 2009; Gupta, 2008, Rezessy et al, 2006; Bulkeley and Bestill 2003) note that responses to global challenges occur at various levels and require application of tailored governance approaches.
- In terms of **functional objectives**, all modes of partnerships can do: consultancy, advocacy, information exchange, capacity building etc (OECD, 2006). Borzel and Risse (2010), suggests the following list of functions: rule and standard setting, rule

implementation, service provision). Additionally, Glasbergen et al (2007) refers to raising awareness and technology transfer; Linder (1999) outlines moral regeneration, risk shifting, restructuring public service etc. Abbot and Snidal (2009) observe agenda setting, negotiation of standards, implementation, monitoring and enforcement.

## 2.2 Partnership modalities

The phenomenon of partnerships is discursively constructed by scholars and existing in many variations, which can only be understood within established narratives. Distinction of modes proposed in this paper is based on conceptualisation of dichotomy of each mode object/subject relation. Three partnership modalities can be distinguished in relation to their contribution for climate governance, i.e. partnerships as instruments, partnership as governance agents and partnerships as governance regimes. Each mode of partnerships can contribute to climate governance via aggregation of actors and acting as a whole (an independent formation), while the definition of actor can vary for each mode. The instrumental mode of partnerships is a process and aggregation of individual representatives of the participating organisations or communities. Partnerships as institution are a structure and an aggregation of actors represented by a limited number of individual organisations. Partnerships as regimes are an architecture which comprise a vast number of organisations and representatives.

Additional ambiguity derives from the notion that in relation to the governance each mode can be seen as an instrument. Wurzel et al. 2013 state that a network could be regarded as a policy and governance instrument. Mert (2009) sees Type 2 partnerships instrumental for environmental governance, but nonetheless constructs the study around the notion of partnerships as "new governance institution". Also partnerships can be instrumental for formation of regimes. Bauer et al. (2009) recognizes that regimes can be instruments or mechanisms in the hands of national governments but also as political actors in their own rights. Gehring (2004) notes that it is common in the research on effectiveness of the international regimes to consider a regime as an instrument established by interested actors to bring about change. Hovi (2004) claims that regimes can be used instrumentally to resolve conflicts via generation of mutually beneficial practices.

Similarly, terminological challenges may arise in relation to the definition of institution. For instance, Young's (Young, 1994) definition of an institute is based on functional contribution to the governance and allows variations in scale and organisational approach of the multi-actor arrangement, i.e micro-level (so called common pool resources arrangements), mezo-level and and macro-level (regimes). Consequently, any of the defined modes of multi-

actor arrangements could be labeled as institution as long as they are contributing to defining social rules and presenting a code of conduct.

Glasbergen (1998), Koch and Buser (2006) share concerns that dichotomy is essential part of governance concept, which may result in terminological challenges with inevitable overlapping of analytical frameworks. The overlapping zones are indicative in terms of possible transformation from one mode to another and appearance of hybrid arrangements. An assumption can be made that the borderline between instrumental and institutional modalities of partnerships could be identified in conjunction with shift in partnership's functional objective from policy implementation to service provision, which subsequently requires organisational structure and standards as noted by Pattberg (2009). Once the functions are being extended and an organisation is becoming involved in rule-setting in a chosen issue area, expanding the network to include other powerful actors and upscale activities to the international level, one can assume that regime has appeared. Additionally, the key partnerships parameters related to structure, scale, orientation, representation, degree of centralisation and embedding could be indicative of distinction of partnership modalities. For instance, the border line between the instrumental mode and institutionalised mode could be drawn by change in structure from simple non-hierarchical to defined centralised structure, extent and quality of representation from limited and informal to extended and formal etc (Table 1). The regime is different from institutional and instrumental modes in terms of strictly international scale of operations in combination with complex non-hierarchical structure and the most extended number and variety of partners.

	<b>Instrument modality</b>	<b>Institutionalised modality</b>	<b>Regime modality</b>
<b>Structure</b>	Simple, Non-defined,	Network based, Defined,	Network based, Complex,
<b>Degree of centralisation</b>	Decentralised, low or no standardisation of procedures	Centralised, Medium standardisation	Centralised High standardisation
<b>Representation</b>	Informal	Formalised	Formalised
<b>Number of actors</b>	Limited	Medium	Extended

<b>Orientation</b>	policy implementation	service provision	standard and rule setting
<b>Scale</b>	Local, regional, international	Regional, international,	International

Table 1. Overview of variations across partnerships modalities

### 2.3 Effectiveness assessment framework

There are a number of factors affecting partnership effectiveness. Effectiveness could be a function of some partnerships characteristics such as design (Ostrom 1990, Wettestad (1995), Sorensen and Torfing (2009) and structure (Young 1994, Levy et al 1996, Lehman 2006), representation (Lehmann 2006, von Malmborg 2003), scope (Ostrom, 1990, Chan and Muller, 2012) and orientation (Keohane, 1993) and scale (Andonova 2009B, von Malmborg 2003).

However, the factors affecting the performance of the partnerships are more or less understood, the notion of what should be considered as a benchmark of effective partnership is understandably not clear. Additional challenge is imposed by variety of partnerships types, each of which would have a different notion for effective performance. In line with this concern, Brinkerhoff (2009) suggests that a standard for measuring partnership effectiveness shall not be uniform but rather tailored to specific objectives of the partnerships. For instance, effectiveness can be measured as a problem solving capacity Miles et al (2002), goal achievement (Andresen and Rosendal, 2009), performance against implemented functions (Ivanova, 2009).

