

---

**Fachbereich Erziehungswissenschaft und Psychologie  
der Freien Universität Berlin**

Foresight management or futures research, or both?

Dissertation

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades

Doktor(in) der Philosophie (Dr. phil.)

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

vorgelegt von

Mag.Art.

Øverland, Erik F.

Berlin, 2014

Tag der Disputation: 7. Juli 2015

Erstgutachter/in

---

Prof. Dr. Gerhard deHaan

Zweitgutachter/in

---

Prof. Dr. Harm Kuper

## **1 Forword and acknowledgements**

As a research fellow at Institut Futur at the Freie Universität Berlin the last 2 ½ year and as a Co-editor of the recent established European Journal of Futures Research, I had the privilege to turn my more than 20 years experience in the field of futures studies and futures into some systematic scientific reflections. The research presented here are about topics that have attracted my attention a long time, and it relies on several comprehensive Foresight programmes, both in Norway and abroad. Especially my role as a chief architect and program manager of the Government initiated Scenario project Norway2030 (Øverland ed 2000b) plays a fundamental role for both the content and reasoning throughout several of the articles. Also my participation and cooperation partner to the OECD International Futures Program and EUs former Cellule de Prospective are important reference points. My facilitator role of foresight projects within the Research Council of Norway – Aquaculture2020, Material Technology 2020, Energy 2020+ and Biotech2020 has been a valuable context of the most exciting foresight experimentations.

This work also relies on the efforts of a long range of people. I will use the opportunity to thank colleagues and friends at the Institut Futur at the FU-Berlin like Professor Dr. Habil. Gerard de Haan, Ingo Wolf, Bernd Stegmann, Björn Helbig, Robert Fischback, Jana Huck, Nina Kolleck and Sascha Dannenberg, my co-author and discussion partner over many years - Prof. Dr. Jan Erik Karlsen at the University of Stavanger, Prof. Dr. Reinhold Popp at the Salzburger Zentrum für Zukunftsforschung, the futures researcher and science fiction writer Karlheinz Steinmüller, the colleagues within the World Futures Studies Federation WFSF - Jennifer Gidley, Rakesh Kapoor, Peter Mettler and

Peter Bishop. Riel Miller at UNESCO has played a special role as discussion partner over the years – thanks Riel. And, not to forget, my good friend and co-author Prof. Dr. Iver B. Neumann at the London School of Economics.

I would also like to use the opportunity to thank my colleagues within The European College of Regional Foresight, The Fumee project, the former ERA project – ForSociety. Last and not least my thanks go to Dr. Nika Daryan for extraordinary interesting conversations the last year, and to my beloved family, my wife Annette and my kids Philipp, Alina, Nanine and Thilo. Love you!

Berlin, April 30th 2014

## Content

1	FORWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	3
2	DISPUTATION AN DER FREIEN UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN, 7/7 2015.....	6
3	SUMMARY.....	20
4	ZUSAMMENFASSUNG .....	1
5	INTRODUCTION.....	4
6	RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGIES .....	6
6.1	Research questions.....	7
6.2	State of current research .....	7
6.3	Methodologies .....	15
7	WHY BE INVOLVED IN FUTURES THINKING?.....	15
7.1	Four categories of motivations .....	16
7.1.1	Supporting decision making.....	16
7.1.2	Create attention .....	18
7.1.3	Develop depths insights in different areas .....	19
7.1.4	Promote innovation and creativity .....	19
7.2	On what level should we apply futures studies?.....	20
7.2.1	Practical level.....	21
7.2.2	Strategic decisions within corporates.....	21
7.2.3	Political level.....	22
7.3	Foresight and research .....	23
7.4	Foresight and politics.....	26
8	BOOK AND RESEARCH ARTICLES – A BRIEF PRESENTATION .....	29
8.1	Contribution 1 (Textbook): Øverland (ed) (2000).....	29
8.2	Contribution 2 (Article): Neumann&Øverland (2004).....	30
8.3	Contribution 3 (Article): Karlsen, Øverland, Karlsen (2010).....	37
8.4	Contribution 4 (Article): Karlsen& Øverland (2012).....	39
8.5	Contribution 5 (Article): Øverland (2013) .....	42
9	BRIEF CONCLUSION .....	44
10	REFERENCES .....	46
11	TEXTBOOK AND RESEARCH ARTICLES .....	50
12	SUPPLEMENT .....	327

## **2 Disputation an der Freien Universität Berlin, 7/7 2015.**

# **Foresight Management, or Futures Research, or both?**

Von Erik F. Øverland

Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, Professoren, Kollegen und andere Interessierte. Ich freue mich sehr, Ihnen im Rahmen meiner Disputation meine Forschungsarbeit noch einmal näher erläutern zu können.

Diese Dissertation besteht aus 4 publizierten Beiträgen. Die Beiträge stellen eine Reflektion über sowohl praktische Vorgehensweisen als auch konzeptuelle Diskussionen bezüglich der Schnittstelle zwischen konventioneller Forschungsmethodik und Professionen und der Zukunftsforschung dar.

Der Titel, unter dem ich die Beiträge zusammengefasst habe, lautet "Zukunftsmanagement oder Zukunftsforschung, oder beides?" Die zugrunde liegende These ist, dass eine wissenschaftliche begründete Zukunftsforschung möglich ist. Warum muss man dieses nachweisen, werden Sie fragen? Warum ist das nicht selbstverständlich? Eine einfache Antwort lautet: Die Befassung mit Zukunft wird oft von Beratungsunternehmen praktiziert. Sie machen zwar Anlehnungen an ein ganzes Repertoire an Methoden, sind schließlich aber in Bezug auf das Einhalten von Standards und Gütekriterien der Sozialwissenschaften eher nachlässig, operiert oftmals intuitiv und kommt als Trendforschung manchmal als Boulevardforschung (Rust) daher.

Zukunftsforschung als Wissenschaft hat in dem pragmatisch ausgerichteten Umfeld keinen leichten Stand. Sie ist dabei sich zu entwickeln. Und dazu sind meine Artikel und die Dissertation als Beitrag gedacht.

Ich habe mir in meinen Arbeiten zwei Forschungsfragen gestellt:

1) Erstens: Wie kann Zukunftsforschung legitimiert werden? Ist es überhaupt möglich eine Brücke zwischen Zukunftsdenken und Wissenschaft zu bilden, oder kann Zukunftsdenken nur in Form von Zukunftsmanagement (Beratung) stattfinden?

2) Zweitens: Kann es eine wirkungsvolle Zukunftsforschung in Bezug auf Politikgestaltung/Political foresight geben? Wenn ja, in welcher Form kann bezogen auf dieses Feld eine effiziente und konstruktive Zukunftsforschung organisiert und durchgeführt werden? Das Feld der Politik ist – das liegt an meiner Tätigkeit in Norwegischen Ministerien – eines der Felder, in dem sich Zukunftsforschung als Wissenschaft bewähren muss.

Die veröffentlichten Artikel diskutieren diese Problemstellungen sowohl direkt als auch indirekt. Hier wird diskutiert, wie Zukunftsforschung innerhalb der Soziologie, Politikwissenschaften, auf dem Gebiet der internationalen Beziehungen, der Geschichtsforschung, der Strategischen Forschung und der Bildung von Managementtheorien eine Funktion hat. Ferner wird ausgelotet, ob und auf welchem Niveau diese Beiträge liegen. Die Güte der Forschung zu heben, dem dienen in den Artikeln auch Vorschläge zur Veränderung der Tools, mit denen man in diesem Kontext operiert.

Ich werde mich im Folgenden weniger den praktischen Aspekten meiner Arbeit widmen als der Grundlagenfrage nach dem wissenschaftlichen Status der Zukunftsforschung. Da meinen Artikeln in der kumulativen Dissertation vorangestellte Synopsis nicht ausreichend auf dieses Thema eingegangen ist (und deshalb von den Gutachtern auch mit Recht kritisiert wurde), freue Ich mich jetzt, die Gelegenheit nutzen zu können, diese Thematik weiter zu vertiefen.

Also:

Verglichen mit einem klassischen Begriff von Wissenschaftlichkeit gibt es für die Zukunftsforschung zwei bedeutsame Herausforderungen:

- 1) Zukünfte gibt es noch nicht, und
- 2) Aussagen über die Zukunft lassen sich nicht falsifizieren. Sie können nicht an der Realität überprüft werden – auch nicht an der künftigen Realität.

Das Problem der Unverfügbarkeit von Zukunft verfolgt seit nunmehr fünf Jahren in diesem Kontext (Grunwald, 2009: 26). Er versucht zu belegen:

- 1) Zukunft ist was Erforschbares (allerdings in einem vielleicht überraschenden Sinn) und der Begriff der Zukunftsforschung hat daher einen Sinn
- 2) die erforschbare Zukunft ist jedoch keine Gegenwart einer *zukünftigen* Zeit, sondern Teil der je *heutigen* Gegenwart.
- 3) Zukunftsforschung ist daher keine Wissenschaft von „der“ Zukunft, sondern von ihren je gegenwärtigen Konstruktionen. Zukunftsforschung erforscht nicht



die zukünftigen Gegenwarten, sondern die gegenwärtigen Zukünfte.

Zukunftsforschung erforscht damit bestimmte Aspekte der Gegenwart.

Grunwalds Begründung liegt in der Geltungsanalyse und in einem post-positivistischen wissenschaftstheoretischen Ansatz. Diesbezüglich hat seine Position viel Gemeinsames mit unserer Konzeption in dem Artikel zur „Perspektivistischen Szenariobildung“. Grunwalds Begriff „gegenwärtigen Zukünfte“ korrespondiert mit anderen Beiträgen aus der internationalen Literatur, wie z. B. in dem Artikel „Towards an ontology of the present moment“ bei Anthony Hodgson (Hodgson, 2012). Wie Grunwald, Hodgson und Andere, habe ich mir auch die Frage gestellt: In welcher Weise kann von der Analyse gegenwärtiger Zukünfte behauptet werden, dass sie wissenschaftliche Qualität und Evidenz besitzt? Zukünfte sind komplexe Konstruktionen d.h. Prognosen, Szenarien, Visionen, die aus Wissensbestandteilen, Ad-hoc Annahmen oder praktischen trendanalytischen Aussagen und Relevanzentscheidungen bestehen. Laut Grunwald wird „ein Diskurs über Geltungsfragen von Zukunftsaussagen dadurch zu einem Diskurs über die – jeweils gegenwärtigen – *Voraussetzungen*, die zu der Zukunftsaussage geführt haben“ (Grunwald, 2009: 26). Die Wissenschaftlichkeit von Aussagen über die Zukunft muss **ex ante** erwiesen werden. Das heisst, sie müssen Gegenstand einer Geltungsanalyse und/oder Diskursanalyse sein. Wissensbestandteile und Prämissen können sodann nach üblichen diskursiven Massstäben unter Geltungsaspekten analysiert werden.

Das interessante an dieser Position ist, dass sie zuerst die Diskussion über konventionelle Faktizität und die Frage nach dem tatsächlichen Eintreffen von

erwarteten Zukunftseignissen für vollständig uninteressant und überflüssig hält. Zum zweiten beinhaltet sie eine deutliche Ambition, die Konstruktion von Zukunftsvorstellungen unter bestimmten Prämissen nicht als Fiktion, nicht als Spekulation oder Beratungsmodus zu bezeichnen, sondern als Forschung.

Ich möchte mich allerdings über diese Position hinweg bewegen und genauer die Distinktion von Faktizität und Geltung diskutieren. Das geschieht bisher international eher fragmentarisch und unsystematisch, wie der Band von Giaoutzi und Sapiro mit dem Titel "Recent Developments in Foresight Methodologies" (Giaoutzi&Sapiro eds. 2013) zeigt.

Um diese Fragestellungen näher zu diskutieren, knüpfe ich noch einmal an den letzten der vier Artikel aus meiner kumulativen Dissertation an. Ich möchte ihnen einige Reflektionen über die sogenannte semiotische Kanttransformation, insbesondere durch Habermas präsentieren. Daran werde ich erläutern was es heisst, Sachverhalte und Tatsachen zu konstruieren. Ich werde für eine sozial-konstruktivistische form der Erkenntnisgewinnung plädieren und dabei die Perspektive von Kenneth Gergen und Bruno Latour miteinbeziehen, um meine Argumentation zu unterstützen.

### *Die semiotische Kanttransformation*


In seinem Buch „Faktizität und Geltung“ (Habermas 1994) vertritt er noch einmal seine These über die *linguistische Wende*, die seit dem Buch „Erkenntnis und Interesse“ (Habermas 1968) als Hauptgrundlage seines Kommunikativen Handelns gilt. Die linguistische Wende wird auch als die semiotische Kanttransformation bezeichnet.

Habermas ist daran gelegen, die erkenntnistheoretische Subjekt-Objekt Position Kants zu überwinden durch eine dritte vermittelnde Instanz, nämlich die Geltungsdimension der Sprache. Bezogen auf Charles Sanders Peirce in Amerika, Gottlob Frege und Edmund Husserl hier in Deutschland als auch G.E. Moore und Bertrand Russell in Grossbritannien, soll „die Weichen für die Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts“ gestellt werden (Habermas 21994:25). Habermas zufolge fasst Frege diese Ansicht in folgender These zusammen: „Wir sind nicht Träger der Gedanken, wie wir Träger unserer Vorstellungen sind“ (Frege 1966: 49). Es geht hier um eine Distinktion zwischen Gedanken und Vorstellungen. „Vorstellungen sind jeweils meine oder deine Vorstellungen; sie müssen einem in Raum und Zeit identifizierbaren vorstellenden Subjekt zugeschrieben werden, während Gedanken die Grenzen eines individuellen Bewusstseins überschreiten. Gedanken bleiben, auch wenn sie von verschiedenen Subjekten an jeweils verschiedenen Orten zu jeweils anderen Zeiten erfasst werden, ihrem Inhalt nach im strikten Sinne *dieselben* Gedanken“ (Habermas op.cit: 25). Aus dieser Perspektive heraus sind die Gegenstände in unserer Vorstellungen gegeben, während Gedanken und Tatsachen nicht mehr als unvermittelt angesehen werden können, sondern sind nur als dargestellte, also in Sätzen ausgedrückte Sachverhalte zugänglich!

Wird mit der „Faktizität“ des Sachverhaltes, der unvermittelten Vorstellungswelt etwas nichtkonstruiertes erfasst, ist es „das Ding an Sich“?

Habermas trennt scharf zwischen einer Verständnisorientierten kommunikativen Erfahrung und sensorischen Erfahrungen und Betrachtungen. Die Betrachterperspektive ist für Habermas und die Vertreter der semiotischen Kanttransformation eine sehr einsame. Um diese Einsamkeit entgegenzuwirken setzt Habermas diesen Bereich des

Verstehens entgegen, also Geltung um eine Art Intersubjektivität gewährleisten zu können.



Der einsame Betrachter äussert sich propositional und hat eine *unmittelbare* Relation zur Realität, während die kommunikative Erfahrung eine vermittelte sei. Es ist die Interpretation, die Einigung über die Bedeutung der Aussage, die die Erfahrung über das Private hinwegbewegen soll. Habermas entwickelt dann auch eine Reihe von Begriffspaaren, die diese Trennung reflektiert, wie z. B. Systemwelt-Lebenswelt, instrumenteller Vernunft-kommunikativer Vernunft, Erkenntnis – Interesse, Faktizität – Geltung. Als Konsequenz legt Habermas Gewicht auf die *prozedurale* Aspekte einer rational argumentativen Kommunikation. Er stellt folgende 4 universalpragmatische Kriterien auf:

- 1) etwas muss verständlich ausgedrückt sein (für Andere)
- 2) Es muss eine Wahrheit über irgendetwas behauptet werden
- 3) Es muss wahrgerecht sein
- 4) Es muss richtig sein (in Bezug auf Konventionen)

Diese sollen also eine Art Intersubjektivität sichern und eine „gewisse“ Wahrheit gewährleisten. Es ist das Regelbewusstsein und die Strukturen des Hervorbringens, und nicht die Inhalte selber, die dann Rekonstruiert werden sollen.

Es sind diese Kriterien, die Befürworter von geltungsorientierter Zukunftsforschung, wie Grunwald und andere, zu Grunde legen wollen in einer wissenschaftstheoretischen Begründung von Forschung über die Zukunft, oder wie Grunwald es formuliert, über die „Forschung von gegenwärtigen Zukünften“.

### *Eine alternative Annäherung*

Der Status dieser gegebenen Gegenstandswelt könnte aber, auch anders interpretiert werden. Was wäre, wenn die auf der Basis sensorische Erfahrung gewonnenen Einsichten *auch* ein Resultat unserer aktiven Mithilfe wäre? Das Ergebnis einer geteilten Konstruktion, die Konstruktion der Materialität als solcher, die Existenz von Gegenständen überhaupt, als Vergangenheitserwartung (war), als Ambition der Gegenwartsbestimmung (ist), UND als Erwartungsorientierung der Zukunft (sein könnte)? Einer Trennung zwischen Vorstellungen und Sinneseindrücke (unvermittelt) auf der einen Seite und sprachliche Symbole und Gedanken (vermittelt) auf der Anderen lässt sich bestreiten. Meine These ist zunächst, dass diese „einsame“ Position gar nicht so „einsam“ sein kann, wie die Vertreter der semiotischen Kanttransformation behaupten. Dass Ich in der Lage bin etwas wahrzunehmen, muss nicht als eine unvermittelte gegebene Sinneswahrnehmung verstanden werden, sondern könnte als eine immer schon vermittelte und konstruierte Gegenstandswelt gedacht werden.

Um diese zu veranschaulichen, werde Ich ein Paar Reflektionen über das Phänomen „Konstruktion“ machen. Damit schließe ich an die Kant Darlegung in meinem Horizonartikel an. Die Konstruktion der Natur, der Dinge im Sinne Kants deutet auf eine Radikalkonstruktion hin. Hier geht es nicht nur darum zu zeigen, dass die Erkenntnis vom sozialen Umfeld und kulturelle Variationen abhängig wären, sondern auch darum, dass die Natur in Wirklichkeit über eine kontinuierliche Produktion und Reproduktion von *Erwartungen* konstituiert wird.

Nach meiner Ansicht stellen die Befürworter der semiotischen Kanttransformation - wenn sie nach der Einheit zwischen das erkennende Subjekt und dem wahrnehmbaren Objekt fragen – die falsche Frage. In meinem Artikel Universal Perspectivism: transcending „facta“ and „futura“ through foresight theory building“ behauptete Ich folgendes über die Hauptambition Kants in seiner theoretischen Philosophie: „What Kant is doing here is to turn the fundamental ontological and epistemological question upside down, from the question about what unites subjects and objects to the wondering on how a sustainable and continuous dichotomy between them over time is possible in general“ (Øverland, 2013:42). Nach meiner Interpretation der Kantischen Philosophie versucht Kant nicht die Einheit zwischen Subjekt und Objekt oder Kultur und Natur zu elaborieren, sondern er nimmt eine Art Dauerpraxis ausserhalb der Philosophie und Methaphysik als Ausgangspunkt. Dieser Dauerpraxis ist die damalige (die auch die heutige sein könnte) kontinuierliche Progression innerhalb der Naturwissenschaften. Der einmalige historische Erfolg der Naturwissenschaften muss erklärt werden. Wie ist dieser überhaupt möglich?

Nach meiner Ansicht ist das Grundvorhaben Kants in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft nicht nach der Einheit zwischen dem Erkennenden Subjekt und dem Gegenstand des Erkenntnisprozesses zu fragen, sondern wie diese Trennung, die für Kant die Hauptvoraussetzung der Moderne und jeder wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit sei, auf Dauer aufrechterhalten werden kann.

Es ist nicht so, dass das Ding an Sich zu verstehen ist als die Faktizität, als gegebener Gegenstand der Vorstellung (das quasi „unvermittelte“), wie Habermas und Andere es behauptet, sondern Das Ding an Sich lässt sich mit Kant auch als eine kontinuierliche (in die Zukunft gerichtete) *Erwartungsvorstellung* der Naturwissenschaftler von erforschbaren Objekten verstehen. Die Aussage „Diese Rose ist rot“ ist bei Habermas ein für unsere Vorstellung gegebener Sinneseindruck, der jeder Einzelne von uns privat erfährt. Aber, liebe Anwesende, Sie sind wohl damit einverstanden, dass diese Rose rot ist, oder nicht? Wie der Naturforscher als auch ihr, liebe Anwesenden, haben wir eine Erwartung, dass die Rose als Bestandteil der Natur sei. Wenn Ich mich an einem Dorn einer Rose verletze, schimpfe Ich nicht mit dem bösen Rosengeist oder Rosen“gott“. Ich ziehe lieber beim nächsten Mal Handschuhe an, um so eine Situation nächstes Mal zu vermeiden. Die Rose wird also als Natur, als Nicht-Subjekt behandelt. Die Rose qua Natur ist eine immer schon *begrifflich bestimmte Unbestimmtheit!* Dies mag trivial wirken. Ist es aber nicht.

Die Phänomenologie der Erscheinungswelt des „Das Ding für Mich“ setzt eine grundsätzliche Konstruktion der transzendentalen Hypothese des noch zu erforschenden Naturobjektes voraus, das nie erreicht wird, aber immer wieder konstruiert und

rekonstruiert als eine Zukunftserwartung von Zusammenhänge in einer Natur, die per se nicht Subjekt sein kann. Diese Interpretation bildet dementsprechend die Brücke zur heutigen Diskussionen des Konstruktivismus. Wie wichtig das Aufrechterhalten dieser Dichotomie sein zu scheint, wird auch vom z. B. von Bruno Latour verdeutlicht. In der Einleitung von *Politique de la nature* (Latour 2001: 11) schreibt er:

“Anstatt die Dichotomien von Mensch und Natur, Subjekt und Objekt, Produktionssystem und Umwelt zu “überwinden”, um so schnell wie möglich einen Ausweg aus der Krise zu finden, hätte man im Gegenteil die Bewegung verlangsamen, suspendieren, hätte sich Zeit nehmen müssen, um diese Dichotomien gleichsam wie ein Maulwurf zu untergraben.”

Wenn man diese Aussage mit dem radikalen konstruktivistischen Ansatz vergleicht, den er hat, finden wir viele Parallelen zu der obigen Diskussion. Nur, wir haben das Gefühl, Latour bringt den Ansatz nicht ganz zu Ende und er ist undeutlich, wenn es darum geht, die obengenannten Fragen Kants – wie ist die Progression der Naturwissenschaften überhaupt möglich?, und – wie kann eine Trennung zwischen Subjekt und Objekt auf Dauer gewährleistet werden? - zu beantworten. Gergen (2009) fragt rhetorisch z. B. „Was wäre es, wenn wir sagen würden, dort draussen seien keine Bäume, Gebäude, Frauen, Männer etc., bevor wir uns darüber geeinigt haben, dass sie existieren?“. Obwohl er der Meinung ist dass sozialer Konstruktivismus „ontologisch stumm“ sein soll (Gergen 1999), bedeutet dies, laut unserer Interpretation nur, dass die Trennung zwischen Epistemologie (wie) und Ontologie (was) schwierig aufrechtzuerhalten ist, wenn auch die Faktizität ein Ergebnis Konstruktivistischer Aktivitäten sind.

*Mögliche Konsequenzen für eine Zukunftswissenschaft*



Der Reiz, Kant selbst für eine Zukunftswissenschaft als Referenz zu nutzen, liegt darin, dass Wissenschaft und Forschung *Erwartungen* zur Grundlage haben – und diese sind immer auf Zukunft gerichtet. Das heißt: Die Konstitution/das Konstruieren von Objekten an sich, setzt eine Zukunftsorientierung voraus. Ohne die „transzendente Erwartungshaltung“ von zukünftigen Zusammenhängen einer beforschbaren Natur/Technologie lässt sich Forschung gar nicht denken. Damit ist ein wenig Aufgeregtheit aus der Zukunftsforschung zu nehmen, die ja als Gegenstand die gegenwärtige Zukunft hat.

Nimmt man dieses zusammen mit den Überlegungen, die aus der Diskussion um Faktizität und Geltung resultieren, so ist man noch einen Schritt weiter:

Bei einem zu erforschenden Sachverhalt muss man davon ausgehen, dass wir nicht Vorstellungen von „gegebenen“ Gegenständen entwickeln können, sondern immer wieder nur vermittelt Objekte erkennen können. Sowohl die Erscheinungswelt (das Ding für mich) als auch das was darunter liegen sollte (latents/Das Ding an sich) sind Ergebnisse konstruktivistische Aktivitäten. Letztlich wird man diese Differenz zwischen Erscheinung und „Wirklichkeit“ aufgeben müssen, weil über die Wirklichkeit im Sinne eines „so ist es wahr“ gar nichts gesagt werden kann. Man nähert sich *nicht* im Laufe der naturwissenschaftlichen Forschungsgeschichte den Sachverhalten, wie sie wirklich sind an, sondern ein Paradigma löst ein andres ab (I. Fleck; Th. Kuhn) und die Ergebnisse müssen sich schließlich unter Nützlichkeitsabwägungen bewähren (Hartman / Janich).

Was übrigens bestehen bleibt, ist die Vorstellung von Natur als solche. Allerdings ist die empirische Realität (das können auch Vorstellungen sein) Voraussetzung dafür, dass

wir überhaupt etwas wahrnehmen können, aber sie ist erforschbar nur durch die Bildung einer kommunikativen intersubjektiven Forschungsgemeinschaft, die konsequent Natur als etwas grundsätzlich Anderes versteht als Kultur.

Um etwas zu erforschen, werden Dinge in Vorstellungen transferiert oder Vorstellungen über Vorstellungen formuliert. Insofern ist die Beschäftigung mit Zukunft – ähnlich wie die Beschäftigung mit Geschichte, oder aber auch mit Literatur prinzipiell auch in wissenschaftlicher Weise möglich, wenn man meinem Vorschlag folgt, einer konstruktivistischen Erkenntnistheorie zu folgen. Das habe ich insbesondere mit dem Artikel „Transcending „facta“ and „futura...“ angesprochen, aber auch in „Sociological Contributions..). Sich mit der Zukunft wissenschaftlich zu beschäftigen ist dann „nur“ noch davon abhängig, dass sich eine Forschergemeinschaft findet, die Gütestandards ihrer Tätigkeit festlegt, ihre eigenen (oder adaptierten Methoden) entwickelt und ihre eigene Fachsprache sowie Publikationspfade herausbildet. Diese Position dürfte aber den Anforderungen von Kollege Prof. Dr. Reinhold Popp auch entgegenkommen, eine viel engere Integration zwischen herkömmlichen Professionen und Zukunftsforschung als eine „undiskutables“ forschungspolitisches Ziel zu etablieren, wie z. B. bildungswissenschaftliche Zukunftsforschung, gesundheitswissenschaftliche Zukunftsforschung, technikwissenschaftliche Zukunftsforschung, soziologische Zukunftsforschung, politikwissenschaftliche Zukunftsforschung usw....

Um die einleitende Frage - "Zukunftsmanagement oder Zukunftsforschung, oder beides?" zu beantworten: Zukunftsforschung ist nicht nur möglich. Sie sollte zielgerecht weiterentwickelt werden und in einem höheren Grade als zuvor eine kritische Instanz für Projekte der Zukunftsberatung sein. Sowohl Zukunftsberatungen als auch

Zukunftsforschung sind möglich, und Ich möchte hinzufügen – viel wichtiger als je zuvor!

Ich bedanke mich recht herzlich für die Aufmerksamkeit!

### **3 Summary**

The title of this synopsis of the four attached articles is “Foresight management or futures research, or both?”. The title reflects the ambition of the presented work to make plausible that futures reasoning could be made both more systematically, more in line with contemporary research methodologies and even be considered as research. On the other side futures research is also presented as an important tool for strategic thinking and especially for policy making. How both these possibilities could be addressed is the central question to be answered in the presented work.

#### **Research questions**

This outline and the presented papers tries in a substantial way to answer the following research questions:

- 1) How do we legitimize research on futures? Is it at all possible, or do we have to stay within the framework of foresight management (consultancy)?
- 2) What is political foresight/futures research? And, how are we supposed to organise and carry out political foresight in effective and constructive ways?

#### **State of current research**

The point of departure in this doctoral thesis is that futures are real areas of investigations. As obstacles of scientific research futures are not yet acknowledged as an area of scientific reflection in a way it could be. Therefore there is a huge gap between this need and the contemporary professional approaches to futures thinking. Somehow you got the impression - greater the need, more the professional approaches are missing. There is a huge need to rethink the discipline, and much more look into the potential futures thinking has for research, and even to investigate how it even could be

research. In the recent book “Recent Developments in Foresight Methodologies” (Giaoutzi&Sapio eds. 2013) several contributors point at this need. This is also the main objective among a group of scholars behind a special issue of On The Horizon (Vol 21. No 1, 2013). This issue gives an unique overview of the contemporary discussion among leading futures researchers on the scientific status of futures studies.

## **Results**

Beside some principal reflections on the theory of science and futures the outline and papers point at some possible and interesting answers to these questions, and demonstrate the interface between futures studies and more established professions, like sociology, history, philosophy, education and political science.

The presented articles represent both significant contributions to the contemporary discourse within the futures field on the foundation of futures research as scientific activity, and the demonstration of the importance of futures research and foresight management. In addition they present proposal on how futures research and practical foresight could be performed. There is no “either or” between foresight management and futures research, but a “both and”. Both foresight management and futures research is possible!

Key words: Foresight, futures research, futures studies, foresight management, scenario building, ontology, epistemology, constructivism, philosophy, perspectivism, sociology, international relations.

Berlin, April 30th 2014

## **4 Zusammenfassung**

Der Titel dieses Exposés der vier beigefügten Artikel lautet "Zukunftsmanagement oder Zukunftsforschung, oder beides?". Der Titel spiegelt die Ambition der vorliegenden Arbeit wieder. Gezeigt werden soll, dass Zukunftsdenken sowohl systematischer zu betreiben als auch besser in Einklang mit herkömmlichen Forschungsmethoden zu bringen ist. Die vorliegende Dissertation zeigt, dass eine wissenschaftliche begründete Zukunftsforschung möglich ist. Darüber hinaus wird Zukunftsforschung als ein wichtiges Instrument des strategischen Denkens und besonders im Bezug auf die Politikentwicklung dargestellt.

### **Forschungsfragen**

Dieser Umriss und die beiliegenden Artikeln versuchen die folgende Forschungsfragen zu beantworten:

- 1) Wie kann Zukunftsforschung legitimiert werden? Ist es möglich, oder kann Zukunftsdenken nur in Form von Zukunftsmanagement (Beratung) stattfinden?
- 2) Kann es eine wirkungsvolle Zukunftsforschung der Politikgestaltung/Political foresight geben? Wenn ja, in welcher Form kann eine effiziente und konstruktive politische Zukunftsforschung organisiert und durchgeführt werden?

### **Forschungsstand**

Der Ausgangspunkt dieser Doktorarbeit ist, dass Zukünfte erforschbar sind und als sinnvolle Bereiche der wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen verstanden werden müssen. Davon ausgehend gibt es bis heute sehr wenige Forschungsarbeiten, die sich mit dem Grundlagen theoretischen Fragestellungen der Zukunftsforschung beschäftigen. Die vorliegende Dissertation ist ein Beitrag dieser Situation zu verändern. Darüber hinaus

sind theoretischer Grundlagenarbeiten eine notwendige Legitimation um Zukunftsdenken in einer wissenschaftlichen begründeten Zukunftsforschung umzuwandeln. Wie könnte Zukunftsdenken Wissenschaft sein? In der neulich erschienen Buch "Recent Developments in Foresight Methodologies" ("Aktuelle Entwicklungen der Methoden der Zukunftsforschung") (Giaoutzi&Sapio eds. 2013) zeigen mehrere Beiträgen deutlich auf die Notwendigkeit Grundlagen-arbeiten innerhalb der Zukunftsforschung zu betreiben. Dies ist auch das Hauptziel einer Gruppe von Wissenschaftlern hinter einer Sonderausgabe von On The Horizon (Vol. 21. No 1, 2013). Diese Beiträge geben einen einzigartigen Überblick über die gegenwärtige Diskussion unter den führenden Zukunftsforscher auf den wissenschaftlichen Status der Zukunftsforschung.

## **Ergebnisse**

Neben einigen prinzipiellen Reflexionen über die Theorie der Wissenschaft und Zukunftsforschung, geben dieses Exposé und die beiliegenden Artikel einige mögliche Antworten auf diese Fragen und zeigen auf signifikante Schnittstellen zwischen der Zukunftsforschung und anderen wissenschaftlichen Professionen wie Soziologie, Geschichte, Philosophie, Pädagogik und Politikwissenschaft.

Die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Dissertation stellen beide wichtige Beiträge zum aktuellen Forschungsdiskurs innerhalb des Bereiches der Zukunftsforschung (Futures field). Sie zeigen auch die Bedeutung und Relevanz von, nicht nur Zukunftsforschung, sondern auch in erhebliche Masse das Zukunftsmanagement. Darüber hinaus können diese Ergebnisse als Tools und Konzepte für sowohl Zukunftsforschung als auch für das Zukunftsmanagement eingesetzt werden. Es gibt kein "entweder oder" zwischen Zukunftsmanagement und Zukunftsforschung, sondern ein "sowohl als auch". Sowohl Zukunftsmanagement als auch Zukunftsforschung ist möglich!

Schlüsselwörter: Foresight, Zukunftsstudien, Zukunftsforschung, Zukunftsmanagement, Szenarien, Ontologie, Erkenntnistheorie, Konstruktivismus, Philosophie, Perspektivismus, Soziologie, Internationale Beziehungen.

Berlin, 30. April 2014



## 5 INTRODUCTION

The title of this synopsis of the textbook and the four attached articles is “Foresight<sup>1</sup> management or futures research, or both?”. The title reflects the ambition of the presented work to make plausible that futures reasoning could be made both more systematically, more in line with contemporary research methodologies and even be considered as research. On the other side futures research is also presented as an important tool for strategic thinking and especially for policy making. How both these possibilities could be addressed is the central question to be answered in the presented work. The aim of this synopsis is both to underline and make better visible the argumentation and claims in the four articles presented. The author has collected experiences from conventional research, the futures field and from policymaking over more than two decades, and respectively he is very concerned about the interfaces between these areas. Especially his experience as a project manager for comprehensive foresight programmes at national policy level and as an initiator to the establishment of the recent Journal European Journal of Futures Research EJFR, represent a very relevant context for the research presented in the following. In addition to the present articles the author has written and edited several monographies and text books at university level throughout the years (Øverland ed 2000b; Johne&Øverland eds 2005; Karlsen&Øverland 2010).

Futures thinking are legitimised in different ways, and must be seen in relation to the different objectives, contexts and scale, varying between foresight projects (European Commission 2002a). We could identify at least three main categories of rationale

---

1 I will use the terms “foresight”, “futures studies”, “futures thinking”, “futures reasoning” and, finally, “futures research”

behind futures reasoning today. Firstly, systematic futures studies or foresight is an important tool promoting better decisions, independent whether these are at corporate level, or at political level. Secondly, futures studies could be a very useful tool to attract attention in the media or at other arenas, like conferences etc. Thirdly, qualitatively and successful performed foresight projects may contribute to comprehensive in depth analyses within selected fields.

Further futures studies put weight on three different activities as equivalent and necessary elements in its methodology. This has its origin in the so called “Greek triangle” (Godet 1987), and could be considered as “to think, discuss and design the future”. These activities could partly be looked at as chronological and linear elements, which means, first to think, then discuss and at last implement measures to realise the futures, and partly as overlapping, parallel activities. The last because thinking, debating and implementing could be carried out as parallel activities. Partly it is also possible to look at these as circular activities, which means, when we have thought, debated and implemented measures, we may turn back to the thinking procedure or to debating the future again, before we again move into the landscape of implementation.

All of these three elements need certain inputs and frames. The thinking process presupposes knowledge about both the past and the present, as also a high degree of creativity and imaginary strength about the future. The debate about the future often needs an open and participative communication process, that either involves experts or ordinary people in for instance people panels. The thinking process and the debating, however, take place in present mode. Most difficult seems to be the design of the future, especially because you here are supposed to create certain futures or futures possibilities in the present within different given time horizons.

## 6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGIES

Also the methodological repertoire underline that the dimension of design is the most complicated one. There is less methodological support aimed at the design of futures and implementation as there are for the other two dimensions of futures reasoning. In the foresight community of today you seldom or, if at all, find research as rationale behind futures thinking and foresight. The rationale is solely to be found in the practical effects and the use of foresight methodologies. This leads to a definitional distance to futures research as such. In many ways, we may say that futures research does not yet exist, at least not as a sustainable discipline. This is also a very important point made by Prof. Reinhold Popp (Popp 2013: 1):

Futures research forms a very marginal part of the activities of universities and large research companies throughout Europe [1, p 25]. Several small companies working in the field of future-oriented corporate and policy consulting fill up this academic gap. These consultants mostly implement future oriented communications, consulting and planning processes by an internal arrangement with commercial enterprises or even in public administration institutions (e.g., in ministries, etc.). Some representatives consider their services of participatory assistance in corporate foresight processes as participatory research [2, p 10]. Is this claim justified? Or should these services be defined as futures consulting, strategic planning or, at best, as “futures management”?

Popp's answer to these questions is that there is no answer given the present status of the futures field. First, reports about such activities that could be scientifically evaluated are to a large degree lacking. Second, customers often do not want the transparency required for scientific review; therefore, contractors do not provide it. Third, there is nothing or at the most, less research that is focused at the legitimisation of the design aspect of futures studies.

## **6.1 Research questions**

This PhD thesis consists of 4 contributions that are already published and all of them, in one way or another, addresses the discipline issue cited above, and investigate further the question – is futures research possible? There is a red path going through all the articles, although the contexts and themes they address differ. To make this path more visible I will present how the articles highlight the following issues, issues that are now emerging as some of the most important themes between acknowledged scholars in the field. These are:

- 1) How do we legitimize research on futures? Is it at all possible, or do we have to stay within the framework of foresight management (consultancy)? Beside some principal reflections on the theory of science and futures, I will present how the articles point at some possible and interesting answers to his questions, and demonstrate the interface between futures studies and more established professions, like sociology, history, philosophy, education and political science.
- 2) What is political foresight/futures research? And, how are we supposed to organise and carry out political foresight in effective and constructive ways?

## **6.2 State of current research**

The point of departure in this doctoral thesis is that futures are real areas of investigations. As obstacles of scientific research futures are not yet acknowledged as an area of scientific reflection in a way it could be. All research is motivated by a desire to find out how things are and how new knowledge might influence different aspect of society. Therefore there is a huge gap between this need and the contemporary professional approaches to futures thinking. Somehow you got the impression - greater the need, more the professional approaches are missing. Therefore there is a huge need to rethink the discipline, not necessarily in the way Pang (2010) acclaims – in an

increased way to bring in technological devices and prediction market logic – but much more look into the potential futures thinking has for research, and even to investigate how it even could be research. In the recent book “Recent Developments in Foresight Methodologies” (Giaoutzi&Sapio eds. 2013) several contributors point at this need (ie. Karlsen&Karlsen 2009), (Giaoutzi&Sapio eds. 2013: 3,4):

“Foresight is an area within Futures Studies that focuses on critical thinking concerning long term developments, whether within the public sector or in industry and management, and is something of a sub-section of complexity and network science. .... Foresight is a professional practice that supports significant decisions, and as such it needs to be more assured of its claims to knowledge (methodology). Foresight is practiced across many domains and is not the preserve of specialized ‘futurists’, or indeed of foresight specialists. However, the disciplines of foresight are not well articulated or disseminated across domains, leading to re-inventions and practice that does not make best use of experience in other domains.”

This book presents and goes through the state of the art within the foresight field today, between other with the purpose of testing the research ability of futures thinking. This is also the main objective among a group of scholars behind a special issue of *On The Horizon* (Vol 21. No 1, 2013). This issue gives an unique overview of the discussion among leading futures researchers on the scientific status of futures studies. Article 4 below is one of the articles from this issue. Like Giaoutzi&Sapio above they conclude that one of the most important and interesting topics to discuss today is how to further develop the tradition of systematic futures thinking toward a kind of scientific status. The status of foresight and Futures Studies is still a subject of uncertainty and doubt as most scholars still do not know, or are not able to think about the future as something that could be subject for research.

The contributions (textbook and articles) presented in this thesis are:

### **Contribution 1 (Textbook)**

Øverland, E.F. (ed) (2000): *Norway2030. 5 scenarios about the future of public sector*, Cappelen academic publishing AS, Oslo Norway

Contribution: 50 % of written text and the function as the editor.

Context: Erik F. Øverland was the initiator and project manager of the whole Norway2030 program. He was main responsible for the choice of methodologies and managed the process the whole program period (2 ½ years). He also represented the ministry and the Norway2030 program abroad in different contexts like the OECD International Futures Program, arrangements within the EU, Privy Office in Canada, Performance and Innovation Unit in UK, just to mention a few. The Norway2030 programm attended a lot of attention, both national and international, and has inspired a long range of policy related foresight projects around the world, like for instance the german FUTUR program, programs in the UK, Australia and at the EU-level. Norway 2030 was top-benchmarked as a program for policy foresight by the Cabinet office in UK in the early 2000's.

*Cappelen Damm AS* is one of the most acknowledged academic publishing houses in Norway, aimed at scientific text book publications. *Cappelen Damm AS* is a cultural and educational enterprise, focusing on the distribution of literature through bookstores, book clubs and publishing. Cappelen Damm's publishing house produces a wide range of trade books in both traditional and electronic media. The publishing house publishes more than 1000 new titles each year – these include Norwegian and translated high-quality fiction, non-fiction and educational books for adults, young

adults and children. The publisher also provides a substantial number of magazines, maps and games.

See also: [www.cappelendamm.no](http://www.cappelendamm.no)

## **Contribution 2 (Article)<sup>2</sup>**

Neumann, I.B.& Øverland, E.F. (2004): International relations and policy planning: The method of perspectivist scenario building”. *International Studies Perspectives*, 5,p.258-277

Contribution: 50 %

Context: The article is based on the Norway2030 project and partly on the book. The article, however, develop the perspectives in Norway2030 toward the field of international relations. Erik F. Øverland is responsible for and the origin of the main thesis and perspectives in the article. The contribution of the co-author is mainly the context and the discourse around international relations. Since 2012 Prof. Iver B. Neumann has been Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at London School of Economics (LSE), one of the most recognized positions at the LSE.

*International Studies Perspectives* (ISP) is one of the most recognizes scientific journals within the field of international relations and demonstrate a relatively high impact factor. *International Studies Perspectives* publishes peer-reviewed articles that bridge the interests of researchers, teachers, and practitioners working within any and all subfields of international studies. The journal is devoted to five types of contribution: Policy research and commentary, Pedagogical analyses, New and

---

<sup>2</sup> All articles have been subject for peer reviews.

updated datas, Pieces of interest to the international studies profession and Special Issues and Forums.

Abstracting and Indexing Information:

- Academic Search (EBSCO Publishing)
- Academic Search Premier (EBSCO Publishing)
- CatchWord (Publishing Technology)
- CSA Biological Sciences Database (ProQuest)
- CSA Environmental Sciences & Pollution Management Database (ProQuest)
- CSA Sustainability Science Abstracts (ProQuest)
- EBSCO Online (EBSCO Publishing)
- Ecology Abstracts (ProQuest)
- ERA: Educational Research Abstracts Online (T&F)
- PAIS: Public Affairs Information Service (ProQuest)
- ProQuest Central (ProQuest)
- ProQuest Education Journals (ProQuest)
- ProQuest Research Library (ProQuest)
- Sociological Abstracts (ProQuest)
- Studies on Women & Gender Abstracts (T&F)
- Worldwide Political Sciences Abstracts (ProQuest)

Impact Factor: 0.787

See also: [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/\(ISSN\)1528-3585](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1528-3585)

### **Contribution 3 (Article)**

Karlsen, J.E., Øverland, E.F. and Karlsen, H. (2010): “Sociological contributions to futures’ theory building”, in *Foresight* 12 (3),p.59-72.

Contribution: 40 %

Context:



This article is a result of long lasting discussions between Prof. Jan Erik Karlsen and Erik F. Øverland about the need and ambition to relate futures studies to more conventional professions, in this case - sociology.

*Foresight* (Emerald Group Publishing) is one of the most recognized journals within the field of futures studies. It publishes foresight and contributions and futures studies from all over the world. *Foresight* is an international bi-monthly journal concerned with the study of the future. Futurists often remind us that the purpose of thinking about the future is not to predict what will happen but rather to consider alternatives. *Foresight* is Indexed and Abstracted in: ABI/INFORM Academic Research Library EconLit (American Economic Association) Future Survey (World Futures Society) INSPEC Political Science Abstracts (IFI) ProQuest Research Library Scopus - See more at:

[http://www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/products/journals/journals.htm?id=fs#sthas\\_h.jZuvmeoI.dpuf](http://www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/products/journals/journals.htm?id=fs#sthas_h.jZuvmeoI.dpuf)

See also: <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1463-6689>

#### **Contribution 4 (Article)**

Karlsen, J.E. and Øverland, E.F. (2012): “Promoting Diversity in Long Term Policy Development: The SMARTT Case of Norway”, in *Journal of Futures Studies* 16(3): p.63-78.

Contribution: 50 %

Context: The article is a result of a scenarioprocess managed by Erik F. Øverland in cooperation with the research councils of Sweeden, Iceland, Finland, Denmark and Norway. The carrying concept in the article (SMARTT) was a direct result of a discussion within the working group headed by the author. The *Journal of Futures*

*Studies* is also one of the most recognized journals within the futures field and attract contributions from all over the world, and with a long range of subjects.

The *Journal of Futures Studies* is a globally-oriented, trans-disciplinary referred journal. Its mission is to develop high-quality, futures-oriented research and thinking based on the evolving knowledge base of Futures Studies. Articles accepted for publication are expected to show an in-depth understanding of the field's dimensions, content, research perspectives and methods.

To stimulate the systematic use and growth of futures literature, one of the criteria for article publication in this journal is an indication of how the article relates to others in the futures literature. This should include reference to material published in this journal and in the others that are the core journals in the futures field (including, Futures, Foresight, Technology Forecasting and Social Change and Futures Research Quarterly) as well as futures material contained in books, monographs, and other journals. Along with articles, the Journal will publish essays, reviews and symposia on the following:

- Epistemologically focused futures studies on the construction of possible, probable and preferable futures
- Methodologies in futures studies, including not only integrated, layered, and critical approaches, but empirical, interpretive or action-learning based approaches as well
- Applied Futures(for example, case studies in the use of futures thinking for organizational transformation)
- Alternative futures of particular subjects (for example, genetics, nano-technology, utopianism, social movements, or particular areas, such as East Asia)

See also: <http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/>

### **Contribution 5 (Article)**

Øverland, E.F. (2013): “Universal perspectivism: transcending “facta” and “futura” through foresight theory building”, *On the Horizon*, Vol.21 Iss: 1 pp.39-45.

Contribution: 100 %

Context: the thematics addressed in this article are thematics that have occupied the author since his first thesis (mag.art). His reflections on the theory of science and in particular the philosophy of Immanuel Kant are here related to the futures field and the field of constructivism. *On the Horizon* (OTH) (Emerald Group Publishing) is a strategic planning resource for decision makers in the public and private sector and, in particular, education policy makers, administrators, practitioners, and researchers in post-secondary and life-long learning worldwide.

*On the Horizon*, also explores the issues that are emerging as technology changes the nature of education and learning within and among institutions, other organizations, and across geo-political boundaries, as learning increasingly takes place outside of the traditional institutional environment. *On the Horizon* pursues its mission by publishing special issues on critical trends and topics, drawing upon thought leaders from policy analysis, futures research, and academic scholarship, and solicits innovative concepts and creative ideas that challenge conventional wisdom. The journal is abstracted and indexed by: Scopus, A+ Education, Academic Search Alumni, Academic Search Complete, Academic Search Elite, Academic Search Premier, Australian Education Index, Cabell's Directory - Educational Psychology & Administration, Current Abstracts, EBSCO, Education Research Complete, Education Source, IEE INSPEC database and, Publishing in Academic Journals in Education. See also: <http://www.emeraldinsight.com/journals.htm?issn=1074-8121>

### **6.3 Methodologies**

The methodologies used to carry out the research presented in these articles range from conventional literature analyses, over conceptual studies to the experimentation with a long range of foresight methodologies. Scenario building is at the core of these, but also panels, back casting, Delphi-studies, weak signal analysis and wild cards, are discussed.

Above all, several of the perspectives presented in the articles are a direct result of the experiences my team and I have from the comprehensive foresight programmes we were involved in. As a project manager of Norway's most complex and comprehensive political foresight program (Norway2030), I stimulated my colleagues to spend a lot of energy reflecting on how to do things, the methodology and process. In addition we were also concerned about reporting interesting experiences back to an academic setting. We may say that we organised the process very much like an action research project, that both involved conventional research components as it also was aimed at a certain inductive reflection on results during the process. This we can see is a red track throughout the different articles.

## **7 WHY BE INVOLVED IN FUTURES THINKING?**

The rationale behind foresight and futures research is complex. The legitimization of such processes has to be seen in relation to objectives, context and how comprehensive they are. There are several motivations for doing foresight.

## **7.1 Four categories of motivations**

The most obvious motivations could be categorized in four main categories (Karlsen&Øverland 2010; 21). First, we are witnessing that decision makers, independently whether they are at corporate or political level, increasingly are looking for new ways of approaching strategic thinking. Several contributors the last decades (van der Heijden 1996) criticize contemporary management strategies to be too one dimensional, too much dependent on historic trends and developments, and much too less interested in thinking the “unthinkable” (Taleb 2010). Second, futures studies might be an important instrument for to attract attention in media and at other areas. A third important rationale is that futures studies can contribute to in depth analyses at, literally speaking, all kind of fields. Fourth, to stimulate innovation and creativity is also a central aspect of doing futures studies.

### **7.1.1 Supporting decision making.**

It is not without reason that foresight has had a solid breakthrough within business administration and policy building. We see a comprehensive orientation towards strengthening the decision making through foresight in the fields of strategic management, business development, marketing, risk management and different policy areas and so forth. The main reason for this is that decision makers in an increasing way experience that their surroundings appear complex and less anticipatory. A world marked by surprises and non-intended developments, or what Taleb calls “Black Swans” (Taleb 2010) and increased complexity. Simple rationality models are non efficient to meet the challenges of contemporary societies. We need to increase the robustness of planning and strategic thinking beyond the use of forecasting and probability models. Van der Heijden (1996) expresses this need in the following way:

Scenarios are the best available language for the strategic conversation, as it allows both a differentiation in views, but also brings people together towards a shared understanding of the situation, making decision making possible when the time has arrived to take action.

(Van der Heijden 1996: ix).

The quote above shows that strategic discourse should not be thought of as a linear activity and that the sources of information are many, complex and blurred, far beyond what a manager or political analyst can manage. Therefore there is a huge need to both synthesize relevant information and to systematically develop decision-oriented documents that combines short term and long term perspectives.

The European Union and political authorities in many countries (UK, Germany, France, USA, China, Korea, Japan etc.) develops projects, programmes and units that are aimed at strengthening policy long term development. The common denominator of this development is above all the need to combine decisions and political goals within the respective legislature periods with long term analyses of basic political and socioeconomic phenomena. Interesting examples in this respect are the Performance Unit at the Cabinet Office in Great Britain, the programmes *Forschungsdialog Futur* (2000-2005) and *Narratives: The German BMBF Foresight Process* (2007-2009) by the Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung) in Germany, authority based think tanks and research institutes in that different countries like Iran, USA, China, Singapore and Japan. Both in Europe and else in the world we are witnessing a considerable growth of milieus that either are using foresight or are aimed at doing so, to improve and strengthen their policy making activities.

### 7.1.2 Create attention

Another important rationale behind foresight and futures studies is to develop future images and projects that are aimed at awareness raising. Relevant examples in this respect the last decades are scenarios for the environmental movement. Both visual horror scenarios and more strategic oriented scenarios are relevant in this respect. Also marketing actors and communication professionals use futures studies as a part of their visualising of consequences and the meaning of different business areas. The event and conference business have used visualised futures images to present stunning effects to fascinate the public. Awareness rising can be both intentional and non-intentional.

Examples of intentional awareness rising we do find in international classic studies like (Kahn&Wiener, 1967) *The Year 2000. Speculations 33 years ahead*. In this book they launched a several interesting theories about in which direction the US and the world would develop. The project got a lot of attention, both because of the prominent participants and the well acknowledged institutions behind it. There are also several examples on literature based futures studies that have achieved comprehensive attention. Robert Harris' novel *Fatherland* (1992), Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932), George Orwell's *1984* (1949), William Gibson's *Neuromancer* (1984), Margareth Atwood's *Oryx and Crake* (2003) and Philipp K. Dick's short story *Minority Report* (1954), are all well known and exciting examples of this. Within the environment movement we also find quite a number of examples demonstrating that scenarios about catastrophic events consciously are constructed to attract attention.

Examples of non-intentional awareness rising we find in i.e. in a project by the European Union called *Europe 2010* (EU 1999). Just before the launching of the project some parts of the report were leaked to the press in Denmark and Germany. The press picked out some ideas they like, without bother very much about the context in which

they appeared. The different scenario ideas were presented as the official viewpoint of the Commission. These caused a lot of action and negative attention.

### **7.1.3 Develop depths insights in different areas**

Especially well acknowledged research institutions already have comprehensive experiences with foresight, not at least in their efforts of deepening, make research results more concrete and to visualise such. I have often been used to demonstrate possible consequences of research in order to get attention to their research from a wider global research community. Combined with films and other media techniques foresight methodologies could be very powerful tools in awareness rising. We may here talk about a combination of attracting attention and the ambition to go deeper into selected themes.

### **7.1.4 Promote innovation and creativity**

In the last years futures studies has got increased attention among people concerned about innovation management and policy building.

Foresight exercises are expected to contribute to innovation policy and decision making at various levels of society by generating appropriate inputs for planning and decision-making and/or by facilitating useful dialogues between various stake-holders. Both the foresight process itself and its outputs can be valuable in this respect (Grupp and Linstone, 1999; Salo and Cuhls, 2003). The value of the foresight exercise depends on the ways in which the resulting knowledge is implemented in ongoing and forthcoming actions. The explicit and direct uses of foresight knowledge in predefined decision-making contexts are, however, just part of the picture. Important indirect and diffuse links exist, too. For instance:



- Foresight exercises may contribute to society's strategic intelligence by stimulating future-oriented thinking and by widening researchers', policy makers' and industrial decision makers' perspectives and knowledge base.
- Foresight exercises can be useful in creating a required set of common language and an understanding between the various interest groups. Obviously the framing procedure is a critical element for this.
- Shared foresight knowledge can be helpful to engage decision makers in specific issues to, in legitimating the chosen course of action, or in supporting fruitful debates among the stake holders.
- Even irrational and casual uses of foresight knowledge may have significant triggering effects on some important decision outcomes (for example, framing of issues that affect managerial risk-taking behaviour).

The influence of foresight knowledge in policy and decision making may thus happen through multiple paths (through a number of negotiation, vision building and consensus building processes) that are difficult to explicitly define in the beginning and during the foresight process. Furthermore, earlier foresight studies are often used as starting points for the later ones, and the users of the foresight knowledge often have difficulties in pointing out the exact ways in which they are making use of some specific foresight knowledge. Still, various types of foresight exercises may play an important role in preparing the industry and the society for the future, making it easier to utilise the “windows of opportunities” when they appear.

## **7.2 On what level should we apply futures studies?**

As indicated above futures studies may be applied on several different levels. In reality is foresight a very flexible tool and can be adapted to the most situations and objectives

(Slaughter 1995). To present some tentative conceptual approaches we may differentiate between a practical level, a strategic level and a political one, on which central and general policy areas are addressed. We see for instance that policy areas as education and research policy, innovation policy, policies for regional development, strategies for innovation in public sector, just to mention a few, in an increasing degree tries to apply futures studies as new and alternative approaches to policy building. All these levels are also often represented in educational schemes within futures studies, ie. in the masterprogram for futures studies at the Freie Universität Berlin (deHaan 2012).

### **7.2.1 Practical level.**

Systematic futures thinking may be applied to test out ideas or to analyse possible consequences of external events may have for individuals or groups. The whole range of consulting oriented corporate foresight activities could be put under this label.

Foresight is in this respect above all a work form that seldom results in comprehensive reports or written images of the future. It is mainly practical ad hoc exercises to meet practical needs.

### **7.2.2 Strategic decisions within corporates**

Futures thinking as a tool for organisation development and change management, has already got a lot of attention the last couple of decades. Contemporary, a quite broad range of methods, techniques and tools are used to promote business development, organisational change and strategic thinking at corporate level (Cuhna, Palma, da Costa 2006). We may then speak of organisational or corporate foresight. We then could talk about foresight management. Foresight activities are here integrated in the organisation, either at management level or elsewhere in the company. Futures analyses are here to a large degree used as support to important decisions and to highlight uncertainties in the

landscape in which the organisation exists. Both public and private enterprises are taken account of these kind of approaches.

### 7.2.3 Political level

Many classical futures studies have started out as policy development projects. The authorities in an increased number of countries have already addressed the need to think more in long term and to improve policy oriented decision making. Governments, strategic policy actors and science in general, have traditionally been sceptical when it comes to the potential for systematising predictions into fully fledged tools for future planning through foresight, such as scenario-□ building. But recent development shows that these attitudes are changing radically. Foresight organised and conceptualised in a special way<sup>3</sup>, might be a very useful tool to redefine policy planning and stimulate it to take account of long term perspectives. Foresight can contribute to concrete problem solving as experienced by planners.

Political foresight, however, represents a long range of approaches (Cuhls&Giorghiou 2004). Some of the most important ones are.:

- Futures studies/foresight as a work form within expert panels and whitepaper developments done by public expert groups.
- Foresight as an integrated part of the policy building activity itself, strategies, programmatic plans and ministerial reports.
- Foresight as sector specific analyzes prior to the budget oriented priority discussions.

---

<sup>3</sup> The last years I have given a lecture on political foresight at the master program for futures research (Masterstudiengang Zukunftsforschung) at the FU-Berlin. Here I demonstrate the rationale behind these developments, introduce the term post-governance, and present several examples of policy oriented foresight programmes through out the world.

- Foresight as ex-ante exercises in advance to the launching of political programmes or proposals.

The role for the organisers in policy foresight and how to balance dialogue and content development are extremely important regarding possible success of the foresight exercise (Jenssen 2007). The Norway2030-project was one government anchored political foresight project that at an early stage in this development tried to experiment, not only with new approaches and philosophy for long term policy building, but also challenged the conventional role of the organiser (ministry). In addition it tried to look at the interface between dialogue and participative approached and content development in innovative ways (Øverland 2003/2013). Norway2030 has also contributed to the establishment of a long range of similar programmes world wide, like the German Forschungsdialog FUTUR-program<sup>4</sup>.

### **7.3 Foresight and research**

In probably all countries around the globe, we find a group of people who call themselves “future researchers”. At the same time they work primarily in the fields of political and management consulting. This phenomena is very well commented on in the Editorials of the European Journal of Futures Research (Ahrend, Barben, de Haan, Øverland, Popp, Reinhardt and Urbanek 2013: 4)

---

<sup>4</sup> The German Research Dialogue Project FUTUR: Volker Dietz, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung - BMBF 2003.

“These so-called future researchers participate very rarely in the discourses of the scientific community. This is because, in the future-oriented consultancy business, although most clients expect the application of relevant scientific knowledge, the *generation* of scientific knowledge, i.e., research in the real sense of the word, is generally not a part of the consultancy project. If the practical application of scientific knowledge is described as “research”, it only leads to an inflationary use of the research concept.

This problem has long been resolved in established disciplines. For instance, in the medical field, only those people are called researchers or scientists who predominantly work towards generating new medical knowledge. Experts who apply this knowledge, i.e., practising doctors never claim to be “researchers”. Even patients consider their doctors as academically qualified practitioners rather than as researchers or scientists. In this sense, all people and institutes predominantly working towards generating future-oriented scientific knowledge must insist on an honest declaration: Wo „Forschung“ drauf steht, muss auch Forschung drin sein (If there is a research claim “on the outside”, there must be research inside).”

This is an important reflection because they on the one hand address the potential of futures management to turn its activity into research. On the other hand it announces some critical remarks on people that seem to abuse futures orientation and the term “futures research”. If they call themselves futures researchers they also have to meet some basic criteria. As Popp also argue (Popp 2013: 1)<sup>5</sup>:

“Based on the current status of discussion about action research, this article presents

---

<sup>5</sup> See also Grunwald (2009)

the methodological principles and methodical specifics of a scientifically substantiated participatory futures research. Its most important principles are

- a) a clear role distribution between the actors of futures research on the one hand and practitioners in the respective action field of futures shaping on the other
- b) visible orientation to quality factors of scientific study (that are appropriate for the object of study)
- c) transparency in terms of concrete research processes and research products and, based on this data, for feedback to the scientific system, as well as
- d) the involvement of participation-oriented researchers in the critical discourse of the scientific community. The term “research” should not be used until at least these quality factors for good research are fulfilled.

With this in mind, the author of this article advocates & a clear role distribution between the actors of futures research, i.e., the researchers, on the one hand, and practitioners in the respective action field of futures shaping on the other, & visible orientation to quality factors of scientific study (that are suitable for the object of study), & more transparency in terms of concrete research processes and research products and, based on this data, for feedback to the scientific system, as well as & the essential involvement of participation-oriented researchers in the critical discourse of the scientific community.”

In addition to Popp’s criteria above, it is necessary in order to strengthen academic futures research and future-oriented policy planning and consultancies, that

- a) the research community “discovers” the field and its methodologies,
- b) “futurists” acknowledge and professionalise scientific “rules”,
- c) there are specialised futures research programmes and grants,
- d) there is a debate on quality criteria and a culture of reflexive foresight,

- e) futures reasoning is integrated in professional discourses,
- f) different policy actors, e.g. research councils and ministries, engage in the field and experiment with new and innovative approaches for policy developments.

Source: Karlsen & Øverland (2010: 244)

The connection between foresight and research could be a central issue for the futures thinking of the future. The so called Causal Layered Analyses (CLA) developed by Inayatullah (2004, 2006) clearly moves in this direction as this approach differentiates between “appearances” and “latents”, and “facta” and “futura”, and establish a genuine research project to investigate those possible latents. Also Poli (2011, 2013) tries to develop a scheme that legitimise futures thinking as research activity, as he also goes far in searching for an ontological status of futures studies as such<sup>6</sup>.

Poli addresses in particular the complexity, difficulty, but still the possibility to define futures reasoning around not yet happened phenomena as research. How is research on non-existent phenomena possible? This question could be one of the most important issues for the discourse on science theory and philosophy in the years to come.

## **7.4 Foresight and politics**

Policy or governance foresight has attracted increased attention the last couple of decades. As the society appears more and more complex and the need to be better aware of uncertainties and long term challenges has been identified as one of the main challenges within policy building, a long range of experimentations at policy level

---

<sup>6</sup> See also Martin&Irvine (1989), Miller (2007) and Steinmüller, Kreibich&Zöpel (2000).

within and between nations has come at stake. There is therefore more need than ever for policy builder to mobilise creative fantasy to make imaginations about what may happen in the future. Especially Governments and large social and political institutions have expressed this need, and they also considering themselves having a moral obligation to also act as guardians of an uncertain future. In this respect long-termism and current political and social situations are closely interrelated.

To move in such a direction you cannot rely on traditional planning approaches like simple forecasting or prognoses<sup>7</sup>. As the world is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and complexity it is decisive to go beyond traditional planning approaches and develop several possible futures with the help of foresight, like for instance scenario-methodology and broadscoped foresight. To increase legitimacy and strategic power such processes should be organised in a way that involve the society in a broader sense. Also here governments have an overall obligation.

In the last decades, however, the importance of moving beyond these kinds of policy planning concepts is becoming evident (Karlsen & Øverland 2012). Increased complexity and uncertainties requires looking for new ways of doing things, not only as regards the economy, but also the development of policies and legal frameworks.

Instruments for policy development have to reflect uncertainties and address possible solutions in a way that foster more robust decision-making despite lacking reliable predictions.

---

<sup>7</sup> This is also the argument within the conventional technology assesment environment, and not at least by technological foresight professionals. See for example Grupp (1995).



In Europe, as well as globally, policy planning and traditional planning techniques tend to be unilinear and economic, and are not able to reflect the contemporary experience of the world as complex and uncertain. Governments, strategic policy actors and academics have traditionally been sceptical when it comes to systematically developing predictions into fully fledged tools for future planning such as scenario-building. The philosophy of future-oriented exercises based on forecasts and prognoses offers a number of reasons why such caution should be warranted. Still, apart from practical reasons, e.g. the need to meet the expectations emanating from a budgeting system that measures “utility” in terms of the contributions of scientific knowledge and traditional foresight to concrete problem solving as experienced by planners, there are sound and immediate reasons why prudence should be kept in abeyance. Substantially, it should be possible to circumvent some of the problems involved by relaxing our understanding of time as one-dimensional and linear. If one proceeds down this lane, futures research in all its dimensions may be a better candidate for creating grand visions for multicultural, pluralistic and complex societies like the European ones than forecasts and prognoses (Neumann&Overland 2004).

During the past fifty years, both future-oriented policy planning and futures research have assumed an increasingly “professional” nature. On the one hand, practices have become more tailored to the needs of customers and methods have become more robust. On the other hand, the awareness is growing that constraining futures research to a collection of specific techniques is far from being satisfactory and that a fundamental theory is needed. As a matter of fact, after decades characterised by diminishing interest in the theoretical underpinnings of futures studies, the past few years have seen the onset of a new concern with their foundation. Interestingly, the recent surge of papers discussing various aspects of what may eventually become a theoretical framework for

the field has not been limited to the epistemological bases of futures studies, but has also begun to address the problem of its ontological grounds.

## **8 Book and Research Articles – a brief presentation**

The four articles addresses the above presented research questions a substantial way. The contexts in which these questions are addressed are mostly the area of political foresight. Three of the presented articles discuss explicit the futures research issue and present reflections and proposals at both the level of practical research methodologies and at the level of theory of science, ontology and epistemology. The presented contribution tries explicitly to meet the criteria launched by Popp (op cit 2013). The practical foresight exercises are all used as a point of departure to discuss matters of concern within different research communities, like international relation/political science, history, sociology and philosophy.

### **8.1 Contribution 1 (Textbook): Øverland (ed) (2000)**

Øverland, E.F. (ed) (2000): *Norway2030. 5 scenarios about the future of public sector*, Cappelen academic publishing, Oslo Norway

Contribution: 50 % of written text and the role as the editor.

This textbook is the main documentation from the Norway2030 programme. The structure of the book tries both to fullfill criteria of scientific research, allthough taking account of the particular tradition of foresight, and to reflect the key fact that the topics discussed both are about the past, the present and the future. It describes in detail the origin and process of an original political foresight project, which has attracted a lot of attention world wide.

The book is build up by different sections representing pasts, presents and futures. The pasts part describes both the hoistory of futures thinking as some aspect of the past situation of the Norwegian society. The presents part gives a diagnoses of the contemporary situation on selcted central policy areas, while the futures part deescribes the futures scenarios, alltogether 5 and with one wild card in addition. Beyond that there is a thourough presentation of the process, selected methodologies and the participants and their work forms.

*Textbook: Attachement No 1.*

## **8.2 Contribution 2 (Article): Neumann&Øverland (2004)**

Neumann, I.B. & Øverland, E.F. (2004): "International relations and policy planning: The method of perspectivist scenario building". *International Studies Perspectives*, 5,p.258-277

In this article we respond to the, at that time ongoing discussion on the need of scenario building, and how to carry out such activities. We present an outline of a method for scenario building. First, we review what has been done since scenario planning was first developed in the aftermath of World War II. We identify a tendency to reify current trends as the key weakness of early scenario planning, and one that it shares with traditional socioeconomic planning. Secondly, in order to break with this tendency, we present and advocate an approach that we call perspectivist scenario building. We argue that scenario building and participation-oriented foresight processes must be viewed as a potential for totally renewing the tradition of socioeconomic planning within governmental institutions and function both as a supplement and as a complete alternative to approaches based on forecast and prognoses. Thirdly, as a consequence of our conception of perspectivist scenario building as an if not scholarly, then definitely

scholarly informed contribution to policy planning, we reflect on our own experience in participation-oriented scenario work with Norwegian bureaucrats and politicians in the framework of a broad-scoped national scenario project for the Norwegian Government in the period between 1998 and 2001, called Norway 2030. We are particularly aimed at demonstrating the relevance of this contribution to the IR community inasmuch as the available literature primarily addresses business and industry, and tends to be directed towards the achievement of specific goals rather than general strategic planning (in a minor degree also Godet, 1987; Schwartz, 1991; van den Heijden, 1996; Ringland, 1998).

As mentioned we are launching a concept we have called “perspectivist scenario building”. It is based on former work on science philosophy and is clearly based on a post-structuralistic reasoning. The context we present this is political foresight a) a review of the Norway2030, and b) how scenario building might contribute to the International Relation community.

Since thoughts about the future cannot help but enter into our planning of policy, the International Relations community should make it an aim to help systematize these thoughts. One way of doing this is by developing a methodology for scenario building. Much extant work on scenario planning shares a key weakness that is well known in traditional socioeconomic planning, namely a tendency to reify current trends. In order to break with this tendency, this article sets out an approach that we call perspectivist scenario building. We also try to illustrate the points made and demonstrate the value added for planners by reflecting on our own experience in participation-oriented scenario work with Norwegian bureaucrats and politicians in the framework of a broad

scoped national scenario project for the Norwegian Government in the period between 1998 and 2001, called Norway 2030.

In the Norway2030 project we constructed a social-historian in 2030 which were supposed to “back cast” and explain virtual development. The way they were supposed to do this open up for a direct link to approaches developed by historian, like contra-factual history methodology and perspectivist history research.

### **Perspectivist scenario-building**

The Norway2030 exercise was in the beginning mainly based on the same methodical approach as the one adopted in the project “Scenarios Europe 2010” by the Forward Studies Unit/EU. This approach was called “Shaping Actors, Shaping Factors”<sup>8</sup>, and places great emphasis on the identification of structural conditions (factors) and various forces of change (actors) that are envisaged as influencing social development.

### **Shaping actors – Shaping Factors**

The Method “Shaping Actors, Shaping Factors” can be described as a process involving the building of scenarios for the area one wishes to investigate by developing mini-scenarios (paths of development) for actors and factors, and then collating these to form partial scenarios for key areas of major importance for development in the area that is the object of the study. The partial scenarios are then collated to form main scenarios, which are the product of the process.

---

<sup>8</sup> Shaping Actors Shaping Factors rely much on the french la Prospective school between others represented by Godet (1987, 1996), Jouvenel (1993) and Wilson (1995)

This method is simple and cost-effective compared with alternative methods, such as Delphi studies<sup>9</sup>. We could also benefit from the results of the study *Scenarios Europe 2010*, which was completed autumn 1999, and this enabled close co-operation with the Commission, in relation both to questions of methodology and to considerations concerning the content of the future study. The scenario-building process was built up by creating partial scenarios for the selected key areas. The project group submitted initially a proposal for major key areas. Generally speaking, the selected key areas were intended to encompass the major factors that influence or delimit development in the area studied. The partial scenarios were collated to form five main scenarios, where the fundamental perspective consisted of future public administration policy and the organisation of the public sector in response to the factors that the partial scenarios draw attention to.

For each of the key areas were selected 20–25 actors and factors of importance for the development of these topics (Shaping Actors, Shaping Factors). Potential paths of development for an actor or factor were then considered in relation to alternative paths of development open to the other actors and factors. During this phase, the mutual dependencies of actors and factors were clarified. This partly involved clarifying logical and non-conflicting relations between them, e.g. that factors such as ‘radical increase in the number of employees’ and ‘drastic reduction in the number of births’ or ‘reduced immigration’ did not occur in the same scenario. It also provided some evidence of the actors’ ability to act strategically either to influence the development of one or more

---

<sup>9</sup> Delphi studies are characterised by the use of many broadly composed specialist groups that, by means of extensive and detailed questionnaires, provide input to various realistic views of the future and of development characteristics. The method is used in Japan, the USA and a number of European countries, primarily in studies of technological development.

actors or factors or to adapt to a development. The strength of the relations between the development paths was assessed to judge their suitability for inclusion in consistent partial scenarios for the topic concerned.

The scenarios should be:

- \* recognisable – have associations with current conditions
- \* clear and consistent
- \* varied
- \* relevant – applicable to strategic purposes
- \* challenging – stimulate creative thinking and action

At the shoulders of the “shaping actors-shaping factors”-approach we soon oriented ourselves towards what we now call *perspectivist scenario-building* (Øverland, 2001; Neumann&Øverland 2004). Among other things this was a result of an interpretation of the development in this field the last one or two decades. The main characteristic of the new generation of scenario institutions is the growing process orientation. Scenario-building is viewed as a learning technique whose value lies not least in spreading awareness of change processes to as many employees as possible in the organisations that use the technique. Scenario-building as universal stories are deconstructed, contextualised and tailored toward different enterprises and objectives. A consequence of these national exercises should organise themselves as programmes consisting of several foresight projects at different societal levels. Scenario-learning and scenario-building are some of the most flexible tools and methodologies you may use creating change, reform and development in the complex world of today.

Perspectivist scenario building is marked by

- the emergence of a new generation of scenario communities which transcend traditional Foresight approaches,
- scenario learning, scenario building, and planning,
- an approach oriented towards broad participation (everybody has to develop their own future),
- flexible time-span perspectives (both short and long term),
- a clear distinction between the scenario discourse and the following strategic, budget-oriented planning- and priority-discourse,
- being a phase of perspective development for the following discussions of strategic priorities and policy development,
- focusing both at actors/decision makers and factors/trends/physical environments,
- a thorough time-perspectivism in which both pasts, presents, and futures are dynamic variables,
- a backcasting approach that also includes the real past. The real history as a separate dimension in the construction of future scenarios (e.g., N2030: The social Historian 2030),
- a modest form for linearity (time linearism but multidimensional),
- the integration of a dimension of meaning in all the scenarios (to demonstrate what it does mean to live in the respective future scenarios),
- a spider web logic “benchmarking” the scenarios towards each other

An important achievement of this work is some recommendations on how to do political foresight (op.cit: 276):



“A clearer distinction between scenario development and the processes that employ scenarios to shape strategic dispositions and political priorities frees the scenario development process itself from the current political or strategic agenda function. This is decisive for development of new and interesting perspectives on the future. For those who take part in the scenario development itself, this means that they will have both the potential and the authority to follow through on more lines of argument, conceive of more alternatives and try out more “politically incorrect” views. Time perspectivism and perspective scenario building are key concepts in making this possible. International Relations scholars possess a wealth of historical knowledge and theoretical insights that may prove welcome and valuable to policy-planning processes, granted that they are presented in forms that are accessible and ways that are seen as relevant by policy makers, be that in the state sector, in the business community, in NGOs, or for that matter in social movements. Scenario planning may be a heuristic skill that may come in handy in this regard. Building and disseminating scenarios for the future is not traditional scholarly work. If one wants to have an impact on running policy, however, it may nonetheless be work for scholars.”

A baseline below these perspectives is that futures studies also have to be presentable and discussable within selected research communities. The whole outline in the article is made on this premise.

*The article: Attachement No 2.*

### **8.3 Contribution 3 (Article): Karlsen, Øverland, Karlsen (2010)**

Karlsen, J.E., Øverland, E.F. and Karlsen, H. (2010): “Sociological contributions to futures’ theory building”, in *Foresight* 12 (3),p.59-72.

This article aims to contribute to futures theory building by assessing the inherent ontological and epistemological presumptions in foresight studies. Such premises, which are usually embedded in foresight studies, are contrasted with sociological imagination and contemporary social science discourse.

