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Franziska Weller

Securing Peace

The Role for
Guarantees in Post Conflict
Situations

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Freie Universität Berlin

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Conflict Situations**

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ARBEITSCHWERPUNKT POLITIK

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Arbeitsschwerpunkt Politik

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**Securing Peace –
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ARENA	National Republican Alliance
AU	African Union
CCPM	Joint Political-Military Commission
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIS/PKF	CIS Peacekeeping Force
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy
CNR	Commission of National Reconciliation
COPAZ	National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
D&D	Disarmament and Demobilization
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DV	dependent variable
FMLN	Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation
FNL	National Liberation Front
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FRODEBU	Front for Democracy in Burundi
GDP	gross domestic product
GNI	gross national income
HIIK	Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
ICG	International Crisis Group
IRP	Islamic Renaissance Party
IV	independent variable
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
ONUB	United Nations Mission in Burundi
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PALIPEHUTU	Party for the Liberation of Hutu People
PDP	People's Democratic Party
SIDDR	Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations

UNAVEM	United Nations Verification Mission
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UPRONA	Union of National Progress
US	United States of America
USD	US Dollars
UTO	United Tajik Opposition

"If you want to make peace with your enemy, you have to work with your enemy. Then he becomes your partner." ~ Nelson Mandela

1. Introduction

1.1 Civil wars in a global context

A short cyber-journey to the North of Yemen, Chad or Pakistan suffices to remind us that violent conflicts are neither a spook of the past, nor merely part of the larger 'African Tragedy.' Civil conflicts unfortunately continue to erupt around the globe and often outlast concerted efforts to end them. Given the detrimental effects on human and economic development, fighting out differences with violent means has never seemed very prudent to a security-seeking university student like myself. If one can at all speak of a consensus within the peace and conflict studies literature, it is that wars are a tricky phenomenon and that they do not allow for mono-causal explanations. With the end of the Cold War, a wave of civil conflicts swept the collapsed Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as well as destabilized states in Africa and Asia. Next to horror and misunderstanding, these intrastate conflicts stimulated academic inquiry. In the emerging field on the study of civil conflicts, severe inequalities, easy access to disposable resources, high unemployment among young males, ethnic hatred, and hostile neighborhoods and topographies – to name just a few – have all been cited as potent explanatory factors for the occurrence and resurgence of violent conflicts.

Given their complexity, it is little surprising that no magic formula has yet emerged for successful conflict settlement. When conflict parties are trapped within the borders of the same country and have no 'own' territory to retreat to after fighting, resolving their conflict necessarily involves more than drawing a truce line.¹ Many scholars and practitioners have argued that civil wars cannot be settled unless one side emerges as the decisive victor on the battlefield, able to coerce the loser(s) into abiding by the winner's terms. According to Kaufman, Licklider and others, reaching a negotiated settlement that lasts is close to impossible, especially when a conflict is ethnically motivated.² In absence of a military victory, "the organizational structures left in place make renewal of violence a constant possibility, undermining conventional politics."³ Furthermore, initializing cooperation can be an unacceptable show of weakness in the eyes of deadly antagonists.

¹ Dividing a war-torn country is hardly ever an option, given the strong international norm against secession and the difficulty of separating peoples and territories 'cleanly.' See Licklider (1995).

² Kaufman (1996).

³ Atlas and Licklider (1999) p.38. This finding was originally voiced in Licklider (1995).

However, starkly aware of the human and economic costs of all-out violent battles, the international community has started to get engaged before a war finds a 'natural' termination.⁴ Evidence from various data collection projects at the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) shows that between 1989 and 2007, 41 per cent of all violent conflicts have seen attempts at negotiated settlement via peace agreements.⁵ Public attention builds up when repeated rounds of negotiations culminate in a handshake between sunglasses, smiling leaders, who promise to stick to more civilized forms of interaction in the future. Excitement quickly fades, when later reports inform us that conflict has erupted anew. Evidently, only some peace agreements have brought peace, while others merely preceded the recurrence of armed struggles.

1.2 Research question

This research endeavor departs from the observation that the problem with making peace does not (exclusively) lie in the incompatibility of goals between combatants, the unwillingness to talk and to negotiate a compromise, or the lack of realization that cooperation is mutually preferable. Even when such obstacles have been addressed and an agreement has been reached, armed groups still sometimes opt for retaining their arms and for continuing to fight.

One conceivable explanation for the divergent success rates of negotiated civil war settlement is that peace agreements are inherently unstable compromises. If conflict parties are unwilling or unable to stick to the promised concessions, the peace deal turns into nothing more than an insincere demonstration of good intent. It becomes cheap ink on paper. Conflict parties may sign an agreement to buy time, to please an international patron or to display goodwill in front of the international donor community. What weakens this argument is that (recent) peace agreements tend to be more than hot air. With the mediating support from international negotiators, states craft intricate agreements with mutual guarantees to abide by them. Furthermore, signing ceremonies are highly publicized events, rendering a one-sided defection politically costly thereafter.

For the purpose of academic inquiry, trouble starts with the seeming non-comparability of peace processes: each follows an idiosyncratic logic and dynamic. Some therefore posit that peacemaking must be seen as a process "that involves the achievement of a range of

⁴ Easily forgotten today is the fact that before the end of the Cold War, a prevailing notion was that once a peace agreement had been signed, peace was practically certain. This was also reflected in the first generations of UN peacekeeping operations, which largely focused on war limitation. See Doyle and Sambanis (2007).

⁵ See Harbom et al. (2006).

peace milestones" without falling into a purely linear logic according to which countries transition from being at war to being at peace without ever recoiling.⁶ Accordingly, it is neither easy nor entirely sensible to locate the endpoint of a peace process and name it a success or a failure.

Critical voices in the field of conflict resolution state that an agreement and the process of implementing it need to produce a self-sustaining, deeply rooted and integrative peace before one can speak of success.⁷ In order to evaluate such long-term developments, the process would need to be assessed in all its facets. While such a view is certainly laudable for setting the bar high, it is not very suitable to focus research. Hampson rightly notes that observing conflict termination processes across generations causes a problem of "infinite regress:" we can never be sure that the prospect of failure does not lurk directly around the corner.⁸ For the sake of feasibility and parsimony, this study scales down the benchmark for success. Since it seems safe to say that dismantling one's armed capabilities is as risky for each conflict party as it is crucial for the larger peace prospects, demobilization stands at the center of the research question:

When conflict parties have signed a negotiated peace agreement, why do they sometimes demobilize their armed forces and sometimes stay mobilized and prepared to re-escalate the conflict?

1.3 Theoretical and practical relevance

Asking what makes or breaks peace processes is of theoretical and practical interest.⁹ From a theoretical point of view, this Master's thesis aims to put two determinants of peace implementation at a test. The two explanatory variables, power-sharing institutions and external security guarantees, are two amendable and comparable parts of fragile and hardly controllable peace processes. It is thereby relevant to ask not only about the general influence of each variable alone, but also about the relative weight of this influence in combination. Unlike ethnicity or structural factors concerning the socioeconomic and resource environment, these two factors are to some extent adjustable by policymakers and practitioners.

⁶ Brown et al. (2008) p.4.

⁷ Paris (1997), for example, adopts such a strict measure of success and identifies just a single case of success, Namibia, in his observed universe of cases. However, grouping cases in which all out war recurred in the same category of 'failure' as those where some of the conflict items remained unresolved seems unwise and unpractical for explaining qualified differences when success is seen on a continuum.

⁸ Hampson (1996) p.9.

⁹ For why this is desirable in principle, see King et al. (1994) p.15ff.

To date, the body of literature addressing this or a related object of research has grown from an array of (sub-)disciplines such as security studies, peace and conflict studies, political economy, and the feminist and human rights literature. Researchers have made great strides in the systematic collection of conflict and post-conflict data (partly attributable to a number of research centers and databases)¹⁰ and the identification and refinement of theories on war recurrence and conflict resolution. Indebted to (and slightly swamped by) this breath of existing studies, I venture onto the hardly beaten path of conducting a small-n, cross-national comparative case study. Compared to the comprehensive yet highly simplified quantitative studies on the one hand and the narrative, multi-factorial and therefore indeterminate single case analyses on the other, a qualitative comparison can contribute to the precision of hypotheses while further enlightening the studied cases empirically. Four cases have been selected for scrutiny: Angola, Burundi, El Salvador and Tajikistan.¹¹

Studying cases in which conflict has already erupted, this analysis does not cover the entire spectrum between war and peace, let alone democracy and development. In effect, it cannot explain why conflicts sometimes turn violent in the first place and why their escalation can be completely avoided elsewhere. On a similar note, guaranteeing an end to the violence may require certain measures that may later inhibit the creation of a deeper, more sustainable form of peace. Three such measures that are often criticized for 'buying' a false peace are purely military interventions that attempt to impose peace by non-peaceful means where local parties are still at war,¹² short-term economic relief efforts that weaken long-term growth, and the political empowerment of the most violent groups via power-sharing pacts.¹³

To differentiate between depths and qualities of peace, the literature has coined the terms 'negative' peace, which is achieved with an end to violence and 'positive' peace, which is not achieved until all conflict parties have reconciled the causes of their conflict and/ or until the country has reached a certain level of democratization. Recognizing that positive peace is in fact the more desirable goal to achieve in the long run, I hold that negative peace is by no means negative in the normative sense of the word. In reality,

¹⁰ Among the more influential ones are the International Crisis Group, the US Institute of Peace, the World Bank Research Unit of Conflict and Conflict-Affected Countries and the UCDP.

¹¹ See ch. 4.5.

¹² See Galtung (1998).

¹³ A critique of power sharing for its anti-democratic effects can be found in Roeder and Rothchild (2005b).

even this inferior level of peace is not an easily attained goal. Not reaching it renders subsequent steps rather utopian.¹⁴

1.4 Method and research design

In terms of structure, the thesis adheres to a positivistic logic. It thereby follows the behaviorist scientific school with its premises that causal relations exist and that they help to explain objectively observable social outcomes.¹⁵ Though social phenomena are incredibly complex, a scientist can grasp and explain them by making theory-guided observations. According to this paradigm, complete objectivity, in the sense that the nature of observations is independent from the scientist's eye, is difficult to attain, but possible in principle. As elaborated in chapter four, the thesis employs the central elements of a positivistic research procedure, namely to identify assumptions, to deduce explanatory hypotheses from existing theories, to apply them in a cross-national comparative study and to evaluate the results in view of their relevance for future theorizing.¹⁶ The case-independent definition of one dependent variable (DV) and two independent variables (IV) provides the framework for a structured comparison of cases.¹⁷ Given the constraints on time, space and data availability, this thesis does not go far beyond the comparison itself. The downturn of this limitation is that when the test lets us assume a correlation between the IVs and the DV, the hypothesized causal connection between them may merely be suggested without proof.¹⁸ For this purpose, process-tracing would be the better methodological choice.¹⁹

As suggested by the research question, the DV is the degree of demilitarization, one step on the path towards implementation and a central sub-goal spelled out in practically every peace agreement. A detailed definition of demilitarization as it is understood in this study and a justification for the focus on the security sector will be given in chapter 4.1.

Theoretical inspiration for the explanatory hypotheses springs from cooperation theory, accounting for realist and institutionalist propositions on the conditions that facilitate cooperation in the most unlikely situations, namely in matters of security. With a realist spin to it, the credible commitment theory predicts that actors are unlikely to cooperate in

¹⁴ Wolff discusses this issue by referring to two distinctive policy choices: conflict management (i.e. putting a (permanent) end to the fighting and containing the negative effects of conflict) vs. conflict settlement (i.e. "to settle actual disputes or provide conditions in which the conflict parties themselves could address their issues in non-violent ways" within an established institutional framework). Wolff (2006) p.133.

¹⁵ Hollis and Smith (1991) pp.45-91.

¹⁶ Van Evera (1997), ch. 1 and 2.

¹⁷ On the choice of the comparative method see ch. 4.4.

¹⁸ See Popper (1953).

¹⁹ Note that process-tracing, widely used in qualitative social research, has not truly penetrated the realm of peace and conflict studies yet.

the absence of some coercive force. An institutionalist interpretation of a credible commitment concurs that disarmament is difficult to achieve without enforcement, but stresses consensual aspects over coercive ones. Pointing to the fact that actors can mutually agree upon requesting third party assistance to make each side's commitment to cooperation more credible, institutionalists argue that actors can and will create institutions that foster cooperation. As long as cooperation is attractive enough, it can evolve without coercive measures. For the purpose of answering the stated research question, this implies that the quality of peace agreements,²⁰ the nature of post-agreement (political) institutions, and the presence of third party assistance matter.

In addition, I keep an eye on the most important competing explanations, most of which single out the conflict environment as the main determinant of peace implementation success. According to this logic, the structural and sociopolitical factors such as income levels and resource endowment determine the likelihood of the emergence of spoilers and their potential strength to obstruct peace. In order to take the baseline prospects for peace into account, some of these competing explanatory factors are held constant via the case selection.

1.5 Outline

The thesis is structured into six parts. This introduction is followed by a review of the most pertinent literature on peacemaking and war recurrence. The review serves a three-fold purpose: it clarifies central terms, introduces the wider scholarship of post-conflict studies and offers various competing explanations. The third chapter develops the theoretical basis for the two explanatory hypotheses. The methodological approach, including the operationalization of the variables, is described and explained in chapter four. Chapter five presents the empirical analysis, which is summarized and critically evaluated in the concluding chapter.

2. Approaching the challenge of conflict settlement

2.1 Locating the post-agreement phase

The object of study being post-agreement phases after conflict, the term conflict should be clarified. The focus here is on armed intrastate conflicts, as opposed to interstate

²⁰ Even though ceasefires and peace agreements, given their ad hoc nature, are not necessarily institutions, they perform similar functions which institutionalists set out to be conducive to cooperation: agreements and the types of institutions they create filter and provide information, reduce uncertainty, set standards and increase the valuation of the future. See Fortna (2004b).

conflicts or unarmed conflicts. I use the terms intrastate conflict and civil war synonymously and define them broadly. A civil war is an armed conflict that causes at least 25 battle-related deaths²¹ per year, “occurs within the recognized boundary of a state, involves the state as a principal combatant, [and] includes rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the state.”²² Certain conflict stages and corresponding strategic responses are common to most conflicts.




Figure 1: Conflict stages and strategic responses²³

With the signature of a peace agreement, a conflict moves from the containment to the settlement phase.²⁴ The term ‘post-conflict’ denotes this specific post-agreement stage in a conflict (roughly marked by the shaded circle). A peace agreement, or peace accord, is a written document signed between two or more warring parties consenting to make peace, “to explicitly regulate or resolve their basic incompatibility.”²⁵ It usually includes the establishment of a ceasefire and the promise to erect new political and legal institutional structures.²⁶ An agreement never ends a conflict per se. Rather, the phase that follows an agreement is distinct from the actual conflict phase because agreements are supposed to “provide a framework in which conflicting goals can be accommodated and pursued by means other than political violence.”²⁷

To some extent, it is a technical document signed by elites. On another level, it can be of

²¹ Analogous to the UCDP’s definition. Most quantitative studies adopt the ‘magic’ 1,000-deaths per year threshold to consider a conflict a war. Since my study is more concerned with the strategic behavior of conflict parties and third party interveners than with the overall number of violent acts committed or the number of people killed per year, the specific threshold is of marginal interest. Though all cases chosen for the empirical analysis here produced an enormous amount of victims (thus theoretically allowing for a narrower definition), I refrain from artificially limiting the applicability of my findings. Furthermore, the question of whether and to what extent the specific levels of destruction are comparable across conflicts is thereby left aside.

²² Doyle and Sambanis (2000) p.783.

²³ Figure adopted from Ramsbotham et al. (2006) p.11. Note that the depiction implies a rough sequence, not a perfectly linear process.

²⁴ The goal in this particular sequence is to put an end to direct violence, rather than the structural or cultural violence underlying a conflict. See Ramsbotham et al. (2006) p.10.

²⁵ Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1997) p.342.

²⁶ Bell (2006) p.374.

²⁷ Wolff (2006) p.155

high symbolic value for the entire population. One should distinguish between partial/ interim agreements and comprehensive/ final settlements.²⁸ An observable trend over the last decade is the tendency towards more detailed, comprehensive agreements that often spell out timetables for implementation and for compliance with commitments. One reason may well be the increasing presence of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in peace processes, bringing along international lawyers and negotiators. Analytical problems arise when accounting for the common reality that negotiated settlements usually bring forth a successive number of agreements, addressing the same or different points of contention and including the same or different conflict parties. Recognizing the potential for distortions, this study follows the lead of previous authors and takes the most comprehensive peace agreement as the point of departure.²⁹ Nevertheless, since actor behavior must be evaluated as part of an overall process, subsequent agreements, including less comprehensive ceasefire agreements, factor into the evaluation of the case on all the variables under consideration.

The object of study is ultimately to analyze and predict conflict party behavior. Thus choices need to be made on the treatment of groups as the unit of analysis. The terms group, faction, party and antagonist have been used synonymously throughout the hitherto discussion. This practice will be continued as we proceed, with the added remark that the incumbent government is one conflict party according to the here employed civil war definition. In the empirical analysis, the official group names and acronyms will be used. It makes sense to "focus on individuals or groups that are in a position to alter conflict dynamics in one way or another."³⁰ Even when disregarding non-potent groups, the actor spectrum is diverse. It consists of the main contenders, smaller rebel groups, political leaders and a range of outside actors.