#### a. Approaches to measuring partnership effectiveness

The partnerships fitting the instrumental modality are a participatory process targeting policy levels with relatively limited number of parties involved, low standardisation of procedures and loosely defined structures. The instrumental use of partnerships implies that partnerships are applied by certain actors for achieving specific outcomes. Indeed, studies on partnerships as an instrument are frequently examined from the actors' perspective implying that every partner represents a particular interest, comes with specific expectations and stands for its own rationality (McInerney, 2000).

The concept of instrument implies a policy mechanism and efforts aimed at achieving the intentions of the policy makers (Bressers and O'Tolle, 1998). Therefore effectiveness in the case of an instrument can be measured in terms of the extent of achieving the target, which led to application of the instrument. In this sense, the instrumental effectiveness, i.e. extent

of the problem solving capacity, is also valid for partnerships set as regimes (Dombrowsky 2008, Skjarseth 1992, Gehring 2004) and institutions, e.g. Johannesburg partnerships were instruments aimed at implementing multilateral targets on climate and energy (Bäckstrand, 2007).

Institutional modality of partnerships must have a defined structure of an organisation, standardised procedures and at least the regional presentation. The institutional modality is distinctive in terms of organisational set, functions and contribution to climate governance. The partnerships of this mode are primarily understood as institutional arrangements contributing to the climate governance and examined in terms of the roles and functions they may fulfill (Huijstee et al, 2007). Among possible functions characterising institutionally set partnerships are standard-setting and norm creations, knowledge dissemination/technology transfer, technical implementation, building institutional capacity and innovations. (Glasbergen, 2001). Among other features of the institutionalised partnerships are established reporting system, product and service orientation, national/international level of operations, presence of accountability mechanisms and funding strategies.

Institutional perspective derives from the definition of the institution, which in this study is understood as a set organisation with a specified mandate, structure and a scale of operations. Studies of institutional effectiveness are frequently drawn on the organisational aspects (management approaches (Watson, 2001), organisational structures (Chan, 2012) and design (Sorensen and Torfing, 2009; Szulecki et al, 2012, Young, 2011). The other studies assess effectiveness from the various aspects of accountability which is analysed through the presence of funding mechanisms (Watson, 2001), monitoring and evaluation frameworks (Wettstad, 1995), elements of strategic planning (Gupta, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 2007), extent of application of auditing and self-reporting, frequency and accessibility of disclosed information (Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010; Auld and Gulbrandsen, 2010). It's worth mentioning that the concept of accountability is also applicable for partnership regimes as they can be seen as "international organisations created to administer the provisions of environmental governance systems" (Young 1994:175) or partnership instruments in case of partnerships that don't have an organisational status but take the form of a project (Szulecki et al 2012). Therefore the institutionally effective partnership is an arrangement with a clear mandate regarding the roles and responsibilities and evidence of the programmatic planning with measurable targets, monitoring and evaluation framework and reporting with verifiable results.

Regime modality of partnerships are such multi-stakeholder arrangements that have complex architectures, extended number of parties and are involved in standard and rule-setting. As noted by Andresen and Rosendal (2009), regime is a form which has characteristics of institution/organisation (i.e. structure, design), and also a norm-setting

capacity. Miles and Underdal states that an institutional component is essential part of any regime (regimes are frequently managed by an organisation) and it affects the problem solving capacity of regime. Pattberg (2009) states that regime is as a result of continuous institutionalisation and creation of meta-structures governed through their own rules and regulations. Regime effectiveness approaches derive from the international relation theories (Backstrand, 2012) and are concerned with various aspects of decision making processes including transparency and legitimacy. Sorensen and Torfing (2009) suggest that in terms of effectiveness, regimes can be measured against their capacity to generate policy options based on high degree of legitimacy, whereas legitimacy denotes inherent capacity of a rule to encourage compliance and defines how an organisation acts and through who for achieving compliance (Hisschenuller Gupta, 1999:160). Legitimacy is frequently associated with inclusiveness (Ledered, 2011; Hahn and Pinkse, 2014; Backstrand, 2012; Dellas, 2012; Wettestad, 1995; Kankaanpaa and Young, 2013; Biermann et al 2012) and correlates with balanced representation of different stakeholder groups (Backstrand, 2006). Participation lies in the very core of each modality of the partnerships (Visseren-Hamakers 2007) and is necessary for achieving broader sustainable development goals and increasing citizen empowerment (Della, 2012). Although, the concept of legitimacy is most frequently applicable to the studies of the international institutions and regimes with existing structures, participation is a concern for partnerships set as instruments (in a form of projects) within already existing structures (Leach et al, 2002; Thackway and Olsson, 1999). Therefore, according to this analytical perspective, the effective partnership is a transparent and participatory arrangement (Michaelowa, 2012).

#### b. Assessment Framework

The main question of the study is which modality of partnerships delivers more tangible results in terms of the goal attainment and presents more legitimate and accountable solutions for tackling the climate change issues. The study also attempts to provide cross-comparison for three modalities of partnerships in terms of their effectiveness for tackling climate change issues and hence there is a need to introduce the indicators that would allow compatibility and common measures.

The assessment framework comprises a set of qualitative indicators that conceptualise the idea of effective partnership (Table 2). The assessment represents a survey of the key partnership attributes across the main indicators: goal attainment, accountability, legitimacy and transparency. The survey is based on the content analysis, studies of the online resources, progress-reports, Annual CDM reports of the Executive Board to the Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC web-site, CDM database, and web-sites of REEEP, WWEA, GVEP and REN21.