This paper is a conceptual analysis of theoretical assumptions embedded in foresight studies. It discusses this through sociological lenses, including concepts like anticipation, latency, time, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, change and plurality of images, offering clarity in terms of both futures studies and foresights. Further, it explicates that presumptions embedded in foresight methods help recognition of how such methods shape the concepts of future and time. This is vital for assessment of the analytical products of foresight studies. This research paper contributes to the ambition of linking the theoretical world of futures research and the practical world of foresights closer together by explicating key concepts and implicit assumptions in both fields. It also demonstrates a significant interface between sociology as a profession and futures research. Further, we consider this apparent lack of reflexivity in foresights. Revisiting the concept of sociological imagination (Mills, 1959; Taylor, 2002), we suggest that many of the challenges and topics in foresight studies have their counterparts in sociological thought. We extend this observation, suggesting that how “future” and “time” are constructed in foresight activities has implications both for how trustworthy future studies can be and for theory building in foresights. As we will see, the paper presents some perspectives on the ontology and epistemology of futures studies which

is followed up in the fourth of the presented articles (Karlsen, Øverland, Karlsen 2010: 62)

“In this vein it would not make sense any longer to talk about a reality in itself that is given independently of human effort and a reality marked by our constructivists’ activities and prejudged as a “reality for us”. This also corresponds to a radical interpretation of the philosophy of Kant (1787). This constructivist view transcends traditional phenomenology and the area “Das Ding für Mich” in the same moment that “Das Ding an Sich” achieves status as constructed (Øverland, 2000b). The reality as such is constructed and is a result of scientific and human processes. The consequences for anticipation activities are tremendous: in forward-looking activities we reproduce the distinction between reality in itself and reality for us, but when reality in itself is considered to be a human construction, the link between pasts, presents and futures comes closer. The act of anticipating possible futures also creates a kind of basic reality (ontology) – the reality itself as constructed through the ambition to identify possible realities in the future. In both scientific discourse and the anticipation of futures we take advantage of the same kind of basic reality construction.”

The paper concludes with the claim that a theory of futures may draw on central reasoning and ideas within sociology, including all significant concepts of the sociology of knowledge and the conditions for the shaping of change processes, etc. Clarifying the concepts and models applied to understanding anticipation as mental processes, anticipatory systems as collective foresighting, latents as futures in waiting, expectation as driver for stable social interaction and communication about the future, and defining precisely the conceptual application of time, understanding better the concepts of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity all have implications

for the promotion of a theory of the future. Reverting back to social imaginary and sociological imagination, as a society we interpret and explain the past through practices and established knowledge in the present. This is, however, an iterative process, so that the past would not be able to understand itself. The same may hold for the future: when we explain the future, the future will understand itself in a way we in the present will not be able to comprehend.

We are convinced that if such sociological concepts are to be included as building blocks of a theory of futures, they must also, as previously claimed by Hideg (2007) leave traces inside the present practice of thinking, debating and shaping the future, i.e. inside actual foresight projects.

*The article: Attachement No 3.*

#### **8.4 Contribution 4 (Article): Karlsen& Øverland (2012)**

Karlsen, J.E. and Øverland, E.F. (2012): “Promoting Diversity in Long Term Policy Development: The SMARTT Case of Norway”, in *Journal of Futures Studies* 16(3): p.63-78.

This paper addresses in particular policy foresight and present and describe how a concrete foresight project was carried out as a part of a cross-national policy building process within the field of education and research policy. Through the description of significant challenges of Nordic educational and research policy with a particular focus upon the role of knowledge enhancement and innovation, this paper presents both a vision, a backcasting scenario approach and a political roadmap for future possible research and innovation policy at the Nordic level. Applying the methodology of Foresight we emphasize the cognitive and debating stages of developing a longer term

vision and the framing of an aspirational scenario of a learning intensive society. Based on input from the Nordic higher education institution (HEI) policy experts, an image - acronymed SMARTT - for the next 15-20 years, encompassing **Science, Mobility, Advancement, Research and Technology Transfer**, is presented. The paper emphasizes the stages of the foresighting process, including both the development of mini-scenarios and backcasting, by analyzing the interplay between HEIs and their swiftly changing environments and futures. The concrete process steps are also related to the contemporary discourse on the relations between theories of path dependency, path breaking and path creation.

In particular the paper relate the foresight exercises to the path-dependency approach, which is a central theme and tool of scientific strategic analyses within professions far beyond the foresight field. Again we are witnessing a way to link futures studies to research communities and discourses within different contemporary conventional professions. Foresight carried out along the lines presented in this article demonstrates an integrated and creative use of path theories, in which path dependency analyses occur, path breaking activities are demonstrated and new paths are created.

Our approach here is therefore aimed at showing the relevance of path theories for futures studies, not as a real historical trend analysis and contemporary path explanations, but as tools for futures oriented backcasted story telling. In addition, however, backcasting approaches could also be used as a tool for new interpretations of real pasts, real historic events, either as a part of a contrafactual historic analyses or as historical research through perspectivist historical research methodologies (Neumann&Overland, 2004). Perspectivist scenario-building and the concepts of situational scenarios and development scenarios are positioned into the path-dependency approach and made relevant for this kind of thinking.

One of the conclusions is (Karlsen& Øverland 2012: 76):

“HEI policies at the Nordic level needs to be de-locked from contemporary dependencies and must be recreated as a new and common policy representing the Nordic region as such. HEIs and the university sector, not only at national or at Nordic level, but also at European and global level, are areas very well suited for long term thinking. The way Kolleck et al. (2011) argue in favor of long term analyses in the area of Education for Sustainable development, we should make the HEI sector and research policies at different levels object for foresight and futures research.”

*The article: Attachement No 4.*

## **8.5 Contribution 5 (Article): Øverland (2013)**

Øverland, E.F. (2013): “Universal perspectivism: transcending “facta” and “futura” through foresight theory building”, *On the Horizon, Vol.21* Iss: 1 pp.39-45.

This article is mainly a theoretical article and a contribution to both the professional discourses on the scientific foundations of futures research, and post structural theory of science.

The point of departure in this article is between other things the contributions presented above, but also on a project this author has been involved in for many years going back to his mag.art. dissertation a couple of decades back. This article elaborates further the post-positivistic perspective in the other articles and even tries to go beyond such a position through a discussion of Latour (1987), Latour&Wolgar (1986) and Kant (1787). Perspectivistic scenario-building and the reflections made in Karlsen& Øverland (2010) are here taken a step further.

The article also advances the view that contemporary foresight activities are increasingly dominated by commitment to research methods and an ambition to found a sound theory of futures thinking. Arguably, there has been a general failure to examine and explicate the relationship between theory and method. As Poli (2011); Karlsen & Karlsen (2007a, 2009); Aaltonen (2010), Aaltonen&Barth (2005); Inayatullah (2008) and others argue, there is both a need and a will to develop a substantial foundation of futures studies that not only goes beyond epistemology, but explicitly tries to establish an ontological rationale for futures research as a post-positivist scientific activity.

Following along this line, the purpose of this paper is to represent a radical

constructivist approach to the theory of latents and level of realities that transcends traditional phenomenology.

As announced above the paper gives a brief outline on how Kant meets Latour and constitutes and reproduces two ontological areas, man and nature and argues in favour of a post-post conception called “universal perspectivism”. Findings – It is found that the foresight community and futurists must revert to some basic ontological assumptions about the future, e.g. as a reflection of human imagination or as a projection of today’s situation, particularly the reproduction of the construction of an idea of the human being as such, and its opposite – what it is not. The consequences for anticipation activities are tremendous: in forward looking activities we reproduce both the distinction between reality in itself and reality for us, or put differently, between appearances and latent. These are then linked to the differentiation between two basic ontological areas throughout all time modalities, nature and society (man). The link between pasts, presents and futures is getting closer.

The article also addresses one of the most spread and important approaches for futures studies today - the so-called causal layered analyses CLA (Inayatullah, 2004).

One important conclusion of this paper is (2013: 43):

“In forward looking activities we reproduce on the one hand the distinction between reality in itself and reality for us, or put differently, between appearances and latent. These are on the other hand linked to the differentiation between two basic ontological areas throughout all time modalities. Reality in itself is considered to be a human construction, which is reproduced, not only toward the past and present, but also as significant categorisation of futures imagining.



Further, the conventional question about the ontological status of futures – whether “the future” is real (objective) or imaginary (subjective) must be abandoned as the most important ontological question. As a consequence of the outline above, the answer to this question must be neither nor. Here we argue in favour of a radical constructivist approach that moves beyond the conventional distinctions between latent and visible, and follow up the work of Inayatullah (2004, 2008) as it goes beyond a post structural and deconstructionist approach and reformulate the ontological fundament of a CLA’s four level analyses as such. As between other Poli (2010, 2011) argue, there is today a sound possibility to construct a foundation of futures studies as scientific activity, as futures research.”

*The article: Attachement No 5.*

## **9 Brief Conclusion**

This outline and the presented textbook and papers tries in a substantial way to answer the research topics launced above. They represent both significant contributions to the contemporary discourse within the futures field on the foundation of futures research as scientific activity, and the demonstration of the importance of futures research and foresight management. In addition they present proposal on how futures research and practical foresight could be operationalised. So, to answer the question indicated in the title of this exposé, there is no “either or” between foresight management and futures research, but a “both and”. Both foresight management and futures research is possible!



## 10 References

- Aaltonen, M. (2010), *Robustness: Anticipatory and Adaptive Human Systems*, Isce Publishing, Litchfield Park, AZ.
- Aaltonen, M. & T. Barth (2005) How Do We Make Sense of the Future? *Journal of Futures Studies*, May 2005, 9(4):45-60.
- Ahrend, Barben, de Haan, Øverland, Popp, Reinhardt and Urbanek (2012) Editorial, *European Journal of Futures Research* Vol 1 15:12
- Atwood, Margaret (2004) *Oryx and Crake*, Anchor USA
- Barré, Rémi (2002) *Foresight and their Themes: Analyses, Typology and Perspectives* Sevilla: *The Role of Foresight in the Selection of Research Policies – Conference Papers 13-14<sup>th</sup> of May 2002*
- Cuhls, K. and L. Georghiou (2004) Evaluating a participative foresight process: Futur - the German research dialogue, in *Research Evaluation* Vol. 13, Number 3, December 2004, pp. 143-153.
- Cunha, M. P. e., P. Palma & N.G. d. Costa (2006) Fear of foresight: Knowledge and ignorance in organizational foresight, *Futures*, Vol 38:942-955.
- De Haan G (2012) Der Masterstudiengang “Zukunftsforschung” an der Freien Universität Berlin: Genese und Kontext. In: Popp R (ed) *Zukunft und Wissenschaft. Wege und Irrwege der Zukunftsforschung*. Springer, Heidelberg
- Dick, Philip K. (1954/2002) *Minority Report*, The Complete Stories of Philip K. Dick Vol. 4: The Minority Report and Other Classic Stories eVersion 4.0 / Scan Notes at EOF
- European Commission (2002a) *Thinking, debating and shaping the future: Foresight for Europe*. DG Research, Unit RTRD-K.2. Final report prepared by a High Level Expert Group for the European Commission, Brussels Belgium
- Giaoutzi, M. and Sapio, B. (eds) (2013), *Recent Developments in Foresight Methodologies*, Springer New York
- Gibson, William (1984) *Neuromancer*, Ace Books
- Godet, Michel (1987) *Scenarios and Strategic Management* London: Butterworths.
- Godet M (1997) Manuel de Prospective Stratégique. Tome 2. *L’art et la méthode*. Dunod, Paris
- Godet, M, and Roubelat, F.(1996): Creating the Future: The use and Misuse of Scenarios, *Long Range Planning*, 29 (2) (April)
- Godet M, Durance Ph (2011) *La prospective stratégique : Pour les entreprises et les territoires*. Dunod, Paris
- Grunwald A (2009) Wovon ist die Zukunftsforschung eine Wissenschaft. In: Popp R, Schüll E (eds) *Zukunftsforschung und Zukunftsgestaltung*. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg

- Grupp, Hariolf 1995: *Technologie am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts*, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg Tyskland
- Grupp, H., H.A. Linstone (1999), National Technology Foresight Activities Around the Globe: Resurrection and New Paradigms, *Technological Forecasting and Social Change* 60, 85-94.
- Harris, Robert (1992) *Fatherland*, Hutchinson UK
- Hideg, E' (2007), "Theory and practice in the field of foresight", *Foresight*, Vol. 9 No. 6, pp. 36-46.
- Huxley, Aldos (1932/2006) *Brave New World*, Harper Perennial Modern Classics; d edition
- Inayatullah, S. (2004), *The Causal Layered Analyses (CLA) Reader*, Tampang University, Tamsui, Taiwan.
- Inayatullah, S. (2006), "Anticipatory action learning: theory and practice", *Futures*, Vol. 38, pp. 656-66.
- Inayatullah, S. (2008), "Six pillars: futures thinking for transforming", *Foresight*, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 4-21.
- Jenssen, S. (2007) The demand for dialogue: studying the influence of organisers in public foresight, *International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy (IJFIP)*, Vol.3, no.4 (2007): 403-419.
- Johne B. & Øverland E.F.(eds) (2005): *Live off, live with, live for. Our Biotechnology Future*, Cappelen Publishing, June 2005
- Jouvenel B de (1967) *Die Kunst der Vorausschau*. Neuwied, Berlin
- Jouvenel, H. (1993): Sur la Méthode Prospective: Un Bref Guide Méthodologique, *Futuribles* 2 (1)
- Kahn, Herman & Anthony J. Wiener (1967) *The Year 2000. A Fremework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years* New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Kant, I. (1787), *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt.
- Karlsen JE, Øverland EF (2010) *CARPE FUTURUM. Kunsten å forberede seg på fremtiden (The Art of Foresight Management)*. Cappelen Academic Publishing House, Oslo
- Karlsen, J. E. & H. Karlsen (2007a) "Expert Groups as Production Units for Shared Knowledge in Energy Foresights", *Foresight*, Vol 9. no. 1 2007:37-49.
- Karlsen, J. E. & H. Karlsen (2007b). *Classification of tools and approaches applicable in foresight studies*. Paper presented at the COST A22 conference in Athens, Greece, July 9-11, 2007.

- Karlsen, J.E. and Karlsen, H. (2009), "Classification of tools and approaches applicable in foresight studies", in Giaoutzi, M. and Sapio, B. (Eds), *Bridging Narratives and Numbers*, Ashgate, Aldershot.
- Karlsen, J.E., Øverland E.F., Karlsen, H. (2010) "Sociological contribution to futures' theory building" in *Foresight* VOL 12 NO. 3
- Karlsen JE, Øverland EF (2012) Promoting Diversity in Long Term Policy Development: The SMARTT Case of Norway. *Journal of Futures Studies* 16(3):63-78
- Latour, B. (1987), *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Latour, B. and Woolgar, S. (1986), *Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
- Martin, B. and Irvine, J. (1989) *Research Foresight. Priority Setting in Science*. London: Pinter Publishers.
- Miller, R. (2007), *Futures Literacy: A hybrid strategic scenario method*, *Futures* 39:2007, pp. 341-362
- Mills, C.W. (1959), *The Sociological Imagination*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (reprinted 2000).
- Neumann, Iver B. (1997) "En geografi for enhver anledning" ("A Geography for every Occasion") *Samtiden* 103 (1): 27-37.
- Neumann IB, Øverland EF (2004) International Relations and Policy Planning: the Method of Perspectivist Scenario Building. *International Studies Perspectives* 5:258-277
- Orwell, George (1949/2009) *1984*, Ullstein Taschenbuch
- Pang, Alex Soojung-Kim (2010) "Futures 2.0: rethinking the discipline", *Foresight*, Vol. 12 Iss: 1, pp.5 – 20
- Poli, R. (2010), "The many aspects of anticipation", *Foresight*, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 7-17.
- Poli, R. (2011), "Steps toward an explicit ontology of the future", *Journal of Futures Studies*, Vol. 16 No. 1, pp. 67-77.
- Poli, Roberto (2013), "Overcoming divides", *On the Horizon*, Vol. 21 Iss: 1 pp. 3 – 14
- Popp R, Schüll E (eds) (2009) *Zukunftsforschung und Zukunftsgestaltung*. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg
- Popp R (2012) *Zukunftsforschung auf dem Prüfstand*. In: Popp R (ed) *Zukunft und Wissenschaft. Wege und Irrwege der Zukunftsforschung*. Springer, Heidelberg, pp.1-24
- Popp R (ed) (2012) *Zukunft und Wissenschaft. Wege und Irrwege der Zukunftsforschung*. Springer, Heidelberg

- Popp, R (2013) Participatory futures research. Research or practice consulting?, *European Journal of Futures Research, Vol 1* 15:16:
- Ringland, Gill (1998) *Scenario Planning. Managing for the Future* Chichester: Wiley.
- Salo, A., K. Cuhls (2003): Technology Foresight - Past and Future, *Journal of Forecasting* 22/2-3, 79-82.
- Slaughter, Richard A. 1995: *The Foresight Principle*, Praeger USA
- Steinmüller K, Kreibich R, Zöpel C (eds) (2000) *Zukunftsforschung in Europa*. Baden-Baden
- Taleb, Nassim.N. (2007/2011) *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, Allen Lane
- Taylor, C. (2002), 'Modern social imaginaries', *Public Culture*, Vol. 14 No. 19, pp. 91-124.
- van der Heijden, Kees (1996) *Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation* Chichester: Wiley.
- Øverland, Erik F. & Qvale, Thoralf U. (2000a): Norway out of Europe?, Chapter in "European Labour Relations", György Széll (ed), Vol II, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire 2000
- Øverland, Erik F. (2000a) "Universell Perspektivisme. Et verdensbilde hinsides postmodernisme og modernisme" ("Universal Perspectivism. A Worldview beyond Postmodernism and Modernism") *Samtiden* 106 (2-3).
- Øverland, Erik F. (ed) (2000b) *Norge2030. Fem scenarier om offentlig sektors framtid (Norway2030. Five Scenarios about the Future of Public Sector)* Oslo: Cappelen akademiske forlag (english manuscript)
- Øverland, Erik F. (2003/2013): *The Importance of Developing Long-Term Visions for Countries. The Norway2030-Vision: Lessons for Turkey*, Istanbul Forum 8-10th of May, Istanbul Turkey and *European Journal of Futures Research – Supplement 2/2013*
- Øverland EF (2013) Universal Perspectivism. Transcending "facta" and "futura" through foresight theory building. *On the Horizon* 21(1):39 - 45

## 11 Textbook and research articles

The textbook is integrated in the text and the articles are attached as separate documents

### **Textbook 1**

Øverland, E.F. (ed) (2000): Norway2030. 5 scenarios about the future of public sector, Cappelen academic publishing (in Norwegian language), Oslo Norway (English translation, see below)

### **Article 1**

Neumann, I.B.& Øverland, E.F. (2004): International relations and policy planning: The method of perspectivist scenario building”. *International Studies Perspectives*, 5,p.258-277

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3577.2004.00173.x>

### **Article 2**

Karlsen, J.E., Øverland, E.F. and Karlsen, H. (2010): “Sociological contributions to futures’ theory building”, in *Foresight* 12 (3),p.59-72.

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/14636681011049884>

### **Article 3**

Karlsen, J.E. and Øverland, E.F. (2012): “Promoting Diversity in Long Term Policy Development: The SMARTT Case of Norway”, in *Journal of Futures Studies* 16(3): p.63-78.

Download: [http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/?page\\_id=707](http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/?page_id=707)

### **Article 4**

Øverland, E.F. (2013): “Universal perspectivism: transcending “facta” and “futura” through foresight theory building”, *On the Horizon*, Vol.21 Iss: 1 pp.39-45.

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/10748121311297058>





# NORWAY•2030

---

Erik F. Øverland (Ed.)

Five scenarios on the future of the  
public sector in Norway

Translated from the Norwegian  
by  
Richard Lawson



## Co-authors:

Iver B. Neumann

Erling Dokk Holm

Trond Høviskeland

# Contents

PASTS .....	64
CHAPTER 1 .....	64
FROM SOCIOECONOMIC SCENARIO PLANNING TO PERSPECTIVIST SCENARIO BUILDING .....	64
The history of the future .....	64
Socioeconomic planning.....	65
Other Norwegian planning activities .....	67
Traditional scenario planning .....	68
Traditional scenario planning in Norway .....	73
Perspectivist scenario building .....	76
Perspectives for pasts, futures and presents .....	80
Futures research as construction of the past .....	85
Meaning and daily life .....	86
How many scenarios? .....	87
Summary .....	89
PRESENTS.....	92
CHAPTER 2 .....	92
PERSPECTIVES ON PRESENT-DAY SOCIETY .....	92
The major contours .....	92
Globalization .....	93
The global economy .....	93
The global village.....	94
Global institutions .....	94
Anti-globalization.....	95
Technological developments .....	95
Information and communications technology.....	96
Genetic engineering and biotechnology.....	97
Energy technology.....	98
Demographic changes.....	99
Continued population growth.....	99
Fertility99	
Cleavages.....	101
Society .....	101
Money in the till .....	101

Industry in the melting pot .....	102
Solidarity in doubt? .....	103
Nature .....	103
Crisis for coast and countryside .....	104
The energy nation .....	106
Welfare .....	106
Health 107	
Education .....	108
Meaning .....	109
The public sector .....	111
Supranational overtones .....	112
Dimensioning of the scenarios .....	114
State – market .....	115
International – national .....	115
Collectivism – individualism .....	116
Traditional – innovative .....	117
The scenario spider .....	118
FUTURES .....	119
CHAPTER 3 .....	121
NORVEGIA – <b>NORWAY</b> 2030 .....	121
Main ideas and assumptions .....	122
An aggressive child .....	124
Norvegia comes to the fore .....	126
The crisis comes .....	126
All for Norway .....	128
Back to nature .....	130
Health and care .....	131
Medical bonus .....	132
Urbanization of rural areas .....	132
Jobs 132	
The revival of the comprehensive school .....	133
Life in Norvegia .....	136
Framework Norwegian .....	137
Rainbow .....	138
The state of Norvegia .....	140
Two levels of public administration .....	141
The triumph of the central government .....	141

Postscript by the social historian 2030 .....	144
The national character.....	144
CHAPTER 4 .....	146
REGIO – <b>NORWAY</b> 2030 .....	146
Main ideas and assumptions .....	147
Deede .....	148
People on the move.....	149
Urban services .....	151
People in Regio.....	154
The Oslo tunnel accident 2013:.....	154
From town to town – the new transport policy.....	156
Welfare in an individual-oriented urban community.....	158
Health shopping.....	159
Education for life in the town .....	160
The dynamics of the espresso machine .....	161
Deede revisited:.....	161
Atlantic Center – Bjørvika.....	163
Simplicity and diversity.....	163
Mafia.....	164
The public sector in Regio.....	164
Urban mentality.....	167
The power of the regions.....	171
A regionalized public service.....	172
Universal instruments.....	174
Postscript by the social historian 2030 .....	175
Stylishly out of step .....	175
CHAPTER 5 .....	178
BONSAI – <b>NORWAY</b> 2030 .....	178
Main ideas and assumptions .....	180
Biomarazzi.....	182
Free movement of everything and everyone .....	183
The welfare basis .....	184
Transport and fisheries .....	185
Watch out for number one! .....	186
The VAT era.....	188
Jobs     189	

Money for life .....	190
School fauna .....	191
The money artists .....	192
Crime and punishment .....	193
The state of Bonsai .....	194
The people of Bonsai.....	195
Who are we?.....	196
The administration of Bonsai .....	197
Local Bonsai.....	198
Inspectorates .....	199
Postscript by the social historian 2030 .....	200
A polluted life.....	200
 CHAPTER 6 .....	 202
ANTAGONIA – <b>NORWAY</b> 2030 .....	202
Main ideas and assumptions .....	203
Pentecostalists in Lørenskog .....	204
From petrocommunity to biodiversity.....	206
ICT full stop! .....	208
Skyscrapers overlooking the ocean .....	211
Welfare diversity .....	213
The Genetics Service.....	214
Scholasticism and the school.....	216
Religious communities .....	218
Cultural conflict.....	219
Globalized public sector .....	220
The scourge of multiculturalism .....	221
Federation.....	222
The state as intermediary.....	223
Large municipalities.....	224
Private suppliers .....	225
Postscript by the social historian 2030 .....	227
So Fair was our Country.....	227
 CHAPTER 7 .....	 230
INNOVA – <b>NORWAY</b> 2030 .....	230
Main ideas and assumptions .....	231
Nada Design .....	233

The birth of Innova .....	236
Creativity from above.....	239
The innovation environment .....	241
Innovative welfare.....	243
The battle of the generations .....	244
Our daily bread.....	246
New school .....	247
Pop goes the culture .....	249
Something to believe in.....	249
Crime 250	
Innovation identity.....	251
A new democracy.....	252
Scenarios .....	254
The urban world .....	256
Postscript by the social historian 2030 .....	258
Sociology for the 2005 generation.....	258
IMAGINE.....	260
<b>Wild Cards</b> .....	261
CHAPTER 8 .....	262
BIOHAZARD.....	262
A “wild card” .....	262
Peter Silberstein’s account.....	262
The world crisis 2010–2022 .....	263
Human Optimization Programme.....	266
The Industrial-Medical Gene Corporation and the DIMBY effect .....	268
The social historian 2030.....	269
Berlin .....	275
The road ahead.....	277
CHAPTER 9 .....	285
FROM SCENARIOS TO POLICY .....	285
Introduction .....	285
Previous changes of perspective.....	287
The scenarios’ contribution to policy as a process .....	288
A national centre for future-oriented strategy and policy development.....	289
Scenario thinking as renewal of the political democracy.....	289
The scenarios’ contribution to policy content .....	290



The major contours.....	290
Doping and gene therapy.....	291
Housing policy .....	292
On democracy .....	293
The social safety net.....	293
Culture and art policy.....	294
Crime and violence.....	295
Labour market and integration policy .....	295
The Innovation gap.....	296
A taxation system adapted to regionalization .....	296
Policy for dealing with existential crises.....	297
Pension and medical bonus reform .....	297
The new civil service.....	297
Competitive tendering in the public sector .....	298
Policy for culture, family and community .....	298
Administrative policy.....	300
Summary.....	301
CHAPTER 10 .....	302
PERSPECTIVIST SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE.....	302
Processes and procedures in Norway•2030.....	302
Start and project philosophy .....	302
Preparations .....	302
Phase I: Procedures we followed in the working groups.....	304
Illustration of the process with the help of the results of the globalization group ( <i>work group 1</i> ).....	309
Phase II: Scenario study.....	317
Conclusion .....	319
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	320

# FOREWORD

The project “Norway 2030” was launched in summer 1998. The idea was to try out new approaches to identifying long-term challenges for the Norwegian public sector. After visiting a number of institutions abroad that have experience with scenario development as a working method, we decided to try out the scenario method on public administration policy. We invited all ministries, several directorates and two state-owned companies with experience of scenario development to participate. The project has also invited the comments of a large group of people from industry, media, research institutions and NGOs. Fifteen out of sixteen ministries have been involved in the project

Scenarios are particularly well suited for use as a tool for communicating new perspectives on change, innovation and renewal because they involve working with ideas and thoughts that are not normally part of the daily political debate. Scenario development is thus a working method that fosters the capacity for innovative thinking. In this respect, the process involved in developing scenarios is of great value in itself. Through the discussions in the interdepartmental working groups *Norway 2030* established a new kind of horizontal arena and network between ministries.

One might ask oneself whether it is possible to implement such a project within a ministerial system. Is this the sort of task that ministries should be involved in? Is it possible for a staff of permanent officials that functions as a political secretariat to interact with the political institutions on developing perspectives on the public sector for the next generation? There are bound to be varying views on these issues. Early in autumn 2000, the Norwegian Directorate of Public Management (Statskonsult) published a report that was given the title *Framtidens departement* (The Ministry of the Future). The report emphasizes the ministries’ role as political secretariats and advisers to the political staff and the need for more flexible working methods. Norway 2030 fits into this picture, and contributes to the development of the ministries in such a direction by providing both civil servants and politicians with an opportunity to dwell on other matters than normally allowed by the daily routine. Renewal in such a direction demands new and freer working methods. Concrete evidence that this has been possible is not least provided by this book. The text you have in front of you presents five scenarios as well as five additional chapters including a historical account, a presentation of the situation today and an account of how we have practically proceeded with the project. The scenarios are an expression of what could happen, not what will or should happen. The presentation is entirely the responsibility of the authors and has not been subjected to political consideration.

We should like to take this opportunity to thank a large number of institutions at home and abroad for their support. Of our international contacts we wish particularly to mention the EU president’s advisory body *Cellule de prospective* (Forward Studies Unit), the OECD International Futures Programme in Paris, the Office of the Finnish Prime Minister and the Policy Research Initiative of the Government of Canada. In Norway, we have conducted productive talks with a large number of establishments and

persons, such as Kairos Futures Norge AS, Future Preview AS, the STEP group, Lærende Network and a group developing a futures website called Futurama.

*Ole Willy Sandbekk*

Director General, Ministry of Labour and Government Administration

# **NORWAY•2030**

## **Pasts**

# 12 PASTS

## 13 CHAPTER 1

# 14 From socioeconomic scenario planning to perspectivist scenario building

*In this chapter we do three things. Firstly, we present the origins of scenario planning and its arrival in Norway. We show how both socioeconomic planning and scenario planning developed in the aftermath of World War II. However, owing to the political dominance of social democracy, scenario planning did not arrive in Norway until the 1970s, and was viewed by the public sector as an alternative to socioeconomic planning. Secondly, we present – and advocate – an approach that we call perspectivist scenario building. Here we argue that scenario building must be viewed as a supplement to socioeconomic planning and not as a complete alternative. Thirdly, and most important, we take the consequences of our conception of perspectivist scenario building as something to be carried out publicly, and employ a participation-oriented methodology adapted to social and strategic planning. This methodology is of decisive importance for our project, which broadly concerns that which we today call the public sector. We feel this to be particularly necessary because the available literature primarily addresses business and industry, and because it is directed towards the achievement of specific goals rather than general strategic planning.<sup>10</sup>*

## 14.1 THE HISTORY OF THE FUTURE

Future orientation as an element of social and strategic planning has varied greatly over the years. Although we need not discuss the many origins of planning here, we can establish that, as an institutional practice, examples can be found in Norway of urban planning from the 17<sup>th</sup> century onwards and of the planning of regulative policy from the 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, the experience of World War II has been utterly decisive for the planning now being carried out in the western world. It was for example not by chance that the term futurology and the idea of a predictive science emerged for the first time in 1943.<sup>11</sup> There was of course a long existing literary and political tradition for envisaging “Utopias” or alternative worlds, but here a point was made of not relating

---

<sup>10</sup> See Schwartz 1991, van der Heijden 1996, Ringland 1998, and to a lesser degree Godet 1987

<sup>11</sup> See Bullock 1988: 339

directly to our own coordinates in time and space (the word Utopia means “not a place”). The communist Soviet Union, fascist Italy and Nazi Germany all carried out large-scale central planning between the wars. Planning in western countries was however different and more limited. It played a major role in military strategy, such as the planning, implementation and justification of the Maginot Line<sup>12</sup> in France. The military planning of the allies during World War II was not unlike that of earlier wars. What differed was that, after the end of the war, the experience of specific military planning and of wartime civilian conditions was extended into peacetime. Central governments had clearly become aware of the potential of planning and of the efficiency gains that could be derived from continuing with it.

The question one must ask oneself is why did this happen after World War II when it did not happen after the Franco-Prussian War or World War I. The answer may be sought in general factors such as increasing social complexity, but perhaps particularly in the increasingly clamorous political demands for the adoption of Keynesian policies, which would involve surrounding industry with political buffers in an attempt to avoid the unfortunate consequences of an economy that is not directly managed. These demands, which were made by social democrats and socioliberals, were reinforced by the German and Italian experience, which showed that it really was possible to control unemployment by managing the economy, while at the same time increasing productivity. Owing to a lack of political expedience, there has been relatively little research into how, for example, Norwegian social democracy drew on the inherited experience of the Quisling regime, which had itself taken over a certain legacy of social democratic planning. In the present context however, two examples will suffice to illustrate the general point. Øystein Sørensen (1991) has shown how the social democrats adopted central elements of the social policy of the Quisling regime, in some areas verbatim. Alan Milward (1972) refers to parts of the Quisling regime’s economic planning apparatus being taken over by the Gerhardsen government. Europe’s experience of the planning of totalitarian regimes may in other words be seen to have been an important condition for the planning of democratic regimes.

## 14.2 SOCIOECONOMIC PLANNING

Within social democratic circles in the 1930s, especially in Norway, it was the economists who had positioned themselves as the central planners. However, the urge to plan was universal. In France, where planners could take advantage of a platform consisting of a *dirigiste*, state-oriented tradition, a planning community dominated by economists with scientific aspirations developed as early as the 1950s. The date of the breakthrough of planning is often given as 1949, when a proposed policy founded on direct control through nationalization was shelved after an intense struggle, and a policy based on indirect public control was adopted.<sup>13</sup> This thereby enabled the retention of

---

<sup>12</sup> The Maginot Line was a line of fortifications constructed between the wars in the confidence that the next war would be a defensive war like the previous one. However, it proved useless against German tanks and offensive strategy.

<sup>13</sup> Slagstad 1998

the elite consensus already reinforced by the war, which may be regarded as a further condition for the achievement of agreed planning. In order to be able to operate such a policy, planning was understood as “a system of strategic decisions [and institutional frameworks] for establishing future courses of action”.<sup>14</sup> We will return to the problems of definition surrounding planning, but wish already at this point to observe that it involves rather more than pure prediction of future conditions: one must also say something about how one envisages the process that leads up to these conditions. All approaches to planning should reflect how the working process itself will be divided between a) specifying future conditions (which in principle are fundamentally unpredictable as a future goal) and b) clarifying the process by which these conditions should be reached. These two practices are associated with different ways of thinking and working, different administrative and political guidelines, different normative frameworks, etc.

The incipient hegemony of the economists was partly founded on their expertise in the type of planning demanded in connection with indirect public management. The institutional roots of this work were within the central government administration, primarily in the ministries of finance and trade, and particularly in connection with work on the national budget, long-term programmes and the annual fiscal budget. Whereas long-term programmes in most western European countries were a feature of a brief post-war interlude, in Norway they were a permanent feature. The Ministry of Finance set up a planning department in 1962.<sup>15</sup>

In the 1970s there was a lengthy debate on the overburdening of the public sector, which it was feared could result in a systemic crisis. As a consequence of this, the traditional socioeconomic planning apparatus came under pressure and system theory perspectives focusing on relations, communications and negotiations made a certain headway in Norway. There was also an emergence of social science institutions that wished to view social change and development in a broader perspective than was favoured by economists. Graduates in business administration began to play a more important role in business and industry. The socioeconomic tradition was caught between two fires, on the one hand from broadly based critical social scientists, on the other hand from commercially oriented business administration graduates. The Ministry of Finance responded by inviting sociologists, social anthropologists and political scientists to join the staff of the Ministry’s planning department. The purpose of this was to further develop the perspectives of long-range planning. While the long-term programmes from 1954 to 1973 only sporadically incorporated perspectives from the new social science institutions, a decisive change was made by the Korvald government in the Long-term Programme for the period from 1974 to 1977.<sup>16</sup> There was a dawning awareness of the negative consequences of continued rapid growth, and the programme emphasized the essential relationship between increased public activity and the

---

14 Østerud 1979: 12, 62

15 Østerud 1979: 70

16 Thorsvik, Jensen & Bratbakk 1997: 26

conditions for enhanced welfare. There was also an increased focus on the qualitative aspects of public policy. Terms such as environment, security, well-being, solidarity and personal development were in frequent use. All the long-term programmes from the period 1974–1977 up to the present day are therefore marked by an increasing tendency towards relativization and amplification of the purely macroeconomic view of social science and system theory perspectives.

Many people perceived the results of this as a break with traditional socioeconomic planning. In our view, this development is rather an expression of an important supplement to the socioeconomic approach than a radical break with it, while also affording an opening for the use of scenario planning. While it is true that this was a critical supplement that existed as a separate tradition, it did not bring the socioeconomic planning tradition to an end.

We wish nevertheless to argue certain fundamental differences between the scenario tradition and socioeconomic planning as it was practised at this time. The planning hegemony of the economists was, as formulated by Øyvind Østerud (1979: 19), based on a perception of planning as a cross-country run, where the object was to find the shortest distance between two points. You attempted to plot a course and leave behind the present before public opinion and current policy could stop you in your tracks. Planners wanted the freedom to plot the course and to see their plans implemented, but were facing a contradiction in terms.

On the one hand, there was a demand for consistent decisions concerning the future, where the decision chain is explained in terms of a progression of events. On the other hand, there was a demand for maximum freedom, capacity for control and adaptability in relation to the restrictions of the past (Østerud 1979: 18).

The self-critical debate surrounding this issue in socioeconomic communities seems to have been restricted to a distinction between ends and means, where the main issue was the extent to which economists should assist politicians in deciding goals (the process whereby they arrived at this, they have kept mainly for themselves). One of the problems that has thus not received much attention is whether it is possible to “establish” a single conjecture about the future as a “goal” and, if so, what this implies. The diachronic view of the world that makes itself felt here is a weakness of this approach to planning. Past, present and future are conceived as points along a line of development – that is to say primarily linear – and planning is viewed as a decision process concerning how one is to move from one point (present) to another (future) in the most efficient way. Such a way of thinking does not go well together with the conception of time that an increasing number of people have today or with a view of the future as insecure as that which dominates our own times.

### **14.3 OTHER NORWEGIAN PLANNING ACTIVITIES**

Only a decade after the Ministry of Finance set up the institutional innovation of a planning department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also set up a planning department. To understand the circumstances surrounding this, one must examine experience with planning not only in the economic area but also in other foreign ministries. One will then find that the first of these institutions to set up a planning department was the



British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and that this took place immediately after World War II in order to make use of what was regarded as useful wartime experience. The FCO was traditionally an organizational model for other foreign ministries, and the idea spread, so that in 1972 a planning department was viewed by the Norwegian foreign policy community as something one simply had to have. The department of the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration, where Norway 2030 has its home (the Department of Administration Policy), was also originally a planning department. In our case, the scope of the department was general rather than being tied to the economic area.

Another type of planning concept is the movement for futures studies. This is of particular interest from a Norwegian point of view because Johan Galtung and the International Peace Research Institute played a major role in the institutionalization phase. The movement was institutionalized as the World Futures Studies Federation in connection with a conference in Oslo in 1967. In the 1970s and 80s, it was particularly the so-called WOMPers from the **World Order Model Project** who drew attention to themselves. The Future in our Hands, Alternative Future, Forum for System Criticism, etc. all belong to the green branch of this movement. Galtung (1991: 5) maintains that “the conference had no ripple effects in Norway” but, since this can be read in a Norwegian book, the statement contradicts itself. It involved the production of studies about “alternative worlds”, where the object was to transcend the uniformity that characterized the way traditional political circles approached reality, particularly the future.<sup>17</sup>

## 14.4 TRADITIONAL SCENARIO PLANNING

Besides socioeconomic planning, the planning momentum from World War II can be followed along another main route, namely the events that occurred within that which during the 1950s was to be known as the American military industry complex. The RAND Corporation was founded in 1946 following an initiative by General H. H. Arnold with financing from the Douglas Aircraft Company and later from the Ford Foundation. The name RAND was quite simply an acronym for Research and Development and, especially during the earlier years, RAND was preoccupied with depicting and legitimating its activities as genuine research. RAND and offshoots such

---

<sup>17</sup>In a famous series of confrontations, Dag Østerberg adopted the role of Galtung’s nemesis (see Selstad 1991: 11-14). Østerberg argued from a standpoint that was critical of comprehensive science and prediction. However, as we shall later demonstrate, it is possible to criticize this academic approach from a non-academic viewpoint, for example as follows: “In a number of university disciplines it is the past that is focused on. Rivalling hypotheses are presented to explain what has happened and why. In order to understand one’s own time and current developments, it is of course important to have an understanding of the past. However, the universities have an unfortunate tendency to focus one-sidedly on the past. Where are the imaginative and creative ideas about the present and the future? Awareness and knowledge of the past is impotent if it is not associated with the other two dimensions. *A great deal of intellectual power is wasted when it is only brought to bear on things that have already happened* (Øverenget & Kvalnes 1999, our italics).

as the Hudson Institute and the Institute for the Future operated on the edge of defence circles, and developed the original military planning methods “operations analysis” and “systems analysis” for general use. Operations analysis simply involved the standardization of existing relations within the armed forces with a view to achieving continuous control of troops and materials deployed in the field. Systems analysis consisted of “constructing more abstract models independently of any existing concrete practice to give planners and decision-makers a basis for choosing the best system for attaining defined objectives on the basis of general criteria relating to advantages, disadvantages, risk and probability” (Håttun 1993: 38).

New approaches such as the Delphi method were also developed for forecasting of trends and scenario planning, which now appeared for the first time.<sup>18</sup> The explicit aim here was to function as intermediaries between knowledge developers in academic and other institutions on the one hand and the Government on the other.<sup>19</sup> While these activities retained their military objectives, they also spread rapidly in the direction of other parts of the government machinery, first of all to the area of nature conservation. The year of 1965 was a turning point as this was the year that program budgeting was introduced into the American central government administration, and the RAND people, who had been involved in developing this technology, accompanied the results of their work into the government offices. From here they continued to exert pressure on the authorities to tone down the principle of revolving plans and tone up alternative skills such as scenario techniques. In this work, a dash of gravitas was needed, which not least explains the choice of the term “scenario”.

These stories were first called scenarios by the writer Leo Rosten, who suggested the term on the basis of Hollywood terminology. Though the terminology was obsolete, he didn't think the more current term “screenplay” sounded dignified enough. Herman Kahn adopted the term because he liked the emphasis it gave, not so much on forecasting, but on creating a story or myth (Ringland 1998: 12).

---

18 “More specifically, the following types of trend projection were adopted:

- Extrapolative trend projection. This involved approximate estimates of unknown values, factors and phenomena on the basis of known, comparable values.
- Correlative trend projection. Here future conditions were investigated on the basis of mutual dependency, interaction and correspondence with known values.

Analogous trend projection [...where inferences were drawn] on the basis of identification with corresponding previous or current cases, tendencies or development characteristics.” (Håttun 1993: 42). In the case of the Delphi Method, “a group of experts, a *panel*, is given a question or task. The problem usually involves prediction of the date in the future when a specific phenomenon will occur, for example optical steering of private automobiles on highways. The answers to such questions will of course vary considerably. The researchers calculate the median and remove the two outer quartiles. This median value is then given to the panellists, who are asked to explain their deviations and then revise their estimates. A new median value is then calculated. The process may be repeated several times” (Selstad 1991: 50).

19 Dickson 1972: 28

The first scenario community was dominated by Olaf Helmer, a mathematician, and Herman Kahn, a social scientist. From a science theory point of view, both were pragmatists and, particularly in the case of Helmer, positivists. This is an important background to bear in mind when building further upon the methods they developed. As a main reason why the experts drawn upon in the Delphi method do not necessarily produce correct predictions, Helmer did not, for example, point to the generally problematical aspects of predictions, but to the difficulties involved in reconciling the experts' differing statements and their lack of willingness to be used as guinea pigs!

As pointed out by Ole Eirik Håatun (1993: 58) among others, he rigged up his methodological investigations with an apparatus that ostensibly should strengthen the validity of the data, but which in fact did no more than to adorn them with the garments of experimental natural science. From a methodological point of view, it was intended that the lack of verifiability would be compensated for by "testing" the "reality" (intersubjective reliability) of the results. Methodologically speaking, social and natural science were treated as two parts of the same comprehensive science.<sup>20</sup> There are parallels between Helmer's approach to social aspects and that of contemporary economists.

The approach of Herman Kahn was more advanced. In the first major scenario study to create waves in the public sector, *The Year 2000*, he defined scenarios as "hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision-points"<sup>21</sup>. Firstly, he voiced only limited scientific pretensions for his predictions. Secondly, he made explicit reference to the context of an activity, explaining for example that project applications had been constructed so that as many decision-makers as possible would find something they liked.<sup>22</sup> Thirdly, he made it explicitly clear that he appreciated the increasing impossibility of coordinating different realities in an implied "general will" as a central argument for involvement in scenario planning. While citizens considered the scenarios, they would of necessity enter into a shared reality.<sup>23</sup> Here he anticipated the reasoning of many of today's scenario builders although, unlike them, he did not take for granted that realities collide and cannot be brought into agreement. On the contrary, he thought of scenario planning as a kind of metadiscourse where these collisions can find a joint arena.

---

20 Experts in the respective fields were, for example, regardless of their statements on the matter concerned, requested within five minutes and without aids to answer questions of the type "What is the area of the moon in thousands of square kilometres?" [...and] "How many people must there be in an arbitrary group if there shall be a probability of 1:2 that at least one third of them shall have the same birthday?" (Håatun 1993: 49). This form of pastime lives on in investigations of physical risk, which as a rule are carried out by scientists; for critical comments on this, see Jon Elster 1983: 185-208.

21 Kahn & Wiener 1967: 6.

22 Kahn 1960: 119

23 Conversation between Kahn and Bruce-Briggs 1972: 4.

Kahn held on to a number of universalist postulates. For example, he maintained a baseline that he referred to as “the basic, long-term multifold trend”, a “standard world” and a bundle of differences of degree that he called “canonical variations” (for example a world that was more integrated than “the standard world”)<sup>24</sup>. Fourthly, he was, despite his belief in “canonical variations”, preoccupied with making the outcome potential as broad as possible, with the inclusion of factors that could not be worked into the outcome potential: “Wild” speculation is needed to provide an imaginative perspective within which alternative choices can acquire a deeper, if not necessarily more exact, meaning”.<sup>25</sup> This opens up a playground for all kinds of imaginative fun and games, and we are reminded of the impure origins of many apparently pure scenarios. It is, for example, no coincidence that Daniel Bell’s (1967) foreword to *The Year 2000* mentions science fiction authors such as H.G. Wells, Aldous Huxley and Arthur C. Clarke<sup>26</sup>. In the same way, we have in our own work allowed ourselves to be inspired by names such as Philip K. Dick, William Gibson and Bruce Sterling. Fifthly, it was Kahn’s explicit intention that the scenarios should function as contributions to and guidelines for public debate. In this he differs from many of those he inspired, who would come to develop scenarios for use in internal corporate decision-making processes, and not only as contributions to public debate.

Of particular methodological interest is Kahn’s analogical approach to the use of historical data for establishing a “baseline”. The main idea was that one should first go back in time as many years as one intended to speculate into the future, then examine the changes that had taken place from that time up to the present and finally use the sense of change calibration one derived from this exercise as a point of departure for specifying the degree of change. If, for example, one’s starting point is 1966 and one intends to say something about the changes that will take place during the next 33 years, one must first return to 1933, draw an outline of how the world looked then and make a survey of the changes from 1933 to 1966. It is envisaged that this should then serve as a basis for analogical conjecture about the next 33 years. Firstly, by using this method, one can identify what Kahn calls “clusters of events”, that is to say relations between courses of development in different areas that one would not have become aware of without carrying out the exercise. Secondly, one can elaborate on the pictures of the

---

<sup>24</sup>The universalizing modernity thinking that can be observed here also made itself felt in other ways.

One of Kahn’s associates, Ray Wilson, remarked in connection with furious Brazilian reactions to a proposal to dam up a lake in the middle of the South American continent that he could not see the problem: “Their concerns are with a few villages, a city, parrots and stuff like that” (quoted in Dickson 1972: 98).

<sup>25</sup>Kahn & Wiener 1967: 357

<sup>26</sup>There is an element of cross-pollination here: Bell (1967: xxii) reports how a book by H.G. Wells published in 1900, *Anticipations*, inspired a series of no less than 80 books called *Today and Tomorrow* with speculations concerning the future, and how one of these, by the biologist J.B.S. Haldane, inspired Huxley’s *Brave New World*.

above-mentioned “standard world”, “surprise-free projections” and “canonical variations”. Kahn was of course aware that this analogical thinking hinged on a presupposition of linear time, and that this presupposition was somewhat shaky. Another insurmountable problem is that one of the factors that initially motivated Kahn to draw up scenarios was his belief that the process of change accelerated, whereas the method he proposes here surely presupposes that the pace of change is more or less constant, not only during the period up to the present but also up to the future year about which one is speculating. One may of course correct for this by assuming that change accelerates, but it is impossible to say by how much or to conjecture what changes are affected in different areas of society. On the other hand, maintained Kahn, the method was also advantageous since events during the period up to the present were often unexpected as well as being powerful catalysts of change, so that this type of history study also provided a reminder of the importance of holding the door open for “wild” speculations. For the period from 1933 to 1966, Hitler and World War II provided such a reminder. If we take the period from 1966 to 2000, which was Kahn’s future, and view it as our past, the end of the Cold War is seen to be a similar radical and unpredicted event.

In the clear light of hindsight it may be tempting to view the end of the Cold War as something that was inevitable. For Kahn it would have been a “wild” speculation (so “wild” that he hardly regarded it as worth a mention). Here too is one of a number of reasons why historians’ input in connection with scenarios is often not much help. Historians are on the whole clever at pointing out everything that can happen and that we cannot possibly know, but they are also often very quick to point out that absolutely everything can be included in a continuity schema as long as we are able to make an effective calibration of the past. It is for example not difficult to view the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as a case of continuity if one sets up a long enough historical perspective. In his student days, a member of our team once made the mistake of asking his godfather, who was a palaeontologist, if climate change was natural or anthropogenic. His godfather merely pointed out that the minute changes that had occurred during the last couple of thousand years were not significant if one viewed the matter in perspective, and that the issue was therefore not worth considering. He was simply not interested in the period when the sum of human actions had reached such a level that it might perhaps have played a role after all. Just as the palaeontologist’s perspective is often not particularly helpful to the social scientist, the historian’s perspective can for the same reason be irrelevant to the scenario builder. History must be comprehended backwards, whereas planning must be carried out forwards.<sup>27</sup>

After the Hudson Institute, RAND and others had introduced scenario thinking in the USA in the 1960s, the Shell Oil Company and the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) developed the scenario methodology for civilian purposes and coupled this with the organizations’ strategic development. Historical speaking, the link between military

---

27 As we shall return to, the past must however continue to be an important source for scenario builders.

planning and the private sector came about simply because Kahn needed in the 1960s to find private sponsors and ended up, among others, with Shell.<sup>28</sup> However, it is worth noting that the very first simple preparations for what would one day be called the Internet came into being in the same environment as scenario methodology was developed. The Internet, or the ARPANET as it was known, was developed as a communications system across different units within the US defense establishment and as communications technology for institutions associated with research concerning strategic defence issues. After a time, two groups broke away from Shell and SRI and formed the Global Business Network (GBN). Shell, SRI and GBN have now dominated the scenario field for many years.

As a social practice, traditional scenario planning is the domain of small groups. They build on what are known as scenario studies, i.e. an expert-based scenario process, where a group of selected experts works mainly internally. There is little or no involvement with groups outside the expert panel during the development of the scenarios. This practice has, as mentioned above, much in common with traditional planning. Interestingly enough, the term “scenario planning” itself is somewhat misleading since it is not a question of planning scenarios, but of planning with the help of scenarios. Characteristically, the scenarios function primarily as additional dimensions to traditional planning tools and operate within such a framework. Traditional scenario planning is not capable of freeing itself from a number of the postulates of socioeconomic planning. Our supplementary approach aims at both restricting and cross-pollinating with the socioeconomic planning practice and the scenario process (see below).

## **14.5 TRADITIONAL SCENARIO PLANNING IN NORWAY**

The formation of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) was not only a result of the socioeconomic planning orientation but also of contact between American and Norwegian defence planners. The FFI was early in discovering what was going on elsewhere, particularly in the American institutions. As early as the beginning of the 1970s, the FFI began its “perspective studies”. Njølstad & Wicken (1997: 323–324) write as follows:

Perspective studies were a useful instrument for the FFI’s advisory work and were used in association with the weapons development that the Systems Group was later to carry out for use in work on long-range planning in the armed forces. On the basis of the contemporary situation and the lines of development that had led up to it in the history of technology, perspective analyses were used to attempt to make predictions (educated guesses) concerning the weapons development during the next 10–15 years. For this purpose the researchers made use of a number

---

<sup>28</sup> Ringland 1998: 12

of methods: intuitive forecasts, extrapolation and correlation of trends, analogies and what was called “forward-looking history writing”, that is to say scenarios.<sup>29</sup>

The FFI has been engaged in scenario planning for several decades. Unlike the case of American colleagues, there has been little communication with other research communities. This was therefore unknown to people working in institutions outside the armed forces and even to many people within (see however Kjølberg 1991).

The first scenario project in Norway that played a role in the public sector was Scenarios 2000 from 1987.<sup>30</sup> This made use of what we can call a version of Kahn’s “standard world” but, since the framework was Norway, it was more like a “standard nation”. As was made known during the conference held in 1999 to review the result, Scenarios 2000 was also methodologically influenced by Kahn via Pierre Wack. It was moreover, at least for some of the people who took part, a matter of a conscious choice of scenario planning rather than socioeconomic planning:

The method we introduced we had obtained from a man called Pierre Wack, a cosmopolitan French journalist who was head of the planning department at Shell Oil. [...] Traditional planning concerns the decision-maker’s macrocosm, said Wack; on the subject of making a correct analysis of the external reality. Scenarios on the other hand address the decision-maker’s microcosm, his internal conceptions of what reality looks like, the experience-based filters we use to distinguish between what we feel to be important and what we regard as not being. As a result of the process involved with coordinating work on the Long-term Programme, I had lost all faith in public planning, and, this message therefore hit a nerve. Thus was born the idea of the Norwegian scenario project, actually the first of its kind. (Osmundsen 1999; replying to critical comments on the Long-term Programme. See also Osmundsen 1987.)

While Kahn used a “standard world” as the basis of his global scenarios, Scenarios 2000, which had Norway as its scope, was based on “the Norwegian model”.<sup>31</sup> Like Kahn, Scenarios 2000 operated with three scenarios: “Renewal”, “Care” and “Disintegration”. It is worth noting that Scenarios 2000 did not explicitly operate with

---

<sup>29</sup>They provide some examples of such analyses, of which one from 1970 considers the possible developments in the Soviet Union during the following 15 years. The analysis was very positive on behalf of the West, but for this reason aroused negative reactions from military leaders! This analysis is also one of the few to envisage the possibility of the collapse of the Soviet system.

<sup>30</sup>See Hompland 1987.

<sup>31</sup>The Norwegian model refers both to a model of the welfare state and to a model for organizing working life. The former is characterized by public responsibility and ownership of service production, while the trade union movement, employers and the state characterize the latter. For a more detailed account, see Hagen 1999, Øverland 1996.

any reference scenario or “trend-forecasting” scenario, but that “the Norwegian model” was nevertheless used as the point of departure for all three postulated futures.

From the 1970s onwards, a number of smaller and far more “contextual” scenario projects were carried out in Norway.<sup>32</sup> Statoil was among the companies that began from 1987 using scenarios as an integral element of its planning work.<sup>33</sup> We find examples of scenario projects both within regional planning, under the auspices of the trade union movement and to a great extent in relation to environmental and climate policy issues. The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities, the Institute of Applied Social Science and the Research Council of Norway’s Programme for Research and Documentation for a Sustainable Society (ProSus) must be mentioned here. These have received little public attention and vary considerably as regards quality, methodological stringency and relevance. Today a number of private research institutions have specialized in the use of scenario methodology. This is then linked with work on developing strategic concepts for private industry. Establishments such as Kairos Future and Future Preview are typical examples of these.

The only Norwegian scenario project that has created anywhere near as much debate as Scenarios 2000 is Horisont21.<sup>34</sup> It is hardly coincidental that the project published its report in “the horizon year” for Scenarios 2000 and thereby indirectly presented itself as a continuation of this project. Horisont21’s three scenarios “Teamwork”, “Diversity” and “Management” are also reminiscent in a number of ways of Scenarios 2000’s three scenarios. We see particularly strong parallels between “Teamwork” and “Renewal”, and between “Management” and “Care”. “Teamwork” is moreover clearly Horisont21’s counterpart of Rune Slagstad’s challenge to the Norwegian elite to get a renewed grip on its political strategy in the book *De nasjonale strateger* (The National Strategists) (1998). This book depicts a society characterized by active national strategies based on a national consensus and broad agreement on the diagnosis of the challenges faced by Norway. This enables a broad national concerted effort in response to the unpleasant aspects of globalization. The world is divided into an inside, “Norway”, and an outside, “the world” and, despite the fact that globalization concerns how the border between these was eroded, the whole scenario was built up around the idea that the clearly demarcated unit *Norway* reacts to a challenge that comes “from the outside”. The unit that is subjected to critical examination with the help of the input concept *globalization* is equally assumed to be the active unit of the scenario. The term “the Norwegian model” and its postulation of an unequivocally given nation-state that can largely be governed independently of factors defined as “external” is used as

---

32 For a review of these, see Selstad 1991.

33 Ringland 1998: 251–257.

34 See Roland 2000.



the anchor for the unit under discussion, i.e. the nation-state of Norway.<sup>35</sup> We also see parallels between Horisont21's "Management" and Scenarios 2000's "Care". In both, priority is given to health and care in preference to education and day care centres. The relation to the disintegration scenario in Scenarios 2000 is most clearly expressed indirectly through the main message: "things have gone very well for Norway during the last 20 years but, if we continue in this way, they are bound to go wrong." Major emphasis is given to the term "change competence" and to an impression of reform lag in the public sector. It is sometimes said that Norway is very good at handling the upswings, but is not much good when faced with major difficulties or crises. There are certain differences between Scenarios 2000 and Horisont21 as regards content but, where process and method are concerned, they resemble one another closely.

## 14.6 PERSPECTIVIST SCENARIO BUILDING

During recent years a new generation of scenario communities has emerged and, in countries such as Canada, the UK, Finland and South Africa, these also include parts of the central government administration.<sup>36</sup> In summer 1999, Norway 2030 took part in the establishment of the forum for "government-related long term strategists" under the auspices of the OECD International Futures Programme. OECD-IFP functions today as a node of a world-wide network of futures researchers and communities. Although it does not itself represent any specific tradition or school, it is one of the foremost international institutions in this field, and has contacts both with the older established institutions and with the new ones. Another important international body is the EU president's advisory body *Cellule de prospective* (Forward Studies Unit). Until Roman Prodi took over in 1999 this was extremely future-oriented, and has carried out several scenario studies and processes during the last 10 years. After Prodi took over, the unit was restructured, and it will reappear with a new name and a different organization (for the time being we do not know what this unit will be called).

The main characteristic of the new generation of scenario institutions is the growing process orientation. Scenario building is viewed as a learning technique whose value lies not least in spreading awareness of change processes to as many employees as possible in the organizations that use the technique. Particularly in the EU environment there has been a definite change of emphasis towards the procedural in the design and implementation of scenario projects. The establishment by the Forward Studies Unit of five working groups across the Directorates General (DGs) and the work that has taken place in these groups employing the method "Shaping Actors – Shaping Factors" is a step forward in this respect, and has been a great source of inspiration for Norway 2030.

---

<sup>35</sup>A number of commentators in the media have criticized Horisont21 for "scrapping" the Norwegian model (Bakke, Dagsavisen 2000). However it is also possible to view this from the opposite angle by pointing out that they, by maintaining their rhetoric about a so-called Norwegian model's modified excellence, strait-jacket their whole project. This seems to be Horisont21's unintentional reference scenario.

<sup>36</sup>Ringland 1998: 245–251.

A more process-oriented scenario methodology requires the broad involvement of target groups, contributors to policy formation and decision-makers. The goals are just as closely linked to the process as to the views of the future and development paths. At the same time, this perspective stresses that scenario development should not have time limits, but that scenario activities are an institutionalized working method where the scenarios themselves are continuously changed and developed.

A major element of this development is the use of the Internet as a general contact network for a number of different institutions. This enables smaller units and institutions to take responsibility for tasks of this kind, which have traditionally been perceived as consuming a great deal of time and resources. Here a stronger emphasis is placed on quality considerations at the same time as the scenario process is linked more closely to organizational development and competence building. The intervals between scenario products become shorter. We no longer see so many projects of three or more years rounded off by the publication of large reports and with no plans for further continuity. Scenario methodology is integrated into daily tasks and becomes one of a number of ways of tackling day-to-day challenges. One thinks in terms of scenarios even when dealing with short-term challenges. The exceptions are the cases where experience of scenario methodology as a way of working must be built from the bottom up.<sup>37</sup> Larger and longer projects that contribute to subsequent institutionalization may then be the solution. It is also increasingly usual to talk in terms of scenario building and scenario learning, not least in order to avoid the misleading expression “scenario planning”. These expressions communicate that scenario development is an active process involving developing so-called building blocks or components, then putting these together to form a scenario. The competence-building and learning that takes place through participation in such projects is emphasized as a major goal in itself. Today, attempts are often made to establish scenario projects as a sustained and continuous working method, where one draws on as many levels as possible of one’s own organization as well as involving people from other institutions.

Another decisive change in recent development is the tendency to separate scenario building and scenario learning from the more operative strategy and planning activities. There are several reasons for this, but the most important is that this both legitimates and makes possible an arena for the exchange of ideas and visions that as far as possible is disengaged from the daily political and strategic agenda. At the same time, it is important to view these processes within a larger context. We can therefore think of scenario building and scenario learning as an independent and important perspective development process for later discussions concerning priorities and dispositions in the work on development of an operative strategic or long-range plan. In the ministerial context, this distinction corresponds to a division of labour between civil servants and politicians, where civil servants have more responsibility for the development of scenario perspectives, while the political staff are more heavily

---

<sup>37</sup> *Norway 2030* is a typical exception of this kind since the establishment of a “future arena” within the central government administration is an important goal.

involved in discussions on priorities, measures and budget-related issues. The changes that the new generation of scenario builders are in process of introducing are of such an extensive nature that we regard them as a transition to a new phase, which we refer to as perspectivist scenario development. The term “perspective” derives originally from the Latin *perspicere* meaning “look at closely”. In art, the term is used to refer to the illusion of depth in a painting or drawing. We have also been inspired by the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), who used the term *perspectivism* already in the 19<sup>th</sup> century to refer to his own epistemological approach. The meaning that is closest to our use of the term is “the way something is perceived from a particular point of view”. This is illustrated by the expression “to view something according to different perspectives”. A perspective is a kind of mental view or outlook through an extent of time, including views of the future. “Seeing something in a historical perspective”, “developing a future perspective”, “presenting alluring perspectives” and “extending a perspective within a larger context”, are all examples illustrating this use of the term. Perspectivist scenario building bases future visions on a choice of “building blocks” (and perspectives of “the world”) and that scenarios cannot be viewed independently of the knowledge of the world of the participants in scenario projects. Not least the latter underlines the importance of having a broad approach with many actors and that one also views scenario building as learning and organizational development. Last, but not least, a perspectivist approach enables one to make a clearer distinction between the scenario building itself and a more operative budget-oriented strategy and policy development process, cf. figure 1 below.




Figure 1. The relationship between scenario perspectives and strategy or planning focus

The scenarios function here as background perspectives and varied preconditions for the operative strategy or planning discourse. Scenario building is thus a different process than strategy development or planning at the same time as it is an important precondition for a successful strategy and planning process. Against this background, scenario building might also be viewed as a valuable supplement to forecasts and projections aimed more directly at decision variables, and not as a pure alternative. The philosophy of Norway 2030 has always been to examine the potential for development of interesting tools that can be used to further develop, support and supplement traditional planning. Perspectivist scenario building and the project Norway 2030 are our contribution in this respect.

Methodologically speaking, perspectivist scenario development may thus be seen as building upon work carried out both in the private sector and in environments associated with the public authorities of different countries. The Norway 2030 team was early in consulting a number of institutions at home and abroad before the start of the project, and has since maintained regular contact with them. “Shaping Actors – Shaping Factors”, the Forward Studies Unit’s methodological approach, represents what we referred to above as scenario building and scenario learning. In one of the Forward Studies Unit’s largest projects during recent years – Scenarios Europe 2010 – the approach was also varied in another way. Instead of starting with the heavy trends, demography and other factors with a low degree of uncertainty, they started at the other end. Firstly, they broke the principle of purely expert participation and so-called “quality testing” of participants by openly inviting all of the Directorate Generals (DGs) to take part in the groups. They emphasized relatively broad participation in order to enhance the potential for benefiting from the scenarios in policy development processes following the scenario phase. Officials and specialists on the DG staffs were the main target group for this project. Priority was therefore given to including as many as possible of them in the process, and they constituted 95 per cent of the participants in the project’s first phase. If the objective is to open up the organization for futuristic thinking, this must be an appropriate approach. Secondly, they started with “the

uncertain”. Thirdly, they made a clear distinction between active subjects (so-called actors) and less heavy, non-intentional framework conditions (factors). On the basis of a visionary initial memorandum that outlined a number of fundamental concepts and issues in five different thematic areas, the whole picture was divided into manageable pieces by identifying what were referred to as significant actors and factors. The actors were regarded as significant quite simply because they were carriers of present and/or future change. The intentional actor is an important concept here. Factors are closer to what social scientists call structural elements. Factors concern trends, material framework conditions and other elements of a clearly non-intentional character. Both trends such as “globalization” and “individualization” and units such as “legislation”, “gender” and “business ethics” are examples of such factors. The Scenarios Europe 2010 project is one of the most important sources of inspiration for Norway 2030 and for the concept we have further developed in the direction of perspectivist scenario development. Perspectivist scenario development must be understood as a scenario building process the intention of which is to supply background material and varied perspectives for subsequent strategy and policy development processes. The strategic focus has recently been strengthened.

#### **14.6.1 PERSPECTIVES FOR PASTS, FUTURES AND PRESENTS**

Where basic thinking is concerned, perspectivist scenario development differs from traditional scenario planning mainly in its attitude to the concept of time. An attempt is made to conceive of time in a less linear manner and to take the methodological consequence of this by adopting forms of expression that encourage reflexivity in the reader in relation to time. Time and space are particularly important categories of human experience since they are more fundamental than other aspects of the world. Modernity requires a special understanding of time, space and the relationship between them. Since Newton, space has been conceived of as something empty that can be filled with human products. In our context, we need dwell no further on the problematical nature of the concept of space.<sup>38</sup> However, planning should always involve devoting attention to problematical aspects of time. The prevailing view of time, which also underlies both socioeconomic planning and traditional scenario planning, is that it can be divided into three – past, present and future. Each present will be enclosed by the two other types of time, which, respectively, have been and will be present. This view can be set off against a perception of past, future and present as three different, but coexisting aspects of life: the past endures because it is remembered in the present, the future exists among other ways in the form of planning. When socioeconomic and other planners visualize and attempt to shape the future, this requires such an understanding, thereby calling into question the linear perception of history:

...history is not only the study and criticism of the relics of the past. It also involves an awareness of history’s meanderings and cascades, a knowledge of historical change and of ideas about the forces that drive and the forces that prevent change in the past, present and future. [...]

---

38 See Neuman 1997.

It also seems clear that scenario building, the most well-known method or approach to future studies, is – and should be – virtually an “imitation” of history. (Strandbakken 1991a: 150–151).


Put another way, if we conceive of time as something linear along which we can slide back and forth, we are already acting in a way that begs the question: if we can move in this way, is it reasonable to think of the points along which we supposedly move as being in a linear arrangement or is it more meaningful to postulate that we are located simultaneously in the present and the future (or the past)? If we think along such lines, it is evident why it is difficult to conceive of one present and one future, or indeed of any finite number of presents or futures.<sup>39</sup> We may, in general, assume there to be an infinite number of time and space nodes (or “chronotopes”). Like theories, scenarios are, in a sense, always created for a purpose, from a specific present position that must necessarily supersede other presents. One is therefore duty bound to bring this to the attention of one’s readers and to reflect over it.<sup>40</sup> This also entails the possibility of thinking in terms of two or more pasts. The past is also constructed on the basis of different perspectives in the present, and must in principle be subjected to continuous reconstruction and discussion. However, such a thought may be more likely to hamstring the planners than to liberate them. For pragmatic reasons, we should probably be content to allow the doubts presented here concerning the linearity of time to promote a softening-up of our thoughts on linear time rather than a complete break with it. However, such a cautious softening-up might lead to quite far-reaching methodological consequences for the type of scenario development one wishes to carry out.

The main approaches to planning that have developed since World War II differ from one another in relation to a single central factor: the concept of time. Socioeconomic planning takes a linear approach whereby one establishes a single future – a so-called goal – and then specifies how this goal will be arrived at. The graphic representation for this approach to planning is quite simple (see figure 2):

---

39 The need to think in terms of different “presents” is one of the reasons why it is difficult to fully accept Strandbakken’s (1991b: 33) standpoint when he writes “Personally, I would have preferred a tighter terminology, whereby we only regarded scenario techniques as being in use when *several* scenarios were developed, where some conditions were held constant while other were varied, and where the common point of departure for the scenarios was made explicit”.

40 This may seem obvious, but it is not. Ottar Brox writes about the reactions to his contribution to the planning debate that “The failure to examine the problematical aspects of the planner’s own position is particularly criticized: is the planner some kind of objective, omniscient being in the employ of the public authorities or is he a rebel leader? I have allowed this question to remain unanswered in this book too – just as it is in almost all planning theory” (Brox 1995: 104). Reflection on this quotation ought to address more than the view of “the establishment” that is focused on here.




*Figure 2. Socioeconomic planning. Linear conception of present and future along one potential development path.*

Scenario planning as it was first developed by Herman Kahn, and as it reached Norway via Scenarios 2000, has been brought a step further. The idea that a single future can be conceived as a goal has been thrown out. Instead of this, several different possible futures are envisaged. What has been retained however is the concept of historical linearity. In the approach followed by Herman Kahn, one of these goals was privileged, so that what he referred to as “the basic, long-term multifold trend” leads to a future that he regarded as a (continuation of a) “standard world”. Other scenarios resulted in futures that were conceived of as “canonical variations”. Although the idea of one future has been abandoned, the concept of linearity has been retained. Kahn also retained the idea of a beaten path, which may be referred to as a trend-forecasting scenario, or “more of the same”. The Norwegian projects

---

<sup>41</sup> The dotted arrow indicates that in practice this is not always as unambiguous as postulated by the theory. There are some signs of alternative thinking, if in a somewhat incomplete and undifferentiated way.

Scenarios 2000 and Horisont21 attempt to break with this basic concept and give equal status to all of the scenarios, but it is still uncertain whether this has been successful. The approach followed in these projects can be graphically represented as follows:



*Figure 3. Traditional scenario planning. The connection between present and future is conceived as linear, but involving more potential development paths. If a trend-forecasting scenario is used as the baseline (here Scenario 2), this can be indicated by making the line from the present to one of the futures thicker than the others.*

Traditional scenario planning is presented as improving on socioeconomic planning by increasing the number of futures. One takes the tendency indicated by the dotted line in figure 1, multiplies it, and makes it a permanent element (compare with figure 2). An attempt is also made to persuade the economists to follow one's example, as was done by Terje Osmundsen in an article in connection with Scenarios 2000:

There has also been progress in public economic planning in recent years. An example is that the Ministry of Finance has begun to present alternative development paths, sometimes referred to as scenarios. However, the main problem with the alternatives presented so far is that they are really only partial variants, which therefore do not express the diversity of possible visions of the future and courses of development. (Osmundsen 1987: 5).

We present ourselves as an improvement on traditional scenario planning by softening up the linear conception of the future. We say “soften up” rather than “break with”, because we are aware that the linear conception will to some extent be carried over even when applying the approach that we have called perspectivist scenario development. It is namely one thing to maintain as a general rule that that both present and future are illogical, and must therefore be envisaged not as different whole dimensions but as clusters of realities. It is quite another thing to operationalize such an insight in actual scenario development and planning. Graphically our project can be represented as follows:






Figure 4. *Perspectivist scenario development*

If we compare the three diagrams, we see first a development where we have not attempted to break with the linear concept of time. To do so is extremely difficult (i) because the number of realities is in principle infinite, (ii) because these realities are incommensurable in the sense that they are difficult to compare along the same axes, and (iii) because they have different degrees of relevance for different purposes. The ability to predict the future with regard to specific direction and in detail is not a logical requirement for planning, but one must assume that a probable outcome exists, and an (in principle infinite) number of phenomena that can occur. It will therefore remain a challenge to further develop approaches and find new ones so that the different futures can be depicted in a way that elicits reflexivity from the reader.

Such an approach already exists in traditional scenario planning. It is called “wild” speculation. Kahn proposes this, not because he wishes to dissociate himself from a universalist concept of history<sup>42</sup>, where realities develop in parallel, but because

---

<sup>42</sup> i.e. dissociate himself from the idea that a single common history exists for everyone.

he wishes to incorporate the unexpected. Scenarios 2000 made use of this approach by including a part at the end of their account that they called “Imagine that...”, where different “wild” speculations of the kind “that the Cold War should come to an end” were presented.<sup>43</sup> We attempt to improve on this technique by incorporating such speculations in the scenarios so that they become a direct reminder in the account that wild and improbable courses of development are not only possible but perhaps even more possible than one might at first think. Moreover, such wild speculations provide a completely different balance between realities in the future that the scenario is attempting to depict. We have chosen to collect a number of “wild speculations” in a separate “Imagine...” chapter near the end of the book.

## 14.7 FUTURES RESEARCH AS CONSTRUCTION OF THE PAST

Another such approach is also adopted by Kahn: to view the present from the past, in his case the year 1966 from the years 1900 and 1933. We attempt to develop this further by adopting what might be called time-perspectivism: we make use of narrators who view both the year 1970 and the year 2000 from 2030 by introducing a social-historical diagnosis in the year 2030 (the social historian 2030). At the same time we use others who view 2000 from 1970, and yet others who view 2060 from 2030. In their scenario project on Sweden ten years ahead, Levin and Nordfors (1998) adopt a similar approach and include an excerpt from an imaginary “Government Report on Power and Democracy 2008” in each scenario.<sup>44</sup> We hope by means of this approach not only to give the reader a feeling of viewing the present from an imaginary future, but also to allow the form of the account to take the consequences of conceptions of past, present and future belonging together and influencing each other. In Norway 2030 we posed the simple question: considering the large degree of freedom allowed in forming perspectives on the future, why should not this also apply to reconstruction of the past? When changes in perspectives on the turn of the century can occur between 1950 and 2000, we must concede that such changes in perspectives may also occur between 2000 and 2030. We may therefore refer to “perspectives on the past” as a separate additional dimension of scenario studies concerning the future.

---

43 Hompland 1987: 241-247.

44 This approach has the unfortunate side-effect of revealing as a fiction the project’s expressed goal of saying something about the Nordic area as a whole – and not only Sweden. In both Norway and Denmark the plans for new government reports on power and democracy to be finally submitted some years prior to 2008 were already at an advanced stage when these scenarios were written. Since it is hardly likely that new research programs on power structures will be set up the same year or a year or two after completion of the current research programs, it is clear that Sweden and not the Nordic area as a whole was the focus of the scenario planners at the time of writing. The scenario planners remain unaware of being situated in a Swedish tradition where the Nordic countries are conceived unproblematically as an extension of the Swedish national ego.

It is usual in connection with scenarios to develop what are known as development scenarios. Briefly, this involves revealing conjectural and hypothetical courses of development for individual variables or sets of social, cultural or material contexts. One of several approaches involves assuming the role of a historian at the end of the development path that is outlined, and reviewing the “history” of the period for which the futures study applies. The whole historical epoch depicted is of course fictitious in the sense that it is a simulated history that takes its point of departure in the present and moves its attention through the future towards the historical endpoint, the year that the futures study is concerned with saying something about (for example 2020, 2025 or 2030).

Presenting a retrospective view of a simulated history in a scenario on the future is not especially original. This approach only begins to be interesting if we extend such a “historical epoch” to include the genuine past, i.e. the past we possess knowledge of as we commence our futures study. Taking as our starting point the idea that history is viewed from one or another perspective and therefore changes in relation to social, cultural and economic changes, it is legitimate to conjecture how our genuine past will appear in 2030 compared with the conception we had of historical reality at the time of starting our study or earlier.

To increase awareness of the fact that the content and construction of accounts of the past change over time, we have established “the real past” as a separate dimension in the study of the future. In this respect, the following question has special relevance: how will both our real (>2000) and scenarized (1999–2030) past appear in 2030? It is particularly this dynamic interplay between futures, pasts and presents that we attempt to illustrate in figure 4, above.