Group behavior can theoretically be observed on two levels: the individual combatant and the leadership, which usually converges in the hands of a single male, such as a president, a commanding general or warlord. It has been rightly pointed out that rebel groups tend to be highly fractionalized and internally incohesive, rendering the formal leadership out of control. In addition, many of the assumptions about the motivation of combatants and their leaders in war are difficult to gauge. Extensive interviews of

²⁸ Bell (2006) sensibly differentiates further between three types of peace agreements, dependent on the phase of peace talks, which they delineate.

²⁹ This makes sense considering that the content of the foregone agreements is usually integrated into the comprehensive one.

³⁰ Jeong (2008) p.22.

individual leaders and fighters would only start to shed light on the true driving force behind their actions: were combatants motivated by their feeling of insecurity or did they mostly weigh their options in economic terms? Generating the kind of data that would be needed to understand individual motivations in a (post-)conflict environment is not within reach for this thesis.

As will become clear in the next section, most theorists assume some level of group cohesion. Treating each group as a single actor reduces complexity for their proposed analytical models. The theoretical model presented in chapter 3 follows this lead with the considerable feeling of unease that was just elucidated.

2.2 Review of explanations for peacemaking and war recurrence

Since the deployment of the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1948, much of the practical experience in conflict resolution has been characterized by learning-by-doing. Systematic academic inquiry into the topic has only taken foot in the mid 1990s, which means that determining robust factors for successful peacemaking remains dodgy. Yet in light of the boom in the literature since then, it is impossible to offer an exhaustive overview here.³¹ Rather, this sub-chapter outlines the central arguments that have been made to explain different outcomes of peace processes. It will become clear that the overall complexity of post-conflict situations does not lend itself to lean theorizing, resulting in the fact that many scholars have advocated a 'hodge podge' multi-factor approach, testing all potentially potent factors in quantitative analyses or using them to enlighten a single case in all its facets.

The most common goal in academic research on this subject is to explain war recurrence or, conversely, a return to peace (and democracy).³² Proposed explanations for this ambitious endeavor can roughly be grouped into four categories, depending on what is assumed to primarily motivate combatant groups: hatred, grievance, greed, or fear. The most pertinent explanations that authors have brought forth differ with respect to these underlying motivations. Consequently, the brief review of the literature is structured along these four basic sensations. Note that theories hinging on the fear factor are only briefly mentioned here and discussed in more detail in the theoretical model in chapter 3.

When hatred is the driving factor, scholars propose cultural, historical, or war-related group incompatibility as the best explanation for why combatants fail to cooperate. The

³¹ I recommend the more detailed but succinct overviews by Collier et al. (2008) and Mehler (2008).

³² Note that many explanations for the recurrence of wars are equally applicable to the outbreak of wars; essentially one complex body of literature addresses both questions.

most common point of departure is that conflicts are more intractable when different ethnic groups fight them. Some interpret ethnicity as a primordial phenomenon and an inherently conflict-stirring factor in social life.³³ Others stress that ethnicity does not matter until powerful elites abuse it to attain other goals.³⁴ The common denominator is that there is a higher potential for conflict in 'ethnically mined' states, but that it is not ethnic difference itself that creates conflict and hampers conflict resolution.³⁵

In a post-conflict environment, group antagonism will always be heightened. The fighting will have defined identities anew and aggravated mistrust, whether the groups define themselves in ethnic, religious, political, ideological, linguistic or socio-economic terms. According to this logic, the costliness of the war, measured in overall duration, the severity of the killing, the loss of lives, and economic destruction best predicts the probability of war recurrence.

"Earlier wars set the stage for conflicts that occur in later years because [excessive] violence exacerbated ethnic divisions making coexistence difficult [...], or because the human costs of war created psychological barriers to building peace."³⁶

No consensus has been reached on how to measure or even define ethnicity. The measures of choice in small-n and large-n comparative case studies are (1) overall ethnic and religious heterogeneity³⁷ and/ or (2) ethnic dominance and repression.³⁸ It has been largely agreed that the first measure, ethnic heterogeneity, is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain why conflicts turn violent,³⁹ partly because a highly stagnant factor is unlikely to explain something as volatile as violent conflict. Inter-ethnic hatred only comes to the surface when groups have maltreated each other in the past, which is implied by the second measure.

When the institutional make-up of a society enforces ethnic polarization, causing ethnic favoritism and narrowly (instead of nationally) targeted policies, then the disadvantaged

³³ A prominent representative of this view is Horowitz (1985).

³⁴ See Snyder (2000).

³⁵ Fearon (1995) proposes that interethnic violence would not occur if ethnic difference, combined with unstable political institutions did not give rise to a commitment problem resulting in mutual fear and mistrust. Also see Wolff (2006), Sawyer (2004) p.2, Hale (2008) and Lake and Rothchild (1996). Also note that Gurr (2000) statistically examines an overall decrease in ethnic conflicts in the world.

³⁶ Walter (2004) p.372.

³⁷ See Collier and Hoeffler (2001). Fearon (2003) offers a theoretical and empirical guide on the use and employability of ethnic and cultural fractionalization indexes.

³⁸ See Birnir (2009).

³⁹ Refer to Collier et al. (2008) for a recent study that has generated such a finding. Interestingly enough, many quantitative studies seem rather biased in the way they 'waste' serious thought on the ethnic factor in the sense that they have come up with a qualitative proxy.

group may choose to resort to arms to voice its grievances.⁴⁰ Then grievance is the primary motivator, and the explanation can be found in the nature of (political) institutions.⁴¹ In this context, the connections between decentralized forms of government and conflict resolution has started to receive increased attention.⁴² The role of political institutions after conflict is the topic of chapter 3.2., where I examine the existing literature on power sharing and some of its alternatives in greater detail.

Somewhat related to institutional arrangements, the structural environment influences grievances and the baseline prospects for peace.⁴³ Few would disagree that the probability for former antagonists to cooperate in Angola was lower from the start than in Macedonia. Especially prominent in quantitative studies, indicators for a higher degree of difficulty include the overall number of combatants, the number of hostile parties, the degree of hostility in the region, income levels and state capacities, and the presence of disposable resources.⁴⁴ All of the above in one way or another condition the specific opportunity structures shaping the motivation for peace vs. war. And opportunity structures shape incentives. Doyle and Sambanis differentiate between offensive and defensive incentives that drive post-war behavior. According to the authors, offensive incentives include the prospect of reaping the spoils of war by seizing the property of rivals, imposing a specific ideology on the state and its people, selling readily extractable resources, or all of the above.⁴⁵

Offensive incentives entail greed as a motivational element. Those to whom renewed war is more lucrative than peace may chose to fight on. Specific war economies are especially pertinent in this context. The greatest challenge in any peace process is to get everyone with a stake in peace on board while managing or containing those who profit from a continuation of war. Differentiating between sincere peacemakers and spoilers is the essence of the spoiler literature around Stedman.⁴⁶ Peace processes are bound to create winners and losers. Actors who find themselves on the losing end will try to undermine or derail the process. They will do so by refusing to sign an agreement in the first place –

⁴⁰ See MacGarry (1993) and Birnir (2009).

⁴¹ Political institutions define the way in which interests are expressed and aggregated and policies are decided on and implemented. The most commonly examined formal political institutions are constitutions, government systems, and electoral and legislative rules. Many of these rules and basic laws look rather similar from country to country without producing the same outcome. Hence it is important to note, as has been done extensively in the institutionalist literature, that informal rules and norms oftentimes constrain and shape behavior.

⁴² Bunce and Watts (2005) and Schou and Haug (2005).

⁴³ The term baseline prospects is borrowed from Fortna (2004b). Stedman et al. (2002) group the variables defining the implementation environment under a "difficulty index."

⁴⁴ See Stedman et al. (2002), Walter (2002) and Collier et al. (2008).

⁴⁵ Doyle and Sambanis (2000) p.780.

⁴⁶ Stedman (1997). Also see Zahar (2003) p.121.

outside spoilers – or by failing to abide by the agreed terms – inside spoilers. “Even the best-designed settlements must be prepared for violence from leaders and organizations who decide that the kind of peace in question is not in their interest.”⁴⁷

Spoiler theory suffers from at least two weaknesses. First, it lacks a magic formula to differentiate (*ex ante*) between a spoiler and an armed group that bargains hard but is honestly interested in making peace. Critics secondly point out that a group leader is never eternally defined as a spoiler, not least as one spoiler type. On the contrary, “the concept of a spoiler can only be defined in relation to a given peace agreement”⁴⁸ and to the context in which negotiations and implementation take place. A non-cooperative armed group may be strategically marginalized along the way (as in the case of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia), sign a separate agreement later on (like the CNDD-FDD in Burundi), or disintegrate (like various armed factions in Tajikistan).

Stedman argues that what makes the difference between success and failure is that potential spoilers be treated in line with their identified goals and their level of commitment to achieving these goals. Depending on this assessment, international custodians of peace must choose to try and induce, socialize or coerce them.⁴⁹ I will return to this proposition in the next chapter, where I discuss power sharing as a way to increase the peace dividend for those who participate (strategy of inducement) and a firm third-party commitment to the peace process as a way to lower the costs of de-escalation and to raise the cost of re-escalation (strategy of coercion).

Zartman also departs from the idea of a cost-benefit calculus when he theorizes that warring parties are unlikely to negotiate in good faith unless the moment is ripe in military terms. Only when parties have realized that they are locked into a military stalemate will they be willing to accept something lower than total victory over their opponent.⁵⁰ The moment to settle a war is ripest when opponents are more or less balanced in their economic and military capabilities. Such a hurting stalemate is also more likely to occur when a war has been fought for an extended length of time and when it was costly, because factions may then lack the manpower and financial capacities to continue their military efforts.

⁴⁷ Downs and Stedman (2002) p.8.

⁴⁸ Zahar (2003) p.116.

⁴⁹ Stedman offers a typology of spoiling potential based on groups' goals and their level of commitment to achieving these goals: greedy spoilers with a low commitment pose the lowest risk, limited spoilers (with limited goals) with a high commitment are more problematic and total spoilers (total goals and a strong commitment) are likely to completely derail a peace process. See Stedman (1997).

⁵⁰ Zartman (2001).

Outside actors can influence the degree to which a stalemate hurts the warring parties by imposing economic sanctions, denying aid payments, or capping supply chains for strategic equipment. In the past, the economic muscle of the international community has usually been used to force the stronger party to the negotiating table. Once an agreement has been reached, strategic aid disbursement becomes more important, especially for the demilitarization process. The costs associated with cantonment, the collection and destruction of weapons, and the compensation of ex-combatants are extremely high. Well-targeted aid programs and higher levels of development are both associated with smoother demilitarization processes.

This leaves us with the last of the four underlying motivations: fear. Hinging explanations on the fear factor makes particular sense for post-conflict situations. Parties may want peace, but cannot commit to it out of the suspicion to be cheated. The next chapter elaborates the dilemma of commitment in more detail. It first introduces a security-related conceptualization of post-conflict situations. The subsequent sub-chapters 3.2. and 3.3. describe two forms of guarantees with the potential to alleviate the commitment problem, resulting in the two explanatory hypotheses for the theoretical model of this thesis.

3. Theoretical model: overcoming the commitment problem

3.1 Credible commitment theory

Credible commitment theory departs from the assumption that antagonists after war, when they are boundedly rational actors,⁵¹ are concerned about their security. Without a clear winner, cooperation is required to secure peace, especially in the military realm. However, disarming and demobilizing may resemble suicide if the former antagonist defects. Stated in game theoretic language, in the absence of a credible commitment by the other to cooperate, defection is the dominant strategy. The decision to end or reignite a violent conflict, according to this model, depends not only on the evaluation of the current situation, but also on the anticipation of the risk of being attacked in the future.⁵² From the point of view of a rebel force that fights for national power, without a credible

⁵¹ In highly simplified terms, rational actors weigh the costs and benefits of an outcome and chose their actions accordingly. Rationality is bounded by uncontrollable constraints in the environment of a decision-maker: limited or asymmetric information, time pressure, high levels of uncertainty, socially determined heuristic shortcuts, and so on.

⁵² See Federspiel (2008) p.13.

assurance that government forces will not overrun them as soon as the balance of power shifts in its favor, cooperation is unattractive.⁵³

Usually applied to the nature of the international system under the defensive realist paradigm,⁵⁴ the concept of anarchy also helps to enlighten security concerns of sub-state entities in weak and destabilized states: limited knowledge about the other side's actions paired with the absence of an intact coercive authority creates fear and insecurity.⁵⁵ Such mutual security fears, as Snyder and Jervis suggest, contribute to the outbreak or onset of civil wars. The authors depart from Hobbes' insights that (1) the state normally provides a buffer against anarchy and (2) "because individuals are more vulnerable than are states, the security dilemma is likely to be more severe in civil than in international anarchy."⁵⁶

Walter lists three theoretical solutions to facilitate cooperation in situations with a weakened or absent sovereign authority.⁵⁷ First, parties can resort to increased deterrence by enhancing their unilateral defensive security measures, making an attack by the other side yet more costly and less likely to be victorious. A (widely contested) scenario for tense interstate relationships, this is not an option likely to lead to an overall appeasement of intrastate relations. Also, as Posen points out, the security dilemma is more difficult to counteract "when offensive and defensive military forces are more or less identical," as is the case with light weapons, used in today's civil wars.⁵⁸

A second possibility is the segmentation of the peace process into reciprocal implementation periods, making cooperation per period less risky via tit-for-tat.⁵⁹ Such a tactic can ensure that sides are more or less equal during the demobilization process, but it cannot prevent groups from withholding troops and equipment for later attack. With limited information and without monitoring, the inter-subjective interpretation of the situation resembles the prisoner's dilemma, even when tit-for-tat is encouraged. Without

⁵³ See Fearon (1995). Note that Fearon was among the first to make use of the commitment problem to explain the rise of ethnic warfare in the collapsed Soviet Union. Walter and Snyder postulate that the commitment problem is equally applicable to other conflict or post-conflict situations, whether or not these involve specifically ethnic factions. See Walter and Snyder (1999).

⁵⁴ See Jervis (1978).

⁵⁵ See Posen (1993).

⁵⁶ Snyder and Jervis (1999) p.15.

⁵⁷ Walter (1999) and Walter (2002).

⁵⁸ Posen (1993) p.104. Light weapons are defined as "man- and truck-portable weapons" like small arms, grenades and land mines. See Spear (1996) p.377.

⁵⁹ Initially proposed as a solution to cooperation under anarchy in the seminal experiment by Axelrod (1984).

a third party enforcer, the end result (defection in the final period) will be the same.⁶⁰ Consequently, defection is the preferred strategy in each preceding step.

Third, there is mutual or unilateral reassurance:⁶¹ If a conflict party is sincerely interested in a cooperative outcome, it can send costly signals. According to this logic, reassurance is the rational answer to mistrust when cooperation is the mutually preferred outcome.⁶² According to Hartzell and Hoddie, carefully crafted, step-wise implementation processes can reassure antagonists of their lasting commitment to the overall settlement process.⁶³ However, as the authors admit, in a context where mutual suspicions, destroyed infrastructures and information shortages obstruct direct communication, signals may quickly be blurred or misunderstood. For such precarious scenarios, third party verification remains an essential ingredient.

The problem with all of these remedies is that they are not automatically binding, ergo not necessarily credible. This means that even if conflict parties are tired of fighting and want to make peace, they are faced with the challenge of crafting credible guarantees against immediate or future exploitation. The two most relevant forms of such guarantees are introduced below: power sharing as an institutional guarantee and external security guarantees.

3.2 Raising the stakes: Power sharing as an institutional guarantee

Some promise to share strategic decision-making power has been part of most negotiated settlements since the 1990s.⁶⁴ As this chapter will make clear, these promises can vary greatly in their nature, strength and overall credibility. For a better understanding of the argument that is made here, it is helpful to take a step back with a look at the general role for political institutions after civil war.

If territorial partition is not a viable option for solving a civil war, then conflict resolution requires the (re-)construction of an institutional framework in which a single sovereign government makes political decisions. Institutions are here defined as the

⁶⁰ Note that Ostrom et al. (1992) offer a model for devising self-enforcing institutions to overcome cooperation problems "without a sword." The essence of Ostrom's "alternative solution" is the idea that the actors "themselves can make a binding contract to commit themselves to a cooperative strategy that they themselves will work out." (p.15). If an interaction setting extends over time, "and individuals adopt internal norms, it is possible for individuals to utilize contingent strategies, not simply independent strategies, in relating to one another." (p.36). However, if time horizons are short and players heavily discount the future, a central element of this institutional arrangement is the (mutually agreed upon) appointment of a third party to monitor and sanction behavior.

⁶¹ Advocates of reassurance originated as a critique of the deterrence literature during the Cold War.

⁶² Kydd (2000).

⁶³ See Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) p.305.