For each indicator the value ranges from Low to Medium and High. The value explains the degree to which the indicator has been met (based on analytical explanation).

<b>Effectiveness type</b>	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Operationalization</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Instrument</b>	<b>Goal attainment</b>	Achieving GHG emissions reductions	Evidence of achieved GHG emissions reductions
		Achieving specific targets	Extent of meeting the target set by the partnership
<b>Institution</b>	<b>Accountability</b>	Clarity of the mandate	Presence of the documents that describe the partner roles and responsibilities
		Reporting	Presence of monitoring and evaluation framework in place and detailed reporting with quantitative and qualitative review of the progress made
<b>Regime</b>	<b>Legitimacy</b>	Partner engagement within decision-making	Presence of steering, advisory committees with balanced representation
		Presence of the mechanisms for public consultations	Evidence that civil society organisations provide legal representation, regularly facilitate or support the advocacy concerns of grassroots groups and vulnerable populations
	<b>Transparency</b>	Public disclosure of documents:	Documents made available to the committee are also made available to the public at the same time. This transparency will allow the public to gauge whether the committee's findings were substantiated by available

information or whether they were delivered without any such references.

Table 2. Effectiveness assessment framework

### 3. Analysis of effectiveness across three modalities of climate partnerships

Climate change is one of the priority issues in sustainability agenda and a malign (Wettestad 1999, Hisschemoller and Gupta, 1999) type of problem with various conflicting issues, resolution of which requires a collaborative effort. Partnership incentives are essential for tackling climate change as they provide linkages to more benign issues and therefore increase a problem solving capacity (Hisschemoller and Gupta, 1999:195). Three modalities of partnerships can be observed within various segments of the issue area, i.e. CDM partnerships, institutionally set partnerships (REEEP, GVEP etc), larger partnership formed around UNFCCC..

#### 3.1 CDM partnerships

The CDM projects are examples of partnership with high degree of public-private interactions (Duyck, 2011) that involve a diverse set of actors, such as project investors (governments or private actors), multilateral institutions, non-profit organisations, carbon brokers and developing countries (Bäckstrand 2007). CDM partnerships operations involve relatively small quantities of resources and limited number of partners. CDM partnerships are characterised by simple non-hierarchical structure (Table 3), which are assigned in line with CDM guidelines (Decision 3/CMP.9 Guidance relating to the clean development mechanism, 9/CMP.7 Materiality standard under the clean development mechanism, 10/CMP.7 Modalities and procedures for carbon capture and storage , Modalities and procedures for a CDM). CDM partnerships do not have centralised body or/and process for decision-making. The project implementors are solely in charge of decision-making. A limited number of partners are consulted for implementation purposes in a form of one-off contact established to achieve compliance with the requirements for CDM projects. CDM partnerships operations involve relatively small quantities of resources and number of partners.

#### CDM Partnerships

Indicator	Value	Explanation
Goal attainment	High	According to UNEP DTU CDM/JI Pipeline Database, CDM projects demonstrate various degrees of achievement of emissions

reductions, depending on the type of project.<sup>2</sup> On average performance of CDM projects in terms of the ratio of expected CERs to actually issued ones has remained high with 95-100% (UNEP Riso Centre 2012)<sup>3</sup>

**Clarity of the mandate**      **High**      Strictly defined in line with modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism <sup>4</sup> and technical paper on issues relating to possible changes to the modalities and procedures for the CDM

**Reporting**      **High**      CDM has clear guidelines and standards for reporting on the progress of emissions reductions. According to CDM Standard<sup>5</sup>, the monitoring plan shall include: the operational and management structure to be put in place to implement the monitoring plan; Provisions to ensure that data monitored; Definition of responsibilities and institutional arrangements for data collection and archiving; accuracy level of measuring and measuring standards etc. <sup>6</sup>. The frequency of reporting vary across 7621 registered projects, however on average one to two progress reports are submitted per year

**Partner engagement within decision-making**      **Low**      CDM partnerships do not have a centralised body or/and process for decision-making. The project implementors are solely in charge of decision-making. A limited number of partners are consulted for implementation purposes in a form of one-off contact established to achieve compliance with the requirements for CDM projects. The project partners include: national governments, business firms, wider civil society. For instance, once the project is initiated by the investors, governments are consulted regarding Project Design Document (PDD) approval, which has to be endorsed by the national authority. According to CDM rule book,<sup>7</sup> designated operational entities (DOEs), which is a private firm, is consulted for validation of the project, which involves publicly displaying the PDD, receiving the comments,

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cers.htm>

<sup>3</sup> Strengths and weaknesses of the CDM in comparison with new and emerging market mechanisms Axel Michaelowa Paper No. 2 for the CDM Policy Dialogue, June 2012

<sup>4</sup> <https://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/index.html>

<sup>5</sup> [http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Standards/pp/pp\\_stan01.pdf](http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Standards/pp/pp_stan01.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> <https://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/index.html>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.cdmrulebook.org/421.html>

ensuring that changes being made to address the comments. Additionally, DOE is in charge of validating the emission reductions achieved at the end of the project.