## **14.8 MEANING AND DAILY LIFE**


A third approach we use to attempt to develop a supplement to traditional scenario planning is to introduce meaning directly into the account. Socioeconomic planning and traditional scenario planning were intended as a means of “putting frameworks around peoples lives” in order to create a space for people to live in. What this kind of thinking fails to detect is that people are formed by their social environment and that they reflect over this environment. Traditional planning put people’s lives into parentheses, and the parentheses were the economic factors that the planners aimed to describe. We wanted to say something about the lives as well. In order to achieve this, we include a story about “daily life in 2030” in each scenario, where we look at an individual who lives in such a future and must relate to its realities. Since the number of realities is in principle infinite, the choice of perspective for the story from daily life is basically decided completely arbitrarily, but here too we have tried to keep to the fundamental notion of

scenario planning, that things must be described in a way that is both plausible and surprising.<sup>45</sup>

## 14.9 HOW MANY SCENARIOS?

The question of how many scenarios one should have also deserves a mention. Traditional scenario planning, as in the two Norwegian projects Scenarios 2000 and Horisont21, has often been based on three scenarios. This has certain advantages but there are also pitfalls. Firstly, it is easy to get an impression that the scenario in the middle represents the golden mean between the other two (see also figure 3, above). This is also often used as a rhetorical device to make one contribution, for example a scenario, seem more moderate or desirable than the others. The problem is that, in this way, the scenarios lose their distinctness. They function as parts of a whole, and the two outer ones seem to function mainly as trappings for the one in the middle. The other pitfall can perhaps be viewed as a special case of the first, namely that one scenario, in the tradition of the dialectic, manifests itself as a synthesis of the other two, which are respectively assigned the roles of thesis and antithesis.

It may also be appropriate to use four scenarios, but this is often done because two trends are regarded as most important. A table is therefore constructed with two rows and two cells in each, where each cell contains a scenario. An example of such a procedure is given in Levin & Nordfors 1998, where it has been decided to focus on globalization and knowledge-based production as fundamental trends. The following disposition has therefore been drawn up



<sup>45</sup>This differs for example from Langeland 1998, where fragments of the daily life of one Bente Pedersen are used to concretize general points, so that there are neither any surprises nor any variations of perspective. Scenarios 2000 successfully uses a similar approach, to express the variation in place rather than time: each of the scenarios is commented on by a fictitious foreign external observer, respectively Jean Francois Normand, Charan Negandhi and Hanne Lore Riesenberger (Hompland 1987: 10).




Figure 5: Possible plan for four scenarios. (Source: Levin & Nordfors 1998: 24).

The main problem associated with such a procedure is that the design of the scenarios is fixed to just two main axes. Pedagogically speaking, this is of course an advantage, but it involves depriving oneself of a number of possibilities for varying the scenarios in relation to each other. In Norway 2030 we have consciously chosen to build five scenarios. This we have done both to avoid the traditional “good”, “bad” and “something in between” trap and the four-celled table trap. We have also enhanced the potential framework for the scenarios by thinking in terms of an octagon of variables (the so-called “spider’s web”), which constitutes the joint framework for the scenarios. Different combinations of these variables define the differences between the scenarios (see figure 6, below).




Figure 6. Spider’s web with eight variables. This follows the logic adopted by widespread benchmarking practice in other contexts. The object is to be able to compare the various realities by means of a set of variables common to all scenarios. The variables in the eight segments of the diagram are common to all of the scenarios. The variations between the scenarios are defined on the basis of different “scores” on a scale from 0 (zero) at the point of intersection in the centre to 10 (maximum) – at the outer edge of the octagon. This is illustrated here by the diagram from scenario IV, Antagonia. Here we see a combination of a high degree of individualism and an international orientation. The scores for collectivism and national orientation are both low. There is little innovation and only middling orientation towards traditional criteria, whether cultural, social, political or economic.

## 14.10 SUMMARY

We can summarize recent developments in terms of two main factors. Firstly, there is an increasing tendency to use scenario development in connection with strategy and development work in establishments. The use of scenario processes has become increasingly frequent in connection with organizational development, development of human resources and competence, work on major reforms, strategy development and learning. Secondly, there is a tendency towards a radical expansion of the scenario development in the sense that the number of scenarios is increased from three or four to five or more and that a clearer distinction is made between the scenario development itself and the subsequent discussions on strategic and political priorities. A clearer distinction between scenario development and the processes that employ scenarios to shape strategic dispositions and political priorities frees the scenario development process itself from the current political or strategic agenda function. This is decisive for development of new and interesting perspectives on the future. For those who take part in the scenario development itself this means that they will have both the potential and the authority to follow through more lines of argument, conceive of more alternatives and try out more “politically incorrect” views. This would have been far more difficult if the connection between strategy development and the political agenda had been tighter. On the other hand, we must find satisfactory transitions between scenario development and the subsequent priority discussions concerning work on strategies. One requirement here is that major decision-makers are included in the scenarios. Good scenarios make central and significant decision-makers visible. Since Norway 2030 is a ministerial project and policy concerning the renewal and further development of the public sector is the main theme, it is important for us to point out some central actors and potential present and future agents of change. We have deliberately made a relatively short list, and are painfully aware that the number of decision-makers who can conceivably have a major influence over the development of Norwegian society must necessarily be far greater than the number of actors included in this list. However, it is also important for us to pay attention to the consequences of decisions in our “own establishment”. The future policy of the Government, as the ministries’ highest decision-making body, should be given a central place in the scenarios. In addition to this, we have made an assessment of other central actors who may conceivably acquire considerable influence over social developments and developments within the public sector in the years ahead. We will make no further comments on the actors we have included in the list, but they will be found in the various scenarios.

*The Norwegian government*

*Political, religious and ethical movements*

*The European Union*

*International organizations*

*Employers’ and employees’ organisations*

*Innovation actors*

*Aggregated individual common interests, e.g. in consumption and settlement*

All of these actors are to be found in one or more scenarios, and they are ascribed varying importance in the different scenarios. This also underlines the point we make of emphasizing diversity and the importance of raising our expectations of the future. The emphasis on a diversity of futures does not involve abandoning the linearity principle, but rather dissociating oneself from a form of one-dimensionality in one's expectations of the future. There is more than one form of linearity. Discussions about the future have begun to revolve around the development of several possible futures. This differs from the orientation towards goals that characterizes the traditional scenario tradition, and it is this that forms the basis of what we have chosen to call perspectivist scenario building.

# **NORWAY•2030**

# Presents



# 15 PRESENTS

## 16 CHAPTER 2

# 17 Perspectives on present-day society

*This chapter provides an overall view of the point of departure for the scenarios – the lines of conflict, issues and challenges present in Norwegian society in the year 2000. We emphasize both the broader social issues and trends, and more specific conflicts that directly concern the public sector. One intention of the chapter is to provide points of departure for the social developments described in the five visions of the future, but the chapter is also intended to function as a contrast to what may be regarded as major issues during the period up to the year 2030.*

## 17.1 THE MAJOR CONTOURS

This chapter examines what we understand as fundamental trends in social development and factors that we anticipate will have great importance for continued developments. These include globalization and of course also technological developments as well as the clearer trends that lie in demographic projections. Viewed as a whole, these are robust trends, which play a part whether we want them to or not, but they are also trends whose result is unknown – at any rate the result in 30 years' time. The number of people living in Norway or in Hammerfest, how they will be occupied and who their leaders will be are still open questions, but we believe that major contours will indicate some directions.

In the year 2000, Norway is a wealthy country, and its wealth is relatively evenly distributed. Norway is ranked highly in international indexes. In relation both to GDP and to vaguer measures, we are generally placed near the top of such lists. The United Nations *Human Development Report* is an example of the type of indexing that aims to measure quality of life and where an attempt is made to differentiate indicators for welfare from pure economic parameters such as gross domestic product. This report examines a number of indicators, such as economy, distribution, access to resources, etc., and operates with an index known as the *Human development Index* (HDI). In this ranking, in the year 2000, Norway was in second place after Canada, somewhat higher than would be indicated by the GDP figures alone. The last twenty years of vigorous economic growth have not resulted in drastic changes in social differences. In present-day Norwegian society there is broad agreement concerning which welfare targets are important and what level they should be on. On the other hand, views differ greatly as to how society should act and be developed in order to maintain and further develop the assets that exist. Traditionally, there has been a dividing line between those who hold the view that the market should be allowed to control more than it does today and those who favour giving greater responsibility to the public sector. In recent years the debate has also addressed the effects of globalization and its consequences for Norway. The issues of national and state ownership are important in this context. The new dividing

lines are defined not only by the traditional clash of interests between labour and capital but also by the understanding of the term “national” and by the role of the state in globalization.

## 17.2 GLOBALIZATION

A distinctive feature of our time is the increasing tendency to be affected by the same economic, political and cultural trends regardless of where we are in the world. Mankind has become more uniform. National, ethnic, cultural and geographical boundaries are collapsing. Attitudes and values are spread, cultures integrated and social structures altered. The world is being changed by the freer movement of goods, capital and people across national borders. An umbrella term often applied to such processes is “globalization”. In *Norway 2030* we use the term globalization primarily to designate the sum of the processes that function integratively in global terms. In other words, we presuppose the existence of such globalization. We will focus on three different aspects of globalization: economic globalization, cultural globalization and institutional globalization.

### 17.2.1 THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Trade across national borders is perhaps the most manifest feature of globalization. The level of world trade is higher than ever and involves a steadily growing portfolio of goods and services.<sup>46</sup> However, economic globalization is primarily a matter of the level of international capital flow, not only in the form of payment of goods, but primarily through portfolio investments and direct foreign investments. Technology and international deregulation of credit markets have enabled the transfer of almost inconceivable sums of money across national borders at the push of a button.

In Norway this is for example reflected by the fact that financial investment in foreign securities has grown far more than Norwegian exports during the same period, and at an even greater rate than GDP.<sup>47</sup> The increase in direct foreign investments, both national and global, is perhaps an even more powerful expression of what most people associate with economic globalization – the almost continuous stream of mergers and takeovers across national borders. International markets and new requirements regarding competition and efficiency seem likely to lead to an increasing number of mergers of

---

<sup>46</sup>During the last 25 years, world trade has increased at more than double the rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) worldwide. For a more detailed discussion of globalization and internationalization of the economy, see the Holden Committee (NOU 2000:21) and the Berge Committee (NOU 1996:17).

<sup>47</sup>During the period from 1993 to 1999, the market value of portfolio investments (i.e. the sum of foreign purchases of shares, obligations and bonds in Norway and Norwegian purchases of such securities abroad) increased by an average of 30 per cent per annum (constant prices), which is more than six times the export increase for the same period and eight times the growth in GDP. As a share of GDP, the market value of portfolio investments increased from 29 per cent in 1993 to 76 per cent in 1999 (NOU 2000:21).

companies and corporate groups across national borders. Qualitatively speaking, this is where the new features of globalization of the economy are primarily to be found.

The global economy is in many ways extremely complex, and there have been many attempts to create transparency. Capital flow is revealed in annual reports and statistics and in companies that change owners. Where cultural globalization is concerned, we do not find this form of transparency. Its consequences, however, are extensive.

### **17.2.2 THE GLOBAL VILLAGE**

The expression “global village” refers to the feeling that the whole world is becoming a single place in the sense that people throughout the world have increasingly more in common and what were once viewed as major cultural differences are no longer so clear. For, as the anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen puts it, “Nowadays, tribal people from Africa read the Bible and daily newspapers, the inhabitants of distant Chinese villages keep track of daily developments in the Persian Gulf on the radio; people in Trinidad and Malaysia watch the same American soap operas on TV”.<sup>48</sup>

One aspect of this form of globalization is clearly a form of standardization that many people regard as undesirable – even tasteless. In the emergence of a common culture, terms are usually dictated by mass cultures, for example American phenomena such as Hollywood, CNN and Coca-Cola, and Japanese products such as Nintendo and Pokémon. On the other hand, this development also fosters the spread of positive attitudes and views across national borders, such as the concept of human rights and, more generally, the establishment of new global references as criteria for life and human dignity.

Globalization also makes possible global communities that transcend both local cultural hegemonies and the global mass culture. Such communities, or niche cultures, will become increasingly available as communications technology increases the potency of “virtual” organizations and networks. The global networks are not only for people with special interests; they are also useful communities for people who are unable to reconcile themselves to society at large, such as Norwegian neo-Nazis or Chinese dissidents.

### **17.2.3 GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS**

When large areas of economic and cultural activity take place across national borders, policy must take this into account. There is also a trend in the direction of increasing institutional globalization and, unlike what we previously referred to as internationalization, i.e. processes where states were the most important actors and cooperation in the world was primarily channelled through them, institutional globalization is mainly multinational or even supranational. The shift in recent years from internationalization to globalization therefore raises a number of issues associated

---

48 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “*Verden er blitt ett sted*”, *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, 1991 (The article is available from the author’s home page <http://www.sv.uio.no/~geirthe/Archive.html>).

with the autonomy of nation-states. In many areas, developments will to a greater extent be decided by factors beyond the control of central government politicians. A number of traditional instruments no longer function as effectively, while others are no longer appropriate. Globalization causes us to make comparisons across national borders and no longer accept poorer national solutions as easily when it transpires that other countries and other networks have much better ways of dealing with matters.

On the other hand, globalization is also partly a result of political decisions in major international institutions where decisions are made by nation-states. The United Nations is one example. The World Trade Organization (WTO), which arranges for maximum trade across national borders, is another. In most types of international cooperation, Norway has attempted to achieve special arrangements.<sup>49</sup>

In Norway, institutional globalization has primarily been discussed as a question of europeanization, concerning Norway's relations with the EU. Irrespective of the question of membership or non-membership, most people seem to agree that Norway must comply with the decisions of the EU, for both economic and purely practical reasons. It is true that some conflicts arise, men these are few compared with the number of rules and regulations we accept. This picture is further reinforced by our participation in other forms of parallel cooperation with the EU and the EU member-countries in a number of political areas, such as the Schengen cooperation.

#### **17.2.4 ANTI-GLOBALIZATION**

There is considerable scepticism and opposition to many different aspects of globalization although it does not appear that many people are against globalization in itself. The opposition to globalization may in a way be interpreted as a reaction against the common destiny that mankind has gradually become aware of. Here we face for example the fact that globalization also involves globalization of risk and environmental destruction.<sup>50</sup> In the global risk society, pollution created in one place gives rise to problems in another place while overfishing in an ocean causes a crisis somewhere else. Without political counter-measures, globalization reinforces potential income differences between rich and poor countries and undermines local cultures.

### **17.3 TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS**

In Norway 2030, we have adopted relatively moderate assumptions concerning technological developments. We made this decision because even relatively cautious

---

<sup>49</sup> See for example Svein S. Andersen (2000).

<sup>50</sup> Here the work of the German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, who coined the expression "risk society" (1986), has been of major importance.

assumptions give rise to radical and spectacular visions of the future.<sup>51</sup> We have paid particular attention to ICT, genetic engineering, biotechnology and energy engineering.

### **17.3.1 INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY**

The decisive factor in microtechnology has long been data processing itself, in other words the speed at which a microprocessor is capable of performing calculations. This is well illustrated by the fact that an ordinary PC in the year 2000 has a potential data throughput greater than all the computers NASA found room for on board the vessels used to put men on the moon. The technology is still at a stage where we count the number of transistors that can be placed on a silicone chip. However, in recent years, it has been the communication potential of this technology that has particularly been in focus, rather than the data processing itself. The emergence of the Internet and digital communications in general has resulted in many ways in a merger of telecommunications and computer technology. Many people view the principle of computers everywhere in the world sharing the same data as a quantum leap in the application of microtechnology. It has given rise to a number of possibilities, from the exchange of quite ordinary messages via the Wide World Web to advanced applications, such as telemedicine, which actually allows doctors to assist in surgery without being physically present. In the financial area, it is expected that many services and products that do not need to be physically delivered, such as banking and insurance services, user support, education, etc., will be completely integrated in the digital networks.

Developments in telecommunications, which in many areas still constitutes a bottleneck in the digital economy, have reached a stage where we now envisage a future where most nonverbal communications will be digitized and transmitted via various networks. TV, radio, music and other forms of entertainment will all be available as digital services.

The new information and communications channels offer undreamt-of possibilities for those who wish to communicate with the whole world, regardless of whether this is regarded as desirable by the public authorities or by society. Cryptology also enables the use of information technology for communications of a far more private – and indeed undesirable – nature. Countries that prefer to limit public access to information have reduced scope for achieving this and, with the introduction of wireless Internet

---

<sup>51</sup> As mentioned in chapter 1, Delphi studies are often met with in technological scenarios. These studies are internationally acclaimed, particularly owing to their relatively extensive empirical basis. The Delphi study of 1998 was based on a comprehensive questionnaire under the auspices of *das Fraunhofer-Institut für Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung* (<http://www.isi.fhg.de/>) carried out at the request of the German Ministry of Education and Research. Approximately 2400 German experts in different fields of technology were involved in the study. The popular versions of this work have been of great value to us. In Norway, there are also institutions with major competence in technology projections. We have, for example, gained a great deal from our reading of Sintef's publications and the magazine, Gemini.

protocols, it will indeed be a technically demanding task to deny people free access to information.

### **17.3.2 GENETIC ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY**

All natural organisms have the same basic code. This discovery is the basis of modern genetic engineering and biotechnology, a field of knowledge and technology which is becoming increasingly important and which internationally constitutes one of the biggest private research fields. There are two main areas of application for modern genetic engineering and biotechnology: microcosm and macrocosm, i.e. the human body and the remainder of the ecosystem. The first application concerns the design and improvement of medicines and the way the body itself functions (health). The other concerns corresponding attempts to improve on nature, particularly driven by the wish to speed up parts of the ecosystem.

Genetic engineering associated with human health is perhaps the area that has been most discussed, since technological developments in this area are in many ways perceived as an extension of assisted reproduction technology, a technological development that has been and still is controversial in many countries. However, this field in its entirety has far more to offer and, in the view of many people, it is only now that the entire human genome has been mapped that our eyes will be opened to the possible applications of this knowledge. It is nevertheless probable that we will see major medical developments. The potential is particularly great for early and more precise diagnosis, identification and treatment of hereditary diseases and eventually for the cultivation of complete organs to supply the needs of individual patients.

Another main application of modern genetic engineering and biotechnology is genetically modified food. Here researchers have long been promising new forms of, and not least cheaper, food. It is intended that the new food will also be both more functional and more spectacular. However, GM food is still somewhat alien, and production is still relatively limited. The spectacular products are mainly found in the literature (and in some futures studies) since, in the year 2000, genetically modified food is primarily manufactured from plants and animals that have been made resistant to pesticides, fungi, viruses or insects. However, there is no doubt that this area will grow and that future shopping baskets will contain many products that differ from those available today.

In addition to agricultural and medical developments, genetic engineering and biotechnology offer a large range of other areas of application. Among these are the use of DNA analyses in criminal investigations and the use of biological identification and knowledge in connection with insurance, where knowledge of genetic material also affects risk assessments. However, the applications that we will perhaps experience as most revolutionary are those that we have hardly conceived of yet, such as links between biological and digital information.

The population seems ambivalent to modern biotechnology and genetic engineering. On the one hand, there is widespread scepticism to all uses that may result in damage to

nature, particularly when this involves food. An investigation by the National Institute for Consumer Research in 2000 shows that 89 per cent of the population will avoid GM food.<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, there is little doubt that most people will welcome applications of the technology to the treatment of serious diseases. Here the opposition, which is primarily ideological and religious, seems already to be eroding.

### 17.3.3 ENERGY TECHNOLOGY

During the last 50 years, the world's approach to energy has been characterized by increasing consumption, a growing dependence on petroleum products, and considerable optimism in relation to new forms of energy.<sup>53</sup> The reason for this is of course population growth and improvement of the material standard of living. Although it is reasonable to anticipate that the demand for both petroleum and electric power will continue to grow, we may experience radical changes in this area during the next thirty years. The consequences of such changes will be considerable, and will particularly depend on how quickly it will be possible to replace current energy systems.

In relation to heating and similar power consumption, there is continual development of new and better methods to replace the relatively expensive electric power. This particularly applies to the use of district heating but also improved use of solar cells, etc. are appropriate candidates. A corresponding development can be observed in the transport sector, where there is considerable technological development, such as the use of hydrogen fuels. Decisive factors are price and availability of new products. The world's coal reserves are expected to last for another 250 years and, unless coal-fired power stations become very unprofitable, this production is likely to continue for just as many years.<sup>54</sup>

For Norway, developments in the energy sector are of particularly great importance. On the one hand, the country has an eccentric pattern of energy consumption involving a greater consumption of electric power than any other country coupled with a tax level for petroleum products amongst the highest in the world.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, Norway

---

<sup>52</sup> *Dagbladet*, Tuesday 29 August 2000.

<sup>53</sup> From 1945 to the 1970s, nuclear power made considerable headway, both ideologically speaking and in practice. Nuclear power stations were constructed throughout the world, and progressively more areas of use were found for this form of energy. It was envisaged that cars, buses and all kinds of small transport vehicles would be nuclear-powered, and optimistic books were published for children with titles such as *My friend the atom*, which painted a detailed portrait of a future society where all potential problems had been cleared away by the new technology.

<sup>54</sup> Gemini, No.1 - February 2000 - 12<sup>th</sup> year

<sup>55</sup> Electricity and petroleum products have been the dominant energy carriers in Norwegian energy consumption for stationary purposes during the last thirty years. At the same time, the relationship between electricity and petroleum for stationary purposes has changed considerably in the direction of a relatively greater consumption of electricity during this period (see e.g. NOU 1998:11, *Energi og kraftbalansen mot 2020* (Energy and electric power balance towards the year 2020)).

is one of the world's largest exporters of such products, in addition to covering approximately 90 per cent of its own needs for electric power by means of more or less natural resources of hydroelectric power.

## **17.4 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES**

Fertility, mortality and immigration are factors of great importance for public expenditure on pensions and health and care services, but these factors also have more indirect effects, such as the number of teachers needed. However, in the scenarios, population structure constitutes an even more complex picture since we are attempting to identify both the causes and the consequences of population changes in a much broader perspective. Factors such as fertility, mortality, average life expectancy, family status, settlement patterns, etc. are reliable indicators since they are relatively stable over time. Systematic changes are easily detected in time series. Nonetheless, it is important to take into consideration that the more unforeseeable and unexpected trends often receive too little attention in such projections. However, perspectivist scenario planning provides the opportunity to look beyond the usual assumptions and to take account of factors that are less probable but nevertheless of major importance if they occur.

### **17.4.1 CONTINUED POPULATION GROWTH**

The population of Norway on 1 January 2000 was nearly 4.5 million and, had then increased by approximately 33 000 in one year, which amounts to a growth in population of 0.7 per cent.<sup>56</sup> Incidentally, this growth is the greatest registered since the first half of the 1950s. It is explained by an immigration figure of 19 300. By comparison, the average increase in population per year during the period from 1890 to 1975 was 0.8 per cent. During this period the population increased from approximately 2 million to approximately 4 million.

In Statistics Norway's last population projection, it is anticipated that the population will continue to rise slowly during the next 25 years from 4.4 million in 1999 to between 4.6 and 5.4 million in 2025. The increase will probably not stop at this point, but a decline cannot be ruled out.<sup>57</sup> Statistics Norway's calculations are based on assumptions concerning three factors that the size and structure of the population are dependent on: fertility, mortality and net immigration.

### **17.4.2 FERTILITY**

Fertility is a matter of physiology, but it is the social component that is decisive for the changes we see and have seen in this area. For example, the rate of reproduction is affected by women's ages on giving birth, and this, in its turn, is decided by social

---

<sup>56</sup>More precisely, the figure was 4 478 500 (Source: Statistics Norway, Population statistics. Population by age, sex and marital status, 1 January 2000).

<sup>57</sup>Statistics Norway, Population projections. National and regional figures, 1999–2050.



factors. Low age on giving birth reduces the gap between generations, which results in more rapid population growth. The current fertility rate in Norway is 1.8 children per woman, as against an average of approximately 1.6 for the whole of Western Europe. Without immigration, a fertility rate of 2.1 would be necessary to maintain the size of the population. In addition to the social aspect, fertility is also affected by technological developments, inter alia as a result of new reproduction technologies, but also as a result of other anthropogenic conditions that can lead to reduced fertility, including pollution. Although projections indicate a steady increase in the Norwegian population, it is widely held that this will not be sufficient. The projections from Statistics Norway are based on the assumption that life expectancy will continue to increase between now and 2050. The anticipated life expectancy for new-born babies in 2050 is between 77 and 83 years for men and between 81.5 and 87.5 years for women. This approximately corresponds to that of many other European countries, and United Nations projections, and represents a considerable increase from the current level, which in 1998 was 75.5 years for men and 81.2 years for women.<sup>58</sup>

During the next 10–15 years, the number of people over 67 years of age will be stable or will fall slightly from 619 000 in 1999 to between 598 000 and 622 000 in 2010. The number of elderly people will then grow considerably. Statistics Norway's latest projections show that in 2050 there will be between 0.9 and 1.2 million people over 67 years of age. For the oldest group, i.e. 90 years and over, there will be growth throughout the period. Initially the number will increase only slightly, from 24 000 in 1999 to 30 000+ in 2010. There are many reasons for viewing the ageing of the population as one of the main challenges of the years to come. Business and industry forecast a scarcity of manpower. The economists envisage increased pension costs and increased expenditure on nursing and care services. However, it is difficult to predict the effects of the elderly boom. There will also be more healthy elderly people, and many of these people will probably want to continue working longer than is usual today. This particularly applies to people in occupations that are not physically demanding.

In 1999, net immigration to Norway was at its highest level ever. Statistics Norway anticipates that we will also experience high immigration figures during the coming years. In the “high” alternative, we assume that net immigration will be even higher in 1999 and 2000 than it was in 1998 and will then remain at 15 000 per year. In the “medium” alternative, we assume that net immigration will be slightly higher in 1999 than in 1998 and then fall to 10 000 per year. In the “low” alternative, we assume that net immigration will fall gradually to 5 000 per year. Immigration is the component of the population calculation that is most difficult to predict. Net immigration, unlike fertility and mortality, can change dramatically from year to year and is as a rule dependent on external factors, particularly crises and warlike conditions in other countries. However, it is also probable that internal causes, particularly shortage of

---

<sup>58</sup> Statistics Norway, Population projections. National and regional figures, 1999–2050.

manpower, will result in fluctuations in net immigration and a possibility of major increases in years to come.

An important part of demography is the mobility pattern, which is often a major factor of population structure and size in more geographically limited areas. While in 1930 46 per cent of the country's population resided in densely populated areas (more than 200 inhabitants), by 1980 this figure had risen to 70 per cent. The social, cultural and political consequences of such a development must also be taken into account. Here it is possible to envisage new lines of conflict where the old and the young might constitute major antagonists. The form this will take is largely dependent on the policy adopted by the authorities. We can also envisage changes in attitudes and views concerning *nature* and *technology*, where the approach to biotechnology and genetic manipulation changes from a very sceptical attitude to a positive one where this field is regarded as the number one growth sector of the future.

## 17.5 CLEAVAGES

The selection we have made of lines of conflict will be presented under the following four headings: *Society* deals mainly with economic factors in the year 2000 –from the fiscal budget to the major strikes that took place that year. *Nature* is an attempt to say something about living in and off the countryside in the year 2000 with an emphasis on primary industry and fishing as well as more recent environmental and energy issues. Part 3 is entitled quite simply *Welfare*. The final part, *Meaning*, concerns the people who live in this society, what they do and what they believe in, and the kinds of protection they feel they need against internal and external dangers.

## 17.6 SOCIETY

All the scenarios in *Norway 2030* take as their point of departure a country characterized by prosperity. Since 1993 Norway has mainly experienced relatively good economic growth and relatively low inflation. Unemployment has fallen from approximately 6 per cent to around 3 per cent towards the end of the final decade of the millennium. Petroleum income has been high, world economy stable and Norwegian goods and services are in high demand.

### 17.6.1 MONEY IN THE TILL

High petroleum income secures large profits for Norway while a considerable proportion of this income is placed abroad through the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund. To date, there has mainly been political agreement concerning the need for such a fund, although many voices advocate increased domestic application of these resources. The argument put forward by those who wish to save as much as possible of the petroleum income is that the country needs these resources to cover future National Insurance commitments. However, it is also clear that these reserves help to prevent disturbance of the Norwegian domestic economy by fluctuations in the price of oil, and many people regard this as being at least as important a purpose of the petroleum fund.

Petroleum income also explains the sound status of Norwegian government finances. In the *Revised National Budget* for 2000, a surplus of NOK 120 billion is anticipated for

the fiscal budget for 2000.<sup>59</sup> In economic terms, the Norwegian public sector is characterized by the wealth of the country, and consumption in the public sector has increased steadily over several decades. There seems however to be greater dissatisfaction with the public sector today than just a few years ago. There is nevertheless a not inconsiderable ambiguity in the dissatisfaction expressed in the demand for lower taxes and at the same time more and better services from the public sector. For many people, this contradiction seems solvable only by increased privatization and competitive tendering.

The private sector economy on the other hand is far less stressed, although it is true that in the year 2000 there were signs of overheating in some sectors. Large areas of business and industry are enjoying the benefits of a major international boom and many companies have paid relatively high dividends in recent years. Combined with the inflated expectations of companies regarding “the new economy”, this contributed to exhibitions of wealth that many people found objectionable, a matter which was referred to in connection with the collective agreement of 2000. However, many people hold the view that such differences in income cannot be avoided, and that we will see more of them in the time ahead as a result of restructuring in the private sector.

### **17.6.2 INDUSTRY IN THE MELTING POT**

In spite of a considerable rise in employment levels in large areas of private and public services, employment levels in industry are falling, particularly in metals and machinery industries. This development is not surprising, and is partly due to lower investment activity in the North Sea. However, many people regard the development as also reflecting an increasing movement away from the production methods of the industrial society. The concept of “the new economy” is also an expression of the expectations many people have regarding these changes.

Nonetheless, there is relatively strong agreement that the future for Norwegian industry will be more research-based than is the case today. Fish farming industry is a sector that is currently doing well, and which is also becoming increasingly knowledge-intensive. A major problem in this area seems to be the low level of interest in research shown by private industry, which is not unnatural in view of the industries concerned.

Another marked trend, both in Norway and in the rest of the world, is a considerable investment activity in existing companies across national borders. Companies are restructured in international terms, either through takeovers or mergers or by means of other forms of alliance. In the EU alone, the number of mergers and takeovers increased from 2 800 in 1987 to approximately 7 600 in 1998. Many people regard this as an indication that the corporations of the future will to a great extent be transnational and stateless, a development that will particularly be seen as a challenge by small countries with open economies.

---

<sup>59</sup>Since the revised national budget was submitted, crude oil prices have continued to rise. This estimate is therefore too low.

### 17.6.3 SOLIDARITY IN DOUBT?

Many economists nevertheless hold the view that one of the greatest challenges for the Norwegian economy today is the high demand for manpower in relation to the supply. The number of vacancies has quadrupled since the beginning of the 1990s. Today there are over 35 000 vacancies in Norway<sup>60</sup>, more than ever before.<sup>61</sup> This challenge will not be made any easier to address by the fact that the need for manpower within medicine and education will grow in the years ahead. Unless there are available reserves of manpower or capital, the growing consumption of resources by the public sector will absorb production factors that could otherwise have been used by business and industry. Of course, the problem is that a tight labour market increases the probability of mounting price and wage inflation. In the view of some commentators, this situation is already unavoidable since, in the year 2000, for the first time for several years, we experienced major strikes. Moreover, the competitiveness and profitability of export industries has been weakened. We see today a much steeper growth in labour costs in Norway than is experienced by our trading partners.<sup>62</sup>

In connection with the strikes in spring 2000, it was said by some commentators that the period of what has been called the *solidarity alternative* was over. Others were more inclined to blame the unrest on peoples' impatience with high share dividends, lucrative options and golden parachutes paid to managers and owners, while they themselves were expected to show moderation, and that the strikes were thus mainly of a symbolic nature. The settlement nevertheless involved pay increases, which can be interpreted as indicating that people simply wished to receive their rightful share of the economic growth.

## 17.7 NATURE

It is characteristic of the structure of industry in Norway that it is closely associated with nature and natural resources. This is in many ways our destiny, one which also endows us with unique potential. We have an abundance of both renewable and nonrenewable resources, and wish of course to exploit them. However, the price we have to pay for extracting these resources is added to considerably by the cost of transport and communications. The price of other activities is also high, especially if we compare with corresponding activities in smaller, flatter and warmer countries.

---

60 Quarterly report No. 3/2000. *Aetat*.

61 Since 1993, we have witnessed a positive development in the labour market and, at the end of the 1990s, we were able to ascertain low unemployment and labour force participation rate higher than it has ever been. At the end of 1999, the labour force study (AKU) conducted by Statistics Norway showed an unemployment rate of 3.2 per cent. The AKU figures also showed that the employment figure increased by almost 240 000 persons from 1993 to 1998. In 1999 the labour force participation rate was over 73 per cent (Source: Statistics Norway).

62 For the period 1997–2001 we can expect the pay level to increase by 10 percentage points more in Norway than in an average of other countries (Source: Norges Bank).

### 17.7.1 CRISIS FOR COAST AND COUNTRYSIDE

The pattern of settlement in Norway has traditionally been linked to the use of natural resources. Today this settlement pattern is challenged, not because we no longer use the countryside, but because modern technology makes it no longer necessary to live there. Some people still want to live in the countryside. The question is whether and to what extent the majority of people are willing to pay the price of fulfilling such wishes. This applies not only to support for the barren patches of land farmed by west country smallholders or the windswept fishing villages of Northern Norway. It also applies to the availability of postal services, doctors, tunnels and roads kept open all the year round, broadcasting and broadband networks. The futility of protests in rural areas against the centralization of Norway's postal services also demonstrates how far we have come in accepting that it is not possible to make one's home on any headland or mountain ledge and at the same time expect to be provided with all the services of modern society.<sup>63</sup>

This dilemma is particularly visible in the fishing industry. Today, most operations can be performed by relatively large vessels that put into harbours far from the fjords and banks where the fish are found. The conflicts between the trawlers from Sunnmøre and the old-fashioned fishing boats from the coast of Finnmark are a consequence of this. However, it has also proved possible to take nature home with one by domesticating the fish. This has given us a new industry with considerable growth potential for the future. When both fishing and mariculture are included, the fishery industry is now Norway's second largest export industry, with an export value of NOK 30 billion in 1999.<sup>64</sup> For the fishing industry, the world market is of major importance, and globalization opens up enormous business opportunities.

However, in a global world there are few products that are really profitable to cultivate in Norway with its mountainous terrain and difficult climate. Support for agriculture in the form of subsidies and trade restrictions has nevertheless helped in maintaining a relatively large and active agricultural sector in Norway as well as an agriculturally based food industry that employs nearly 32 000 people in over 1 200 enterprises. However, there is no doubt that this system is in process of being phased out, and the number of full-time farmers has never been smaller than it was in 2000. A great deal however is dependent on the acceptance in the population for state support of agriculture and the more indirect consequences of this, such as high prices for many foodstuffs.<sup>65</sup>

---

<sup>63</sup> It is debatable whether the reorganization of Norway Post's distribution network actually represents a qualitative change in the service supplied – if agreements have been entered into with the retail trade concerning the supply of postal services in shops. See also St.meld. 37 (1999–2000) *Om omlegging av Postens ekspedisjonsnett* (Reorganization of Norway Post's distribution network).

<sup>64</sup> Source: Ministry of Fisheries.

<sup>65</sup> For a discussion, see for example St.meld. No. 19 (1999–2000) *Om norsk landbruk og matproduksjon* (Norwegian Agriculture and Food Production).

The purpose of the Norwegian agricultural model is partly to provide food security both in health terms and in the form of guaranteed supplies. However, it is primarily the regional policy arguments that have predominated. The threat of depopulation of rural areas still has political currency but, when this appears to be happening anyway, the argument loses much of its force. The main alternative to agriculture and forestry is tourism and more service industries. Others maintain that agriculture is important for the cultural environment, and even the natural environment, although the latter is somewhat dubious.

It is now some years since environmental policy was high on the political agenda. Many politically active groups of young people are no longer in evidence, at any rate in the media.<sup>66</sup> The strong economic growth may well have played a part in reducing the interest for ascetic sacrifice of the environment, and the interest that is evident is also often primarily associated with what people perceive as direct threats to their health. This is reflected in people's scepticism regarding genetically modified products and food additives.

The changes in the interest for environmental policy are not however necessarily an indication of less interest in the environment as such, and it is unlikely that people have lost faith in the experts in this area. There are completely different explanations that are likely to be more relevant. Much environmental policy today is an integral part of other sectoral policy, and it can be assumed that we have come closer to solutions for many of the more traditional environmental challenges associated with nature conservation and pollution. Through the EEA agreement alone, Norway has implemented approximately 250 acts in Norwegian law.

The most important current challenges in this area, particularly atmospheric emissions and climatic effects, are so far from people's everyday life that it is difficult to maintain as strong an involvement as for example in connection with the local watercourse or salmon river. Climate policy is also difficult because it is by nature cross-sectoral, and therefore necessitates reaching agreement on a completely new generation of mandatory instruments from national to global level. In such a context, there is little doubt that each and every one of us becomes relatively small and somewhat far removed from the solution to the problem. While most people are aware of what is meant by source

---

<sup>66</sup>The statistics showed that we are actually less preoccupied with the environment today than we were only ten years ago. Reduced anxiety results in reduced involvement in environmental issues. *Samfunnsspeilet* No. 4, 1999.

separation and recycling, not so many people are familiar with the contents of the Kyoto Protocol.<sup>67</sup>

### 17.7.2 THE ENERGY NATION

Norway is Europe's largest and the world's sixth largest producer of hydroelectric power,<sup>68</sup> and electricity production in Norway is almost 100 per cent based on hydroelectric power. Not surprisingly, consumption of energy is also mainly based on electric power.<sup>69</sup> Norway is the world's second largest petroleum exporter, and the one that extracts most from its reservoirs. Gas is expected to take over a relatively greater proportion of the petroleum sector when petroleum extraction falls off after 2010. In 1999 this sector accounted for approximately 35 per cent of the total value of Norwegian exports, and constituted 9 per cent of state income.<sup>70</sup> But, unlike hydroelectric and gas-fired power stations, there has been little opposition to Norwegian petroleum production. Disagreement has been associated with the way the state organizes its involvement rather than the production itself. There are now signs of the return of this debate as we look towards a decline in petroleum production – and there is no doubt that the decline will come. Statfjord/Snorre, Gullfaks and Oseberg, which currently account for almost half of the production, are all now past their maximum production levels, while no new fields of corresponding capacity have been discovered.

## 17.8 WELFARE

During the 20<sup>th</sup> century, there was a steep rise in anticipated life expectancy in Norway, by over 24 years for women and 21 years for men. A very important part of this increase was due to curative medicine and, more generally, to increasing improvements

---

67 The Kyoto Protocol entails a commitment to reduce the of the industrialized countries' total emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 5 per cent viewed in relation to the 1990 level during the period from 2008 to 2012. Countries have been assigned varying commitments in accordance with the objective to even out the costs between countries regarding fulfilment of these commitments. Norway may increase its emissions by 1 per cent, but for us, as well as for most other industrialized nations in the west, it will be extremely difficult to fulfil the commitments, not least because of the sharp increase in emissions since 1990.

68 The total production capacity for hydroelectric power is today 27 307 MW, which is distributed between approximately 856 power stations. In addition to this, there is 265 MW from thermal power stations. The total economically viable hydroelectric power resources in Norway are estimated at 178,3 TWh, calculated as mean production (NOU 1998: 11 *Energi og kraftbalansen mot 2020* (Energy and Electric Power Balance towards the year 2020)).

69 Petroleum products constituted in 1997 approximately 21 per cent of the stationary energy consumption.

70 The income is derived from several sources: income from the State's Direct Financial Interest (SDFI), taxes from oil companies and profits from Statoil and Norsk Hydro.

in the health service.<sup>71</sup> The welfare state also assimilated the ideals of the educated society, and the first decades after World War II were also marked by increased investments in the education system in Norway. In 1969, nine years of schooling was made compulsory and, from 1954 to 1966, the number of students attending universities and colleges quadrupled. A population that is healthy and fit to work is of course of paramount importance, but the welfare state is perhaps even more concerned with taking care of those who are neither. The welfare state is committed to giving such groups as worthy a life as possible.

Petroleum income has enabled us to do many things that would not otherwise have been possible, perhaps particularly where welfare policy is concerned. We must nevertheless remember that most welfare schemes were planned and implemented before anyone began to include even future petroleum income in fiscal budgets. Some costly additions have certainly emerged over the years, but problems have perhaps arisen just as much as a result of global changes. Globalization makes it more difficult to maintain adequate taxation, and thus the necessary income to cover the cost of items such as National Insurance. The debate concerning reduced taxes shows that there is a limit to what people are willing to pay, particularly when they see what corresponding goods and services cost abroad.

Dependence on petroleum income is a fundamental economic welfare problem. Another is that the demand for many National Insurance benefits grows more rapidly than the income from taxation. In the long term, it is therefore probable that “something has to give”, as the Governor of Norges Bank put it in his Annual Address in 2000. The result is a situation where the debate more concerns maintaining the welfare state than developing it further. We are told that maintenance of the welfare state is dependent on its modernization.

### **17.8.1 HEALTH**

Few policy areas are more emotionally charged than health policy. Our lives and those of our families are dependent on good health. Health is consequently a policy area that preoccupies most people and which very many people have experience of. In the *Norwegian Health Survey* of 1995 seven of ten people reported that they had diseases or afflictions of a more permanent nature. However, although we generally report a large number of diseases or afflictions, this does not mean that we are a suffering people. In fact, eight out of ten people assess their health as good or very good. Although it is clear that the health of the population is dependent upon far more factors than the health service’s consumption of resources, the media often give the opposite impression. The problem is of course that political attention is easily attracted by acute needs and in recent years it is financial crises in the hospitals that have been most focused on. The result is a considerable growth in hospital expenditure. However, when the financial crisis continues year after year, there are perhaps grounds to ask whether the problems might have other causes.

---

<sup>71</sup>For a discussion of the significance of developments in the field of medicine for demographic parameters, see Larsen Ø. & Falkum E. (1999; 119: 4482–7)



Firstly, it is clear that we are facing a dilemma. It is possible to treat an increasing number of patients, but we are not and never will be able to satisfy all demands. There will always be a need to make priorities, and there will always be waiting lists. There is probably only one way out of this impasse; allow the supply and price of medical services to be decided by the demand. Of course, the price we pay for this solution is changes in the distribution and availability of the services, and there does not appear to be a majority in favour of such a solution at present. The alternative to increasing investments in the health service, particularly hospitals, is to examine the use of existing investments. Even the Norwegian Medical Association is sceptical of the way hospitals are run, and submits that many medical man-years could be freed by reorganization.<sup>72</sup> Some people hold the view that the problems arise from the struggle between the medical and nursing professions. It has also been proposed that hospitals should be given a more independent status and that they should be run by more professional managers.<sup>73</sup>

Doubts have also been raised as to whether health policy is directed towards those with the greatest needs. Studies indicate that health is socially conditioned, so that higher social status results in better health.<sup>74</sup> A recent study contends that there is a considerable mismatch between the health problems often reported by women and the attitudes and approaches adopted by the health service, whose job it is to help them.<sup>75</sup>

### 17.8.2 EDUCATION

The last decade more than any other has been characterized by reform of the primary and lower secondary school. Children now start school at the age of six, thus extending the length of compulsory schooling from nine to ten years. Many people would in fact say altogether 13 years, since upper secondary education is also in practice almost compulsory. However, the many reforms have given rise to very few conflicts, which indicates that by and large there is broad agreement on school policy. Challenges are perhaps mainly to be found in other areas. For example, the availability of qualified teachers seems to be a problem, a consequence of the fact that the profession has lost status, both economically and socially.

From 1988 to 1990 the total number of students attending Norwegian universities and colleges increased from 109 300 to 132 800, an increase of altogether 22 per cent. The

---

<sup>72</sup>The Norwegian Medical Association recently published a study of the efficiency of hospitals. They found that hospitals would be able to free 1600 medical man-hours by changing the way they operating their activities.

<sup>73</sup>See for example NOU 1999: 15 *Hvor nært skal det være? Tilknytningsformer for offentlige sykehus* (Forms of affiliation for public hospitals).

<sup>74</sup>Neither occupation, education nor income is solely indicative of social status (Source: Ministry of Health and Social Affairs).

<sup>75</sup>NOU 1999: 13 *Kvinnens helse i Norge* (Women's Health in Norway).

biggest increase was at universities. The increase, larger than any experienced in Norway since the 1960s<sup>76</sup>, was due to the large number of 19 and 20 year-olds and to the high level of unemployment among young people. These factors resulted in greater pressure on higher educational institutions. It also became less usual for young people who had attained entrance qualifications for higher education to wait a year or two before beginning to study. Sixty per cent of students at universities and colleges are women. Some people see this as grounds for asking why only 12 per cent of the professors are female.

The enormous demand for education is regarded as an advantage for the country. Concepts such as *knowledge capital* and *human capital* currently enjoy high status, but the long period of education in Norway is also resource-consuming. It has therefore been proposed that the length of studies should be somewhat reduced and brought more into line with international practice.<sup>77</sup>

## 17.9 MEANING

In the scenarios, we are primarily preoccupied with public interventions in civil society, i.e. the public measures and regulations that people at large must comply with in addition to the norms and criteria by which social life is regulated.

Perhaps the most characteristic feature of social life in a democracy is the focus on protection. The first thing that springs to mind here is of course the need for defence against external enemies. In Norway there has been broad agreement on the need for such protection throughout the whole post-war period. Although the Norwegian armed forces have always been small when viewed in relation to the geographical size of the country, they have had a privileged place on the fiscal budget. However, in the year 2000, the need for strong defence forces seems increasingly remote and, as a result of this, defence budgets have been considerably reduced and there has been a growing debate concerning Norway's defence needs. Arguments for a restructuring of compulsory military service are put forward with increasing frequency, not only because of budget reductions, but also because technological developments have resulted in extremely advanced military equipment.

The need for protection is not restricted to that provided by the armed forces. The demand for more police in the streets is symptomatic of an increasing preoccupation with security. Crime statistics have soared during the post-war period. Perhaps the greatest impression in the 1990s has been made by the increasing media coverage of crime involving children and young people, particularly associated with drugs, robbery

---

<sup>76</sup>At the end of the 1990s, over 20 per cent of the population have degrees, whereas only fifteen years earlier, this figure was under 15 per cent. At the same time, there was a sharp increase in the number of people with upper secondary school qualifications, and fewer people with only primary and lower secondary education.

<sup>77</sup>NOU 2000: 14 *Frihet med ansvar. Om høgre utdanning og forskning i Norge* (Freedom with Responsibility - On higher education and research in Norway).

and violence.<sup>78</sup> There has also been an emergence of other new forms of criminal activity during recent decades, and certain population groups are overrepresented in the statistics concerning assumed perpetrators.<sup>79</sup> The police service has been provided with increased resources, and there has been an explosive increase in private security guard services. An increasing number of these tasks, which were previously viewed as belonging to a core area of state responsibility, are today privatized.

The demand for increased secular protection coincides with the steady decrease in the number of people who find corresponding consolation in the Church of Norway.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, in the year 2000, Norway still has a state church, although the debate concerning secession grows in proportion to the internal disputes within the Church. Today it appears that those who support a clear dividing line between church and state are either strong believers and or have no belief at all. Whether and, if so, when secession will take place therefore seems to be dependent on the mood of the more moderate group. For these people, the fear of being marginalized by a conservative free church is perhaps what make them most wary of supporting secession.

At the same time, social developments in recent years entail that expressions such as “popular church” can no longer be regarded as apt. As a result of several years’ influx of immigrants from Muslim countries, Islam is now the most populous religion after Christianity, and this has increased the relevance of the question of how large a proportion of the population must be members of the Christian state church in order to be able to defend a state church system. On the other hand, there are perhaps not so many people who view the Church as consisting of any more than tradition and history, a framework round rituals of major symbolic value, the so-called popular church. The conflicts in connection with annual Christmas concerts shows that many people disapprove of a development whereby the Church is reduced to being one of a number of mediators of culture.

In 1993, Norway was the second country in the world to establish by law the right of homosexuals to enter into registered partnerships. Modern households include a wider range of structures than the now traditional nuclear family. Unmarried cohabitation has increased considerably. Registered homosexual partnership is primarily an Oslo phenomenon. People who wish to live openly as homosexuals seem to prefer to move to the larger towns. In Oslo and the other large towns, there is also an increase in the number of single-person households. Surveys of living conditions also show an

---

78 *Samfunnsspeilet* No. 3, 2000

79 Immigrants from Asia, Africa, Central and South America and Turkey show high figures, resulting in overrepresentation of assumed perpetrators for the whole immigrant population. By comparison, the proportion was lowest for immigrants from North America and Oceania (*Samfunnsspeilet* No. 3, 1999).

80 The decline is shown by the so-called values study made by Statistics Norway, which shows the development of certain values in the Norwegian population from 1982 to 1996.

increasing tendency for people to have a larger number of close friends, which is perhaps not so surprising considering the number of single people. There is also an increase in the number of children who belong to more than one household, both simultaneously and over time.

If we investigate how people use their time, we find a significant number of people who consider that we spend an increasing amount of time shopping. Some go as far as to maintain that the role of customer is gradually taking over our role as citizens. We prefer purchasing to participation. Some feel that this is a question of the time available to us; that we no longer have time to participate. When asked what would improve their lives, two out of three young families answer more time or more free time. There is something paradoxical about shopping culture when people signal that what they really want to do is to realize themselves. We place increasing emphasis on our experience of life, on quality and meaning, but we also answer “better economy” when asked what we need to improve our lives.<sup>81</sup>

## 17.10 THE PUBLIC SECTOR

The rest of this chapter is devoted to the public sector. The state has less legitimacy as a social architect than it did in the 1950s and 1960s, and less people view the state as being representative of the community as a whole. On the other hand, the state as a supplier of welfare services is more often held responsible for its actions and is required to provide alternatives to choose between. In a situation where an increasing number of people have higher education, there are also more people who know how to make demands.

For the public sector, trust is more important than it is for most actors in the market. When buying and selling, either as a private person or as an enterprise, one is in possession of a unique tool specifically designed to reduce risk in trading situations – money. In the public sector, on the other hand, the transaction itself often hinges on trust. It may often be difficult to see what we receive in return when dealing with the public sector – when we pay taxes, elect our political representatives, etc.

The public sector seems to respond to increasing demands from citizens by becoming more like the private sector, and the private sector is where people go when they are dissatisfied with the services offered by the public sector. The word “client”, once considered a polite way of referring to people using the services of public agencies, has now acquired derogatory connotations and most agencies now refer to people as “users”<sup>82</sup>. In some agencies, the term “customer” is now used.

---

81 *Samfunnsspeilet* No. 4, 1999.

82 The most characteristic is the project on public service offices carried out by the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration, involving the availability of public services on the users’ own terms. The same ministry is currently working on what have been referred to as *service declarations* for the public sector, a kind of checklist of services that can be obtained from any specific agency.

Since 1980, there has been a tendency to increase the local freedom of state agencies to arrange matters more efficiently by giving them wider authority in the areas of budgeting and personnel. At the same time, requirements regarding operational planning and increased performance orientation have resulted in more systematic control of professional content as well as new arrangements for performance control.

At the start of the new century, increased control is also a key factor of the national control system. Particular attention has been given to the Storting, which has a special Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, the only committee to be granted a *separate right of initiative*. This means that the committee makes whatever investigations of the public administration it finds necessary. It questions politicians and bureaucrats, and its sessions are televised. Correspondingly the Office of the Auditor General also has a Performance Audit Department, which investigates inefficiency and misuse of public administration resources. However it has been questioned whether this development does not at the same time strengthen the sectorization of the public administration, thereby hindering coordination.

During the period from 1945 to approximately 1980, the public sector was characterized by expansion that was to some extent considerable. The public sector grew both in “breadth”, i.e. through the establishment of an increasing number of specialized bodies, and in “depth”, i.e. through staff increases in individual agencies driven by increasing quality demands and control aspirations. It has later become more difficult to gain support for budget increases for the establishment of new state institutions, and problems can therefore no longer be solved by expansion.

Instead, it has been necessary to restructure and in some cases merge institutions in order to make their activities more targeted, to strengthen specialist institutions and to increase cost-effectiveness. However, the international administrative machinery is currently expanding. This is also true of the Norwegian delegations, the number of which is constantly growing and is likely to continue growing in the years to come.

### **17.10.1 SUPRANATIONAL OVERTONES**

During the period since 1945, Norway has made its presence felt at four international levels: global, Atlantic, European and Nordic. Global cooperation has mainly taken place under the auspices of the United Nations, a quarter of whose financing has for several years been provided by the Nordic countries. Since the end of the cold war, NATO has been further integrated, and now manifests itself as far more than a traditional defence alliance. The EU is in process of establishing a separate cooperation on security and defence policy. Now that both Sweden and Denmark are members of the EU, there is very little left of the concept of a common Nordic bloc. The question of EU membership has been the single most controversial political issue of recent years. In two referendums, slight majorities against Norwegian membership have resulted in our standing today outside the most important decision-making bodies in Europe. However, Norway has attempted to negotiate special arrangements in most international cooperation the country has been involved in. The choice of the EEA model is therefore

perhaps not so surprising.<sup>83</sup> The EEA Consultative Committee of the Norwegian Storting uses an average of three and a half minutes on each EU decision that is implemented in Norwegian law as a result of the EEA Agreement.<sup>84</sup>

In addition to indirect internationalization of the public sector, the last 20 years have been characterized by increased autonomy for public administrative bodies. A large number of agencies have changed their form of affiliation. In the state sector, the conversion of public corporations to state-owned enterprises has affected approximately 65 000 public service employees. In terms of both economic activity and number of employees, state-owned enterprises constitute a considerable and growing share of the state sector. Organizationally, the state is now more differentiated although there has been a certain clarification of forms of affiliation. However, current proposals concerning partial and full privatization of state agencies and enterprises favour continuing this process.

In connection with the dissolution of monopolies and conversion of public corporations to companies that must compete on equal terms with private actors, a need for *re-regulation* has arisen. It is not reasonable to deregulate a sector and then leave it to fend for itself. It must be *re-regulated*, this time showing due regard for the development and maintenance of a functioning competitive market. Perhaps the clearest example of this is the telecommunications sector, where a Post and Telecommunications Authority has been established. Increased autonomy does not imply that there is no longer a need for state control and surveillance of security matters. However, these functions, which were originally part of the activities of the state corporations, must now be organized as separate supervisory bodies, as in the case of the separation of the Norwegian Railway Inspectorate from the Norwegian National Rail Administration. This separation has not as yet resulted in a change of ministerial affiliation, but this issue is being discussed on the basis that different roles (with potential role conflicts) should be associated with different ministries.

The conflicts between the central and local authorities is a conspicuous feature of present-day Norwegian society, but is also a conflict with roots that go back to the days when Norway was ruled by a class of public officials appointed by the King. Municipal economy is dependent on allocations by the state to the municipalities. Very few municipalities make a profit, and those that have succeeded in doing so, among others a number of energy-producing municipalities, have had their funding reduced in an

---

83 See for example Svein S. Andersen (2000).

84 *Aftenposten*, 28 September 2000.

attempt to improve distribution.<sup>85</sup> The dilemma for the central government is not only that money shall be distributed as well as possible. There is also a danger that the central government will find itself responsible for a shortage of facilities in specific sectors, as is currently being experienced in relation to the area of health care.

The municipalities for their part are far from satisfied with the economy. The dilemma arises when they are assigned tasks for which no funding is forthcoming. The changes made in the municipalities' incomes system in 1986, which were intended to increase their independence, have resulted at the national level in an increasing political need to secure national control of sectoral policy. The result has been a growth in earmarked funding. In 1999 almost 39 per cent of government funding was earmarked, compared with approximately 20 per cent in 1990.<sup>86</sup> This development undermines municipal autonomy, and is without doubt also partly responsible for the failing interest for municipal politics shown by people who actually live in the municipalities.<sup>87</sup>

Today the discussion concerning economy between the central government and the municipalities, especially hospital economy, seems to be in a particularly difficult phase. There is now talk of transferring the responsibility for county hospitals to the state, thus increasing the vulnerability of the county authorities. Beyond this, another instrument of the central government is the merging of municipalities. There is widespread agreement in many central government circles that the time is ripe for a change in the way Norway is politically divided, partly in order to adapt to the new communications, but perhaps primarily to save money. Among the municipalities, there is equal if not greater agreement that mergers between municipalities are undesirable.

## 17.11 DIMENSIONING OF THE SCENARIOS

The various positions and perspectives described above can be reduced to a set of parameters or axes. In order to be able to compare the scenarios with each other, we need a set of variables that are applied to each scenario. The difference between the scenarios can then be partly expressed in terms of the variations between the values of these variables from scenario to scenario. At the same time, this provides a point of departure for the scenarios. The parameters contribute to the structuring of the scenarios, so that we can "benchmark" and compare the scenarios with each other. The parameters are:

---

<sup>85</sup> Municipal boundaries have remained almost as defined in the 1960s, when an extensive reorganization reduced the number of municipalities from approx. 750 to approx. 450. On the other hand, there was continuous a increase in the number of municipal employees throughout the 1980s and 1990s, even though the growth rate was somewhat lower. In 1962 there were approx. 100 000 man-years, in 1978 223 400 man-years, in 1988 321 000 man-years and in 1998 410 000 man-years in the municipal sector.

<sup>86</sup> *Sosialøkonomen* No. 4/2000.

<sup>87</sup> See Harald Baldersheim in Tore Grønlie, and Per Selle (ed.) (1998)

*State – market*

*International – national*

*Collectivism – individualism*

*TRADITIONAL – INNOVATIVE*

### **17.11.1 STATE – MARKET**

If we examine the views of the welfare state that characterize current public debate, two main ideal types emerge. There are on the one hand those who hold that the public sector should meet challenges in the traditional manner, i.e. large public sector, extensive public ownership and widespread public services. On the other hand there are those who feel that the public sector should be smaller, almost as small as possible, and that privatization and competitive tendering are important instruments. These opposite ideal types exist on an axis between “large public sector” and “as small a public sector as possible”.

### **17.11.2 INTERNATIONAL – NATIONAL**

The national versus the European and/or global is a central issue of current society. Two referendums concerning membership of a political European community have both resulted in a majority in favour of remaining outside. The debate concerning Europe and the form and extent of the affiliation is very heated in Norway, and its outcome will be of major importance for the Norwegian society of the future. Norwegian economy is open and small, and has close ties with world trade. It may therefore seem paradoxical that the country does not join a major trade regime that would secure improved access to markets. There are many reasons for this but, on both occasions, considerable weight was given to arguments concerning the citizens’ right to dispose of the country’s resources. This is an argument that concerns both the scope of the democracy and the status of property rights. Norwegian regional policy has also been associated with instruments that conflict with the ideals of liberalized world trade.

Norway is extremely dependent on the global economy, and globalization makes this dependence even more apparent. The term *globalization* itself is used in a number of contexts as a collective term for all of the forces that make the world smaller, from the Internet to giant multinational companies. Current debate lies on a scale between euphoric idealization of globalization processes and the worst imaginable doomsday visions. Some of the horror scenarios on globalization have been called globalization traps, such as Martin and Schuman (1998), “Juggernaut” or Giddens (1991 and 1994), “The Beast”, and the conception of indefinable primitive creatures that might attempt to devastate our world. Others, such as Manuel Castells<sup>88</sup>, place more emphasis on the positive aspects and potential of civilization.

---

<sup>88</sup>For a Norwegian introduction to Castells’ three-volume work, see Thomas H. Eriksen: “*Nettverksmakt: Manuel Castells*” in Neuman I. (ed.) (2000).



The following scenarios address the whole potential framework of globalization. We have attempted to strike a balance by emphasizing the positive parameters of this development while also focusing on the potential crises and catastrophes that follow in the wake of globalization.

### **17.11.3 COLLECTIVISM – INDIVIDUALISM**

The relationship between the social community and individual needs and rights also constitutes an interesting conflict dimension of the Norwegian and international communities today. In this context we cannot ignore the terms “Norwegian model” and “solidarity alternative”.

The term “Norwegian model” refers, like the term “Scandinavian model” to a highly developed welfare state where the state has a major responsibility for the economic and social security of the citizens. Most western European nations are welfare states in one sense or another. However, the state does not always play so large a role. In the Norwegian/Scandinavian model the role of the state is more pronounced than it is in many other welfare states. The Norwegian/Scandinavian model also has a distinct character. It is characterized by the fact that many of the rights enjoyed by citizens are universal. They apply to everyone, and are not subject to means tests or regulated in other ways. An example of such a right is the right to child benefit. In working life the Norwegian/Scandinavian model is characterized by traditions for local contractual schemes laid down in framework legislation and framework agreements and by traditions for codetermination with a local and national democratic perspective. The class compromise between employers and employees that took place in Norway in 1935 is the most well-known example of this.

The term “Nordic/Scandinavian model” can nevertheless be said to conceal as much as it reveals. There are considerable internal differences in the countries in the organization of welfare and in the scope of available facilities. The term itself originates in the fact the three Scandinavian countries historically have many features in common. Sweden, Denmark and Norway all had social democratic governments between the wars, and were able to decide the forms that social changes would take. In all three countries, extensive class compromises were implemented, resulting in a stable political culture and relatively harmonic development in social and cultural areas.

The solidarity alternative gives rise to corresponding problems in relation to collectivism and individualism. These concepts lead to a number of other fundamental observations. They are often viewed as opposites in an either/or relation. Some people maintain that too strong individualism breaks down collective arrangements and promotes egotism in society. However it is also possible to view the concepts in a both/and relation, where greater individual freedom, scope and statements of need simultaneously give rise to new and different types of community, communities that may comprise everything from new consumer groups to major socio-political movements. In Norway in the year 2000 such an either/or attitude to this question prevails, while in the scenarios we point towards a change of perspective in the direction of a both/and between social solidarity/collectivism and individualization.

#### 17.11.4 TRADITIONAL – INNOVATIVE

In current social debate we often encounter the terms *traditional* and *innovative*. The business community has been particularly active in criticising the lack of change competence (not least within the public sector, but also in business and industry), the low level of risk management preparedness and the poor conditions for establishment of new activities. Moreover, Norway has a tradition for playing it safe, where entrepreneurship is conspicuous by its absence. Although most people claim to have a progressive approach to change (including those who are mainly interested in preserving things as they are), there are currently a number of perspectives both on the necessity of a greater innovation orientation and, not least, on the policies that shall be applied to this area in the future. This line of conflict attempts to determine whether society is changing in a more innovative direction or whether tradition, status quo and resistance to change will prevail.

All who reflect actively over the role of the civil service believe that it can be made more efficient. Its resources can be better utilized. However, this does not mean that the civil service needs to be reduced in size. More liberally oriented people see a smaller civil service as an end in itself, but little emphasis is placed on this point of view in the Norwegian political debate. Efficiency, on the other hand, is a catchword, and all Norwegian governments during the last 20 years have stated that they aim to make the civil service more efficient.


Another and more recent catchword is *proactivity*. This involves the actor – in this case the civil service – in playing an active role in determining the conditions for the activities of itself and others by being at the forefront of structural and cyclical changes in society. The concept of a proactive civil service is intended to transcend the traditional conceptual framework for understanding the tasks of the civil service, although it should be pointed out that all forms of counter-cyclical policy, for example Keynesianism, are in principle proactive. A proactive civil service may be both smaller and greater than that of today. It is not characterized by size, but by aiming to be a knowledgeable actor with an active agenda for development of welfare, industry and knowledge. We might postulate that efficiency is one type of reform thinking and that proactivity is another.

When Norway experienced a major increase in unemployment at the beginning of the 1990s, the college and university sector was substantially expanded, and student numbers increased correspondingly. This policy was criticized by those who asserted that this was merely a means of concealing unemployment. We shall not speculate here as to whether there lay other motives behind this expansion, but the authorities at the time were fully aware that what they were doing was investing in future competence. Now, at the end of the 20th century, there is broad agreement that this was a sound strategy. There has proved to be a positive correlation between education and the ability to find employment, and even apparently irrelevant and peripheral education has proved useful for those who took it, and thus for the country as a whole. Although there are different ways of perceiving this, there are those who, with hindsight, have been tempted to use the term “proactive” for what they consider to have been a far-sighted and sound policy that the authorities adopted for the education sector at the beginning of the 1990s.

In the continuing debate on reforms within the public sector, we can now glimpse the contours of a dialogue where more nuances can be imparted to the conventional view that a slimmer civil service is not necessarily a more efficient civil service.

## 17.12 THE SCENARIO SPIDER

The scenarios will also be presented with the help of the so-called spider model. The scenarios vary in relation to the values of these parameters. In this way we can “benchmark” the scenarios in relation to each other. In this example, both “individualism” and “collectivism” have been given a high “score”, while market orientation is low and international involvement relatively high. Each of the following scenarios will be presented in this way.



**NORWAY•2030**

**18 Futures**

# Norvegia

## 19 CHAPTER 3

# 20 Norvegia – NORWAY●2030

*The Norway of today is a powerful nation-state. The Protestant work ethic and the social democratic welfare state form the basis of a new national project for moulding and cultivating good citizens. The national orientation has been maintained by means of a strong external peace-keeping image and an equally strong internal security image orientation.*


Norway currently enjoys considerable international recognition as “The Land of Peace”. The Norwegian authorities have adopted ideas from New York’s “zero tolerance” policy from the end of the 1990s involving punishment for the slightest misdemeanour or breach of good manners.

Proper upbringing to ensure the well-mannered social conduct of Norwegian citizens is regarded as a major public responsibility. An active integration and nation-building policy is pursued in relation to immigrants. The keenest supporters of Norvegia are women, and it is they who dominate political and social life.

The winds of nationalism blow keenly in European politics, and the EU has now been reduced to a loose trade agreement with very few supranational institutions. What remains is a number of powerful, consolidated nation-states that experience a chaotic surrounding world as a threat. Norway has continued to remain outside the European Union, and is now stronger than ever compared with other countries that have had to adjust their systems and institutions to new framework conditions. Norwegian business and industry has more legs to stand on, an active onshore industrial and service sector, a larger gas sector and an international involvement associated with Norwegian foreign policy.

The nation-state is able to control the development of the most important sectors of society by using legislation to assume an active regulatory role. The general retiring age is now 80. Decision-making authority lies with the national government, but the hundred or so municipalities have an important implementation function. This is a small nation whose powerful public sector gives it a vigorous and dynamic image envied by many other nations, who would gladly emulate it. Considerable efforts are invested in enhancing national honour and pride through clean streets, respectable welfare arrangements, etc. Terms such as “national sovereignty”, “self-sufficiency”, “national community” and “strengthening of the national competitive advantage” are recurrent themes of the Prime Minister’s speech to the nation on New Year’s Eve. The legacy from Gro Harlem Brundtland is prominent, and “it is typically Norwegian to be good” is the official motto.

## Norvegia



## 20.1 MAIN IDEAS AND ASSUMPTIONS

*The coming of the crisis.* In 2009, the fall of the oil price to less than five dollars a barrel was a major blow to the Norwegian economy. Most fields on the continental shelf were closed down, and gas supplies also became worthless since oil and gas prices are closely related. This loss of income very quickly resulted in extremely poor funding of the public sector with subsequent tough rationalization measures. Industrial policy was revised and state involvement was increased. The principle of industry neutrality was abandoned in favour of enthusiastic investment in selected sectors. This investment proved successful, and Norway experienced keen economic growth from about 2015 onwards. Traditional industries were renewed and new ones emerged. In the efforts to build Norway's image, its status as the Land of Peace has had a major effect, and the combination of patriotic politics and involvement in world peace has paid dividends. With the help of Nordem (Norwegian Resource Base for Democracy) and Noreps (Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System) Norway has become a major humanitarian power. Nordem now plays a major role in waving Norway's banner, and has taken over many of the roles that were previously the province of NORAD, while at the same time diverting the focus from development cooperation in the traditional sense to institution building with a focus on peacework and confidence-building. NORAD has been closed down, and the funds that previously went to this bilaterally oriented development aid organization have mainly been re-channelled to Nordem.

*"New" nature.* The large growth in population is mainly centralized in the larger towns in various parts of the country, and this urbanization corresponds with an active environmental and nature conservation policy, where nature restoration is carried out on a large scale, and increasing areas of the country have been designated as conservation areas. The transport sector is dominated by new and rapid express train services between the largest towns, and air traffic in southern Norway has been considerably reduced.

*Smaller differences and more community.* Individualization, as we witnessed it during the years between 1990 and 2010 has been superseded by a new phase, and a new national community has been created in Norway. Individual citizens still have many rights, but the overall national framework has been expanded and has gained increasingly greater impact. Working life is marked by what at the end of the last century was known as “the new economy”, characterized by frequent career changes and an unstable labour market. There are smaller differences between managers and workers and between different occupational groups. However, there are greater differences between the standard of living in some urban areas and the poorer rural areas.

*Urban culture.* Although more people now live in towns, this has not rendered it completely pointless to live in rural districts. In spite of certain practical problems, the strong national orientation contributes to the feeling of the inhabitants of rural areas that they are doing the nation a service by maintaining settlements outside towns and densely populated areas. The supply of services and entertainment is greater than ever before, and is available almost everywhere, including outlying regions. In certain areas, such as language, society is characterized by greater tolerance for foreign cultures. On the other hand, some people maintain that the state and the nation give a generally intolerant impression in their keen focus on their own qualities. However, most people would disagree with such a diagnosis.



## 20.2 AN AGGRESSIVE CHILD

Karen is worried. The supervisor of the day care centre has asked her to call in for a chat. Benjamin is showing aggressive tendencies. His moods are rather unstable and yesterday things just went too far. He physically attacked one of the other children. Fighting is discouraged here, as in all other places, and Karen is both ashamed and deeply worried about what has happened. Day care for infants became compulsory in the same way as school fifteen years ago, and parents were at the same time made legally responsible for all children under 16 years of age. This could therefore develop into quite an awkward problem. If there is one thing that worries Karen, it is how things will go with Benjamin. An aggressive child can easily become a loser at school, and pupils who have difficulties at school can expect tough special teaching and separate pedagogical provisions. The success rate is extremely high, but that is not reassuring enough for Karen. She wants her child to be 100 per cent normal.

Karen is an operating theatre nurse. Her place is beside the operating table. She very rarely sees patients die these days. The number of road accidents has been reduced to almost zero and children are hardly ever involved in accidents in the home. Traditional violence is more or less a thing of the past. The enormous pressure on measures to prevent violence and accidents is giving results, although old people still sometimes come in with hip fractures. People die, but not in fights or collisions. Injury prevention has been around for a long time but, during the last 20 years, a real headway has been made. The concept of “injury” has been greatly extended, and there is no general acceptance of violent behaviour.

Today she is working at the accident and emergency unit. Nothing much is happening. She has pulled some bolts out of an ankle and sewn together a cut for a boy who fell off his bike. However, one of the patients is in a worse state. It is a young boy. He has broken three ribs and one of his arms. He also has bruises all over his body. The boy has been beaten up, but it has happened voluntarily. He is a member of the Oslo Cagefighting Club, one of the many athletics clubs that offers violent sports – under supervision, of course. Cagefighting, shootfighting and various other violent activities have become very popular, although most people think the whole thing is absurd. However, some people seem to need violence, though Karen cannot understand why.

Karen has mixed feelings about her job. She has a decent wage, but the work is very tiring. Moreover, working in the health sector, one is constantly reminded that old people are a drain on the budget. However, thanks to luck in love, she travels a lot, for her husband Tom is among the thousands of Norwegian men and women who earn their living serving the cause of peace. Tom works at Mashwingo in Matabele. They met seven years ago when she was working days and nights patching up war victims. She was there to help the combatants to find systems whereby they could live together. But then she was ordered to return for a new tour of duty, so she had to leave him there. She is proud of him, and misses the life out there. She hopes her next posting will be abroad, together with Tom. Life is freer abroad than it is at home. It doesn't feel so unreasonable and wrong to smoke a cigarette or drink one too many gin and tonics. Although Norway has become very preoccupied with health and model behaviour in this area too, it is not like that in the rest of the world.

It has been written into the Constitution that Norway shall be actively involved in democracy and human rights. The most momentous event in Karen's life was, when she was 15, when her class spent a whole year working on an assignment in Uganda. In the sixth form, she more or less commuted between Oslo and Armenia. Since then this kind of travel has become a natural part of her life, and she is not alone. At any one time, about 40 000 Norwegian citizens serve in development aid and peacework. The Norwegian school system has been reformed in relation to the international involvement that now characterizes society. All pupils spend at least six months abroad in areas designated by the Ministry of Peace and Foreign Affairs as relevant for school projects. Classes are put together from every single school that has service overseas. That's how it should be, says her father. He is getting on in years, but is still active in the Norway-Serbia Friendship Association. It had once been known as the Norway-Yugoslavia Friendship Association and at the beginning of the 1950s, in the flower of his youth, he and his first wife took part in the labour brigades that were involved in laying railway sleepers. In the 1980s he was in Nicaragua picking coffee for the Sandinistas. After he retired in 2000, he went straight to Nis and worked on the reconstruction of the town. He is one of those who has a bust of Jan Egeland on his mantelpiece, and still dodders about in Dubrovnik during the summer. He never gave up, but curses the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general. He still visits there when he can.

She has her bicycle standing outside the day care centre. It is not locked. Times have changed. The streets are once more safe and secure. Indeed, society is perhaps more secure than it has ever been, and there is hardly a society that can compare with Norway. She cycles to work through tranquil streets with broad cycle tracks. She spends her weekends walking or skiing in the woods north of Oslo, but they are not as they were when she was a girl. If you are unlucky, you can even lose your life, as happened to the head teacher of Tåsen School when she came between a female bear and her two cubs at Åklungen. They put up a statue of her in the schoolyard, but predators are still protected.

Karen is one of the few people she knows of who doesn't have a single adopted child. Among the "Nordemmers"<sup>89</sup> it is quite usual to have one or two, but she feels that her hands are full enough as it is. Adoption has been greatly simplified, and it has become a considerable source of income for the Red Cross and Norwegian Church Aid. The follow-up provided by the organizations is also very good, so one is guaranteed help with the special problems of some adopted children. At least there is no chance of them becoming criminals. New technology has enabled electronic surveillance of previously

---

89 Nordem was set up in 1993. During the first ten years, it was a resource bank, the purpose of which was to supply competent persons at short notice to fulfil Nordem's goal: "in an effective manner make qualified Norwegian personnel available for international assignments which promote democracy and respect for human rights." Initially, the organization was attached to the Norwegian Institute for Human Rights but, as it extended its activities, it became a large and independent organization. This spring, its database listed 100 000 persons, and each year over 23 000 persons work on assignments abroad. A total of 8 200 man-years was carried out in 2029.

lucrative activities such as liquor smuggling, counterfeiting, people smuggling and prostitution.

Tomorrow it is Saturday, and Karen is having dinner with her mother at the Nordberg Senior Citizens' Centre, a perfectly ordinary old people's home, where the average age of the residents is 94. The home, which is managed for the state by Norwegian People's Aid, is largely run by the residents themselves. Of course the productivity of a retired 83 year-old doctor is less than that of a young person of 40, but *elderly-help-elderly* functions excellently, both giving more meaningful lives to elderly people and holding costs down. Later on, her mother will look after the children while Karen pays a visit to the National Opera to see a show about St. Olav, the patron saint of Norway. The new opera house had been planned for many years, but had been shelved time and time again. The building was finally put up as part of the new national focus on culture.

No-one talks about gender equality any more, but children learn at school about the major changes at the end of the last century, when men still played an important role in politics. The fact that women demand rather more of society's common resources owing to their role in reproduction is in a sense compensated for by the gradual joint awareness that men need more follow-up, help and control so as not to fall outside society. The Prime Minister actually mentioned this in her New Year speech, and Karen has often thought that she would have less to worry about if the twins had been girls.

## **20.3 NORVEGIA COMES TO THE FORE**

At the start of the new century, the Norwegian economy went like greased lightning, greased as it indeed was with North Sea oil and gas. The surplus revenues from petroleum activities were placed in a separate petroleum fund. There was also keen growth in productivity in onshore industries. Export volumes were considerable in traditional industries, and fishing and mariculture experienced very vigorous growth. The new industries too, as part of high-technology industry, were showing their paces. The Norwegian petroleum sector accounted for approximately one-third of the total value of Norwegian exports (National Budget for 2001).

### **20.3.1 THE CRISIS COMES**

The population reached 4.5 million just after the turn of the century, and it was assumed at the time that it would continue to grow. Today, we can see that this was correct, but the forecasts were somewhat conservative relative to the rise in immigration that we have experienced throughout the period since then. Since 2004–2005 there has been an annual net immigration of over 15 000 people. The fertility rate has varied, but has also been higher than it was during the period from 1970 to 2000. In the year 2000, public finances were extremely buoyant. The growth of the public sector had always been kept lower than that of the private sector, but there were resources to implement a broad range of reforms within the education and health sectors. Particularly within the health and care field, expenditure began to increase substantially long before the turn of the millennium. Continual improvements in medical technology coupled with higher prices increased the costs that would anyway have risen a great deal because of the increase in the number of elderly people. The aim of the reforms was to increase both capacity and quality.