⁶⁴ Hartzell and Hoddie (2007).

humanly devised constraints on social interaction⁶⁵ that can foster both conflict and cooperation. Specific institutional arrangements have many interconnected trade-offs and unexpected side effects, especially in the political realm; finding the right formula is difficult. As Rothchild and Roeder put it, former antagonists, governments, and international organizations “are challenged to design political arrangements that can simultaneously meet the tests of representativeness, democratic accountability, effective governance, and political stability.”⁶⁶

An institutional structure with democratic character is not only internationally more acceptable than an autocratic one.⁶⁷ A democratic system constrains the ability to make unilateral changes to laws and constitutions. Hence democratic structures contain a more credible and more sustainable institutional guarantee against future exploitation than autocratic or dictatorial ones. Promising the naissance of a democratic polity, elections have often served as milestones in civil war settlement. However, evidence shows that elections after conflict are amazingly destabilizing.⁶⁸ Before institutions for implementation and oversight have been put in place, conflicts have often reignited over the contestation of election results.⁶⁹

“Winner-take-all’ elections encourage zero-sum contests. Unless there is some form of compensation, the loser will have a strong incentive to take up arms and return to a renewed campaign of violence in pursuit of political objectives.”⁷⁰

Power-sharing pacts have the potential to circumvent this problematique. Although power-sharing institutions are difficult to craft, manage and enforce, and inflexible for future adaptation, they may well be the least worst political arrangement to manage the transition from a negotiated peace to a lasting peace.⁷¹

In a broad sense, power sharing refers to joint decision making. Power-sharing institutions as defined by Roeder and Rothchild are “formal institutions that distribute

⁶⁵ Analogous to Douglass North’s definition in North (1990).

⁶⁶ Rothchild and Roeder (2005) pp.3-5.

⁶⁷ See Stedman (1992) for a poignant discussion of the democratic spirit of the “new interventionists” in the Cold War aftermath.

⁶⁸ A phenomenon that Collier (2009) recently reemphasized. The current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan are cases in point.

⁶⁹ Snyder (2000).

⁷⁰ Crocker and Hampson (1996) p.63.

⁷¹ One of the most contentious issues in the academic and practical world of conflict resolution is how to manage the transition from power sharing institutions to more flexible forms of democracy that foster reconciliation and integrationist political parties instead of deepening ethnically based voting blocs. For the most informative study to date refer to Noel (2005).

decision-making rights within the state."⁷² According to the more detailed definition by Gates and Strom,

"a power-sharing arrangement is an agreement that constrains the set of agents (politicians, policy makers) that are empowered to make political decisions in a given community, for example a state. The parties to such agreements are usually political parties, armed forces, or other organizations representing different social groups whose perceived interests are significantly at odds with one another."⁷³

In other words, the aim of power-sharing agreements is to guarantee inclusive, partitioned and/ or predetermined decisions via mandates (hard guarantees) or opportunities (soft guarantees).

Originally, the term dates back to Arendt Lijphart, who prominently coined it in the context of comparative politics. The idea of power sharing in the sense of Lijphart's consociationalism, inspired by cases like the Netherlands or more recently South Africa,⁷⁴ is to foster cooperation between opposing factions in plural/ deeply divided societies and to create a moderate and democratic form of government. Thus, it entails much more than the mere inclusion of the weaker parties in government. The defining elements to be found in a consociational polity are: (1) a grand coalition cabinet, requiring elite cooperation, (2) group autonomy, allowing for a certain degree of self-rule regarding issues that are of interest to particular groups but not to the commonality, (3) proportionality at the basis of the electoral system and (4) a minority veto, the instrument of last resort for minorities to protect their interests.⁷⁵

In a rather normative debate on the merits of different institutional arrangements for mitigating ethnic conflict, Horowitz, Roeder, Rothchild and others have opposed Lijphart, Nordlinger and their followers and propagated an integrative or 'centripetal' approach to sharing power over the consociational group building-block approach. In practical terms, critics of power sharing hold that majority rule and elite competition are better suited to moderate ethnically based societal divides by promoting integrative political parties.⁷⁶ Authors like Schneckener, Wolff and O'Leary have asserted that this dispute between the

⁷² Roeder and Rothchild (2005a) p.30.

⁷³ Gates and Strom (2007) p.4.

⁷⁴ Lijphart (1968) and Lijphart (1994). Nordlinger made a similar case for power sharing in ethnically mined states. See Nordlinger (1972).

⁷⁵ Sisk (2003): http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/power_sharing/ (accessed June 12, 2009).

⁷⁶ Horowitz (1985), Roeder (2005), Mehler (2008). Also see O'Leary (2005) for an especially poignant discussion of the points of contention on both sides of this debate.

two extremes is fruitless for the analysis of recent conflicts.⁷⁷ They consent that there is no perfect institutional system that can mitigate conflict as a kind of 'one-size-fits-all' formula in divided societies.

This realization is especially pertinent when considering that no war-torn state in Africa, Asia or Central America has actually institutionalized consociationalism as the textbook prescribes. If the context of analysis shifts from generally divided societies to post-conflict settings and from comparative politics to international relations, then power sharing must be seen as an institutional formula with the potential to make peaceful cohabitation more attractive than violent conflict.⁷⁸ Mehler underlines this point when he states that "power sharing in peace agreements has a less 'preventive' character as intended when power sharing is an ingredient of institution-building in a less conflictive situation."⁷⁹

Hartzell and Hoddie differentiate dimensions of state power in which power can be shared – the military, political, territorial and economic dimension.⁸⁰ Similarly to the emerging complex power sharing literature,⁸¹ they reason that the more levels an agreement involves, the better the chances for sending and detecting signals of cooperative intent.⁸² Within the logic of guarantees: The higher the number of dimensions, the lower the possibility for the minority or the weaker party to be fully exploited in the future. In other words, even if one party seizes monopoly power of one area of state power, the opponent can still exert a certain level of influence via the remaining channels. In a medium-n comparison of cases of war termination, the authors count the number of dimensions of state power that promise power sharing, leaving them with an ordinal measure of power sharing extensiveness. The results weakly confirm their hypothesis.⁸³

Notwithstanding its theoretical logic, the comparability of 'comprehensiveness' across cases is unconvincing: Is each realm of power actually worth the same or do they need to be weighted? And is an agreement to share power in the political and military sphere worth less or more than one that simultaneously addresses economic and territorial

⁷⁷ Schneckener (2002), Wolff (2007)

⁷⁸ The connection to the term "peaceful cohabitation" is lent from Lemarchand (2007).

⁷⁹ Mehler (2008) p.10.

⁸⁰ Hartzell and Hoddie (2003).

⁸¹ Wolff (2009).

⁸² Fortna makes a similar point for the durability of ceasefire agreements in interstate conflicts. When reducing uncertainty is one of the main objectives of an agreement to end a war, then the more specific an agreement, the lower the uncertainty about what constitutes compliance and how noncompliance can be detected. Fortna (2004b) p.22.

⁸³ Hartzell and Hoddie (2007).

dimensions? Especially when the sample includes all types of civil conflicts, how can we rule out the possibility that a rebel group may value territorial autonomy ten times more than a guaranteed post in the executive?

As a result of these considerations, it makes sense to focus on power-sharing arrangements at the political center.⁸⁴ According to Sisk's definition of the term for post-conflict scenarios, power sharing denotes any political system that "fosters governing coalitions inclusive of most, if not all, major mobilized ethnic groups in society."⁸⁵ Such governing coalitions can take the form of shared control over executive positions, quotas in representative bodies, a predetermined allocation of key ministries, or all of the above.⁸⁶

In fragile post-conflict political systems with strong authoritarian tendencies, capturing a meaningful position in the realm of the executive is a way for factional leaders to claim some political reward in return for peace and to try to preserve their influence into the future. In the absence of institutional restraints on the abuse of power (such as checks and balances), a strong and active civil society or democratic legacies, one of the defining merits of democracy, ex ante uncertainty about the division of the political pie after an election,⁸⁷ becomes an ex ante impediment to participation by those political contestants who would receive but a negligible share of power. In other words, power-sharing arrangements have the potential to influence cost-benefit calculations in a way that "each player will see the payoff from peaceful cooperation as superior to the expected returns from violence."⁸⁸

The mere fact that a peace agreement contains power-sharing provisions does not imply that power is actually shared. It seems justified to assume that contestants will need to see some observable proof of the incumbent's commitment to share power in reality. Such a commitment can be demonstrated in the transitional government of the interim phase between the signature of a peace agreement and post-transitional elections.⁸⁹ According to the typology by Manning, political power in interim government can be allocated in four ways: it can remain in the hands of the incumbent, be transferred to an

⁸⁴ Roeder and Rothchild (2005b) and Bieber (2003).

⁸⁵ Sisk (1996) p.4. In light of the discussion on ethnicity in ch. 2.2, I widen Sisk's definition to be applicable to not specifically inter-ethnic institutional arrangements.

⁸⁶ See Walter (1999) p.141. Also see the ch. 4.2. on the operationalization of IV1.

⁸⁷ Ex ante uncertainty makes democracy into a systemic arrangement, which no actor wants to change unilaterally. Refer to Przeworski's and Fearon's (2006) model of democracy as equilibrium.

⁸⁸ Gates and Strom (2007) p.3.

⁸⁹ This is only one common definition for the study of interim governments. Transition periods in a more general sense tend to be more broadly defined as the period between the collapse of one government/system and the (stable) reconstruction of a new one. In that case, the beginning of the war would be the more suitable definition of a starting part.

internationally-run transitional authority (such as in Cambodia), or a popularly elected transitional government (such as in the recent experiments in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq)⁹⁰ or it can be allocated according to elite-negotiated quotas (such as the executive power-sharing pacts I have been discussing above).

Lyons proposes that the nature of political processes (mostly, the degree of participation) in the interim phase impacts antagonists' evaluation of the viability of the larger political process.

"Transitional arrangements will be critical arenas in which ex-combatants and civilians make assessments regarding whether the post-conflict environment will protect their interests and whether to support the peace building and electoral processes."⁹¹

Combining theories on power sharing and interim governments as potential bridges to peace and democracy:⁹² Power sharing in interim government can serve as a confidence-building measure to build mutual trust among factions, as a terrain for antagonists to signal a desire for peace, to socialize within the political realm and to induce potential spoilers to stay on board.⁹³ Hence the first explanatory hypothesis is:

H1: The higher the degree of power sharing in interim government, the higher the probability that conflict parties demobilize their armed forces and de-escalate the conflict.

While there is large consensus that power-sharing pacts are at best a transitional device, I inquire specifically about the widely stated but hardly tested connection between power sharing and demilitarization in transition. If conflict parties agree to demobilize without power-sharing guarantees, then the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected. H1 will prove incapable to enlighten the studied cases. Such guarantees may then be considered either unnecessary or insufficient for demilitarization and conflict de-escalation.

After having looked at the options for institutional guarantees, the next section zooms in on the role for external guarantors in peacemaking.

3.3 Lowering the risks: External security guarantees

Credible commitment theory predicts that cooperation in the field of security between antagonists after war may be irrational without third party involvement during the vulnerable post-agreement phase.⁹⁴ "At a minimum, the explicit involvement of a powerful third state in maintaining peace invokes international audience costs to violating the

⁹⁰ See Manning (2007) pp.57-66

⁹¹ Lyons (2004) p.38.

⁹² Term adopted from Guttieri (2007).

⁹³ See Sisk (1996), Jarstad (2006) and Rothchild (2005) pp.255-256.

⁹⁴ See Walter (2002). Also consult Collier (2009).

agreement."⁹⁵ At a maximum, effective external security guarantees threaten to punish any aggressor that defects from the terms of agreement. Such guarantees simultaneously serve as a deterrent to defection and as a protection to any party that fears being taken advantage of during demobilization.⁹⁶ "Third parties can thus ensure that the payoffs from cheating no longer exceed the payoffs from faithfully executing the settlement's terms."⁹⁷

The idea that only third parties can credibly monitor, verify and sanction antagonist behavior serves as the *raison d'être* for the interposition of peacekeepers or peace enforcers. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement describe a situation in which a third party engages in the conflict country with the intent of promoting peace there. The concepts have been coined within a UN framework, but they relate to a larger context with or without UN involvement; implied in all of them is the prefix 'international.' In his famous "Agenda for Peace"⁹⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali defines the concepts according to their objectives, the level of consent by local parties and the conditions under which force may be used.⁹⁹ Peacekeeping focuses on monitoring and verification activities conferred to a third party with the consent of belligerents.¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the deterrent capacity of peacekeeping is limited. In UN practice, a ceasefire is the prerequisite for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission.¹⁰¹

Peace enforcement missions, on the other hand, aim to ensure compliance with a ceasefire without the consent of the parties. Resorting to the use of violence is justifiable when it aims at rolling back aggression.¹⁰² In its ability to sanction non-compliance, peace enforcement poses the most credible threat. However, ever since the disastrous experiences with failed peace enforcement attempts in Rwanda and Somalia, a 'peace-enforcing fatigue' has afflicted the UN and its contributing countries.¹⁰³ Further complicating the picture, peacekeeping missions in the past have ventured into the realm of enforcement. The lines become especially blurred in the French (and Russian) stance on peacekeeping. Here the logic goes: In shifting conflict environments, mission success

⁹⁵ Fortna (2004b) p.27.

⁹⁶ Stedman (1996) p.746.

⁹⁷ Walter (1999) p.137.

⁹⁸ See Boutros-Ghali (1992).

⁹⁹ For a succinct overview see Stedman (1996).

¹⁰⁰ The concepts peacebuilding or wider peacekeeping have been introduced to account for the fact that peacekeeping today has become multidimensional. The more complex tasks peace-builders are confronted with include humanitarian assistance, policing, and economic recovery. Many scholars refer to peacebuilding in a broad sense, describing any effort at restoring peace after war.

¹⁰¹ Originally "UN peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, so that efforts could be made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means." United Nations (2003): <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/> (accessed August 10, 2009).

¹⁰² See Doyle and Sambanis (2007) and Durch (1993) for two detailed discussions of the topic with respect to UN missions.

¹⁰³ Term adopted from Doyle (1996) p.538.

may depend on the readiness of the intervener to cease being defensive and impartial. When one conflict party objectively threatens to spoil the peace process, total impartiality may negatively affect the credibility of intervening forces.¹⁰⁴

While public debate on external (military) intervention in internal conflict situations has become increasingly critical, most empirical studies confirm a positive connection between the presence of an external guarantor of security and civil war settlement.

Walter's analysis of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe provides an example for a credible external guarantee conceptualized as the commitment by a powerful third state that facilitated conflict settlement there.¹⁰⁵ Thinking along the same lines, Collier singles out the British intervention in Sierra Leone in 2001 and the long-term French guarantees to countries in the 'Françafrique' as cases in which third party guarantees were effective at reigning in aggressors.¹⁰⁶ Note that in today's post-Brezhnev Doctrine world, not many countries are willing to take such a politically costly step on their own account.¹⁰⁷ Focusing on peacekeeping as a type of external guarantee, Fortna finds that the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission increases peace duration.¹⁰⁸ Hampson measures the effect of external support more broadly and concludes from a comparison of peace processes from the 1990s that the "quality and level of support" by third parties during the implementation phase¹⁰⁹ are crucial. Others call a similar variable "international capacities,"¹¹⁰ or construct an "international willingness" score for each sampled post-conflict situation.¹¹¹

Whatever the variable capturing the strength of commitment by an external guarantor is called, there is consensus that external guarantees can only be expected to have the desired effect when they are credible. First, it is important to distinguish empty promises from a credible commitment to intervene. Walter suggests that a mere promise may be sufficient to convince conflict parties to sign a negotiated settlement but insufficient to aid its implementation (especially in the military realm) when the promised force never

¹⁰⁴ See discussion of Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon and French policy positions on peacekeeping in UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1996) p.46ff.

¹⁰⁵ Walter (2002).

¹⁰⁶ Collier (2009).

¹⁰⁷ The UN Charter considers only two circumstances in which the international community can legally intervene in the affairs of a UN member state: when the events in that state pose a threat to international security (invoking Chapter VII) or when the state gives its consent (Chapter VI). See Wilkins (1997) p.255.

¹⁰⁸ Fortna (2004a).

¹⁰⁹ Hampson (1996) p.210.

¹¹⁰ Doyle and Sambanis (2000).

¹¹¹ Downs and Stedman (2002) pp.54-61. Fortna (2004b) adopts a similar model for her study on the durability of international ceasefire agreements.

comes.¹¹² Second, the capabilities of the third party force must be robust enough to have an observable influence on the ground. Robustness depends on both strategic and logistical components, notably power interests and the contribution of resources and troops.¹¹³

The second explanatory hypothesis for this investigation is:

H2: The higher the robustness of external security guarantees, the higher the probability that conflict parties demobilize their armed forces and de-escalate the conflict.

Accordingly, if parties demobilize in the absence of a robust external commitment to the process, then the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected and the second IV could not sufficiently explain the variation in the cases.

Since both of the hypotheses predict a positive relationship between the IV and the DV, one should expect the two IVs to complement or even reinforce each other. This means that the case in which both are absent should also exhibit the lowest commitment to demilitarization. Accordingly, when both types of guarantees are strong and credible, then parties should more readily agree to disarm and demobilize.