**Public consultations**

Medium

However, there is an established process for public consultation, i.e. Global Stakeholder Process (GSP), the public engagement is frequently called as 'ticking the box' activity. Lack of standards affects the quality of consultation processes and there is evidence of poor engagement which resulted in validation of the projects with ineffective measures to provide affected communities with recourse, i.e. hydropower projects that include Stung Tatay (Cambodia); Panan (India); Santo Antônio (Brazil); Jirau (Brazil); Teles Pires (Brazil); Kamchay (Cambodia) Marañon (Peru); Nam Ngum 5 (Lao PDR); Yunnan Gongguoqiao (China); Barro Blanco (Panama); and Bonyic (Panama)).<sup>8</sup>

CDM partnerships prove to be effective instruments with high levels of accountability due to robust measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) systems. From the regime perspective, CDM partnerships demonstrate medium legitimacy (due to decision-making being solely done by the project implementors and lack of enforcement for engagement of civil society) and medium levels of transparency.

### 3.2 Institutionalised climate partnerships

Institutionalised climate partnerships have defined and centralised structures with the governing mechanisms in place (boards, steering committees etc). The partners are diverse and measured in hundreds. Collaborations among partners rely on varied methods through project implementation, funding, information exchange etc.

The following partnerships of the institutional modality have been chosen: REEEP, GVEP, WWEA, REN21. Table 1 shows the criteria used for selection of cases, i.e. all of the above partnerships are formalized as organisations, have network of partners with established rules for joining, centralised structure and are oriented towards service provision, while operating and the international level. All of the selected partnerships have a mandate to tackle climate change, however the methods of tackling, services and approaches to membership vary. Therefore, selection is made to reflect variations within institutional modality and with

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/submission-regarding-human-rights-to-the-cdm-7899>

consideration of data accessibility issues. All of the above partnerships have well established reporting systems and regularly published performance reports.

It's worth mentioning that despite the main commonality (being an institutionally set, open end partnerships aiming at mitigation of the climate change), the partnerships present substantial variations in terms of scope, actor representation and membership policies.

In terms of membership, REN21, and WWEA are conditionally open institutions. REEEP and GVEP are not accepting partners' applications at the moment, but both used to be conditionally open. As for specialization, REN 21 and WWEA are advocacy and information generating partnerships, GVEP and REEEP are oriented towards policy implementation (Johannesburg Plan) and advocacy.

REEEP invests in clean energy markets in developing countries to reduce CO2 emissions through a strategic portfolio of the projects. GVEP (Global Village Energy Partnership) works with local businesses in developing countries to increase access to modern energy and to improve the quality of lives for millions of people. WWEA is an international non-profit association embracing around 100 countries and working for the promotion and worldwide deployment of wind energy technology. REN21 promotes renewable energy to meet the needs of both industrialised and developing countries that are driven by climate change, energy security, development and poverty alleviation.

<b>REEEP</b>		
<b>Goal attainment</b>	<b>Low</b>	Lack of specifically set emission targets hampers concluding on the goal attainment. Only 6 percent of projects supported by REEEP resulted in direct reduction of emissions, while the majority of projects relate to capacity building measures (Parthan et al, 2010).
<b>Clarity of the mandate</b>	<b>High</b>	Partners roles and responsibilities, organs of REEEP, function of the meeting of partners, governing board, international secretariat are defined by Statutes <sup>9</sup>
<b>Reporting</b>	<b>Low</b>	Quantitative reviews of the progress are available only for the projects being implemented. Progress reports are based on descriptive analysis with qualitative assessments which are subjective and difficult to verify.
<b>Partner</b>	<b>Medium</b>	The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency

9

<http://www.reeps.ru/files/Statutes%20of%20the%20Renewable%20Energy%20and%20Energy%20Efficiency%20Partnership%20%28REEEP%29.pdf>

<b>engagement within decision-making</b>	Partnership is comprised of 385 member organisations. These include businesses, NGOs, industry associations, financial institutions and other civil society entities, as well as 45 national governments. <sup>10</sup> REEEP engages with a limited number of partners using joint-decision making via the Programme Board, which proposes longer-term programme priorities and oversees the monitoring and evaluation process. The Board is comprised of one representative from each of the regions covered by REEEP Programs, up to five donor representatives (represented by governments and business), one representative from an international NGO, and two representatives from business.
--	--

<b>Public consultations</b>	<b>Low</b> Mechanism for public consultation is not available
-----------------------------	---

---

**GVEP**

<b>Goal attainment</b>	<b>High</b> Lack of specifically set emission targets hampers concluding on the goal attainment. The website refers to 4.3 million tons of CO2 being avoided (implying that projects enabled GHG emissions to be avoided by the third parties) through the implemented projects, however there is no indication of the target that would allow an understanding of whether this amount is an adequate achievement.
------------------------	--

<b>Clarity of the mandate</b>	<b>Medium</b> Limited information available at the website, including GVEP values, approaches to programs, membership of the board of trustees, names of partners. The roles and responsibilities of partners, mechanisms for appointment of the board of trustees are not clearly defined.
-------------------------------	---

<b>Reporting</b>	<b>Low</b> Quantitative review of the progress is available only for the projects being implemented. Progress reports are based on descriptive analysis with qualitative
------------------	--

---

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.reeep.org/partners>

---

assessments that are subjective and difficult to verify.