Then suddenly the very foundations of the country were shaken. Once more, there was a dramatic loss of income. However, unlike the fall in petroleum prices in 1986, the crisis in 2009 proved to be structural rather than cyclical. It was no less than a complete breakdown. The health service was at the end of its tether and government income sank dramatically. From representing one-third of export income, the petroleum sector's contribution fell drastically and was approaching zero.

Most people were taken aback that this loss of revenues came so early. In the mound of official reports produced between 1985 and 2009 it was normally assumed that petroleum income would not begin to fall until about 2020. This was explained by the emptying of the reservoirs on the continental shelf (which motivated the high rate of production) and the emergence of new energy technology in connection with the climate regime, which would reduce the oil price. Moreover, a number of experts had pointed out that liberalization of energy markets in the European community would result in increased competition and hence lower prices.

In fact, the income from the petroleum sector fell much more rapidly than had previously been assumed in economic forecasts and projections. As early as 2009, the petroleum market collapsed. The largest Arab petroleum-exporting countries realized that an energy revolution was on the way and decided to pump out as much as possible and sell it at the lowest possible price in the hope of delaying and sabotaging this revolution. When the price of oil fell to under five dollars a barrel, Norway's petroleum income stopped up altogether. A number of fields could not be operated at all at such low prices.

The low price of oil resulted in a dramatic fall in the price of gas as well, since the pricing of these two energy carriers is closely associated. The assumption that there would still be considerable state income from gas when petroleum reserves were used up prevailed as part of the official view right up to the crisis. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy estimated in the year 2000 that the income from petroleum and gas would be at approximately half of the 2000 level in 2030, and that it would begin to fall from about 2010. It was thought that gas would gradually take over from petroleum as the main export product from this year.

Many attempts were made to solve the crisis. It was decided to increase the country's productivity by implementing a number of emergency measures. The working week was increased to 40 hours and the retiring age was raised to 70 (in 2024 it was raised to 80), which might seem strange in view of the fact that employment levels sank at the same time. The reason was that the country was experiencing for the first time the mechanisms of the reform of continuing education: mechanisms which in the short term would prove to prevent increased access to the resources of the labour market, and thereby preventing wage reduction. In order to increase productivity, other instruments had to be used, such as extended working life.

The crisis challenged many familiar conceptions of Norway. Both the level of affluence and its basis were viewed with fresh eyes, leading to consequences such as the acceptance of lower standards in parts of the health sector. The old slogan "separate rooms for all" was no longer left unchallenged. The health sector gave up idealizing

private life and no attempts were made in later reforms to combine patriotism with rationalization.

## **20.4 ALL FOR NORWAY**

Not least, industrial development models were radically altered. In practice, the official Norway abandoned the principle of industry neutrality in the aftermath of the crisis. This principle, which the former Ministry of Finance had fought for since the 1980s in spite of the fact that it was not consistently adhered to, had placed a number of strict limitations on the activities of the public authorities. A new and extremely active industrial policy was initiated under the motto “proactivity”. Proactivity meant, from its introduction as a catchword in the 2010s, that the Government actively went in and supported certain sectors to the detriment of others. An international statutory framework set up clear limits for the type and scope of such support arrangements, but a creative civil service showed the will to push through many support programmes. “Our launching this year of the world’s largest biomaritime industrial estate at Sortland is an example of our proactivity. We have contributed over 4 billion nice clean kroner of the taxpayers’ money, and have succeeded in encouraging business and industry to join us in a large-scale cooperative venture, where they also contribute a corresponding sum,” says the Prime Minister.

In the 2010s, large state-owned enterprises were started within various sectors, such as aquaculture, other types of food production, tourism, nanotechnology and biotechnology. The purpose of these enterprises was to develop sound and internationally competitive industries based on what were viewed by the granting authorities as industries where the conditions for being among the best in the world were particularly favourable. Proactivity in the industrial establishment itself was reciprocated by generous increases in government research grants. In 2012 only Sweden had a larger public research budget than Norway, when R&D funds exceeded 7 per cent of GDP. This amounted to a considerable increase since the start of the century, when it was less than 2 per cent. This stimulated considerably greater interest in research by Norwegian business and industry, which had traditionally shown little enthusiasm.

The scheme has been a great success. The original goal of developing winners out of industries with certain absolute advantages had mainly been achieved. In the course of the 2020s the crisis was clearly seen to be over. New industries grew up. There was sound growth of GDP and other relevant measures. The Government’s active policy was maintained despite the fact that things were now going well.

Now, in 2030, exports of saltwater-farmed fish constitute over 35 per cent of export income and, contributing to a total of over 45 per cent for the fishery industry as a whole. The tourist trade is also very profitable for a country with an image of unpolluted countryside – the land of the great outdoors. There are therefore strict regulations governing road travel, industry, road construction and other disturbances of nature. Restoration of the countryside has proved a great success, not least economically. Visitors to Norway stay for long periods and spend a lot of money while they are here. Other industries have also shown good progress. Norway has gained a place on the map within the development of certain areas of nanoresearch, particularly

sensor and actuator technology, and the industry that follows in its wake. The industry has growing export revenues and contributes to increased value creation in many of the more traditional sectors.

Business and industry play an active role in global fora, stretching the limits of regulation by nation-states. We see the beginnings of another free-trade area, which, as well as maintaining the traditions of the European Common Market, also enters into agreements with other transnational regions throughout the world, particularly North America and Asia. The interests of Norwegian industrial policy and Norwegian nation-building coincide here. The new general foreign policy orientation provides something for both of them.

In 2010, all the warning lights for Norwegian economic development glowed red. The fall in petroleum income came earlier than expected. With crude oil priced at five dollars a barrel, the profitability of the oil fields in the North Sea was extremely low and the demand for traditional export goods, such as metals, timber, ships and ships' equipment had long since dwindled. However, software was selling well, and the growing production of manufactured goods, where design was the main competitive advantage – not least the furniture industry of western Norway, experienced growth, as did aquaculture. But, generally speaking, business and industry did not have much vitality to speak of. In a cut-throat international market, Norwegian industry often experienced that it had little ability or potential for marketing its products. Therefore, in 2010, the Norwegian Trade Council led by Vegard Ulvang, the skiing champion of bygone days, adopted a strategy that later proved extremely successful. Norway was marketed as the Land of Peace, a pure nation in a pure country. It was not so strange perhaps that the attempt to market oneself with the trappings of the Vikings, the midnight sun and skiing skills had proved utterly ineffective, indeed self-destructive.

Such an aura of peace and tolerance, a well informed population, advanced technology and financially sound nationally based industries are today Norway's most important competition factors in relation to foreign competitors. An extensive and committed focus on school and education during the last twenty years, expressed by the slogan "lifelong learning", has paid off. Increasing public ownership is explained by the need for national ownership and national control of resources. There have long been attempts to use other control instruments than ownership, e.g. concessions, regulations, purchase of services, etc. But external threats, such as continual courting of Norwegian industry by the multinationals, cause the authorities to make conscious use of increased public ownership as a control instrument.

The new Norwegian identity – the Land of Peace – has proved a great success and, from 2010 and in the following difficult years, this formula functioned very well indeed. During the course of the years, "Made in Norway" has become an exceptionally valuable label to have attached to one's products. Part of the reason is of course that the products are good, but the symbolic value associated with peacework must not be underestimated.

## 20.5 BACK TO NATURE

Besides the role played by “peace” as an export article, a major role as Norway’s trade mark is now also played by “nature”. Internationally, Norway is now in an exceptional situation. The Norwegian countryside is in a better state than ever, less polluted and exposed than at any time since the middle of the previous century. There are a number of reasons for this. One is that airborne pollution is down to a minimal level, barely measurable. Another and more specific reason is that provisions concerning nature conservation and environmental protection have now been written into the Norwegian Constitution and are strictly enforced. Several new national parks and landscape protection areas have been established during the last 30 years, and the countryside has been extensively restored. The experience of the municipality of Lørenskog is illustrative of the changes that have taken place in many other places. Lørenskog was once a growth municipality, happily situated between Oslo and the main airport at Gardermoen. During the first decade of the century the municipality grew rapidly, soon doubling its population to 60 000 people. The new settlements consisted primarily of housing estates that ate their way into what was previously cultural landscape and more or less unspoiled nature. After nature restoration was placed on the agenda, several of the housing estates were demolished. Today the old cultural landscape has been restored, and the countryside has begun to reassert itself in the remaining housing estates. Settlement in the new and much enlarged municipality is now more concentrated around the centre of Lillestrøm, which has become a town in every sense of the word.

Such a radical approach cannot be adopted without broad popular support, and this is more than adequately forthcoming. Even the inhabitants of the housing estates appreciate the urbanization, and appreciate not least the improvements in the natural surroundings. There is a great demand for structures involving advanced landscape planning integrating cultural landscape and outdoor recreation, farms with a good supply of both food and courses and abundant wild nature with bears and wolves and good fishing. In short, people’s lives are more urbanized, while the countryside is wilder than it used to be.

This policy, though not always as radical as in Lørenskog, has made travelling in Norway a wild and beautiful experience that few other places in the world can compete with. However, not everywhere is equally accessible – at least not by car. The number of kilometres of road is now back at the level where it was in 1970. This is because many roads have become overgrown as a result of the increase in areas designated as national parks and landscape protection areas. Transport has always been complex and costly in Norway but during the last ten years a number of extensive infrastructural measures have been implemented that have made enormous improvements in communications between the largest towns. An important part in this has been played by the railways. Public-spirited private actors in close cooperation with the authorities have constructed new and partly new railway lines between Oslo and Kristiansand (the Coastal Route), between Oslo and Bergen (the Haukeli Express, and between Oslo and Trondheim. These straight and rapid railways are served by high-speed trains that have ousted all airline services competing for the same routes. The socioeconomic effect of these railways has been considerable. Particularly the Coastal Route has worked miracles for the economic dynamism of the southern coastal region. The train from Kristiansand to Oslo now takes just over an hour. The railways also help in maintaining

the traditional centralized structure of the country. All tracks lead to Oslo. Moreover, as opposed to highway construction, high-speed railways actually increase the rate of urbanization at all the places where the train stops en route. Transport policy is therefore extremely well integrated with the concept of a more nature-oriented policy.

## **20.6 HEALTH AND CARE**

It lies perhaps in the nature of things that health and care services will always be a problem sector. However, a considerable willingness to pay for such services is shown both by members of the public and by the authorities. Consequently, this sector receives considerable resources, and the political focus on it is correspondingly keen. In 2010, when people became aware of the crisis that the country was in, the Government was provided with the necessary prior conditions for raising patients' fees for medical services, for privatizing a number of minor services and for introducing competitive tendering for a number of public services.

These measures helped to reduce the costs associated with the health service, but this also opened the way for more privatization, since services now became far dearer, and the ideological opposition gradually weakened. As public grants were reduced, the quality of the public health service continued to decline and the population became increasingly dissatisfied.

The pressure on the system was so great that, when extensive privatization of the primary health service was proposed in 2014, there was soon a political majority in favour of such a decision. Means-tested subsidies were introduced for the chronically ill and for those with special medical needs.

The crisis in this sector was a major cause of the municipal reorganization. Hospital services, which involve more complex and demanding medical treatment, are still a public responsibility, and there is broad political support for maintaining this approach. However, this has demanded a radical restructuring of the public sector. In 2012 a separate hospital directorate was established, and all hospitals were placed under this body. They are kept under strict control and provide services on equal terms for the whole population.

Hospitals became both extremely effective and also extremely specialized. Although the population will never be completely satisfied with the quality of the Norwegian health service, it is now among the best in the world, and most people experience that they receive courteous and satisfactory treatment. However, much modern medical technology is so expensive that it is not used for people over retiring age, and in this group there are big differences between the health of the haves and the have-nots. Longevity is now closely correlated with income level. The number of Norwegian citizens who purchase medical services in other countries has in periods been high, but has fallen in recent years. This has been brought about by the renationalization of Europe. Arranging for the payment of National Insurance benefits abroad is now complex to put it mildly.

There has been a great increase in the demand for health and care services since 2000, but the biggest challenges are still in the years ahead, when the number of people over



90 and 100 will reach new heights. In preparing to meet this development, major changes have been made in the social security system.

### **20.6.1 MEDICAL BONUS**

An important element in this respect is the *Pensions and Medical Bonus Reform*. This scheme involves the collection of pension and medical bonus points by all citizens throughout their lives. The points awarded vary according to the individual's input during his or her years of employment. These points can be paid out directly in the form of money or they can be used to purchase different types of medical treatment that are not strictly life-saving. Saving of lives is a purely public responsibility (cf. the state undertaking First Aid). Most people use most of their bonus points to purchase different forms of genetic therapy, joint surgery, home help and plastic surgery. However, the number of points that can be earned is far from enough to cover the needs of large population groups, and it is therefore usual to supplement the bonus points with private means for purchasing medical services. Some people have used points on a number of expensive operations as a result of which they have ended up in the situation that they live much longer than they have points for. Some initially extremely wealthy pensioners must therefore live on charity during the last years of their lives. But these are the exceptions. Most people manage to estimate their consumption reasonably well, and leave accounts with a balance of approximately zero when they die.

In the new century the growth of employment levels in the health and social services sector continued, but it did not increase more than the population, and the number of man-hours per employee increased owing to the new pension regulations. In 2030, 360 000 man-hours were worked in this sector, approximately 30 per cent more than at the turn of the century.

### **20.6.2 URBANIZATION OF RURAL AREAS**

The success of the central government in putting the health sector on its feet again has resulted in renewed confidence in the central government as a solver of conflicts and problems. Owing to the boom in fish farming, employment levels in rural areas have strengthened, but this has led to increased urbanization in these areas. Sizeable urban centres have been developed along the coast. This is a deliberate development. The growth in population has thus not only resulted in an increased density of population in the area around the Oslo Fjord. There are today a number of fairly large cities that 30 years ago were only cities by virtue of the city status that they had conferred upon themselves. Places such as Bø in Telemark, Levanger, Lillestrøm and Ulsteinvik are examples of vigorous small towns that are continually expanding. Towns such as Harstad, Molde, Mosjøen and Fredrikstad have doubled their populations and have assumed a decidedly urban character. This development has not least been the result of economic policy, which has enjoyed the support of a considerable consensus. The economic security gained by citizens and the economic growth exhibited by the country demonstrate for most people that this is successful.

### **20.6.3 JOBS**

Old people are not exactly treated badly, but they are certainly subjected to new demands. The retiring age is currently 80 years, but people are encouraged to continue working as long as they have good health. Restrictions on the use of private means have

been introduced and expensive private treatment in other countries is heavily taxed. There is a restrictive policy on sending old people in need of nursing to nursing homes in warmer countries, even where this is seen to be cheaper for the state than further expansion of nursing homes in Norway. This is officially explained as being due to the lack of quality control, etc. but the real reason is the fear that widows and widowers will revive enough to squander their savings far away from the control of the Norwegian authorities, for example by marrying foreigners.

Close cooperation has developed between the school and the Third Sector and between school and industry. This is reflected in the greater use by the school of the competence of the Third Sector and of industry. The Third Sector has taken over increasing social responsibility, both in the care sector and in employing all those not included the conventional labour market. An increasingly closer bond has also been established between the state and the Third Sector. This has occurred regardless of government. The Third Sector's growing role in society is visible in all areas, but the greatest growth can be seen in the area of working life.

## **20.7 THE REVIVAL OF THE COMPREHENSIVE SCHOOL**

Norway has an extensive university and college system. There are six universities and 18 colleges. Norway's Biomaritime University in Bodø is one of the world's leading institutions in its field. The increased number of universities has come about as a result of pressure from the various educational institutions. After a period at the start of the century when universities were allowed to charge tuition fees and pursue a more market-oriented policy, a new system has recently been introduced whereby all higher education is once again free of charge, and this has also been established by statute and written into the Constitution. Higher education has thus been given the status of a benefit to be taken for granted by everyone.

The large Directorate of Learning has responsibility for all education in Norway. The comprehensive school forms the cornerstone of a high quality school system, where all pupils are guaranteed almost exactly equivalent educational provisions. The whole system is state-run, but within a fairly flexible framework. The Directorate of Learning is concerned with parameters such as educational content, buildings, equipment and recreational areas. Higher pay for teachers and increased status for the teaching profession are important components of the new strategy for schools. "Reward the educators" is the title of a major campaign by the Norwegian Union of Teachers to justify the enormous salaries now paid to teachers, who are now more highly paid than doctors, engineers or any other group in the public sector.

The role of the state as a producer of ideology is very clear in the school, and the national ideology, which emphasizes patriotism, national moulding and cultivation of good citizens is coupled with an international involvement in peace and democracy that pervades the national curriculum.

The reason for focusing on such a strictly regulated school system can be found in recent history. The comprehensive school more or less collapsed around 2010. The transfer of funds to the local authorities was drastically reduced with particularly tough consequences for the primary and lower secondary school. A number of private options

appeared, and the disparities that resulted from this development gave rise to angry protests from the general public. The unequal society that many people saw rise from the ashes of the comprehensive school resulted in a radicalization of the public. The demand for a revitalized and strong comprehensive school was one of the most marked and powerfully mobilizing political demands.

The demands received broad support, which was perhaps not so strange, since the public sector's involvement in education has strong traditions in Norway. The crisis of 2010 was for many people just the final straw. The users, the authorities and the general public had long been very dissatisfied with all levels of the school. The capital and human resources allocated to this sector were in international terms somewhat small. The difficulty of recruiting competent teachers and the low standard of the existing teaching and materials weakened the school's position.

Investigations revealed major qualitative differences between the different schools, and this could largely be explained by the different municipalities' differing levels of investment in this sector. In 2012, the state was forced to take over the responsibility for the primary and lower secondary school, just as responsibility for the upper secondary schools had ended up with the state following the demise of the county authorities at the start of the century. The state's assumption of responsibility for the education sector was hence a consequence of the crisis in municipal economy, the demand for better schools and the demand for genuinely equivalent standards.

Today the situation is altogether different. The school system is recognized as being one of the best in the world. The national curriculum allows individual schools a certain freedom as to the application of pedagogical concepts. Among others, the Montessori and Steiner schools have now been incorporated into the state school system. Of greater importance is the emergence of new and more advanced pedagogical directions, an area where Norway lies in the forefront internationally.

This development allows for quite extensive specialization within the overall framework of the comprehensive school. This specialization has improved the schools, and there is keen rivalry between the different schools. The private sector and NGOs provide additional teaching after school, often with the aid of retired teachers who are willing to work free of charge. The combination of drilling and creativity espoused by the school is rooted in a national curriculum with a large common core.

The comprehensive school has thus not merely been revived, but also reformed. An important place has been given not only to the new pedagogical concepts, but also to close ties with development cooperation organizations and to direct cooperation on development projects. The national curriculum also plays an important role, and the school provides a thorough approach to the concept of character formation, founded primarily on Norwegian history. Traditional subjects such as Norwegian, physical education and mathematics are given priority. The emphasis on physical education is formidable and is consistent with the major emphasis placed on sports and physical education by the authorities, both recreational and top-level sport.

Sport has never had a stronger position in Norway, and we are a major sporting nation in both summer and winter sports, both indoor and outdoor sports. Norway just won an

Olympic bronze medal for basketball, one of the sports where we are among the top nations today. Extreme sports are also gaining increasing popularity in Norway.

There are no longer any private schools in Norway. They are not prohibited, but they have ceased to exist. During the first period after 2010, a number of such schools appeared, but they soon discovered that there was little interest for them both because they did not in general offer higher quality and because they were expensive. They were also a fly in the ideological ointment.

The new century has seen radical changes in the upper secondary school. The school came under pressure as a result of the increasing disparity between the knowledge and skills of the different pupils resulting from the increasing differences between the homes they came from. There were growing discipline problems among the weaker pupils. Violence and crime played an increasing part in their daily lives at the same time as the brighter pupils, as a result of arrangements such as free choice of school, etc. gradually became concentrated in a smaller number of schools. This tendency was particularly evident in the larger towns. Today there are those who hold the view that the legendary Reform 97, an educational reform from the end of the last century which bore the signature of a minister of education known as Gudmund Hernes was a major cause of the difficulties experienced by the pupils with least aptitude for theoretical subjects.

In 2006, after a long political debate, a reform was introduced that came to be referred to as the *Practice Reform*. Put briefly, this involved moving all vocational training out of the schools and into establishments. This cooperation between industry and the school is viewed by most people today as very successful, and has been clearly instrumental in counteracting dropout of weaker pupils. Moving teaching staff out of the school also resulted in an improvement in reciprocal access to knowledge. The reform was (and still is) the subject of considerable attention, and the model has now been emulated by a number of other countries.

However, this reform soon proved to have some unexpected consequences. Pupils with an aptitude for theoretical subjects, who would normally have wanted to stay at school, now also wanted closer contact with working life. This was picked up by politicians and resulted in a sudden change of character of the whole upper secondary school. Now in 2030 upper secondary schools are organized more and more like universities. Teaching is now carried out in small groups and in lectures attended by a large number of pupils. The usual approach is now to make pupils responsible for their own learning with guidance from teachers. The day of the teacher's desk is definitely over! During their entire schooling all pupils are attached to establishments or organizations outside the school itself.

The aspect of Norwegian schools that has attracted most international attention is their active participation in development projects run by the state and by NGOs. This was finally formalized in the constitutional reform of 2013 following several years' involvement and active participation by a number of schools in such development assistance programmes. All schoolchildren spend at least six months abroad during their schooling, primarily between the ages of 17 and 19. This very extensive and demanding concept has since its establishment helped to increase the pupils' linguistic, cultural and

organizational skills. There are of course hazards of an entirely different kind than those associated with conventional schooling. Some school classes have been exposed to warfare, and a few pupils have lost their lives during the course of the years. Nor can it be denied that some pupils are taken seriously ill or die in accidents, and there are also those who drop out of school in the host country and are never seen again. Despite these risks, a large number of people continue enthusiastically to endorse this form of education. With few exceptions, the pupils thoroughly enjoy their stay abroad. Studies show that on average this type of experience considerably increases the pupils' coping skills.

Development of the university and college sector at the start of the century was characterized by three main factors. Firstly, education was increasingly directed towards relevance in a globalized world. This involved the development of common standards, especially in OECD member countries. Secondly, students to a greater extent than previously moved abroad to study (12 per cent of students from Oslo studied at foreign educational institutions in 1999). Thirdly, there was a marked increase in the competition for students. This was one of the reasons for increased specialization by educational institutions.

However, when European cooperation began to fall apart in 2010 and the EU disintegrated, the free movement of students became restricted. This was an especially serious blow to the Nordic and eastern European countries, where a greater proportion of students attended foreign universities and colleges than was the case in the larger European countries.

## **20.8 LIFE IN NORVEGIA**

Almost six million people live in Norway. The large increase in population during the last 30 years is due to several factors, among others, longer life expectancy and measures such as divorce tax and cash benefits for infants not in day care centres have forced up the birth rate. However, the main cause is immigration. When immigration has been high, the fertility rate has also increased, naturally enough since the immigrants come from cultures where it is normal to have many children.

The average life expectancy has increased from 76 years for men and approximately 82 years for women at the turn of the century to approximately 90 years for both sexes, which is more than Statistics Norway had expected. The fertility rate is now 2.1. The immigration figure is approximately 15 000 per year. The rate of urbanization has increased, but has been distributed differently. Centralization has not been concentrated around the Oslo Fjord. Instead, other regions have experienced increases in population. The greatest increase of all has been in Nordland, where the population has more than doubled from 240 000 to over half a million as a result of the boom in the fish farming industry. The population of Bodø has increased from 40 000 at the turn of the century to approximately 100 000 today. Narvik has passed 50 000, a growth of 250 per cent. The little town of Sortland, which painted itself blue and had 9 000 inhabitants in the year 2000, is the municipality that has expanded most. It now has over 70 000 inhabitants and so far the growth has not shown any signs of flattening out. There have also been major changes south of Oslo. Vestfold's population of 210 000 has swollen to over

400 000. Østfold's population of 246 000 has increased by 150 000, mainly in Fredrikstad and Moss.

The high rate of immigration experienced by Norway so far this century can primarily be explained by the great need for labour immigration at the start of the century and the sharp increase in this form of immigration from countries outside the former EEA area.

In addition to this, an almost explosive increase in the mobility of the European labour market resulted in inundation of Norway from 2005, when Hungary and Poland became members of the EU. However, during the depression from 2010, the immigrants remained in Norway, and are heavily overrepresented among the unemployed.

Following the reduction of the EU and concomitant dissolution of the EEA, there was less mobility in Europe. However, the labour force that remained within the Norwegian national boundaries was on the whole highly educated. Those who were not were now able to benefit fully from the Reform of Continuing Education and Training. The restructuring of Norwegian industry benefited greatly from continuing education and, when the crisis was called off around 2020, the Norwegian labour force was the most competent in the world.

### **20.8.1 FRAMEWORK NORWEGIAN**

Cultural policy is aimed at supporting printed culture and the expression of our common national culture. The former is viewed as being a precondition for the latter. Politically, this has not least been expressed through the reestablishment of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Church Affairs, which was abolished by Stoltenberg's second government after the election of 2005. This has become a very large ministry with a large budget and powerful political management. "Culture is the putty that holds our nation together," says the Prime Minister (when she is not saying the same about the peace policy). She explains her wish to protect the Norwegian language and imbue every single citizen with a robust national culture by reminding us that the world is really a somewhat chaotic place and other alternatives for a common foundation have vanished in the grinder of globalization.

A major *language reform* has been implemented. It is embodied in a new set of rules for the written language, referred to as *Framework Norwegian*. Framework Norwegian is a liberal language regime where most of the forms within what were previously called New Norwegian, Bokmål and Riksmål are permitted in addition to a number of new words introduced by ethnic minorities. The social sciences have also been given lower priority in favour of natural science and technology subjects. The continued financing of social sciences is justified on the basis of its being a national responsibility to study the preconditions and expansion potential of the national community.

When the new National Opera was finished in 2008, the authorities became aware of the enormous potential that lay in making Oslo into an internationally interesting city, and it was viewed as important to associate Norway with the most interesting international trends. The new Museum of Contemporary Art was created in this spirit and placed on an oil drilling rig right inside the harbour basin, and is regarded today as perhaps the most prominent of Oslo's buildings along with the National Opera and the City Hall. The architect has reaped global recognition for her style, referred to as "industrial

recollections”, and she has also designed Venezuela’s new national assembly, Libertada, which is currently being erected – also on an oil platform.

The focus on culture is the result of a strong political will to give priority to culture, particularly that which is regarded as our common culture, on the grounds that this is an important unifying symbol that must be kept intact.

### **20.8.2 RAINBOW**

In line with foreign policy, Norway has defined itself as a non-violent society, and in 2013 it was written into the Constitution that “it rests with any sitting government and any Storting to strive to maintain a non-violent society. This shall be understood to mean a society that combats all forms of violence, both institutional and personal, both intentional and unintentional.”

The influx of immigrants to Norway became a natural part of the country’s peace and development work, and today we provide a haven for immigrants from countries that did not exist 20 years ago, such as Matabele and Ossetia. Immigrants are recruited through peacework. Another common arrangement is known as “guaranteed immigrants”. This means that industrial concerns, public agencies or others can import manpower as long as they guarantee economy, accommodation and employment. This has resulted in a considerable influx of highly skilled workers from countries such as India, Vietnam and Nigeria.

The Norwegian state has given high priority to integrating immigrants, not least in order to be able to increase the rate of immigration in order to meet the demand for manpower. The majority of immigrants are very well integrated in Norwegian society. Immigrants are regarded as a natural part of the social picture, and representatives of ethnic minorities are found in all social strata. Most people regard people with a different ethnic background not as a threat to established values, but rather as a resource for further development of society. The majority of immigrants live in and around the large towns, primarily in Eastern and Western Norway. However, the geographical catchment area for immigrants has been somewhat extended. For example, among fishery workers in Northern Norway there are many people of Asiatic and Russian origin. But there are still major disagreements within the immigrant community. The integrationists, who are in the majority, meet strong resistance from small pockets of isolationists, who make active efforts to establish ghettos. A small group of cultural radicals is attempting to call attention to the fact that half of the immigrant boys between 16 and 25 years of age are under some form of surveillance, particularly when posted to work as waiters and porters for Nordem. They are also protesting against prohibition of the use of head-scarves. However, almost no-one is interested in hearing about these manifestations of integration policy and, since the media supports the Government’s policy, little attention is devoted to the associated police brutality and the extremely thorough electronic surveillance. Pakistan has several times attempted to submit a resolution at the United Nations against Norway’s integration policy, but Norway’s status in the organization has made it difficult for the country to make any headway.

Second and third generation immigrants play an important role in the labour market, and it is now regarded as completely normal to employ immigrants in the public sector. Special measures to increase recruiting have been discontinued because they are superfluous. Immigrants are more mobile than native Norwegians. A second-generation immigrant of Pakistani background thinks nothing of applying for a job in Arusha or Toronto. At one time there were a number of immigrant groups that represented a major social problem. They had a low social status and were involved in violent and criminal behaviour. During the years between 2010 and 2014 the justice and police authorities finally settled the problem of the gangs in the capital, which resulted in an overnight reduction of violence and crime in the city centre. In the year 2015 a new programme was implemented whereby schools, day care centres and NGOs cooperated on the creation of safe and satisfactory environments for young people to grow up in. Sport and culture activities centred in and around schools function as natural meeting places for young people in the evenings.

The problem that had been a nightmare for Norwegian politicians during the last part of the last century and the first half-year of the present century, would mainly solve itself. In the European union the integrationists lost battle after battle. The development towards a close-knit federation came to a halt because there was too much opposition and too many contending interests within the EU. A number of new members with poorly developed economies protested against the destruction of their own domestic markets by products from the more developed countries, while they did not have free access to all countries' markets for their agricultural products. The common currency had been adopted by no more than half of the member countries. The gradual domination of political developments in the EU by right-wing radicals proved too much to bear for the citizens of a number of member countries.

In 2014, England was the first state to withdraw from the European Union, but other countries soon followed. In Norway, an increasing proportion of the population had become positive to membership, partly because the difference between membership and non-membership seemed to be gradually eroding. However, as the wind of right-wing radicalism blew more and more strongly over the Union, the situation changed. The Union seemed no longer to be the safe haven that its proponents had always argued it to be. Holding Austrian nationalists down in 2000–2003 was one thing, but holding down a nationalist upswing over the whole union was quite another. The effect of this wind for Norway was an increasing appearance of normality in relation to Europe as a whole.

Events in Europe soon proved to be part of a global trend. International organizations were losing ground, and their power had an increasing character of power exercised on behalf of individual states. This created a general feeling of impotence and anarchy at the global level, which gave rise to demonstrations of force. One of the reasons for Norway's central role as a peacekeeper was the continuous increase in the demand. Less dramatic, but particularly arbitrary manifestations of the same mechanism could frequently be observed in trade policy. For example, the Russian government would demonstrate its power by blocking Norwegian fish exports because they viewed the Gulf Stream as giving an unfair competitive advantage to Norwegian fishermen and fish farmers.



In a complex and chaotic world, national boundaries are of paramount importance. The political status of the nation state was particularly strengthened by people's need for a sense of identity and "roots" to counterbalance globalization and the trend towards common culture. Repeated disagreements on boundaries and a lack of willingness on the part of international organizations to involve themselves in such matters have also strengthened the demand for the formation of powerful states.

## **20.9 THE STATE OF NORVEGIA**

Norway in 2030 is a country where the public sector is in a strong position, not only as a producer of welfare, but also as an essential component of Norwegian identity. The public sector is perceived as a cornerstone of the Norwegian democracy. It ensures welfare and redistribution and has great legitimacy. Not least, the public sector has demonstrated the ability to adapt and to increase its efficiency without abandoning its fundamental responsibilities.

However, the public sector also has problems, and they are of a classic kind. The volume of tasks is too great for the available resources. Norway's public sector is in permanent danger of overstraining itself, and there is a continuous struggle between the Ministry of Finance and Industry and all other Norwegian institutions. The ministry is responsible for keeping a tight hold on the purse strings and for developing industries, whereas all other bodies want to use more money for consumption-related purposes.

The Government steers the nation with a firm hand and with broad support from the Storting. At the local level, the Government makes extensive use of consultation with the population. However, in reality few decisions are made locally, and many people perceive this as being merely a power strategem. Much of the dialogue is conducted between the authorities and interest organizations that take it upon themselves to represent different groups.

The digitization of the Storting has had many consequences. The fact that all members now have offices in their constituencies and spend more of their time there enables new synergy effects between national and local politics. The members are more visible and are more available for local input, at the same time as they themselves more easily focus on local conditions without this resulting in fragmentation or regionalization of national politics. The opening of the Storting at the start of each annual session is a magnificent show broadcast directly from Eidsvoll. The Queen reads the Speech from the Throne, which has become an annual event of a completely different format than it used to be. It has become traditional to allow this speech to be written by a great Norwegian author. Last year it was written by Hanne Ørstavik. This year the popular author May Grethe Lerum has been honoured in this way for her sale of over ten million books during the last 40 years.

Very few people regard the close ties between the state and the third sector as problematical. Popular involvement and support for this type of organization is enormous, and they do not owe their subsistence entirely to the state. They succeed moreover in combining local and global involvement. Humanitarian organizations are global and secular as well as being affiliated to global organizations such as the WHO and the UN, but are nevertheless not especially bureaucratic. Most Norwegian NGOs

are involved in major internationally coordinated political initiatives. They have in many ways emulated the environmental movement, and almost all of them belong to large networks, regardless of what they are involved in. The purely religious organizations, such as missionary societies, have become far more secularized, and resemble Norwegian Church Aid and the Red Cross more than organizations that serve a purely religious purpose.

### **20.9.1 TWO LEVELS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

Norwegian public authorities in 2030 are organized on two levels only, central government and municipality. Following the demise of the county authorities after the turn of the century, there was a natural development of intermunicipal cooperation resulting in a number of voluntary mergers between municipalities. Today, the number of municipalities has been reduced from over 430 to 120. The central government no longer has any local offices, but each municipality has a central government representative in the administration who has in many ways taken over the County Governor's role. The 120 municipalities are responsible for providing public services, and their daily duties are much concerned with making the municipality an interesting alternative for industrial concerns and new settlers. With very few exceptions, the central government has completely taken over responsibility for health and education, but extensive intermunicipal cooperation, particularly in relation to infrastructure, gives the municipalities plenty to do.

## **20.10 THE TRIUMPH OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT**

The scope of the public sector is quite different than it was 30 years ago. The public sector has increased its total involvement in some areas, while reducing it drastically in others. The central government has complete control of the health and education sectors, but has sold out most of its interests in infrastructure and other communications. It has on the other hand major interests in R&D activities, and Norway's level of involvement in these areas is among the highest in the world. Stated succinctly, the central government focuses more on less.

Norway is currently a member of NATO and the United Nations. Briefly expressed, NATO membership leaves in practice little room for manoeuvre where defence policy is concerned and, as throughout the last 80 years, national interests must coincide with the interests of the alliance. The population at all events continues to give its wholehearted support to the alliance. Following the disintegration of the EU 20 years ago, the relative importance of NATO membership increased. Conflicts in neighbouring areas of Russia and in the Balkans have subsided, but many of these conflicts have left behind considerable residual tension. During the last 20 years, NATO's most important role has been maintenance of high readiness against terrorism. New technology, including nanotechnology, enables weapons of mass destruction to be produced quite easily. NATO's challenges are therefore formidable, and all member states, from Russia in the east to the USA in the west, are linked together by a joint early warning and surveillance system that is being continuously developed in order to be one step ahead of the terrorists.

The UN system is still relatively weak, but has increased in importance after the disintegration of the EU. Despite a number of reforms, the fundamental weaknesses of the institution, such as the reduction in power resulting from the right of veto, have not been removed, and this naturally limits the operational capacity of the organization.

The central government has been strengthened and has taken over a number of the responsibilities of the municipalities, county authorities and the market.

- Large central government directorates now have responsibility for all health and education provisions.
- The number of municipalities has been reduced from 430 in the year 2000 to 120 today.
- The municipalities have no responsibilities in the areas of health and education, but have responsibility for local settlements and industrial policy.
- Municipal self-rule is directed towards attracting industry and new settlers to the individual municipality.

The justice sector has changed markedly during the last 20 years. The state has again decided that it shall have an absolute monopoly as regards the use of force, which it gradually relinquished during the decades after the end of World War II. All forms of security guard service have now been placed under the police service, which finances part of the increased workload by taking payment for watchkeeping and other services. The state door attendant monopoly (all door attendants are today state employees with a long state-authorized training) has been established in order to increase the control of restaurants, bars, discotheques, night clubs, etc., which were increasingly associated with criminal activities after the turn of the century.

The size of the public sector in number of employees is almost identical to what it was 30 years ago, but is differently distributed. The size of the central government administration has been reduced since more functions have been placed under directorates. An extensive privatization of transport, telecommunications, postal services and other state enterprises has considerably reduced the number of state employees in these areas. However, the growth of the care sector has had the opposite effect on the statistics. In 1970 there were 272 000 employees in the public sector. By 1996 this figure had increased to 682 000, and the total share of employment had risen from 17 to 32 per cent. Today, in 2030, the total number of employees in the public sector is almost exactly 700 000. However, since the population has risen to 6 million and employment is still high, the public sector does not count for more than 18 per cent of the labour force.

Since the public sector now consists of only two levels, the central government and the municipalities, employment at these two levels is distributed differently. While the county authorities previously had responsibility for hospitals and upper secondary schools and the municipalities had responsibility for the primary and lower secondary school, all of these major responsibilities are now looked after by the central government. Administration of these areas takes place in directorates, and the power of the directorates plays a markedly different role in the Norwegian public sector than it did 30 years ago.

Tax policy makes use of an extensive set of instruments. During the last 20 years tax deductible items have become an increasingly usual feature of all accounting. For

example, enterprises can deduct expenditure on research and development, and private persons can deduct tax on donations to NGOs up to a certain amount. The size of this amount is a frequent topic for political squabbles. There is also a set of tax benefits that apply to certain branches of industry located in rural areas, such as agriculture, care of the cultural landscape and rural tourism.

## 20.11 POSTSCRIPT BY THE SOCIAL HISTORIAN 2030

### 20.12 THE NATIONAL CHARACTER

Excerpts from Torstein Erling Lund (2026): *The Norwegian national character, an attempt to explain it.* (zzz\\:\norway.filosofi.nationalforlaget.bit/Lund08), page 15:

“If we look back at the period from 1970 to 2030, we can observe from 2009 onwards a marked change in the values and attitudes of Norwegian citizens. Attitudes that were previously viewed as self-glorifying and almost nationalistic, that is to say values expressed by words such as “nation”, “purity”, “honour”, “loyalty” or “patriotism”, functioned increasingly during this period as ideals for people in general. A reformed Progress Party allied itself with the Centre Party and parts of the Norwegian Christian community in creating a political and intellectual development of *the national* as a political and social concept. This happened partly as a result of the economic crisis, but only partly. At least as great a role, in my view, was played by the total failure of the globalization and internationalization of political institutions. People’s genuine and heartfelt longing for “the original”, for nature and for the hard-and-fast values and tenets they needed to help them steer their lives now made itself felt, and in so doing turned the management of the crisis after 2009 into a unique chapter of Norwegian history. The crisis was dealt with in a masterly way just because the task did not only consist of economic and political reconstruction, but perhaps more of cultural and intellectual mobilization and of an approach to sound, edifying and enduring values. It is in this social and cultural boom, where “the national” is transformed into something positive and sympathetic, that we must look for the building blocks of a constructive and enlightening ethic of the national character, which will function as a foundation and cornerstone for any society...”

# Regio

## 21 CHAPTER 4


# 22 Regio – NORWAY●2030

*Norway's Constitution begins with the words "The Kingdom of Norway is a free, independent, indivisible and inalienable Realm", and these words stand unaltered in 2030, yet the country is now anything but indivisible and inalienable. Norway is now a federation of seven strongly independent conurbations. The Oslo region is the predominant region with by far the largest population. People live closer together, but most people have plenty of room compared with people who live in the large conurbations of other countries. Norway is still a nation-state, with a parliament and a national government, but the national government has lost a great deal of power to the regional governments and the EU.*

It is primarily the concentrations of population in and around the towns that distinguish the social structure in 2030 markedly from that of earlier times. The Oslo region, which stretches from Kongsvinger to Kongsberg and from Horten and Moss to Mjøsa, now numbers almost 3 million people, representing a considerable growth in population. The populations of the other large conurbations have also grown, particularly those of the Stavanger region and Region South. Region North and the Bergen region have also undergone a large growth in population, but not of the same order as the above-mentioned regions. Fredrikstad and Halden belong to the Bohuslen region, which extends all the way to Gothenburg and, like the Trondheim region, crosses national borders.

As in the rest of Europe, life in the conurbations is characterized by multiculturalism and close ties with other urban centres both at home and abroad. The number of religious groups is steadily growing, although the number of strong believers has not increased correspondingly. Corresponding trends are also visible in relation to a number of other factors, such as consumption patterns, where the population was previously relatively homogeneous. This diversity is primarily an urban phenomenon, although life outside the conurbations also offers opportunities for variety. If one opts to live outside the conurbations, this also expresses a choice of lifestyle and, for most people, a somewhat less comfortable lifestyle. Urban communities are no longer willing to foot the bill for the maintenance of an extensive range of services in rural districts. There is a high level of tolerance, but less generosity. The right to choose entails the duty to pay.

Today, political parties are also regionalized and, although there are some national parties, they are very weak. The lines of conflict are often more clearly marked between the national parties than between the parties in the various conurbations. There is very active democracy in most conurbations. This is partly because even the largest Norwegian conurbations are small and transparent in international terms in spite of being more closely tied than ever before to events in other parts of the world.



## 22.1 MAIN IDEAS AND ASSUMPTIONS

*Centralization and concentration.* Social development is taking place at the same pace as increasing centralization at all levels, with a starting point in industrial economic centralization resulting from the growth of the service sector including ICT. This is giving rise to major demographic changes involving increased migration to towns and conurbations. Consequently we are witnessing an urbanization of the economy, so that in many ways it is towns rather than nation-states that compete for resources, manpower and industrial contracts. Immigration and free movement across national borders are increasing at the same pace as the steadily increasing need for services.

*Environment and resources.* The growth of the conurbations has been accompanied by a growing opposition to government funding of rural areas and primary industries. Norway is being transformed from a commodities economy to a service economy. There is also more competition for investments, but the towns have the upper hand, and as time goes on it is town politicians who are in control of most developments including those in rural areas on the outskirts of the conurbations. New infrastructure is currently under construction, aimed at improving connections between towns. We also experience a gradual reduction in petroleum activities and an active urban-oriented environmental involvement where key roles are played by health and environmental concerns.

*Individualism and new community.* Urban individualism has gained an increasing impact. Working life is marked by frequent career changes and an unstable labour market. There is a bigger gap between managers and workers, and also between different occupational groups, not least between the standard of living in the rich urban areas and the poorer rural districts. The market has taken over many of the functions previously carried out by the public sector. On the other hand individualization causes new forms of community to flourish, from pure communities of interests to major joint arenas such as extensive consumer associations and political movements.



*Urban culture.* Life in the towns is increasingly experienced as more meaningful, and people therefore show less appreciation for the joys of life in the country. The supply of services and entertainment is greater than ever. Society also shows greater tolerance for foreign cultures, which constitute an increasing element of urban life. The seamy side of the big towns is also growing, though not as rapidly as many people feared.

## 22.2 DEEDE

Deede staggers out of bed. Yet another day has begun, but she feels rested. The kids are at the 24-hour day care centre at Fana so she can take it easy. Deede is glad that her employer takes responsibility for more than just her. After all, she is giving the best years of her life to Berkeley Norway, where she has worked since she was headhunted after getting her doctorate on “The use of electric nets in aquaculture: Ecology, economy, aetiology”. Berkeley Norway is represented in all the conurbations. The company is international and has subsidiaries in most countries. Deede is in great demand and has to do a lot of travelling. She is among those who have been most successful in adapting to the new labour market. She has been in the Berkeley stable for nine years now, and has been given increasingly better terms. This is also where she met Ragnar, whom she now lives with. It is a long way from Calcutta, but no further than is normal for young women like her. Deede likes Norway very much – better than most other European countries. Perhaps because the country, like her own India has English as its second official language. It makes the world smaller. Deede at any rate is no eccentric. She is just what Ragnar teasingly calls a “global babe”.

Deede sees that the breakfast is already on the table. Charles is wonderful. Although she doesn't know about all the learning challenges that Charles has been through, as a language teaching theorist, she is not entirely unfamiliar with the methodology behind it. It certainly says something about the enormous advance that have been made in teaching methods in recent years that a slightly genetically modified chimpanzee of a certain standard can learn 500 words of “basic English” and take care of all the housework. Deede and Ragnar's household is one of the few in the project for trained chimpanzees but if things go according to plan, such “pedchimps” will be usual in Bergen in 10–12 years' time.

Deede's dark skin provokes no-one, but she notices that many people share her irritation when her mother insists on wearing a sari when she is visiting. She is an obstinate old woman, and perhaps it isn't so easy for her to learn from her daughter but, all the same, Deede cannot deny that she is really rather ashamed of her mother. Her mother is just as reactionary as the peasants who dominate the Norwegian immigrant community. In Deede's opinion, it is exceedingly distressing that major parts of the immigrant population have not adopted a more western lifestyle. At the quayside in Bergen people seem to dress and behave more as they do in rural areas of Pakistan than in cities like Peshawar.

It dismays her that groups with strong antipathy toward immigrants succeed in gaining a considerable foothold in Norwegian society and, using both violent and peaceful means, demand the expulsion of minorities. These groups are inspired by a Norwegian sociologist who was active at the turn of the century in contending that societies must be ethnically clean if they are not to fall into chaos. In their protests, the minorities have become strongly radicalized, not least those of fundamentalist persuasion. Deede opens the morning post. A large file has arrived from Berkeley Pyongyang. She is holding a course there in October and is already looking forward to it. She has had a lot to do with a number of students down there and it will be fun to meet them face to face.

At the weekend, they are going for a trip to the countryside – the whole family. They are visiting an old friend of Ragnar’s, one of those whinging sourpusses Ragnar studied with, who loved Norway as it used to be. Typically enough, he lives way out in the sticks. How dreary it is there! Bringing up children in a place with such deplorable school provisions is no different from child abuse. Schools, educational welfare services and other care services for children are of much higher quality in the towns. It’s all because of the high degree of centralization, Ragnar usually says. In his view, it is wrong to gather all the resources in the centre. Income growth in rural areas is falling apart because of wrong-headed policies. Perhaps he is right, but the world is unjust, thinks Deede, and the majority of people really don’t want to live in sparsely populated areas. Man is a social animal, and that’s all there is to it. Whether in Oslo or Calcutta, the town always provides cultural variety and possibilities for self-fulfilment.

## 22.3 PEOPLE ON THE MOVE

Regio is more than anything a result of lengthy centralization. In 1664 there were 440 000 people in Norway and only 7 per cent these lived in towns. By 1990, the proportion of town-dwellers had increased to approximately 72 per cent of a population of 4.2 million.<sup>90</sup> In many ways, centralization is therefore a natural extension of this development, and it comes as no surprise that over 95 per cent of the population now live in towns. Centralization has taken place both at the national level, in that the Oslo region during these years has had the largest net growth in population, and within limited geographical areas, where towns and other urban settlements have grown at the expense of settlements in the surrounding countryside.<sup>91</sup>

Regio is also a result of the *acceleration* of this centralization during the period 2000–2030. This development was already visible during the last half of the 1990s, and was a

---

90 Historical statistics for 1994, Statistics Norway (NOS C188).

91 Viewed as a whole, the rural districts have experienced a negative balance of migration each year since 1981, and net “emigration” reached a peak so far of over 7700 persons in 1997. The population growth in 1998 was the largest for 25 years, but the growth was restricted to large urban centres. Two-thirds of the increased population settled in the counties around the Oslo Fjord. Most population growth during the 1990s was in the conurbations (Regional policy statement 1999, Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development).

source of concern for many people, particularly members of the former Centre Party, which participated in the first coalition government led by Kjell Magne Bondevik, and a number of measures were therefore implemented with the purpose of counteracting and at best limiting depopulation of rural areas. However, measures such as public awareness campaigns had very little effect in competition with the powerful forces motivating people's wish to move south.

For people moved as never before. But this time it was not only young people who were on the move; the not-quite-so-young had also begun to get itchy feet, and the far-from-young were in many cases simply obliged to follow. As in earlier times, it was jobs that called and that were the main reason why people moved. While young people were looking for work, old people were looking for people who could work to supply their needs – from nurses to postmen. Interestingly, however, people today take a positive view of this, and involve themselves in social, political and cultural aspects of town life.

An important aspect of centralization at the start of the century, particularly in the Oslo region, was the combination of scarcity of human resources and considerable economic activity, for example in the construction sector. To a great extent, it was the state itself that led the way in this development. Several major projects, a new main airport, a national hospital, an opera house and, not least, a small ICT estate were all completed during a fairly short period. However, by 2003, *scarcity of resources* was synonymous with *shortage of qualified manpower*, and it became increasingly usual for large building contractors to cover both moving and re-establishment expenses for people from rural areas who wanted to take part in the building activity.

Another consequence of the pressure on the economy, which did not however contribute to the same extent to the growth of the towns, was increasing immigration. Following changes in regulations in 2003, labour immigration became usual, not least from eastern Europe, which during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century had become a considerable exporter of manpower to the whole EU area.

In 2008 eastern Europeans constituted over half of immigrants to Norway, and a total net immigration of approximately 30 000, which represented more than a doubling in relation to the 1990s. The possibility was also opened up for major labour immigration from the developing world, primarily to meet a constantly increasing demand for manpower by service industries such as transport, distributive trades and cleaning services.

For the youngest employees it was particularly the availability of interesting occupations that motivated moving to the conurbations. The possibility of finding an “interesting” job was greater for those with education, and the more education a person had, the more likely it was that he or she would have to move to a town to find a relevant job. At the start of the new century, those with long education were more likely to live in urban areas than those with shorter education. Today this trend is extremely clear. The towns have become the arena for people with higher education.

As early as 1997, a total of 138 000 people in Norway had at least 4½ years higher education. Twenty-five per cent of these resided in Oslo, and they constituted 9 per cent of Oslo's inhabitants over 16 years. Møre og Romsdal, Finnmark and Nordland had the smallest proportion, constituting 2 per cent of the population.

The state owns and operates a major university awarding degrees to doctorate level, while the regions have responsibility for all other education. Owing to centralization and urbanization, several of the former colleges have been closed down. All regions now have their own universities, and there are altogether 14 universities in Norway. Foreign universities have also been established and, as mentioned above, Berkeley Norway is found in all regions, not only in Norway but throughout northern Europe. Both private and public higher education provisions are available either very cheaply or free of charge, and the quality is generally very high, not least because of the high level of competition between educational institutions.

Today, all schooling up to and including the upper secondary level is organized in accordance with EU standards and is administered by the regions. The quality of education varies from region to region. Some regions make very large investments in this field, while others are more moderate.

At the start of the century, politicians with a regional profile had already begun to be aware that the distribution of education had become a problem and many people pinned their hopes on the new technologies providing new jobs in rural areas. For the problem was not only that young people preferred exciting jobs in the towns. The “exciting” jobs had also gradually replaced the traditional jobs in rural areas, especially those in industrial settlements. The gradual reduction in the number of industrial jobs, which began as early as the 1970s, continuing with full force until, in 2010, little more than 120 000 worked in manufacturing industries, under a third of the number in the peak year of 1974.

In 2010 it was also clear that most efforts to establish new technological activities in rural areas had failed. In spite of generous terms, particularly in the first decade of the 21st century, there were very few successful establishments outside the conurbations. As a rule new technology established itself in the towns, and the younger generation with it. Physical work was a thing of the past. It became increasingly clear that urban culture held all the potential for self-fulfilment, both through the new jobs and through the life that could only be lived in the towns.

## **22.4 URBAN SERVICES**

When Norway's last traditional postal service gave up in 2017, this marked the end of a several-century long tradition for manual post deliveries. It also marked the final transition to the new age, the service society, which the postal service did not survive to see. Two main factors were responsible for the fact that the demise of the postal service did not surprise anyone in 2017. Firstly, an increasing number of communications were carried out electronically, particularly in areas where the national postal service had

previously enjoyed a monopoly deriving from the old Postal Services Act. Secondly, the traditional postal delivery was also dealt a blow by the changes in the structure of the service society itself, i.e. the general reduction in common services in favour of more individual services geared to the market.

The development of the service society has been a lengthy process. Broadly speaking, it is the general growth in incomes that has given rise to the increased demand for services. At the turn of the century it became increasingly difficult to satisfy this demand, particularly for some of the services that the public sector was then the main supplier of, such as health and social services. In Norway, as in the rest of the world, the fact that growth in productivity was by and large lower in the service sector than in manufacturing and primary industries resulted in a sustained need to transfer manpower from the latter sectors to the service sector.

In 1962 service industries accounted for just over 56 per cent of employed persons. By 1995, this share had increased to almost 79 per cent. While the total rate of employment increased by almost 550 000 people during this period, employment in public services (public medical services and other public services) increased by almost 450 000 (Report No. 4 to the Storting (1996–97) the Long-term Programme 1998–2001).

In 2000 many people were therefore preoccupied with the problems the country would face towards 2030 as a result of a shortage of manpower for hospitals, schools, etc. The emergence of a digital Regio was in many ways part of the solution to the manpower deficit in the service society. The new technology opened up for extensive rationalization, particularly where it could replace more labour-intensive services, such as manual delivery of post. It was also possible to rationalize more knowledge-intensive services, which is of course why we now take for granted that most higher education takes place far from the traditional schools and universities, which are constantly being reduced in number. Today's medical facilities, whereby competent surgeons can operate on patients from distant locations by means of electronics, are a result of the techniques known as telemedicine at the start of the century. Perhaps the biggest change in the service society during the last 30 years is the development of electronic trading and payments transmission services. For, while most trading today takes place electronically, this was only true of a negligible amount before the turn of the century.

In spite of a major efficiency and rationalization potential, the manpower shortage in the service sector was too large for all of the problems to be solved by the new technologies. As early as 2000, many people favoured demand regulation measures. At first, these were moderate measures in the form of charges for what were at the time mainly public and subsidized services. The major changes were however introduced because an increasing number of people wanted customized services, and were willing to pay for them, which led to an increase in the number of private services.

Another reason for Regio's development was that business and industry in the different conurbations increasingly joined up with international production and marketing networks. The ties between individual enterprises and groups in such sectors and those in other countries were considerable. Both cooperative networks of small enterprises and powerful multinational and transnational companies became active proponents of provisions to allow production, market access and policy across traditional regional and national boundaries. In the wake of this development, there was a change in the income profiles of ordinary workers. Services such as cleaning, childcare, electronic security clearance, maintenance and transport gradually became included in salaries, particularly after the restructuring of the taxation system in the EU in 2018 removed such services from taxable income. During the period prior to the great federal reform, the industrial actors (multinational and transnational companies and small and medium-sized enterprises operating in networks) assumed much of the role of nation-states and supranational bodies in areas such as trade and industrial policy, research and technology policy, environmental policy, media policy and global opinion formation. In

some regions, industrial players also assumed responsibility for local security by means of private security forces. Prior to the federal reform, industrial players took control of global development through extensive cooperation between themselves. It was the USA and the EU that proved most successful in handling the multinational companies and networks, and they thereby gained important tactical advantages in competition with other regions that were often under continuous pressure from such establishments.

Nonetheless, it was not long before it was regarded as important to attract the multinational and transnational companies. The bait used by most Norwegian regions consisted primarily of a highly educated workforce, a population proficient in foreign languages and a dynamic and adaptable culture.

From the year 2000 to today there have been major structural changes within business and industry. For example, a number of goods and services that were previously supplied by different companies, such as telecommunications services, travel, energy, food and financial services are now purchased from one and the same supplier. At the start of the century, cooperative enterprises and big supermarket chains began searching for new business areas. They pounced on segments where the traditional actors failed to make any particular improvements to the product. Today consumers have a couple of large suppliers to choose between, and the suppliers attempt to hold on to their customers by means of an ingenious system of bonuses, etc.

In 2020 Norway was no longer at the top of the list of the wealthiest industrialized countries in the world, primarily because the flow of income from petroleum and gas was in process of falling off. Although new techniques made it possible to extract petroleum from smaller and previously unprofitable wells, the total volume of petroleum production in the Norwegian sector diminished considerably from the level around the turn of the century. It is true that more gas was extracted than ever before, but areas of use were still limited. However, although prices were still primarily linked to the energy market, the climate regime gave rise to greater profits on the sale of gas than of petroleum.

## **22.5 PEOPLE IN REGIO**

### **22.5.1 THE OSLO TUNNEL ACCIDENT 2013:**

In November 2013 there was an accident that had long been feared. A road tanker overturned in the middle of the Oslo Fjord tunnel, exploded and completely stopped the flow of traffic. Security in the tunnel failed to function owing to lack of maintenance, and the tunnel filled up with vehicles. A total of 120 cars were involved in chain collisions because the road tanker exploded. The generation of heat in the tunnel was enormous, and a total of 250 people lost their lives as a result of the accident. The accident provoked a major political debate leading to a focus on support to rural areas and the effects of this. Extreme examples of misuse of subsidies made front-page headlines in the tabloids. The urban parties exploited the accident to expose how

abortive regional policy may have been an indirect cause of the failure to give priority to the development of infrastructure in central areas.

The focus on regional policy, particularly in the northernmost counties, was kept up at the start of the century, but it had little effect on the development of a new economic basis. When the public bodies that allocated the subsidies proved to have little control over how the funds were used and public investigations revealed misuse, more people in urban areas began to question investments in regional policy. Scepticism was also strengthened by the fact that the price of food, drink and tobacco continued to rise in relation to neighbouring countries until Norway itself became a member of the EU in 2007. The debate on food prices had gone on for a long time. People expected a change, and it was largely Norwegian agriculture that was given the blame.

Transfers to primary industries were gradually reduced and at the beginning of the 2020s expressions such as “regional support” and “Finnmark packages” were already a thing of the past. A major factor in this development was of course the growth of the towns and the urban population’s dissatisfaction with the high food prices, the lack of investment in infrastructure and the generally high cost level. But this development did not begin to gain momentum until the state itself was forced to reduce its expenditure as a result of the changes in the age structure of the population. In addition to this, as a result of EU membership, several of the previous subsidy schemes were no longer legal.

Today, in 2030 the painful restructuring has been carried out and the number of agricultural man-years has been stabilized at around 10 000<sup>92</sup>. Agriculture is now divided into two sectors, one sustainable industrial and one ecological. Partly owing to more efficient farming structures and new technology, the volume of agricultural production is at approximately the same level as it was in 2000. Sustainable industrial agriculture involving a small number of farms pulverized the basis for the Norwegian Farmers’ Union, which took the consequences of the restructuring and became a purely professional organization. In 2020 the Norwegian Farmers’ Union was admitted as a member of the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry.

The Union of Norwegian Farmers and Smallholders continues to exist, and is dominated by those who wish to be engaged in ecological production of niche products close to the consumer. Examples of successful products of this kind are Skjåk ham and Lom cheese. Value creation for individual products in this type of agriculture are now much better than in sustainable industrial agriculture. The added value that lies in brand building is considerable. In sales volume, the ecological agriculture sector will gradually compete with the sustainable industrial agriculture.

---

<sup>92</sup>In 1999, 80 000 man-years were performed in agriculture. This represents a fall of 11 400 man-years or 13 per cent since 1994/1995. Agricultural Census for 1999, preliminary figures, Statistics Norway.



## 22.6 FROM TOWN TO TOWN – THE NEW TRANSPORT POLICY

The opposition to local and regional production was also strengthened by environmental arguments. The extensive division of labour involved an enormous increase in traffic and corresponding environmental problems. This also resulted in traffic infarction along the major European motorways, and a danger of a corresponding development in air traffic. When motorway traffic through northern Germany collapsed in 2010, high taxes were imposed on transport throughout the EU area.

The high concentrations of people in and around towns eventually resulted in the need for another road network in Norway. The relatively rapid growth of the conurbations also resulted in the first two decades in a need for continuous development and extension of existing road and rail networks within the regions. However, only a small amount of funding was allocated to central areas before the restructuring of policy following the tunnel accident in 2013.

Several of the companies that held concessions for the operation of railways in and between the major cities in 2020 were also given considerable public support as it gradually became clear that the road system would not tolerate more traffic. The Bergen Metro, which at first aroused considerable controversy, was characterized as a city railway for the future by the German-dominated holding company when it began operations in 2013. The company had also started construction of similar railways in other Norwegian urban districts. The so-called Pentagon system, the intercity express between Oslo, Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger and Kristiansand that was completed in 2027 also considerably reduced the travelling time between these cities. Between Oslo and Trondheim the trains did not stop at all, and the travelling time was reduced to two and a half hours.

Since 2020 much greater interest has been shown in bulk transport by rail. The express trains outperformed maritime transport in many areas as railways and trains were improved, permitting greater speeds, and air traffic was subjected to increasing restrictions because the capacity of the airspace over many of the largest regions of the EU reached saturation point at this time.

The environment has become a major international competition factor between towns. A *clean* town has a valuable competitive advantage in the battle for “brainpower”, the best paid form of manpower but that which is most difficult to hold onto. The typical Norwegian town dweller has relatively little contact with nature but is nevertheless preoccupied with environmental problems, primarily those that manifest themselves as hazards to his own health. This is also one of the reasons for the poor conditions of biotechnology and genetic engineering in Norway and the rest of the EU. Town dwellers also cultivate pure and harmonious aspects of nature and human life, although they do not take as much interest in the great outdoors as previous generations. Modern biotechnology and genetic engineering have been far more successful in establishing themselves in Asia and to some extent in the USA. The EU is also a major importer of food from these areas.

Concentration of the population has been instrumental in many environmental problems almost solving themselves. This applies particularly to issues such as protection of the

countryside and biological diversity. At the turn of the century, conservation areas constituted no more than approximately 10 per cent of Norway's land area, while today they are almost 30 per cent. A number of predators, such as wolves, bears and lynxes are once more well established in large inland areas of Norway despite the fact that many animals are killed when they come too close to urban areas. As a result of the reduced activity in rural areas, this development has been relatively painless, especially after removal of the state support for protection of sheep farming. The development in the direction of more collective transport has also helped to reduce pollution in the towns after a period of growing problems at the start of the century, particularly in connection with the old transport system.

A major industry has developed based on environmental technology. Although this development has not made much progress and environmental and climate problems are still considerable, people have faith in this approach to the problem. This has the best foothold within the FTAA (*Free Trade Area of the Americas*) and the EU, while people in the SEAA (South East Asian Alliance) area associate such ideas with Confucianism. The concept of proactive technological approaches to saving the environment and the world's climate has therefore not been as well received here as it has in the other regions of the world.

## 22.7 WELFARE IN AN INDIVIDUAL-ORIENTED URBAN COMMUNITY

**Bjarne:**

I've been living for three years now at the Clover Meadow Senior Citizens' Centre, which is run by the council. I've decided to move to Statoil's accommodation for the elderly. It's a lot dearer there because it's private, but I've only got myself to think about now, so I can do as I like as long as I can afford it. Considering the better quality of nursing, catering, entertainment, etc., I think it's worth the money. At Statoil's accommodation we have quite a lot of freedom to make our own choices, which we have to pay for of course. Those who want to can spend part of the year at the centre's hotel in south-east Asia. I really had a mind to do the same as Petter. He's bought a share in "Creative Seniorship". This is an institution that is wholly owned by the people who live there. They employ the staff themselves and are able to decide the daily timetable. According to Petter it's no dearer than Statoil's elderly accommodation. He says that this is mainly because they use the staff very flexibly. They actually have some unqualified people working there (including some youngsters who are still at school), especially in the weekends.

The population structure in 2030 is characterized by many decades of low birth-rates in Norway, as in most affluent nations. One of the consequences of this is that there is a relatively big difference between the welfare facilities we have today and those available to people only 30 years ago. The welfare state had its heyday around the turn of the century. As a consequence of the psychological effect of many years of gradual cuts and squeezes in this area, there is little opposition today to the relatively limited public involvement. In the view of most of the population, it is up to each individual to secure his own retirement and insure himself against illness. It is up to each and every one of us to decide how well off he wants to be.

Since pensioners are charged for most of the facilities available to them, balancing the generational accounts has gradually become less of a problem. Social security payments and private pensions mainly go back to the state coffers or to other actors in the elderly market. The tax reform of 2014, which decided that pension income and income from employment should be treated alike, helped to make this balancing act less problematical than was envisaged at the turn of the century.

At the end of the last century, the generational challenge looked the same throughout Western Europe. Given the rate of employment at the time, all OECD countries were expected to experience an increase in the dependency burden. In countries such as Germany and France it was envisaged that the number of pensioners in the long term would approach the number of employed people, while in Italy and Spain the number of pensioners might even exceed the number of employed people.

Many elderly people with large economic resources use a lot of money on relatively expensive private health care. Many elderly people are also capable of working considerably longer than was the case 30 years ago. There are a number of reasons for this, but the principal one is that more elderly people today have an education that can be used in many more areas.<sup>93</sup> Last but not least, pay trends with an emphasis on individual agreements have been instrumental in ensuring that the average upper middle class level of pay is considerably higher than the average public sector pensions.

## 22.8 HEALTH SHOPPING

The establishment of more market-based health provisions has also been instrumental in regulating the demand for medical services. Many operations and treatments are now so expensive that few people can afford to take advantage of them. This applies particularly to major life extension operations such as gene transplants and organ transplants. Most enterprises offer their employees both health insurance and a health programme. In other areas most of the services offered are also covered by fee arrangements, insurance or subscription services, that must be paid for by the users themselves.

As early as 2000, Helsevakten Telemed AS opened in the Oslo area Scandinavia's first private subscription-based monitoring and consultation centre for heart and lung diseases. By means of telemedicine, chronic sufferers of heart and lung diseases could take ECG, arrhythmia and lung function measurements in their own homes.<sup>94</sup> The development of ICT in general medicine, and particularly in telemedicine, has also been instrumental in reducing the need for nurses, which was a major problem only 30 years ago, not least because it was thought in 2000 that the need for nurses would increase by approximately 60 per cent.<sup>95</sup>

The public health service gives main priority to matters related to public health in general, particularly epidemics, which from 2010 to the present day have been a growing problem. There is of course always a danger of epidemics when people live close together, but they have gradually become an increasing problem for quite different reasons. In eastern Europe many diseases that in Norway were eradicated long ago are as active as ever. A consequence of Norway's growing relations with eastern Europe is therefore frequent outbreaks of epidemics, which, fortunately, we have so far been able

---

93 This is one of the main points made in the OECD report *Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society*, OECD 1998.

94 Helsevakten Telemed AS was established in Lørenskog in March 2000. It is manned by nurses and an operations manager as well as special nurses from the Norwegian Helicopter Ambulance Service, who answer telephone enquiries and receive data submitted directly by patients, doctors, ambulance personnel, institutions and companies holding subscriptions for the service. *Dagens Medisin* 20 January 2000.

95 *Scenario 2030. Health services for the elderly towards 2030*. National geriatric programme, October 1999. Norwegian Board of Health.

to hold in check. Tuberculosis is a particularly difficult problem, not only in itself, but also because patients are vulnerable to other infections for which we no longer have antidotes.

## 22.9 EDUCATION FOR LIFE IN THE TOWN

In the school, this adjustment to the competition society took place through extended contact between the school and the community and by the reintroduction of individual grading throughout the school. At the same time, a degree of streaming was introduced to separate the brighter pupils from the weakest. The brightest pupils were able to compete for scholarships which gave them free admission to private schools. This meant that gifted children and those with wealthy parents had access to better schooling than the state schools were able to offer. The increased freedom regarding choice of school, combined with a greater freedom to introduce educational provisions based on new principles and concepts, was one of the principal agents of social reproduction. By means of a more competition-oriented school system, pupils were prepared for a competition-oriented workplace.

In the labour market, Norway experienced several trends at the same time. The population of occupationally active age was divided into two separate groups, one group that was within the labour market (either employed or seeking employment) and another group that had nothing whatsoever to do with the labour market. The labour force was considerably more adaptable than it was at the turn of the millennium. The wage gap widened, and was now at the same level as in the rest of Europe.

The main price for the diverse consumption patterns of urban life is that most people have to work more. We have, it is true, been given more holiday. As early as 2002, we were granted a fifth week of annual holiday, and the sixth week was introduced in 2015. We may perhaps get a seventh week in a couple of years. However, workdays have been lengthened. There are many schemes that enable people to take more free time, but very few people make use of them. Owing to the need for manpower, people are rewarded more for the work they do, in terms of both pay and career opportunities. This particularly applies to elderly people, who receive relatively high remuneration for continuing to work after reaching retiring age. Individual contracts of employment are negotiated on the basis of the market value of each employee. The high proportion of elderly voters has made it difficult to abolish favourable pension schemes such as the contractual early retirement scheme, and elderly employees therefore have a sound basis for negotiation.<sup>96</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup>In 1998, 50 per cent of employees entitled to contractual early retirement took advantage of this to retire as early as possible. The proportion of 62 year-olds who take early retirement is far higher than was anticipated by the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions and the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry when the scheme was introduced. The state pays 40 per cent of the costs associated with all over 64 years of age who take advantage of the early retirement scheme. The costs associated with 62 and 63 year-olds are covered in full by the employers. *Dagens næringsliv* 17.07.1998.

The unions that fail to adapt to the new conditions lose support. This has particularly affected the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, which has spent a long time readjusting from its role as an organization for the industrial society. Negotiations are increasingly conducted on an individual basis, and individual agreements have become more usual in both private and public sector. The winners are the hirers of labour who have much to offer, and the sellers of labour with sound professional and social qualifications. The organizations are too weak to be able to ensure redistribution, which results in a negative spiral for both weak hirers and weak sellers of labour.

## 22.10 THE DYNAMICS OF THE ESPRESSO MACHINE

### 22.10.1 DEEDE REVISITED:

Deede likes to stand reminiscing over life in the old days. She remembers the school bands and all the fund-raising, knocking on doors to sell raffle tickets. She remembers one occasion when even the Prime Minister had to sell raffle tickets at the local school during the Constitution Day celebrations. Many people thought that was a bit odd. It is not easy for her grandchildren to understand how much this meant to people. Raffle tickets disappeared with the school bands. She can see why most parents no longer take part in such activities. The kids are just not interested any more. But she thinks it also has something to do with everyone being pressed for time. For, in spite of all the splendid flexitime schemes that come and go, most people don't seem to have much time left over. And if you are going to take part in cultural activities, which is after all important, it is best to do something that involves personal development, preferably something creative – something you can boast about at work or put on your CV.

In 2020 a workplace was no longer just a workplace. One was expected to have fun at work. Work had become culture. No decent workplace could be without its own coffee or juice bar and, if it wasn't big enough to have its own, it should at least look like one. Designers were hired in to make sure that both customers and employees experienced a young, fresh and up-to-date environment that, most of all, should look as if it had just opened. It wasn't easy. It demanded a great deal of both managers and employees to keep the office looking fresh and newly established. The press could be at the door at any time with their eternal consumer surveys. How many stars would they be awarded this time? The result could be catastrophic for the company's ability to hold on to its customers and key staff.

True enough, for most people this was no more than a dream, and as a rule they had to seek out the espresso machines in off-duty hours. However, the feeling of having to be *where it happened* was strong – regardless of whether you actually had a job that put you there. This was the dynamism of city life – and during the first decades of the new millennium, the importance of *being where the action is* was broadcast with increasing volume. This was the way to live – the real life and, for the steady streams of young people who moved to the towns to study, it became correspondingly difficult to return home. It was not only that they were overqualified for most of the jobs available at home, the cafeteria at the Co-op was no longer as meaningful.

Paradoxically, the towns also took over as guardians of rural culture. Most forms of rural art and culture was gathered in the towns by associations and support groups who took upon themselves the task of conserving the culture that no longer had an authentic and viable environment in the rural areas where it belonged. There were also innumerable support schemes and funds that helped to ensure that such cultural expressions survived, especially after several of the big towns included culture as an element of their industrial policy.

Culture is no longer underrated as a competition factor. As a result of this, art and the role of the artist have been accorded a significant position almost everywhere. Since the international breakthrough of what became known as the Bodø school at the beginning of the 2020s, the art of this region has attracted enormous attention, demonstrating the role played by art both as a creator of identity and as a generator of income, as well as enhancing people's lives with objects for contemplation and, one might even say, therapy. It must also be said that this region has long focused on avant-garde and innovative art. Artscape Nordland from the end of the last century placed sculptures in the natural landscape, creating something quite new in the Norwegian art of the period.

## 22.11 ATLANTIC CENTER – BJØRVIKA

Excerpt from Aftenposten 15 April 2030:

“Bjørvika 15 April 2030. *“At last, Oslo has become a city that measures up to international criteria.”* So ended LeBeouf Gardestad, Regional Secretary for the Oslo region, his speech at the opening of the new Atlantic Center at Sjursøya in the heart of the Oslo Fjord. The public applauded enthusiastically.

One of Europe’s largest conference centres, it has been erected in cooperation with the Statoil Art Foundation. It has a total area of over 60 000 m<sup>2</sup>, of which the exhibition area alone is 30 000 m<sup>2</sup>. By way of comparison, the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao is only 24 000 m<sup>2</sup>. Regarded as one of the world’s most spectacular pieces of architecture, the building already attracted enormous international attention before it was completed.

For Gardestad and the rest of the regional secretariat, the project marked an important stage in the marketing, especially in view of the eternal competition between several of the large conurbations around the Baltic Sea, which were particularly aggressive in their flamboyant marketing campaigns...”

## 22.12 SIMPLICITY AND DIVERSITY

In 2030, the central government no longer has an active cultural policy. As a result of growing criticism of the central government’s lack of a cultural policy, responsibility for this was gradually taken over by the conurbations. Following the federal reform of 2021, the towns became the primary custodians of cultural policy. Culture had a different purpose for the towns than it did for the state. The towns looked upon culture as the glue that held them together, creating unity out of all the diversity and helping to make them attractive in relation to other conurbations of the world. Both culture and education have a central place here, and the conurbations make considerable funds available to historians as well as to authors and other artists, who provide them with a rational basis to support their regional identity. The regions are also eager to develop and standardize their language forms and dialects. Not without reason, New Norwegian, a form of Norwegian based on rural dialects, is dominant in the Bergen region, especially outside the town centre. The friction between national and regional levels in the area of cultural policy is an important element of the political debate.

Historically, the towns have always been more liberal than the rural areas surrounding them, and this is also true of Norwegian towns in 2030. While the conurbations are in many ways large, continuous suburbs with the order and relative stability that is normal in areas of this kind, the town centres have become increasingly complex in all their organized disorder. In the town centre, many different lifestyles are jumbled together. Together they constitute “the colourful community” that people in previous decades dreamed about or feared. The last labour immigrants to arrive live here alongside newly



arrived religious refugees, retro-hippies, artists, tramps, students and everyone else who is not yet ready for life in the suburbs.

Back in 2000 there were many indications that the relatively homogeneous Norwegian population was in process of changing. Figures from that time show that Islam was the largest religious community outside the Church of Norway with over 45 000 members. In some parts of Oslo one could already find central urban districts where dozens of different nationalities lived alongside one another. However, although culture flourished as never before, many people felt that there was less sophistication than ever. The fact is that most people have little interest in the elite culture in the centre of the conurbation.

It is in many ways paradoxical that, although there are more independent film companies and recording companies than at any time in Norway's history and that an increasing number of people are able to take part and even live off this kind of activity, the dominance of the global entertainment conglomerates is greater than ever. The media and news giant World Entertainment, for example, is the largest economic entity in the world, with a turnover larger than the US fiscal budget.

## **22.13 MAFIA**

Last but not least, organized crime is a challenge to the international community. Governments and international bodies are rife with corruption. The picture is dominated by a small number of criminal organizations on the "Cosa Nostra" model, which have divided the world and the markets between them. Quarrels between them frequently end in armed conflicts. Using information technology, including the Internet, criminal organizations continually thwart the international fight against crime, and are making rapid headway in countries with weak infrastructure and little internal security control, while also invading the economies of developed countries. This constitutes a major challenge to the rule of law, but stimulates social solidarity that countervails a general breakdown of legal systems. However, the development of crime hinders economic development in a number of regions and reinforces the wealth gap between rich and poor regions of the world.