Figure 2: Depiction of theoretical model

4. Methodological approach

4.1 Demilitarization (DV)

The peacebuilding literature has offered various ways to measure peacebuilding/peace implementation success. The most widely used ones are (1) absence of violence/

¹¹² Walter (1999) pp.152-153.

¹¹³ For the operationalization of robustness see ch. 4.3.

reduction in the conflict level (2) resolution of the underlying disputes¹¹⁴ (3) mandate achievement of a peacebuilding mission¹¹⁵ and/or (4) achievements of a sub-goal.¹¹⁶

The more detailed the studies on peace processes become, the more narrowly defined the phenomenon to be explained. Sub-goals that are most commonly singled out are the protection of human rights, refugee repatriation, truth and reconciliation, and demilitarization. Notwithstanding the rise in demand for civilian and political assistance, military aspects retain their distinct complexity.¹¹⁷ As a result, the dependent variable is narrowed down to one sub-goal in peace implementation: demilitarization.¹¹⁸

Demilitarization lies on the nexus between weapons control and security sector reform. It is here defined as the act of doing away with the military capability of a nation's army, a group or a region. It is often the result of a peace treaty. Note that countries with bloated militaries have in the past chosen to downsize their armed forces without a foregone war.¹¹⁹ In post-conflict settings, demilitarization is especially tricky. Depending on the case, it entails disarmament, demobilization and social reintegration and/or military integration (DDR).¹²⁰

¹¹⁴ See Bratt (1997).

¹¹⁵ Refer to various internal UN reviews. Using mandate achievement as the proxy creates obvious issues of non-comparability between cases, a selection bias on such peace processes that involve peacebuilding missions and endogeneity, since the degree to which a mission is successful directly depends on its ex ante aspirations.

¹¹⁶ See Walter (2004).

¹¹⁷ See Spear (2002) p.141.

¹¹⁸ Barbara Walter, whose work I am highly indebted to, makes the theoretical connection between the degree to which former combatants cooperate after war with their willingness to surrender arms. However, instead of actually measuring the degree to which disarmament and demobilization has been achieved, Walter resorts to a much more general measure of commitment to peace: the overall success of settlement implementation measured by the degree to which (1) violence has ended after five years and (2) combatants make a "good-faith effort" at implementation. Walter (2002) p.54.

¹¹⁹ For a number of recent cases of this kind see Carames and Sanz (2008).

¹²⁰ Several nuanced reports on the financial and operational aspects of DDR emerged around the Stockholm Initiative on SSR (SIDDR) and the UN integrated standards system on DDR. This body of literature is highly practice oriented, focusing on the comparison of operational aspects of individual cases of DDR failure and success. Within the UN context of DDR mandates, comprehensive studies of several cases were undertaken under the umbrella of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDR) in the 1990s. Terms and concepts are introduced in the introductory book: UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1996). For a handbook styled work see Ball and van de Goor (2006) and for an example of a detailed case study see Boshoff and Vrey (2006). An overview of more recent cases of DDR can also be found in Carames and Sanz (2008).




Figure 3: Stages of Demilitarization: The DDR Process¹²¹

DDR can be seen as a process involving several sequential or parallel programs. The underlying objectives for conflict resolution are rather narrow, situated in the military sphere: to stop fighting and decrease fighting capacities, the creation of a single national army (also referred to as rebel-military integration) and/ or the separation of combatants from at least some of their weapons. Eventually, these are means to build stability, to reduce violence and to increase the security level in support of the overall peace process and the chances for future democratization.¹²²

Disarmament describes the process of “eliminating the military capabilities of warring factions.”¹²³ Demobilization is the “controlled discharge” of combatants from armed forces. This may require the assembly of armed groups into cantonment areas or safe zones.¹²⁴ To lower the probability of conflict relapse, discharge needs to be followed by reinsertion and long-term reintegration, usually involving special benefits programs, arms-for-money exchanges and employment initiatives. Evidently, disarmed soldiers without a job, without a family and safety net will not automatically refrain from resorting to arms in the future. In these global times, weapons can be re-attained in a timely and covert fashion on the international marketplace. Notwithstanding the importance of reinsertion/ reintegration, this step will not be part of the formal measurement of the DV here.

The most straightforward reason for this omission is that theoretically as well as practically, the ‘R’ of DDR is highly dependent on very specifically targeted monetary assistance programs and the overall financial stability of a country, including employment opportunities. In short, explanations that may be fitting to explain why combatants agree

¹²¹ Own adaptation from Ball and van de Goor (2006).

¹²² See UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1996) p.174 and Ball and van de Goor (2006).

¹²³ UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1996) p.171.

¹²⁴ See Ball and van de Goor (2006) p.2.

to lay down arms may not be sufficient to explain why they successfully reintegrate into civilian life in the medium and long term.

Even when narrowed down to disarmament and demobilization (D&D), comparing demilitarization success across cases is a complicated exercise. The basic measurement procedure here is to compare baseline numbers on the amount of combatants and weapons in a post-conflict situation with the goals for D&D in the peace agreement and the amount of actually disarmed and demobilized forces. Unfortunately, obtaining adequate baseline figures is merely impossible, particularly on the number of weapons in circulation. In some cases, such as Tajikistan,¹²⁵ such figures were never generated. Or, as in the case of Angola, armed factions and government forces grossly overstate their military potential in order to increase the level of uncertainty and to qualify for higher benefits payments.¹²⁶ Promised funds can also be an incentive for non-combatants to declare themselves as such, giving rise to the term 'phantom combatants.' Furthermore, "data may be distorted for political purposes: government agencies may have an incentive to underplay issues related to potential political instability, or, if they are seeking assistance in addressing a particular problem, may overstate the dimensions of that problem."¹²⁷

A second obstacle is that every demilitarization process in the past has run into difficulties during implementation and none have progressed in a completely smooth, linear fashion to deserve being called a success.

An acceptable solution can be found when stressing the behavior of ex-combatants and their leaders over the technical details in the process. Then, the most important indicator for antagonist cooperation is the degree to which the parties to the peace agreement initiate the process at all. A second indicator is the proportion of ex-combatants showing up for demobilization compared to the number set out in the peace agreement. More concretely, a case is coded as 'demilitarization success' when all the major armed factions in a conflict send forces to cantonment sights and/ or when at least 50 per cent of ex-combatants targeted by DDR planning are eventually demobilized. In contrast, the DV is coded 'demilitarization failure' when at least one signatory party fails to commence the DDR process and/ or when less than 50 per cent of ex-combatants targeted by DDR planning are eventually demobilized.

¹²⁵ Torjesen et al. (2005) confirm that there was no inventory of weapons in opposition hands during the civil war.

¹²⁶ Carames and Sanz (2008) p.27.

¹²⁷ Torjesen et al. (2005) p.3.

One may rightly object that these narrowly defined indicators give too much weight to the quality and content of peace agreements. In an attempt to save this study from coding a completely defect or misguided peace process as a success (because the opponents failed to commit themselves to more than a bare minimum concerning demilitarization in the peace agreement), I include the level of conflict intensity after the official end of the implementation phase as an additional indicator for the DV. The main source consulted to measure conflict intensity is the conflict intensity index published each year by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). The HIIK conflict intensity index¹²⁸ codes conflict and post-conflict situations according to their level of intensity between 1 and 5.

non-violent:	violent:
1 = latent conflict	3 = crisis
2 = manifest conflict	4 = severe crisis
	5 = war

Figure 4: Levels of conflict intensity

When the conflict has become non-violent, it is assumed to have de-escalated.

4.2 Degree of power sharing in interim government (IV1)

As justified in the theoretical discussion, the power-sharing variable used here consists of the promise to share political power within the executive decision-making bodies of government. The power-sharing provisions promised by agreement texts serve as a first indicator for this variable. The second indicator is found in the structure and nature of interim government institutions. It has been argued above that the promise to share power is more credible when parties (or the ruling party) take concrete steps to share their power with the opposition.

Accordingly, the indicator for the first IV consists of two parts:

1. The degree to which the agreement text makes political power-sharing provisions and
2. The degree to which actual decision-making power is shared in a 'grand coalition' between antagonists in interim government. This will be examined for the realm of (1) the presidency (2) the cabinet (3) parliament/ the national assembly (4) and any additional interim governing institutions with legislative and executive functions (such as national

¹²⁸ See Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2008).

councils or electoral commissions). The aggregated judgment of the power-sharing character is then subsumed into a binary variable: the degree of power sharing varies between 'high' and 'low.'

4.3 Robustness of external security guarantees (IV2)

The definition and operationalization of the robustness of external security guarantees departs from Walter's conceptualization of the term: the willingness of a third party to commit to the implementation of a peace agreement. First, a look at the external actor spectrum involved in peace negotiations determines whether any third party makes a promise to "verify or enforce post-treaty behavior?"¹²⁹

Second, even though "force does not need to be used in order to be useful,"¹³⁰ parties after conflict can be expected to notice when a promised force never comes. In order for third actor involvement to be classified as a security guarantee, the guarantor(s) must follow through and "provide the expected service."¹³¹

Third, robustness depends on the strategic intent and the technical and physical capacities of the guaranteed force. Theoretically, military capabilities must be sufficient to reign in a defector. Potential indicators for military capability are the size of the third party's armed forces and its power standing in the world. Walter does not formally operationalize this part of the measurement but calls upon the reader's common sense in pointing to cases in which a big country got involved in a small one: "Britain overshadowed Zimbabwe, Ethiopia dwarfed Sudan, and the United States could restrain the Dominican Republic."¹³² Another indicator is an outside state's inherent self-interest in the country. Such an interest is more likely to be present when colonial ties or alliance loyalties are involved, or when the outside state has a strategic power interest in the region. However, both of these factors rely on speculations and subjective perceptions that conflict parties are unlikely to make in the heat of the moment.

Instead of looking at crude power relations, the mandate and the size of the deployed force serve as a more appropriate indicator for the robustness of an external guarantee. In sum, Walter codes her cases along a six-point scale with varying degrees in the mandate's robustness and the size of the force:¹³³

¹²⁹ Walter (2002) p.64.

¹³⁰ UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1996) p.73. The authors actually paraphrased a famous comment on peace enforcement by John Ruggie.

¹³¹ Walter (2002) p.65.

¹³² Walter (1997) p.340.

¹³³ See Walter (2002) pp.64-68. Note that I slightly modified Walter's ordinal scale by integrating insights from the similar indicator employed by Doyle and Sambanis (2000).

- 0 No security guarantee
- 1 Informal promise to protect without defined mandate and force
- 2 Willingness to deploy verification mission of under five hundred observers
- 3 Willingness to deploy verification mission of at least five hundred observers
- 4 Willingness to deploy an armed (traditional or multidimensional) peacekeeping mission force of under five thousand
- 5 Willingness to deploy an armed peacekeeping force of at least five thousand, with capacity to enforce

Figure 5: Levels of robustness of external security guarantees

Keeping this entire range in the levels of strength in mind, I redefine the IV2 as a binary variable for the purpose of this small-n study. This means that anything from no guarantee to a verification mission is coded as a 'weak security guarantee.' Accordingly, the deployment of a peacekeeping force with a sizeable troop contingent counts as a 'robust security guarantee.'

4.4 Comparative case study

As the introduction pointed out, the aim of this thesis is to test the applicability of the two identified explanatory hypotheses. Theoretically, this could be done in three ways: in an experiment, a quantitative, large-n study or a qualitative comparative case study.¹³⁴ Given the ethical and technical impracticability of the first and the obstacles before data collection and measurement exactitude of the second, the format of choice is a small-n comparative case study.

Based on the Mill's philosophy of science, a comparison can resort to the logic of congruence, difference or a combination of the two, while the first is methodologically the most problematic.¹³⁵ The method of difference, also called most-similar case design, is certainly not perfect either. The central point of critique pertains to its oversimplification of complex causal mechanisms. It is also insufficient for the explanation of nuanced variance across cases, since it rules out the simultaneous, step-wise, or combined effect of several variables.¹³⁶ Nevertheless, it is one of the most common methods used in the social sciences. Resorting to it is well justifiable as long as the research motivation is to identify general tendencies in the relationship between variables and to test existing theories.

¹³⁴ Van Evera (1997) p.50.

¹³⁵ For a detailed discussion on Mill's method, see George and Bennett (2004) p.31.

¹³⁶ George and Bennett (2004) p.32.

4.5 Case selection

In the most general sense, any period in the history of a country, where a peace agreement has formally ended a civil conflict, qualifies as a case for the empirical investigation. The number of potential explanatory variables is much larger than the number of cases I can scrutinize in a small-n study. Unfortunately, the number of inferences that can be made cannot be greater than the number of observed implications. In order to circumvent indeterminacy to the best of my ability, I examine a total of four cases: Angola (1991-92), Tajikistan (1997-2000), Burundi (2000-2005) and El Salvador (1992-1994).

Of course the above cases were not selected randomly. "Random selection and assignment have serious limitations in small-n research."¹³⁷ The 'second best option' is the intentional selection of observations. This allows the researcher to control for variables that are important but can be excluded from the explanation.¹³⁸ This lowers the potential for omitted variable bias,¹³⁹ but dramatizes the potential for selection bias. To increase the explanatory potential of the model in a most similar case design, it is desirable for the selected cases to vary substantially on their values for the IVs.¹⁴⁰ This posed a particular challenge for this research endeavor. In a nutshell, when faced with the two methodological evils of (1) making an unconvincing argument due to the outright omission of a large number of variables and (2) comparing cases that are slightly too similar, I chose the latter.

Concerning the level of variation of the first IV, power-sharing provisions in peace agreements, I can only recount what has already been hinted at in the theoretical overview: In the age of the "democratically supportive zeitgeist,"¹⁴¹ parties hardly sign a substantive peace agreement that grants not at least limited guarantees to share power in the future, either in the form of a promise to hold free elections, to form a coalition after elections or to govern cooperatively in the interim phase. However, the cases nevertheless vary in the degree to which interim governments actually integrated opposition parties.

With respect to the variation in the second IV, external security guarantees, preliminary research showed that identifying strongly varying cases 'from the real world' would pose a

¹³⁷ King et al. (1994) p.115.

¹³⁸ See ch. 5.1.

¹³⁹ For a discussion of the problem and potential remedies see Leuffen (2007).

¹⁴⁰ When the cases are selected according to their variation on the IVs. See Hönnige (2007).

¹⁴¹ As Linz and Stepan famously coined the post-Cold War international norm. See Linz and Stepan (1996) p.74.

challenge. According to UCDP's Peace Agreements Database, which documents all peace agreements after armed civil wars between 1989 and 2005, there was only one country that dispensed with a third party to underwrite the agreement: Djibouti. Unfortunately, the case of Djibouti had to be dropped due to the serious lack of information.¹⁴² In addition to the common practice of asking for third party witness and external support, there is an understandable bias in the literature in favor of cases in which the UN was somehow involved in peacemaking activities.

Unfortunately, my case selection reflects this bias: in all four cases, at least a UN observer mission was guaranteed and sent to monitor the commitment to peace. Hence, the cases do not cover the entire spectrum between 'no guarantees' and 'very strong guarantees.' On a positive note, this means that (1) my case studies do not lose touch with reality and (2) I can make qualified judgments on the effect of different levels of peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities.

The bulk of the gathered data stems from the analysis of primary source (like the original texts of peace agreements, public statements etc.), secondary sources like journal articles, reports published by international organizations, and conflict databases. To complement these sources, extensive news analysis (using Lexis Nexis) was conducted for each respective examination period. This qualitative research method has the added advantage that it enables the researcher to take certain case-specific dynamics into account, which can be important to assess to what extent the conflict parties seemed willing to share power in the first place and then strove to make consensual decisions.

Regarding the period of examination, I have already made clear why the focus is on the short term. The standard examination period used in the literature is two or five years after the signing of a peace agreement. There are a number of justifications for this choice:¹⁴³ Some aspects characterizing the conflict environment might attenuate over time, the effects of institutional arrangements are likely to change in the long term, a renewed war after a decade or longer is likely to involve vastly different parties, and there are only a few incidences in practice where civil war resurged after more than five years.

Since the speed of implementation depends in part on the timetable defined by the terms of agreement, merely counting the number of years is rather arbitrary. Interested in the first steps of peace implementation, I define the examination period for each case as the interim phase, meaning the time between the signing of a peace agreement and the first

¹⁴² Try googling the 'Djibouti Peace Process' and you are sure to get over 1,000 hits pertaining to the peace process in Somalia, but none (well, maybe five) that actually concern Djibouti.

¹⁴³ See Hartzell et al. (2001) p.187.

post-conflict election. This can be only a bit over one year as in the case of Angola, a bit over two years in El Salvador, three years in Tajikistan, and five years in Burundi.

5. Empirical analysis

5.1 The implementation environments

The four cases of peace implementation chosen for the empirical analysis resemble each other in various theoretically relevant respects. First, recent peace processes in Angola, Burundi, El Salvador and Tajikistan, took off in largely unfavorable contexts. The countries are situated in unstable, conflict-ridden neighborhoods. Also, international actors intervened during each war in (covert or overt) support for a local party: the Great Powers, South Africa and Cuba in Angola; Russia, Afghanistan and other neighboring states in Tajikistan; the US, Cuba and the Sandinistas in El Salvador, and rebel groups based in Rwanda and Tanzania in Burundi.