<b>Partner engagement within decision-making</b>	<b>Low</b>	GVEP has two categories of partners, i.e. program and financial partners. Fifteen financial partners (represented by governments, business, IFIs and NGOs such as Barclays, DFID, EU, Garfield Weston Foundation, OFID, Sida, USAID, Vitol Foundation, World Bank, EEP Africa, Rotary Club, UN Foundation, ENERGIA) provide funds, which are further disbursed by GVEP to support projects implemented by 15 program partners (represented by private firms and NGOs such as National Geographic, Invested Development, Africa Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF), Ashden, BiD Network, GIZ, Hedon, Heifer International, Energia/ETC International, Solar Sister, Climate Innovation Centre Kenya, GSMA, Kiva, SEM Fund, Toniic). <sup>11</sup> . Decisions about organisation and program development are done by the Board of Trustees, which consists of 9 members none of which comes from the partner organisation <sup>12</sup> .
--	------------	--

<b>Public consultations</b>	<b>Low</b>	Mechanism for public consultation is not available
-----------------------------	------------	--

---

## WWEA

<b>Goal attainment</b>	<b>Low</b>	Lack of specifically set emission targets hampers concluding on the goal attainment.
<b>Clarity of the mandate</b>	<b>Medium</b>	No evidence of statute document has been found, role and membership of the working groups, procedures for becoming a partner. Little information available about organisational structure, roles and responsibilities of the Board and [procedures for appointing the Board members.

---

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.gvepinternational.org/en/business/our-trustees>

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.gvepinternational.org/en/business/our-trustees>

<b>Reporting</b>	<b>Low</b>	Progress reports include description of the events and activities undertaken. Quantitative reviews are made on membership growth.
<b>Partner engagement within decision-making</b>	<b>Low</b>	Partners are not engaged in decision-making. WWEA has 280 members from 75 countries; mainly, national associations, scientific institutes and companies. WWEA reaches its partners through informing, organisation of the World Wind Energy Conferences and publication of the bulletins. WWEA governing board consists of 11 members, none of which comes from the member organisation.
<b>Public consultations</b>	<b>Low</b>	Mechanism for public consultation is not available

---

## REN21

<b>Goal attainment</b>	<b>Low</b>	Lack of specifically set emission targets hampers concluding on the goal attainment.
<b>Clarity of the mandate</b>	<b>High</b>	Information regarding organisational structure, role and function of the General Assembly, steering committee, contributors, code of conduct and membership is available in REN21 Statutes.
<b>Reporting</b>	<b>Low</b>	Progress reports are based on descriptive analysis with qualitative assessments that are subjective and difficult to verify. Available quantitative estimates relate to the number of the visits of the webpage, downloads, extent of press-coverage, number of events organised.
<b>Partner engagement within decision-making</b>	<b>High</b>	REN21 network consists of 4 R&D companies, 9 governmental organisations, 13 NGOs, 11 industry associations and 10 international organisations. REN 21 has the most inclusive governing system in place, which is represented by the multi-stakeholder Steering Committee. The Committee is composed of up to 50 members who reflect the membership base and are

---

---

composed of the relevant actors from national governments, international organisations, industry associations, academia and NGOs. Furthermore, REN21 has a mechanism of General Assembly, which facilitated interaction among all the partnership members through regular meetings and information exchange

<b>Public consultations</b>	<b>Low</b>	Mechanism for public consultation is not available
-----------------------------	------------	--

Institutionally set partnerships demonstrate low levels of instrumental effectiveness due to uncertain contributions to reduction of GHGs emissions, however, this conclusion could be adjusted if taking into account the broader consequences and attainment of the goals specific to each partnerships.

In terms of institutional effectiveness, institutionally set partnerships demonstrate low to medium levels of accountability due to weak reporting and not explicitly clear mandate (in case of WWEA and GVEP). The regime effectiveness is low on average with the exception of REN21 which shows medium values due to a high degree of partner inclusiveness in decision-making.

### 3.3 UNFCCC regime as a partnership

UNFCCC is aiming at creation of an enabling environment and rule setting within the issue area. The relationship and roles of partners are strictly regulated. UNFCCC regime as a partnership can be characterised as a closed institution with high fragmentation, extensive number of partners involved, substantial scope and operations and global level. Similarly to CDM, the partnership operates in a highly regulated task-environment and role of partners are strictly set, but in contrast collaborations are continuous in time and include an extensive number of actors.

---

#### UNFCCC

Indicator	Value	Explanation
<b>Goal attainment</b>	<b>Low</b>	Inability to meet initial 5% target (non-ratification of the USA and withdrawal of Canada. (Morel and Shishlov, 2014) and adopting long-term post-Kyoto targets (Bäckstrand, 2007),

---

<b>Clarity of the mandate</b>	<b>High</b>	Clearly defined in corresponding frameworks such as UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol etc
<b>Reporting</b>	<b>High</b>	The procedures and standards for reporting, monitoring and evaluation are strictly set. Article 5 of the Kyoto protocol commits Annex I Parties to having, national systems for the estimation of greenhouse gas emissions in line with agreed methodologies. Article 7 requires Annex I Parties to submit annual greenhouse gas inventories, as well as national communications, at regular intervals, both including supplementary information to demonstrate compliance with the Protocol. Article 8 establishes that expert review teams will review the inventories, and national communications submitted by Annex I Parties
<b>Partner engagement within decision-making</b>	<b>Low</b>	<p>Characterised by unequal access to decision making. Governments are in charge of enforcing and making the rules, while civil society, academia and business are engaged as observers. (Bäckstrand, 2007)</p> <p>As stipulated in Article 7.6 of the UNFCCC: Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. According to Handbook<sup>13</sup>, currently more than 750 NGOs are admitted as observers. Business type of non-governmental actors are engaged through consultation and provision of oversight to validation and verification of the regime mechanisms (established by Kyoto Protocol Duyck, 2011).</p>

---

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook. Bonn, Germany: Climate Change Secretariat

<b>Public consultations</b>	<b>Medium</b>	According to E3G report, UNFCCC offers limited opportunities for citizen empowerment and participation of civil society. There is no standard process for consultation with public sector, however several civil society initiatives have been set up to monitor progress and outcomes and to act as observers to this process. e.g. AidData, International Aid Transparency Initiative.
-----------------------------	---------------	--

Partnership of climate change regime does not prove to be efficient “instrument” for achieving the targeted emissions reductions necessary for preventing adverse effects of climate change. Climate regime has high levels of institutional effectiveness and low to medium levels of regime effectiveness, due to limited opportunities for stakeholder engagement in decision making and involvement of civil society.