The nation-state retains the monopoly on the use of force in a relatively narrow area, primarily defence, police and that part of foreign policy that is associated with policing and defence functions, which have increasingly overlapped one another since the implementation of the Schengen Agreement. The ICT police are part of the Europol joint services. This involves *regional* cooperation across national borders (especially within the EU). It includes cooperation on commercial and industrial development, service development and organization between large municipalities and regions. The Titan project established in Sogn og Fjordane before the turn of the millennium breaks completely new ground for this type of cooperation.

## **22.14 THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN REGIO**

Norwegian towns in Regio have many parallels with the city-states of Antiquity. They are powerful and independent towns that constitute the basis of society and provide much of the driving force behind developments. The Norwegian towns are not states in themselves but, following the great upheaval of 2021, the so-called federal revolution,

they acquired political status through conversion to conurbations. A conurbation often consists of two or more towns located close together. A major cause of this development was the urbanization pattern from the turn of the century onwards, often referred to as “urban sprawl”, whereby towns spread out and grew into each other. Conurbations formed in areas where encouraged by geographical conditions, as in the south of the country.

Today’s Norwegian conurbations are generally smaller than those of many other countries. The seven regions differ somewhat as regards economic orientation and size. While the Oslo region is primarily characterized by services, the two western regions are considerably more industrially oriented.

The conurbations began primarily as population concentrations and, although they long had considerable political power in practical politics, were not endowed with any formal political or administrative status until after the federal reform of 2021. Until then, such functions were the province of the central government and the municipalities, although there were early indications that changes were in process of being brought about by the constant expansion of the urban municipalities. From the start of the century, powerful forces strove to merge urban municipalities and conurbations to form a single political and administrative level.

However, it is not only because they constitute large population concentrations that the towns are seen as strong. It is also because the state, both in Norway and in the rest of Europe, has become relatively weaker. The unified and protective entity, that the nation-state once represented is no longer so important. The threat picture, though not entirely absent, at any rate differs from that found at the turn of the millennium, while the need for such protection is largely attended to by quite different bodies, i.e. by the EU and to some extent by the United Nations. The same applies in a large number of areas where various international bodies attend to responsibilities once viewed as being the province of the nation-state.

A more pronounced community of interests is constituted by the conurbations. Lines of conflict of the kind often previously found between towns and between countries are now primarily found between conurbations, which are also involved in continually changing alliances with and against each other. Sometimes neighbouring conurbations cooperate on furthering their common interests. At other times, they are in dispute with one another. Conflicts may concern anything from funding provided by the state or the EU to the establishment of national institutions, both desirable and undesirable, or may be more symbolic, as in the great culture disputes. Sometimes there are clear lines of conflict between conurbations across national borders, such as Region South’s unwillingness to cooperate with Øresund and the Oslo region during the period 2025–2027. Region South was worried about the loss of jobs. However, relations with conurbations in other countries usually involve cooperation and, in this way, they attend to matters that were previously part of foreign trade policy.

Last but not least, the conurbations also play an important role in fostering regional identity through collective views. They have something that the county authorities lacked, a clearly defined heart and as a rule a limited area with clear boundaries that makes it easy for most people to identify with the conurbation and its inhabitants. But the conurbations also belong to a larger network of towns constituting an international

community consensus that cuts across most local cultures. Here it is that we find the unwritten rules for what real towns shall be like, for the institutions they must contain and for what is tacitly understood to be “done” or “not done”.

### 22.14.1 URBAN MENTALITY

The leader of the Urban Party, Sigfried Martinsen is looking forward with pleasure to the Urban World Congress in New York next week. The Norwegian Urban Party, a relatively populist party with roots back to the weekly newspaper *The Evening News* (previously *The Morning News*), has been assigned the task of giving a presentation on how Norway has succeeded in deregulating the social democratic welfare model and developing the Scandinavian ideal model for a liberal and urban state. Martinsen has said in an interview with CNN that the main strategy is to allow the market to control most areas, while ensuring a minimum level of publicly financed services for those who for various reasons fall outside. Social unrest is of no benefit to our market economy, stresses Martinsen to the interviewer. As politicians, it is important for us to know what is the responsibility of society and what can be entrusted to private initiative. We must respect the right of individuals to live their own lives. The purpose of public systems is to support flexibility in all markets and freedom of choice for individual solutions.

The urban mentality that most people identify with today has changed attitudes to politics and public control from those that prevailed just a few decades ago. The principal value lies in the freedom to make one's own choices, not necessarily economic choices, although this too is more manifest than it was, but more fundamental choices concerning one's own life and life course. In many ways, the orientation of the public sector and of policy in general is an expression of the wider acceptance of these attitudes, but it is also clear that the vigorous growth of the conurbations has played an important part in enabling its implementation.

People's identity is largely associated with the experience of an urban community, a community that is in strong position not only because towns are larger than they were but also because of their increasing resemblance to one another in cultural terms. In many ways, the towns represent the future rational community. This is where the exciting jobs are to be found, the jobs or the projects for the future, such as media, advertising, e-trading, finance, etc. It is also easy to find exciting jobs in other towns, both in Norway and in the rest of the world, although relatively few people take advantage of these opportunities. Nonetheless, most people value the fact that they are there.

For this urban regime, politics, particularly national politics, represents something negative and out of date. Urbanist ideology often draws attention to the role played by the state in preventing an increasing part of the population from enjoying the opportunities represented by the urban community. "The purpose of the nation-state is to draw boundaries between different peoples, but today there are no inequalities to draw boundaries between." It is further maintained that this is why the nation-state has given rise to the major differences between those who have potential and those who have no potential to make use of all the opportunities that exist.

The towns also represent a community with very few duties or limitations for individual citizens. People are to a great extent allowed to be in charge of their own affairs, and for

many people this is exactly where the greatest advantage of Regio lies. Reactionary and traditionalist voices have been heard to say, not without a certain malice, that Regio is a community without rights. One has responsibilities and rights as a citizen of the state but not as a member of Regio, and it is precisely this factor that is reflected in the political cleavages most clearly manifest in 2030.

In the tensions between town and state it appears that the towns and conurbations are making most headway. On the one hand, the towns and conurbations have gained increasing power, both over their own territory and over progressively greater areas of surrounding country, a power that primarily concerns economy, and thus also jobs, housing, services, etc., and which thus differs from the power basis of the nation-state, coercive force, regulations, taxes, etc. In other words, the almost self-evident psychological effect of this gives the towns a major advantage over the state despite the fact that potential and services are not offered free of charge by the towns.

Nor, on the other hand, are the state welfare services what they once were, and what is now referred to as “citizen standard” is far from what used to be considered acceptable in a welfare state. In the view of the experts, this has been a self-reinforcing development, and is primarily a consequence of removing an increasing number of areas from the public sector, i.e. transferring them either to private actors or to municipal initiatives, which in practice also have transferred them to the private sector. As a result of the reduction in the range of services offered by the state, the interest for and legitimacy of the central government level has also subsided.

The economic autonomy of both the central government and the Storting has been reduced at the same pace as the conurbations have acquired greater power. However, this is not the only problem; much of the basis for the decisions and arrangements that were previously the domain of national politics have been transferred either to the towns or, to an even greater extent, to more or less supranational bodies, primarily the EU. Most regulations with economic consequences are decided within the EU system, and it is therefore not unusual that both conurbations and commerce and industry communicate directly with Brussels rather than via the central government and the Storting.

Among the relatively few who are concerned about this, there are many people who are sceptical of the development and who believe democracy to be in danger. The lack of democracy in the EU system has been regarded as an established truth for half a century, but this view seems to be gradually changing. Within the EU itself a great deal has happened. Not least, EU institutions are now far more open and accessible to the general public than they were at the end of the last century. There are also many indications that this trend will continue. As interest for national politics declines, the public directs its attention towards the regions and EU institutions. In reality, the European Commission and the civil service have acquired increased power at the expense of the European Parliament but, since “democracy” is no longer perceived as being synonymous with parliamentary, representative democracy (as a result of the many programmes for development of deliberative democracy during the period 1995 – 2020), the Commission and the civil service were viewed in a far more positive light. It

must also be said that the representative system of government was not particularly well adapted to the strong growth of the conurbations.

An important role in the development of the regions has been played by what are known as cooperative boards in the conurbations, where industrial interests are strongly represented. These institutions, which have corporate characteristics, have high legitimacy in many of the towns. This is partly because they are efficient and fast-working, but also because the purely representative democracy has lost public esteem over the years. It must also be said that Norwegian parliamentarism has never really respected the principle “one man, one vote”, and this has made it easy for alternative principles of government to gain ground.

At the national level a corresponding parliamentary democratic deficit has emerged through increased use of referendums. The official explanation is that information technology has made it extremely simple to implement such referendums. However it is also well known that referendums can also be used to legitimate decisions taken at the national level, and as a weapon against the conurbations in the battle for control of the public sector.

The conceptual basis for public control today is *effective* control – not only control in the form of the operation of institutions, agencies and measures, but also in relation to the decision-making process itself. Society is subject to constant change, and the pace of change is rapid. This, at any rate, is how the situation is perceived by the majority of people, and the old procedural perspective on democracy and public decision-making processes is regarded as inadequate in this respect. The scope of issues subject to political consideration has therefore been drastically reduced. Flexible solutions and individual adaptations have become the general rule. Many of the factors that were subject to public regulation at the turn of the century are in 2030 entrusted to individual citizens and the market.

State control involves not only adapting policy to meet the needs of the times. As a rule, the international community establishes frameworks for activities, and in a much more attentive way than before. In most areas, such as foreign affairs, finance, transport and labour market policy, it is primarily the EU and the WTO that take responsibility for the actual control.

In many ways, the state has become more of a control body that ensures that the international rules are complied with and that the institutions that are assigned the responsibility for policy administration comply with the agreements and contracts that are entered into. If anything goes wrong, the solution is generally a public hearing in the Storting. It is a long time since the novelty wore off such hearings and, as a rule, it is the central government politicians who come off worst. It is nevertheless a weapon that the central government has at its disposal, and it is frequently used. The hearing on the Public Employment Service is a good example. Following the scandal where stock exchange listing of the Public Employment Service resulted in the take-over of the whole employment service by Manpower in 2007, the hearing lasted for seven years.

Although some small municipalities look upon the central government as an ally in their struggle with the large urban municipalities, the state is in a weak position in relation to

the local government sector. For example, the central government is no longer able to earmark support for measures that it or the Storting find appropriate. The subsidiarity principle has a strong position in the EU, and also imposes limitations on state control. In practice, this entails that the state must negotiate with the regions concerning measures it wishes to implement throughout the country. This has particularly been exploited by the conurbations to achieve their own objectives.

The regional governments form the second level of the Norwegian political system. It is here that the political struggle takes place between the various interests within a region, and it is here that the region's political identity is shaped and maintained. Following the reform of 2021 this institutional level became the new mid-level of Norwegian public administration. The regional governments have a large sphere of activity and are today the most powerful political institutions in Norway.

Regional thinking reached Scandinavia as a political concept and in the form of concrete arrangements that were imported to Scandinavia from countries further south. The first concrete outcome of the new thinking was the establishment of the Baltic Sea region and the Barents region early in the 1990s. Belgium was very early in defining regions. As early as 1980 the Belgian central authorities were obliged to implement a constitutional reform whereby the country was divided into three regions, where the third region was the bilingual capital, Brussels. In 1990 a new reform was implemented giving the regions separate governments with responsibility for foreign trade, agriculture, education and research.

The reform of 2021 resulted in distribution of all taxation in Norway between the three levels. The state was no longer to transfer funds to regions or municipalities except in special cases. In practice this has led to very varying levels of taxation in Norway since there are variations from region to region and from municipality to municipality. All VAT goes to the state, all property tax goes to the municipalities and all other taxes, such as income tax and wealth tax go to the regions, as well as which everyone must pay three per cent income tax to the EU.

#### **22.14.2 THE POWER OF THE REGIONS**

Formally speaking, there are three levels of public administration in Norway in 2030: the state, the regions and the municipalities. In practice, it is also correct to view the EU as an administrative level over the nation-state. However, the municipal administrative level is extremely weak and, although the Aldermen's Acts of 1837 are still in force, the federal reform of 2021 moved local power up to the regional level. In most cases, the regional level is closely associated with the largest town in the region, and this has made strong municipal democracy superfluous for a number of towns. Within the boundaries of the nation-state there are therefore only two effective levels of public administration.

The Regional Governors' Offices ostensibly represent the central government at the regional level, and have been brought about by merging the former County Governors' Offices. Although they formally represent the state, in practice they have developed to function for the conurbations in which they operate. Today the regional governments are extremely active public administrative bodies, and represent a major departure in Norwegian public administration during this century. In practice the urban districts are also a separate level of public administration, and have a status similar to that of the smaller municipalities outside the conurbations.

In 2005 Norway celebrated a hundred years as an independent nation and applied for membership of the EU. In the referendum held in September of the following year, 74 per cent voted in favour of membership and Norway became a full member from January 2007. Most of the population, including the Storting and the Government, felt that this was none too soon. It became increasingly clear that it was the EU that was responsible for making the most important decisions and that Norway was more or less obliged to comply with them. The result of the negotiations was less favourable for



Norway than that achieved in relation to previous applications, but the country was under more pressure now, and was therefore ready to agree to a greater loss of sovereignty. The EU had also become more unified, and there was now less room for divergent views concerning the established core of the cooperation, including the Monetary Union. The EU also played an important role as an ally in relation to other supranational bodies, which have become gradually more powerful. This particularly applies to the WTO, but also the UN and a number of the more technical regimes, such as the ISO, MPEG, etc.

Membership of the EU also speeded up the processes leading to changes in the relative power of the state and the conurbations. Interest for Norwegian EU membership has traditionally been strongest in the towns, and membership has proved extremely useful for the conurbations. Not only has the EU been an ally in many contexts; the gradual consolidation of the regionalization policy has also helped the largest conurbations in Norway to exploit the advantages of the major regionalization programmes. A large EU programme for cooperation between regions across national borders has been of decisive importance for several Norwegian municipalities, particularly because one of the main components of the programme has concerned the development of new and effective transport solutions between the regions.

The membership resulted in a large number of state responsibilities and institutions either being completely taken over by corresponding agencies in the EU or being converted to branches of such agencies. This applies to heavy institutions such as Norges Bank (the Norwegian central bank) and Statistics Norway, which is now part of Eurostat. However, although a number of institutions have changed their affiliation, most of them are nevertheless still subject to the authority of the Norwegian state, while it is perhaps in this area that the biggest changes have taken place. For many of the state agencies, particularly inspectorates, it is generally the EU that functions as the legislative and judicial authority, while the state is merely responsible for the executive operations.

### **22.14.3 A REGIONALIZED PUBLIC SERVICE**

The first thing one would notice about the public service in 2030 compared with that of thirty years ago is that it is considerably smaller. This is perhaps not so strange since many of its tasks have been transferred to the regions. There are therefore fewer people working in the central government administration, in the ministries and directorates and other state agencies. However, it is difficult to compare the scope and functions of the state with those that applied before the turn of the century, primarily because the organization and distribution of work are quite different. The central government administration now consists primarily of the ministries and the remaining directorates. There are also fewer ministries, in fact only four:

- The Ministry of Home Affairs (Labour, Justice, Local Government, Police, Children and Church)
- The Ministry of Health and Social Security
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (diplomacy and defence)
- The Ministry of Research and Education

All other responsibilities are taken care of by the regions, particularly those that concern the creation of identity, i.e. all education and all culture.

However, what we might characterize as the external state is still extensive, although several of its agencies have relatively few ties with the central level. Several of the agencies, which attend primarily to various supervisory functions, do not regard themselves as state agencies, but more as independent foundations that monitor important social functions. Many of the instructions also come directly from the EU system rather than from the Government.

Other agencies and establishments are also independent in the sense that they are self-financing and, as a result of the great budget reform, have only a limited affiliation to the central government. This particularly applies to the state hospitals, which are largely self-financing, although the state covers treatment costs over and above standard patient's charges. Many tasks are also carried out by private actors, both on contract and as a result of privatization.

Although it may not seem so today, the major reform of public administration that took place in 2021 was intended as a compromise. The reform was born out of the wish to arrest and modify the regionalization the country had undergone during the 15–20 years prior to 2021. Central government players and many of the less expansive regions viewed with concern the fact that some regions began to take on an almost nation-like identity. There was quite simply a fear that separate states would materialize, as had already occurred several other places in Europe. The Basque country and Flanders became new nation-states quite early in the new century. A major referendum resulted in support for a proposal to increase the scope of the central government at the expense, not of the regions, but of municipal autonomy. This cunning compromise created a tidier administrative landscape and greatly increased the number of mergers between municipalities. Urban municipalities, that wanted a bigger say in relation both to the state and to the small outlying municipalities, were very satisfied, and most of the regions were exultant. Typical large rural municipalities and the most dynamic of the regions were disappointed over the result but, after a short while, all of the regions found the solution satisfactory.

The office of County Governor was also reorganized and took over more functions in order to strengthen the role of the central government in the regions. However, the Regional Governors' Offices, as the new offices were designated, are equally or perhaps even more closely associated with the regions, and are in reality only to a small degree subject to the authority of the central government. The regional governors have a primarily operative rather than supervisory function and one of their main responsibilities involves negotiation of contracts with private actors who perform tasks on behalf of the state. This particularly applies to services that were previously the responsibility of the former county authorities. They also have supervisory responsibility primarily associated with their role as agent for the owner, i.e. the state and, increasingly, the municipal liaison committees in the conurbations.

The municipal liaison committees were established by the municipalities in the conurbations to meet an increasing need for coordination both with the new regional governors' offices and the regional councils, and also to enable the regions to take a

more effective part in EU regional programmes. The liaison committees have proved effective and have taken over much of the actual policy development on behalf of the smaller municipalities. The conurbations pursue an active policy in relation to the world at large, particularly in trade matters. Negotiation of agreements is the responsibility of the EU, but responsibility for positioning and for more operative functions lies at the regional level. The regions have their own representation offices.

Many of the small municipalities, particularly those that lie on the outskirts of the conurbations, often experience that they have little influence. Reduced economy as a result of depopulation makes it difficult to hold strong positions.

The opposition to mergers between municipalities is therefore not as strong as it was. For many small municipalities, this is often the only possibility open. Between 1959 and 1968 mergers between Norwegian municipalities reduced their number from 743 to 451. The pace then slowed down so that, by the year 2000, there were still 430 municipalities. However, this year the number dropped to under 200 for the first time.

#### **22.14.4 UNIVERSAL INSTRUMENTS**

Perhaps the most obvious instrument applied by the public sector is the reduction in its ambitions as regards welfare policy, not least because, in a regionalized Europe, one is obliged to accept greater differences between regions. The level of taxation varies a great deal between regions and, interestingly, it is the regions with the highest tax rates that are most popular and most successful in creating a profitable cultural identity. With the exception of a central university at doctoral level, responsibility for educational policy lies with the regions. Service industries are primarily in the private sector, but the public sector has responsibility for a minimum of services in relation to social groups that are unable to pay for private facilities primarily because they cannot afford accident and sickness insurance. The private services available are primarily based on private insurance.

The following picture has impressed itself during the last 10–15 years: growth in private solutions in areas that were previously public coupled with the emergence of public administrative bodies with differing degrees of autonomy in relation to government and ministries. This was partly brought about by forming companies to operate in the increasingly competitive market, and partly by establishing foundations.

In the public sector EMS systems now play an important role. EMS (Electronic Management System) is really only a technical term for public information made generally available via the Internet. This is a coordinative system that applies not only in Norway but throughout the EU. By means of this system, matters concerning every single citizen can be efficiently dealt whatever they relate to, from health insurance, pension payments or work permits to applications for building permission. The efficiency gain has been enormous.

Most care workers are no longer employees of the state or municipality, but of private companies. Schemes have also been set up for the purchase of nursing home beds in southern Europe. The purchase of services in other countries is one of the ways Norway has chosen to deal with problems associated with its ageing population. This was a conscious decision, regarded as a supplement to the import of service workers to

Norway. Both the users of services and the Norwegian population at large are most satisfied when pensioners allow themselves to be looked after in warmer countries.

A form of digitized state emerged, organized around a large number of networks. Social scientists referred to it as “the disaggregated state”. The multinational companies were models for a type of organization that shaped economic life taking political life by storm with industrial networks, European networks for a group of political parties and networks of towns or regions. The EU’s enormous information network, Coreu, played a major role, flanked by the regional data networks. Information exchange and interaction between the levels was made easier, swifter and more transparent. Networks of coastal regions, regions struggling with dying industries, high technology towns, etc. In addition to these “official” networks, informal networks are developing, consisting of public and private actors who view their interests as being served by interaction. They may have a common history and a common interest, and have their prestige and careers associated with the network. When such private networks become sufficiently powerful, policy will be shaped within the networks, which in its turn will result in policy outside the traditional political structures.

## 22.15 POSTSCRIPT BY THE SOCIAL HISTORIAN 2030

### 22.16 STYLISHLY OUT OF STEP

Excerpt, chapter five, Sverre Jervell (2023) *Stylishly out of step. My life in eight acts.* (yyy\\:harvard.edu.mfa.197)

In our neck of the woods, we come late but we do it in style. During the middle ages, we organized ourselves in a far more centralist way than most other political entities in Europe. While people on the continent spent their time quarrelling about the power of the King versus the Church and political levels flowed over into one another, we had a clear line of command all the way from the King and his men down to the peasantry. In the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries a strong nationalist movement sprang into existence in Europe, but not until the 1830s did it make itself felt in Norway. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, nationalism reached its zenith on the continent and was in a dialectical manner succeeded by federalism. The nation-states gave way to regional and supranational solutions, while we used our oil money to cultivate nationalism as never before. In chapter three I mentioned the strong effect that Hans Magnus Enzensbergers book on Europe and Norway had on me in the 1980s. I interpreted his view of a “Norway out of step” as meaning that we would end up following the others’ example after lagging behind for half a century or so. It proved correct. In the long view of European history, we in the north follow the lead of those who live further south in the end. But the Norwegian wave of regionalism at the beginning of this century was the result of another Norwegian failure to keep time. Underneath the *national* the *regional* was hibernating. The Hålogaland Theatre and the Borgarting Court of Appeal and Nidar chocolate factory all drew strength from this underlying current, and reminded us even then that, despite the celebration of Norwegian homogeneity in abstract political contexts, in our food habits, in our religious life and in other areas that resist remodelling we still had our regional identity intact. When at last we became part of

Europe, we put our best foot forward and did so with a vengeance. It took its time, but this was only to be expected when the oil money was used to postpone a restructuring that more and more people realized would come sooner or later.

# Bonsai

## 23 CHAPTER 5

# 24 Bonsai – NORWAY●2030

Norway in 2030 is a liberal society where as few responsibilities as possible are held by the state. The market has taken over almost everything. The state's revenues are derived from funds that administer the proceeds of the sale of state property and from value-added tax, the only remaining tax. The only social safety net provided by the public sector is *citizens' pay*. This has only one rate, and is paid to everyone over the age of eighteen not involved in working life, that is to say students, pensioners, chronically sick and disabled and anyone else who has no income from regular gainful employment. The contribution to the economy made by the petroleum sector is now small. It is true that we still burn gas, but the companies responsible for this activity are not among the most profitable, and international environmental taxes take a large cut of the profits. These taxes are largely decided by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is in practice controlled by the ten major multinationals. In 2030 environmental taxes constitute an important element of the WTO's policy since it is the big multinationals that now control both the ecology and the economy.


In Norway, as in most other countries, it is now the big multinationals that provide the safety net previously provided by the welfare state. The most important companies are of course those operating in the insurance market. Many insurances are now compulsory, but many employers provide very good welfare schemes for their employees and their families both during and after terminating employment. The largest item on the national budget is nevertheless the citizens' pay scheme. Since in practice it is the only welfare scheme in 2030 financed by the public sector, this scheme is our most important social policy instrument.

However, many other facilities are available. The supply by private institutions of everything from emergency relief to culture has grown at the same pace as the welfare state has been phased out. Many people regard this as a shameful chapter of the country's history, but most people regard the services now provided as superior to the best ever provided by the welfare state. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the whole civil society in 2030 is the complete absence of public policy. For the most part, people are now free to do as they wish. There is no longer anyone who decides what films you may order for your television or counts the number of bottles you carry across the border.

Public administration has been almost completely withdrawn. In 2030 there is very little left of the once so extensive Norwegian civil service. Almost everything has been sold, closed down or merged with something else. The largest parties, which are still ranged from right to left, all prefer a *laissez-faire* regime, though in varying degrees. All state activities with an element of commercial operations have been sold while most other

service activities have been contracted out or taken over by private or voluntary establishments that are paid for supplying services in accordance with state contracts.





## 24.1 MAIN IDEAS AND ASSUMPTIONS

*Funds and VAT.* The national markets are being woven increasingly closer together while the autonomy of individual nation-states is being steadily reduced. Capital, goods, services and brainpower float freely. There is considerable agreement that policy must be adapted to this development, which in itself has major consequences for deciding which responsibilities can be assumed by the state. The result is a development whereby the market is mainly left to itself at the same time as more and more areas of society are included in the market. State revenues are dependent on two elements: the state's own financial dispositions and VAT. All other taxes have been abolished.

*Auctions and right of common.* A large part of the state's economic resources result from the sale of natural resources and of the companies that previously administered these resources, such as Statoil, Hydro, SDFI (State Direct Financial Interest), Statkraft, etc. Other state-owned enterprises have also been sold and the proceeds added to the state capital. Most natural resources have been auctioned off or put into the care of professional managers. However citizens' access to the countryside is still as it was at the turn of the century. The right of the public to roam freely in the countryside and to exploit fishing and hunting rights is protected by law.

*Citizens' pay.* The mobile and highly educated people who combine technology with a general knowledge of society and relational development, the entrepreneurs and the innovators become the new dominant social groups. These operate just as much in "Cyberspace". All public pensions and benefits have been abolished and replaced by a single general scheme known as citizens' pay. This scheme applies to absolutely everyone over the age of 18 who does not have gainful employment.

*Hollywood and the avant-garde.* The big multinationals dominate not only the world's economy, but also the economic, social and cultural life of individual countries.

Culturally speaking, this is the global Hollywood, where the heavy machinery of the entertainment industry is a major influence in people's lives. Greater priority has been given to entertainment and less to art. This has had a devastating effect on the art world not least in Norway, where the state previously provided a certain degree of support for exclusive and traditional art forms. However, there are also counter-tendencies. Even though not a single krone of public money is spent on the arts, private sponsors involve themselves increasingly in culture. There are also forces within both new and traditional art forms that oppose the fundamental values of modern society. Both the established art scene and the avant-garde receive support from a large and growing public. Today, art is responsible for articulating subtle political protests, which gives rise to considerable friction with the established ideological regime.

## 24.2 BIOMARAZZI

Svein Johannesen has known for some time that it would come to this. It has happened before, and after all it's all part of the natural order of life. He has been downsized, downscaled, made redundant, call it what you will, but it's over. Johannesen has worked for Biomarazzi for three years, three hard and we might perhaps say good years. At any rate, three years of a normally highly educated middle-aged man's life. In the course of these three years at Biomarazzi he has worked on several different R&D projects. When creating new medicines, the company runs several internally competing projects. The development work usually takes six to seven months.

The last three projects he has been on have all failed, and have also ended up right at the bottom of the internal ranking. Although there are no rules that say you shall be fired if you are not on the winning team, there is no doubt that he is no longer an attractive member of staff. Disappointing, yes it is bitterly disappointing. After working 12 to 14 hours a day for three years, it is over. But he has not forgotten the first, glorious year. Then he was on the winning team and could wallow in share options and fat bonuses when the internal ranking was announced. But it would take a lot to hold his own now. He is over 50 and is beginning to feel his age in more ways than one. He is not as fit as he used to be, probably because he doesn't get enough exercise, and all the direct and indirect hints from colleagues to find something else get on his nerves. The very word "colleagues" seems hollow and meaningless.

People over 50 should not be hanging on to the most demanding and well-paid jobs. Perhaps this is how it ought to be, but Svein knows that he has a pretty miserable life in store for him. He will have to sell the flat and will lose most of his friends because he won't be able to afford the cost of his meagre social life any more, and perhaps his marriage will go west as well. It is not at all certain that Jonathan can be bothered with a fellow who isn't "corporate" any more. He knows that, when he leaves the building, his name, fingerprint and picture will all be deleted. He will no longer have access to the Biomarazzi complex; he will be out of the system, once and for all. There is not much waiting for him out there. He has some savings – has put a bit by during the good years, but it won't last long. Citizens' pay isn't much. It's intended to keep people out of the gutter and no more. The shares he won at the various places he worked have all been cashed in over the years and spent on poor investments, expensive holidays and exotic amusements.

He could of course try and find a new job, but he knows deep down that he hasn't much chance of landing anything on the same level. His network is gone – if he ever really had much of a network. It wasn't really much more than a sort of mutual admiration society that only functioned as long as everything went according to plan and his income was on the way up.

He will have to find a new job at a lower level, with lower status. That is the decision he knows he will have to make at the end of the day. He could surely get a job folding shirts at Follestad or working in the checkout at Wal-Mart, or he could compete with the Poles for a job driving a garbage truck or perhaps try to find a niche in some market that no-one has thought of yet.

His sister Inger is more successful. Like him, she has been a project nomad all her life, but she has always been the more articulate of the two. She is an excellent communicator. When she speaks, people listen. She is a civil servant. The ministries are also characterized by internal competition, and Inger has led several winning teams. She is one of the most successful report writers in the country. She has also had her frustrations, but she has thicker skin than he has – she always has had. What is more, she is a bit of a scrooge, so she has laid up quite a bit of cash over the years.

Svein Johannesen is depressed and not a little disappointed with himself. He, who has been one of those successful young men who flock around the most lucrative and rewarding jobs, who are paid enormous salaries and bask in their own success. He loved the system and always felt a touch of contempt for those who didn't, and who were unable to succeed. But at this moment he just feels sick. Svein remembers that his mother always said it was easy to mistake one's good fortune for skill. The words never made much impression on him, but now on his way home, enclosed in a Bugatti of last year's model with the sky as his roof, he recollects the words of the 80 year-old lady whom he sometimes has hardly been prepared to acknowledge as his parent.

He make a sudden decision. Turning off the motorway, he sets his course towards Sollihøgda, where his mother and 21 other pensioners have set up house with a cook, a doctor and a couple of Hungarian nurses. In a thoroughly privatized health service, this is one of the solutions preferred by the middle classes. Quite moderate, and utterly decent. He finds her sitting on the veranda, as if she had expected him. He kisses her on the cheek and sits down beside her. She has understood.

– So it's over now, my boy? she asks, smiling sorrowfully and looking at him in a way he can't remember her doing since he was a small boy.

## **24.3 FREE MOVEMENT OF EVERYTHING AND EVERYONE**

In Norway we have experienced what we call company sectorization. This means that certain companies have almost completely taken over whole sectors of society. Because the Norwegian market is so small and because EU requirements concerning competition only apply at the EU level, national monopolies of certain sectors are not regarded as problematical. For example, almost the entire Norwegian roads sector is now under the control of Bertelsmann, who bought up Strong Communications (the former Norwegian Public Roads Administration) and almost all hospitals are now run by Zürich Health Care. There are many reasons for this development, but the main one is that, at the beginning of the 2020s, Norway, which had traditionally had a very open economy, decided to make a radical change in the role of the central government in line with the major changes taking place within the EU. The EU had developed, not into a close political union, but into a relatively well-coordinated economic community.

Norway became a member of the EU in 2018. In spite of all its imperfections, it was a community that actively fostered certain coordinative standards within health and education. As the pressure on public finances increased, there were changes in the political landscape. The attempt by the EU to avoid "tax dumping" by creating a uniform tax policy so that no states could lie below a certain minimum level was not

successful, and this defect was, as we shall see, later exploited by Norway. The success of the multinationals in become the most prominent actors in the world economy is due to their becoming so wide-ranging, not only in economic terms, but also culturally. They provide their employees with a clear identity. The demand for identity is one of the most characteristic features of the new century, and no-one does a better job in this area than the big multinationals. They all have their distinctive stamp – it is this that ensures their survival – and they offer a wide range of services for their employees, which to a great extent replace the facilities that used to be offered by the public sector.

In Norway, revenues from the petroleum sector fell drastically from 2020, just as expected. Offshore petroleum production fell because the reserves were almost used up, and the fall in production coincided surprisingly well with the fall in the price of oil. An energy revolution was in the offing and the profitability of offshore production fell dramatically. The price of gas, which lags slightly behind fluctuations in the oil price, also fell, although not quite so steeply, since the tough international climate regime was more favourable for energy carriers with a lower carbon content. Certain measures had already been adopted. Higher education had been privatized, but health and lower education were still safe in the public sector's lap.

In 2020, Norway was still a very wealthy country, one of the wealthiest in the world, but wealth had also resulted in a demand for benefits that were reliant on vigorous economic growth, and this had now come to an end. In this situation the state had three courses of action open to it:

- a) increase the tax burden in order to maintain the level of welfare
- b) reduce the level of welfare
- c) change the way welfare was organized

Or it could combine the different strategies. In 2022 the Storting appointed a broad committee to find a solution that could find favour with a majority of the population and the Storting. Several different models were considered, and the one that won with a clear margin (68 per cent of the votes in direct elections), was entitled *The reform for well-deserved welfare*. It had two revolutionary elements: the introduction of *citizens' pay* and the phasing out of the taxation system.

## 24.4 THE WELFARE BASIS

The control of natural resources today has changed in a number of areas. In some fields the market has taken over, in others the state via the statutory framework has provided for a greater transfer of benefits to the general public. One example is the extended right of common access to the countryside. This right has always been strong in Norway, and there has been strong popular mobilization to extend it even further. Shore zones have broadly speaking become available to everyone, the national parks have been made larger and more numerous and hunting and fishing have been made generally available to the public unless resources should indicate otherwise.

The Resource Directorate has drawn up a statutory framework for the auctioning of all types of rights where the demand is greater than the supply, and effective exchanges have been set up for the sale of licenses for everything from cloudberry picking to wreck diving. The international quota system for environmental emissions has gradually been adopted in other areas with limited resources, both renewable and nonrenewable. One example is trade in emission permits on the ETS Exchange. The level of these permits is fixed by the EU on the basis of assessments of the amounts of different toxins tolerated by the European countryside. These are sold to the highest bidder, and environment management is thus extremely cost-effective. Although there are many arguments against such a regime, there is no doubt that it provides a high environmental quality for a small outlay.

#### **24.4.1 TRANSPORT AND FISHERIES**

The state has withdrawn from almost all sectors, and the infrastructural is no exception. The Norwegian Public Roads Administration no longer exists. Road tolls have become the rule rather than the exception. Roads are paid for by those who use them. Recent years have also seen the implementation of several new private railway projects. The Norwegian transport company Braathens has had great success with its railways. As a result of new rail transport technology, domestic flights between Oslo and the largest Norwegian towns are no longer profitable. Both the new Coastal Route to Kristiansand and Stavanger and the new railway to Bergen via Haukeli have been constructed and are operated by private companies.

Fishery management has been changed dramatically. After the crisis that hit the cod fisheries at the start of the new century, the whole quota system was discontinued. The Directorate of Fisheries assumed that the fishing industry would regulate the catch itself if given the responsibility. This was also the case, but it required long-term industrial players, which Norway had a plentiful supply of in this sector. In order to prevent individual companies from pulling out of the industry whenever conditions were poor, they were required to guarantee that they would have a certain long-term involvement in this sector before being granted licences to fish within the Norwegian fishery limits. It was thought that this would give them the necessary incentive for rational resource management.

However, in the process that followed discontinuation of the quota system, it was not easy for the coastal fishermen to survive. They discovered that the quota regime had afforded them a degree of protection that was now no longer present, and most of them went out of business. Very few of them had enough capital to survive the bad years, and there were therefore not many of them left when the good times returned. During the years around 2010, stocks again became large and profits were enormous for the few large fishery companies that controlled the Norwegian fisheries. The energy sector was already largely liberalized at the start of the century and today, of course, parts of the largest energy companies are multinational. For example, Enron is Norway's largest onshore energy company, and has been the largest developer of wind power and solar energy installations. Today, the supplier structure within the energy market has changed radically. Suppliers are increasingly service companies that are also involved in other types of activity.

The management of the gas and petroleum sector has always been associated with strict state guidelines. The policy of distributing concessions for different fields has been carried out in new ways. This is not only because there are no longer any purely national companies, and because the state no longer owns shares in such companies, but also because there is now a tendency to let the market decide for itself which fields shall be developed and at what price. Also here auctions have become an important instrument for deciding prices. Much recent research indicates that the traditional management of Norwegian natural resources, not least energy resources, did not result in particularly impressive yields.

#### **24.4.2 WATCH OUT FOR NUMBER ONE!**

The so-called “Equal-Citizen Prosperity Model”, which is the academic term that has replaced the old term “welfare state”, entails quite simply a belief that fundamentally equal treatment of all citizens results in the best economic prospects for the country and thus for the citizens themselves.

The introduction of citizens’ pay was at first extremely controversial. The debate that led up to it was exhaustive, and considerable political involvement was generated during this period. The result was the introduction of a scheme that was called the *Norwegian state citizens’ pay*, which involved all citizens over 18 years of age who were not gainfully employed. Citizens’ pay replaced all other social security arrangements (job-seekers’ allowance, National Insurance, sickness benefit, etc.), as well as social welfare benefits and student grants. Citizens’ pay has only one rate, which lies at approximately 40 per cent of the average wage, i.e. approximately the level of the minimum pension at the time the reform was introduced. The reform resulted in the abolition of a large number of public institutions in the area of social welfare benefits, including the National Insurance Service and the State Educational Loan Fund, giving rise to a large private insurance market. Many factors pointed towards such a reform. The reform of continuing education, which the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions and the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry agreed on at the turn of the century, had as time went on a major impact. In practice, this reform put an end to unemployment in the traditional sense.

In the recession of 2010, when many people lost their jobs as a result of staff cuts in a number of sectors, the continuing education scheme was used to provide further training or retraining. In this way, the competence of the labour force was maintained and increased, eventually leading to an increase in productivity, which benefited everyone, chiefs and braves alike. But there were those who fell by the wayside. These people took course after course without ever improving their qualifications, and finally ended up in a growing group of social welfare clients.

As time went on, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions also struggled for the introduction of study pay. They acknowledged that a long education is, in itself, an argument in support of higher pay, and thus distorts a negotiation situation that has traditionally been based on parameters decided by the situation of sectors open to competition. This was logical since the Norwegian economy had long been extremely open, among the most open in the world. Yet another reason to consider citizens’ pay had emerged. Last, but not least, it was necessary to do something about the rise in

pension payments by the public sector, and the number of adult citizens on disability benefits seemed to be constantly rising. A reduction of the public sector expenses in this area was therefore imperative.

The motives behind such a reform were not only many, they also came from widely differing groups. The anarchists believed that citizens' pay would enable people more easily to live the lives they wished to live, thus avoiding the proverbial slavery of paid labour. The social democrats wanted a distant stigmatization of the unemployed, while the social liberals wanted respectability for all, including those who did not adhere to the Protestant work ethic or who, for other reasons, did not succeed in participating in the world of work. The economic liberals envisaged being able, by a single move, to be rid of large parts of the public sector.

Roughly speaking, three different models for citizens' pay were considered:

- a) a benefit that would be paid to all citizens not in gainful employment and which would be the same for all recipients
- b) a benefit that would be paid to all citizens, regardless of whether they had other income
- c) a benefit associated with the introduction of flat tax. Citizens' pay would be granted to people whose income was lower than a certain amount.

The reason for finally deciding that citizens' pay would be given to all citizens not in gainful employment was that this approach made it appear that society made a distinction between work and leisure.

During the debate, many opinions were voiced on the effect that citizens' pay would have. Many of the predictions made at the time have since proved correct.

There were vigorous protests from senior citizens' organizations since the incomes of many pensioners would be reduced by the loss of all additional pensions. The organizations correctly predicted that this would result in a renewed interest in private pension schemes. However, the great majority of pensioners have made sound arrangements through the private pension market. On the other hand, many people on disability benefit now have poorer economy since benefits to this group have on average been greatly reduced, and they have also experienced more difficulty on the pension market. There are fewer of them and they are less well organized as a group than pensioners.

Some people maintained that a large number of unemployed people would be worse off and that, here too, there would be a large market for private insurance schemes. This proved only to a small extent to be correct. Today, most people who fall outside the labour market are better off on the citizens' pay scheme than they would have been if they had been dependent on social welfare, which they would have been after a certain period of unemployment. The poverty and insecurity later experienced by many of those who become unemployed is mainly a result of the privatization of the health system and the growth in crime, which primarily affects this group.



Almost all recipients of social welfare are now better off, quite simply because citizens' pay is more generous than social welfare benefits, but some have lost out because the follow-up provided on an individual basis by the social welfare office helped many of the most disadvantaged in finding their feet. Those who have benefited most from the new scheme are the students. They have been given an increased income both during their studies and afterwards since they no longer have student loans to pay back.

On losing all of these public benefits, employees' demands for insurance against sickness and unemployment were not only directed towards private insurance arrangements, but also towards the their employees.

Expenditure on National Insurance in the year 2000 was budgeted at approximately NOK 170 billion (Proposition No. 1 to the Storting 1999–2000: annex 1). In the same year, the State Educational Loan Fund had a budget of approximately NOK 7 billion, while social welfare benefits were budgeted at just under NOK 4 billion. This amounted to a total of NOK 181 billion.<sup>97</sup>

#### **24.4.3 THE VAT ERA**

The new taxation system is by far the most radical in the developed world. All state taxes with the exception of VAT have been abolished. VAT together with the revenue from state funds is used to finance citizens' pay, the justice sector, the armed forces, the small public health service and basic support for education. The state has no other expenditure. The municipalities are allowed to impose taxes at their discretion, but only in relation to municipal services, so in practice the municipal taxes are low or non-existent. This tax reform has increased productivity in society and has enabled Norway to show phenomenal growth rates in the course of just a few years. However Norway is not alone in adopting such a policy; countries such as Denmark, Austria and Spain are attempting to apply almost exactly similar models.

In the budget proposition for 2000, the Ministry of Finance predicted that the income from VAT and investment tax would total approximately NOK 115 billion. (Proposition No. 1 to the Storting (1999–2000)). Calculations presented by the Ministry

---

<sup>97</sup>In Norway in the year 2000, a total of 2.4 million people were in gainful employment, while 72 000 were unemployed. 73,2 per cent of the population (16–74 years) were either employed or unemployed in the fourth quarter of 1999. In 1998, there were 132 500 recipients of social welfare benefits. A total of NOK 3.7 billion was paid out in the form of social welfare benefits 1998. Social welfare clients received an average of NOK 28 200, or slightly more than NOK 5 600 a month. (Statistics Norway)

of Finance in the national budget for 2000 (Report No. 1 to the Storting (1999–2000) show that, if VAT had also been imposed on a selection of services, it would have been possible to collect a further NOK 5 billion. However, VAT has not been imposed on social services, health or education. Since several of these services are subsidized, it would make little sense to impose VAT on them. In our scenario, these sectors will be more commercialized, and such a strategy would not therefore be so complicated, as well as which the ideology in our scenario prescribes that total tax revenues shall remain unchanged. Roughly estimated, imposing VAT on these services would provide an additional income of NOK 100 billion, giving a total of NOK 215 billion, i.e. approximately 35 per cent today's fiscal budget.

#### **24.4.4 JOBS**

In the arena of working life today we witness considerable variations and an income level in most industries reflecting that of Europe. The social partners are no longer the same as they were 30 years ago. The Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO) has disintegrated, and now functions primarily as an industrial policy interest organization. It was indeed the NHO that suspended collective pay agreements in 2008 in the hope that the profitability of individual companies might be a decisive premise for pay negotiations. However, time was already running out for organizations of this kind.

The many new companies found little or no appeal in the confederation's message, and the employees had long since abandoned the conception that there was any collision between their interests and those of capital. The use of share options and other instruments had become extremely widespread, not only in small high-technology enterprises, but in almost all categories of establishment, such as in service industries and in pure industrial jobs. The employees gained much greater control of the small and medium-sized enterprises. The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), on the other hand, has largely survived, though it has no more than 500 000 members, as against the over 830 000 it had at the start of the century. The LO has become a quite different kind of trade union confederation than it used to be.

When collective agreements ceased to exist, the LO redefined its role. Today, the LO is just as much a bank, an insurance company and a supplier of services such as energy and telecommunications as it is a union confederation in the traditional sense. It offers support for individual and collective negotiations and provides legal advisory services. One need not be purely a wage-earner to qualify for membership of a union nowadays. Directors are also welcome. The slogan of the LO is "Welfare for all is our joint responsibility". The fact that the LO no longer sees the public sector as being the only possible solution does not mean that the LO has completely thrown ideology overboard. The organization is rooted in the conception that society exists, and that collective arrangements in a number of areas represent a high point of civilization.

The other trade union movements are gone. The Federation of Norwegian Professional Associations, the Confederation of Vocational Unions and the others all disappeared during the 2020s after trying for a long time to keep up with the increasing lack of faith in organizations demonstrated by their potential members. However, working life still

has its front lines. They are no longer between employees and employers – 60 per cent of the population derives more than 30 per cent of its income from self-employment, so that distinction doesn't mean much any more – but between those who have qualifications and those who either won't or can't manage to get any. People in gainful employment do not have much respect for those who are not. After the introduction of citizens' pay, there is a large layer of society that receives no more attention from the public sector or any other social service than the monthly pay slip.

The labour market is now largely characterized by those who, at the turn of the millennium, were referred to as generation X. There are plenty of jobs in Norway, and today's 30, 40 and 50 year-olds have influenced the labour market with preferences that are markedly different from those we were familiar with in the last century, not safe permanent jobs, but

- having the freedom to choose,
- spending long periods away from the labour market, for example engaged in private travels,
- showing curiosity for new challenges,
- viewing work as an opportunity for continuing learning and, not least,
- using public and private employment agencies when there is a need for new job contracts.

Many districts that have had problems competing for the most attractive manpower have their own employment agencies.

Consultancy activities relating to the drawing up of job and career contracts have become a major service. The individual power of employees has increased considerably partly as a result of the good labour market and the advice offered to individual job-seekers. In many cases working conditions are defined in contracts that resemble those entered into by professional athletes 30–40 years ago. Many employers offer good learning environments in order to be attractive in relation to other criteria than salary. The supervisory authorities are constantly watching out for tendencies to exploit weak groups when drawing up employment contracts.

Religious communities and other organizations in the voluntary sector have shown particular concern for the interests of people (not least young people) who are vulnerable in the current labour market, a labour market characterized by employers primarily preoccupied with securing their own freedom of action and choice when appointing staff.

## **24.5 MONEY FOR LIFE**

The liberal health regime is now almost fully implemented. In principle, everyone must manage for themselves. We must all belong to an insurance scheme, indeed it is illegal not to have insurance. Health is a growth sector and, on the whole, people are willing to pay the price. However, there is a certain group in the population that the insurance companies refuse to have anything to do with. This consists of the poorest, those with serious drug problems, those with criminal records. Five years ago this group passed the

200 000 mark. It now numbers over 240 000 people and is still growing. These are people who are not able to look after themselves. They are totally dependent on the help of the voluntary sector. In all towns over a certain size there are accident and emergency units, hostels, outpatients' clinics, etc. that provide for the essential needs of the most vulnerable groups of the population. These facilities are financed by donations from the Storting, business and industry and the efforts of volunteers. The general state of health of the population may be an interesting parameter for assessing how the new liberal health policy is functioning. There has been a general improvement in the state of health of the great majority. This can mainly be explained by progress within medical technology and not by the ownership of the health sector. However, there is a large gap within this group. The best form of genetic therapy, that which saves or lengthens lives, transplant surgery, etc. is also the dearest. Today, age and income are closely associated in a way that is relatively new. The affluent have always lived longer, but this has been due to a healthier lifestyle. Now, in addition to this, wealthy people are able to purchase medical services that radically alter the length and quality of life.

Poor people, those unable to afford insurance who only have citizens' pay to live off, find that their state of health deteriorates in both relative and absolute terms. The average age in this group has fallen to under 70 years, while the average for the population as a whole lies around 95 years. People in these marginalized groups eat more meat and have a far higher alcohol consumption than the rest of the population, and are completely unable to afford major life extension measures or genetic therapy against cancer, etc. An extensive campaign has recently been mounted sponsored by Montesano, to persuade the poorest people to eat more healthily, and to reduce their consumption of meat and alcohol.

### **24.5.1 SCHOOL FAUNA**

Most of the big multinationals also provide their own contributions to the education system. This functions in a number of different ways. They endow professorships at universities and colleges – an old practice – and they pay for college and university education for their employees. The trainee system is very well developed, and it is not unusual for these companies to bind people to them from the age of 17 or 18.

The sector is otherwise characterized by internationally differentiated universities. Transnational education and research networks have been growing for a long time. This is enabled by increased harmonization of education systems in different countries, and it has become easier to gain approval for foreign qualifications. The emphasis on performance in relation to objectives has tightened the links to the markets (resource centres, industrial estates, etc.). The scope of publicly financed research and teaching has been considerably reduced. There is a growth of new forms of research with increased interaction between the involved parties.

The public education system was gradually privatized during the early years of the century. The universities and colleges pressed to be permitted to increase their degree of self-financing. They were allowed to begin charging tuition fees and, as early as 2015, the state contribution to this sector was almost non-existent. Means testing was introduced, and special arrangements were made for students with less affluent parents.

Today most universities and colleges are either foundations or limited companies, where the big multinationals often have considerable shareholdings.

Primary and secondary education has also been taken over by the market, and the comprehensive school has been buried once and for all. The state provides a small subsidy for each pupil, which the parents are obliged to use to pay for education, but each school may charge whatever fees it wishes. This has of course resulted in the development of a number of purely elite schools, where the standard of the school is decided entirely by the parents' economy. However, the voluntary sector has entered into this market and has set up a number of schools that can show almost as good results as the elite schools in spite of being free of charge. They also enjoy the advantage, as perceived by many people, that the parents who send their children to such schools are more interested in taking part in voluntary communal work and other socially constructive activities.

The sector has undergone many other changes that are perhaps equally extensive as the change in financing. The national curriculum has been changed radically. The EU has demanded a number of major changes. Among others, the syllabuses have been brought more in line with those of Europe, but the most important change is that there are no longer any requirements regarding methodology, only regarding results. The idea that the state should be responsible for ensuring adherence to certain pedagogical principles has now been abandoned.

There is no longer a traditional national financial system in the Norway, but a large range of such services is nevertheless available. Since the stock exchange, as in most other countries, has been closed down, most securities trading is conducted via the remaining international stock exchanges. The financial sector has undergone extremely radical changes during the last 30 years, primarily as a result of the liberalization of the financial sector that occurred during the first ten years of the century. It was total and global and resulted in shrinking profit margins for financial products. The banks however were among those who managed the readjustment best, and several of the large European banks are today also suppliers of groceries, medicines, energy, etc. to consumers.

### **24.5.2 THE MONEY ARTISTS**

The cultural sector, particularly artists, have always been very reliant on the market, but Norway today manifests itself as something of a rarity. Few countries, if any, have a so market-driven cultural sector. When culture was defined on the basis of public policy in 2012 within the framework of the liberal metamorphosis that was taking place, the transformation was in reality complete. As early as the 1990s there was already a sharp increase in the profitmaking requirements made of most cultural institutions.

The income from entry charges to cultural events is increasing, and each year the political authorities demand increased profitmaking by the institutions themselves. As a result of this, the authorities' interest in financing this sector is diminishing. This weakens the framework conditions for "highbrow" culture, which has a smaller public. At the same time, more popular culture is becoming more highly acknowledged and respected. When the Ministry of Culture was abolished in 2012 and the last remains of

public support for the cultural sector disappeared, it did not come as a shock, but more as a natural development.

A great deal of the so-called “highbrow” culture is disappearing, and that which survives is dependent on a small but affluent public. It is financed partly through the sale of tickets and the purchase of works of art and partly indirectly through sponsorship and private patrons. A number of institutions have become more dependent on such benefactors while also charging higher entry fees. As a result of these changes, entertainment has to a great extent taken the place of art. The theatres have been turned into music halls while the operas stage performances by everything from Bulgarian crooners to commercial folk dancers.

At the same time, there is a strong development today in areas of the art scene that are not dominated by commercial interests. New avant-garde art may not attract the masses but it has a considerable public, and art has become one of the few arenas where political opposition is articulated. The critical potential of art is demonstrated to the full by the growing public of the alternative theatre. Both traditional and new art forms are experiencing an increase in interest after many lean years.

### **24.5.3 CRIME AND PUNISHMENT**

In 2030, the core areas of the state are approximately the same as when it was founded in 1905. We have seen a return of the traditional state, and most of the country’s citizens share the view that justice policy is its most important activity. Early in the new century there was a change of criminal policy regime. “For the sake of the victim” was the title of a government report published in 2012, which radically redefined Norwegian criminal policy. The idea of reforming criminals was abandoned. This approach had long been under pressure, and growing crime figures led finally to the abandoning of the reform project. This resulted not only in severer punishment for most offences but also in less humane treatment of criminals, involving less parole and tougher prison conditions.

An element of retribution is now clearly present in criminal policy although the time-honoured concept of general deterrence can be said still to be active. However these developments have had very little effect on crime figures. There was a reduction in crime during the 2020s but this was quite simply because more criminals were in gaol. Another feature is that recruitment to criminal activities is increasingly socially skewed. The first two decades of the century were characterized by an increase in violence. Although violence affected many people, it also gained approval in certain areas. Even discussions on criminal policy became more violent. Acceptance of violence was growing because violence was more frequently interpreted as self-defence in one sense or another and because it came to be regarded as a natural way of reacting and solving problems.

The increase in the number of young people today who are involved in combat sports is symptomatic of this development, as is the arming of the police force. In many ways we can say that a violent discourse has taken root, which is also reflected in the authorities’ increasing tolerance for expressions of violence used as entertainment. So, although we have a level of sanctions that should demonstrate less tolerance for violence, in some respects it is condoned.

Although large new prisons are being built everywhere and the crime rate is falling, it is worth noting the exceptions. Violent crimes such as homicide and rape have doubled each decade since the turn of the century, and the development does not seem to have reached its peak. This may indicate that the effect of general deterrence is merely theoretical. However this crime trend does not have much effect on people's views. As always, there is some opposition to criminal policy, but it is weak, and the majority of people are totally uninterested in its messages.

It is not only violent crime that is on the increase. White-collar crime is far from under control. As a result of the greater liberalization and internationalization of society, white-collar crime is a growing sector. Owing to the liberalization of the economy and elimination of border controls, prostitution, drugs and weapons have long been major imports. Although Europol has become a large and effective organization, and although new technology has helped to prevent many previously lucrative activities such as counterfeiting, there are other areas that the heavy electronic surveillance apparatus has difficulty in detecting.

In new sectors it is difficult to control the development. As always, there is widespread illicit production of drugs. "Drugs on demand" is a growth sector and, despite a stringent policy for control of the distribution of drugs, the authorities have difficulty in dealing with the enormous supply in this market. Sale and production of organs for transplant surgery is a growth sector where organized crime is involved. The same applies to various virtual services. The perception of rights in society is of course in process of changing radically. There has been an increase in juridification. Since there has been a general shift in the state's involvement from production and distribution of services to control, the political function of the judicial system has been enlarged. New areas of rights are continually emerging.

## **24.6 THE STATE OF BONSAI**

The public sector in this society is characterized by the minimal central government. The ideal is a bureaucracy no larger than is needed to safeguard the right to life and property and to free competition.

After its formal introduction by more countries, democracy is in a deep legitimacy crisis with diminishing election participation, parties without members and widespread contempt for politicians. Western democracy has become increasingly populist, with a political agenda decided by newspaper headlines and TV opinion polls and where political discourse has a character of pure entertainment. The multinationals dominate the political scene by means of lobbyism, donations and shares in the multimedia pools.

In addition to the multinationals, the bureaucracy is responsible for much of the long-term thinking. Political institutions have little depth. As an alternative to the political institutions, a number of more popular movements have grown up in support of the representative channels. In this way the democratic institutions have become just one of many categories of influential players. New forms of democratic representation are also being experimented with, such as referendums, direct election, government via opinion polls and panels, etc. As a result of the political legitimacy crisis, organizations such as the EU have not developed into political unions, but into associations of powerful

regional economic entities with the Commission as a unifying power centre. The main purposes of the EU are to maintain the political provisions for the market, so that the political scene is not completely taken over by an oligopoly of multinational companies, and to defend European market interests in the WTO.

Several of the new democracies, particularly in Africa, proved to be only pseudo-democracies, and these have now returned to single-party rule with presidents who have given themselves dictatorial powers. The same has happened in Russia, China and a number of other Asian countries.

### **24.6.1 THE PEOPLE OF BONSAI**

The fundamental nature of Bonsai is that of a traditional liberal regime. The central government has few responsibilities and its primary purpose is to safeguard the lives and property of its citizens. In this system it is the Storting that is the highest decision-making authority with the exception of the authority transferred to supranational bodies, such as the Council of Ministers in the EU.

A representative democracy underlies the role of the Storting, and now all votes are weighted equally regardless of which constituency one belongs to. However, the Storting has only 66 members, and its role has been reduced since the parliament does not have a monopoly of decisive power. After several years of trials, direct democracy was introduced in connection with the revision of the Constitution in 2014 in a number of areas such as the budgetary and legislative procedures. Referendums are held quite frequently, often as many as two a year and, at the local level, even more frequently. This means that all citizens over 15 years of age are able to take part in preparing the fiscal budget by voting over the various items. In spite of its reduced size, the fiscal budget is one of the most important political instruments. All citizens also have the right to propose new legislation but in this case their votes only count for one-third. The indirectly elected representatives count for two-thirds. Practice varies from municipality to municipality, but some allow almost all decisions to be made through direct voting by the citizens.

The support for this type of election varies. The fiscal budget rarely mobilizes more than half of the electorate, while some referendums attract up to 90 per cent. Under the state level is the municipal. The level in between, consisting of county authorities, no longer exists. The municipalities are very much larger and therefore far fewer than they used to be, and today number no more than 33 altogether, as against 435 at the start of the century. The municipalities are governed by elected representatives, and the Aldermen's Acts of 1837 still apply in principle, but the split between direct and representative democracy varies from municipality to municipality. In the larger towns there are urban districts which also have direct elections and a number of other arrangements, but most towns have no level under the municipal.

The WTO has in many ways taken over the role of the UN as the central forum at the global level. Companies have ousted nation-states as central international players, and play a major part in the political scene in supranational bodies such as the EU. The world is characterized by a market without boundaries. Norway floats upon the rough waters of the world economy and has finally dragged itself into the EU, where a certain



protection is provided for instability and a certain market security and price stability is provided for export products.

#### **24.6.2 WHO ARE WE?**

The population's identity can primarily be regarded as Norwegian. The Norwegian self-image has changed somewhat during the last 30 years but Norwegian archetypal ideals such as moderation and humility are still highly prized. The fact that they are not active everywhere does not remove the feeling shared by most Norwegians that these are noble characteristics of the Norwegian people, and the tradition is easy to find. In Norwegian history there are many stalwart representatives of the view that the central government shall be small and restricted. Examples are Johan Sverdrup and Tor Mikkel Wara. Most of Norway's inhabitants view the liberal and minimal state as being completely natural, and give it their wholehearted support. Its norms and ideals have been adopted as those of society. Those who support increased redistribution have also gradually given up the purely political arena and now find more support for their views in the voluntary sector. So, can we say that politics has been abolished in the modern, liberal Norway? Since most things are now governed by the market, has the political sphere become so narrow that it is no longer relevant? There is some truth in this where present-day Norway is concerned, but the development has not been completely straightforward. As the market gradually took over many functions that previously belonged to the public sector, there was a shift of focus in the political debate. There were hot-tempered exchanges about seemingly technical aspects of tendering policy. There were long discussions about whether a contract for the operation of the railways, for example, should be for six years or 20, and there was disagreement on the amount of state support for education, where of course the state still has a financial responsibility. There was also permanent opposition to the winding up of the welfare state. Most of those who disagreed with the view of the majority in the Storting gathered themselves in a single political party. They represent a small but eager minority of the Norwegian people.

The parliamentary system has proved to be quite robust, although it has almost nothing to do compared with earlier times and, although direct democracy is very decisive on many questions. People, at any rate approximately 50 per cent of them, continue to vote at elections, and the involvement of the media is also considerable. Parliamentarism has survived as a system of government not least because it has a kind of historical and popular legitimacy. The alternatives to a national parliament that are periodically brought up as a result of diminishing support for elections have never gained much popularity. Attempts to strengthen regional or local political institutions have been less successful than many people assumed. The conception that people would be more eager to involve themselves if they were given greater influence over their own neighbourhoods proved correct. Some of the municipalities have very politically engaged populations, but the outcome is not necessarily that they spend a lot of time and resources on politics.

The largest party in the 2029 election was the Consumer Party, which for the first time won over 40 per cent of the votes. The Consumer Party has the slogan "We get things done!", and aims always to be on the side of the consumers. In today's society, where the market reigns supreme, this message has particularly strong appeal. The Consumer

Party arose from the ruins of the former Liberal Party and Progress Party after these parties more or less fell apart around 2010. The aim of the Consumer Party is to help consumers in every way, and the party's agenda is therefore equally involved in pressuring the big multinationals and other market players to offer goods of better quality, improve labelling, etc., and in demanding that the authorities arrange for free competition. The Consumer Party is not a traditional party, but is also an interest organization that provides its members with legal aid and drives many cases through the legal apparatus. The party has particularly made its mark in insurance cases.

Extensive privatization has left the governing role of the state much stronger in many ways than one might expect given the conventional views of the state and the market. More market does not mean in this state structure that a small role is assigned to the state. It is small as a producer, but not as a controller. Nor does the fact that the state inspectorates have been privatized or contracted out deprive the state of its controlling function. The state governs not least through the statutory framework, and the growing juridification of society is an expression of this. The security of the citizens is safeguarded by an extensive statutory framework, and the term *state governed by law*, which historically refers to the period prior to the introduction of parliamentarism, is frequently used in public reports. The Storting, the people via direct elections and the EU are all able by means of different instruments to instruct the Government to amend the statutory framework, and the authorities enforce the statutory framework through the inspectorates.

## 24.7 THE ADMINISTRATION OF BONSAI

Three levels of public administration are relevant for Norway in 2030. Two are traditional Norwegian levels, the municipalities and the state. The third and highest level is the EU. As a result of Norway's membership, the decisions of the EU Council of Ministers are now directly implemented in Norwegian law. In reality, this has been so for a long time. Even before the turn of the century, Norwegian social scientists showed that this occurred extensively even though Norway was not at the time a member of the EU.

After two major rounds of government restructuring, first in 2015 and then in 2024, there are now only four ministries, the Ministries of *Defence, Justice and Home Affairs, Finance and Education*.

Supervisory responsibilities that were traditionally looked after by the directorates are now handled by private inspectorates. The model that has received acceptance is the so-called Veritas model, named after the world-renowned Norwegian certification company, whereby responsibility for supervision and inspection is contracted out to one or more private companies, either limited companies or foundations. A number of former directorates have been converted into such companies or foundations. They all have the word "inspectorate" in their titles. There are not many subordinate government agencies left. The Directorate of Education, the Directorate of Taxes and the Police Directorate are among the few that have survived.

The central government administration has not only been slimmed down, it has also changed its working methods. Civil servants are no longer employed by individual

ministries but by the civil service as a whole. This means that they can be moved at any time to wherever in the system they are most needed. Moreover, only a small minority of state employees have permanent tenure. Most people are appointed to work on projects, where they usually find themselves among the most competent intellectual and organizational resources in the country. Work in the civil service on studies and recommendations is normally organized so that several teams compete against each other. The winning team is extremely well rewarded. The losers receive little or nothing. The rule is *no cure, no pay*, just as in the private sector. There is also extensive exchange of employees between the public and private sectors. A normal career encompasses working in both the private and the public sector.

### **24.7.1 LOCAL BONSAI**

Unlike some neighbouring countries, Norway's regionalization policy has been very limited. This is primarily because the growing globalization has resulted in strong support for a more centralized model but, in spite of this, one of the consequences of the liberal model is major differences between regions. Western Norway has become exceptionally more wealthy than the rest of the country, but this has not resulted in any demands for secession. What would be the point? Nothing is paid into the public sector besides VAT, so what arguments could be found for such a dispute?

There have been many administrative reforms. After the county authorities were abolished at the start of the century, the local government sector was completely remodelled. The income system for the municipalities was restructured, a reform that in short entailed allowing the municipalities themselves to impose whatever taxes they found necessary, while at the same time putting an end to transfers between municipalities. This resulted in the disappearance of most of the small municipalities. Today there are altogether 33 municipalities in the country, and this number has been stable for some years. True, there have been proposals to convert some municipalities to pure limited companies in which one buys shares when taking up residence there, but this reform has no particular appeal for ordinary citizens. The municipalities function well enough for most people, and local democracy has enough to do. It is kept occupied by matters concerning planning permission, routes for new roads, etc. At the state level reforms are primarily associated with the downscaling of the public sector.

Since the state's involvement as redistributor and welfare provider has been drastically reduced, it really has only two main instruments left. One of these is tax alternatives. The state has currently a minimal tax basis compared with before. If any further major responsibilities should be assigned to the state, this would have to be changed, but there is no support for this in the population or among politicians. The other instrument is the statutory framework, but in practice there is little that the Norwegian authorities can do with this. The statutory framework is by and large coordinated with the EU, and there is little room for national exceptions.

The most independent and radical feature of Norwegian politics is the tax policy. Since all taxes on income, wealth and capital have now been abolished and VAT is the only remaining tax, the total tax pressure is extremely low. There is a constant political battle concerning the level of VAT, and this year there is a majority for raising it to 19 per cent from 18.5 per cent last year. The Government has explained the increase by the

need to dampen economic growth, not increase the state's income. The VAT rate is thus being used as means of levelling the trade cycle. The Norwegian level of taxation is now one of the lowest in the western world.

## 24.8 INSPECTORATES

Competition policy is a major responsibility for the authorities. In the distribution of roles between the central government and the EU, the Norwegian Inspectorate for Competition and Consumers is responsible for ensuring that Norwegian consumers are guaranteed free competition. Heavy fines are imposed on those found guilty of illegal cooperation on prices or other unfair methods of competition. In other areas of consumer policy, such as quality requirements, the public sector also plays a major role. The statutory framework is intended to safeguard consumers against goods that are not adequately labelled, which have illegal contents, etc.

As mentioned above, the organization of fishery policy has mainly been left to the market, but there is a superior Norwegian state body in this area, the *Inspectorate for Natural Resources*, which includes a number of previous directorates and inspectorates, such as the Directorate for Nature Management, the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority, the Directorate of Fisheries, the Fishery Inspectorate and the Animal Welfare Inspectorate.

The main responsibility of this institution is to ensure that the statutory framework is complied with and that the principle of sustainability is not infringed. In the event of infringement, this inspectorate is empowered to intervene on behalf of the state and to impose fines and adjustments. It may in other words overrule the market and replace it with direct state control if the market's own control mechanisms fail to function as intended. The inspectorate was established in 2022 as part of a major restructuring of the state sector, and has proved a success. Resource management in Norway is good, and the statutory framework is rarely exceeded. The reason for the success lies undoubtedly in the severe penalties imposed by the inspectorate on several occasions with subsequent tough adjustments. Penalization by the inspectorate often results in ruin and in being put out of business. In the fishing industry this has happened several times. In this way, the Inspectorate for Natural Resources has become an authority that is taken seriously by everyone, as a result of which most of those working within the sectors subject to the inspectorate are careful not to breach the statutory framework.

In a number of other social sectors, we can observe the same thing. The inspectorates are large and powerful. They are put out to tender and are driven by private capital, but remain loyal to their client, the Norwegian state.

## 24.9 POSTSCRIPT BY THE SOCIAL HISTORIAN 2030

### 24.10 A POLLUTED LIFE

#Excerpt Thomas Nielsen (2027): A Polluted Life. Erik Dammann's movement  
(zzz\baloney.bull.barents.bit)

In summary, we now see that FIOH (Future in Our Hands), FFS, BZB and the other organizations that sprang out of Dammann's movement made an interesting analysis of the monopolization of the economy and the vulnerability of the environment.

Nonetheless it was the following generation's champions of the environmental cause who made the best analysis of what needed to be done. The forces opposing capital should have concentrated their efforts on a transnational political strategy such as that adopted by us. Confidence in the nation-state as a problem-solver proved fatal. We who placed our faith in the EU also made too little effort. With hindsight, it is easy to see that we were far too late in getting involved in global issues. In my view, we also made a poor job of cooperating with the transnational corporations.

The Battle of Seattle in 1999 is a good example. Instead of giving the WTO an environmental and democratic dimension and holding a discourse with the transnational corporations, it ended up with stone-throwing and other infantile leftist deviant behaviour. Partly as a result of this, the WTO today is not particularly receptive to our arguments. If we had realized that the game was destined to be global regardless, things might have turned out differently. It was not until the Bellona Foundation entered into transnational alliances with Sredafront, Testanational and others that we succeeded in establishing ourselves as a player and in bringing about the agreement with Biocom. This agreement functioned as the basis for the transnational corporations' environmental efforts throughout the 2020s, and was probably more important than anything accomplished by Dammann's group. In spite of this, it is important to maintain a balanced view of these pioneers. They grew up in another world, and were not able to address the consequences of globalization. Nonetheless they asked the right questions.

Many of us would never have made a start without the study circles that they organized in the 1970s and 80s. They may not have succeeded in taking the plunge to analysing and acting globally as well as locally, but then neither did many of our politicians. It would of course be totally lacking in historical perspective to blame this environment for things going as they did. Nonetheless, in a counterforce perspective, it is important to learn that it is the revisionists who succeed, while the utopians with their heads in the clouds easily end up attending at the birth of the world they have been warning against.

# Antagonia

## 25 CHAPTER 6

# 26 Antagonia – NORWAY●2030

Once a relatively harmonic and rather homogeneous little country on the edge of the European community, Norway today, in 2030, is a far more diverse and complex land, and a full member of the EU. Today, Norway consists of a number of different cultural and religious groupings, all with considerable disposition rights. There is greater diversity, but there are also more conflicts.


Immigration and increased life expectancy have both contributed to an increase in the population from 4.5 million around the turn of the century to over 6 million today. This has resulted in extensive changes to the settlement structure, the labour market and the education system.

Diversity is particularly manifested by innumerable large and small population groups, with different lives, beliefs and lifestyles that live alongside one another. For, although we are still a relatively peaceful people, the conflicts between competing groups are clearly apparent. These antipathies unite groups which often have very different orientations in powerful ad hoc movements.

Conflicts are often triggered by the decisions of the large global agencies, and are often associated with developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering. Norway's new staple industry is the biomaritime industry, which consists of traditional mariculture combined with an expanding biotechnology. The fundamental difference between this and the petroleum-based economy of previous decades is that the maritime economy is primarily based on renewable resources. This means that the resource base is in many ways more predictable, but also more vulnerable, and the latter has led to Norway's active espousal of environmental causes.

Agreement is no longer as close as it was on issues such as which statutes and regulations shall apply, how the country shall be governed and, least of all, on who shall govern it. The political scene is marked by continually changing coalitions and groupings. At the same time, much of the political orientation reflects the fact that it is both time and resource consuming to establish and maintain shared norms and rules in such a society. Indeed, in both the public and the private sector, it is increasingly important to apply integrative measures to enable people to continue living and working together. This also includes making welfare provisions available to those who fall outside the stronger groups' own welfare schemes, among other reasons, to prevent the emergence of more extreme groupings. The role of the state as mediator between different social groups is a prominent feature.

## Antagonia



## 26.1 MAIN IDEAS AND ASSUMPTIONS

*Growth gives rise to new challenges.* During the first ten years after the turn of the century, the Norwegian economy had a very high rate of growth, mainly owing to buoyancy in the petroleum and mariculture sectors. As the state's enormous profits continued to grow, there were increasing demands from the general public for better welfare provisions. The public sector, which had long shown little growth and had therefore experienced a decline in a number of areas, was now thoroughly upgraded. The combination of an expanding public sector and long-term upturn in the private sector resulted in a semi-critical increase in the demand for manpower. This problem was partly solved when Poland and Hungary became members of the EU, and thereby gained access to the EEA labour market from 2006. Some relief was also gained by lifting the freeze on immigration for a while and adopting a more liberal approach to labour immigration. As a result, there was a considerable jump in population, which passed the 6 million mark already in 2020 and has now, in 2030, reached 6.5 million. This major alteration of the Norwegian demographic, social and cultural landscape has led to increased instability. Short-sighted politicians fail to set up mechanisms to bring about sufficient integration.

*The bountiful ocean.* Fish and seafood took over as Norway's staple industry following the reduction in the importance of the petroleum sector. The idea that the ICT would become a major sector in Norway stranded as company after company foundered. Norway's maritime tradition provided a platform for a major involvement in biotechnology and genetic engineering, and this type of technology proved decisive for development of various seafood products. The degree of processing that today's biomaritime products are subjected to already prior to their conception makes nonsense of the reference to Norway as primarily a commodities economy. The ocean is vulnerable, and these developments therefore encourage Norway to pursue very strict policies in relation to resources and the environment, and to fight for such policies in international fora.



*Group solidarity.* Cultural differentiation has transformed Norway from a country that has largely overcome its class distinctions to a country with growing distinctions between groups. This manifests itself in cultural, economic and political conditions. The majority of people are increasingly sceptical of public welfare, and many larger groups establish their own measures for their members. Society has become a concept that can no longer be taken for granted. Perhaps we should rather talk in terms of the plural form, “societies”.

*Cultural distinctions.* The scenario is primarily concerned with differentiation as a result of individualization tendencies, greater import of foreign cultures and growth in religious movements. Differentiation was particularly expressed in the emergence of more powerful religious and ethical groups. The abolition of the state church system played a major role. These developments also exhibited some of the paradoxical consequences of individualization – the need that liberated people have to find new anchors in their lives. These developments were enabled by the new facilities provided by ICT for organizing regardless of time and space. A serious consequence of the state’s weak policy in relation to the new groups of immigrants at the start of the century was that they were not integrated into society and were therefore exposed to hostility from large elements of the Norwegian population, which was in itself responsible for widening the distinctions.

## **26.2 PENTECOSTALISTS IN LØRENSKOG**

Johnny Hansen attends the Pentecostal school in Lørenskog, a school whose approach to teaching consists of Christian interpretation in all subjects, including natural science subjects and ICT. Most of the pupils at the school belong to the Pentecostal congregation in Lørenskog, which, in addition to the school, also runs a nursing home and an education and careers advisory service in the municipality. Some of the pupils belong to the Coptic Church, but these are largely temporary refugees and first-generation immigrants from Egypt, the Sudan and Madagascar. Many immigrants from Egypt and the Sudan have made their home in Lørenskog.

Johnny’s parents are active Pentecostals and have taken part in the enormous growth of the congregation during recent decades. This is a fact in which they take great pride although they know that the growth is not only due to active Pentecostals. The main factor that gave rise to it was the separation of church and state, but there was tough competition for the many souls that sought spiritual consolation as time went on. Johnny’s father cannot stop talking about the many lost souls who choose more exotic movements, particularly the Norwegian Buddhist Society, which has experienced even greater growth than the Pentecostals. He does not however agree with those in the congregation who hold the view that the state church system was after all an advantage to the country.

Johnny is happy at school, but he would have liked to have had a shorter journey to school each day. At first, it seemed a bit strange to be attending a different school than

the others kids in the block, but after a while he noticed that there were several of the others who didn't go to the local school either. The Jewish family on the first floor send their children all the way to Oslo every day. Johnny is friendly with one of the Jewish boys as well as most of the other children of his age in the block, but his parents have said that he is not to have anything to do with the two Turkish families who live in the neighbouring block. He didn't understand why until he started school – the parents were always friendly on the rare occasions when he bumped into them. Now he understands why. Markus in his class pointed out to him the infidels and lost souls once on a school trip to Oslo. Their clothes were often a good way of seeing it.