Second, peace processes in all four cases suffered from high levels of fractionalization, unstable alliances, and weak group structures. None were saved from the eruption of confrontations among former allies in the post-settlement context.¹⁴⁴

A third factor relating to the baseline prospects for peace that can be held sufficiently constant across the four cases is wealth. In any study on conflict or post-conflict situations, one can always count on income/ GDP to significantly correlate with the probability that (renewed) conflict breaks out. When Doyle and Sambanis say "local capacities," they measure GDP.¹⁴⁵ When Collier speaks of the "Bottom of the Billion" as the most conflict-prone group of countries,¹⁴⁶ he means the world's lowest income group. It almost seems like a new 'iron' law: rich people fight less. Though this finding leaves room for bewilderment (rich people are reportedly neither happier nor less greedy than poor ones), I largely circumvent an analysis of the connection. Since most civil conflicts take place in the poorer lot of countries,¹⁴⁷ it is not too difficult to control for income and still find variation across cases. A quick and rough measure will suffice to rule out stark distortions here. I resort to the county ranking used by institutions like the World Bank: Countries with a GNI per capita (purchasing power parity, in USD) of at least 11,906 are categorized as high income countries, between 3,856 and 11,905 as upper middle

¹⁴⁴ Regarding this last point see Atlas and Licklider (1999).

¹⁴⁵ To their defense: they add life expectancy as another proxy.

¹⁴⁶ The term was coined much earlier but is picked up again in Collier (2009).

¹⁴⁷ Again, I am not taking the causal connection easy here: the problem of reverse causality is not off the table.

income, between 976 and 3,855 as lower middle income, and 975 or less as lower income countries.¹⁴⁸

All the cases selected for the analysis belong to the lower middle income and lower income category. As the figure below shows, all but El Salvador even belonged to the lowest income group throughout the respective observation periods.




Figure 6: GNI per capita (PPP, in USD), selected countries and years¹⁴⁹

A fourth variable with a potential impact on the likelihood that conflict parties peacefully agree on a post-conflict institutional framework is a country's previous experience with democracy. Constructing completely new participatory institutions can be more challenging and spur more skepticism than making institutional adaptations. To measure a country's previous regime type, I resort to the Polity IV score.¹⁵⁰ The aggregated polity score ranges from negative 10 to plus 10. It combines several key indicators: competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, level of restriction in the regulation of participation and competitiveness of participation. A country that is coded -10 demonstrates the strongest tendency towards authoritarianism, a state that scores +10 has the least autocratic and most democratic tendencies.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ See the World Bank's classification of economies in The World Bank (2009): <http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0> (accessed October 5, 2009).

¹⁴⁹ Source: World Bank Development Indicators.

¹⁵⁰ The score has been constructed by researchers at George Mason University and the University of Maryland. Depending on the country, the dataset offers polity scores dating back well into the 19th century.

¹⁵¹ Marshall and Jaggers (2009).

To put this into perspective, in 2008, Germany scored 10, Brazil 8, Chad -2 and Belarus - 7. Since a 0 is already pretty bad in terms of the level of democratization, I consider a country's previous experience with democracy to be similarly low as long as the polity score before the outbreak of the war in question was 0 or lower for at least 20 years. Even though El Salvador and Burundi experimented with democracy before and during the conflict somewhat more than Angola and Tajikistan, all four were autocratic, as their respective polity IV scores attest.¹⁵²

Finally, in order to justify the focus on executive power sharing, the contestation over national power must have at least in part motivated the original conflict. According to the classification in two conflict databases (the HIIK Conflict Barometer and the UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset) and based on extensive background research, the main rebel groups in the four conflicts were in fact in opposition to the political structure and/ or contested for power against the incumbent government. In the HIIK typology,¹⁵³ at least one of the conflict items was "national power" in all four conflicts. In the UCDP's logic, the incompatibility is "government" or "government/ territory" (not only "territory").¹⁵⁴

The next sub-chapters present the analysis of each case with respect to the DV and IVs. In the sub-chapter 5.2. on the DV – demilitarization – a brief description of the conflict history and the major conflict parties will introduce each case.

5.2 Demilitarization

5.2.1 Angola

For the largest part of its recent history since having gained independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola has seen little peace. The three nationalist groups that had been engaged in a fight for independence, the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), quarreled over the physical and ideological control of the country for decades.¹⁵⁵ Only with the end of the Cold War and the related end to US and Soviet Union covert support, did a first major chance to crafting peace turn up. The two parties, the

¹⁵² The dataset is downloadable from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm> (accessed October 13, 2009).

¹⁵³ The Barometer lists ten conflict items in total: Territory, Secession, Decolonization, Autonomy, System/ideology, National power, Regional predominance, International power, Resources, and Others.

¹⁵⁴ See Höglbladh (2006).

¹⁵⁵ The literature on the history of the Angolan civil war during the Cold War is extensive, especially with respect to super power involvement. For a concise overview consult Vines and Human Rights Watch (1999) pp.13-19.

MPLA¹⁵⁶ and UNITA¹⁵⁷ began to hold peace talks in 1989.¹⁵⁸ By the early 1990s, when the first truly concerted effort at crafting peace emerged with peace negotiations in Bicesse, Portugal, the war had already killed between 100,000 and 350,000 people (estimates vary).

On May 31, 1991, MPLA president dos Santos and UNITA president Savimbi signed the Bicesse Accords. In hindsight, many analysts have declared these settlement efforts doomed to failure from the start. The two most common explanations concern the lack of a truly hurting military stalemate and the externally imposed nature of the agreement. Certainly, there is a grain of truth in these interpretations. However, the analysis of statements, news articles and background reports from the time reveals that most participants and observers actually believed that peace was a realistic option.¹⁵⁹

With their signature of the Bicesse Accords, MPLA and UNITA nominally agreed to disarm and integrate their military wings.¹⁶⁰ The benchmarks for demobilization were only ambiguously defined. This stems in part from the parties' half-hearted commitment to the process and in part to the fact that there was no reliable baseline data to depart from. Both sides grossly overstated their military capabilities, though it is unknown by how much exactly. The bloated numbers state that the MPLA's armed forces consisted of 113,700 soldiers and UNITA's of 37,300. Out of the estimated total, a new Angolan Army consisting of 50,000 was to be formed and the remaining combatants to be demobilized. There was no information on weaponry.

As any report on the behavior of the main rebel force in Angola in the 1990s attests, UNITA failed to implement most of its pledges in the realm of military issues. Most of the troops that showed up at assembly points belonged to the national armed forces. Of those that came, only a few were demobilized. In September 1992, when the process was supposed to be concluded, only 24 per cent of UNITA and 45 per cent MPLA troops were demobilized; disarmament had hardly begun. Stated differently, UNITA held on to an estimated 30,000 armed soldiers and the MPLA to around 10,000.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, UNITA held back heavy weapons, stationed soldiers at strategic points around the country and

¹⁵⁶ At this point the MPLA was the official but internationally not fully recognized governing party.

¹⁵⁷ Note that the FNLA had joined forces with UNITA by then.

¹⁵⁸ Williams (1993).

¹⁵⁹ With respect to a military stalemate, for instance, most observers emphasize that the frontlines were relatively stable, the territory evenly divided between MPLA and UNITA forces and military victory unattainable for either side.

¹⁶⁰ Annex 1, Art C.1. reads: "All the armed forces shall be assembled 60 days following the entry into force of the ceasefire." The appendix identifies 50 centers for assembly dispersed throughout the Angolan territory.

¹⁶¹ See Fortna (1993) p.402.

hid battalions across the border in Zaire.¹⁶² Although a united Angolan army with a shared command was created on paper in the interim period, real power over remaining forces in the country remained with the two parties' presidents. The defunct disarmament process altered the military balance between the two opponents in UNITA's favor. When it became clear that the electorate favored the MPLA with dos Santos as president (though the scheduled run-off to determine the ultimate result never took place), Savimbi calculated that his chances of winning a bigger share via the return to military means was greater than his chances of tipping election results.

With their respective armies kept sizeable and intact, the parties launched large-scale attacks less than a month following the elections. After the short but hopeful interlude, the war resumed with even fiercer intensity than in the episodes before. Each conflict database that I consulted coded the year 1992 in Angola as a period of violent war until the next settlement effort started with the Lusaka Peace Process.¹⁶³ In the end, it was not until 2002, when the national army struck a military victory against UNITA and killed Savimbi that the war finally terminated durably.

5.2.2 El Salvador

The civil war in El Salvador lasted for 12 years and took the lives of some 75,000 people.¹⁶⁴ Similar to the turn of events in Angola, it was not until the international environment became more favorable to a peaceful solution with the end of the Cold War that the parties launched substantive peace negotiations.¹⁶⁵ The first talks between the government, led by the right-wing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) and a coalition of five leftist opposition forces, including the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), were held in 1987 and again in 1989. The process failed at first due to the parties' incapacity to find an acceptable transition mode into a future government. The ARENA government made insurgent participation in politics conditional on the latter's foregoing demobilization. The FMLN demanded the process to run in reverse: it was unwilling to disarm and demobilize in absence of a guaranteed integration into governing institutions.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² Stedman (1997) p.37.

¹⁶³ On a human rights-focused case history of the Lusaka Process, see Vines and Human Rights Watch (1999).

¹⁶⁴ Munck (1993) p.75. Also see UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1997).

¹⁶⁵ Despite an effective military stalemate, both parties engaged in continued military build-up thanks to direct US military aid flowing into government coffers and Soviet, Cuban and Sandinistan (Nicaragua) support for the FMLN.

¹⁶⁶ See UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1997) pp.123-129.

Under the auspices of the UN, renewed negotiations finally culminated in the comprehensive "Final Agreement on Peace," signed in Chapultepec, Mexico in January 1992. The agreement set out a detailed and ambitious roadmap for implementation, especially with respect to military aspects. The parties agreed to restructure and downsize the national armed forces and to demobilize most of the FMLN combatants. A major obstacle in the process was the bloated size of the armed forces. In the 1980s, the national army had grown from 16,000 to 56,000 soldiers. The FMLN had mobilized a military force of around 7000-8000 by 1992.¹⁶⁷ In line with the implementation schedule, FMLN demobilization was to be completed by 31 October 1992 and the El Salvadoran armed forces to be halved over a period of two years. To fulfill the former goal, FMLN forces had to gather in one of 15 secure areas.¹⁶⁸

Despite the degree of detail, the implementation in reality did not proceed without disruptions. Mutual accusations about non-compliance on vital political and economic issues (including land reform) delayed the first phase of the FMLN's demobilization by two months.¹⁶⁹ The government similarly missed its agreed deadline for the first phase of cantonment for military personnel.

In the end, UN observers supervised the assembly of approximately 63,000 members of the armed forces and practically all FMLN combatants and verified troop behavior and weapons destruction thereafter.¹⁷⁰ The national armed forces eventually downsized to 32,000, even more than the envisaged half. The FMLN demobilized 100 per cent of its pledged contingents at a pace of 20 per cent per month.¹⁷¹ By the end of the D&D process, the FMLN had turned in 9,851 individual arms, 379 support weapons, over four million rounds of ammunition, 140 rockets, and 9,228 grenades, 5,107 kilograms of explosives and 74 surface-to-air missiles.¹⁷² In August 1993, FMLN Coordinator General Schafik Hanal declared on behalf of the five constituent groups that the insurgent structures had been dismantled in compliance with the terms of agreement.

¹⁶⁷ UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1997) p.131.

¹⁶⁸ Munck (1993) p.84.

¹⁶⁹ The greatest obstacle in the overall implementation process was to come from the higher ranks of the Salvadoran Army. It had been agreed that those officers in the higher military echelons with records of human rights violations were to be purged. When the military leadership obstructed this move, the FMLN immediately halted its demobilization. In an effort to curb the ensuing crisis, Boutros-Ghali proposed to postpone the deadline for demobilization of the FMLN to December 15, extending the duration of the process by another month and a half. The two parties immediately accepted his proposal.

¹⁷⁰ See Wilkins (1997) pp.285-288.

¹⁷¹ Even though the last group of former guerrillas had not yet been demobilized, ONUSAL attested that the FMLN had completed its obligations in the realm of D&D on December 14, 1992. See Stanley and Holiday (1997).

¹⁷² UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1997) p.138.

In sum, notwithstanding the unfavorable conditions for peacemaking, demilitarization was successful in the process of peace implementation in El Salvador. As a report by the UNIDIR concludes, "the FMLN ceased to exist as a fighting force and the purification and downsizing of the armed forces did take place."¹⁷³ The opposing parties never seriously questioned the validity of the process and no side ever seriously breached the ceasefire agreement. With demilitarization largely achieved, the new administration that was elected in 1994 continued with the implementation of outstanding issues of the peace agreement, namely judicial and land reform.

The success in the realm of official D&D as prescribed by the peace accord coincided with an end to large-scale, politically motivated violence. For the year 1994 already, the HIIK attests a conflict intensity score of 1. Nevertheless, the peaceful settlement of the El Salvadoran civil war could only do so much to curb violent crime there; security and weapons control continues to be a contentious issue for the entire population.

5.2.3 Tajikistan

When Tajikistan declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the ruling Communist party stayed in power and silenced a growing opposition with nationalist, Islamic and/ or democratic agendas. It outlawed opposition parties and forced many political leaders into exile. Clan in-fighting, a weak economic base and barely existent unified institutional structures left the country fragile and helped the power struggle to turn violent a few months after the first post-independence presidential elections. The war in Tajikistan certainly had a sizable territorial component. Yet it is classified as a "power struggle between a new class of political entrepreneurs."¹⁷⁴ The first year of the war was the most intense in terms of the number of dead and displaced it caused: estimates state that in 1992 alone, around 30,000 lives were lost¹⁷⁵ and around 660,000 people were internally displaced or sought refuge in neighboring countries.¹⁷⁶ After this most intensive year of fighting, the parties continued their struggle in guerilla warfare. Until 1997, the war inflicted as many as 50,000 battle-related casualties.¹⁷⁷

After several rounds of peace negotiations, the inter-Tajik talks concluded with the signature of the "General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan" on 26-27 June 1997 in Moscow. The main parties to the 1997 General

¹⁷³ UN Institute for Disarmament Research (1997) p.140. Also: The Guardian (1992).

¹⁷⁴ Abdullaev and Barnes (2001) p.8.

¹⁷⁵ Brown (1998) pp.93-95.

¹⁷⁶ See Background Information on UNMOT website in United Nations (2000): <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot/Unmot.htm> (accessed October 10, 2009).

¹⁷⁷ See Serrano (2003) p.156.

Agreement were the incumbent government led by President Rakhmonov (who joined the People's Democratic Party (PDP) in 1998) and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a weakly unified bloc created at the onset of negotiations. The UTO was dominated by the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) but also hosted an array of smaller parties with various interests, of which the (unarmed) Democratic Party of Tajikistan was the largest. In addition, several more or less independent warlords, in charge of small groups of armed combatants, were militarily active across the country. Though they lacked a political agenda, most of these smaller grouping aligned either with the government or with (especially Islamic components of) the UTO.

Of all the protocols in the General Agreement for Tajikistan, the one on military issues was implemented most successfully. The agreement prescribed both forms of demilitarization: the integration of the numerous armed forces into a unified military and D&D of the remaining combatants. Like in the case of El Salvador, the parties agreed to a staged process: During the first stage, armed units of the various groups unified under the UTO were to assemble for registration and a medial check. Those units situated in Afghanistan first had to transfer back into Tajikistan. In the second stage, the assembled UTO soldiers were to be transformed into corresponding units of the armed forces of Tajikistan. The DDR strategy in Tajikistan was thus unique in the sense that opposition forces were integrated into the national army without being disarmed first. Evidence from registration lists shows that, for the most part, fully intact UTO units were incorporated into the armed forces.¹⁷⁸ This unconventional approach to DDR has been interpreted both as a major oversight¹⁷⁹ and a recipe for success.¹⁸⁰ In the final stage of the process, the 'unfit' bunch among the UTO fighters was to be demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life.

The fragmentation of armed groups across different regions posed an obstacle to the creation of a unified national military force. Command and control structures were weak or nontransparent. For the most part, real power was in the hands of field commanders, who enjoyed the loyalty of their recruits and were seen as the guardians of safety in the regions. Consequently, opposition fighters began to move slowly from their bases and hide-outs to UN-monitored camps in early 1998.¹⁸¹ Only 4,335 UTO fighters and 1,562 weapons were registered by May 1998.¹⁸² By the end of the same year, UTO leadership

¹⁷⁸ Torjesen and MacFarlane (2009) p.50.

¹⁷⁹ Mostly by authors emphasizing the importance of achieving a 'positive peace.'

¹⁸⁰ See Torjesen and MacFarlane (2009).

¹⁸¹ See The Economist (1998).