#### 4. Discussion

CDM partnerships demonstrates the highest ranks of effectiveness as instrument and institution, however they have the weakest partnership identity in terms of project-based structure based on limited number of short-term contacts with the companies and organisations. Despite lacking the element of joint decision making, partnerships contribute to citizen empowerment with established Global Stakeholder Process, which results in low to medium value of regime effectiveness (Table 4).

Type of effectiveness	Instrumental	Institutional	Regime
<b>CDM</b>	High	High	Low to medium
<b>REEEP, GVEP etc</b>	Low	Low to Medium	Low to medium
<b>UNFCCC</b>	Low	High	Low to medium

Table 4. Cross-comparison of effectiveness across three modalities of climate partnerships

Institutionally set partnerships have the low ranking within instrumental effectiveness. Low values of instrumental effectiveness could be explained by lack of accountability in terms of GHG reductions among this type of partnerships. However this modality provide valuable input and attain (alternative to GHG reductions) goals through knowledge exchange, capacity building and institutionalising the issues that are not explicitly addressed within the climate regime (e.g. contribution to climate change via development of SME in case of GVEP, alternative business models in case of REEEP). Consideration of broader outcomes is necessary for concluding on instrumental effectiveness of this modality, but it is lacking

quantitative methodologies (Walteer and Zurn, 2004) as there is a time lag between the activities and a change (Dombrovsky, 2008)) and high uncertainty and costs involved in calculation of such emissions reductions. Surprisingly, this modality shows the lowest rank in terms of institutional effectiveness and is surpassed by CDM and regime partnerships. Despite having clear mandates and structures, on average this modality has weak reporting and approaches to M&E, which result in low to medium value under institutional type of effectiveness. In terms of regime effectiveness, this modality demonstrates a similar low to medium value result to climate regime and CDM partnerships, which is explained by lack of participatory opportunities for partners and civil society.

Finally, climate regime proves to be an inefficient instrument and efficient institution, which results in second rank in terms of contribution to tackling climate issues through three types of effectiveness.

The variations in effectiveness are observed within institutional and instrumental categories. Variations in goal attainment could be possibly explained by the specialisation and scope of the problem, i.e. the smaller the scale, amount of the resources and partners involved the more efficient the partnership is. Variations in accountability could be related to degree of regulation of the task environment (Table 1). Institutionally set partnerships operate in considerably less regulated environment that is characterised by lack of standards for reporting and M&E. Hence the lower degree of regulation the lower level of accountability. However more detailed tendency analysis is needed for finding causal relationship between each independent variables of each modality of partnerships (such as structure and scope) and effectiveness values.

## **5. Conclusion**

Understanding partnership effectiveness is a complex issue, which relies on various assessment methods and approaches. An additional challenge relates to diversity of partnerships, which demonstrate significant variations in term of structure, scope of work, degree of institutionalisations and means through which they contribute to environmental governance. Different standards of effectiveness should be established to address these variations and allow for the comparative assessment of effectiveness.

The study determines the adequate definition of effectiveness for each modality and proposes a set of indicators for each type category of effectiveness standard. In such a way three analytical perspectives for assessing effectiveness have been developed and applied to each partnership modality specialising in climate change. Furthermore, each climate change partnership's modality is assessed against three standards of effectiveness. As a result of assessment, CDM partnerships appear to be the most effective based on their total

contribution against the three effectiveness standards, while institutionally set partnerships are the least effective for tackling climate change issues.

The proposed evaluation framework relies on a limited number of indicators and delivers a reductionistic conclusion, which has an illustrative purpose to demonstrate variations of partnership effectiveness depending on the analytical outlook. The more explicit conclusion could be made on the basis of large-n studies using comprehensive evaluation framework addressing other aspects of partnership contribution, such as transparency, adaptivity, innovation etc.

Furthermore, a detailed tendency analysis could be developed in order to detect the areas of partnerships specialisation and understand how the advantages of each modality could be used more effectively for the perspective of climate governance.

## REFERENCES

Andonova, Liliana. International Organizations Inc. - Patterns of Environmental Partnerships. in International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance eds Edited by Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner, Anna Schreyögg 2009

Auld G and Gulbrandsen LH. Transparency in nonstate certification: consequences for accountability and legitimacy. Global environmental politics. 2010. Volume 10 Number 3. Pp 97-119

Backstrand K. Are partnerships for sustainable development democratic and legitimate. In Public-private partnerships for sustainable development. Emergence, influence and legitimacy. Ed by Pattberg P, Biermann F, Chan S and Mert A. 2012 Pp 165-182

Backstrand K. Multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development: rethinking legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. European environment. VOL 16; NUMBER 5, ; 2006, Pp290-306

Bäckstrand K. Accountability of Networked Climate Governance The Rise of Transnational Climate Partnerships. Paper to be presented at the Amsterdam Conference on Earth System Governance, May 24-26 2007

Bauer et al. Treaty secretariats in global environmental governance in Biermann, Frank, Bernd Siebenhüner and Anna Schreyögg (eds), International Organizations and Global Environmental Governance. London, Routledge, 2009. Pp 174 – 191

Biermann F, Chan S, Mert A and Pattberg P. The overall effects of partnerships for sustainable development In Public-private partnerships for sustainable development. Emergence, influence and legitimacy. Ed by Pattberg P, Biermann F, Chan S and Mert A. 2012. Pp 69 – 88

Biermann F, Siebenhüner B (ed). 2009. Managers of Global Change. The influence of international environmental bureaucracies.