He thinks this is rather odd because his brother, Kåre, also looks a bit infidel sometimes in the way he dresses, and he likes music that is not allowed at school. Perhaps that's why he doesn't want to stay on at the Pentecostal school next year when he moves up to the upper secondary. "A lost school," say the teachers about the school he wants to go to. His parents are in despair, and are praying that it is just a bit of youthful rebelliousness that will soon pass, but they are not sure. Kåre has stopped going to choir practice. He comes and goes just as he pleases, and takes no notice of what anyone says. The same thing happened to Anders' brother, who lives on the same floor. He even joined Red Youth, which believes in taxing both the religious organizations and their donors, who are often elderly people. "If there's one thing all religions have in common, it is that old people are supposed to be able to shoot their mouths off without being contradicted never mind how fat in the head they are," said Anders once before being ordered to go home.

Johnny's parents are among those who are not interested in making use of a number of the new medical facilities. Most Christian groups, the largest Muslim organizations and of course the Buddhists are against genetic medication for life extension. Most of them are also strongly against the use of genetic manipulation of fertilized eggs to ensure that one's offspring receive specific genetic material. The Hansen family therefore agree on one issue: that it is wrong to interfere with God's work, something that their son Kåre also agrees with, but in his view this is because the cost is outrageous. Both of Johnny's parents have taken part in many demonstrations in Western Norway against what Johnny has understood to be "mad scientists". He has therefore difficulty in understanding why Mikkel, who is two years older than he, pokes fun at his parents' "horror of the genes", as he calls it.

However, Mikkel enjoys great respect among the kids on the street. The fact is that his mother is a star in Lørenskog. She is the Chair of the municipal council, and was elected because she really knows how to hold the floor. Mrs Pedersen or Dagny, as she is always called, was discovered by a communications adviser who dropped in on Dagny's hair salon for a quick cut. He was charmed and impressed by her oratorical gifts, her utterly flexible social disposition, a personality who could discuss anything with anybody, and who made everyone she dealt with feel that they were someone special. "You've got lovely wavy hair," she might say. Dagny had praise for everyone, and they all went away with lighter hearts (and wallets), looking forward to the rest of the day. At least, that was how it seemed. She was unique, and now she is Chair of the municipal council. She belongs to a type of politician who would hardly have existed but for direct election of the Chairs and a number of other arrangements.

Johnny thinks Mikkel's mum is gorgeous, and she is certainly perfect for newsreels and communications in general. She represents the decent, hard-working, friendly, self-sacrificing people who have made their own way in the world, and she is a frequent guest on the talk shows which, beside the popular tabloid *The Way of the World*, constitute the most important arena for mass politics. The national parties are primarily election campaign machines for people like Dagny. However, the party's finances and strategy are not in Dagny's hands, but in the hands of her advisers.

## 26.3 FROM PETROCOMMUNITY TO BIODIVERSITY

Norwegian economy is currently very stable. Norway is still one of the world's wealthiest countries and has a sizeable trade surplus almost every year. The petroleum sector's contribution to overall value creation has been greatly reduced but still amounts to 12 per cent of Norway's export. Mariculture and processed products from this sector constitute the largest industrial sector in Norway, and account for over 50 per cent of the country's export. But there are also other industries of vital importance. In the furniture industry for example, all companies are now primarily oriented towards the global market, and this also applies to a number of smaller sectors. Their survival has been dependent on changing their status from that of large suppliers on the domestic market to players on the regional or global market.

The lengthy uninterrupted upturn experienced by the Norwegian economy from 1993/1994 to approximately 2020 would have come to an end much earlier were it not for the considerable increase in immigration, which turned out to be a much heavier component of Norwegian industrial policy at the beginning of the new century than had ever been expected. Mr. Ted Hanisch, the Director General of the Norwegian Public Employment Service at the turn of the century had several times recommended that annual immigration be increased by 40 000 workers plus families and this was finally what was done. From 2001 immigration policy was gradually reshaped. In the Storting, a large majority voted in favour of labour immigration on a grand scale. For the first time in Norwegian history, the authorities began to make active efforts to attract people to come and live in Norway. The development of excellent placement services, such as the international department of the Public Employment Service as well as many new private agencies, resulted in a major influx of new immigrants. As early as 2005, net annual immigration exceeded 40 000, and the majority of immigrants came seeking employment. Compared with the previous decades, when net immigration was rarely over 10 000 in any single year, this involved a major structural alteration of Norwegian society. At the same time, the EEA area was expanded when Hungary and Poland became members of the EU in 2006. Polish labour immigrants were particularly numerous and, together with the major Russian immigration to the northernmost counties, resulted in a population of over 200 000 Slavs in Norway by 2010. Today 6.5 million people live in Norway, which is approximately a million more than predicted by Statistics Norway in its most expansive forecasts in 1998. These forecasts provided for a net immigration rate of 15 000 persons per year, so no-one should be surprised by the fact that the Norwegian population expanded as much as it did.

While in the year 2000 there were 250 000 immigrants, approximately half of these from the third world, around 1.2 million of our inhabitants today can be regarded as

immigrants, depending on which definition one uses. The largest groups are Swedes, Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, Nigerians, Somalis and Pakistanis.

Immigration has had a number of complex consequences. It has resulted in changes to the demographic structure of the country, reducing the effects of the elderly boom. Moreover, the economic consequences have been considerable. Employment levels are extremely high in Norway, and many of the ethnic minorities have a labour force participation on a level with that of native Norwegians.

However, the economy has been greatly influenced by the new ethnic and social structure. Skilled trades are dominated by the Poles. The Ukrainians and Russians have become the largest groups within traditional primary industries such as agriculture and forestry, and large contingents of Christian Yorubas have taken up furniture production in a constructive interaction with the people of Sunnmøre and Romsdalen. The Somalis have gradually taken over the transport sector, and it is over 10 years since a native Norwegian was employed as a driver by any Norwegian bus company. In some cases, the ethnically divided labour market has not altered the ownership situation in the sector. In others, including those mentioned here, there have been major changes. Not least, this development has changed the composition of the population in various areas of the country. Although there is a Chinese restaurant and a Polish plumber in every single town, there are hardly any Ukrainians or Russians in Western Norway. They keep to the inland areas and Northern Norway, and the Pakistanis are mainly found around the Oslo Fjord.

The extremely active labour market policy initiated by the Norwegian authorities in 2005 was aimed at training immigrants for areas where there was a great demand for manpower and, although many of the immigrants already had qualifications, training was still necessary. Hungarian nurses were not automatically able to give Norwegian sick and elderly the treatment they expected although they had basic nursing qualifications. They were limited by linguistic and cultural differences. This realization resulted in an extremely active, even aggressive training policy. All immigrants, both labour immigrants and refugees, were expected to take courses in Norwegian language and social conventions. This policy has proved successful because it has resulted in high economic growth and a fairly self-supporting immigrant community. A simple, ingenious move by the Government at the start of the century was the merger of the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration with the Public Employment Service, thereby allowing immigration policy to become a function of manpower needs. Various parts of the Public Employment Service were later privatized. The Ministry of International Development was made the appeal body, particularly in cases where the breach of fundamental human rights was claimed.

However this policy has not, as most people had probably envisaged, resulted in the integration in the labour market being mirrored by cultural and social integration. The ethnic minorities wished only to a small extent to be assimilated by Norwegian society. This led, not least, to increased support for parties and groupings that were racist or extremely hostile to immigration, so that the ethnic minorities were made to feel Norwegian society did not welcome them as they were. This strengthened the more orthodox groups within the minorities and resulted in the re-establishment of traditional

religious and cultural practices. An example is the Yorubas, who were originally extremely secular and who had fled Nigeria because they were being persecuted and massacred in the civil war. They had now become far more conservative in their approach to religion than they were when they arrived.

Politically speaking, parties that demanded that immigrants adapted to Norwegian society, often using the term “integration”, were rewarded with increased support. However, what was really meant by “integration” was often no more than assimilation. None of the political groups who were opposed to immigration succeeded in halting the increase. If for no other reason, Norway’s EEA membership made this quite impossible. Antagonism between opponents and supporters of immigration therefore increased dramatically during the new century. Today, immigrants to Norway of third, second and first generation are in many ways less secularly oriented than in many other countries. This has resulted in low or even diminishing integration in daily life, and has given rise to clear geographical patterns in the ethnicized labour market.

However, the ethnicized labour market, perhaps the most extreme in Europe, does not stand in the way of the constant increase in productivity and the dynamic industrial development. Design and product development is of a very high standard and, although the term “Norwegian design” has never been less relevant than it is today, the global codes within design are gracefully manipulated and mastered by the new ethnicized vanguard of the economy. The care sector is also expansive and, owing to its demographic structure, Norway is now able to receive elderly people from other countries. Prices are competitive and, in Vesterålen, there are over 30 000 beds in nursing homes for elderly German-speaking people.

Today the state owns few or no shares in business and industry with the exception of the health and education sectors. During the first decade of the century, a number of Norwegian state-owned enterprises were either sold or partly privatized, a development that was supported by most politicians. The Norwegian part of EuroRail, for example, was wholly owned by the state at this time, as was the former petroleum company Statoil. Even the Norwegian postal service was wholly owned by the state as late as 2005. The sale of these companies added further capital to the Norwegian treasury’s enormous reserves resulting from profits from the petroleum industry. The sale of the former state telecommunications company, Telenor, which in autumn 2000 was listed on the stock exchange, yielded approximately NOK 150 billion in the money of the day.

## **26.4 ICT FULL STOP!**

Many people had hoped that information and communications technology would become the driving force behind the Norwegian economy. A Danish publicly appointed expert group that in 1999 prepared the report “Digital Denmark” showed that the digital economy had a growth potential of up to 50 per cent of the global gross national product. In the view of the group, “The countries whose enterprises are among the first

to establish themselves on the Internet will have a share in this growth. The countries which do not adapt quickly enough will suffer a loss of earnings and jobs.”<sup>98</sup>

However ICT did not function as an engine for Norwegian industry. In spite of considerable political goodwill, Norway failed to keep abreast of developments. When the final stage in the construction of IT-Fornebu was complete in 2008, there were many people who felt the project had missed the boat, and it was regarded as particularly problematical when the remains of Telenor’s successors moved their head office to Italy in 2011. In 2012 the Oslo Housing and Savings Society (OBOS) was the largest single enterprise located at Fornebu. It is true that ICT is part of society, implemented in almost all production processes and all trade, whether pure knowledge enterprises, public services or other forms of production. However, as is well known, Norway failed to establish itself among the countries that really make a profit on the technological infrastructure itself.

The trends were already obvious at the turn of the century. The USA, Sweden and Finland all had large and vigorously growing ICT sectors. In the USA this included all aspects, telecommunications, computers and media, but with the Internet as its spearhead. In Sweden and Finland, the main motive force was in mobile telephone production. In countries such as Ireland and India, it was software. What characterized the ICT industry in these countries was that it supplied products at continually lower prices to almost all other industries.<sup>99</sup> In 2008, the Ericsson-Nokia Group had almost complete control of wireless data communications.

However, Norway found it increasingly difficult to hold onto its competence in the ICT area, particularly in competition with its Scandinavian neighbours, but also with the remainder of the EU. In 1999, the ICT industry in the EU member states lacked 500 000 computer experts, and this figure increased dramatically during the following decade.<sup>100</sup> Perhaps the greatest problem however was that most companies that established a competitive foothold in the new industry were swiftly bought up by foreign companies and, after a while, these companies normally pulled all their knowledge workers out of Norway and locate them in their larger R&D departments.

---

98 *Det digitale Danmark* (Digital Denmark), Danish Ministry of Research. Version 1.0, 29 February 2000.

99 *Digi.no* 7 February 2000.

100 Information and communications technology industry (ICT) plays an important role in all of the Nordic countries, although Norway’s share is small compared with those of the other three countries. The sector is largest in Sweden, where it constituted 10.5 per cent of employment in the private sector in 1996. Denmark came second with 8.8 per cent, followed by Finland with 8.6 per cent, Norway with 6 per cent (74000 employees) and Iceland with 5.1 per cent. Statistics Norway. *Ukens statistikk* No. 50/98.

The continual takeovers of Norwegian technology companies as well as more traditional enterprises also freed a great deal of capital in Norway especially during the period prior to the great stock exchange reform of 2012. Although large parts of this capital were invested abroad, particularly in the EU area, increasing amounts were also channelled in the direction of the new biotechnology establishments. These were primarily establishments within the fishing and aquaculture industry, and they became major growth industries in Norway in parallel with the gradual demise of petroleum and gas production. Towards 2030 this resulted in a boom all the way along the coast. The development of the markets for food fish was however outstripped by the fish processing markets, i.e. the international biotechnology industry and the modern food and beverages industry.

In the 1970s, Norwegian aquaculture was a tiny industry that did no more than eke out the incomes of farmers along the coast and had little economic significance for Norway. The farmers had a concession each, and the number of concessions was identical to the number of fish farming units. However, restructuring of the industry in the 1990s led to liberalization of the regulations for ownership, and the concessions became concentrated in larger companies. The result was a considerable increase in activity and the emergence of an industry that provided the country with a considerable export income. The value of the fish farming industry increased steadily over the years, and today has an export value of over NOK 140 billion, i.e. well over a tenfold increase in the space of 30 years.<sup>101</sup> In 2000 the value of all exported seafood in Norway was less than NOK 30 billion.<sup>102</sup>

This development is due to several factors. In 2030, advanced transport solutions and improved technology for shipping live fish have made it possible to deliver extremely fresh fish throughout the world. At the same time, investments in research have increased steadily throughout the fisheries sector. At first the Government more or less forced the industry to invest in research by imposing a research tax from 2000. However, as the fishery enterprises grew in size, this gained momentum and by 2015 there were as many employees in R&D departments as there were in the production departments of the big biomaritime companies.

---

101 Managing Director Paul Birger Torgnes in Fjord Seafood ASA maintained during a conference held in 1999 by the Norwegian Trade Council, the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund that the value would reach NOK 100 billion by 2020. The same source predicted that the export value of the fish farming industry would be approximately NOK 10 billion in 2000. *IntraFish.com*, 13.09.1999.

102 The Norwegian Seafood Export Council. Press release 10 January 2000. Norway's share of world production within aquaculture and fisheries constitutes approximately 2.8 per cent in 2000, and Norway is the world's second largest exporter of fishery products, with approximately 5.5 per cent of world trade. Ministry of Fisheries, Strategic plan, R&D within fisheries and aquaculture, harbours and infrastructure for maritime transport.

It now became technically and economically possible to farm an increasing number of traditional species such as cod and halibut. At the same time, a number of niche products such as sea urchins also became popular. Moreover, new insight into molecular biology and biotechnological methods leads to a new understanding of biological production, exploitation of marine resources and establishment of new commercial activities. As well as being used as food and ingredients in food products, maritime raw materials are used today as a basis for animal and fish feed, cosmetic products and a large range of industrial and pharmaceutical products.

#### **26.4.1 SKYSCRAPERS OVERLOOKING THE OCEAN**

Most of the population growth has gone to the coastal areas, but the emptying of rural Norway has definitely come to an end. The population has now been stable in inland areas for several years and we can even begin to see signs of growth in some areas. The towns along the coast are growing, and this growth is quite well distributed from region to region. Most towns have undertaken planned development of available land, and the rate of urbanization has increased considerably. Urban development today is mainly in the form of high-rise blocks. This is not only because it makes for effective land-use, but also because there is a greater demand for urban surroundings. Although the growth of the population might be expected to give rise to many problems, our new fellow-citizens are satisfied with a less space-consuming style of dwellings than preferred by most Norwegians.

Lambertseter East in Oslo was begun in 1950 and is regarded as Norway's first satellite town. In 1970 Lambertseter had 18 000 inhabitants. By the end of the century, the district's population was reduced to 10 000 with almost exactly the same housing stock. In 2030, 80 per cent of the district is inhabited by Norwegians of Turkish and Pakistani origin, and the population has again risen to over 18 000.

The higher utilization can be attributed to the fact that larger families are the norm in this population group, and that people generally have somewhat poorer than average economy. In other words, the growth in population has not only resulted in continued building, but also in people living closer together than they used to. At the beginning of the century, the public sector was compelled to reassess its passive housing policy, and social democracy again made housing one of its major causes. The approach, however, was new. The state shouldered the risk by means of guarantee schemes, and development companies were established to develop and urbanize areas in many different locations throughout the country. Examples are Groruddalen in Oslo, Harstad, Bodø, Molde, the catchment area round Moss and large areas of Vestfold.

The relationship to natural resources is influenced by the increased population, but not as much as one might think. Fundamental characteristics of Norwegian society such as



right of common access are unchanged and new energy carriers have made it unnecessary to increase the use of hydroelectric power. Agriculture has been changed considerably, not least because the new immigrant groups from rural districts of Ukraine, Romania and Russia initially acquiesced to a lower standard of living than that enjoyed by the original population. The production of grain crops, meat and vegetables has increased, and Norwegian sheep-farming, particularly owing to the introduction of shepherding, has become quite a considerable industry. Today there are over three million sheep in Norway, and Norwegian mutton is a major export article with an international reputation.

Biotechnology failed to gain an economic foothold in Norwegian agriculture, not only because of the emphasis on “pure” products, but also because the international agriculturally based biotechnology was poorly adapted to Norwegian conditions.<sup>103</sup>

Access to markets also improved when Norway became a member of EU Resources, although this initially gave rise to a dilemma for Norway. In 2005 fishing quotas were allocated by EU Resources, which Norway was forced to join in connection with the renegotiation of the EEA Agreement in 2007 when Iceland joined the EU following the promise of a strong position in EU Resources. Norway’s quotas were allocated by means of concessions, but the investors were not initially interested in landing the fish in Norway. However, as the maritime industry grew, it became increasingly profitable to land fish in Norway, especially since the more traditional waste products and biproducts of the fish were increasing in value as raw materials for biotechnology.

In the years 2005–2010, the entire fishing industry was reorganized. During these years, Norway developed what was known as “clean production”, i.e. the use of enclosed production systems. This helped to give Norway a leading role in technology associated with fishery resources. Production facilities were placed out at sea, in fjords, in lakes or on land and supplied with pure seawater from the depth of the ocean. Clean In – Clean Out became a reality from about 2010. In 2022 exports became so great that Norway had to find new transport methods. Experiments were initiated to transport fish in the old gas pipelines between Norway and Germany.

Perhaps the greatest challenge in the new maritime economy was pollution of the ocean. Two hazards were seen as particularly imminent. The first was more traditional pollution – i.e. discharge of any substances that might in one way or another represent a danger for life in the ocean. Pollution of food resources was a serious hazard since the global market for seafood increased at the same pace as the scepticism of consumers to modern livestock production. Characterization as both healthy and safe food could

---

103 Acting Research Manager Bjørn Åge Tømmerås in the Norwegian Institute for Nature Research pointed out in an interview with *Nationen* that no-one in the international research community produces genetically modified plants or animals that can be used in Norway. We have special climatic conditions in this country, and must use different varieties and strains than on the continent of Europe and in the USA. *Nationen* 27.09.1999.

easily be adversely affected by pollution of the oceans. The growth in supplies for biotechnology made the situation even clearer. Even pollution that would have little or no significance for fish when used as food could have major consequences for the value of the raw material, of which increasing quantities were exported to biotechnological and pharmaceutical establishments the world over.

The other challenge is at least as great, and perhaps more critical today than more traditional pollution since the growth of advanced biotechnology increases the danger of the discharge of viruses, bacteria and genetically modified organisms that may have catastrophic consequences for other living species. For Norway, the growth of the biomaritime sector is therefore a two-edged sword, and the situation much resembles the “environmental challenge” that Norway was facing at the turn of the century as one of the world’s largest petroleum exporters. The difference is that any environmental catastrophes could easily backfire against the industry itself since it is much more difficult to control biological pollution in the ocean than it is on land. This is also one of the reasons why Clean Production is making so much headway.

As a result of environmental awareness and the growing importance of protecting the ocean’s resources, Norway today is an aggressively environmentalist nation, driven by powerful self-interest. The battle against atomic power stations and large enzyme plants in Russia and other EU member countries is noteworthy. However, it has not only had consequences for how we behave internationally. It has also placed considerable constraints on many other policy areas, particularly energy and transport. As much goods and passenger transport as possible shall use the new railway system. The use of coal, gas or petroleum for energy production is no longer allowed in Norway. There is zero tolerance for discharges of any kind into the sea. Along the whole of the west coast, the use of diesel in cars and boats is prohibited, and all use of motorized pleasure boats is prohibited along the parts of the coast where sea ranching is in progress or where large biomaritime installations are located.

#### **26.4.2 WELFARE DIVERSITY**

In 2030 there is very little left of the Scandinavian welfare model. The weakest link is the concept of equality, which is demonstrated by the small degree of support for the parties that espouse this ideology. Nor are distribution policy instruments such as taxes and government funding available following the harmonization of financial policy in the EU. Universal welfare has been considerably reduced although many of the things that have replaced it are no poorer – they merely cost more for all concerned. The EU norm for health and social security sets minimum standards that all states are expected to comply with, and they are lower than the previous Norwegian standards in most areas. The labour market is at once freer and less free than ever before. There are fewer public regulations, statutes and prohibitions steering the labour market but, at the same time, certain sectors have wholly or partly been taken over by specific ethnic groups, which makes the labour market somewhat rigid. Only rarely could a Ukrainian find employment in the transport industry or a Pakistani in the fishing industry. Today’s labour market rewards a number of groups exceedingly well. One group is the engineers, particularly those associated with growth industries. Another group that does

well consists of all those who work over a certain level in the care sector. This is a large sector that pays well, and where the power of the employees is growing.

The American corporate model from before the turn of the century prevails in large areas of working life primarily because most of the large establishments have international owners or, more correctly, they are subsidiaries of large global corporations. In banking, insurance and other types of service, Norway is more than ever a branch country, a fact which makes it difficult to work one's way up the ladder without experience from other countries. There is a large wage gap between managers and ordinary workers. This particularly applies in areas such as finance, ICT, media and advertising, but also to a great extent in the health service, which as a whole constitutes the largest workplace in the country. The greatest freedom is to be found, paradoxically enough, in the biomaritime sector. Here the decisive competence is more local and specific for Norway, and thus more difficult to standardize according to international organizational models.

In the other part of the labour market – within “step-in” or “click-in” – conditions are more varied, but here too employees are under pressure, perhaps mainly because workplaces often have a more one-sided cultural basis. There are especially numerous Asian and African cultural groups in this category. For many people, the alternative is generally a job on the fringe of the health service, in a field where few real demands are placed on service personnel.

In the coastal areas there is negative unemployment and a big demand for manpower in service industries. In inland areas on the other hand the labour market is under less pressure, as a result of which step-in and click-in are often the only alternatives available for many people in this part of the labour market. In the ethnicized labour market the wage gap is wider than in the more traditional area of Norwegian society. In the construction industry, where Poles dominate completely, there is generally a much wider gap between the top and the bottom of the pay scale than is the case for example in the education sector.

### **26.4.3 THE GENETICS SERVICE**

During the last 20 years the health service has become more than ever characterized by developments within medical genetics, a major factor in current health and social policy. This regime was slow in developing but, once it was here, became a major influence, not only for determining what new miracles could be performed by the health service, but indeed for the entire system. The development gained momentum as part of the “Human Development Project”, a sequel to the “Human Genome Project” initially set up to map the entire genetic endowment packaged in the human chromosomes.

The project resulted in the development of knowledge and methods for preventing a number of diseases before they manifest themselves or even before an individual is born. The obvious economic advantages of this appealed to many people. However, Norwegian society is currently divided on the issue of genetic manipulation. As much as 20 per cent of the population is against any treatment of this type, while very many others approve of certain types of genetic therapy.

Medical developments also had major consequences for Norway's experience of the so-called elderly boom, particularly its economic aspects. Back in the year 2000, many people were anxious that, in years to come, there would be too many elderly people in relation to the number of people capable of working, and that many social arrangements would therefore break down. However, the problem was solved by extensive immigration.

Some people also continue working long past the usual retiring age. In addition to the high general level of education<sup>104</sup>, medical progress reduced the number of people contracting diseases. It has been pointed out that the necessity of a high income was brought about by the lack of national health facilities for the new medicine. The demand for genetic therapy was thus in itself a motivation for the increase in the number who continued working. However, the effect of this was marginal compared with that of increased immigration, particularly from Asia and Africa.

The new medicine also helped to change the pathological picture of the population. Prenatal diagnosis and genetic tests are usual today.<sup>105</sup> An increasing number of people are therefore aware of the diseases they are likely to contract during their lives, which makes it easier for them to adapt their lives to a future pathological picture. On the other hand, this has resulted in almost everyone being potentially sick. In many people's view, this was the development that led to the rapid expansion of commercial biotechnology. Most people in whom the genetic likelihood of specific diseases has been determined are members of interest organizations that fight for research funds in their particular area of disease.

The apparent growth in hereditary diseases as a result of improved diagnostics also led to a reduction in the willingness of the general public to contribute financially to help people who suffered from more self-inflicted diseases and injuries. This was also a consequence of the insurance companies' unwillingness to cover hereditary diseases, and the fact that the insurance market gradually focused its attention on accidents. The insurance market also increasingly adapted to social differentiation, and there are now major variations in the price of standard health insurance dependent on which social stratum or group one belongs to.

---

104 In 1997, the proportion of young elderly (60–66 years) in gainful employment was double as high among those with university and college education than among those with only primary and lower secondary education. Among those with upper secondary education, the rate of employment was half as high as it was among those with only primary and lower secondary education. The proportion of disabled people was almost three times as high among those with only primary and lower secondary education than among those with university and college education. The same tendency can be seen among the middle-aged (45–59 years). Statistics Norway. *Samfunnsspeilet* No. 5, 1999

105 As early as 2000, the Department for Medical Genetics at Haukeland Hospital in Bergen offered genetic examination and counselling (clinical genetics), molecular genetic diagnostics and chromosome diagnostics of newborns, as well as foetal diagnostics.

## 26.5 SCHOLASTICISM AND THE SCHOOL

The welfare system has become increasingly pluralistic at the same time as group solidarity is strong in many places. As a result of the reduced role of the state, individual groups now see it as essential to offer sound arrangements to their members. Many welfare schemes are therefore only available to those who fulfil appropriate criteria. Norway, like the rest of the EU has become a multicultural country. The advance of the Islamists in Turkey, Algeria and Egypt resulted in considerable immigration to the EU, in some years approaching 5 million people. At the same time, immigration to Europe from southern Asia continued. Many people found the religious life of these peoples rich, especially when compared with the “infotainment” that increasingly characterized the public sphere. Such reactions resulted in a certain increase in the number of conversions to Islam by native Norwegians but by far the majority joined the Christian charismatic and neo-religious movements.<sup>106</sup>

Major growth in immigration has also entailed that there are many people who have neither built up any right to National Insurance cover nor have participated in any of the many savings schemes established to enable people to pay for the help they need when the expected disease materializes. There are however many other private and voluntary measures where group solidarity is high on the agenda. The Roman Catholic Welfare Fund distributes funds to needy Catholics. The fund also runs its own university, and has a number of institutions for elderly people in various parts of the country. The Pakistani Association for First-Generation Immigrants provides support to newly arrived Pakistanis including support for education at the Muslim Freedom School, which is located on the east side of Oslo. Many of the associations have been established to help their members find jobs, accommodation and school provisions compatible with their ideology or religion.

After the state church system was abolished in connection with the revision of the Constitution in 2010, the school system was radically restructured. A large number of independent schools were founded after the public sector wound up the comprehensive school. The major breakthrough for independent schools came with the new Education Act of 2012 whereby all primary and lower secondary schools were granted the same funding rights as state schools as long as they upheld fundamental learning requirements. Today, the term *independent schools* embraces all schools that are not state schools. This includes schools serving the needs of religious movements or specific ethnic or cultural orientations and schools founded on specific pedagogical systems as well as private schools with less idealistic motives. A large minority of the independent schools are based not on religious, ethnic or cultural orientations but more on the concept of learning as a market.

---

106 Norway was established as a country of net immigration in 1971, with a net immigration figure of 6600 persons. In all subsequent years except one, more people have moved to Norway than have moved away. A new record was made in 1998 with a net immigration figure of over 13 800. *Statistikk mot år 2000: 1970–1971* (Statistics towards the year 2000: 1979-1971), Statistics Norway.

Today over 30 per cent of children of primary and lower secondary school age attend one or another form of religious school, while a corresponding number have chosen a private school for educational reasons. The minorities are a major force in Norwegian society, and the level of conflict between the secular society and the various religious communities is rising. Five per cent of pupils attend so-called intensive schools. These are academic elite schools dominated by children of affluent parents, but with a sprinkling of children with scholarships provided by large companies. The ethnic minorities have welcomed independent schools, and almost all families send their children to schools that sustain their cultural and religious roots.

The secular part of society has also found satisfactory solutions to the discontinuation of the comprehensive school system. Many independent schools have been set up, based either on purely pedagogical alternatives or on specific cultural characteristics, and these provide keen competition for the remaining state schools. These schools regard themselves as secular and have close alliances with state schools. State schools are now organized in a state-owned foundation called Norwegian Learning, which runs both primary and secondary schools.


The independent school concept applies also at the upper secondary level. All who wish to run such schools are required to prove that they hold the necessary fundamental qualifications. Once they have done so, they are free to do as they wish. In this area, a new trend has begun to manifest itself. The choice of school depends no longer only on religious and cultural preferences but also on close ties with higher education. Several of the larger universities that operate in Norway have their own upper secondary schools where a form of specialization is introduced. For example, Harvard's network of upper secondary schools in Norway is among the most difficult to gain admission to, and the drilling provided in traditional character formation is legendary.

Several of the independent schools belong to various forms of alliance. Both the Muslim and the Christian schools would like greater freedom to devise their own syllabuses including the content of science subjects, but there has not so far been a majority in favour of this in the Storting. The religious schools regard the teaching of the theory of evolution as an atrocity and an infringement of religious freedom. The EU has not yet issued a statement as to whether this conflicts with union law but, for several years, legal proceedings have been carried on at the EWU Court in order to decide exactly this issue.

The university sector in Norway has undergone radical changes during the last 30 years. Of the 24 colleges that existed at the turn of the century only seven remain, while the number of universities has increased considerably. The various colleges have either been bought up or merged with foreign educational institutions. At the same time, student cohorts have increased in size, and this combination has given these institutions much more muscle. Some colleges, such as the former Oslo University College, have become branches of the Aga Kahn University, while Bodø College has become part of MIT. The demand for cultural and religious educational institutions combined with globalization has given Norway a vigorous and extremely varied academic environment.

## 26.6 RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

While Norway in 2030 is no longer the epitome of peaceful nations, it is true that we have fewer conflicts than many other countries, and the conflicts rarely lead to violent episodes. We are also involved in a number of peacekeeping operations, and are one of the countries that have valuable experience of arbitration in conflicts. There is nevertheless always a tense atmosphere, as if people have a constant feeling that something serious may happen at any moment. Conflicts arise out of shifts in the ethnic composition of the population, involving ghettoization in the cities and big differences between groups. Numerous controversies, on both concrete and abstract levels, arise in the wake of all the technological changes in our time.



<figure texts>

The Church of Norway

Norwegian Humanist Association

Islam

Pentecostal congregations

Buddhism

The Catholic Church

Norwegian Orthodox congregations

With hindsight, the abolition of the state church system in Sweden proved a far more important event than it was thought at the time. It enabled the Church of Sweden to adapt its rituals so as to absorb the strong neo-religious undercurrents. The Church of

Norway, on the other hand, held back owing to its anxiety that other denominations might profit by these undercurrents. However, as state church, the Church of Norway was expected by the state to function as a “people’s church” with responsibility for the everyday rituals, and not to develop a particularly intense religious life. It was thus the charismatic churches and the neo-religious groups that recruited new members.

A number of clergymen chose to leave the Church of Norway and join the charismatic movement. When the Church of Norway was finally separated from the state in 2010, it was already too late to win back the lost sheep not least because the rival churches had been able to build close ties with industry and develop a range of services that proved extremely marketable in a situation where the state’s facilities were growing gradually poorer. These groups were thus secured financially while the commercial basis for the Church of Norway was impaired.

In spite of all this, the Church of Norway is still the country’s largest religious organization with approximately one-third of the population as members. It is a relatively broad, ecumenically oriented church, governed by a college of bishops, which has established a bureaucracy consisting partly of former employees of the Ministry of Church Affairs. The church has a differentiated income structure. It receives some money from the state, for instance in connection with “assignments” This applies, for example, to state funerals and other ecclesiastical duties associated with the armed forces and the royal family. Other income is derived from ecclesiastical duties, fund-raising and to some extent from church property.

The church receives little support from the Norwegian population in connection with normal church activities and, where the traditional rites of passage are concerned, only baptisms and funerals are still engaged in to any extent. The number of employees in the Norwegian Lutheran Church is less than half the number employed by the state church in the year 2000. On the other hand, the Church has established joint websites enabling individual dialogues and transmissions of services via a screen to churches in rural areas that have staffing problems.

### **26.6.1 CULTURAL CONFLICT**

With hindsight, neo-religious developments seem mainly to have been a reaction to developments within biotechnology. This research made it possible to manipulate “God’s work”, and resulted in increasing differences of opinion between different social groups. In politics, these trends were first visible in the form of alliances between left wing radicals and Christian conservatives but as time went on a number of such alliances were established between other groups that were previously far apart, while groups that previously coexisted harmoniously as far as attitudes were concerned suddenly found themselves on either side of a divide. A considerable polarization also gradually manifested itself between a commercially oriented elite, who saw commercial potential in an expansive biotechnological development, and groups that rejected such a development on the basis of a more religious orientation.

We saw for example that elderly people, particularly those who were members of the Geriatric Genome Society, made a stand for breaking increasing numbers of medical barriers, while groups that were supporters of “natural death” strongly opposed permitting this development. It was not only the ethical aspects of this medical research



that were found to be problematical. Increasing resources were allocated to regenerative medicine. It is at any rate a fact that the elderly play a dominant role in political debates. They constitute over 40 per cent of the population and therefore have considerable political power. All politicians compete for their votes, and many of the major political debates have concerned the extent to which life extension measures should be available on the national health service. The Norwegian Pensioners' Association is the largest organization of its kind in Norway, and has a team of lawyers and lobbyists at its disposition. However, the organization has a somewhat stuffy and responsible air about it. Other elderly groups such as the Grey Panthers, which use strategies such as civil disobedience, are also very successful.

## **26.7 GLOBALIZED PUBLIC SECTOR**

In 2030 Norway is an international community, and this makes itself felt throughout the public sector. Firstly, it is international in the sense that it embraces many cultures. The various cultural groups are all very visible and their members are in the main proud of the group they belong to. Secondly, it is an international community in the sense that the principal economic activities are not owned by Norwegians but by large multinational corporations. Thirdly, we can call it an international community because communication and contact with other countries is almost as common as contact between towns and municipalities in Norway, even those that lie quite close to one another. Finally, it is an international community because Norway is a member of the EU, which now functions almost as a full federation in many sectors.

The many different cultural groups, whether ethnic immigrants or self-appointed custodians of immigrant culture, e.g. the MC environments and the Islamists, all leave their mark on the public sector. For, although the groups are minorities in most respects, they often succeed in gaining influence disproportionate to their numbers in relation to politics and administration as well as in other spheres. There is a tacit understanding in the public sector that it is important, in a positive way, to restrict the development of such groups. The continual attempts to impose a degree of order on the cultural diversity have made most people increasingly sceptical of the public authorities. As a result of the high rate of immigration, native Norwegians have become a relatively resourceful group, and there are some major economic differences between native Norwegians and "the others", as reflected in the tax morals of both groups.

At the start of the century, most people perceived globalization of the economy as somewhat threatening, particularly when major investments in ICT proved mainly to be a failure, not in economic terms but because the majority of companies moved most of their operations out of the country when they were bought up. Owing to experience of this kind, the state became far more cautious about investing in specific industries, as a result of which the public sector was little involved in biotechnology when it really began to be profitable. Instead, the state used its well-filled coffers for speculating on the stock market, while it was primarily the EU that was responsible for the necessary regulatory policy. Norwegian economic policy is therefore primarily controlled by international organizations and global corporations, whereas the Norwegian state has assumed a more passive investor role.

The Norwegian public sector is also characterized by globalization in a more general sense. We are increasingly dependent on other countries and particularly on decisions made in international organizations, although many such decisions are first fed through the EU system. However, frequent communications and interaction with foreign countries also reduces the role of the Norwegian public sector in relation to many issues. Strategies and regulations of importance for welfare are generally implemented as a result of developments in other countries and on the instructions of the EU. Since national considerations have been somewhat diluted, the state has made a strong priority of a variety of measures for language protection, web sites, book issues, etc. In spite of steadily falling ratings, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation is provided with considerable funding and other stations' TV talk shows are provided with support for broadcasting in the Norwegian language.

### **26.7.1 THE SCOURGE OF MULTICULTURALISM**

The global community, EU membership, reduced national awareness and multiculturalism have all contributed to making Norway less Norwegian. Owing to the connection between identity, politics and public control, these changes have also resulted in a Norwegian public sector very different than it was before the turn of the century, and this is not only because the foreign and security policy is federal. In 2030, there is also very little left of the Scandinavian welfare model. The weakest link is the concept of equality in the sense of *cultural* equality. Even in the large and still relatively homogeneous middle class, we find many dissolutional tendencies. People are weary of Hollywood's illusions and yearn for something more authentic and spiritual. The fundamental conflict dimension in society is drawn between the streamlined reality of the global society and the local and perplexing abundance of alternatives. Today, many people hold the view that one of the most important tasks of the state is to mediate between population groups, which is also expressed in the more general political control of society.

The idea of "Norwegianness" is weaker today than it used to be. Most people, whether they are native Norwegians or first- or fourth-generation immigrants, regard themselves first and foremost as members of a global community and only secondly as members of a local or cultural community. For the many active minority cultures, the opposite applies. Minority cultures, or counter-cultures, which is the sociological term for these groups, tend to view the global as a threat, often without even understanding that it is the globalization process that has helped to make them what they are. Their opposition to it is nevertheless natural, since minority groups primarily represent cultural places of refuge in the global Disney culture.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature of this society is that the elderly, that is to say those over 70, comprise the most homogeneous groups. This is not only because there are more of them than there used to be or because they have become more alike, but because these groups are to a great extent carriers of the traditions from the heyday of social democracy, and are thus also carriers of an equality and fairness ideology that is quite alien to the young people of today. At the same time, it is somewhat paradoxical that it is these groups of elderly people that provide most support for the multicultural society. The explanation is quite simply that it was these groups that experienced the positive new impulses provided by newcomers to the homogeneous Norway, from

exotic vegetables to foreign religions. Many old people also remember the negative attitudes exhibited by many old people were when they themselves were young, and they have no wish to be branded in the same way.

Most of the younger groups today are more critical of slogans such as “colourful community”, and remind us that the other side of the coin consists of more conflicts and more crime. They view the integration approach as a failure. They like to point out that several of the largest cultural groups do not represent tolerance and openness, but rather the opposite, and that they have also become strong enough to gain political acceptance for their foreign ideas and customs. The remaining groups of young people, naturally enough, disagree with these views since they either belong to the groups that are criticized or they are ordinary young Norwegians who have sought refuge in one or another form of cultural movement.

### **26.7.2 FEDERATION**

The satisfaction of the majority with globalization finds expression in the support for EU elections with an election turnout of well over 60 per cent. This is relatively good, but also demonstrates that many of the minorities also have an international orientation and that these groups are attempting to bring their influence to bear on the EU system. At the European level, there are two relatively stable groupings as regards approaches to religious and cultural traditions, where one supports the view that the range of religious and cultural traditions must be guaranteed by a strong union and the other wishes to safeguard different special interests. Since the latter group has difficulty in pulling together, it is the integrationists who have dominated the European parliament during the last 15 years. Policies are nevertheless relatively recognizable in view of what the two main schools of thought stand for in economic policy, etc., where the old distinction between right and left is still visible.

During several periods up to 2024, two different types of coalition government and various parliamentary constellations dominated the Norwegian political scene. However, election participation gradually dropped to a very low level, rarely over 50 per cent, while the different parties were constantly changed (or “renewed”, as they themselves preferred to call it) as regards both name and organizational structure. Various forms of formal alliance, such as All for Norway, the Rainbow Alliance, etc., were formed without achieving any greater support for the parties or improving the election turnout. Recruiting to the various parties also fell off, and only a minute proportion of the population showed interest in using much time on involvement in party politics.

Following the conversion of the EU to an almost full federation in 2024 and the support for this development given in a public referendum, the national political system was completely restructured. The Storting now has 65 elected members, as against 165 prior to the reform. The real power of the Storting has been radically reduced. Most of the statutory framework is now decided by the European Parliament. The Storting has however legislative authority in certain issues relating to language norms and other legislation concerning specifically Norwegian matters. Today’s Storting is more reminiscent of a large and powerful council for cultural affairs than the august assembly that existed at the turn of the century.

The support for local government elections varies greatly according to the matters focused on in the campaign, which is taken by many people as evidence of democracy working as it should. There are also variations in the involvement shown by the various minority groups, which also vary between the different regions and municipalities. In the rather more homogeneous areas of Western Norway, for example, the election turnout is markedly lower than in other parts of the country. The religious revival also makes itself evident in the high turnout for elections to parish councils and to direct episcopal elections. At some elections, over 80 per cent of the electorate have voted.

### **26.7.3 THE STATE AS INTERMEDIARY**

Many people have been critical of the Norwegian state after the 2024 reform. Now that the EU has now taken another large step towards becoming a full federation, there are many people who regard it as futile to discuss issues at the national level which will nevertheless be decided at a higher level. Large organizations and enterprises prefer mainly to make use of direct contacts with Berlin rather than go via the Norwegian Storting, which is anyway perceived as a second division team, not only in status and power but also in pure political terms. The cleverest heads and the most important persons have been long been established in the EU capital.

However there are also those who hold that the state has an even more central role in the positioning rounds that precede important EU discussions. It is easier to persuade national politicians and bureaucrats that one has a good case when they are not in practice responsible for the outcome. They need not take such matters so seriously, and can easily communicate a controversial standpoint in political horse-trading with a large minority group. Criticism of the central government politicians may however also be interpreted as an reflecting the view that, now that the central government has less to do, it has more occasion to take up matters of greater relevance for people's everyday lives. Many of the minority groups have been able over time to develop themselves without any fear of government interference. The Church is now anxious that we will see a return of ambitious politicians eager to overrule ecumenical developments. With such a point of departure, it is easy to understand that people have become more sceptical of state control after the 2024 reform.

It is nevertheless correct to say that central government is to a great extent synonymous with EU government, and that there is thus clearly less room for national government. All directives, guidelines, monetary and fiscal policy measures and, not least, decisions concerning security and defence policy are taken by the EU. However, at the local level, the picture is still rather different. Local government politics is still fairly unaffected by the EU reform, if we ignore the many structural measures that entailed major changes both regionally and locally from 2010 onwards.

The heyday of the national government is definitively at an end, and we have today a far smaller central government than we had only 30 years ago, and which also has other functions than it used to have. This is not least due to developments in the EU, but the many changes that have taken place in Norwegian society so far this century have also left their mark on the structure of public administration. Few people initially believed that the EU would develop into the political community we see today. The tendencies were nevertheless clear before the turn of the century. This is because changes have

happened gradually. Just as we went from Maastricht to the Treaty of Amsterdam, with the establishment of the economic and monetary union, we have gone forward from the Treaty of Nice through several stages to the most recent, the so-called federation treaty, or *Treaty of Warsaw*, as many people are fond of referring to it. There are still many people who doubt that it is possible to run a federation with 35 member states in a democratic way.

The gradual expansion of the EU area has in many ways forced the need for a stronger central power at the expense of the sovereignty of the individual member states, and this has become especially clear after the admission of many states at the start of the century. The authority of the EU President has been considerably strengthened, and the President functions today more as a proper president than as “first among equals” in the Commission. The same applies to decision-making authority, in the sense that it is no longer possible for individual states to veto the wishes of the majority, which is also given expression by the decision that members of the European Parliament shall no longer formally represent individual states, but the whole of the EU.

The relationship between the EU and the Norwegian public administration is of course affected by this. As a result of the many treaties in just as many policy areas, very much of what can be characterized as technical policy shaping has been taken over by the EU. The EU’s social and health standards, for instance, have totally changed Norwegian social policy. The same applies to the courts, where particularly the authority of the Supreme Court has been challenged.

However, the EU does not have complete control of the international arena. There are many areas where decisions are taken by other supranational bodies, but where the EU has representation and the right of veto. This particularly applies in connection with trade policy, but also increasingly in matters concerning environmental and energy policy and, not least, in relation to the United Nations standing forces, which play an important role in curbing the activities of power-hungry politicians in more troubled areas of the world.

#### **26.7.4 LARGE MUNICIPALITIES**

The transfer of sovereignty to the EU has played a part in reducing the number of public agencies at the central level. Almost everything has been abolished, from small boards and councils to large directorates, often by incorporating core activities and expertise in a corresponding unit in the EU system. The number of ministries has also been reduced. The only new ministry for many years is the Ministry of Resources, which in reality is a continuation of the former Ministry of Coastal Affairs, which was for many years only a “reconstruction ministry” established to help with the development of biomaritime activities. We have also witnessed the privatization of public administration bodies that few people would previously have envisaged could play a commercial role. Many people were critical of the sale of Work Management Consulting (WMC), the former Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority, when this was bought up by the same company that owns Det Norske Veritas.

In other areas, state involvement has instead changed its character. The state has withdrawn from a number of establishments which it previously either wholly owned or was the principal shareholder of, establishments that were in many ways extensions of

the state, and which are now more to be regarded as investment objects. New establishments have also emerged, particularly in the areas where the EU is technologically weak. In the case of Norway, this particularly applies to almost all fields within modern marine technology. The establishment of the Ministry of Resources in 2022 is a good example of this.

One of the biggest changes that EU membership has brought upon the structure of public administration is the differentiation of the municipalities. Today there are bigger differences between rich and poor municipalities than there used to be, which many people view as a consequence of the harmonization of tax policy within the EU, but which is undoubtedly also due to more fundamental changes both in attitudes and in the industrial structure of the country. Many rich municipalities in Western Norway, which stand for much of the value creation in Norway, cooperate directly with the Commission, and use this actively in the continuous struggle with the central authorities and the economically weaker Oslo region. Direct contact is possible since the municipalities are far larger today after restructuring according to the Polish model, whereby the number of municipalities was quite simply divided by ten, so today there are only 44 municipalities.

The municipalities are governed according to the same basic political model as other municipalities in the EU but, as a result of referendums on specific issues, a range of areas is subject to their jurisdiction. The system is not unlike that which was introduced in Norway with the Aldermen's Acts of 1837. The municipality of Sunnmøre is particularly interesting in terms of the Union as a whole and the world at large. The dialect of Sunnmøre has been approved as an EU culture language, which means that it can be used in cultural expressions financed by the EU. This "greater municipality" has an active cultural programme with considerable funding both from Berlin and from local business and industry.

For example, on the model of the English Poet Laureate, an annual grant is paid to a local poet, known as the "Laureate in Residence at the Ivar Aasen School of Language" (until 2015, the Ivar Aasen Centre). Since 2026 this honour has been held by Jon Ali Mbeki, whose last play *Sunrise over the Plains* has already been performed twenty or so times, downloaded by 10 000 users in the original language and translated into five languages. Sunnmøre, along with Galway, Sardinia South and Lüneburger Heide, is a prime example of the EU's successful cultural municipalities.

### **26.7.5 PRIVATE SUPPLIERS**

As a result of the long-standing policy for more open boundaries with other countries, Norway has a large population of immigrant origin. It has also become usual to travel abroad to work and study, and to have residences in several countries. This provides considerable challenges for the health and social security system, and the EU's standard for health and social security was welcomed by many people when it was introduced. The scheme guarantees minimum standards at the European rather than national level. Owing to new diseases, and because many people prefer to be treated in Norway owing to the excellent facilities available, the system is often overburdened. Patients are also increasingly expected to pay for services, even those that are still provided by the public sector. The price of public services not subject to the minimum standards laid down in

the EU's standard for health and social security also vary considerably between the municipalities.

The social security system as an insurance scheme was abolished because people lost confidence in it when they became aware that they would get less out of it than they paid in since there were now more users than payers. Private insurance arrangements have taken over from the social security system, and there is a strong conflict between the political parties that believe in maintaining this new arrangement and those that would prefer to return to social security and want to put an end to payment for medical and other services that were previously state-financed.

The state has little income from taxation owing to harmonization with other countries, but large investments and ownership of global establishments provide a reasonable cash flow. Allocation policy instruments such as taxes and government funding are more difficult to apply after harmonization of financial policy in the EU. Universal welfare facilities are therefore mainly a thing of the past, with the exception of child benefit, which has broad support from all classes. The welfare system has become increasingly pluralistic at the same time as group solidarity is strong in many places. Many welfare schemes are therefore only available to those who fulfil appropriate criteria.

Two main factors have been involved in the development of the organization of public agencies and public services. Firstly, organization is characterized by the fact that the central government is no longer the highest administrative level in Norway. For most agencies, this entails an organizational dualism which many people find absurd, but which in more aggregated forms undoubtedly has a rationale. Dualism means quite simply that the agencies must adapt organization, routing and rules laid down in the EU charter on public administration (which in principle is intended to safeguard security under the law and equal treatment throughout the Union), while the competition factor, which is also strong in the public sector, entails that it is just as important that individual establishments are creative and capable of showing what they are good for.

It is true that there are very few public agencies of the old sort left in Norway. Market ideology constitutes in many ways the other trend that has contributed to a restructuring of the public Norway. Most agencies have either been privatized or quite simply closed down as a result of the establishment of a market in the area and thus also actors who were able to take over production of the service on behalf of the public sector. Perhaps most remarkable is that relatively little opposition has been shown to this development. For many employees, it was better to become "private" than to have to accommodate to the Commission's numerous demands and whims.

## **26.8 POSTSCRIPT BY THE SOCIAL HISTORIAN 2030**

### **26.9 SO FAIR WAS OUR COUNTRY**

Ellen Mbaata, “So Fair was our Country” (Oxford University Press, 2028: p 124):

“Norway changed rapidly after the turn of the century. The country was at the peak of an economic boom. Employment levels were high and the welfare level exceptional, viewed both from a global and a regional level. The buying power of the population had increased by 40 per cent during the previous ten years, and the relative increase in welfare from 1975 to 2000 was much greater in Norway than in most other countries.

The new-found wealth and security had brought about a change in the mental orientation of the population. The emphasis on security in the form of a roof over one’s head and full employment resulted in priority being given to new security projects. The health sector was generally of extremely high quality, as was shown by all comparative studies of the period, but the constantly ageing population was most preoccupied with the shortcomings that after all could be found and, with the help of the media, a picture of an insecure old age was created. Scepticism of the immigrants who were darker than most Norwegians was rife.

The political foundation was shaken upside down. The Norwegian Labour Party which, since the period between the two world wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> century had been the country’s largest party both in number of members and support, had to give up its position to the fairly new Progress Party. The Progress Party was a genuine postmodernist party, capable of timing its media stunts with astounding precision. It focused on citizens as consumers and combined this perspective with a populist style where such things as insight into economic mechanisms were ridiculed.

However the Progress Party was not successful in reversing Norwegian immigration policy. There were major net increases in immigration into the new century, generated by the demand for labour. Norway joined the EU at a time when the EU was rapidly expanding into eastern areas of Europe, and immigration from these areas was considerable.

The pace and volume of immigration was to change Norway totally. The politicians opposed it with words, but not with deeds, since they were not in charge of the frameworks that policy was required to comply with. This led to a situation where the Norwegian native population was full of programmed scepticism and the new immigrant groups were neither able nor willing to subject themselves to meaningful integration. Today’s disintegrated state is a result of the failure on the part of the country’s leading politicians at the time to see that the ideological and cultural project of the nation-state was no longer relevant. Instead, they held on to it, even after it had been reduced to a mere prop. No attempt was made to revise the content of the nation-state in relation to the new multiethnic reality. This is the tragedy of Norwegian society, and I am convinced that the political leaders at this point in history made a number of



decisive errors. As I have shown, there were better alternatives available. For it was then that so much came undone that we really could have used, the things that once made our country so fair.”

# Innova

## 27 CHAPTER 7

# 28 Innova – NORWAY●2030


Norway is now a society where creativity and innovation have highest priority. The most important task of the authorities is to encourage innovation in order to promote keen economic growth. This policy overrides all other goals, such as distribution and levelling. The principle of industry neutrality has been abolished and replaced by targeted focusing on individual industries with great innovation potential. The state has become a major investor in certain industries and sectors, and cooperates pragmatically with the private sector in all matters concerning industrial development.

The new and extremely active economic policy (innovation policy) has been implemented in close cooperation with the European Minister of Innovation, enabled by Norway's membership of the EU. Staple industries in Norway today are marine-based food production where major elements of the processing are carried out in Norway, biogenetic agriculture and energy-intensive production (aluminium, chemicals, etc.). Areas such as "clean production", water, tourism and gas production, are also of great importance.

Current political conflicts concern disagreement on whether to focus on tourism or water and what initiatives we shall take in relation to globalization. Other topical issues concern how we shall create efficient and imaginative markets in the developing world and how we shall beat the Americans and the Chinese in the development of commercial biotechnology and genetic engineering. There are still some small political groupings that fight to combat economic growth, manipulation of nature, the development of capitalism, globalization or "imperialism", but they are of little importance.

In employment relationships, individual agreements on working hours are now usual. Employers are no longer a clearly defined group. An increasing number of employees become contractors after establishing sole proprietorships or small limited companies. This has resulted in employers/customers being less preoccupied with the availability of their employees/suppliers. They are far more concerned with productivity. A major charge against the current political system is that it stimulates white-collar crime. The absence of clear boundaries between the authorities' economic activities, administration and commerce has its price.

The great majority of the general public have a high standard of living. Economic growth is high and the policy ensures that everyone shares in the general prosperity of the country. It is usual for families to own their own houses and to have access to holiday homes in Norway and abroad. The Government has established a special public limited company (Back-to-society.com ASA), to offer financial resocialization to all those who fall outside of society. This has proved a great success.



## 28.1 MAIN IDEAS AND ASSUMPTIONS

*From distribution policy to innovation policy.* This state construction is a result of economic policy becoming the most important arena. The goal has been strong economic growth motivated by the wish to survive in the global competition. Later in the new century traditional distribution policy ceased to fulfil its goals and fell into disrepute. Redistribution did not result in reduction or better integration of marginalized groups.

The emergence of new communities, which paradoxically are a direct result of the decay of old social formations, resulted in the state's loss of authority in a number of areas. At the same time, globalization and total liberalization of world trade were viewed by the population with growing anxiety. In this context, the innovation state becomes a new national compromise where the wish for material security results in a radical alteration of the traditional perceptions of the distribution of responsibility between the state and the public sector.

*The Innovation State.* The most important political decisions that made Innova's development possible were the introduction of an active state investment policy, the decision to fully accede to international patent legislation, reappraisal of the principle of industry neutrality, changes in the tax law, establishment of the Ministry of Finance and Innovation in 2008 (synergy between the ministries that in 2000 were known as the Ministries of Finance, Local Government and Regional Development, Trade and Industry, Education, Research and Church Affairs and Transport and Communications) and the follow-up both in Norway and in Europe at large of proposals by a number of committees for concrete measures to enhance innovative dynamism. This policy constituted the real turning point of Norwegian and European policy during the first quarter of the 21st century. As time went on, socioeconomic developments opened most people's eyes to the necessity of such a political reform.

*Biotechnology.* Biotechnology has been successful in firmly establishing itself, and Norway has become a major actor in the fields of biotechnology and mariculture. Authorities and actors from both sides of industry work closely together to build new industrial structures in the country. The authorities and their instruments are characterized by a strong involvement in establishing a sound climate for innovation and investment, coordinating knowledge institutions and stimulating cooperation between actors in different sectors. There has been a particular focus on bridging the gap between certain areas of high technology and traditional maritime industry.

The petroleum age came to a sudden end earlier than expected in the year 2000, although gas production continued, thereby preventing the worst possible crisis. Before 2010 it was already obvious that the Norwegian economy would need to readjust very rapidly if it was to maintain reasonable provisions within education and social welfare. However, there has been considerable privatization in these sectors, and in relative terms the public sector's contribution is much weaker than it was.

*External view of reforms.* Very sound institutional, political and legal frameworks provide flexible solutions for coordination of work, family life, looking after small children and other social and cultural considerations. The state and the private sector have shown a growing awareness of these and other matters and, viewed in the light of the need for an adaptable labour force, these are extremely important areas. Besides society's overall innovation orientation, humanitarian organizations also function as important forces for reform, and represent an alternative to pure market liberal ideologies. There is very little public support of art and culture.

## 28.2 NADA DESIGN

Jenny Skirung gazes out of the window. Down on the street below people are rushing by, but quite a few of them find their way into Nada Design. She has four employees in the shop. Years ago, she did everything herself, absolutely everything. She is relieved that things have gone right, but the reason is quite obvious. Her own strong will and capacity for hard work lie at the bottom of her success. Her company, a small furniture shop with products she has designed herself is one of a large number of small workplaces in “the new manufacturing economy”, based on entrepreneurship and generous support from the different government-run innovation centres.

The Norwegian state finances a number of innovation centres, where research and industry are linked together with a view to development of commercial products. For Jenny, it is the centres within marketing, design and materials technology that are the most interesting. There has been a considerable change of emphasis during the last 30 years. There is now a certain social prestige attached to being an entrepreneur and, although owning your own company is not necessarily a path to riches, it is extremely popular today. Some entrepreneurs very quickly make a large fortune and, although most of them never really hit the jackpot, there are many who dream of doing so.

Jenny has two daughters. There is twelve years between them. The elder girl, Marianne, was born when Jenny was still married to Fred. She got her second child by visiting a clinic in the Netherlands. That was in 2017. She had just had her fortieth birthday. She had no man in her life, but all she wanted was another child. She wanted to make sure that the child would be well-equipped for life. No sooner said than done. Ingrid, as she called the child, will be 13 next week, and she’s a lovely girl. Perhaps not the spitting image of her mother, but very much her mother’s daughter.

Ingrid attends one of the best schools in town, Bakklandet International School. It specializes in international relations and universalizing. Universalizing became a school subject in the middle of the second decade of the century after an increasing number of people saw the necessity of being proactive in developing global standards, ethical and normative guidelines that apply across national borders and, not least, an area on the Globalnet (the successor to the Internet) for continuous discussion on perspectives concerning mankind, nature and society that can be given universal status. The admission requirements for Bakklandet are rigorous, and the fees are high, but only the best is good enough for Ingrid. There’s no point in having top genes if the environment is not up to scratch. Jenny is glad that the whole concept of the comprehensive school has been scrapped. There were no social mechanisms to support the principle of unified education or the idea of a school where one should not be able to pay for the tuition. Privatization of the education sector has resulted in the emergence of elite schools, and many critics argue that this results in the growth of class distinctions. That’s probably true, says Jenny, but it is her view that most parents can afford to pay for their children’s education if they give it priority. She has done so herself. She has been generous to her children at the expense of a number of material comforts. For example, she has no car. Moreover the authorities ensure good coordination between all the different private educational solutions, and are quick to come down on those that stray too far from the path.

Her ex-husband – Soft Soya Fred, as she calls him – is one of those who strongly disagrees with the new school system. In his view, the large variations in teachers pay that are a natural consequence of such a development result in much poorer standards of teaching at the cheaper schools. They become dumping grounds for outdated and worn out teachers, he maintains. Jenny thinks this is totally wrong, but she chooses not to tell him what she thinks. He usually also began to hold forth on the differing quality and other differences between schools weakening the national character. That is something Jenny couldn't care less about. Her products are not "Made in Norway". True enough, some of them are made here, but it makes no difference. The quality stamp on the bottom is all that is needed nowadays, and that says nothing about where they are made. Apart from that, it is only the design that counts.

Her eldest daughter, Marianne, is 25 and has started working for Oxo in London. She has taken a degree in design management with studies in both London and Milan. Her qualifications are ranked highly everywhere, not that they need to be approved by anything except the labour market. Some of her friends have taken degrees at foreign universities and for them it is a relief that all qualifications are now internationally coordinated, which considerably increases the efficiency of the labour market. Marianne belongs to the 2005 generation, a generation of young people who move around the world with the greatest of ease, and almost all of whom have higher education involving studies abroad.

Jenny is working on the design of a new sofa. She has made a model and is busy making one or two small adjustments. She is pleased with it and feels that it will be a success. She has thought to call it "The State of God". It has a good ring about it, and tells of a warm and contemplative God, a God after her own heart. A God without rules and regulations. "A little bit like Buddha, a little bit like Jesus and a little bit like me," she thinks. She is sitting stroking a piece of new fabric from Montesano. It is self-cleaning. Tiny microbes live in the fabric and keep it clean so it never needs washing – quite clever. She thinks of her first designs where she used ecological wool. She was a disciple of the Danish designer Niels Peter Flint, and was active in preaching the gospel of environmentally friendly design. But today there is no environmental movement, and no-one is preoccupied with the environment and nature conservation in the way they used to be. The organization Nature and Youth, which Jenny was a member of in the 1990s, has changed its name to "Civilization and Youth".

The term "sustainable development" has lost its meaning, mainly because technology and product development during the last 20 years solved many of the former pollution problems. This also resulted in almost everyone abandoning the so-called "biocentric" perspective on nature that characterized many of the "alternative" ecological movements during the last three decades of the 20th century. Jenny only knows one person who still raves about these things, and that is Jonas at the centre for the over-80s, an old hippie who has still not come down to earth after an acid trip in the 1970s. The conception of an original ecological balance that must be protected against any form of manipulation is now regarded as being one of the greatest socio-political delusions of the last century. Some people go as far as to call such views a threat to social development. Jenny does not have such feelings about it, but she often says to her friends: "In order for me to be more me and us to be more us, we must develop more

new technology, do more science and change the physical conditions around us.” In the old days people would have laughed if anyone had said such a thing, but not so today. Many people maintain that transforming nature while increasing economic growth is essential to the civilized development of society. The relationship between what is perceived as “natural” and what is characterized as “artificial” has changed enormously since Jenny was young. She remembers well how people reacted against silicone implants and other changes to the human body during the 1990s. Today redesigning your body is regarded as the most natural thing in the world. Indeed, it is unnatural not to make such changes. Jenny herself has invested in a new and prettier pair of hands.

But, never mind, she has held on to some of her enthusiasm, or to put it perhaps more correctly, she still has some principles. She is very critical of the regulation of watercourses and the building of new roads. A rather lonely position, to be sure, but one not to be given up! Jenny’s loneliness in relation to her views on watercourse regulation and roads may be due to the fact that Norway’s role as an energy nation has made the country independent of hydroelectric power. Norway is still a major energy nation, and energy production has played a role in deciding many of the frameworks for Norwegian social development, even in recent decades. Solar energy and a new form of wave energy solved many of the previous environmental problems, and have taken over as the main sources of energy. Water is no longer what it used to be. Roads are not what they used to be either. They are less visible, more attractive to look at and often placed underground. This is yet another good reason why most people no longer view the transformation of nature with concern.

Jenny thinks it might be time to start thinking about having another child. In many ways, she has lived like a youngster during the last five years, and she looks as young as ever. Jenny is not averse to the joys of life, but she earns enough to spend some of it on care and therapy to keep herself looking young. Now she wants another child. She has no husband, but is not sorry on that score. There is no lack of insemination offers. She has not yet decided where to go for the genetic material, but she wants a boy this time. She had lots of fun during her younger years, and she found this recent period of youth much like the previous ones. Lots of parties, boys and concerts. But nothing beats being a mother. Jenny checks the screen for the latest news. The main news is about the Norwegian Air Traffic and Airport Management. A number of people have expressed the view that the privatization of the airport management company is the indirect cause of the increase in aircraft accidents. Others say that the high winds are to blame.

Jenny Skirung has plans to further expand her business. She has already obtained a footing in a very select store in Copenhagen. She hopes to be able to supply to an international market within a few years. The state gives her active assistance with these efforts. The state innovation centres are really a good thing, and major improvements have been made since they were first conceived in the 1990s and began to take the form of research parks, entrepreneurial centres and industry parks. The term “industry park” makes Jenny smile, but she is glad of this development. It is adapted to the needs of people in her situation. It is this forest of small and medium-sized enterprises that generates export income. When Jenny started Nada in 2011, there weren’t many good support schemes for people starting their own businesses. Subsidies were mainly



channelled to existing industries that, for various reasons, had ended up in competition with subsidized industries in other countries.

Today, there are a number of schemes, among others, for start-up loans and tax incentives. One can be completely free of tax for the first three years of taxable income and then, during the next seven years, tax is gradually increased to the normal level. Wealth tax is also waived and the rate of tax on capital and labour is in most cases identical. This started something which seems to go on for ever. The whole country is full of entrepreneurs. Jenny was also helped out a lot by her family, particularly her mother was a faithful and energetic supporter. Moreover, the local industry council set up a competent board of directors, and this is fully financed by the state. After five years, support for the board is gradually phased out.

Jenny thinks constantly of her mother. She died this spring, and it was in every sense a painful death, not only for her mother, but for everyone who knew her. Jenny's mother had been given a number of transplants, both kidneys, heart and a number of glands had been replaced. But, after one of the last operations, she had severe pains, and the doctors soon found out that she had contracted a new and unknown virus that was slowly but surely devouring her. The virus attacked muscle tissue, and there was no cure for it. But Jenny's mother was a tough old bird, and was active in "The Association for Sufferers of Organic Diseases" until she breathed her last. This is an important association in these time of virus infection and is typical of the new organizations that are emerging.

### **28.3 THE BIRTH OF INNOVA**

Following the marked fall of the euro during the first years after the turn of the millennium and the increasing concern about Europe's economic future, it was acknowledged that drastic instruments would need to be employed to safeguard Europe's economic, social and hence political position. This insight arose across traditional political camps in most European countries. The part of the traditional right wing that was most commercially oriented has today allied itself with the "new left", the movement that sprang out of the upheavals within social democracy in Europe. Most European countries therefore have different political constellations today. In Germany, for example, the SPD (Sozial Demokratische Partei Deutschlands) split in 2016 and entered into a new party constellation with the FDP (Freiheitliche Demokratische Partei) and breakaway members from the CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union) under the name FSP (Freie Soziale Demokratische Partei). It is significant that the word "Demokratisch" is not represented by a "D" in the abbreviation of the party's name. This is indicative that democracy is taken for granted, and that it is regarded as the very basis of any political movement and party formation.

In England, we have witnessed a corresponding change in the pattern of political parties, where the social democracy of Tony Blair (Prime Minister of Great Britain 1997–2008) and Anthony Giddens (sociologist and renowned new-left ideologist) has been combined in a unity with the more industrial liberal forces among the Tories and other parties. Strenuous efforts are also being made to create political alliances of this type across national boundaries in Europe. In Norway there has also been a corresponding development, whereby cooperative ties have been forged particularly between the Norwegian Labour Party and the Conservative Party. After Norway joined

the European federation in 2012, cooperation between the former Norwegian Labour Party and Conservative Party intensified, and they have now gone together with EU-friendly members of the Progress Party, which was split by the referendum, to form a new party, the Democratic Party. There have been positive developments in both representative and direct democracy after the turn of the millennium. The Democratic Party also has close cooperative relations with sister parties in other European countries. These new alliances have encouraged an active industrial policy that has been instrumental in changing Norwegian attitudes to commercial activities, entrepreneurship and risk-oriented living from deep scepticism to positive acceptance. In 2030, entrepreneurs and small business managers are actually regarded with admiration and esteem and as something worth striving for.

Important preconditions for Innova's development were the authorities' decision to build all policy into an innovation policy framework and the decision in the spring of 2006 that the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund should be applied exclusively to developing new industry. These decisions had been imminent for some time after a number of committee recommendations and studies during the period 1990–2006 called attention to the lack of innovation orientation in economic policy and to mutually conflicting policy in a number of sectors, described as “taking with one hand and giving with the other”. When the OECD submitted its extensive innovation policy study and recommendations to member countries in 2004, Norway had really no choice. Several well-known research institutions in Norway were major contributors to this work, and there were calls from many quarters for Norway to pioneer its implementation as well. Another extremely important factor was the authorities' support for the EU's directive on biotechnology and genetic engineering patents immediately following the turn of the century. This ensured Norwegian environments a foothold in this sector.

The global social background for such a step was that, as a result of agreements on free trade, sector-specific industrial policy, etc., the combination of market forces and political institutions had great importance for commercial and industrial development. The politicians have now gradually gained a certain degree of influence on economic life both at home and abroad, while market actors have gained considerable freedom to act within broad innovation policy frameworks. Partly as a result of the decision of the Storting in 2006, Norway was able to develop new growth industries before the radical reduction of the income contributed by the petroleum industry towards the middle of the second decade of the century. These industries were based on technological knowledge derived from various industries based on raw materials.

Dependence on central and up-to-date competence in both private and public sector gradually increased. The central organization of institutions of research and education was therefore an important public responsibility. After long-term investment in the development of one of the world's best electronic infrastructures, it was seen as a major public responsibility to secure genuine public access to information and research results within the fields of biology and genetic engineering.

Since the middle of the second decade of the century, there has been a remarkable consensus concerning this in Norway and this policy has today approximately the same status as support for the welfare state had during the 1950s and 1960s. The economy

became gradually less dependent on petroleum. As early as 2025 its role was already considerably reduced. Innovation policy as such was a direct result of the awareness, even twenty years prior to 2025, that petroleum was not the future, but the past. The ownership structures are also changing, although there was a revitalization of state ownership in connection with the reorganization and review of innovation policy in 2021. From considerable reduction during the period 2000–2020, state ownership in 2030 is extensive and diversified between a number of industries. In 2030, the state's net assets abroad are in the region of EUR 1000 billion. Based on a yield of 5 per cent, this adds an annual supplement of approximately EUR 50 billion to the fiscal budget.

As well as using the yield from the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund for developing new industries, the Ministry of Finance and Innovation introduced as early as 2012 a fundamental distinction between investments and costs in the National Accounts and Budget as well as in the long-term budgeting for investment over the next ten years.

Global markets, increased competition and the rapid rate of change placed new demands on quality, service and efficiency. As a result of the pressure for increased specialization in the market, establishments had a constant need for learning and innovation. Organizational forms changed not only in the direction of smaller organizations with more flexible and project-oriented solutions and decentralized decision-making, but also in the direction of new forms of decision-making systems that still gave considerable power to top-level managers in large systems, if another kind of power. Organizational forms were not changed from one form to another, but were rather defined in relation to a diversity of forms according to needs, activities and the tasks to be performed. The background for this included technological developments, the markets' demand for proximity and the necessity for continual development of human knowledge and skills. It was often difficult to distinguish between traditional managers and staff in the organization. More people were free to dispose of their own time and work when it suited them. They performed a wide range of tasks demanding both high and broad competence. An individual employee was often highly specialized in relation to his own core competence and contributed to different projects both within the same establishment and at other establishments that needed his specific competence. There was an increase in the competition for specific groups of personnel, and it became usual to change employer several times during one's career.

This helped to solve some of the problems associated with the lack of sufficient manpower to meet the needs of business and industry. The demand was largely met at lower and middle levels of competence. The problem was associated with tough competition for high-level competence. However, the increasing flexibility of the education system was a benefit, and private actors gained entry to the education market through certification and authorization rules introduced by the authorities. This raised the pay level for university employees, and they compete on almost the same footing as private sector solutions. This flexibility was one of the reasons why restructuring in Norway enjoyed the success that it did.

All these forms of workplace organization were linked to regional and global ICT networks. These networks, which were based on an advanced Internet4 solution, formed the main components in the organization of working life. Internet4, or Global Operating System and Server Interface Protocol (GOSSIP), as it was known, was an improvement on Internet3 (2020), which replaced Internet2 (2010), which was the successor of the first Internet that was established in 1993. To say that technology was a driving force in this development is an understatement.

### **28.3.1 CREATIVITY FROM ABOVE**

Innovative culture is a widespread phenomenon, and is not restricted to Norway. However, Norway has succeeded in persuading large multinational companies to establish themselves wholly or partly in Norway mainly because Norway offers residential solutions in attractive natural surroundings. Norway's national pride has changed character, but is still an important identity factor. In 2020, Gro Harlem Brundtland's slogan from the 1990s "It is typically Norwegian to be good" was replaced by "It is good to be innovative – in Norway". In Denmark, they have parodied the Danish tourist industry's advertising catchword from the turn of the century: "It is great to be Norwegian – in Denmark", changing it to: "It is great to be creative – in Norway". Pride in relation to an expanded Norwegian community is important and contributes to a positive identity formation in a world that is being gradually woven more tightly together.

As a result of Norwegian competence built up around the petroleum industry combined with the development of competence in information and communications technologies, Norway plays a leading role in the development of new effective solutions within the development of energy based on extraction and exploitation of fluids (petroleum, gas, water, hydrogen).

The discussion concerning the application of the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund to the development of new competitive industries in Norway gathered momentum in 2004. The need arose for major state funds in connection with intervention in readjustment processes between industries, from the retail trade, banking, insurance, travel and tourism to various service industries, particularly in the care sector. The shipyard package adopted by the Storting as a part of the fiscal budget for 2000, in spite of the fact that its main intention was to hold onto industry specific competence, was the first attempt at national intervention that to some extent contributed to increased mobility between industries.

With hindsight, it may also seem that the Minister of Industry made a decisive move in breaking the first ground for the establishment of Norway's International Technological Development Centre at Fornebu in 2003. The centre was given broad support by the Storting through a financing plan over five years. An important political requirement for establishment of the company was that public funds should only be used in connection with development of the knowledge-intensive business area of the company. The company was listed on the stock exchange eight years later (2011) and there was considerable interest in keeping the company in Norwegian hands, at the same time as large Norwegian enterprises considerably increased their holdings. In 2009 NITUS awarded the first degrees in generic biotechnology and marine technology.

The digital economy was strengthened. The problems regarding secure routines for the use of electronic signatures in connection with payments were solved in 2002. As early as 1999 Internet banks were established. During the course of 2001 the effects of increased use of the Internet for payment of bills and loan transactions began to have consequences for the number of bank branches. The same development occurred in Norway Post. In 2007 a number of industries experienced structural changes and the number of employees in the retail trade, in travel and tourism and in banking and insurance was greatly reduced.

The innovation centres became an important element of the new policy. From the middle of the second decade of the century, they were established Norwegian in towns of a certain size. The innovation centres carry out active linking between industry, product development and research. A typical example is the design centres. These centres are responsible for allocating a number of grants to designers who are thereby enabled to develop products they believe in. They are able to create prototypes and produce small series. Industrial concerns can then subscribe to projects they see potential in and can contribute input to the development of the various products. These centres have helped to make Norwegian furniture industry one of the most profitable in the world, and have made a world-wide reputation for Norwegian designers. The centres also help established industry with legal advice, coordination of procurements, network building and marketing.

In 2030, the authorities have put the final bricks in place in an incentive regime that is attractive to foreign, knowledge-based companies. The attraction is particularly associated with a concentration of research and technology development in the university towns, and the Oslo region has made its mark as an outstanding technology metropolis, where the Fornebu development at the turn of the millennium was a precondition. This resulted in Norway becoming an attractive country within marine R&D and energy research, achieving advantageous combinations of knowledge development and capital. The tax regime in Norway is divided between a federal tax to the Union and a national tax to the state. The tax to the Union amounts to 18 per cent of all income over EUR 50 000. In order to clarify the proportions, we must point out that knowledge workers in Europe have an average wage of EUR 150 000. The national tax is subject to competition between European nations since variations in the tax are used to regulate the competitive advantage in the battle for industrial establishments and competent manpower. The level of taxation in Norway is relatively high. The national tax is approximately 20 per cent from the first krone earned. Only France and the United Kingdom have higher national tax rates. However, there is a very high level of public support for the tax regime. Tax revenues are not only used to cover current expenditure, but also for long-term industrial investments. This lends legitimacy to the high level of taxation.

Many people hold the view that the level of taxation is one of the reasons why Norway is doing so well at present. The money is well applied. Owing to its advanced energy technology, Norway has perhaps the world's best ICT infrastructure, large financial reserves, an active investment policy and major competitive advantages.

The fight for human capital is fought between nation-states, strategic alliances of nation-states and transnational unions such as the EU and the FTAA (*Free Trade Area of the Americas*). Nation-states have a major responsibility for creating favourable conditions for establishments so that they locate their production and administrative units in the country concerned. Nation-states apply considerable resources to marketing their advantages. This includes strategic alliances between nations. For example, Norway has strong allies in Germany, the Netherlands and Shenzhen province in China. After the decline in population growth, the fight for the best human resources has increased in importance, and national borders have proved suitable for such marketing campaigns.