¹⁸² See United Nations (1998).

announced that it had closed all its military and operational bases in Tajikistan and across the southern border.¹⁸³ In a final head count in 1999, a Small Arms Survey report on Tajikistan states that 6,238 UTO fighters (out of the estimated 7,000-8,000) were either demobilized or integrated into the armed forces and 2,119 (36 per cent of the estimated total) weapons handed in overall.¹⁸⁴

In sum, demobilization/ military integration was largely implemented in accord with the agreed upon goals. The process was less successful on the disarmament front. Next to the uncertain political future and the dispersed group structures, Pirseyedi cites the general importance of the possession of weapons for socio-economic gains as the main reason for some ex-combatants' lack of compliance with disarmament.¹⁸⁵ Despite the effective appeasement of government-UTO relations, the security situation was extremely fragile by the end of the interim phase. Several non-UTO affiliated groups stayed armed and retained their potential to spoil the process. For the most part, they configured around leading commanders, such as Makhmud Khudoiberdiev, who abdicated from his government position to break away from the peace process and harassed the country from border positions in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. The level of stability, measured in armed clashes and incidents of gun violence, actually deteriorated to a low-point at the end of the implementation phase in 2000. The total number of armed clashes rose from just below 20 in 1998 to around 90 in 2000 and then slowly back down to 20 by 2004.¹⁸⁶

Nonetheless, the successful demilitarization of the UTO significantly helped to put an end to large-scale fighting and decreased the conflict intensity to a non-violent level by the end of the transition period; the HIIK assigns the number 2 for the Tajik conflict in 2000.

5.2.4 Burundi

Burundi, like its 'sister state' Rwanda, is notorious for the violent outbursts of (alleged) ethnic hatred on its soil.¹⁸⁷ The first power struggle between Hutu and Tutsi parties erupted in the 1960s in reaction to the Hutu revolution in Rwanda. A military coup to topple the monarchy in 1965 and excessive mutual killings in 1972, 1988 and 1993 strained relations between the two groups, to say the least. In a country with a total population of 8.7 million, civil war has killed an estimated 250,000-300,000 people since the 1990s until today.

¹⁸³ Abdullo (2001) p.50.

¹⁸⁴ See Torjesen et al. (2005) p.72 and United Nations (1999b).

¹⁸⁵ Pirseyedi (2000) p.61.

¹⁸⁶ Data gathered by Torjesen et al. (2005).

¹⁸⁷ Since I am in no way able to do the historical intricacies justice here, I advise the interested reader to consult Lemarchand (1993).

Multiparty peace negotiations were initiated with the help of the international community in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1998. The actor spectrum in the Burundian conflict is by far the most fractionalized of the four.¹⁸⁸ More than 20 armed and unarmed parties were somehow involved in the fighting and/ or sat around the negotiating table. On an aggregated level, one camp grouped the mainly Tutsi incumbent government and armed forces under President Pierre Buyoya against the largely Hutu opposition. Three more or less ethnically aligned blocs emerged during negotiations in Arusha: the G-7 (predominantly Hutu parties, including FRODEBU and the CNDD), the G-8, later G-10 (several Tutsi parties, the government and UPRONA) and the excluded, Hutu-dominated rebel groups CNDD-FDD¹⁸⁹ and PALIPEHUTU-FNL.

Demilitarization of the various armed factions in Burundi was a difficult, bumpy, and highly imperfect process. The Arusha Accords set relatively detailed guidelines for DDR and for structures to be put in place in order to facilitate it. The agreement envisaged two phases: a first phase, lasting one year, for the transformation of the Burundian Armed Forces into a new Burundian National Defense Force of not more than 30,000 soldiers and a second phase, lasting three years, for the DDR of remaining combatants.

During most of the first three year (Burundi I), practically no demobilization took place. Though the interim government formed joint command structures for the National Defense Force, soldiers remained armed and controlled by their group leadership.¹⁹⁰ Many commentators called the Arusha process void or dead at the time.¹⁹¹

The situation changed dramatically for the better with the additional ceasefire agreements signed between the transitional government and various rebel groups in 2002 and 2003 including the General Ceasefire Agreement with the CNDD-FDD and the Pretoria Protocols on power sharing in Burundi (Burundi II). Departing from these agreements, a presidential decree of August 2003 established the National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion with a budget of USD 84.4 million, most of which came from the international donor community. The program oversaw a multi-track¹⁹² DDR process that lasted from December 2004 until December 2008. Despite various technical

¹⁸⁸ Note that space here is too limited to offer a detailed description of the conflict parties and their extremely complicated relationship to one another. For the sake of keeping the reader on board, I drop but the most important names of parties and their leaders.

¹⁸⁹ The CNDD-FDD was originally the CNDD's military wing. It split off at the onset of negotiations.

¹⁹⁰ Nindorera (2008) p.113.

¹⁹¹ As one news reporter predicted in July 2002: "We are currently witnessing a total collapse of the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement and a dramatic deadlock in the peace process at a time when all the indicators are red and all the elements for a general explosion of violence are slowly taking shape." See Expresso News Agency (2002).

¹⁹² This essentially means that not all factions were scheduled to take part in DDR simultaneously.

and financial shortages along the road,¹⁹³ factions largely complied with the implementation of the program.

Baseline numbers are more readily available for armed groups in Burundi than in the other cases (yet their validity is anything but certain): The Burundian Armed Forces were the largest force with 41,000-45,000 troops. The most sizeable opponent with 25,000 troops fought under the flag of the CNDD-FDD (led by Nkurunziza). The remaining five major armed groups staffed around 10,000 additional armed combatants.¹⁹⁴ According to UN internal reports and external assessments, all but the FNL started assembly in some eleven designated sights in late 2004. Until 2007, 23,185 men, women and children were demobilized¹⁹⁵ and 5,400 arms (0.23 arms per person) handed over to UN authorities.¹⁹⁶

By the end of 2005, only the FNL, a Tanzania-based Hutu rebel faction consisting of 1500-3500 rebels continued to fight the government from the hills around Bujumbura.¹⁹⁷ Today (as of April 2009), even this force has formerly demobilized and been transformed into a political party. Despite these positive developments, the Arusha process and its subsequent agreements have not brought a sustained end of the violence to all areas of the country. Small but heavily armed factions continue to fight mostly civilian targets on a local level, in a struggle whose purpose is not always evident. Though conflict intensity has been lower since 2005 it remains violent in parts of the country; according to the HIIK, the conflict intensity is 3 or 4, depending on the conflict dyad.

Summarizing the analysis of the four compared attempts at demilitarization after war, only one case, Angola, stands out as a clear failure. And even there, the parties did demobilize some of their armed forces before returning to the battlefield. The demobilization process in El Salvador was the smoothest, attributable to the antagonists' ability to overcome much of their fear during implementation and to keep their more extreme armed wings on board. In Tajikistan, integration of UTO forces was also successful and more or less implemented within the agreed time frame. However, some smaller factions were excluded from the process or left it during implementation. In Burundi, where the DDR process eventually attracted the highest level of international financial and technical support, one can speak of a qualified or late success. It was not

¹⁹³ Sanitary conditions in cantonment sights and food supply to ex-combatants was a major hurdle, largely picked up by the European Union and the German Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit in the end.

¹⁹⁴ Numbers reported in United Nations (1999a). Also see ONUB (2005).

¹⁹⁵ See ONUB (2006) and Carames and Sanz (2008) p.26.

¹⁹⁶ Carames and Sanz (2008) p.51.

¹⁹⁷ See Alusala (2005).

until 2003 that demilitarization was launched. However, once started, the process went smoothly: D&D of all but one faction was rapidly implemented until 2005 and the reintegration effort started right thereafter.




Figure 7: Demilitarization success, selected cases

5.3 Power sharing in interim government

As will become clear in this sub-chapter, the cases also vary with respect to the nature of political institutions before the first post-war elections: some parties opted to commit themselves to power sharing in interim governments, while others chose to create a more competitive pre-election terrain.

5.3.1 Angola 1991-1992: The Bicesse Accords

The Bicesse Accords addressed the major points of contention, including the question of political leadership. However, neither party could befriend the idea of ceding real power to the other. On paper, the agreement established various bodies for joint action and decision-making. The Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) was to oversee implementation at the highest level. It is through this body that the two parties were to coordinate their actions. The Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission was composed of equal numbers of MPLA and UNITA representatives as well as representatives from the US, the Soviet Union, Portugal and the UN with observer status. The body was supposed to establish ad-hoc investigative commissions to monitor and verify the ceasefire and the subsequent disarmament process.¹⁹⁸ In addition, the National Election Council was to discuss all organizational and regulatory questions concerning the subsequent elections. In reality, none of these institutions had the authority to make binding decisions. Key decisions were made unilaterally and inter-party dialogue was rare.¹⁹⁹

At the center of the Bicesse Agreement stood the promise to hold national elections to reshuffle the government. Most observers actually regarded this as a fair deal for UNITA,

¹⁹⁸ See Annex I in *Peace Accords for Angola* (1991).

¹⁹⁹ Lyons (2004) pp.48-49.

since the party was recognized as an eligible and meaningful opponent with a sizeable constituency across the country. However, since the election was extremely rushed, no time and effort was sacrificed for the formation of transitional institutions, which enabled the MPLA to "paradoxically maintain its grip on power."²⁰⁰ The MPLA became the internationally recognized government and dos Santos remained in the president's seat.

Despite the promised chance to oust the incumbent on the political battlefield, the exclusion of the opposition in the interim government affected UNITA's motivations as well as its relations with the MPLA negatively.²⁰¹ First, it provided UNITA with a justification to prefer war. The fact that the incumbent Angolan Parliament adopted the rules for the election with only minimal consultation, provided UNITA with an easy justification to contest results when they were out.²⁰² UN observers labeled the September 1992 elections generally free and fair, but it was clear that the MPLA had used the interim phase to mobilize its total control of state-owned funds, the media, and the administrative apparatus for its own electoral advantage. Second, the lack of power sharing in interim government missed the chance to socialize UNITA leadership away from a winner-take-all (loser-loose-all) mindset. Since there was no reason to engage in meaningful consensus building, cooperation was neither necessary nor learned, rendering it unthinkable for the post-election phase. Third, a lack of inter-party communication reinforced mutual fears and suspicions.

5.3.2 El Salvador 1992-1994: The Chapultepec Accords

The Chapultepec Agreement took effect on 1 February 1992 and was followed by a meticulously timed implementation framework over the course of the nine following months. As one of the first steps at implementation, several interim bodies were set up to manage different aspects of the transition phase. The National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), where representation was evenly split between government and the opposition, was nominally responsible for the overall commitment to peace by the parties.²⁰³ In addition, COPAZ was to draft legislation on a new electoral law and other constitutional amendments as well as for a comprehensive land reform

²⁰⁰ Messiant (2004) p.19.

²⁰¹ See Vines and Human Rights Watch (1999) p.14.

²⁰² Hampson (1996) p.113.

²⁰³ ARENA and the FMLN held two posts each, while one was given to each of the six parties that were represented in the Legislative Assembly at the time. Hall MacLeod (2006) p.26. On the dynamics within COPAZ see Baranyi and North (1996) p.18.

program.²⁰⁴ In effect, however, COPAZ was a consultative body and its decision-making competence was mainly symbolic. Next to COPAZ, the accords established a Supreme Electoral Tribunal. However, this body proved incompetent and would probably have been unable to oversee the holding of elections unless the UN mission had stepped in with sizeable technical support.

Though the implementation phase was qualitatively different from the transition envisioned in Angola, the Chapultepec Agreement similarly circumvented the insertion of power-sharing clauses. During the negotiation phase, "the government and the rebels quickly converged upon liberal norms as the basis for any peace settlement."²⁰⁵ The term liberal as used by Stanley means that the composition of a future government was to lie solely in the hands of the electorate and thereby be more encompassing of the will of the wider population than an elite pact. In effect, the parties agreed to uphold the regular election cycle and to keep the incumbent government in place until then. President Cristiani stayed in power and no reshuffling of the cabinet took place in the interim phase. The National Assembly was heavily ARENA-dominated, which posed an obstacle to (but did not prevent) the timely adoption of constitutional changes.

General elections were held in March 1994. The opposition (including the FMLN) managed to unify behind one candidate for the presidential post, Ruben Zamora, who nevertheless lost to ARENA party candidate Calderon Sol. In the new National Assembly, ARENA also won a majority with 39 seats, the FMLN 21 and the Christian Democratic Party 18.²⁰⁶ Though the incumbent ARENA still enjoyed a majority, the elections proved that the FMLN had transformed itself into a viable political party and a non-negligible competing force within the political arena. Some were frustrated with the process itself and cited grave irregularities in voter registration, but no party contested the validity of the results.

5.3.3 Tajikistan 1997-2000: The General Agreement

The two greatest points of contention between the Rakhmonov government and the UTO were the degree of governmental participation of opposition forces and the nature of the constitution: "Could the government sacrifice the principle of secularism favored by most Tajikistanis to accommodate Islamist demands for a share of state power?"²⁰⁷ Like in the rest of the cases examined here, the agreement's protocol on political issues called for the

²⁰⁴ The issue of land reform was of high priority to former combatants scheduled to demobilize, because it determined whether they would be granted an alternative livelihood by obtaining land transferred via the government or through purchase.

²⁰⁵ Stanley (2007) p.133.

²⁰⁶ See, for example, The New York Times (1994).

²⁰⁷ Abdullaev and Barnes (2001) p.25.

installation of several joint institutions for the transition period. The State Council of National Reconciliation (CNR) consisted of members from the UTO and the government (13 each) on the basis of parity.²⁰⁸ It was chaired by UTO leader Nuri, who returned from almost five years in exile in Teheran to take up his new position. First and foremost, the CNR was responsible for observing compliance, drafting legislation such as a new electoral law and proposing constitutional amendments pertaining to the legality of religious parties and the state of the media. Despite the failure of the agreement "to identify clear directions or guidelines for the CNR in its work of constitutional reform,"²⁰⁹ the body fulfilled actual governing functions in the interim phase.²¹⁰ The other major transitional body was the Central Commission on Elections and Referenda, in which the UTO was allotted 25 per cent of the seats.

The parties clearly embraced the concept of power sharing. Originally, the UTO pushed for a 50/50 power-sharing formula for executive and representative government bodies, but finding the ultimate formula was complicated by the existence of a 'third force' in the form of the National Revival Movement around Abdumalik Abdullajanov.²¹¹ The president eventually convinced the UTO to accept a 70/30 composition, in which 70 per cent of posts and voting rights would go to the Rakhmonov government, 30 per cent to the UTO and none to Abdullajanov's party.²¹²

Executive power sharing was not only firmly inscribed in the peace agreement but also largely implemented by the transitional government under Rakhmonov.²¹³ Some authors hail the rapid integration of UTO representatives into governing bodies.²¹⁴ Rakhmonov continued to run the show as President, assisted by Prime Minister Azimov from within his own ranks. The UTO successfully pressed for the post of deputy prime minister, to which the UTO's number-two man Haji Akbar Turajonzoda was officially appointed in early 1998.

²⁰⁸ The agreement text is reprinted in Abdullaev and Barnes (2001) pp.71-72.

²⁰⁹ Zoir and Newton (2001) p.56.

²¹⁰ One reason for its relative strength may well have been that the incumbent National Assembly was an extremely weak institution.

²¹¹ A former prime minister (until 1994) and prominent figure in the North.

²¹² The outright exclusion of this important political force is often cited as a major weakness of the Tajik peace process. The two common explanations for this choice are the personal feud between Rakhmonov and Abdullajanov and the fact that the Revival Movement was largely unarmed and therefore lacked bargaining power. See Abdullaev and Barnes (2001) p.72.

²¹³ Whenever the government did stall on the implementation of the political parts of the accords (such as the assignment of UTO leaders into ministerial posts), the opposition tactically broke the ceasefire with small attacks and skirmishes.

²¹⁴ I should add that the assignment of posts (and the resulting concessions that had to be made by incumbents) was more thorough at the higher level of government than at the lower level, where neo-communist bureaucrats greatly resented sharing power with the Islamic opposition.

Other prominent cabinet positions given to the UTO included the ministry of economics,²¹⁵ the state customs committee,²¹⁶ and the deputy ministry of internal affairs.²¹⁷

In the end, making small concessions to UTO leaders actually aided Rakhmonov to centralize power.²¹⁸ A not as visible tool the government used to appease the leadership of the opposition was the distribution of valuable assets, such as farmland, shopping malls, houses, and casinos to holders of public office. Rakhmonov reportedly ignored and even encouraged the abuse of government positions for private enrichment – “the exceptions being former political or military leaders who have challenged Rakhmonov politically.”²¹⁹ The fact that the spoils of government interested the opposition more than a change in the institutional framework is evidenced in the fact that only shortly after the CNR’s first meeting, the UTO’s oppositionist character declined: The report of a meeting between Rakhmonov and Nuri professes the two leaders’ “complete unity on all the fundamental questions relating to the reestablishment of peace and national accord in Tajikistan.”²²⁰ Numerous IRP members abandoned their party along the way to join Rakhmonov’s governing DPT.

Presidential elections were held in 1999. Their mock-nature must have been apparent enough that the OSCE refused to observe it. Rakhmonov won 96.91 per cent of the vote against an opponent from the IRP that was registered against his will.²²¹ The transition period officially ended with parliamentary elections in 2000, in which Rakhmanov’s PDP won a sizeable majority.²²² Though the election process received better evaluations for its democratic character, reports from election observers were critical.²²³

In sum, the inter-Tajik peace agreement embraced a power-sharing pact and the parties shared power in the interim government, but this became a curious deal once the UTO lost much of its oppositional character and eventually disintegrated. Accordingly, the need to bargain and to build consensus across societal divides lost its role for the work within the new institutions.