Borzel T, Risse T. 2005. Public-private partnerships: Effective and legitimated tools for transnational governance? Complex sovereignty: reconstituting political authority in the twenty-first century. pp 195-216

Bressers ATA and O'Toole LJ. The Selection of Policy Instruments: a Network-based Perspective. *Journal of Public Policy* 1998: 18, 3, 213–239

Brinkerhoff DW. Enabling environmental partnerships: the role of good governance in Madagaskars forest sector. In *Partnerships, governance and sustainable development. Reflections on theory and practice*. Ed by Glasbergen P, Biermann F and Mol APJ. 2007 PP 93-115

Chan S. Partnerships for sustainable development beyond the OECD world: comparing china and India. In *Public-private partnerships for sustainable development. Emergence, influence and legitimacy*. Ed by Pattberg P, Biermann F, Chan S and Mert A. 2012. Pp 115-137

Dellas E. Partnerships for sustainable development in the water sector: privatization, participation and legitimacy in *Public-private partnerships for sustainable development. Emergence, influence and legitimacy*. Ed by Pattberg P, Biermann F, Chan S and Mert A. 2012. Pp 183-208

Dingwerth K and Eichinger M. woqo Tamed transparency: how information disclosure under Global Reporting initiative fails to empower. *Global environmental politics*. Volume 10 Number 3. Pp 74-96

Dombrowsky I. Institutional design and regime effectiveness in transboundary river management – the Elbe water quality regime. *Hydrology and Earth System Sciences*. 2008. Vol. 12. Pp 223-238

Dombrowsky I. Institutional design and regime effectiveness in transboundary river management – the Elbe water quality regime. *Hydrology and Earth System Sciences*. 2008. Vol. 12. Pp 223-238

Duyck S. 7th Global Administrative Law Seminar: Private And Public-Private Global Regulation: Global Administrative Law Dimensions. Delegation to Private Actors of the Competences in Validation and Verification in the Kyoto Protocol Flexibility Mechanisms: Accountability Issues and the Role of the Public. 2011  
[http://www.academia.edu/1984570/Delegation\\_to\\_Private\\_Actors\\_of\\_the\\_Competences\\_in\\_Validation\\_and\\_Verification\\_in\\_the\\_Kyoto\\_Protocol\\_Flexibility\\_Mechanisms\\_Accountability\\_Issues\\_and\\_the\\_Role\\_of\\_the\\_Public](http://www.academia.edu/1984570/Delegation_to_Private_Actors_of_the_Competences_in_Validation_and_Verification_in_the_Kyoto_Protocol_Flexibility_Mechanisms_Accountability_Issues_and_the_Role_of_the_Public)

Gehring T. Methodological issues in the study of broader consequences. Underdal A and Young OR (eds), *Regime consequences*. Kluwer academic publishers. 2004. Pp219-246

Gehring T. Methodological issues in the study of broader consequences. Underdal A and Young OR (eds), *Regime consequences*. Pp219-246. 2004 Kluwer academic publishers.

Glasbergen P. Cooperative environmental governance. Public-private agreements as policy strategy. Ed by P Glasbergen. *Environment and policy* Vol 12. 1998

Grant RW and Robert O. Keohane. 2005. Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics. *American Political Science Review* 99 (1): 29-43.

A. Transparency in global environmental governance: a coming age? *Global environmental politics*. August 2010. Volume 10 Number 3 pp 1-9

Hahn T and Pinkse J. Private environmental governance through cross-sectoral partnerships: tensions between competition and effectiveness. *Organisation & environment*. 2014. Vol 27 (2) Pp 140-160

Haufler V. Disclosure as governance: the extractive industries transparency initiative and resource management in the developing world *Global environmental politics*. August 2010. Volume 10 Number 3. Pp 53 -71

Hisschenuller M and Gupta J. Problem-solving through International Environmental Agreements: the Issue of Regime Effectiveness. *International Political Science Review*. 1999. Vol.20. N2. Pp 151-174

Hovi J. Casual mechanisms and the study of international environmental regimes in in S Underdal and OR Young(eds). *Regime consequences. Methodological challenges and research strategies*. 2004 pp 71-86

Kankaanpaa P & O.R. Young The effectiveness of the Arctic Council Polar Research 2012. <http://www.polarresearch.net/index.php/polar/article/view/17176>

Klijn EH, Koppenjan JFM. Public management and policy networks: Foundations of a network approach to governance. *Public Management*, Volume 2, Number 2, 1 June 2000 , pp. 135-158(24)

Koch C, Buser M. Emerging metagovernance as an institutional framework for public private partnership networks in Denmark. *International journal of project management: the journal of the international project management associations*.Vol 24. N7.2006. pp 548-556

Kooiman J. *Governing as Governance*. Erasmus University, Rotterdam. 2003. SAGE Publications Ltd

Leach, W.D., Pelkey, N.W., Sabatier, P.A., 2002. Stakeholders partnerships as collaborative policymaking: evaluation criteria applied to watershed management in California and Washington. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 21 (4), 645-670.