However, this has also resulted in a pronounced competition for competent manpower. This is mobile and, although the Union has attained a high degree of manpower mobility for this group, it is the nation-states or strategic alliances between such states that compete over it in order to secure value creation for themselves. The nation-states therefore compete, among other ways, by seeking to ensure the lowest possible tax rates. Norway owes its success to active use of the tax regime combined with attractive working and living conditions and recreation facilities. Project and knowledge nomads therefore give priority to Norway over other nations. Knowledge-based enterprises and the education sector have a secure supply of knowledge capital.

The scarcity of and competition for competent manpower have resulted in an extremely fierce struggle for this manpower in the international labour market. Norway is perceived as an important technological metropolis in European terms. Norway succeeds relatively well through its investment in higher education, specialization in energy and technology based on raw materials and through development of knowledge-based enterprises.

In 2030 the population exceeds 5 million people. This is roughly equal to the mid-range alternative in Statistics Norway's population forecast from 1999. This alternative forecast that from 2010 the fertility rate (the average number of children each woman will have during her lifetime) will be 1.86, the average age of giving birth will be 30 years, while the life expectancy in 2050 was estimated at 80 years for men and 84.5 years for women. Net immigration was estimated at 7000 people per year after 2001. These figures proved, amazingly enough, to be fairly precise.

### **28.3.2 THE INNOVATION ENVIRONMENT**

After 2010, developments went in the direction of an emphasis on domestic policy and a clear distribution of responsibility between the nation-state and the supranational level, identical with the Union. Guidelines laid down pursuant to the EU Agreement decide which policy areas shall be decided at the supranational level. The nation-states still administer right of ownership to land and natural resources. The multinationals are dependent on being able to compete for concessions giving access to resources, and must adapt to concession requirements.

During the first 10–15 years after the turn of the millennium, Norway was still to a great extent dependent on the price of oil and gas. After this the prices fell owing to high environmental taxes in consumer countries and, as time went on, this reduced the supply

of money to the petroleum fund. This was a development that Norway began early preparing for through development of financial reserves (the petroleum fund). There was considerable growth in the new renewable energy sources and fission technology was revolutionized. At the same time, the petroleum companies bought in to this growth. Norway is therefore still an energy nation, but more broadly based.

The emergence of products based on biotechnology and genetic engineering resulted in a lack of clarity for most people as regards the relationship between “natural” and “artificial”. At the turn of the millennium, cosmetic surgery, whether in the form of many women’s oversized breast implants or the changes Michael Jackson had made to his face, was not perceived as natural and real. Nowadays, we hardly know what is “real” any more, not only because the scope of cosmetic surgery and gene therapy has increased so much, but also because other social groupings, such as originality aesthetes, who have a great appreciation for what is known as social-natural aesthetics, carry considerable weight. In other words, the artificial has become genuine natural and vice versa. More people accept manipulation with the human body or genetically modified material than before, although some people now regard internal nature as worthy of preservation. The Society for Preservation of Civilization and the Human Body (the former Norwegian Society for Nature Conservation) regards there as being clear links between the development of civilization and the preservation of the human body and the human genome from any form of mutation or manipulation. They are however a minority, and even political parties that, during the first 10 to 15 years of the century, built their political core philosophy on opposition to the biotechnology and genetic engineering industry acknowledge that such attitudes no longer have a future. They become somehow too conservative – and in a bad way. Objections to genetic engineering and biotechnological research and development are therefore largely a thing of the past. Global warming has helped to increase food production some places on the earth, but has reduced it in other places, while giving rise to a broad range of health problems for large parts of the world’s population.

Because new technology has solved many of the traditional problems struggled with by the environmental movement, it has been absorbed by the new socio-political movement that goes by the name “universal perspectivism” or UP. UP arose as a result of new interest in philosophers such as Marx, Sartre, Hegel, Heidegger and, not least, Kant during the first ten years of the 21st century. The term and the movement “universal perspectivism” was a reaction against the postmodernism that dominated western intellectual discourse from the 1980s. Universal perspectivism has now developed into a global network of intellectuals who are working at fever pitch to create a new world picture on a level with the needs and challenges of the 21st century. The philosophy of UP takes postmodernist insights and deconstructionist practice as its starting point (hence the term “perspectivism”) while paying serious attention to people’s need to create absolute criteria (hence the term “universal”). “People are at all times dependent on having certain universal tenets to hold on to” reads the motto of this movement. It was UPer who established the area on the global e-network that the important new school subject “Universalizing” is linked up to. Today, in 2030, this movement is stronger than ever.

Water was viewed globally as an increasingly scarcer resource as the new century progressed, and was listed on the commodity exchange for the first time in 2020. For Norway, water was more than a substance that can be used to produce electricity. It was a new raw material, which was a considerable source of income. The right to water resources was a political topic that ended by the Storting deciding that water, in the same way as petroleum, was a national resource. The exploitation of water resources was entrusted to private interests.

Genetically modified food reduced the price of the most essential foodstuffs used by industry and households. The use of biotechnology in the food industry gathered momentum from 2005. At the same time, Europe witnessed a number of food crises during the first decades of the century. Antiresistant bacteria wiped out 30 per cent of meat production in the Union in 2005. This happened at a time when biotechnology had still not arrived at an understanding of how these bacteria should be combated. As a result of this catastrophe, the price of “pure” meat doubled, and the meaning of pure agricultural production became clear.

Norway attempted to lead the way where pure agriculture was concerned, but continual problems with animal health and the failure of a number of ambitious biotechnology projects prevented these aspirations from being realized until almost 2020. By this time however, Norway was not alone in marketing itself as “pure” and unmodified, so competition was tough, but the tourist advertisement was clear enough: *Norway, not exactly genetically modified*. After 2020 we had considerable success and today we meet tourists with the following motto: *Norway, best genetically modified*.

### **28.3.3 INNOVATIVE WELFARE**

Today, those who no longer succeed in maintaining their welfare safety net are people who have been out of work for longer periods or who only work for short periods and are therefore dependent on the help they receive from the state. They are typically people without much education with social problems in their families or in the social environment they belong to. The group differs little from the group of long-term recipients of social welfare benefits identified as a target group by Report No. 50 to the Storting (1998–99) in the distribution of income and living conditions in Norway. The last monthly figures from the Ministry of Welfare show that 250 000 people are dependent on public assistance in one or more areas. Although a large number of people are marginalized, there is little political will to do any more for the group than ensure that it has minimum subsistence. The marginalized have little or no assets, and are obliged to use cash to buy food and clothing. They tend to gather in derelict tenement buildings where the rents are low and the standard of housing correspondingly poor. To be marginalized is regarded as a personal tragedy. If someone becomes marginalized, it is regarded as being his own fault. To combat marginalization, the authorities are now considering further development of the old company *Back-to-society.com* ASA. This company was originally set up to help financially disadvantaged people to gain access to the global electronic network. This proposal is extremely controversial and is the subject of considerable political debate.

The consequences of “wrong choices” are heavy to bear for individual citizens. Much is left to charity. The family (the social community in various forms) varies considerably. Supplementary insurance against unemployment, disability and chronic illness became



usual from 2010. Public involvement is supported by private investments, particularly in new growth industries. There is little flexibility within the so-called marginalized groups. The gap between those who live on social security benefits and those who have jobs, is far greater today than it was at the turn of the millennium.

Humanitarian organizations have developed considerable independence in relation to religious and cultural traditions, and function as a strong motivating force for reforms in the rich areas of the world including Norway. In a way, they are propagandists for communitarianism<sup>107</sup>. This ideology still has a number of supporters although it is in process of being integrated into the discourse of universalizing. It seems particularly to be included in the repertoire of the universal perspectivists (see above). Apart from this, the NGOs have proved to be extremely successful social institutions. They have made a good job of tidying up where the state and the market have pulled out without settling their accounts. Not least, they have done much of the work that needed to be done on integration of minorities and have also set up major adult education programmes where people with poor qualifications have been able to take part almost free of charge. The religious NGOs have grown most, and have distinguished themselves by their awareness of the enormous amount of social problems that society is struggling with.

Perhaps this is because several of them, such as the missionary societies, have become far more secularized. Today, they resemble organizations like Norwegian Church Aid and the Red Cross.

These organizations have demonstrated that the population has a pretty impressive amount of potential. All new reforms of the public administration have a basis in the assumption that there are large resources, and these organizations are of course included in the continuous reform work. The support for the voluntary sector can, not least, be viewed as an expression of the fact that the population has greater ambitions than bread alone, and that this sector offers a broad range of meaning.

The humanitarian organizations are global and secularized, and are affiliated to the WHO, the United Nations and other global institutions, but are nevertheless not heavily bureaucratic. Globalization has reached out in all directions on this level, and almost all Norwegian NGOs are involved in major international coordinated political initiatives. In many ways, they have followed the example of the environmental movement, and most of them are now linked to larger networks, regardless of what sector they are in.

### **28.3.4 THE BATTLE OF THE GENERATIONS**

In 2006 the Storting decided that the yield from the Petroleum Fund was to be applied to industrially oriented readjustment processes. Expenditure in connection with National

---

107 Communitarianism is a socio-political movement/world picture particularly profiled by the well-known sociologist Amitai Etzioni from about 1990 in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall. The main message is that there must be a “third way” between liberal capitalism and communism. At the same time there is a primary emphasis on values and on moral and cultural issues.

Insurance would have to be found within the fiscal budget. This resulted in a tough ranking of the various needs for budget funds while starting the discussion on the scope of welfare schemes. The Government's standpoint, as it was formulated on implementation of the long-range plan for 2005–2014, paved the way for a reform of the social security system on the basis of the unions' minimum standards, which provided for a minimum of cover in the event of sickness, industrial injuries, disability and unemployment. However, the Government chose to maintain more generous schemes by means of an active link with responsibilities associated with the payment of unemployment benefits, disability benefits, and various forms of social welfare benefits. The responsibility for implementation of measures was assigned to the municipal activation services. Inadequate follow-up of implemented activation would result in the person concerned being reduced to the minimum standard. People on this income level were left to fend for themselves. A number of NGOs attempted to help marginalized people in various ways.

The level of social security schemes ensured a reasonable standard of living. The baby-boom generation was an important national resource. Through successful development of new industries and an active policy for the elderly, Norway laid a sound basis for future development and growth. Industrial restructuring failed to sufficiently reduce the steadily increasing need for manpower. In 2015 it was therefore necessary to create favourable conditions to encourage people to continue working until they were 70. Pension costs would otherwise have increased at the same time as the labour market lacked sufficient manpower. In 2020 the retiring age was increased to 70. The average retiring age today is 75. The trade union movement resisted these changes for a long time because longer education for the majority of the population and a greater life expectancy made it necessary to provide incentives for continued working. Almost full financing of industrial readjustment processes by the state, among other ways through continuing education, gradually convinced the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions and other trade union confederations. Favourable transitional arrangements were adopted to allay dissatisfaction among these elderly people.

Some welfare schemes were gradually scaled down, but considerable public funds were devoted to education and innovation. This was partly based on the view that the population, as a result of several readjustments within working life, now had more free time at its disposal. The work approach in welfare policy was delegated to the municipal activation services in 2015. Those who were neither in gainful employment nor taking part in activation projects, were left to themselves. Increases in the various minimum public pensions and support to individuals were decided by the Storting in connection with the long-term budget. The right to a decent retirement pension was earned through payment of national insurance premiums throughout a long working life.

In 2010 the Storting decided that National Insurance would be funded through a publicly owned fund. An active senior policy and ranking of elderly people in connection with continuing education were important factors in making this decision, and resulted in an increase in the average retiring age from 2005 onwards. Those who had no other income than public pensions were dependent on support from family and friends. The balance of the National Insurance Fund for 2030 shows that public transfers to the fund can be limited somewhat during the period of the long-term budget. However, the Storting assumes that withdrawals from the fund will increase somewhat

in future in that the average life expectancy is expected to exceed 90 years by 2035. At the same time, payments will be held at a low level in order that people shall be given a strong incentive to continue working for as long as possible. It is an individual responsibility to provide for oneself and one's family.

Most elderly people prefer to live in communities with other elderly people, and there are now numerous senior citizens' housing communities. In such communities, the elderly can choose comfort and facilities according to their personal wishes and financial standing. The elderly-elderly over 90 years of age usually need nursing. Many elderly-elderly gradually suffer from poor health and are obliged to move into old people's homes. Those who have secured their old age financially or who have family to support them continue living in the housing community.

### **28.3.5 OUR DAILY BREAD**

Project organization of working life strengthens the knowledge society and has provided increased power to the knowledge elite. The organizational structure is an effective mechanism for engaging and disengaging the manpower that is needed, and people from the private sector are employed to some extent on public administration assignments.

Working life has therefore undergone radical changes. Traditional office jobs, home jobs and telework centres exist alongside one another. The architecture around such jobs consists of digitized walls and equipment that function as aids for communicating with the external environment and as coordinative tools for internal organization and logistics down to the individual level. Major growth in productivity and increased labour force participation by people from 60 to 70 years of age helps to ease the dependency burden on the employed population. Some people refer to this society as the work placement society. The children of the famous generation X from the turn of the millennium now constitute the majority of today's founders and entrepreneurs. It is these people who characterize today's business and industry. Although there is no lack of jobs in Norway, an increasing number of people want to be their own boss. Secure jobs are a thing of the past, but the security of the founders and entrepreneurs increases in proportion to their numbers.

Of course, the changed role of industrial actors (entrepreneurs rather than traditional workers) also influences the general perception of managers and the nature of good management. In the ministries, director generals were abolished long ago and, in both private and public sector, it is now quite usual to alternate between professional and managerial posts with a certain level of responsibility for administrative and personnel policy. Those who want to make a success of their careers today must have qualifications in professional areas and experience of creative management. Today, you must be able to launch new activities while demonstrating professionalism in relation to organization, marketing and commercial development in more established business contexts.

In the grey zones of society, the supervisory authorities are constantly watchful of tendencies to exploit weaker groups in connection with employment contracts. Although this practice is not particularly widespread, policy in this area is important

since it detects people in danger of falling outside the innovation society. This surveillance is carried out by a special group within the state innovation centres, which also cooperates with the few and peripheral trade unions that still function purely as employee organizations. The trade union movement in its traditional sense has ceased to exist. In Norway there is only one large trade union confederation, the Workers' Organization (the successor of the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions). It concerns itself primarily with global cooperation on industrial policy matters, and is a member of the World Organization.

Owing to the increase in the retiring age, there is a high level of labour force participation (80 per cent), and it is not very attractive economically to stand outside working life. A large number of elderly employees continue working part-time. Most companies have established senior programmes, partly to ensure that the competence of the elderly employees is utilized and partly to ensure that this competence is transferred to younger staff. It is usual for elderly workers to be transferred to less physically demanding tasks.

## **28.4 NEW SCHOOL**

The idea of a publicly run comprehensive school was dropped early in the second decade of the century, but the concept of equality was not therefore abandoned. The public sector stipulates quality requirements and norms for primary and secondary schools as regards teaching content, buildings, recreational areas, equipment, etc. The running of the schools has been taken over by the private sector, and teachers have gained higher pay and increased status. Schools are now well-equipped with a high standard of technical equipment, and there is close cooperation between schools, working life and other institutions both on teaching and on the financing of teaching. Teaching is characterized by high quality and Norwegian schools lead the world in some areas.

The reason for abandoning the traditional school concept that prevailed in the last century was that a newly-emerged close cooperation between the public, voluntary and private sectors, between the market and political control, was now visible at all levels. There was also an increasing emphasis on nonformal competence, which was an international trend. Reduced emphasis on formal competence now became so marked that traditional universities throughout the world were struggling to readjust. These developments were brought about by the extreme specialization at all levels of the school system, including primary and lower secondary, that took place at the start of the second decade of the century. As part of the strategy for a more proactive commercial and industrial development, the school system was engaged in major plans to realign the focus of the nation to concentrate more keenly on innovation. This resulted in the abandoning of the concept of a common curriculum, and quality requirements were retained only in certain subjects, such as English, Norwegian and Mathematics.

In 2014, private financing of the upper secondary school was allowed and, three years later, such financing was also introduced for the primary and lower secondary school.

Schooling was now from the earliest years geared towards working life on the basis of competence-building plans developed by the industrial sectors in cooperation with the

public sector. The high degree of segmentation and sectorization of society resulted in early specialization for working life and a continual pursuit of tailor-made competence. However, it was clear that such rigorous adaptation was not beneficial to the adaptability of society, while it was nevertheless a precondition for successful development of the various sectors.

The rapid pace of change demanded a constant and plentiful supply of personnel for new sectors. This was one of the biggest problems in the innovation-oriented and growth-oriented Norwegian society, and the solution was seen to be a safety net arrangement whereby changing jobs involved almost no risk. This seemed to give new meaning to Marx's idea of a "reserve army of labour".

School provisions were more than ever dependent on individual initiative. Since the potential was almost infinite, it was up to each school to decide the degree of individuality it wished to adopt. Although some elite schools had been established and considerable variations in teachers' pay had become the norm, the general rule was "equal opportunities for all". There were of course exceptions, but both supervisory and resocialization policy aimed to minimize unequal opportunities. People were different, and this was reflected in their differing capacity, will and desire to show initiative. There was therefore also considerable variation in access to knowledge and in the quality of knowledge acquired. One outcome of this was a growing differentiation of norms and cultures, but here too there were clear opposing forces, and there were many who called for a more resolute and extensive national curriculum.

However, other factors played a part. Not least, progress within biologically oriented pedagogy enabled the insertion of knowledge into the brain in quite a different way than by reading books. Pre-programmed brain cells were injected, and a certain effect was recorded, at least when the subject was well drilled. As a result of such methods, training took on a quite different appearance and, at the best schools, this type of pedagogical competence was in great demand. The university sector was under enormous pressure. Internationally differentiated universities had become the winners while the national institutions that lacked networks and alliances had fallen by the wayside. Transnational networks for education and research had proved to carry considerable weight, resulting in a demand for increased harmonization of the education systems of the various countries. However, this harmonized less well with the Norwegian commercially oriented model, and a number of critical voices maintained that the Norwegian solution would need to be reformed if it was to hold its own in the future.

The emphasis on *innovative performance management* in the public sector increased market dependence (resource centres, industrial estates, etc.). The amount of "free" publicly financed research and teaching had been greatly reduced. New forms of research were characterized by increased interaction. Universities and colleges were primarily engaged in research and teaching directly associated with companies or industrial sectors, of which they were sometimes integral parts.

### 28.4.1 POP GOES THE CULTURE

Youth was not only a constantly expanding period of life; it was also an ideological ideal. Life extension medicines resulted in increased life expectancy. People actually stayed physically and mentally younger. This combination of extended youth and ideal of youth provided favourable conditions for continually more sophisticated subcultural projects. The diversity of the subcultural field was enormous. The groups and lifestyles that appeared here represented global movements of considerable economic dimensions. The subcultural expressions were not least materialized as consumption; consumption is one of the areas where the capacity for articulation is most well developed in the young. Their participation in youth organizations was not as great as it was but certain religious youth organizations still held a strong position.

The cultural sector, particularly artists, had always been extremely dependent on the market, and this development had been reinforced in recent years. Many cultural institutions had become more dependent on private benefactors (sponsors) as well as on charging higher entrance fees. The income from paid cultural experiences had increased relatively in the institutions' budgets, and there were increasing demands on them to earn money. The authorities' interest in financing this sector had therefore been somewhat reduced. As a result of this, some current cultural policy considerations, that is to say pure cultural policy commitments to less popular art, suffered. At the same time, more commercial art received increasing acclamation and respect.

Artists now paid greater attention to public appeal since "high-quality art" now managed to hold its own without the support of the public sector. The public "know and understand" what is what "qualitatively good". This was also the prevailing attitude among most artists, although there were exceptions. At the turn of the millennium, artists such as Odd Nerdrum and Vebjørn Sand promoted such a view. Since it appeared that the market was capable of supplying us with the "broader" art and culture, the state had decided to allocate resources to "avant-garde" art. The policy was based on the principle that all culture, regardless of historical conditions and traditions, should be allowed the same opportunity for dissemination. In other words, support was given to "avant-garde" activities that had so far fallen outside the traditional sphere of cultural policy. The function of avant-garde art is to foster the outré, the groundbreaking and innovative that the mass of the public are not yet ready to pay for.

### 28.4.2 SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN

It is now 25 years since the process towards the separation of church and state began. The process ended with formal secession in 2010. At the same time, article 2 of the Constitution was amended to read: "*All inhabitants of the Realm shall have the right to free exercise of their religion.*" The Background was complex, but the most powerful forces in favour of secession came eventually from inside the Church itself, partly as a reaction against a number of appointments and against the role of the secular authorities in general. This led to a consensus for separating Church and State.

Nor was religion given an especially prominent place in the new economic policy. Today, it is regarded as a matter of course that the Church must stand on its own feet. Although the Church has become smaller, it is perhaps more powerful than it was during the time of the state church. The Church represents a distinct set of values and has great appeal for a smaller, but stable and loyal public. Norway now has a

completely ecumenically oriented church governed by a College of Bishops. In some areas, the Church has moved with the times, and has fewer barriers against various types of minority, be it homosexuals or Muslims. The Church receives some money from the state, for instance in connection with “assignments”. This applies, for example, to state funerals and other ecclesiastical duties associated with the armed forces and the royal family. Most of the church’s income is derived from annual state support, fees for ecclesiastical duties, fund-raising and to some extent from Church property.

The support for church services however is declining, although the number of employees has increased somewhat. The Church has acquired some new functions, and has extended its services within spiritual guidance and mental health. The Church has become more secular. Sometimes large companies sponsor the local church and, in most local communities, whether in urban districts or small rural districts, the Church is better integrated than it was at the turn of the millennium. Technologically speaking too, the Church has moved with the times and provides various types of digital services for those who are unable to meet up in the church or at the parish office. Some of the new immigrant groups are extremely religious and have played an important role in ensuring that the Church and the Christian religion, despite extensive secularization, still has a certain position in Norwegian society. It is very important to these new groups that different religious practices are ranked alongside one another, and they have found support for this view in the broadly ecumenical and extremely liberal Church of Norway. The more fundamentalist groups are very isolated and find little support. Both hard-core Christian and Muslim groups are struggling for survival.

Secularization has otherwise established itself as a dominant feature of the global cultural landscape. Throughout the world, most neo-religious and fundamentalist political groups that arose immediately prior to and after the turn of the millennium have been considerably reduced as their support and influence has declined. Of the major religions, Islam is the one that has lost most mass appeal, and Roman Catholic groupings have also fallen in numbers. Protestantism and Catholicism are in process of coalescing. New Age has entirely disappeared from the map, and the diverse sects have been absorbed by a new major global political movement of universal perspectivism bearing the name “Perspective Universal”. The prevailing view of nature following the emergence of genetic engineering, biotechnology and the material and social breakthrough of information technology is characterized by “the artificial” acquiring the status of “somewhat natural” and vice versa. A Copernican revolution of the view of nature has taken place, whereby “the natural” as a phenomenon has been completely relativized and “genetic engineering” is regarded as the growth sector of the future and possibly mankind’s foremost opportunity for self-realization and further development of the species.

### **28.4.3 CRIME**

Organized crime has increased its influence enormously, and is closely associated with large lawful sectors of the community such as the restaurant trade, the brothel trade and haulage. Some say that the situation resembles that of the USA in the 1920s or Russia in the 1990s, where organized crime was so extensive that it reached all the way up to the social elite. When the largest haulage firm north of Germany proves to be a den of

thieves, anything is possible. Strong political rhetoric is levelled against this development, but the justice system and the police do not seem particularly motivated to invest major resources in destroying the corruption. Not surprisingly, many people believe the police service itself to be the most corrupt component of this system. Another reason why this type of crime is so deeply ingrained in the system is precisely the active engagement of innovation policy in removing the distinctions between state and citizen and between industry and state. The requirements regarding impartiality have been deliberately weakened since it has long been held that the relaxation of regulations in this area would result in major economic gains, but the growth of organized crime has led to rising efficiency losses. The political opposition against the innovation policy, for what it is worth, finds nourishment for its arguments in the rising white-collar crime figures.

## 28.5 INNOVATION IDENTITY

In the aftermath of this, the fragmentation rhetoric from the turn of the millennium has now come into its own. The awareness of the creation of a new community and the opportunity for people themselves to influence the formation of new groups and communal identities now dominate social studies and political environments. Another consequence of this has been that many of the prophets of decay who had their heyday in the 1970s, and perhaps their days of power in the 1990s, have now completely lost their role on the public stage. Futures research and scenario methodology have become an intrinsic part of political life in an extensive and creative way. The use of such methodologies is one of a number of instruments applied in the creative development of new group and community identities at both local and global levels.

From Minister of Finance Ingunn Jensen's address to the Storting on the fiscal budget for the period 2030–2033 (29 October 2030):

“During the last session of the Storting, the measures that the new coalition government submitted to the Storting were implemented. We can look back on a successful political reform, where the content of the election campaign was incorporated in the fiscal budget for 2026–2029. It is the Government's view that this was a clear statement to the electorate of how our election promises have been followed up by practical measures. The general election of 2029 demonstrated an increase in the public confidence in politicians. When formulating policy, a long-term perspective is essential. While drawing up the framework for the matters that will be important during the budget period of 2030–2033 and in the long-term programme for 2030–2060, I now look back with considerable pleasure on a number of major political decisions that were made during the last electoral period. As an independent nation in the European Union, Norway has consciously focused on developing sustainable industrial engines. Our success has helped the Union to develop into the world economy's most significant player. The success of the Union in reaching a cooperation agreement with Russia and China in 2028 marks the culmination of the history of the Union to date. As a nation, we can maintain with pride that we made an active contribution to bringing the agreement with Russia to a successful conclusion. For our northernmost regions it is important to be able to look forward to increased relations and trade with our eastern neighbour. Norway is



still a small state in the Union but we make a positive contribution to the financing of the economy of the more needy members of the Union. Another example is the development of the economies of the Balkan countries. We can look back with pleasure on the final cessation of hostilities on the Balkan peninsula and now in 2030 the Union can look forward with equal pleasure to including Turkey as a full member already from next year. [...] We can be proud to be net exporters of financial administration services to the Union. This has previously been made possible by our development of the Petroleum Fund. But we can look back on a successful industrial development during the last 10 years as our most important contribution to continued growth. Our export of marine-based foods has increased by an average of 8 per cent during this period, and now constitutes approximately 50 per cent of our exports to the other EU member countries. Our economy at the beginning of 2030 is just as dependent on raw materials as it was 30 years ago, but is no longer solely based on petroleum. As a nation we have been given our fair share – perhaps more than our fair share – of natural resources, such as petroleum, major renewable energy sources and not least water. It has been and continues to be important to further develop the technologies in which we as a nation have comparative advantages. For example, Norway's supply of cheap and clean energy constitutes a competitive advantage, especially in view of increased CO<sub>2</sub> taxes. Another important technology development project is Norway's development of subsea oil production facilities. This has reduced the cost of petroleum extraction in the Norwegian sector, and is a technology in great demand internationally. In this fiscal budget the Government will continue its innovation policy within the above areas, among other ways, through increased state ownership and necessary funding of commercially oriented research.”

### **28.5.1 A NEW DEMOCRACY**

The Norwegian political system was exposed to a number of severe tremors from the year 2000 onwards. The voters' support could vary enormously. Not only in opinion polls but also on election day, voters showed a hitherto unknown lack of reliability. For a period the Progress Party was the country's largest. Then the Centre Party took over. Even the Norwegian Labour Party had its good days. Government coalitions were mainly majority governments, and all existing conventions concerning cooperation between the various parties were once and for all broken.

The referendum on EU membership in 2012 was a decisive watershed in Norwegian politics. Seven out of ten voted to join the Union but this led to enormous problems for the political parties, which were divided on the issue. A majority of Labour Party members, the Socialist Left Party, the Conservative Party and a minority of Progress Party members went together to form a new party, which they called the Democratic Party. The EU sceptics then gathered in a new political constellation, the Rainbow Alliance, which during the course of a few years developed into a new party, the Centre Alliance Party. Although there are a few small parties, what we have today is in practice a two-party system. Since the election of 2013, with the exception of a single period, the Democratic Party has ruled mainly on its own with a steady 50 per cent of the votes. The tremendous instability of the electorate is now a thing of the past.

The Storting is still an important arena, although the significance of the EU for Norwegian politics is also enormous. National policy always concerns enhancing the

qualities of Norwegian society that affect competitiveness, safeguarding Norway's attractiveness as a place to establish industry and stimulating the growth of the Norwegian economy. The politicians themselves have lost their ideology and have adopted a pragmatic approach to the ideals and values that dominated during the last two to three decades of the last century and the first decade of this one. The political parties have left behind their ideological conjurations and are obliged to reveal to the voters how the policy they stand for functions in making practical choices in connection with long-term budgets. This results in a major recruitment of new forces to the political calling.

The joint industrial councils from the golden era of the Labour Party after 1945 have been revived, and this time have been granted real power. Alongside members of the Storting, the various industrial sectors are heavily represented here by members drawn both from the trade organizations and from trade unions as well as from research institutions. The councils are responsible for implementing a great deal of industrial policy. They have large budgets at their disposal, and have attracted considerable international attention since these purely corporative institutions represent a practice followed only by Norway to any extent. The EU admits increasingly more members and, in 2030, constitutes a pan-European economic, social and political entity. Since there is a clear division between matters to be decided by national governments and those to be decided by supranational bodies, nation-states still function in the Union as autonomous, vital entities.

However the EU has also had to face up to reality. The need to find new solutions in a climate of crisis and unrest has resulted in increased pragmatism and a loss of ideology. The division of responsibility between the Union and the various nation-states has resulted in increased power for the European Commission within the Union's areas of responsibility. In other areas, the Commission functions as a major provider of "best practices". The European Parliament has been reformed through a reduction of the number of members to 250. The number of members from each country is still decided in relation to size of population.

From all member states, the European Parliament elects a Presidency for the Commission, which functions as a kind of European government. It is the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission to implement the policy decided by the Parliament. Committees are appointed in the areas that are the responsibility of the European Parliament. In addition to these, advisory committees are appointed in areas where the European Commission makes recommendations concerning national policy. The Union is an effective innovative economy with a joint border policy, an EU defence force and a federal police force (EUROPOL).

In the rest of the world, developments take their course. India has now caught up China in size of population. China's new "Bio Valley" and India's ICT industry are closely associated through the global virtual R&D and market landscape. "Electronic organism" is the buzzword used to describe cooperation of this kind. However, India is still struggling with large underdeveloped areas, partly owing to the continued strength of the Hindu caste system. India has a stable population of 1.5 billion, of which over a third are regarded locally as middle class. Japan has failed to keep pace with the

pressure of innovation and has fallen somewhat behind, even in regional terms. Several other areas, such as China's eastern provinces, the Singapore region and the Australia and New Zealand region have caught up Japan both economically and technologically. The whole East Asian region (Oceania) is thus marked by the balance between several economic "tigers".

In this worldwide political constellation, the continued spread of democratic ideas has led to a greater acceptance of, and will to contribute to interests of national and transnational regions are increasingly perceived by state governments and citizens as coinciding with such a world order. This strengthens human understanding of war as negative, but alters the perception of the necessity of coercive force to prevent war in the long term. NATO has become more closely affiliated to the United Nations not only in peacekeeping missions, but also for military interventions against internal infringements of human rights in individual states. This has occurred several times, among other places, on the African continent. A determined and action-oriented attitude to conflict resolution has induced acceptance of military power as an instrument of democracy. NATO is being expanded and reinforced. A consequence of a more tightly organized world is that the international society intervenes with armed forces in countries (mainly in Latin America and some Asian countries) that fail to control criminal organizations with international ramifications. Even the growth of so-called "cybercrime" has been contained with the help of a special global inquiry unit called the Cyber Police Task Force (CPTF).

The multinationals have become too cumbersome. Their lack of flexibility has resulted in competition from more innovative smaller companies, many of which are located in knowledge pools. At the same time, the rigidity of the large companies results in a lack of innovation and in destructive competition between companies offering identical products and services. There has been a tendency to split companies up according to new geographical and sectoral dividing lines. Supranational regulation has been increasingly successful in further limiting companies' room for manoeuvre.

### **28.5.2 SCENARIOS**

The Government has taken the consequences of the increased focus on futures thinking, and has introduced scenario methodology as part of its long-term programme for the period 2005–2008 as a supplement to macroeconomic projection models. During preparation of the Long-term Programme in 2004, a broad wish was expressed by politicians to increase the period of the long-term programmes from four to ten years. There is a clear distinction between the Union's spheres of responsibility and those of nation-states. In 2005, federalist approaches in the EU involving implementation of joint European guidelines in almost all social areas led to the biggest institutional crisis that had been experienced by the EU. Several nations, including Denmark and Sweden, demanded greater political scope within a number of major social areas. In 2015, the EU member states reached agreement on the areas in which they were prepared to transfer sovereignty to the European federation and the areas where sovereignty would be retained by the individual nation-states. The Union's spheres of responsibility were restricted to defence and security policy (including the police) and financial policy. The Euro was made the pan-European currency. All industrial standards were harmonized.

Monitoring of the four freedoms was continued. The concept of federal tax was introduced. The function of national central banks was transferred to the Eurobank in 2018. It was decided that the nation-states' spheres of responsibility should be education, innovation and infrastructure development, welfare and management of national values. The federal principle in the EU was to impose on the member-states the maintenance of a number of minimum standards, while consultations were carried out across the member-states to determine "best practices". The nation-states' systems for internal redistribution were to be retained along with considerable freedom to develop specific industries, focus on specific technology areas and develop competence within these technology areas. This put an end to the discussion on the democratic deficit in the Union. National involvement has been gradually extended as a result of increased national autonomy.

The principle of ministerial control has been abolished. In other words, a minister no longer has responsibility or authority for individual decisions outside the ministry. Nor do ministers and ministries still have absolute power within their spheres of responsibility. The Government is collectively responsible for governing and coordinating the activities of the state and the organizational structure of the ministries have become "desectorized", more ad hoc and project-organized and with varying lines of management and control. A number of administrative areas have nevertheless been retained owing to their central importance for the national economy, and because there are still a number of administrative tasks that must be solved in this area.

In today's Norway the power of most pressure groups has been greatly reduced. Industrial segments and their allies in the education system have in many ways been permitted to take over all the agendas. The juridification of people's rights results in a weakening of this type of organization since they have traditionally fought political campaigns, but those that succeed in making the necessary changes to safeguard the legal aspect as well are the ones that survive. The political arena was in many ways closed to this organizations of this kind a few years into the new century. They lost all public support and with it much of their legitimacy, so they were no longer able to reach the administration and the Storting with their message.

Internationally too, this is a trend arising from the fact that human rights issues have become a purely legal matter subject to the decisions of international courts. Matters are rarely pursued by organizing pressure groups to defend special interests, as was usual during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. On the other hand, it was the political parties that picked up the messages of these pressure groups. This was quite natural since, after the turn of the millennium, they attached increasing importance to waves of public opinion. Owing to this form of populism, the parties and their spokesmen were quick to pick up the views of certain interest groups and convert them into political actions. Thus the parties took over what had been the "market" of the interest groups. This could be particularly clearly observed in relation to the *Environment and Nature Party* and other parties strongly rooted in, respectively, health and care of old people, the power of the media, education, religious interest groups and (inter-)ethnic issues.

### 28.5.3 THE URBAN WORLD

Large urban communities throughout the world have, as regional centres, gained increased economic, cultural and political importance, and a kind of common urban culture has developed across national boundaries. In global terms, 27 large conurbations have come into being that play a major role for innovation and economic development. Increasing numbers of people all over the world feel themselves to be “in the same boat”, particularly because the list of problems and challenges that must be solved globally has become very long and very visible for most people. “Universalizing”, “Innovation Studies” and “Globalization Knowledge” are all now separate school subjects everywhere in the world. There has been a development of powerful global and regional institutions that are able to deal with both national and international conflicts, whether ethnic, religious or cultural. Major environmental problems are dealt with effectively. NATO has become an integrated instrument for a new United Nations. The first preparations for an institution that may become a sort of first world government are well under way under the auspices of the United Nations and the WTO. All parts of the world will be represented in this body, and the leader will be elected by the New United Nations General Assembly. The United Nations, the WTO and the World Bank are in process of integrating into a single global union, the “World Union”. There are plans to introduce “world citizenship” with a “world passport” that will give free access to settlement and employment throughout the world. The new socio-political movement, “Universal Perspectivism”, based on a continuation of intellectual traditions in the former industrialized nations, embraces today major groupings in regions of the world and countries such as China, Japan, India, America, Europe and parts of North Africa and, for many people, has taken the place of religion.

The principle of unified administration replaced the sector principle in 2005 and has consolidated its position as the leading principle for the public administration in 2030. The ministries are reorganized around the new overall responsibilities and have been radically reduced in number (there are now seven ministries). Today, the authorities also focus on encouraging cooperation across traditional sectors and on ensuring the best possible knowledge management so as to be able to further develop the climate of innovation in society. The authorities administer a set of general stimulative measures such as partial funding of research in enterprises. After the European Regional Business Development Fund (ERBDF), established in 2014, took over the activities of the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund in 2015, instruments for increased innovation and creativity in small, medium-sized and large enterprises have increased in scope and quality. Welfare policy is also rather different than it was in 2010 or 2000. The differences are particularly noticeable in the market for medical technology, products and services within health and care. The authorities have been extremely active in creating this market, among other ways making considerable demands on procurements policy, and investing money in infrastructure in areas such as nanotechnology, foetal medicine, microsurgery, maritime biogenetics, biotechnology and genetic engineering directed towards food production and raw materials development. The authorities still have extensive industrial holdings, but never more than 20 per cent. The 20 per cent rule began in 2006 as part of the great industrial policy reform. The authorities also exercise enormous influence over everything of commercial importance between establishments, between sectors and in international commercial relations. The publicly financed part of this has been built up according to the principle of “one-stop shopping”. Hospitals are private, but the framework conditions for their

operation and organization is the subject of thorough political discussions and decisions. Distributive policy has been toned down and is associated with an extensive “help for self-help” philosophy. Municipal Norway has been centralized through a centrally controlled “greater municipality” structure.

In the aftermath of the crisis of 2010 and parallel to the development of the innovation policy, a quiet administration policy reform has been carried out. Here, the term “administration policy” has been replaced by “socially oriented innovation policy” – rather long, but never mind! – and a number of overdue changes were made. The necessity of viewing administrative and innovative tasks from different ministries within a larger context resulted in an extensive merger of ministries. Education, transport, finance and industrial policy were all gathered in the *Ministry of Finance and Innovation*. The Ministries of Fisheries, Agriculture, Petroleum and Energy and Environment were merged to form the *Ministry of Resource Management*, while the Ministries of Labour and Government Administration, Health and Social Affairs, Children and Family Affairs and Local Government and Regional Development all became part of a new large *Ministry of Welfare*. The organization of the remaining ministries has changed very little since the turn of the millennium. However, a separate office has been set up directly under the Prime Minister with responsibility for coordination, long-term planning and scenario building.

Municipal Norway has been centralized, and today there are only 140 municipalities. The size of the municipalities is typically around 50 000 inhabitants. The county authorities were abolished in 2008, and upper secondary education has since 2024 been the responsibility of the municipalities, while responsibility for hospitals was transferred to the Directorate of Health in 2015. Both competitive tendering and privatization of public services have contributed to a shift of the public service portfolio in the direction of innovation-related services. Traditional control and supervisory functions are regulated by law and are operated to a great extent by private actors, such as *Competition Control ASA*. The labour market is very flexible for those who have work.

In Norway, the Forum for Development of Business and Industry and a number of innovation centres have become state instruments for development of entrepreneurship in new and existing enterprises. There is a conscious focus on certain specific industries (food production, energy, industry based on raw materials, biotechnology). Educational qualifications that these industries have a special need for, are actively supported through state grants for technical equipment, industry-specific research programmes, awards for outstanding research within the area, etc. Research competence and industry-specific competence have been gathered together in the Norwegian Innovation Society and its many affiliated innovation centres, all of which have been brought about by means of a synthesis of the measures previously initiated by the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund with various industry-neutral measures initiated by the former Ministry of Trade and Industry. In business and industry there is now wide acceptance of the extensive role of the state as an agent of innovation. Opposition can still be found in conservative economic and political environments, where many still hold the view that the state shall only correct market failure. There are still those in Norway who voice the conservative view that the

state imposes too heavy taxes on individual companies and undertakes too great a responsibility for redistribution. Since 2020, when the effects of the development of competence within marine-based food production first began to be noticeable, such views have had little effect on the sitting coalition government.

## 28.6 POSTSCRIPT BY THE SOCIAL HISTORIAN 2030

### 28.7 SOCIOLOGY FOR THE 2005 GENERATION

The year of 2027 saw the publication of a book that launched an interesting diagnosis of the significance of social democracy during the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the first 30 years of the 21<sup>st</sup>:

From Sigrid Linke (2027), “Sociology for the 2005 generation”,

(zzz:\snazzy.beat.oncomouse.aca):

“When we look at Norway’s development during the last half century from the end of the cold war, Max Weber’s analysis of the Protestant work ethic seems to be confirmed once again. The hard-working Norwegians survived the traditional social democratic epoch and, when the opportunity to earn money by using imagination and sheer hard work presented itself once more, it was just to go ahead and do it. Not much restraint was shown at first, and the 1980s are rightly remembered as the “yuppie” era, when fast bucks went hand in hand with short-sightedness. We will not place too much weight on the local colour in this picture. American literature from the period (e.g. Bret Easton Ellis’s *American Psycho*, Tom Wolfe’s *Bonfire of the Vanities*) paint a similar but even more extreme picture. It was probably the change from the industrial society to the innovation society that took both the planners and the money people by surprise both in Norway and in the USA. Such a hypothesis is confirmed by the observation during the last 20 years of similar tendencies in Shenzhen, Shanghai and other places in China where the same development has manifested itself. In Norway, however, the Protestant work ethic was a special cultural premise that made it simple for every single citizen to exploit this change of structure in order to become what we call an entrepreneur.

The national consensus on membership of the EU that came into being towards the end of the first decade of this millennium was also decisive. Around the turn of the millennium, it seemed for a time that the nation would be split apart. A number of groups – local politicians, researchers, industrialists – began increasingly to desert the national arenas because they felt that they were cut off from the general developments taking place in Europe and the world. However, as the baby boomers swelled the ranks of the retired and rural areas discovered the potential of the EU’s regional fund, we saw the disappearance of two social elements that had kept Norway out of the EU from the first Norwegian public debate on Europe in the 1960s onwards. Old conflicts were healed, and the nation could once more pull together. This was able to happen precisely because Norway opened itself up to Europe and the world. This national settlement is at least as important to an understanding of Norway as was the settlement between workers and farmers in 1935. In 1935, the remainders of the agricultural society were incorporated into the industrial society. In 2012, the remainders of the nation-state of the industrial age were incorporated into the network state of the innovation age.

Norway's high level of education also played an important role. The founding of a doctoral university resulted in Norway's inclusion in a number of research networks, and encouraged new interest in return visits by foreign researchers following Norwegian researchers' visits to institutions abroad. The growth of foreign educational provisions on the net and in Norway's branches was also important. These provisions enabled any young people who so wished to avoid struggling through long compulsory courses they were not motivated for and had no use for, and instead to put their efforts into studies they found interesting. This was also consistent with the new pedagogy, which takes account of the view that intelligence is more than one thing, and that pupils with different types of intelligence must therefore be offered different types of education. With hindsight, it seems strange that, as late as the 1990s, Gudmund Hernes, then Minister of Education, was permitted to introduce centralist and already outdated pedagogical principles at all levels of the Norwegian school and university system. Here lies an important lesson in sociology: older planners often devise plans relevant to their own younger days, forgetting that conditions undergo a transformation during the course of 40–50 years. We must not be too hard on Hernes. The kind of fundamental readjustment processes we refer to here are after all not easy to discern while they are happening. Moreover, today's planners will also be old one day.”



# **NORWAY•2030**

## **29 Imagine...**

**..**

## 29.1 WILD CARDS

In the work on development of the scenarios, a number of ideas and thoughts were aired that we decided for a number of reasons to exclude from the scenarios. One reason was that they did not conform to the whole picture that was scenarized. Another was that they seemed too violent or too immediately improbable. A third reason was that they might have a too provocative or negative effect. In spite of these considerations, there is a value in presenting ideas and thoughts of this kind. In the scenario tradition, such extreme and almost outrageous conceptions are referred to as *wild cards*. Wild cards cultivate certain trends and follow these, one might almost say, to the bitter end. Since *Norway2030* has developed a number of such conceptions, we feel it right to present at least one such wild card.

The following text is such a scenario. If we examine it closely, we see that the text actually presents several wild cards woven into a single framework. The wild card we have entitled *Biohazard* can function as a wild card in relation to all the scenarios. They all contain components that could lead to a situation such as that described in *Biohazard*. The story has been constructed as a description of the future by the Berliner Peter Silberstein (born November 2010). Silberstein works at the European office of the Institute for Futures Issues in Berlin and, despite his youth, is a prominent member of the great world-wide political movement *Perspective Universal*.

## 30 CHAPTER 8

# 31 Biohazard

### 31.1.1 A “WILD CARD”

Biohazard	
<b>DEMOGRAPHIC AND OTHER FACTS</b>	
Population of the world:	approx. 6.5 billion
Number of nations:	none
Number of global institutions:	8456
World government?:	Yes
Number of transnational political regions:	8
GDP in world terms:	EUR 15 000 per head per year
GDP growth 2010–2020:	minus 24 per cent per year
GDP growth 2020–2030:	plus 15 per cent per year
Number of poor:	2.3 billion
Number of people who live in regions/ areas that can be considered democratic:	5.5 billion

## 31.2 PETER SILBERSTEIN’S ACCOUNT

New York, Shenzhen, Beijing, Jakarta, Tokyo, Lagos, Mexico City, New Delhi, and Berlin. The nodes of the wide-world web 2030 shine towards me – *Peter Silberstein* – as I activate the interactive wall of the “global mode” at home in the colony house. The place is Berlin, Europe. There are 452 of us living in the colony house. Here we have everything we need, including a centre for allele development (further development of genetic therapy methods from the 1990s), reproduction-free sexercising centre, our own café, gym, virtual shop, telework centre and the web room, where I am now. If I touch selected areas of the digital walls, it is just as if I move into another world. Did I say “as if”? Illusion! This has *really* become a considerable part of everyday life in 2030. An infinite number of cameras, databases, information constructors and researchers continually update the virtual representation of the world and bring it right into our colony houses, individual homes, schools and workplaces.

I point at the “virtual history box”, which is the global base for story-telling, that is to say the global centre of world history. In the future, it will be said that people in 2030 were the first to really begin living *virtually* by organizing most of their daily lives in relation to the global virtual space through the network of information, picture transmissions and stories. Even my bank, Globalbank 1, serves me stories about the potential development of the stock market in a scenarized range of possibilities where scenarios are constantly bombarded with socio-politically potential events. Physically, the world has gradually become so small that moving in time and space has lost much of its allure, as opposed to the situation at the turn of the millennium. Hemingway’s travels take place today on the net and in the web. I check to see whether there are any new major stories today, but it is clearly a bad day for such stories. Conclusio: *zero*. For want of something better, I type in a little essay about “universal perspectivism”, the intellectual movement that became so popular just after the turn of the millennium and which has now become a major cult, before switching to “global history mode” to take a closer look at what has happened during the last 15–20 years.

### **31.2.1 THE WORLD CRISIS 2010–2022**

I speak loudly and clearly. The sound waves with the words “Period 2010–2022” soar through the room, and a moment later it feels as if the whole system is collapsing, but no; pictures and text soon appear, documenting one of the worst events of recent history. We are not talking about world wars or virus epidemics, nor about the collapse of the world-wide electronic network nor the breakdown of food production and supplies throughout the world. No, this is a new crisis, and one so serious that we were halfway through it before we understood what was happening. And it is a double crisis. Firstly, fundamental organic functions of several million people were destroyed at the same time as their capacity for empathy was severely impaired. Secondly, and partly in the aftermath of the first crisis, people throughout the world were thrown into a deep and long-lasting existential identity crisis.

It is a question of a fundamental existential identity crisis resulting from the relativization of the absolute status of the organism through a runaway development of biotechnology and genetic engineering. The emergence of the new synergy technology and extensive intervention in human genes and body shook people in their fundamental patterns of orientation. The distinction between “the natural” and “the artificial” was almost wiped out, and an increasing number of people found difficulty in defending religious standpoints that emphasize the pure, original, natural man created in God’s image. Mankind emerged more and more independent of gods, and today some would call this the final phase of secularization. The precursor of this was the spread of a “loss of empathy” and direct physical disability of half a billion young people throughout the entire world. These young people proved to be suffering from a reduced capacity to identify with other people and show consideration for them. They had been “conceived” as part of the Human Optimalization Programme (HOP) that was implemented in 2010. This was a kind of successor to the Human Genome Project (HUGO) that was completed in the year 2000. The programme’s objective was that all people should have access to a common gene pool. This “universal” genetic package was put together by a small number of reprogenetic R&D environments whose intention was to identify the “best functions” for the human organism. This was to be tried out on a large number of

embryos throughout the world. A kind of experiment for development of a new elite that “all” people would later be able to emulate. The human organism was not only to be improved. The “improved quality” was also to be spread so that everyone could take part in this development.

The crisis was not due to technological developments as such, a conclusion that was often hastily drawn 30–40 years ago when discussing the risks related to the emergence of new technology. If I enter the Social Diagnosis Area, it is rapidly revealed that the crisis was primarily caused by the trench warfare adopted by political authorities, intelligentsia and the general public, who all leaped to defend fundamentalist “for” or “against” positions when discussing the potential framework of biotechnology and genetic engineering. Large groups were by definition *against* genetic “manipulation”, while other groups were almost unreservedly *for* it. Throughout the western world, there was a drastic fall in interest for natural science and technology throughout the 1980s and 1990s up to the second decade of the new century. As a result of this, developments in this area were left up to the “specially interested” while politicians, intelligentsia and the general public adopted a primarily fundamentalist and disregarding attitude to the emergence of the new synergy technology. The result of the antiscientific wave and the arrogance of the politicians was catastrophic. The period up to 2010 saw the development of the closed global space, an Industrial-Medical Gene Corporation (IMGC), which carried out its work in secret. Antarctica became an important arena for many such environments.

During the period prior to 2010 a decisive role was also played by the lack of global democratic institutions and control authorities, as well as by a strongly conservative political dominance in Europe and parts of the political environments in the USA and Asia (under a banner of “genetic manipulation is fundamentally evil – we oppose everything”), in giving the responsibility for developments in the biogenetic area to a disorderly Mafia-like undergrowth of anarchistic biotechnology and genetic engineering firms. This development was otherwise enabled by the emergence of new individual needs structures. People exposed to serious diseases could not accept that new technology and forms of treatment should not be employed to save lives. As long as such facilities existed, they were made use of. In this way, the gap widened increasingly between these individual needs structures and policy in this area.

Since no distinction was made between patents on the genes or parts of genes on the one hand and patents on processes associated with implementation of genetic information on the other, the result of the Human Genome Project was that a handful of companies was able to seize control of the most important industrial raw material of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the human genome. These companies were free to administer their patent rights as they wished and set in motion an unrestrained merry-go-round of reprogenetic and reproductive technology innovations. As time went on, they gained considerable power and direct influence over the authorities in central regions of the world. In 2010, the HOP Agreement was signed by the authorities in New York, Shenzhen, Beijing, Jakarta, Tokyo, Lagos, Mexico City, New Delhi and Berlin. This dubious link between the authorities in the different regions of the world and criminal and semi-criminal business environments with patents on the human genome was instrumental in reducing the conception of “humanity” and “human” to a collection of clearly defined properties

associated with the organic genetic material. Standardization of the physical structure became synonymous with “further development” of mankind. During the period following these events, some of them have been attributed to the so-called DIMBY (Do It in My Backyard) effect, that is to say in secret, far from the critical public eye.

I shudder. It is incredible that such a thing could be allowed to happen. I really want to switch to a more cheerful programme but my curiosity gets the upperhand. I see pictures of distorted creatures that resemble people. Groups of people who look completely alike and who gawp at me with an expression that at best might arouse bottomless compassion. I see human-looking apes who work as servants for the rich. In momentary glimpses I see myself standing in front of an embryo pool shop where I can select the characteristics of my own offspring. “Shall it be a she or a he? Shall it be blond with dark skin, dark hair and a pale complexion, blond and pale with extra long legs or perhaps thickset and swarthy – or just like you?” This is the kind of text that has been used since then in advertising for medical services in this field. In one of the top corners of most of these multimedia reports, a window is displayed with a text that may have put the culture of the time in a nutshell. I quote:

*“Although parents or guardians should have a certain scope to select qualities for these children, all pre-embryos and planned births by HOP parents (a broad selection of people found particularly suitable) must be registered with the local representative for interstate authorities and subjected to a pre-embryo treatment based on a globally defined standard for basic human qualities and functions”.*

In the bottom right-hand corner, in a window mainly reserved for factual information, the following text is displayed:

*“As early as 1999 there were places in the world where it was possible for parents to choose the sex of their offspring. Early this year, the state of Virginia, USA approved the use of a new method for selection of sex in the reproduction process.*

*The private clinic in Fairfax, Virginia had then long experimented with the use of colours and laser beams. By colouring the sperm, it was possible to determine the desired sex in 96 per cent of cases. They were then passed through a narrow opening, where each one was lit up. The sperm with female X chromosomes contain more genetic material, and therefore shone brighter than the male Y chromosomes. One then used laser beams to kill the sperm one wished to eliminate.*

*At this time the world's first clone of a large mammal also saw the light of day. On 23 February 1997, it was announced that researchers had succeeded for the first time in cloning a lamb from a cell taken from an adult sheep.*

*The term pre-embryo was devised to distinguish the human embryo during the first 14 days after fertilization, when there is as yet no nervous system, from the embryo phase, which is the remaining period up to birth. Traditionally, the term embryo is used during the whole period from fertilization to birth."*

### **31.3 HUMAN OPTIMALIZATION PROGRAMME**

At the turn of the millennium, there was a budding tendency towards mergers between small innovative biotech firms and pharmaceutical companies, the so-called "big pharmas". This link was associated with the technological and organic merging of cells, genes and proteins (pharmagenomics), where concepts such as proteomics, cellomics and genomics arose. The ending "mics" here refers to the electronic component, that is to say the computer science element in all this (cf. the definition of "cyborg"— Peter S.). This development opened the post-genome era, when the result of the project on the mapping of the human genome was perceived as being like a highway system where all essential elements such as cars, people, traffic lights and other associated functions were completely lacking. The Human Genome Project was completed, even ahead of schedule, but what then? The two main trends that were later to lead to HOP, can be summarized as follows:

1. The association between biology, genetics and information technology, referred to as "bioinformatics"
2. Pharmagenomics

Efforts were now concentrated on the development of methods, processes, arenas and markets where this should be given broad application.

HOP was a global project and a centralized world-wide follow-up of all the fragmented biotechnology and genetic engineering development projects that arose in the wake of the "Human Genome Project" (HUGO). Celera Genomics, a private company, gave HUGO tough competition and put pressure on the HUGO researchers to hasten completion. During the period 2000–2010 developments took a surprising turn. Instead of HUGO, powerful lobbyists and interest organizations representing somewhat dubious forces within these branches seized control of HOP and the whole development within the area of reprognetics almost without critical intervention by the public authorities. The original purpose of HUGO was to map and sequence human genes. Now the purpose was to make the best possible use of this information to develop ways of universally enhancing the functionality of the human organism. "No-one shall suffer from hereditary diseases" was the motto.

"What are all these alleles and genes?" I wonder, and open the fact window again. The following text is displayed:

*“Human beings have approximately 100 000 genes in two copies divided between 23 pairs of chromosomes. It is the totality of information in these chromosomes that is referred to as the “Human Genome”.*

*No individual has more genes than others, so there is no such thing as a gene for red hair, long legs or a high risk of contracting cancer. The variations between people are variations between different forms of the same types of genes. These different forms are known as alleles. Mutations are variations of alleles and not of the total number of genes. In 1997 fewer than 10 000 of these genes had been mapped, and it was assumed that mapping of all the genes would be completed by about 2020 and that by 2030 we would know of all the common alleles of every human gene possessed by the different members of the world’s population.”*

However, developments were to go much more rapidly than first assumed. Not long after the human gene structure was known, the alleles were also mapped. The intention of the HUGO project was to put all of this information into a global public database. This principle was also the core and the starting point of the crisis that later occurred. This database was transferred to HOP, and was a major factor of the impact of the programme in world terms. In many ways, HOP can be viewed as a perverted global plan of action for further development of the human race based on a view of mankind that was incompatible with the advanced technology now available.



### **31.3.1 THE INDUSTRIAL-MEDICAL GENE CORPORATION AND THE DIMBY EFFECT**

The potential profits of genetic manipulation were considerable. The grounds for ethical reservations were correspondingly great. Individual governments therefore attempted to limit the activities of the genetic industry through national legislation and international agreements. As a countermove, an informal alliance was formed between certain industrial concerns and representatives of medical science, the Industrial-Medical Gene Corporation, which wanted to receive full economic and industrial compensation for their research. This Corporation was therefore searching for an opportunity to run its operations unhindered by national and international legislation, away from the spotlight of public attention. In transparent western democracies, there was a major likelihood of exposure. The Corporation therefore allied itself with poor third-world countries that, in exchange for bribes, were willing to allow activities to be set up and carried out on their territories, but somewhere off the beaten track. This was the so-called DIMBY (“Do It in My Backyard”) effect. To further reduce the risk of being discovered, parts of the Corporation moved their activities to the international commons, such as the unoccupied part of Antarctica or to research vessels on the open seas. Such activities were camouflaged by operating with a double agenda. An official part, that would bear close scrutiny and an unofficial part that had to be hidden from the public gaze. The right to inspect vessels on the open seas was restricted to the flag state, i.e. the country where the vessel was registered, which could be a DIMBY third-world country, while in Antarctica this right was restricted to the consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. Inspection activities in Antarctica were relatively costly owing to great distances and were therefore practised relatively rarely. If one was successful in concealing activities, as was initially attempted, the right of inspection in these desolate areas was illusory and irrelevant!

After a time, the Programme for Global Standardization of Certain Basic Human Functions was established, now known as the Human Optimization Programme. Since these authorities were not aware of their own limitations and were too ethnocentric in their definitions of common human characteristics, they proved easy prey for the Gene Corporation’s lobbyists. There was an almost palpable sense of catastrophe. A presentation of the youth of the new China on Tiananmen Square flashed onto the screen (China 2020) like a vision of Hell, where children and young people in the age group from 10 to 20 were not only dressed alike but also looked alike in compliance with the ideal of the global Chinese. In the USA, the global American, despite wearing a different outfit, shared many features of the Chinese and of people in this age group throughout the world. The idea was doubtless good. The problem was that there had been a miscalculation. Just as many German shepherd dogs towards the end of the last century developed hip dysplasia, excessive aggressiveness and other defects owing to undue standardization in the breeding strategies, these HOP children suffered from a standardization of some basic functions that were simply incompatible with the remainder of their organism. Basic functions that were a synthesis of functions developed by American and Chinese researchers were also best suited, respectively, to Americans and Chinese. Others, such as us Europeans, were given a really tough time. Not to speak of the Africans. They had suffered from AIDS. Now they had the HOP syndrome. It was not the manipulation itself but the standardization of the manipulation towards so-called basic or “best” functions that triggered the first real human genetic

crisis. In a short time, mankind was close to undermining its own existence, not as a result of technological and industrial development but by failing to develop global political and ethical institutions that would have been capable of creating common rules and global ethics around this development. Instead, the leading reprobative institutions throughout the world (most of which were private) persuaded the central authorities of most supranational regions to join the Human Optimization Programme, perhaps the most catastrophic joint measure so far devised by man.

## 31.4 THE SOCIAL HISTORIAN 2030

In a newly published book by Konrad Wahrsteiner and David Cage (2029) an interesting diagnosis is presented. These historians are from the Global Institute of Historical Research in New York (GloHR), which is one of the major domains of the “Virtual History Window”. The diagnosis they present is based on a perspective on the course of 20th century events that breaks radically with the dominant perspectives of historians immediately before and after the turn of the millennium. Unlike many earlier historians who, according to Wahrsteiner and Cage, took a pessimistic view of technology, where technological developments in themselves were ascribed major importance in explaining undesirable events, they attempted a new approach to understanding the relationship between technological development, economic growth and dubious social developments (such as the development of Nazism from 1933 to 1945). Wahrsteiner and Cage present the following diagnosis for the world crisis between 2010 and 2022:

### **Wahrsteiner&Cage: The world crisis, 2010–2022**

© GloHR, New York 2029

“The crisis arose, not because people had started development of biotechnology and genetic engineering on a large scale, but because the political authorities of most countries and the developments actually taking place were too far apart. For ideological reasons, the politicians were not capable of actively addressing the explosive developments in the biogenetic area. This was particularly reinforced by the fact that not even individual members of the public had reflected over what this development would really entail for them as religiously, culturally and socially oriented individuals. The question of “what is the natural me and what is the artificial me” became, as time went on, so difficult to make one’s mind up about that people were thrown into what was perhaps the biggest existential crisis in the history of the world. It was comparable with events during the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, when the heliocentric world view took over hegemony from the geocentric. However, for a long time, the problem was that there was no good alternative to the old paradigm. In addition to this, the common human characteristics were defined far too concretely, thereby exposing the concept of mankind to a material reductionism whereby the distinctive character of human beings was defined in terms of concrete functions. Mankind as an abstract moral species no longer existed. (This was vaguely reminiscent of the society described by George Orwell in 1984.)” (215f)

*Main perspective :*

The technological development had come to stay, and it is the socio-political circumstances surrounding a technical/economic growth system that must be held responsible for any negative social development. Mankind is perhaps moving into a decisive phase of the secularization process.

Politicians and the general public reacted largely on the basis of sensational newspaper and net headings, as did my parents, to the publicity given to the first cloned animals at the end of the last century. Today, everyone remembers the sheep called Dolly. The story of Dolly is recounted in all the history books as a symbol of one of the most important events of the 1990s. They reacted as they did because of moral indignation and serious misgivings about both ethical and biological considerations. The whole of the global political institutional apparatus was overtaken by developments within R&D and major global industrial clusters that had specialized in reprognetics. The environmental movement was perhaps the most decisive factor in this new form of conservatism. The environmental movement, which had been primarily oriented towards sustainability and conservation of external nature, allied itself with religious fundamentalists and political groupings that had long been sceptical of genetically modified agricultural products, and formed a common front against all manipulation of what we call “nature”. This was also approved by most political environments and constituted a universal socio-political and public consensus.

After the first sensational headlines at the end of the 1990s there were few politically and socially engaged people who contributed to the popular debate on biotechnology and genetic engineering. It was too new and unreal. Moreover, there was general agreement that this was not a good thing. My Norwegian uncle has told me that he went into Norway’s largest bookshop, Tanum, in 1999 and asked if they had any books on social policy in this area, but came out empty-handed. The bookshop was not able to find a single title in Norwegian and there was only a handful of foreign titles to choose between.

During the last 10–15 years before the crisis, according to Wahrsteiner and Cage (ibid), the industrialized countries, which had gradually developed throughout the globe, were characterized by strong political conflicts where the main combatants were, on the one hand, those who were positive to while critical of the potential of globalization and who, in the wake of this, saw opportunities for a proactive role for the political authorities in the biogenetic revolution and, on the other hand, those who consistently rejected such a development on the basis that genetic manipulation, biotechnological programmes and experiments in reproductive medicine were reprehensible in themselves. These people regarded interference with human genes as utterly sinful. It was either tampering with the original harmonic nature itself or it was improper interference with “God’s work”. (*What rubbish! Personally, I have no belief in such schizophrenic concepts of God, and attempt instead to build faith in a constructive global policy – Peter S.*). In the view of Wahrsteiner and Cage, much of the blame for this crisis must also be laid at the door of the emergence of “the new right” in large areas of the world just after the turn of the millennium, and on the *lack* of a global policy. W&C give the following description of the global situation that resulted in the enormous impact of HOP (ibid: 238–240):

In America the new right-wing wave was expressed as a curious mixture of Christian fundamentalism and extreme industrial liberalism. Growing economic and social differences and conflicts between black and white Americans and between “traditionalists” and “modernists” had undermined stability and social cohesion in the USA. This was instrumental in increasing the country’s self-centredness and in sporadic and unpredictable reductions in international involvement. Involvement in Europe was de-escalated. The same applied to the Asian arena. The United States was still involved in those Latin-American countries with which it had good relations. All things considered, this helped certain influential circles to acquire even greater real power, and a new lobby arena with a base in Silicon Valley and Maryland seemed to dominate American politics more and more.

The stability of the Russian federation was also considerably weakened owing to poor economy, poverty and a lack of political reforms. Russia did not succeed in recovering economically after the fall of the iron curtain and the enormous crisis that began to surface around the turn of the millennium. There were clear declining trends. The Russian central government was considerably weakened by continual conflicts between the president and the Duma. In 2006, several international emergency relief programmes were established. However, interest flagged considerably when the donor countries seemed to have enough problems of their own and the Russian federation gave no sign whatever of being able to change its course. The presidency had no public legitimacy and the situation was characterized by attempts by individual regions to break out of the federation, by major unrest and by the development of strong religious movements in the Muslim areas. Russia was incapable of playing a proactive international role, as a result of which that they were not involved in preparations for HOP.

In China, on the other hand, economic growth has continued, if at a lower rate than at the turn of the millennium and in spite of periodical setbacks. During the first decade after the turn of the millennium, China developed at record pace, which made it a serious player on global markets. There were major regional variations in economic and social equality but investment in selected growth centres proved successful (one country – two systems) and the country now has a number of such areas with good economy. One of these is Taiwan, which is part of the Chinese federation of relatively autonomous regions. Another powerful region is that north of Shenzhen, which has begun to challenge the hegemony within genetic engineering and biotechnology of the so-called “Bio Valley” in Maryland, USA. This sector is now particularly dominated by reproductive technology, embryo biopsy and cryopreservation. In spite of keen investment in new materials and energy technology, there are still traditional environmental problems associated with growing energy consumption. The Communist Party still holds power in the central government – following in Deng’s footsteps – but there is now extensive autonomy in the provinces and locally. Opposition parties are now

permitted locally, and democratic local elections have been held. In some municipalities, the Communists have been voted out. Regional and local tension has sometimes given rise to unrest. The provinces round Shenzhen and Beijing play particularly major international roles. Otherwise in China, the Postcommunist Unity Party continued its predecessors' enthusiasm for centralization, which enabled massive support for HOP.

Japan's economic hegemony in the Asian region was markedly reduced. The country was not able to get the economy back on its feet again after the setbacks at the turn of the millennium. The lack of technological innovation is one of a number of causes combined with a lack of energy and raw materials. In 2010 the region was more marked by protectionism than by cooperation and trade. Japan is partly dependent on support from the USA, China and the EU, and the country is characterized by strong nationalist trends and great political instability.

After increasing progress by Hindutva in India, a military junta seized power in 2007 with the support of the leading western-educated families. The economy was to some extent liberalized, but was also feudal, giving rise to widespread market imperfections, unpredictable problems for foreign investors and large-scale corruption. The population has stabilized at around 1.4 billion, partly owing to a tough social and family policy. The political and economic freedom of action of the minorities is severely restricted by exceptional laws. Foreign policy is characterized by empire-building. India, headed by New Delhi, regards itself as the major power of the region, which must hold Pakistan down and compete with Shenzhen and Beijing for the role of Asia's foremost regional power. Western political scientists who have difficulty in facing the demise of state sovereignty in the west find consolation in the flourishing of a traditional power policy in the east.

In Africa there was really only one region with a certain global importance. This was the area around Lagos in Nigeria, which had managed to make a profit from Internet-based trading and business operations immediately after the turn of the millennium.

Both India and Africa saw opportunities for at last catching up with the rest of the world, and threw themselves into the programme with an enthusiasm that even Aldous Huxley in the 1930s did not have the imagination to envisage.

By upholding the subsidiarity principle, the EU had delegated to national and/or regional authorities many of the powers and responsibilities previously gathered in Brussels. Some of the regions became engines of economic growth, and gained greater economic and political importance than the nation-states. It was now particularly the area from Berlin and its surroundings to the borders of Poland and Denmark that dominated. In addition to this, an important role was played by the regions of Northern Spain, Northern Italy, Øresund and the Dutch/Flemish/West-German Rhine-Meuse although most of what was decided here was channelled

through a quasi-European forum in Berlin. There was still a single European market with a common currency. During the first decade of the 21st century, the role of the European Commission was reduced to a mere supernumerary part in the European drama.

In Germany and Austria, the false democrats, the republicans and the successors of Jörg Haider, the right-wing populist of the 1990s and the first years of the 21st century, and his Freedom Party (FPO) gained a dominant position, while in other parts of Northern Europe, a multitude of right-wing populists emerged from the Danish and Norwegian “progress” parties and corresponding groupings in Sweden and Finland. What many of the political groupings in the various global regions had in common was that they abandoned the traditional ideals of right-wing fascism concerning nature and purity, and manifested an extreme pragmatism in the attempt to transcend the conflicts between the conservatives of the time – *the conservers of “pure” nature* – and those who advocated the development of strong global institutions in the hope of being able to coordinate this development for the good of all peoples. The fact that many laboratories for experiments in biotechnology and genetic engineering were sited in the international commons during the first decade of the 21st century is also part of this picture. Here they were not subject to any form of control.

Immediately before and after the turn of the millennium, i.e. before such political groups began to dominate, the need for clarifications concerning social, political, ethical and legal issues related to rerogenetics began to make itself felt. The authorities of the time were frequently surprised by requests for their views on such issues.

The result of this lack of political enterprise combined with the emergence of these new political groups, which W&C refer to as *genoists* and *genoism* (ibid: 154), was catastrophic. Global institutions such as the Global Biosafety Committee (GBC), the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Committee (GMAC), the Global Food Biotechnology Communication Network (GFBCN), the International Biosafety Protocol Corporation (IBPC) and the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology Biosafety (ICGEB) completely collapsed. These organizations, which partly adopted the names of institutions established during the last 30 years of the 20th century, functioned for a period as a bulwark against extreme excesses and as a guarantee that the global publicity and market situation would not degenerate in the direction of fascism, where money and power were the only guarantees of health and welfare and where increasingly larger groups began focusing too closely on “optimalization” of the human race by means of prenatal genetic manipulation in supplying both private and state orders of specific human qualities.

*An example of this is the issues related to patenting of life forms, which many governments, including that of Norway, addressed in 1999. The result of this varied from country to country but, in Norway, the development was more or less condemned by the Minister of Health in compliance with the views of all the political groups of the day. Norway’s consistent objections played a global leading role during this period.*

*Norway was initially one of the few countries that was extremely restrictive. Later, several other countries followed. Even the US authorities tightened the restrictions on research and industrial development in response to increasing concern about the unknown consequences of this technology. Many politicians and large groups of people reacted spontaneously, with the results with which we are all familiar.*

The incompetence of the politicians and the lack of a global standard international regulations and policy in this area proved fatal. Some abortive attempts can however be documented, such as the following:

*(a) Patents on life*

*In No. 33, April 1999 of its report series, the European Commission's Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) published two articles on biotechnology. The first of these takes up the problems surrounding patenting of biotechnological inventions viewed in the light of the impending harmonization of the different national regulations for the protection of biotechnological inventions within the EU. It is stated that protection of intellectual property is essential for biotechnology firms, and that new European legislation of this area must clarify what, how and when biotechnological inventions can be protected by legal means.*

*Excerpt:*

*Genes may also be argued to exist already, and therefore lack novelty. However, the novelty criterion applies to the pre-existence of a description of the thing in the public domain, not the thing itself.*

*It is clear from what is stated here that it is not really patents on life, i.e. patents on the genes themselves, that are concerned, but patents on the ways these genes are described in the public domain. This new directive is the first instance in history of elements of the human body being made subject to patenting by means of technical procedures. Since 1977 over 7500 applications for patents on human genes have been deposited with the European Patent Office. The new directive therefore formalizes a practice that has existed since 1977. Patenting must comply with current patent legislation as well as ethical and political objections. This means that the following are all inappropriate for patenting:*

- procedures for human reproductive cloning*
- processes for modification of the germ line, genetic identity of people*
- methods that utilize human embryos*
- processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals if this causes suffering without resulting in any medical benefit. The Norwegian government considered this in spring 1999. The Norwegian government was extremely sceptical of developments in this area and signalled a very restrictive attitude.*

Another place in their book, W&C write (Wahrsteiner and Cage, 2029: 156f):

*The result of HOP was a catastrophe. This was not because it was easy to discern any physical defects, but because the HOP children seemed to lack the ability to put themselves in another person's shoes or to show compassion, and thus their entire way of communicating with their surroundings seems to have suffered permanent damage. Since their capacity for human empathy was considerably reduced, HOP children were disliked by most other people. They were perceived as arrogant, reserved, insensitive and often malicious. Interestingly, they did not seem equally lacking in empathy towards other HOP children. Could it be that this was because they were adept at exploiting other people's weaknesses and pity for them, which was neither relevant nor possible where other HOP children were concerned?*

According to W&C, it is impossible to determine whether this “empathy gap” was caused by defects in the reproductive genetics itself or whether it was the result of the isolation and lack of stimulation that HOP children were exposed to during their upbringing. However, in some of the documented discussions from the turn of the millennium, there is evidence of attempts to focus more attention on such issues while resisting pressure to abandon the technique as such by adopting strategies for avoiding risks. This example from Norway, one of the most conservative nations in this field, is particularly interesting:

*At the start of the 21st century the following question was discussed: “What would be the ethical consequences of choosing not to develop new technology?” When considering ethical dilemmas associated with technological developments and applications, it was usual to presuppose that technological developments were hazardous, one might almost say, in themselves. This question turned matters around, and introduced a new perspective on social development, the moral duty to develop new functional and sound technology. A number of people brought up the example of potential parents who could be 99 per cent certain that their offspring would come to suffer from a serious hereditary disease. Is it not ethically and morally dubious not to take advantage of research results and technology to relieve these people of their burdens? The issue was thoroughly discussed and was a topic frequently returned to by the Norwegian Technology Assessment Board that functioned from 1999 to 2003.*

## **31.5 BERLIN**

Despite the fact that we have endured the biggest global crisis in the history of the world, the ruined Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church in Berlin still stands, as does most of the physical environment, not only here but almost everywhere. The population has now been hurled into a major existential identity crisis. Immediately prior to and during the HOP crisis, traditional political, religious and political world pictures were still



more or less intact, although a simplistic reductionist view of humanity seems to gain increasing ground. After the HOP crisis, on the other hand, where not only reductionism, but also biotechnology and the development of genetic engineering in itself made more and more people aware that traditional meaningful stories were unsuitable as reference points, this development played a part in destroying the last remains of religious sustenance. During the latter half of the 2020s and in 2030 the meaning dimension expressed by the question: “What is the meaning of life?” had become so prevalent that institutions of philosophy and ethics throughout the world experienced a boom unparalleled in human history.

There are still traces of people who have changed enormously. Owing to a global mobilization of industrial forces, global and regional authorities, NGOs and major idealistic efforts of people all over the world, the world is slowly getting back to normal. The display at Kurfürstendam shows 30:04:2030. 05:30 NM (Nach Mittag is the German variant of the English PM, which was established in 2018 as part of the standard way of indicating the time in the United States of Europe).

I have now left the web room and am standing on the street outside. The Berlin streetscape has changed. I stand looking at the people around me. Something has happened to them – not all – but many of them. I observe the way they walk. You don’t notice it if you only look at one of them. No, you discover it first by looking at several people at once, which is not difficult in a busy street such as Kurfürstendam. Many people walk exactly alike! They have the same rhythm and, although height and breadth may vary, large groups move in a way that is rather disquieting. Although most of them have different figures, hair colour, height and skin colour, there are sometimes smaller groups of anything from two to six or seven people who look like twins or septuplets. Especially when there are as many as six or seven, it takes you aback. They are obviously all clones (HOP clones). The same arm movement backwards and forwards to counteract the loss of balance caused by moving their legs, which also, if at somewhat varying paces, move in the same way. Worst of all, I sometimes think I resemble them quite a lot myself.