²¹⁵ Given to the opposition's chief military leader Davlat Usmon.

²¹⁶ Headed by ex-warlord Rakhim Karimov.

²¹⁷ Haybullo Sanginov became deputy minister.

²¹⁸ International Crisis Group (2001b) p.4.

²¹⁹ Torjesen and MacFarlane (2009) pp.54-55.

²²⁰ Kommersant Daily (1997).

²²¹ See Abdullaev and Barnes (2001) p.30.

²²² As reported in Agence France Presse (2000).

²²³ See Joint UN/OSCE Election Observation Mission to Tajikistan (2000).

5.3.4 Burundi 2000-2005: The Arusha Peace Agreement/ Pretoria Protocol

Despite the continuation of violent clashes, 19 parties signed the "Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi" in 2000. Since the parties could not agree on some specific provisions within the protocol on security issues and the protocol on the commitment to implementation, these parts of the agreement were initially left unsigned and no ceasefire took effect. Despite its comprehensiveness, the accord marked a minimal political agreement at first. The major flaw of the deal was the failure to get the two main rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL on board. Both parties threatened to spoil the implementation process with incursions in their regional strongholds as well as large scale attacks on the capital Bujumbura.

While the question of the degree of inclusiveness²²⁴ remains pertinent until today, the consensus on the general viability of power sharing for Burundi was relatively firm. Compared to the power-sharing deal in Tajikistan, Arusha set the stage for a much more lasting embrace of the concept within Burundi's institutional structures. The Accord acknowledged the presence and salience of ethnic difference.²²⁵ It fixed power-sharing formulas to determine the composition of the transitional and post-election government on the basis of ethnicity and political grouping.²²⁶

Protocol II on the constitution prescribed that presidential elections be held by universal suffrage (benefiting Hutu candidates due to the group's majority in the population) and that Hutus receive leadership posts in several strategic central government organs, including the judiciary. The transitional cabinet of 26 ministers drew from almost all of the 19 factions taking part in the peace process: Tutsis ended up holding 12 posts, including national defense and foreign affairs and Hutus 14, including interior and national security.²²⁷ At the same time, Arusha institutionalized a minority veto for Tutsis by pre-assigning them a 40 per cent share of the seats in the Assemblée Nationale and 50 per cent in the Senate. The large minimum majority of 4/5 in the National Assembly for

²²⁴ Back in 2001, the ICG criticized Arusha for its inclusiveness and argued that a power sharing deal between UPRONA and FRODEBU without the smaller parties would be favorable. See International Crisis Group (2001a).

²²⁵ A seemingly rhetorical fix, this was in fact a major breakthrough. Allowing and even encouraging the pronunciation of the words 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' during negotiations and beyond made it possible to identify and analyze accusations, especially those voiced by the aggrieved Hutu majority. The conflict thereby became less emotionally laden and increasingly objectified, especially on the elite level. Refer to interview protocols by Haefliger (2003).

²²⁶ See *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi* (2000). Also see Haefliger (2003) pp.14-16 and Hule (2000).

²²⁷ Xinhua (2001).

making constitutional changes served as an additional guarantee to both parties and as an encouragement to "endeavor to take decisions by consensus."²²⁸

In effect, present day Burundi is unique in Africa since "no other state anywhere in the continent offers a more faithful image of the ideal consociational polity."²²⁹ A number of unprecedented leadership workshops further aided the development of cross-factional communication in the interim phase. The internationally funded workshop created a network of 95 key Burundian leaders from all parties and ethnic backgrounds.²³⁰ Among the output that emerged from these workshops was an electoral code of conduct and a statement on the joint determination to ensure the facilitation of elections without violence or intimidation.²³¹

The transitional government was formed on November 1, 2001 largely in conformity with the agreement. It was supposed to remain in place for three years. The question of political leadership was central to all parties. To lift some of the magnitude off the post's shoulders, the President was to be assisted by two Vice-Presidents who "shall belong to different ethnic groups and political parties."²³² Discontent with Buyoya was widespread in both camps and the option of inviting him to stay on as president seemed unthinkable at first.²³³ After firm mediation from Nelson Mandela, the parties finally agreed to divide the three-year term into two trenches, with a Tutsi president and Hutu vice-president leading the country for the first 18 months and a reversed set-up for the second time period. The presidential transition after 18 months went underway smoothly, with Buyoya resigning from his post and handing over power to his Hutu successor Ndayizeye after the designated date.²³⁴

When 2003 Pretoria Protocol signed between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD integrated the CNDD-FDD into the power-sharing deal. The group received four ministerial posts as well as 15 seats in the National Assembly²³⁵ and was anticipated to

²²⁸ *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi* (2000), Art 15.12-15.16.

²²⁹ Lemarchand (2007) p.3.

²³⁰ See program report and assessment in Wolpe and McDonald (2006).

²³¹ Wolpe and McDonald (2006) p.135.

²³² *Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi* (2000), Art. 7.

²³³ See Kimani (2000) and Radio Burundi (2001).

²³⁴ Like the other accords discussed so far, the agreement also installed several joint structures specifically designed to aid and monitor the implementation process. The Implementation and Monitoring Committee held two sessions in 2001. Apart from this body, the Joint Ceasefire Commission and the National Commission on Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration deserve mention.

²³⁵ See Carames and Sanz (2008) p.56.

transform into a formal political party.²³⁶ By 2005, the CNDD-FDD competed in general elections, which were deemed generally free and fair.

In light of the extremely high level of fractionalization and the row of additional dyadic peace agreements that followed the Arusha Accords, the power-sharing deal in Burundi is difficult to assess overall. Nevertheless, one can conclude that the embrace of power sharing in all the major agreements was accepted as a fair compromise by most parties and required the willingness to cooperate. The creation of power-sharing institutions in all major areas of state power can be seen as the parties' best effort to simultaneously accommodate Hutu demands and Tutsi fears. The transition institutions thereby not only promised a lasting change in inter-party relations in Burundi, but they also had a socializing effect.

When depicted on a rough comparative scale of the degree of power sharing in interim government, the four cases range between a low degree for Angola and the highest for Burundi.




Figure 8: Degree of power sharing in interim government, selected cases

5.4 External security guarantees

5.4.1 Angola

There is hardly a civil war that has been characterized by such a high level of external involvement as the Angolan one. The observable quality and degree of external intervention greatly depends on the period of time under investigation. Over the course of the 1980s, the most heavily engaged countries were South Africa,²³⁷ Cuba, the US and the Soviet Union. Even after the end of the Cold War, sporadic external support for the MPLA or UNITA, though greatly reduced, continued well into the 1990s.

²³⁶ It should not go without saying that this deal with the still armed CNDD-FDD was ethically highly problematic, especially with respect to human rights concerns that failed to be addressed thereafter.

²³⁷ In part to retaliate for MPLA support for the guerilla war in Namibia.

Superpower interest in the outcome of the conflict did not translate into financial support for a peacekeeping effort. Hence the Bicesse Accords conferred responsibility for the overall supervision of the ceasefire to the government and UNITA. The parties were supposed to communicate and cooperate within the framework of the CCPM.²³⁸ In effect, it was up to the initiative of the parties themselves to initiate and manage the process of military integration and most other aspects of implementation. "The parties' own perceptions of their self-interest became critical to successful implementation of the plan."²³⁹

Compared to the small UN mission that was already on the ground, the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) was only slightly reinforced. It had a vaguely defined mandate to verify the ceasefire.²⁴⁰ It consisted of a team of 476 unarmed observers, deployed in June 1991. This small contingent was already the result of hard bargaining between UNITA leadership, who demanded a large guaranteed UN presence and the MPLA, who interpreted any external involvement as an intrusion into the country's sovereign affairs. Considering that Angola is a vast country with a population of almost five million at the time, it is not surprising that UNAVEM II had no observable effect on the process. Neither the mission's mandate nor its monitoring and verification tasks were sufficiently robust. Even when observers discovered grave violations of the ceasefire agreement by the antagonists, UNAVEM observers failed to report, let alone respond.²⁴¹

Though the US government reportedly had high stakes in the successful completion of the peace process, enforcement measures were out of the question for two reasons: first, the US was already increasingly entangled in its intervention in Somalia and second, Savimbi's lobby apparatus in Washington was effective in the sense that key decision-makers underestimated his continued willingness to seek a military solution.²⁴² In effect, Angola in the early 1990s fell prey to the fickle nature of an international spotlight that shined brightly during negotiations and faded abruptly when it came to implementation.

5.4.2 El Salvador

When peace negotiations started in 1990, the US was highly criticized for its payment of military aid to the El Salvadoran government, but also became a key mediator. By the time the parties signed the Chalpultepec Agreement, the US had radically changed its

²³⁸ See ch. 5.3.1.

²³⁹ Fortna (1993) p.391.

²⁴⁰ See United Nations (1991)

²⁴¹ See Stedman (1996) p.747.

²⁴² Information based on confidential interviews with government officials conducted by Stedman. See Stedman (1997) p.39f.

foreign policy towards the Central American state, was favorable to a peaceful solution to the conflict and acted as a main guarantor of the peace process. As one news report of the time attests: "Historically, Washington has lost interest in Central America after periods of intense involvement. But El Salvador's peace accord offers a chance to end 40 years of American support for cold-war militarism in Latin America."²⁴³

At the same time, the UN played a major role as the overall guardian of the peace process. Security Council Resolution 693 established the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) on May 20, 1991. The mission's original role was to monitor human rights issues in El Salvador following the Agreement on Human Rights signed in San José that year. The Chapultepec Accords inscribed a more ambitious and far-reaching role for the UN.²⁴⁴ With the consent of the parties and authorized by Security-Council resolution 729, ONUSAL was to "verify all the provisions of the Accords."²⁴⁵ The vagueness of this task-list proved to be a strength and a weakness. On the one hand, it meant that parties had failed to agree on many issues that later had to be solved by UN officials. On the other hand, delegating so much power to the UN that it almost became a "shadow government"²⁴⁶ allowed the parties to save face when making costly concessions to the opposing side.

The reinforced mission was to consist of 631 police observers, 372 military observers and 95 support staff. The resolution to authorize this force came before the ultimate signing of the peace agreement and therefore provided the parties with a concretely promised guarantee. Ultimately, 368 military observers and 304 civilian police observers were deployed.²⁴⁷ Most of the observers were stationed at cantonment sights to directly monitor disarmament and thereby increase trust in the verification process. External peacebuilders in El Salvador also took on the role of impartial referee, "authoritative interpreter"²⁴⁸ and norm-setter.

In addition, the US gave limited unilateral security guarantees to each party at crucial moments during the implementation phase. Munck singles out two concrete situations to attest for this. First, a visit to San Salvador by Colin Powell²⁴⁹ in November 1992 assured President Cristiani and his resistant national army that the US had a great interest in the successful settlement of the war and that it would press further action if the government

²⁴³ The New York Times (1992).

²⁴⁴ Expressed in peacekeeping language, ONUSAL is an example for a multifunctional peacekeeping operation.

²⁴⁵ Cited from McCormick (1997) p.310. Also see United Nations Security Council (1992).

²⁴⁶ As suggested in St. Petersburg Times (1992).

²⁴⁷ See Boutros-Ghali (1995).

²⁴⁸ See for example Hall MacLeod (2006).

²⁴⁹ (then head of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff)

did not fulfill its share of the agreed terms. A few months later, when the FMLN was scheduled to proceed with the demobilization of its last core of fighters, the former guerillas refused to do so on the grounds that this would put them at the mercy of the potentially hostile national army. "Again the USA stepped in, now to give the FMLN the necessary assurances."²⁵⁰

Overall, ONUSAL was equipped with a sizeable peacekeeping force and, more importantly, far-reaching competences in the realm of the overall verification of the mission. Even though it lacked a mandate for enforcement measures to punish aggressors, the robustness of the external commitment to the process, reinforced by informal guarantees from the US, arguably helped the antagonists to overcome their security fears.

5.4.3 Tajikistan

Foreign intervention is not a new phenomenon in the history of Tajikistan either.²⁵¹ In the past as well as today, Tajikistan has turned to Russia with its security concerns. Russia's strong military presence in Tajikistan can be attributed to the latter's geopolitical location. As Boris Yeltsin once clumsily put it, the Tajik-Afghan border was essentially part of Russia's own. Furthermore, sources cite the fear of the spread of Islamic radicalism as an issue that was high on Russia's foreign policy agenda.²⁵²

When the escalating war threatened to destabilize the entire region, the Russian army's 201st motor rifle division, which had never left its bases in Dushanbe and Kulyab, intervened to deescalate the situation.²⁵³ In September 1993, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) responded to the request by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Tajikistan, and established the Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan (CIS/PKF)²⁵⁴ on the basis of the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security.²⁵⁵ This multilateral action legitimized the presence of some 15,000 Russian army personnel and 2,500 border guards already involved in peace operations on the ground.²⁵⁶ By 1997, more Russian as well as Kazakh,

²⁵⁰ Munck (1993) p.86.

²⁵¹ Historically, Soviet expansions violently restructured the country at the beginning of the 20th century, soon complemented by Uzbek infiltrations.

²⁵² See Pirseyedi (2000) pp.49-52 and *Tajikistan, Russia Worry as Taliban Nears Border* (1998).

²⁵³ See Orr (1998). Note that Tajikistan was the only Central Asian country where Russian troops remained in place after independence.

²⁵⁴ See Council of Heads of States and Council of Heads of Government of the CIS in Minsk (1993).

²⁵⁵ The treaty was signed by all Central Asian states, Moldova, Armenia and Russia in May 1992.

²⁵⁶ Note that earlier in 1993, Russia and Tajikistan had already signed a bilateral strategic partnership agreement on economic, political and military cooperation.

Kyrgyz and Uzbek contingents complemented the overall CIS mission, which eventually rose to strength of 29,300 troops.²⁵⁷

The term peacekeeping is problematic to describe the nature of the CIS/PKF, since the forces intervened in the absence of a ceasefire and were overtly partial to the Rakhmonov government.²⁵⁸ Since the Tajik state never had the time to draw up a sizeable army of its own before the outbreak of the war, the mission's official task was to guard the Tajik-Afghan border from incursions to protect strategic installations and international personnel at embassies, NGOs and international organizations.²⁵⁹ With the June 1997 peace agreement, the CIS/PKF took on more actual peacekeeping functions in connection with its intensified cooperation with the UN mission.²⁶⁰

UN commitment to the peace process was secured early on with the establishment of the UN Mission of Observers to Tajikistan (UNMOT) with the 1994 Teheran Agreement,²⁶¹ which had called for the first (ineffective) ceasefire. After having asserted its role during ensuing negotiations leading up to the 1997 General Agreement, UNMOT strengthened its presence and became principal coordinator. In addition to its support and oversight functions, UNMOT was now entitled to monitor the assembly of UTO fighters and to act as liaison between the parties.²⁶² Over the course of the implementation phase, the Security Council authorized an increase in the number of military observers to 120 (of which only 81 were deployed) and 110 civilian personnel. In effect, UNMOT had neither the mandate nor the manpower to resort to coercive enforcement in the case of stark non-compliance by one of the parties. However, it played an important role in practice as impartial liaison and in the management of the demilitarization process. In combination with the CIS/PKF, the external actors were able to provide a secure environment in most parts of the country during implementation.

Some observers judge the close coordination between UNMOT military observers and the regional peacekeeping force as a model for burden sharing in peacekeeping. With the

²⁵⁷ Number cited by Serrano (2003) p.168. Note that Neumann and Solodovnik (1995) and most other sources speak of 25,000 troops. However, Serrano is the only author that conducted extensive research of original sources on the actual constitution of the CIS/PKF on the ground, which is why I deem his assessment the trustworthiest. Also note that 85 per cent of the forces were allegedly ethnic Tajiks on a Russian payroll. See International Crisis Group (2001b) p.28.

²⁵⁸ However, as Mackinlay rightly points out, it is difficult to determine the nature and legitimacy of this intervention in international legal terms, since peacekeeping was ill-defined at the time, even in a UN context. See Mackinlay (2003) pp.3-5.

²⁵⁹ Abdullaev and Barnes (2001) p.36.

²⁶⁰ At the same time, representatives from the external parties were to bundle their efforts with the establishment of a contact group in Dushanbe.

²⁶¹ See UN Security Council Resolution 968 (1994).

²⁶² See Facts and Figures on the UNMOT website in United Nations (2000): <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot/Unmot.htm> (accessed October 10, 2009).

highest stakes in securing peace, the regional countries were more willing to provide armed personnel than the more distant outside powers. If we acknowledge that certain peacekeeping tasks necessitate a certain degree of military 'muscle' to be effectively undertaken (one might call it the dirty work in peacekeeping), it becomes clear that the contingent of unarmed UN observers could not have credibly guaranteed the security of opposing forces without the CIS/PKF forces. On the other side of the coin, a regional peacekeeping force is more prone to being perceived as biased by local parties. But when acting under the order of objectives defined by the Security Council, there is a good chance that mistrust can be alleviated. Judging from public statements made by opposition leaders during the implementation phase, they remained weary of Russia's partiality but lauded its soldiers' role in stabilizing the country.