Lederer M. From CDM to REDD+ What do we know for setting u effective and legitimate carbon governance?*Ecological economics* Volume70, Issue 11. 2011. Pp 1900-1907

Leehman M. Government-business relationship through partnerships for sustainable development: the Green Network in Denmark. *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning*, 8(3). Pp 235-257.

McInerney C. Partnership, participation and power. The contribution of the integrated Local Development program to the development of structure for local participation and decision making. Community workers co-operative. Galway. 2000. Paper presented at the seminar "Include us in – A discussion of issues of power and participation".

Meadowcroft J. 1998. Cooperative management regimes: A way forward? In: Glasbergen P (ed). *Co-operative environmental governance. Public – private agreements as a policy strategy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic,pp 21 – 42.

Mert A. Partnerships for Sustainable Development as Discursive Practice: Shifts in Discourses of Environment and Democracy, *Forest Policy and Economics*, Volume 11, Issues 5-6, October 2009, 326-339.

Meuleman L. Public management and the metagovernance of hierarchies, networks and Markets. The feasibility of designing and managing governance style combinations. 2008 Physica Verlag-Heidelberg

Michaelowa A. Strengths and weaknesses of the CDM in comparison with new and emerging market mechanisms. Paper No. 2 for the CDM Policy Dialogue, June 2012 [http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/research/1030\\_strengths.pdf](http://www.cdmpolicydialogue.org/research/1030_strengths.pdf)

Morel R and Shishlov I. Ex-post evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol: four key lessons for the 2015 Paris Agreement. *Climate Report*, N°44 · May 2014

[http://www.cdclimat.com/IMG/pdf/14-05\\_climate\\_report\\_no44\\_-\\_analysis\\_of\\_the\\_kp-2.pdf](http://www.cdclimat.com/IMG/pdf/14-05_climate_report_no44_-_analysis_of_the_kp-2.pdf)

OECD. 2006. Materials of the workshop on Evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of the partnerships.

Parthan B, Osterkorn M, Kennedy M, Hoskyns SJ, Bazilian M, Monga P, Lessons for low-carbon energy transition: Experience from the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), Energy and Sustainable Development (2010), doi:10.1016/j.esd.2010.04.003

Pattberg P. Private Governance Organizations in Global Environmental Politics: Exploring their Influences *in* Global Environmental Governance eds Edited by Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner, Anna Schreyögg. 2009

Runde D, Wise H. Seizing the Opportunity in Public-Private Partnerships. Strengthening capacity at the state department, usaid, and mcc. October 2011 Web: [www.csis.org](http://www.csis.org)

Skjarseth JB. From regime formation to regime functioning "Effectiveness" – coping with the problem of ozone depletion. Fridtjof Nansen Institute. 1992

Sorensen E and Torfing J. Making governance network effective and democratic through meta-governance. Public Administration Vol 87:2. 2009. Pp 234-258

Streets J. Accountability in Public Policy Partnerships. Palgrave Macmillan 2010

Szulecki K, Pattberg P and Bierman F. Partnerships for sustainable development in the energy sector: explaining variations in their problem solving effectiveness. In Public-private partnerships for sustainable development. Emergence, influence and legitimacy. Ed by Pattberg P, Biermann F, Chan S and Mert A. Pp 88-115

Thackway R and Olsson K. Public-private partnerships and protected areas: selected Australian case studies. Landscape and Urban Planning 44 (1999), Pp 87-97

Underdal A. Methodological challenges in the study of regime effectiveness. eds. Underdal A and Young OR. Regime consequences. Methodological challenges and research strategies. 2004 Pp 3-25

Visseren-Hamakers I, Arts B, Glasbergen P. Partnerships as governance mechanisms in development cooperation: Intersectoral North-South partnerships for marine biodiversity. Partnerships, governance and sustainable development. 2007. Pp 138-168

Von Malmberg F. Conditions for regional private-public partnerships for sustainable development – Swedish perspectives. European Environment N13. 2003 Pp.133-149

Walteer G and Zurn M. Into the methodological void. Researching systemic consequences of international regimes. Underdal A and Young OR (eds), Regime consequences. Pp307-333. 2004 Kluwer academic publishers.

Watson N. The contribution of multi-stakeholder partnerships to sustainable river basin development in Canada. The 2001 International Sustainable Development Research Conference Proceedings. 2001 Pp 319-327

Wettestad J. Nuts and bolts for environmental negotiators? Designing effective international regimes. A conceptual framework. January 1995

Wettestad J. Designing Effective Environmental Regimes: The Key Conditions. Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999

Wurzel RKW, Zito AR and Jordan AJ. Environmental governance in Europe. A comparative analysis of new environmental policy instruments. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2013

Young O R International governance. Protecting the environment in a stateless society. Cornell university press. 1994

Young O R International governance. Protecting the environment in a stateless society. Cornell university press. 1994

Young O. The problem of scale in human/environment relationships. In Local commons and global interdependence: heterogeneity and cooperation in two domains. Journal of theoretical politics. Ed R Keohane and E Ostrom. VOL. 6 N4 October 1994 pp 429-447

Young OR. Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: Existing knowledge, cutting-edge themes, and research strategies. Edited by William C. Clark, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, and approved November 2, 2011  
<http://www.pnas.org/content/108/50/19853.full>