Overall, Russian/ CIS guarantees played a key role in the implementation of the peace accords.²⁶³ Tajik-Russian military relations remained strong throughout the interim period. The two governments signed a treaty on Russia's continued military presence in April 1999. It guaranteed that Russia would keep a military base in the country until lasting stability has been restored.²⁶⁴ However, an assessment of the extent to which Russian and CIS troops would actually have intervened to secure peace if all out fighting had resumed in post-1997 Tajikistan is speculative.

5.4.4 Burundi

The case of Burundi is – again – complicated. International commitment to the peace process changed in quality and strength during the observation period, which is why I opted to divide the case into two: Burundi I, 2000-2003 and Burundi II, 2003-2005.

Burundi I: 2000-2003

The third party with the most demonstrated interest in crafting peace in Burundi was South Africa. Seeing Burundi as an essential domino in an effort to promote a peaceful settlement in the various conflicts of the Great Lakes Region, South Africa has been engaged there as mediator since 1994. Its commitment to the peace effort became even more pronounced when Nelson Mandela became chief mediator in the Arusha peace talks in 1999.

²⁶³ See Lynch (2000).

²⁶⁴ See *Russian Army Base Agreement Signed with Tajikistan* (1999).

International negotiators and local leaders were torn between two evils: giving up sovereignty and ownership of the process²⁶⁵ vs. jeopardizing overall security in the face of untamed violence by non-compliant groups. Tired of fighting and succumbed to the fact that the conflict was too protracted to be resolved without an external guarantor, most parties (especially the G7) voted in favor of UN peacekeeping at Arusha.²⁶⁶ Due to the lack of a ceasefire and a general peacekeeping fatigue, no external party was willing to follow through with the vaguely made promise. When the peace process was on the verge of collapse in 2001, the UN representatives again gave serious consideration to the deployment of peacekeepers. Again, nothing materialized.²⁶⁷

A first but cautious step at increased involvement came in October 2001, when the UN Security Council endorsed the creation of a temporary international security force at the request of South Africa.²⁶⁸ The force, a contingent of 700 troops from the South African Protection Service Detachment (SAPSD), had the restricted mandate to protect the some 150 returning Hutu political leaders to participate in the transitional government.²⁶⁹ Its geographic reach was mostly limited to the capital, thus not meant to verify or enforce peace overall.

Burundi II: 2003-2005

Mostly attributed to the political weight exerted by Nelson Mandela and to the additional peace agreements from 2002 and 2003, the African Union (AU) eventually stepped forward in April 2003 to sponsor the first ever AU peacekeeping mission with a promised 3,000 peacekeeping troops.²⁷⁰ Drawing its personnel from SAPSD and from additional battalions from Ethiopia and Mozambique, 2,870 troops were eventually deployed.²⁷¹ AMIB's mandate stipulated several objectives:²⁷² facilitating "the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreements," creating a stable "defense and security situation in Burundi,"

²⁶⁵ In an interview with Radio Burundi on July 17, 2001, Ambroise Niyonsaba, the Burundian minister in charge of the peace process, expressed the general weariness towards an international intervention: "In Burundi we should have a very small force and this should not scare anybody since its mission would not be to fight but to help."

²⁶⁶ Article 28.5 of the Arusha Accords calls for the involvement of an international peacekeeping force with the task of monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement (which did not follow the signature at Arusha) and supplying assistance and support to the implementation process. Also see Kimani (2000).

²⁶⁷ See Business Day (2003).

²⁶⁸ See United Nations (2001).

²⁶⁹ See Boshoff and Vrey (2006).

²⁷⁰ The AU Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution mandated the deployment of a mission for Burundi (AMIB) on April 2, 2003. Information on the troop size was taken from Radio Ethiopia External Service (2003).

²⁷¹ Number quoted in the ONUB Synopsis in Stimson Center (2007-2009): <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FP20040408637> (accessed October 25, 2009).

²⁷² See Boshoff and Francis (2003).

supporting the DDR process, creating an environment for later UN presence, and monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.

These developments paved the way for the subsequent deployment of the Chapter VII-mandated UN mission to Burundi (ONUB) on 1 June 2004. ONUB consisted of 5,655 military staff at peak deployment, including the former AMIB peacekeepers.²⁷³ The list of tasks largely coincided with the earlier AMIB mandate.²⁷⁴

Again, the case of Burundi is the most difficult to assess on a black-and-white spectrum of the strength and quality of external involvement. Even though the promises made by external guarantors were vague and conditional at first, third parties played an increasingly important role in the eventual demobilization of rebel groups.




Figure 9: Robustness of external security guarantees, selected cases (max. deployed)

²⁷³ See Banal and Scherrer (2008) p.34.

²⁷⁴ See Carames and Sanz (2008) p.52.

5.5 Interaction of the variables

Figure 10 summarizes the results of the empirical analysis. A look at the table is helpful for the discussion of the individual and combined effects of different values for the IVs.

Country: Comprehensive Peace Agreement(s)	Interim Period	IV1	IV2	DV
		Power sharing in interim government	External security guarantees	Peace implementation success: 1. Demobilization/integration 2. Conflict intensity
		high – low	robust – weak	1. >50% – <50% 2. Year: non-violent – violent (HIIK index) ^b
Angola: Bicesse Agreement	1991-1992	low	weak	1. <50% 2. 1992: violent (level 5) ^c => failure
El Salvador: Chapultepec Accords	1992-1994	low ^a	robust	1. nearly 100% 2. 1994: non-violent (level 1) => success
Tajikistan: General Agreement	1997-2000	high ^a	robust	1. nearly 100% 2. 2000: non-violent (level 2) => success
Burundi I: Arusha Agreement	2000-2003	high	weak	1. 0% 2. 2003: violent (level 5) => failure
Burundi II: Arusha Agreement & Pretoria Protocol	2003-2005	high	robust	1. >50% 2. 2005: violent (level 3-4) ^d => qualified success

^a The coding for the IV1 for the cases of Tajikistan and El Salvador was problematic. When grand coalition and guaranteed government posts are the measure of choice, as it is the case here, then Tajikistan is a clear example of such an inter-elite pact. However, measured by the extent to which different parties actually participated in a constitutional reform effort, especially with regard to adjusting the electoral code, El Salvador is the more successful power sharing case.

^b See Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (1992-2008) and ch. 4.1.

^c The 1992 edition of the Conflict Barometer did not employ the coding scheme. However, from any description of events as well as dataset coding, all out fighting reignited in 1992. See, for example, Vines and Human Rights Watch (1999).

^d Note that the regionally limited conflict between the government and the remaining Hutu rebel group Palipehutu-FNL as well as some extreme partisans from the CNDD-FDD was still violent by 2005. As of April 2009, the DDR process for these remaining factions has largely been completed.

Figure 10: Summary of case analysis

In line with the stated hypotheses, the case analyses suggest that both variables are in fact positively correlated with demilitarization and with the de-escalation of the conflict intensity. In the case of Angola, where both forms of guarantees were absent or extremely weak, the parties opted to return to the battlefield not even two years after having signed the Bicesse Accords. The two cases for which both IVs have high values, Tajikistan and Burundi II, demilitarization was largely successful. The effects of the variables seem to be reinforcing each other in the positive as well as the negative direction.

An assessment of the individual effects is more complicated and inconclusive with respect to the evidence at hand.

In El Salvador demilitarization was successful in the absence of a power-sharing pact. This shows that explanatory power of the first hypothesis is limited. IV2 seems to have been the deciding factor. However, attributing the largely successful peace implementation in El Salvador solely to the strength of the UN (and US) role in the process would be hasty, if not foolish. It seems safe to say that ONUSAL positively reinforced a commitment to peace that was already strong from the perspective of the conflict parties following the 1992 peace accords. A New York Times reporter underlines this fact when he concludes: "In the end, while both sides made major concessions, it was the rebels who changed ideology. After years of spurning elections and demanding a direct share of power, they recognized the legitimacy of the Government, accepted gradual disarmament and pledged to enter elections as legitimate political parties."²⁷⁵

The El Salvadoran peace process also suggests that under certain circumstances, a credible commitment to constitutional reform may be an alternative to executive power

²⁷⁵ The New York Times (1992).

sharing as a mutually acceptable institutional guarantee. In fact, the reform path that characterized the interim phase in El Salvador guaranteed the independence of the judiciary, set the stage for the emergence of a sustainable multiparty system and made these regulative changes “less susceptible to later reversal”²⁷⁶ than laws, decrees, or pacts.

The only (partial) case in which a high degree of power sharing met practically no outside support is Burundi I. By 2003, when AU and later UN peacekeeping provided rather robust security guarantees, the parties had effectively failed to start demobilization of their armed forces and fighting continued. It is tempting to infer that power sharing alone can never work, largely disconfirming the first hypothesis. Especially in comparison with the El Salvadoran case, the analysis at first sight is largely in line with Walter’s original proposition, which states that the sine qua non for civil war settlement is a strong international commitment to guarantee a secure environment for demobilization. Of course, this would be too easy.

Much more than the absence of external security guarantees brought the viability of the original peace agreement in Burundi into question. Though intricate and comprehensive, the Arusha Accord was not accompanied by a ceasefire, excluded major armed factions and was met with extreme suspicion by most Burundians. The most critical precondition for power sharing to be functional, namely the question of who is to share power with whom, was not sufficiently sorted out in Arusha.

6. Conclusion

6.1 Summary of results

The empirical analysis weakly confirms the two stated hypotheses. This means that in the transition from a signed peace to a settled peace, power sharing seems to be a useful institutional measure to induce former antagonists to demobilize their armed forces. Furthermore, without a sufficiently robust external security guarantee, combatants are less inclined to demobilize. The confirmation of the hypotheses is good news in the sense that it implies that there is some leeway in aiding demilitarization in protracted conflict settlements.

Overall, the comparative analysis provides stronger evidence in support of the second than the first hypothesis. Note that this is partly attributable to the case selection, which

²⁷⁶ Wilkins (1997) p.279.

was somewhat biased towards cases with external involvement. Power sharing alone seems insufficient to motivate antagonists to lay down their arms. Some commitment by a third party to assist, monitor and/or manage the demilitarization process seems indispensable. The case analysis provides evidence for an even deeper interdependence between the IV2 and the DV than what the original theory on external security guarantees suggested. Robust peacekeeping missions are essential for the implementation of demilitarization processes after conflict for the concrete functions they fulfill regarding the protection of ex-combatants during transit towards provincial capitals and other points of assembly. As such processes become more and more intricate, however, it may be interesting to investigate to what extent and under what circumstances former enemies can designate their own personnel to guarantee their protection and to verify such processes credibly without an external umpire.

The difficulty that I encountered in the endeavor to make informed judgments about the value of both IVs suggests that variable-guided comparative research has its limits in the realm of peace processes, at least in qualitative studies. Something as complex as a power-sharing arrangement cannot realistically be depicted as being either 'present' or 'absent.' Qualitative judgments made in each empirical sub-chapter cannot be reflected in a simple two-by-two matrix, from which overall results are extracted. Thus I join the row of many authors before me and emphasize the risk of drawing deterministic conclusions from cohesive but largely inconclusive evidence.

Interestingly enough, the case of Tajikistan suggests that the normatively most problematic aspect of power sharing, namely buying off potentially threatening opponents with lucrative but otherwise unimportant government posts, actually does work for a 'security first' approach. The strategy to focus on the inducement of potentially threatening armed factions supported peace in the short term. However, in the long term, this institutional choice may have helped to centralize power around a few individuals and to entrench corruption as an accepted (and expected) practice within Tajik political culture. It cannot be stressed enough that the Tajik kind of power sharing, used as a transitional fix after conflict, is hardly related to Lijphart's original idea of a consociational democracy. Achieving the necessary degree of consensus between opponents for such a demanding institutional structure requires that parties develop a consensual political culture. Needless to say, such a norm change takes more time than implementation timetables set out in peace accords tend to allow for.

6.2 Robustness check

This brief robustness check addresses three concrete analytical problems related to the research design as a whole. They are important to keep in mind for the interpretation of the stated results.

1. Antecedent variable: It remains unclear whether the explanatory power of the first hypothesis can in fact be attributed to the merits of power sharing in principle. On the contrary, it is equally probable that the degree to which power is shared in interim institutions is the result of the quality and level of inclusiveness of negotiations preceding the agreement. This in turn ultimately depends on political will, group structures and leadership ability. In that case, any connection found between strong peace agreements and successful implementation must be spurious, pointing to the possibility that strong agreements are made in the easier types of situations. Without being able to disprove this point of concern, I can diffuse its relevance with the proposition of a logical counterargument: precisely in the most protracted situations, belligerents that are intent to making peace may craft especially intricate agreements to help each other overcome commitment problems.²⁷⁷ In other words, cheap diplomacy and hasty implementation processes are bound to falter along the way.

2. Multicollinearity: Both variables of the explanatory model may be related to each other, creating uncertainty for their proposed relationship with the DV. International actors might demand the formation of governments of national unity as a precondition for their involvement. Likewise, if conflict parties do well agreeing on and implementing political reforms in a largely participatory fashion, then a guarantor is less likely to run the risk of supporting a void process and more likely to step in.

3. Reverse causality: Depending on the specific provisions set forth in the agreement (including the conditions for international aid), DDR may be a prerequisite for rebel participation in political institutions, even in the interim phase. DDR can be seen as a way for rebel groups and their combatants to signal good intent to implement one of the riskiest parts of an agreed peace, thereby serving as a confidence building device. One rationale for DDR in peace processes is to exchange political benefits for military capacity, which means that in the chronological chain of events, DDR may well precede the sharing of political power with former rebels. The studied cases provide some evidence for both

²⁷⁷ This basic idea is adopted from Fortna (2004b). It follows a functionalist logic rather than a realist one. Note that, on a similar note, Fortna (2004a) finds that the international community, notably the UN, is more likely to intervene in conflicts that seem especially difficult to solve, countering the argument that the UN sends peacekeepers to such situations that lend themselves to being resolved successfully.

types of causal pathways: In Burundi, CNDD-FDD was unwilling to cooperate in the field of DDR until it was represented in strategic political institutions and legally registered as a political party. In El Salvador, on the other hand, compliance with the DDR process was a prerequisite before the FMLN could formally register in elections as a political party.

6.3 Outlook

In the end, a step-wise approach to securing peace, as it was proposed here for the purpose of academic inquiry, may be not as bad as it is often portrayed in practice. Focusing on security first tones down expectations while streamlining organizational capabilities. When international actors direct their attention to the reduction of physical insecurity, local ownership of other aspects of implementation may be higher than when institutional structures, economic projects and other policy decisions are externally dictated. Given the recently strengthened norm and practice of non-intervention, the willingness of powerful third parties to meddle with local conflicts decreases as the financial and normative burden of such interventions increases.²⁷⁸ Normatively, it is not uncommon to draw parallels between international peacekeeping and imperialism. Many abhor the idea that the international community, especially when acting under the order of a multilaterally agreed mandate, should claim knowledge about what is best for another people.²⁷⁹ As Spears rightly points out, pressure from the outside is more likely to stir resistance, especially when this pressure tries to impose an agreement that requires local parties to cooperate.²⁸⁰

This leaves us with a final outlook on the use of power-sharing pacts as a formula to guarantee cooperation after conflict. Several caveats, some of which have been raised in the critical power-sharing literature, deserve more attention as research evolves. First, political pacts in general have limited influence on leaders of small but violent rebel gangs that fight for fighting's sake.²⁸¹ If the assumption that belligerents want a share of power needs to be dropped, no grand coalition is likely to facilitate demilitarization.²⁸² At the same time, as the case of Tajikistan shows, even if the power to make policy decisions and to represent an interest group at the political center does not in fact motivate

²⁷⁸ For an insightful debate on the legality of intervention see Coleman (2007).

²⁷⁹ Zisk Marten (2004) goes into more depth in this discussion. He compares recent comprehensive UN peacekeeping operations with outside interventions from the imperial past.

²⁸⁰ See Spears (2005) p.187.

²⁸¹ As suggested by research on 'new wars.' See Kaldor (1999) and Münkler (2002), among others.

²⁸² Spears (2005) hinges his critique of power sharing experiments in Africa on the problematization of this assumption.

factional leaders, they may still greedily press for power positions and lay down arms in return.

Second, the question of who is to share power with whom has not been sufficiently addressed here. For the purpose of demobilization, the cooptation model (focus on military actors) is certainly more pertinent than the more democratic model (include political parties without armed wings). While the latter may not bring peace, the former is likely to motivate non-crucial players to turn violent in order to increase their bargaining position to be included in the political deal.²⁸³ In the short term, the former of the two evils is probably worse, despite the alarming immorality of cooptation.

Lastly, it will be interesting to further investigate, what other forms of institutional and self-enforcing guarantees parties after conflict can devise, to improve the chances of Nelson Mandela's visionary proposition that enemies may well become partners if they only get used to working together.

²⁸³ Leading to the "reproduction of insurgent violence." See Tull and Mehler (2005) p.1.

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