Although I am a child of this time, I am not yet able to accustom myself to the sight of people who are exactly alike, although the age difference between them may be considerable. Some would call it a perverted result of the technological development and profit orientation. Others – including myself – regard it as a result of ideological campaigns *against* globalization. Yes, you read correctly – *against* globalization, not as a result of technological development alone. The following is displayed in the fact window:

*The definition of human life has become a fundamentally controversial issue after the crisis. The problem is (still) not first and foremost distinguishing life from AI (artificial intelligence), cyborgs (cybernetic organisms), etc. It is more a matter of distinguishing human life on the one hand from different types of artificially processed life on the other. People have largely reached agreement on what is intelligent life. The political and social discussion primarily concerns the question of what is unique for*

*human life. To be human means at any rate three things: Firstly there is the biological question of whether one belongs to the species homo sapiens or not. Secondly, there is the psychological question: does one react to the same sense-stimuli in the same way as the rest of the subgroup of people whose culture one aspires to share? Thirdly, there is the ethical question: does one regard oneself and is one regarded by others on the basis of biological and psychological features as having the moral rights and obligations that at all times define a human being of the subgroup of people whose culture one aspires to share, and who agree to include one? The main issue involves identifying persons and defining their rights. The manifesto of LIVE IT LIVE defines a person as a member of homo sapiens “who is intelligent, self-aware and conscious”.*

I came to remember my parents, who were so old that they did not take part in the “Human Optimalization Project” (HOP) during the second decade of the century. They were truly fortunate.

## **31.6 THE ROAD AHEAD**

I was so depressed by the sight of the HOP clones that I took refuge once more in the web room. My thoughts run riot. One of the most significant things to come out of the crisis was the Global Planning Agency in New York, established in 2024. Of particular importance was the Institute for Futures Issues, which is today a central part of this directorate. The Global Planning Agency and the Institute for Futures Issues cooperate closely with the leading authorities in each of the 10 transnational power centres (global nodes), and they have played an important role in the development of the crisis management strategy since 2022.

How should one best go about developing effective global institutions and a world-wide decision system capable of restraining, counteracting and repairing critical courses of development? This is the main issue for the Global Planning Agency and the IFI. The IFI is in many ways a modern version of the Simon Wiesental Centre after World War II, where people’s welfare, moral integrity and human dignity have first priority. The idea of managing the human genome, the common genetic heritage of mankind, in the same way as the international commons were managed towards the end of the last century was adopted by the World Government in autumn 2029.

Today they attempt to pick up new challenges. The latest publication is entitled “*GenRich and NoRich. Scenarios for the World 2090*”. Part of the reason for this time span is that the “pace of time” seems to have changed so much that, in order to be able to legitimate serious breaches, one must think in terms of increasingly greater time intervals in the future. As soon as I was old enough, I applied to work at the IFI office here in Berlin. I thought, “*Never more!*” – “*Nie wieder!*”.

For me this is not only a job; it is an involvement motivated by personal experiences and faith in the ability of mankind to tackle such crises as well, but with the awareness that this does not happen by itself. Avoidance of such situations requires effort. It has also been recognized that scenario development can be a valuable tool both for mobilization of effort and as good backcloths for important political decisions. To illustrate this, I here provide a brief excerpt of the last report from IFI. It was written by my good friend, *Sylvester Natureborn*:

### **GenRich and NoRich.<sup>108</sup> Scenarios for the World 2090**

The international community in 2090 is characterized by an enormous polarization. This development, which began already towards the end of the last millennium (1980 and 1990s), has now reached its logical final stage, where the former human society is now divided into two classes. One class is called *NoRich* while the other is referred to as *Gene-enriched* or *GenRich*.

This is the global society's new class system across traditional ethnic, social and biological dividing lines. During the period between 2030 and 2090, an entirely new genetic aristocracy developed, where one large group consisting of approximately 10 per cent of the population has over a long period developed synthetic genes. These genes were developed in laboratories and did not exist as part of the original human genome before reproductive genetics made this possible early in the 21st century. Already today, in 2090, we find the first, second and third generations of *GenRich*, where these new genes have been transmitted via "normal" reproduction. These children are also further developed with new synthetic genes, which are placed in *GenRich* embryos with the help of advanced genetic engineering. Unlike the situation during the crisis of 2010–2022, this *GenRich* human is anything but homogeneous. There are many types of *GenRich* families and many subcategories within each type. For example, there are *GenRich* athletes who can trace their ancestry right back to well-known athletes at the start of the century. Another type is the *GenRich* researcher family, which is particularly suitable for long-term and creative problem-solving tasks.

*NoRich* or *the Naturals*, as they are also known, are the losers in this game. These people constitute 90 per cent of the world's population (in this scenario – IFI has other scenarios in the same report with different indications – SN). These are the people who have neither the desire nor the opportunity to take part in reproductive genetic engineering programmes. They put their faith in traditional "natural selection" and biological reproduction. Eventually, a completely new species has actually been developed, the *GenRich*, in relation to which *NoRich* will in all probability acquire the same relative status that apes and higher mammals had in relation to human beings prior to 2030. The *GenRich* control everything from industry, media and entertainment industry to the knowledge industry. The *NoRich* are low-paid service providers or mechanical production workers in the sectors where they are still needed.

---

108 Freely adapted from Lee M. Silver (1998: 4–7)

The children of the *GenRich* and the *Naturals* grow up in completely separate environments, attend different schools and belong to completely different social worlds. There is very little, if any, contact between *GenRich* children and the children of *Naturals*.

The genetic gap between the *GenRich* and the *Naturals* and the social, cultural and economic differences resulting from this, seem likely to continue growing as time goes on.

(As we see, this scenario reflects the past and the present just as much as the future considering the crisis that the world had just endured during the period 2010–2022. This was actually in process of happening and, if the current trend continued, would be a reality long before 2090.)

*Sylvester Natureborn* – IFI New York, 25.02.2030

This scenario and four others were discussed in the *future mode* in the world history area after they were published in February. The scenario attracted particular attention not least, in my view, because it was reminiscent of the *Human Optimization Programme* and possible long-term consequences of this. People's reactions somewhat resembled those of the German people after the period from 1933 to 1945, when recent trends were viewed in relation to former errors in order to avoid any repeat of the same catastrophic development. Many debaters of this scenario pointed out that the avoidance of a distinction between the *Naturals/NoRich* and the *GenRich* was decisive for the future of mankind.

What is interesting, however, is that practically no-one suggested that the development of this type of technology should be stopped. The prescription was instead a new variant of the traditional social democratic distribution policy, the purpose of which was to ensure access for all *people* to participation in this development, but this time without defining a specific number of basic functions that everyone was to adapt to. "Genetic abundance and functional diversity!" is the battle cry today. Synthetic gene enrichment in itself was largely perceived as positive, while the major priorities consisted of ensuring the possibility for people to take part in this development while safeguarding as great a diversity as possible. This is very reminiscent of the debate concerning the "two-thirds society" towards the end of the 20th century, but now the discussion turns on a scenario for a nine-tenths society of a far more radical character. Rrring...Rrring... The communiphone signals that someone is trying to get hold of me. It is the regional coordinator of "*Perspective Universal*" who wants me to take part in a gathering in Moscow next week. Have a good day!

*Peter Silberstein*, 30.04.2030

**RELIEF:** some selected cuttings from the Norwegian and international press 1999:

VG 26 august 1999:

### **GENE CURE FOR MS**

PARIS (VG) Researchers want to splice human genes in cattle in the attempt to find a cure for the dreaded disease multiple sclerosis. A group of researchers at the Aggroresearch Center in New Zealand has requested the Government to give the go-ahead for the attempt. By uses human genes, they can stimulate cows to produce milk when they are just a few months old. This milk will contain human genes, which are planned to be used in research to solve the mystery of multiple sclerosis.

Aftenposten 30 August 1999:

### **RESEARCHERS FIND GENE THAT CONTROLS INSULIN PRODUCTION**

Researchers in Umeå have identified the gene that controls the body's production of insulin. This discovery can give diabetics an alternative to insulin injections and strict diets.

In Sweden over 3 per cent of the population suffers from diabetes, and the disease seems to be growing increasingly common.

The researchers in Umeå have identified the gene that controls the development of the pancreas. A bulge on the foetus's bowel breaks away and becomes a separate organ. The organ then receives a signal telling it the function that its cells will have, partly to help with the digestion of food and partly to produce hormone insulin, which is used to regulate the amount of glucose in the blood.

The next step will be to reproduce the pancreas outside the body and cultivate insulin-producing cells.

(NTB-TT)

**(1) DAGBLADET 30 AUGUST 1999:**

**SOON POSSIBLE TO TRANSPLANT A HEAD FROM ONE BODY TO ANOTHER**

**(2) BY TOM STALSBERG**

LONDON (Dagbladet): The American brain surgeon and researcher Robert J. White announces that it will soon be possible to transplant a head from one body to another.

For 20 years, White has studied potential methods for doing this. White has performed transplants on monkeys and dogs. Now he would like to attempt the operation on a human being.

– Many people are certain to find it distasteful, but in principle there is no difference between transplanting hearts, livers or kidneys and heads, says White according to the Sunday Times.

– The Frankenstein story, where a human being was constructed by sewing body parts together, will become a reality early in the 21st century. Now I am just waiting for someone with enough money to afford the operation, says Robert J. White.

The actor Christopher Reeve, paralysed after a riding accident, is said to have shown interest, according to the Sunday Times. White says he expects people to be sceptical of this form of surgery, but he believes that it will have a small place in medical science one day.

At a price of approximately USD 5 million, not many people will be able to afford the operation.

**(3) OBSERVATIONS ON DEFINITIONS OF LIFE AND REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM:**

**(4) WHAT IS LIFE?**

In the book “Remaking Eden” (Silver, 1998) Lee M. Silver, Professor of Molecular Biology and Public Affairs, Princeton University and Special

Adviser to the US Congress, discussed the question, “What Is Life?”. He distinguishes between “Life In General” and “Life In a Special Sense”. Life in general can exist, not only without consciousness, but also without any form of neurological activity. Life in general embraces millions of different species of microbes, fungi and plants. The key notion here is that life gives rise to new life (reproduction) and energy utilization. The combination of reproductive process and capacity to develop (survival of the fittest) enables us to say that life in general exists. Whereas life in general has its basis in the individual cell, life in a special sense is dependent on the cerebral function that can create *consciousness*. In human beings, life in a special sense is located in the region between our ears, and far exceeds the boundaries of individual nerve cells. This applies both to animals and people. An animal dies – in the special sense – if its nervous system ceases to function, although most individual nerve cells go on living in a general sense for a little while longer. That beards continue to grow, that hair functions still work and that organs from dead people can be used to save other people’s lives (in a special sense) even after they have been declared dead are all indicative of life in a general sense.

RED HERRING, April 1999 (p. 82):

In an interview with the American economist **Jeremy Rifkin** on his views concerning patenting issues within biotechnology and genetic engineering, Rifkin had the following to say:

RED HERRING: Fuelling the industry’s growth, in part, are partnerships that lead to the patenting of gene sequences. Why are you opposed to patenting genes?

RIFKIN: Because whoever controls the genes controls the next century. Genes are raw resources for everything important to commercial life in the coming century, just as fossils fuels were to the last 200 years. And the name of the game is patents. All major life sciences companies – either on their own or through licences with biotech startups and universities – are scouring the planet looking for rare genes that may have some commercial value that they can patent.

He added: I am not opposed to patenting the *processes* used to find particular genes but I do believe that, under existing statutes, it is illegal to patent the genes that constitute the genome, tissues, and organs. Processes are more than sufficient to be competitive in the marketplace.





# **NORWAY•2030**

# Practice

## 32 CHAPTER 9

# 33 From scenarios to policy

*In this chapter we will examine more closely the transition between scenario building and policy formulation. What factors in the scenarios can be envisaged as having major consequences for policy formulation? What can scenarios be used for in public agencies? scenario building has two principal dimensions: one where pride of place is given to creative processes, working methods and new framework conditions for political planning processes and one associated with the content of the scenarios itself. Here we will primarily consider contribution of scenario thinking to strategy and policy formulation. The title of this chapter, “From scenarios to policy”, was chosen because we emphasize the focus on the whole political value chain. For a unit that works with scenarios, this means that the job cannot be regarded as finished once the scenarios have been written and can be found between the covers of a book.*

### 33.1 INTRODUCTION

The scenarios in *Norway2030* help us to discern new ranges of potential. The scenarios are based on different motive forces and development trends that we see the contours of today, and indicate what *might* happen during the next 20–30 years. There are several ways of creating such descriptions. The *Norway2030* group has chosen to create scenarios that represent five different social models. In the scenarios *Norvegia*, *Regio*, *Bonsai*, *Antagonia* and *Innova*, we are presented with descriptions of different visions of the potential development of factors such as national sovereignty and identity, industrial development and the labour market, urbanization, individualization and new communities, our relations with the EU and cultural diversity. The main elements of uncertainty in the scenarios, which are also of political and ideological character, concern aspects such as the relationship between state and market, national versus international orientation, collective versus individual responsibility and traditional versus innovative commercial and industrial development.

These are difficult and complex themes, which also have major political symbolic value. But the underlying conclusion, regardless of scenario and of what may happen in the future, is that we cannot simply choose the future society that we would like to have. On the other hand, in order to achieve social change, we must make choices, as individuals, enterprises and public agencies, and not least as politicians.

The other main conclusion highlighted by scenario work is that it is no longer possible to “steer” social developments, as we previously believed. Here, a number of factors play a part:

- Society has become more complex, which makes it more difficult to survey the effects of measures.
- Individualization, increased heterogeneity and the emergence of new communities have made it more difficult to understand and predict users’ needs.
- The increased pace of change entails constant changes of requirements and the continual adoption of technology and knowledge that the authorities and legislators had no way of predicting.

- Globalization and europeanization lead to the erasing of national boundaries and to a major reduction of autonomy, but it does not disappear completely.

Each of these factors on its own is important enough. Together, they give rise to a considerable increase in uncertainty as regards the planning of framework conditions and navigation in a new reality.

IT IS NOT THE JOB OF A GOOD SCENARIO PROCESS TO CONDUCT BUDGET-RELATED ASSESSMENTS AND DEFINE THE CONDITIONS FOR THE DISCUSSIONS THAT ARE TO LEAD UP TO AN EFFECTIVE AND DYNAMIC POLITICAL PLAN OF ACTION. THIS MUST BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS, POSSIBLY INVOLVING DIFFERENT ACTORS AND ARENAS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS IMPORTANT TO ARRIVE AT THE INTERNAL LINK BETWEEN SCENARIO BUILDING AND THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO REVEAL FACTORS IN THE SCENARIOS THAT *MAY* HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR POLICY FORMULATION AND EXECUTION. ONE WAY OF DOING THIS IS TO REFER TO THE POSSIBLE SHIFTS OF PERSPECTIVE DURING THE PERIOD FROM 2000 TO 2030 AS REGARDS THE LINES OF CONFLICT AND POLITICAL ISSUES THAT MAY CHARACTERIZE PUBLIC DEBATE. SUCH SHIFTS OF PERSPECTIVE MAY THEN DETERMINE THE CONDITIONS OF THE DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING NEW POLICY AREAS AND THEMES OF CONFLICT. AND IT DOESN'T STOP THERE; WHEN POLICY HAS BEEN DEFINED, THE TRADITIONAL QUESTION ARISES: HOW IS THIS POLICY TO BE IMPLEMENTED? IN THIS PHASE, THE PRECEDING SCENARIO PROCESS IS USEFUL TO HAVE TO FALL BACK ON. HERE A SOUND BASIS HAS BEEN LAID FOR IMPLEMENTATION SINCE MANY OF THE POLITICAL IDEAS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED, WHILE THE PROCESS EXPERIENCE CAN FUNCTION AS INPUT FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE. POLICY IS ALSO INTIMATELY RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION; AND "CHANGE COMPETENCE", OR KNOWING HOW TO EFFECTUATE CHANGES IS NOT SOMETHING THAT WE OUGHT TO LEAVE TO CHANCE OR "THE FUTURE".

Another way of using scenarios that we have chosen not to explore in depth here is to place oneself inside the scenario. Depending on one's own political preferences and value choices, one will then see that there are features of the scenario one would have preferred to avoid or other features that one would actually like to see occur. On the basis of this type of assessment, one may ask oneself the following questions:

- a) What political measures can be implemented to prevent the occurrence of undesirable features of a specific scenario?
- b) What political measures can be implemented to promote the development of desirable features of a specific scenario?

Corresponding questions can of course be applied to the whole scenario. This method can supply direct and immediate transfers to current political choices. The reason why we have chosen not to continue using scenarios in this way is that it requires first making a definite choice of political preferences, which we refrain from doing here. This is more suitable as a potential users' guide for readers and users of the scenarios, including politicians. This can be adopted as a theme for interactive follow-up seminars in the wake of the *Norway2030* project.

## 33.2 PREVIOUS CHANGES OF PERSPECTIVE

If today we review the political themes and discussions through the course of the previous century, there are, in addition to the many serious and important political debates, a number of issues that raise a smile. Some people may perhaps remember discussions they had when the telephone was introduced. Even in the USA, which is regarded as far more technology-friendly than Europe or Norway, there were great debates between journalists and intellectuals about whether this technology would lead to extensive illiteracy and indolence and that people would forget the art of writing letters. At the start of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it was forecast that horse dung would be a great problem in towns the world over. Ten years later the first cheap cars were on the market. In Norway we had similar discussions when colour television was introduced. Many people experienced this as an unnecessary luxury and an expression of growing decadence. Colour TV was forecast a rapid demise, and there were even those who advocated a cultural policy condemning this abomination. As far as we know, colour TV is still a trial arrangement in Norway's media landscape. It is certain that many people remember the discussions concerning the introduction of new telephone exchanges in Norway. The loss of jobs and depopulation of rural areas were part of the refrain that time.

Perhaps the current debates on globalization, outsourcing, genetic engineering and biotechnology, EU membership, etc. will also seem rather outmoded or silly one day when we look back? Several of the scenarios bring up the idea that in the future it may be less interesting to discuss issues such as state or market or suggest that we should either be part of a European/global political institutional community or remain Norwegian and "independent". The relationship between collective solutions and individualism must now be viewed more as mutually reinforcing than mutually exclusive. Equally high or low score on apparently opposing parameters in the scenarios' spider model show that in 2030 the perspective has largely shifted from an either-or logic to a both-and focus in relation to the cleavages that applied in the year 2000. Thus we see that nationalism and a strong international orientation may both be part of the same picture (cf. *Norvegia*) or both strong state and strong market (*Innova, Regio*). This both-and focus also contains a number of surprising elements, such as when the Norwegian peaceful diplomacy is coupled with a zero-tolerance policy and a fiercely national cultural policy, such as in *Norvegia*.

When we now move away from the scenario phase to the policy formulation discourse, we must make some choices. This applies both to the choice of working methods and the choice of perspectives in the scenarios that can function as input to budget and strategy discussions. The following presentation is therefore divided into two sections, where one is concerned with the scenarios' contribution to policy as a process while the

other focuses on the scenarios' contribution to policy content. The key terms throughout are “renewal”, “innovation” and “the will to change”.

### **33.3 THE SCENARIOS' CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY AS A PROCESS**

We should all attempt to comprehend the scope of the changes that are in process of taking place, and give some consideration to their possible outcome. However, this is not easy to accomplish in relation to our daily lives. It sometimes seems as if most of us are so carried away in the effort to become part of the new age that we lack the time and energy to reflect over where it will lead. This is enough in itself to legitimate scenario building as a working method.

Industrial development, organizational development, renewal, innovation, restructuring and modernization are all terms that arouse associations with change. Such terms express aims of achieving improvements to given situations. Within both the private and the public sector, this has long been a major priority. The new factor in recent years is perhaps the increased emphasis on the awareness of change and on the will to change. In the private sector, for example, one thinks in terms of concept-driven development work based on transnational concepts such as Total Quality Management (TQM), Just-In-Time logistics (JIT), Business Process Re-engineering (BPR) and others, while in the public sector expressions such as performance management, deregulation, public management reform, etc. are used.

Such concepts, whether private or public, are all associated with process philosophies. TQM, for example, must be viewed in connection with so-called quality circles, whereby teams of employees stop at intervals during the production process to monitor quality and consider measures for improving product and process quality. Quality thinking is also increasingly employed in the public sector. Regardless of the concepts adopted in connection with change work, supplementary arenas that go beyond purely operational tasks are a central element. Today there is broad agreement that establishments that wish to survive in the long term need arenas and fora both for identifying long-term challenges and for discussing development and improvement. The public sector, the ministries and the political institutional apparatus are no exception in this respect, and it is precisely as a tool for creating such arenas that scenario building can provide an interesting supplement to the current range of procedural instruments.

If the goal is to be better prepared for future challenges and not to allow oneself or one's establishment to be reduced to a mere adaptive organization that in a chameleon-like way only modifies itself in response to external stimuli, obstacles to change must be reduced. The scenario arena can be an important instrument in this context since the attention given to unrealized but latent phenomena makes it far more difficult to defend fundamentalist attitudes and to entrench oneself in standpoints that restrain establishments and organizations from innovation and restructuring. No-one can have a monopoly on perceptions of the future. It is therefore liberating in itself to participate in discourse about the future, since this often helps to break down the walls preventing communication between and within ministries, directorates and agencies and in municipalities and other administrative entities.

### **33.3.1 A NATIONAL CENTRE FOR FUTURE-ORIENTED STRATEGY AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT**

The ministries' organization and implementation of strategy and policy development work varies to a great extent and there are no joint guidelines or coordination between ministries or other areas of the public sector in such processes. Major savings and efficiency gains can therefore be made by gathering competence-building in this field in a horizontally coordinative body.

An interesting experiment would be to establish an institution with central competence in strategy and policy development that could function as a service centre not only for the ministries but also for other areas of the public sector, where core tasks should consist of developing suitable tools and operative assistance for implementing effective strategy and development processes for public agencies. Scenario building could be one of a number of such tools. Such a centre could report both to the Storting and to the Government. Our contact institution in Canada, the Policy Research Secretariat and Renewal Programme "La Releve"<sup>109</sup> functions according to such a pattern. The Canadian initiative is a joint venture funded by most of the ministries. Such an arrangement would also be conceivable in Norway. In order to follow up the above vision of the Minister of Labour and Government Administration, one of the main challenges for such a national centre would be the development of instruments at the central level that could contribute effectively to benign processes at the local level.

### **33.3.2 SCENARIO THINKING AS RENEWAL OF THE POLITICAL DEMOCRACY**

Scenario building can also provide an interesting supplement to the future institutional realization of political democracy.

Modern democracy has a glaring deficiency of dialogue concerning the issues most people experience as important for the future. Neither political parties nor traditional commissions and fact-finding committees seem capable of stimulating such debates. We are therefore tempted to give voice to an audacious idea; why not try using scenario thinking to revitalize political democracy?

*"If the current graphs are extended into the future, the last members will turn off the lights at the party offices in ten or fifteen years' time".* This prophecy was made by Erik Solheim, the former leader of the Socialist Left Party of Norway, when commenting on new figures showing an exodus from local politics and the parties. However, the response of party leaders was the same as it had always been; if only we can improve our ability to communicate and to clarify the differences between the parties, the voters and members are sure to return to the fold. Political parties today have difficulty in reaching the voters. The political arena has become an arena where the battles are no longer fought over political ideas or goals, but are more concerned with individual issues and "ownership" of various state instruments which mean little to the majority of people. Populist initiatives with their simple short-term content are more likely to attract

---

109 See <http://lareleve.leadership.gc.ca> for more information on this.

voters, appealing as they do to peoples feelings and having relevance for their daily lives. The turbulent political terrain, the media, the reduced public legitimacy and the budget apparatus work together to increase pressure on short-term, specific priorities, solutions and results. Paradoxically, there is a simultaneous increase in the need to think holistically and long-term in order to be able to stay at the forefront of developments. The parties need to formulate and communicate their messages in new ways – in pictures that most people can understand and relate to, thereby giving emotional access to long-term perspectives and visions.

Public confidence in political parties has weakened, not because people are less preoccupied with politics, but because the system seems still to be founded on the illusion that it is the responsibility of those who sit at the top to find solutions for the problems and challenges of society and of individual citizens. We all share responsibility for changing this situation.

A consequence of this is that the administrative apparatus must further develop its role as organizer and formulator of policy and visions. Scenario building can be of help in creating arenas for innovative thinking, strategic dialogue and communications between the administration and the users/citizens. The administrative apparatus may thus be transformed from a passive administrator of welfare policy to an active investor, enabling citizens to play a greater part in creating their own welfare.

## **33.4 THE SCENARIOS' CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY CONTENT**

It is not sufficient that scenario building provides us with something to think *with*. It is also important that it gives us something to think *about*. On the basis of the scenarios, it is possible to raise a number of interesting issues with direct relevance for policy content in the time ahead. We refer here both to the major contours and to more detailed policy perspectives.

### **33.4.1 THE MAJOR CONTOURS**

There are many possible variants of Norway in the year 2030. We have chosen to construct five such ranges of potential. If we examine the different scenarios more closely, we quickly gain the impression that globalization has adopted new and unfamiliar phases in all of the scenarios. Even *Norvegia*, which might easily be confused with traditional nationalism where ground has been gained by the forces opposing globalization, must be perceived as a result of further globalization. The combinations of nationalist rhetoric and policy with extensive international involvement would hardly have been possible unless the world had been both more uniform and also more open for specifically local, regional and national cultural and political forms of expression. In *Regio*, the dynamics of conflict between local and regional conditions on the one hand and the emergence of global institutions and cultural expressions on the other run a rather different course than they do in *Norvegia*. This manifests itself as radical changes of character in Norwegian urban communities and geographical regions. Here it is the conurbations that hold sway in close cooperation with their allies in other parts of the world, primarily in Europe. In *Bonsai* globalization underlies the minimal public sector. The extreme level of competitive tendering, market orientation and

liberalism described in this scenario, is only possible because policy is constructed on a radical deregulation regime which in its turn can only be viewed as probable on the basis of trends deriving from globalization. The same is the case in *Antagonia* and *Innova*. In *Antagonia*, a central role is played by immigration and the movement of manpower across national borders. In *Innova* industrial networks are linked together across traditional regional and national boundaries, while national authorities cooperate extensively with regional and global political institutions.

New technology plays a major role in most facets of technology. None of the scenarios takes a “back to nature” approach where major headway is made by those sceptical of technological developments. In spite of the partly catastrophic social developments described in *Biohazard* – our “wild card” – this is also the case here. In *Biohazard*, the cause of the crisis lies in the political handling of this technological development, not in the technology itself.

Both in chapter 2 and in the scenarios we touch on factors concerning individualization and the emergence of new communities. We see growing social mobility, such as in *Antagonia* and *Regio*. We must also assume clearer individual, social and economic rights to characterize societies such as *Innova*, *Bonsai* and *Regio*. Freedom of choice and self-realization have been strengthened in all the scenarios, thus placing greater demand on individual services, including those provided by the public sector. Such forms of individualization are reflected in child rearing, education, at the workplace, in consumption patterns and in the demand for welfare services. Individualization also gives rise to challenges concerning the construction of new community channels that may counteract excessive pressure on traditional values during a phase of moral transition. Organization of consumer interests is also envisaged in all the scenario societies, not least owing to increased education and improved personal economy. Such new communities may also arise out of cooperation on risk minimization in a society marked by increasingly greater risk. Below, we have listed some interesting issues associated with existing or potential political areas. These are a direct result of work on the scenarios.

### **33.4.2 DOPING AND GENE THERAPY**

In work on the scenarios it has become clear that the relationship between “nature” and “culture” is in process of changing. This change has in fact been in progress since the first beginnings of human settlement and agriculture, and the history of mankind concerns to a considerable degree the cultivation of nature to supply human needs. However the changes now in progress, which during the next decade will manifest themselves as major trends, are of such a nature that we may experience a quantum leap in this area.

Genetic therapy and other medical technologies can for example make it possible to radically enhance human performance within athletic disciplines. Whereas performance was previously increased by taking drugs such as anabolic steroids, it will soon be possible to undergo genetic therapy to increase muscle mass by simply coding the genes for increased muscle mass. It is doubtful whether the use of such medical technology can be traced. However this is not the only reason why it will be meaningless to use the term *doping* in connection with genetic therapy. Doping is usually understood as a way of enhancing performance by subjecting the body to external stimuli. Gene therapy



causes the body to increase its *own* performance, although in the first instance of course it involves an intervention with the body. In other words, gene therapy is both doping and not doping.

In top-level sports a great deal of money is involved and the contestants are risk-oriented. In the future, it may therefore become an enormous testing ground for gene therapy. However, the question will be what we mean by top-level sports. Today, sports still have public legitimacy as regards the perception of whether it really is the best athletes who win. If the sports science of the future decides that it is the people with the best genetic therapy who win, top-level sports will be qualitatively something quite different than it is today. Natural talent will mean less than access to technology.

How will the public sector relate to top-level sports? Should the state be involved in such a sector at all? The issue is clearly very complex. Sports have played an increasing part in national identity projects and devaluing their status would be no simple matter. World championships in numerous sports and events such as the Olympic Games are competitions between nations as much as they are competitions between individuals.

What role will be assigned to sport in the future, and what policy can the state adopt in this sector? These are complex questions.

### **33.4.3 HOUSING POLICY**

One of the major issues of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was housing policy. The struggle for a decent roof over one's head was a project that united collective and individual intelligence. The level of housing construction was particularly high during the first decades after 1945 while, towards the end of the century, it fell steeply. The intervention and responsibility of the public sector in this area was markedly reduced during the 1980s.

At the start of the new century there has been a sharp rise in demand for housing in urban areas. The demand for urban life has become relatively greater during the last 20 years, and is growing. However, not only the ongoing centralization but also increased immigration owing to the manpower shortage may once more result in greater prominence for the housing issue in the public sector debate.

Even by moderate population development estimates, we may witness an increase of between 500 000 and one million people in Norway by 2030. Very many of these people will settle in urban areas where there is already considerable pressure on housing. Moreover, we see that each individual Norwegian citizen occupies increasingly more space. A family of four no longer regards a living area of, say, 66 square metres as being adequate.

Increased mobility in the urban centres of the world also requires the structure of housing to be more flexible. People often need two dwellings, of different sizes and functions. The idea of owning one's own home is an important element of the modern Norwegian identity, but may also prove inadequate to satisfy some of the lifestyles that are currently developing. The family structure is also changing, which imposes new demands on the flexibility of the housing stock and on family policy.

These challenges are, both separately and collectively, extremely complex.

It must also be asked whether housing policy in its traditional form is still possible. It would hardly be realistic to think in terms of the measures adopted during the first post-war period since a number of circumstances have changed radically. New solutions are needed.

Perhaps one should consider the methods adopted by large towns and conurbations outside Norway. In Spain, the USA and the UK, large development companies sometimes cooperate on major housing projects involving all publicly owned land in a municipality. This enables the realization of economies of scale while meeting the requirements regarding social housing and capacity. Major urbanization plans are drawn up for such developments.

#### **33.4.4 ON DEMOCRACY**

Thomas Jefferson, one of the American founding fathers, did not regard representative democracy as sufficient. In his view, democracy would be better served by “making every citizen an acting member of government”. The introduction of ICT on a broad scale makes it theoretically possible to allow greater participation by citizens. Direct democracy is now a genuine possibility. It is conceivable that citizens could be given greater freedom to participate in preparing and voting over the various items on the fiscal budget, and to propose and adopt legislation. Referendums could be held more frequently and at very little cost.

However, representative democracy has a number of other functions. It ensures a certain quality control of political decisions, and the representatives’ access to information is also extensive owing to the considerable apparatus available to members of the Storting. It is also an arena that forces special interests to agree on a common standpoint.

Municipalities, county authorities and the central government can all use ICT to develop systems of government and democratic institutions that allow more steering by citizens and less by the politicians. Whether this would be a beneficial development can and should be discussed. The potential for changes in the form of democracy is at any rate enormous.

#### **33.4.5 THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET**

In today’s Norway a number of different schemes are designed to guarantee satisfactory subsistence to members of the population who for some reason fail to procure sufficient resources. Various social security schemes and social welfare benefits exist to provide adequate support. Nevertheless, a number of groups fall outside the current system.

Support schemes are often inequitable. For example, the basis for deciding the amount of social welfare benefit to be paid is in no small degree discretionary.

Students, pensioners, disabled people, unemployed people, drug and alcohol abusers, etc. are groups for which a number of different schemes apply. The factor they have in common is that they all depend on the state for their subsistence. Although some of them have paid pension insurance premiums throughout a long working life, most cases involve a degree of state support, and when this is not so, there are often strong demands that the state provide more assistance, as in the case of students and persons receiving the minimum pension.

A number of alternative proposals have been made for new schemes, often universal schemes such as citizens' pay. Roughly speaking, three different models for citizens' pay have been discussed:

- a) a benefit that would be paid to all citizens not in gainful employment and which would be the same for all recipients
- b) a benefit that would be paid to all citizens, regardless of whether they had other income
- c) a benefit associated with the introduction of flat tax. Citizens' pay would be granted to people whose income was lower than a certain amount.

These reforms would enable a major public apparatus to be scaled down, thus freeing many hands for other pressing tasks. However, they may well have other consequences, such as reducing incentives for taking gainful employment, and thus in the long term undermining individual welfare development.

These issues are extremely intricate, affect very many people and institutions and are moreover of considerable magnitude, measured in purely economic terms.

#### **33.4.6 CULTURE AND ART POLICY**

Culture has been one of the most eventful policy spheres of the last 30 years. As a result of applying the "extended concept of culture", sport and popular music have also been granted a place in budgets. In future, the sphere of cultural policy will be larger and more inclusive. Increased immigration may create extremely complex frameworks round the concept of culture. What, indeed, is the extended concept of culture intended to embrace? In the future, the term *culture* may no longer be meaningful, and we may have to begin referring to *cultures* in the plural. Immigration will change both the size and the identity of the Norwegian population. However, developments in the cultural sector will not be affected by these factors alone. The framework conditions will also be affected by new definitions of art and new perceptions of reality. Is graffiti art? Some say so today. Will many people share this view tomorrow? Or will this still be classified as a criminal activity in 2030? And what about tagging? What role should be played by art in spheres other than the purely artistic? In Norway, art and culture have many roles. One role is that of regional policy instrument. How will such a legitimation of art and culture function in the future?

As yet, Norway has no proper museum of modern life. The role of the museums of modern life is growing throughout Europe. They have become nodes, local and national centres that connect major cultural impulses to national arenas. A new form of publicity with its main points of reference within art and culture, painting, design, architecture and music is showing keen growth. Here we find commercial, artistic and political dimensions woven tightly together. It would be an interesting project to calculate the size and standard a new Norwegian museum of modern life would need to have in order to acquire a status in the European market for art, culture and recreation.

Cultural policy is undoubtedly one of the areas where there is in every respect greatest potential to create interesting and productive political processes and decisions.

### **33.4.7 CRIME AND VIOLENCE**

Crime is one of the phenomena that, historically speaking, has served a legitimating function for states, i.e. legitimating the use of force. Crime levels in Norwegian society have fluctuated with varying social conditions, and have also varied in terms of content and sphere of activity over time. As a result of the enormous social consequences of crime, coupled with the generally nonliberal attitude of the general public, the state today has a large set of instruments and considerable resources at its disposition in this field.

The crime picture is constantly changing, and in the future many conventional criminal acts, such as bank robbery, will become outmoded since money will only exist in electronic form. The more sophisticated character of digitization and surveillance systems will increase the frequency of other types of crime, such as electronic fraud.

Increased globalization provides new framework conditions for organized crime. Some markets, such as for smuggled liquor, may well disappear with the spreading harmonization of duty regulations, while others, such as smuggling of human organs, may show substantial growth.

Violent crime in Norway increased from 1950 to the 1980s but since then the situation has stabilized. Acceptance of violence among young people is on the wane. Whereas it was usual until the 1970s for boys to settle their quarrels with their bare fists, this behaviour is not considered acceptable today. In day care centres, concepts such as “indoor voice” and “outdoor voice” have become established and signal the degree to which a basically peaceful temperament has become the standard. Researchers into child and adolescent behaviour hold the view that a development is taking place today where violence is more than ever correlated with sociocultural status. Put more brutally; the poorer you are, the more disposed you are to violent behaviour.

Paradoxically, the scale of penalties for violence reflects only to a small degree the decline in society’s understanding for this type of behaviour.

Crime in all its forms challenges the state’s legitimacy and is one of the most important political arenas.

### **33.4.8 LABOUR MARKET AND INTEGRATION POLICY**

In one of the scenarios, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration is merged with the Public Employment Service, and immigration policy becomes a function of manpower needs. At the same time, the Ministry of International Development is made the appeal body, particularly in cases where violations of fundamental human rights are used as an argument when seeking asylum.

The background for this idea is that labour immigration will gain ground because it is necessary to meet the needs of the labour market. What form would such a development be likely to take? Will it happen on a large scale with open borders or in the form of commuting? Will specific sectors be favoured, e.g. health care and care of the elderly? Will specific countries be favoured? Will active help be offered by the authorities?

In a more globalized world, migration between countries is part of the prevailing order. Increased mobility is one of the ingredients of the modern economy. At the same time, there seems to be public opposition to immigration. The development of political

and social processes to help us deal with these challenges is one of the biggest tasks facing Norwegian society.

### **33.4.9 THE INNOVATION GAP**

As a result of perspectives such as those that come to the fore in *Innova*, the role of the state may be envisaged as taking a more innovative direction. Is it possible to conceive of new types of interface between government and industry permitting a public stake in future-oriented and long-term industrial sectors? Would this mean that the term “industry neutrality”, though not abolished, could be redefined from its “hands-off”, corrective function to a proactive instrument that could be used to steer the processes involving both industrial players and politicians when they position themselves for development of new sectors, and products or services? Is it possible to envisage an innovative civil service, i.e. a public sector entirely pervaded with innovation and creativity?

It is tempting to coin the term “*innovation gap*” when contemplating Norwegian society. Previous scenario projects were preoccupied with reform lag in the public sector. It is perhaps equally interesting to view the private and public sectors in a more holistic perspective and to point out that *both* private and public sectors in Norway can be seen as subject to innovation lag or gap compared with a number of other countries. The issue that should be raised in political quarters is “how does one go about filling this innovation gap?”.

The idea of establishing innovation centres is interesting. These are envisaged as active links between industry, product development and research. A typical example is the design centres. Such a centre functions by awarding a number of stipends to designers, who are then allowed to develop products they believe in, of which they are able to make prototypes and complete small series.

The centres are able to provide legal competence, procurement coordination, network-building and marketing as well as organizational and financial help for setting up a board of directors, etc.

Industrial concerns are then invited to participate in and contribute input to the development projects they see potential in. These centres can help to increase the size and profitability of the Norwegian furniture industry, and create a world-wide reputation for Norwegian designers. The public sector can also become a customer of one or more such innovation centres that focus on the innovative dynamism within public agencies.

### **33.4.10 A TAXATION SYSTEM ADAPTED TO REGIONALIZATION**

In one of the scenarios, the taxation system is adapted to a regional model. All VAT goes to the state, all property tax goes to the municipalities and all other taxes, such as income tax and wealth tax go to the regions. All levels decide themselves whether to levy taxes and, if so, at what rates. This is one way of thinking about taxation, but not the only one. However, in federations of states, there are often big differences in tax rates from state to state. In a future regional Norway, the different regions might wish to have varying levels of ambition for welfare services, and this would be reflected in the rates of taxation.

### **33.4.11 POLICY FOR DEALING WITH EXISTENTIAL CRISES**

In several of the scenarios we have brought up ethical, cultural and socio-political problems in connection with the emergence of biotechnology and genetic engineering. We have suggested that our conceptions of “natural” and “artificial” may change a great deal in years to come. Not only will we experience a shift of the boundaries between what we perceive as natural and artificial; there is also a danger that the distinctions as such may be permanently damaged. When this calls into question the innermost human points of reference to the outside world, it also touches on a potential need for development of a government policy for “managing human self-reorganization in relation to the world”, which this is really an expression of. Specific initiatives here might include extensive state-run philosophy seminars, support for R&D projects that develop a broadly based, secular ethical approach and establishment of counsellors for the culturally confused.

### **33.4.12 PENSION AND MEDICAL BONUS REFORM**

The concept of a pension and medical bonus reform is presented in the scenarios. This scheme is used to coordinate pension payments and the use of medical services. It involves collection of pension and medical bonus points by all citizens throughout their lives. The points awarded vary according to the individual’s input during his or her years of employment. These points can be paid out directly in the form of money or they can be used to purchase different types of medical treatment that are not strictly life-saving. Saving of lives is a purely public responsibility (cf. the state-owned company, NorwayLifeSave.com). Most people use most of their bonus points to purchase different forms of genetic therapy, joint surgery, home help and plastic surgery. Such an idea may be worth further political development.

### **33.4.13 THE NEW CIVIL SERVICE**

The ministerial sector may be subjected to an almost infinite number of changes in the time ahead. One radical proposal involves organizing the ministerial sector in four ministries, a Ministry of Defence, a Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, a Ministry of Finance and Industry and a Ministry of Education. Supervisory responsibilities traditionally looked after by the directorates could now be handled by private inspectorates. This conforms for example with the so-called Veritas model, whereby responsibility for supervision and inspection is contracted out to one or more private companies, either limited companies or foundations. Another idea worth considering involves converting a number of former directorates to such companies or foundations, which all have the word “inspectorate” in their title. The Directorate of Education, the Directorate of Taxes and the Police Directorate are among the few that survive. What about personnel policy? Might it be expedient to make all employees of state agencies direct employees of the state so that they can at any time be moved to the place in the system where they are most in demand? Why not abolish permanent tenure altogether for state employees? Most employees could be attached to projects. In work on the various reports and recommendations, it might be an idea to set up several competing teams, where the winning team is extremely well rewarded. Rather than “*no cure, no pay*”, the rule could be “*no cure, another way*”, i.e. the losers are immediately assigned other responsibilities. Even tasks such as legislation control and consideration of applications could be organized in such a way. Would it be an idea to introduce a

system of incentives to encourage a greater exchange of employees between the public and private sectors, where a normal career encompasses working in both the private and the public sector?

#### **33.4.14 COMPETITIVE TENDERING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR**

In *Bonsai*, we take the concept of radical competitive tendering to the extreme, resulting in the practical disappearance of the “public sector”. A minimized central government such as that described in *Bonsai* coordinates all schemes that regulate private and civil activities in a way that brings about a kind of correspondence between the interests of the private sector and those of society. Another way of looking at this is to consider competitive tendering as an instrument for effectuating an extensive functional shift in the responsibilities of the “public sector”. If this social model is viewed as attractive, policy in today’s Norway should be radically restructured. However, this has major consequences for our attitudes to privatization and competitive tendering. On the other hand, policy must support measures aimed at developing an effective competition policy that will prevent privatization from resulting in the replacement of the state monopoly by a private monopoly. Owing to the Norwegian demographic and industrial structure and other factors, the number of private suppliers is often extremely restricted, and pure competitive tendering or privatization would therefore not necessarily lead to the expected result.

#### **33.4.15 POLICY FOR CULTURE, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY**

What kinds of change in family structure can we expect and kind of policy will such changes entail? Families reflect the society of which they are part, and we expect to see the development of a quite different community. In the following, we briefly address four factors in this context associated with biotechnology and immigration.

##### **Status**

People live increasingly heterogeneous lives. Owing to increased specialization in society and in the economy, they act more on behalf of themselves than on behalf of a group or class, resulting in a greater diversity of experience. A clear result of this development is that schemes previously created for groups no longer function. One way of solving this problem is to juridify a greater number of the rights of individual citizens, thus raising them out of the purely political sphere.

##### **Children**

Children are given higher status, not as family members, but as independent legal persons. They are assigned separate rights and separate institutional frameworks.

##### **Biological independence**

There is already increasing acceptance for the view that real parent status does not require biological parentage. There is considerable growth in the number of lesbians who become pregnant with the help of donors, and the pressure to allow lesbians and homosexuals to adopt will succeed. We must assume that it will become normal for people in this group to have children. We will then witness that the definition of *sibling* will have nothing at all to do with biology for a large group of people.

Biotechnological research has made considerable progress, and all human genetic material will soon be mapped. This paves the way for completely new medical strategies for combating diseases such as cancer and heart disease, which may increase life expectancy far more than Statistics Norway forecasts in its projections. Moreover, pure genetic manipulation of the ageing gene will be a factor that will not only increase life expectancy, but will also slow the pace of ageing. Not least, there will be a rise in the maximum age for women to give birth.

If the regulations are relaxed, there will be a major increase in adoption, organization of adoption will be professionalized and the ideological and moral foundation for adoption more widely disseminated. In our view, increased adoption is a logical consequence of further privatization of moral responsibility. Not least, it may become usual to adopt children from areas affected by war, where there are large numbers of orphans.

### **Immigration**

If the rate of immigration continues to be high, the family patterns of the immigrants will become more dominant. There is a hypothesis that immigrants resemble us more when they have been here for two or more generations. They acquire our habits and gradually also our fertility rate. There is a lot of truth in this, but it is also true that continued high immigration has the opposite effect and, perhaps most important of all, permitting family reunification delays such normalization.

Growth of the foreign element of the population resulting from higher mobility in the labour markets and increased immigration will increase the importance of English as a common language for these groups.

### **What are the consequences for the public sector?**

If people live increasingly different lives and make different demands on the public sector, what might the consequences be? It may prompt the public sector to develop schemes that are either more rights-based through pure juridification or that operate with more flexible frameworks where the content is defined by individual citizens. An example is increased cash transfers to citizens.

We envisage a development where children are granted stronger rights. Families will belong to the children, and exist for their sake. The current debate concerning responsibility for childcare in connection with a divorce is a case in point. Parents' rights are in process of being adjusted downwards in favour of children's. Children and adolescents will for example be granted greater power in relation to the teaching manpower at their disposal, the type of recreation facilities the municipality or urban district shall give priority to, etc. In the municipalities, special sectors have been designated to deal with the needs of young people growing up. Measures of this kind may gain widespread support. A separate ministry has been devoted to all aspects of growing up, and coordination of the political responsibility will lie here.

If extended families become more usual as a result of increased immigration, new problem areas will come to light. More care needs may be solved in the home, which would ease the pressure on the public sector. However, our insight into the inner lives of these families may be poorer, and they probably interact less with the world at large,



which reduces the role of the public sector in their lives. Protective measures may therefore be difficult to establish.

What will happen if there is an increase in the age difference between children and parents in the traditional nuclear family? We envisage cases where the parents stay at home during the day because they are already pensioners when their children are born.

- a. Will this reduce the need for external childcare (provided there is no increase in the retiring age)?
- b. Healthy grandparents may provide a similar resource for many families.
- c. The need for specialized public services increases owing to increases in the general health differences.
- d. Parents' competence and knowledge will (all else being equal) be proportional to their age.

If there is an increase in the number of international families, where the parents are from different countries, the public sector will be required to provide more information in English. It may therefore become a statutory requirement that all public documents and information are available in English.

If there is an increase in the number of families with adopted children (and if the number of refugee children increases), this could lead to an increase in the number of children suffering from mental traumas and emotional wounds. These children need more extensive and more expensive facilities than most other children.

### **33.4.16 ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY**

#### **The increased need for competence and new career pathways**

The developments now taking place within public administration and services, not least concerning the ministries' role as secretariat for the political leaders, require new working methods and organizational structures to supplement and partly replace the hierarchical model. Improved competence and new categories of competence will also be needed in order to handle new types of task. At the same time, we must anticipate that employees will make much greater demands on the workplace. The competition for qualified manpower will by all appearances be intensified. Nor can the state count on many of its employees remaining in the civil service throughout their working lives.

In responding to this situation, the administration must employ many instruments. Not least, it will be important to further develop one of the public administration's major assets, its ability to offer professionally interesting and qualifying assignments. An important aim in this connection will be to develop contacts and working methods across sector and agency boundaries since this will bolster up the academic development of individual employees and contribute to a more attractive professional environment.

Another instrument involves facilitating new career pathways which take into account the consequences of employees' increased mobility. One way of achieving this is to create career pathways that cut across sector and agency boundaries. For example, a common promotional ladder for senior officials in all (or most) ministries, similar to the pattern followed by the *senior civil service* in the United Kingdom. This would entail

that civil servants were not employed by specific ministries but by ministries in general, with the possibility of periodical transfer, as in the Swedish Government Office (Svenska Regeringskansliet), which embraces all ministries.

More selectively designed career pathways can also be envisaged both at advisory and senior management levels on the basis of political areas that overlap ministry boundaries and cross the boundaries between ministries and directorates. Promotion can be made dependent on experience from one of the other units sharing the same promotional ladder. An obvious example is administration policy, which, as well as the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration and the Norwegian Directorate of Public Management (Statskonsult), also affects the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development. Another example is policy at the intersection between social welfare benefits, social security and unemployment. Here the Ministries of Local Government and Regional Development, Health and Social Affairs and Labour and Government Administration are all involved in addition to a number of subordinate agencies.

Such a development in the direction of regarding central government employees as a common personnel resource would reduce the impression of mobility as a loss for individual agencies. It would also reduce territorial thinking in the relationship between the ministries, and thus help to facilitate better coordination, while making it easier to encourage a more holistic approach to competence-building. An obstacle to such a development is a long tradition for independent, coordinate ministries, a tradition which also applies to the personnel area. However, if the ministries are left to deal with the competence challenge separately, they will in many cases be too small and homogeneous to be able to offer a sufficiently broad range of development potential.

### **33.5 SUMMARY**

Scenario building can contribute a great deal to policy formulation both as a working method in itself and by virtue of its potential to provide both interesting and original elements for future policy development. As a reader of this book, you are free to apply these thoughts and ideas to your own scenario processes with separate and perhaps different objectives than those that have characterized *Norway2030*. Finally, we will say a little about the practical approaches we have followed in *Norway2030*.

## 35 CHAPTER 10

# 36 Perspectivist scenario development in practice

## 36.1 PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES IN NORWAY•2030

## 36.2 START AND PROJECT PHILOSOPHY

Although many of the ideas associated with perspectivist scenario building were already in place at the start of the process, this approach is largely a result of reflections over and experience with the process as it has progressed. Perspectivist scenario building is thus to a great extent an experiential concept and an innovative result of the process of trial and error that has characterized *Norway2030*. In order that others may benefit from the experience we have gained, we will here give an account of what we have done as we have gone along, and why this is viewed as extremely successful by those who have participated and by those who are familiar with the project.

## 36.3 PREPARATIONS

The point of departure for the project was the need to try out new methods and techniques in the work on identifying future challenges in the administrative policy area. Forecasts and projections have made and continue to make a valuable contribution, but nevertheless lack the dimensions and diversity fostered by the scenario tradition. It was therefore decided that scenario techniques would be tried out in this work. In spring 1998, a small group attached to the Department of Administration Policy at the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration visited a number of international environments such as those of Finland, Canada, Denmark, OECD-IFP and the EU president's advisory body *Cellule de prospective* (Forward Studies Unit). These visits motivated the members of the scenario group so much that we invited several of the persons we met to the project's start conference and workshop in the last half of June the same year (1998). The project group prepared an extensive project outline and sent out an invitation to participate in the project, and in the conference and workshop. The title of the conference, "The Use of Futures Studies in Public Management Reform", reflected the main intention of the project. The scenario process must be designed in such a way that it can be included as a reform measure in itself. In this respect, the process was at least as important as the thematic result itself. The target group for the conference was primarily made up of employees of the ministries and of the Ministry of Labour and Government Administration's own directorates, Statskonsult (the Norwegian Directorate of Public Management), the Norwegian Central Information Service and the Directorate of Labour.

The large response to both the conference and the workshop helped to establish the project both at home and abroad. During the ensuing period, the project was presented to members of the Government and, following consideration by two government conferences in September the same year, the project was established as a government project. During the period between September and November the project team prepared the establishment of the four thematic working groups that were to carry out the first phase of the project. Some agencies were very active, sending as many as four delegates, while others, such as the Ministry of Transport and Communications, did not participate directly in the working groups, but received all the material that was produced and responded with feedback while work was in progress. The invitation was left open, while emphasizing that participation was voluntary.

Voluntariness was important since this underlies the philosophy of the project. Briefly, this philosophy entails that all participants take part on their own terms, i.e. they do not represent a minister or typical current political interests. They all take part as individuals with their personal experience and professional qualifications. This was viewed as an important precondition for achieving a successful scenario process. Fifteen ministries formally agreed to participate, and four working groups were established with between 12 and 18 members in each group.


A total of approximately 70 people from ministries and directorates were involved in the first phase of the project, which is relatively unusual in central government administration projects. This enabled the realization of valuable synergy effects across ministry boundaries, allowed many employees of different ministries the opportunity for first-hand experience of this type of process and established “long-term future” as a legitimate concept for many people. *Scenario learning* is a key term for the process that took place in the working groups.

Efforts were made to establish the following attitudes in the project:

- Each project member should represent himself only, and not his minister.
- There are no “right answers”, although we must make priorities.
- The work in working groups is to be based on free intellectual exchange of views.
- The project shall be a free zone from traditional ministerial structures.
- No contributions are “meaningless” (as long as they are fairly grammatical), “uninteresting” or “far-out”.
- “Silly” questions are allowed. “Silly” questions that problematize the emperor’s clothes are actually regarded as desirable.
- Positioning and “special interest representation” should be avoided.
- Concise written contributions may be submitted.


The project was divided into two phases, where the first phase consisted of the work in working groups. All working groups were chaired by staff members of the project team. Altogether nine half-day meetings were held in each of the working groups in addition to some two-day seminars. Working groups started in late November 1998 and completed their work almost exactly one year later. The topics for working groups reflected a fairly typical academic classification within social sciences, particularly

sociology. The topics taken as the point of departure were “globalization”, “economic adaptability”, “culture, values and social patterns” and “social organization and democratic challenges”. Group participation was on the whole satisfactory, although some group members were unable to participate in all of the meetings. An evaluation after this phase confirmed that most people found participation to have been both very informative and stimulating.



**PHASE I**


(Nov. 98)



**PHASE II**

(Nov.99)

(Dec.00)



**36.4**

**36.5 PHASE I: PROCEDURES WE FOLLOWED IN THE WORKING GROUPS**

As a preparation for the first meeting, an initial memorandum was produced for each of the groups. The intention of this was to outline the most important concepts and professional perspectives and say something about the procedure. The first meeting was used to go through this memorandum. In addition to this, a scenarized creativity exercise was carried out where all the participants were required to make a list of events and situations they believed, feared or hoped would play a part in Norwegian society in 2030. The participants were then asked to assess the significance and probability of each prediction. Methodologically, emphasis was deliberately placed on eliciting and documenting what the participants regarded as improbable events and situations. This session was intended to function purely as an introduction to scenario thinking, and the result formed the basis of an interesting self-assessment discussion on the process dynamics of the project. On the basis of the assumption that successful scenario processes also affect the participants in the sense that they give rise to new perspectives, we planned that they would assess whether factors that they had regarded as improbable at the start of the process would be accorded the same status in a new review towards the end of the project. The thesis was that much that was experienced as extremely

unrealistic and improbable would appear considerably more probable and plausible at the end of the project period.

We were proved right! In the evaluation we conducted in relation to a selection of the participants in the late summer of 2000, we found that altogether 62 per cent of what the participants had defined as extremely improbable was now viewed as probable or even extremely probable. Particularly predictions concerning the social consequences of biotechnology and genetic engineering changed character radically as work progressed. We have many examples that give evidence of this. For example, we initially regarded the idea of an embryo pool and of parents being able to choose the sex of their offspring as somewhat improbable even 30 years ahead. This was not only put to shame by further ideas about what might happen within 20–30 years. It transpired that we had been extremely conservative even in relation to our own times, for in autumn 1999 the authorities of Virginia, USA decided that parents should have the right to choose the sex of their own offspring. Another even more relevant example is our assumption concerning the abolition of county authorities. In the scenarios we estimated that this would take place around the end of the first decade of the new century. However, on the basis of the policy of the Government and Storting at the end of the year 2000, this is likely to happen much sooner.

After this introductory exercise, we attempted to break down the thematic field to a set of actors and factors. During the first 2–3 meetings, all the groups had produced a ranked list of *actors and factors* (A&F). The next meetings were used to develop a set of 5–6 *mini-scenarios* for each of these variables (actors/factors). After producing the sets of A&Fs with their respective mini-scenarios, we started the first scenario-building processes. The challenge now consisted of creating various combinations of selected mini-scenarios across all factors and actors in order to arrive at different holistic scenario pictures for the respective thematic areas.

This part of the scenario-learning phase was defined as the “cyclic phase” because we could not conceive of the development from A&F via mini-scenarios to combinations and holistic scenario pictures as being linear. In fact, it involved several rounds, where the combination of mini-scenarios gave rise to the need for new A&Fs and/or mini-scenarios, which provided a basis for new factors in the scenarios, etc. This cyclic process lasted throughout this phase and resulted in an internal interim report involving twenty so-called *partial scenarios*, five in each of the four thematic areas. They were referred to as partial scenarios in order to distinguish them from the *main scenarios* which are the end product of the whole process, and are the scenarios given in this book. When we refer to the first phase as the scenario learning phase, this is primarily because we aim to demonstrate how scenario building can function positively in relation to learning and understanding. This was also the reason why we adopted such a broad approach.

Each of the actors and factors is assigned four to six such mini-scenarios. The mini-scenarios are brief texts of between one-quarter and half a page that express a hypothetical future status for each of the selected variables (A&Fs). This approach was chosen in order to elicit as many alternatives and potential courses of development as possible. We knew by experience that finding two or three, and sometimes as many as four such alternatives was not so difficult. The greatest challenge was the fifth

alternative because this involved really racking our brains and exerting ourselves to try and think of something new and different about the individual variable. This “element of force” has clearly contributed to achieving a positive result so far.

Some actors and factors have no mini-scenarios. This does not mean that these have not been taken into consideration in the design of the partial scenarios. At a point in the process, we decided not to continue working on the mini-scenario documents, but instead to take thoughts and ideas around these variables directly into the partial scenarios. On the other hand, there are certainly a number of factors we have not been able to relate to in this mini-scenario collection. We feel nevertheless that we can vouch for our choice of perspectives and selection of variables. As a famous philosopher once said, “You can’t tell the whole story...”

In order to approach a systematization of the infinity of ideas, we have created a system for classifying the mini-scenarios on the basis of combinations of letters and numbers. The logic is as follows:

Working groups are coded respectively with **WGI**, **WGII**, **WGIII** and **WGIV**. The variables are further divided into Actors (**A**) and Factors (**F**), which in their turn are numbered. In addition, each of the variables (actors or factors) is “fertilized” by between four and six mini-scenarios. These are coded with the letters **a, b, c, d, e and f**. A specific mini-scenario for an actor in working group III will therefore be assigned the code **WGIII-A1c**. This designates the third mini-scenario for the first actor (media) in the working group on culture, values and social patterns. So it continues until the last factor for working group four on social organization and democratic challenges.

The mini-scenarios were written and assigned to the respective factors and actors according to the above designations. To illustrate this, we use the actor USA as an example. Here you can see how we documented the relationship between A&Fs and mini-scenarios:

**USA**      **WGI-A1**

**WGI-A1a:**    *The USA remains a major economic power*

The USA remains a major economic power. At the same time, economic and technological progress in other parts of the world results in the development of several economic major powers/entities at an equivalent or higher level (4–5). The USA’s technological hegemony has been weakened or no longer exists. This has weakened the USA’s potential for maintaining its military and political world dominance. There is therefore an increased need to base central issues concerning security and peace on international consensus.

**WGI-A1b:**    *Erosion of the USA’s relative world hegemony*

An erosion of the USA's relative world hegemony has occurred, as described in mini-scenario No. 1. However, in this case, the USA has not succeeded in adapting its approach to international relations to the new situation. This increasingly seriously hampers international multilateral cooperation, resulting in a setback in the USA's cooperation with other major regional actors (APEC, EU). The USA succeeds in maintaining good relations with countries where it has historically had a strong position (Norway, Latin-American countries, etc.).

**WGI-A1c:** *Increasing economic and social differences*

Increasing economic and social differences and increasing conflicts between black and white Americans and between "traditionalists" and "modernists" have undermined the stability and social glue in the USA. This increases the country's self-centredness, and its international involvement is considerably reduced, sporadically and unpredictably. Involvement in Europe is de-escalated. The same applies to the Asian arena. There is continued involvement in Latin-American countries.

**WGI-A1d:** *Maintenance of hegemony*

The USA's power policy and military hegemony is maintained, despite the relative reduction of its economic and technological status. Owing to the country's military potential, it continues to set the international power policy agenda to a great extent. Its role as "world police" is maintained, despite some military setbacks. Unilateral military action is still carried out in areas where the USA views its interests as threatened.

When reading such mini-scenarios it is important to be aware that they largely reflect the discussions in working groups, and we chose not to censor these. This means that both quality and originality vary considerably both between working groups and between the different variables. These mini-scenarios were the point of departure for the development of the partial scenarios described in the report submitted by the working groups (Ministry of Labour and Government Administration, 2000).

**Stages in the project development in phase I:**

Phase I – Scenario learning in the working groups:

1. prepare a *good composition* of working groups
2. discuss *initial memorandum* and fundamental issues
3. identify actors, factors and important motive forces – long list
4. assess and rank actors and factors (*probability/significance ranked as High (H), Medium (M) or Low (L)* – HH (High probability, High significance, HM, HL, LH, etc. (Significance is relative to the significance of the topic under investigation)



### Questions:

1. **How significant is this A or F for this area?**
2. **How probable is it that this A or F will be part of the social picture in the year 2030/2010?**
  
5. develop between four and six *mini-scenarios*/development paths for each actor/factor
  - point of departure in specialist literature, existing projections or trends
  - breakdown exercise and critical assessment
  - *input* from external contributors, research, politics, media, etc.
  - *creativity process* among the participants of the project group
6. assess and rank mini-scenarios (*probability/significance assessment ranked as High (H), Medium (M) or Low (L)* – HH (High probability, High significance, HM, HL, LH, etc.)) (Significance is relative to the significance of the topic under investigation)

### Questions:

1. **What significance will this event/development path have for this area of work (I–IV)?**
2. **How probable is it that it will occur?**
  
7. *schematize* relationship between factors/actors and respective development paths (mini-scenarios)
8. write accounts of mini-scenarios in relation to actors & factors
9. *visualize* partial scenario combinations
10. write accounts of partial scenarios and prepare additional chapters

The period between meetings three and eight was defined as the so-called “cyclic phase”, where the work on all tasks, including the development of partial scenarios, started in meeting four and continued until meeting eight. Work in the working groups resulted in an internal report that documented both the process and the results.

### **36.5.1 ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROCESS WITH THE HELP OF THE RESULTS OF THE GLOBALIZATION GROUP (WORK GROUP 1)**

The following is a list of the most central creative/operative actors and factors used in the development of partial scenarios in the area *globalization*. Factors are structural, passive variables, while actors are intentional organizations at various levels, in some cases people. Some variables, such as nation-state, can, according to how they are viewed, be placed in both variable categories. Mini-scenarios are, independently of probability, possible outcome values of specific variables in a 30-year perspective. The constructed data matrix that is thus produced constitutes the basis for the building of partial scenarios with regard to global development.

#### **Actors**

1. **USA**
2. *Russia*
3. **China**
4. *Japan*
5. *India*
6. *Other Asian countries*
7. *Africa*
8. *EU*
9. *NATO*
10. *Other transnational regions than the EU*
11. **Global institutions: OPEC, WTO, UN, etc.**
12. *Interest organizations*
13. *Technological “knowledge pools”/regions*
14. *Individuals*
15. *Sociocultural and political movements*
16. *Multinationals*
17. *Criminal organizations*

#### **Factors**

1. *Globalization*
2. *Internationalization*
3. *Network structures*
4. *Human rights*
5. *Sociocultural and political structures*
6. **Science and technology**
7. *Inequalities and distortions in resource distribution*
8. **Nation-state**
9. *Global environment and climate development*
10. *Migration/emigration*
11. *Epidemics*

*12. Individualization*

*13. Organization of working life*

The factors and actors we have selected to illustrate the process are in bold italics. We represent this schematically in the form of the following six tables. The scenarios represent different variants of combinations of mini-scenarios for this selection of actors and factors.

**GLOBALIZATION – Work group I**  
(mini-scenarios for five selected actors and factors)

USA CHINA GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NATION-STATE

## **GLOBALIZATION WGI: Partial scenario 1 – THE WORLD GOVERNMENT**

The elements that constitute the content of the scenario are the shaded mini-scenarios below. The differences between the scenarios are primarily based on the variations in combinations of different mini-scenarios across actors and factors. In this respect, the partial scenario “World government” is a combination of mini-scenarios b for the actor USA, a for CHINA, b for GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS, c and e for SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY and a and c for NATION-STATE.

USA   CHINA      GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS      SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY      NATION-STATE

## **GLOBALIZATION WGI: Partial scenario 2 – MARKETING WORLD**

USA      CHINA      GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS      SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY      NATION-  
STATE

## GLOBALIZATION WGI: Partial scenario 3 – MEGAREGIONS

USA      CHINA      GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS      SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY      NATION-  
STATE

## GLOBALIZATION WGI: Partial scenario 4 – GENOISM

USA      CHINA      GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS      SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY      NATION-  
STATE



## **GLOBALIZATION WGI: Partial scenario 5 – DISINTEGRATING DEMOCRACY**

USA      CHINA      GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS      SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY      NATION-  
STATE

## 36.6 PHASE II: SCENARIO STUDY

The final phase was more reminiscent of a *scenario study*. A small group of people further developed the material from the first phase with a view to creating a book and a report. It is the results of this that you now have in your hands. It is particularly because of the need to think in dimensions, time perspectivism and our clarified relations between scenario building and the planning and strategy process that we now needed to go beyond the pure “shaping actors, shaping factors” approach to what we now call *perspectivist scenario building*.

The point of departure for phase II was a set of four times five partial scenarios, a very extensive collection of mini-scenarios and a bundle of memoranda with professional perspectives. In addition to this, we were left with a first-hand experience of an enjoyable, extensive and experimental scenario development process.

The challenge now was to sew all of these elements together to create five final scenarios. Already initially we were in agreement that this process would necessarily be different than the first phase. This phase was therefore called the scenario study phase. Here a smaller group of people went through the material to put together five new scenarios. Compared with phase I, this part of the project work was more restricted. Apart from a few media initiatives and a number of lectures, the work on the scenarios was now concentrated around a small number of people working closely together.

We who were involved in this process took as our starting point some of the most interesting mini-scenarios and started developing five separate main ideas that the scenarios could be built around. The ideas were discussed completely freely, and the group was really free to start at the beginning again. However, since all members of the group had been involved from the start, we did not of course do this. Nevertheless, the feeling of having a free hand was decisive for the outcome of the process. If the report-writing group had been bound by the existing material, the job of cutting and pasting the existing pieces of text from the partial scenarios and mini-scenarios into the new scenarios would have been much more problematical than it actually was. However, the job was difficult enough. Although we started the writing process almost at rock-bottom as far as text was concerned, input, ideas and text from the mini-scenarios and partial scenarios were used to a certain extent, not least because they represented interesting angles and ideas. The first drafts bore considerable evidence of the cut-and-paste process.

Further work consisted of developing a good disposition to structure the scenarios and two of the other chapters in a uniform way. This also made the writing process somewhat easier. During the final period, the work consisted mainly of further development and “polishing” of the scenarios. It is also clear that, in that respect, the work was never completely finished. This is not in itself anything new, and can also be viewed in relation to the main philosophy of “Norway2030” which, put briefly, consists of the acknowledgement that these scenarios should never be viewed as the solution to anything, but rather as creative and useful input to scenario and strategy processes started by other agencies and institutions.

After a couple of months, enough work had been done on the draft to send it out on a preliminary consultation round. A chapter on history and methodology and five draft scenarios were sent to a total of 70 people from research institutions, industry, the municipal sector, other areas of the public sector and government administration in particular. Many of these were people from other ministries who had been involved in the first phase of the process. The feedback was so positive that we felt on secure ground when we invited publishers to tender for the job of publishing a book.

The dispositions for the individual scenarios were made on the basis of the following common template:

## SUMMARY – THE SITUATION IN 2030

### SCENARIO ACCOUNT

#### WHAT HAPPENED?

Economy

Industry and working life

Environment and energy

Culture and social conditions

### PUBLIC SECTOR IN THIS SCENARIO

Identity, politics and systems of government

Administration and structure

Organization and instruments

### POSTSCRIPT BY THE SOCIAL HISTORIAN 2030

The basic structure otherwise in the scenarios moves from the “relatively secure” to the very great uncertainties.

1. “Facts”
2. Probable motive forces – to be included in all scenarios (high significance, high probability)
3. Fundamental uncertainties – to be included in the basic structure of the scenarios
4. Varying motive forces – to be included only in one or two scenarios
5. Background material – probable motive forces, but of less significance
6. Possibilities – to be considered excluded from the scenarios

Examples of the first are demographic data, population statistics and geographical factors. Probable motive forces may be factors such as population growth, elderly boom, development towards more and smaller households (single person households), etc. Fundamental uncertainties may vary in relation to phenomena such as the development of negotiations concerning new and binding climate agreements, the

structure of negotiations in working life, innovation capacity, the industrial structure of the Norwegian economy, the relationship between state and municipality and the role of the county authorities, the development of new forms of production and organization, developments in Europe and in our neighbouring countries, political framework conditions for energy-consuming industries. Varying motive forces of less significance may for example be traffic development, local pollution and environmental problems or urban structures. Possibilities to be considered excluded from the scenarios are events resembling so-called “wild cards”, e.g. a new kind of Chernobyl accident, war in Europe, complete collapse of the financial markets (Asia, Europe, USA), invasion from outer space or worldwide deluge.

This was the background for the development of a “scenario-related” benchmarking tool, the eight variables of the so-called spider model (see chapters 1 and 2):

*State – market*

*International – national*

*Collectivism – individualism*

*TRADITIONAL – INNOVATIVE*

## **36.7 CONCLUSION**

This was the story of the project *Norway2030*, its process and its content. We hope that readers will be inspired to undertake the challenge of creating a futures arena for their own activities and circumstances. We wish you the best of luck.

## 37 BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andersen, Svein S. (2000) *Norway: Insider AND Outsider* Oslo: Arena Paper No 4
- Baldersheim H. (1998) Kommunal fristilling: Subsidiaritet på norsk i Grønlie T.&Selle P. (red) *En stat? Fristillingas fire ansikt* Oslo: Det norske samlaget
- Bell, Daniel (1967) "Introduction" pp. xxi-xxviii i Herman Kahn & Anthony J. Wiener *The Year 2000. A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years* New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Bech, Ulrich (1992) *Risikogesellschaft: auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
- Brox, Ottar (1995) *Dit vi ikke vil. Ikke-utopisk planlegging for neste årtusen* Halden: Exil.
- Bullock, Alan (red.) (1988) *The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought* London: Fontana.
- Dickson, Paul (1972) *Think Tanks* New York, NY: Atheneum.
- Elster, Jon (1983) *Explaining Technical Change. A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Galtung, Johan "Forord" pp. 5-11 i Kjell Dahle & Pål Strandbakken (red.) *Om fremtidsstudier* Oslo: Alternativ fremtid.
- Godet, Michel (1987) *Scenarios and Strategic Management* London: Butterworths.
- van der Heijden, Kees (1996) *Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation* Chichester: Wiley.
- Hompland, Andreas (red.) (1987) *Scenarier 2000. Tre fremtidsbilder for Norge* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Håtun, Ole Eirik (1993) *Amerikansk fremtidsforskning – nasjonal sikkerhet og allmenn velferd. En undersøkelse av etterkrigstidens vitenskapelige fremtidsinteresse* Hovedoppgave i idéhistorie, Universitetet i Oslo, vår 1993.
- Kahn, Herman (1960) *On Thermonuclear War: Thinking About the Unthinkable* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kahn, Herman & Anthony J. Wiener (1967) *The Year 2000. A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years* New York, NY: Macmillan.
- Kahn, Herman & B. Bruce-Biggs (1972) *Things to Come. Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties* New York, NY: Macmillan.

Kjølberg, Anders (1991) *Scenarier og sikkerhetspolitikk* Internasjonal politikk 49 (2): 147 – 156.

Langeland, Ove (red.) (1998) *Mellom frihet og fellesskap: Det 21. århundrets velferdssamfunn* Oslo: FAFO/Tiden.

Larsen Ø.&Falkum E. (1999) *Helse, medisin og befolkningsutvikling i Norge* Oslo: Tidsskrift for den norske lægeforening 119: 4482-7

Levin, Bert & Lennart Nordfors (1998) *Hvem tar makten? Fire scenarier med vinnere og tapere i Norden 2008* Oslo: Lobo Grafisk.

Milward, Alan S. (1972) *The Fascist Economy in Norway* Oxford: Clarendon.

Neumann, Iver B. (1997) ”En geografi for enhver anledning” *Samtiden* 103 (1): 27-37.

Neumann, Iver B. (2000) *Maktens strateger* Oslo: PAX

Njølstad, Olav & Olav Wicken (1997) *Kunnskap som våpen: Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt 1960-1975* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Osmundsen, Terje (1987): ”Behov for nytenkning i offentlig planlegging. Noen refleksjoner om Langtidsprogrammets rolle – og rasjonalitetens avmakt” *Sosialøkonomen* nr. 2, 1987.

Osmundsen, Terje (2000) ”Kunsten å arbeide med fremtiden” Innledning Scenarier 2000s konferanse Møte ved Milepælen, Folkets Hus, Oslo, 11 November 1999.

Ringland, Gill (1998) *Scenario Planning. Managing for the Future* Chichester: Wiley.

Roland, Kjell (2000) *Horisont 21. Scenarier ved et nytt årtusen* Oslo: ECON/Aschehoug.

Schwartz, Peter (1991) *The Art of the Long View* London: Doubleday.

Selstad, Tor (1991) *Med krystallkule og computer: Prognoser og scenarier i samfunnsplanleggingen* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Silver, Lee M. (1998) *Remaking Eden. Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World* London: Weidenfeld&Nicolson

Slagstad, Rune (1998) *De nasjonale strateger* Oslo: Pax.

Strandbakken, Pål (1991a) ”Fra kritisk til konstruktiv sosiologi; fremtidsstudier og den kritiske tradisjonen” pp. 145-158 i Kjell Dahle & Pål Strandbakken (red.) *Om fremtidsstudier* Oslo: Alternativ fremtid.

Strandbakken, Pål (1991b) ”Nu vil jeg kunngjøre dig hvad som skal skje i vredens siste tid – om metoder og teknikker i fremtidsstudier” pp. 31-42 i Kjell Dahle & Pål Strandbakken (red.) *Om fremtidsstudier* Oslo: Alternativ fremtid.

Sørensen, Øystein (1991) *Solkors og solidaritet: Høyreautoritær samfunnstenkning i Norge ca. 1930-1945* Oslo: Cappelen.

Tamnes, Rolf (1997) *Oljealder Bind VI av Norsk utenrikspolitikk historie* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Thorsvik, Jensen & Bratbakk (1997) *Karakteristiske trekk ved Regjeringens langtidsprogrammer, 1945 – 2001*, Rapport til Planleggings- og samordningsdepartementet

Øverenget, Einar & Øyvind Kvalnes (1999) ”Tid for tid”, *Dagbladet*, 7 August 1999.

Østerud, Øyvind (1979) *Det planlagte samfunn* Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Østerud, Øyvind (1999) *Globalisering og nasjonalstaten* Oslo: AdNotam

Øverland, Erik F. (1996) *Jeg er målløs. Om målsettinger og virkemidler i nordisk arbeidsliv*, Rapport 2/96 Arbeidsforskningsinstituttet

# Appendices

- Appendix 1:** Conference and workshop programme 18 and 19 June 1998
- Appendix 2:** Organization and objectives
- Appendix 3:** Seminar plan for working groups
- Appendix 4:** Table cards – scenario exercise 1
- Appendix 5:** List of participants
- Appendix 6:** Progress plan
- Appendix 7:** Minutes of meetings– work group 1 on globalization
- Appendix 8:** Selection of predictions from scenario exercise 1



## Captions to illustrations

Norsk tekst:

Einar Gerhardsen: Sentralplanlegger av rang.

Foto: Helge Sundel/Samfoto

Herman Kahn: Pragmatiker med sans for framtida.

Scenarier 2000: Første norske bidrag

Kloden: I stadig større grad er verden blitt ett

sted Foto: Erik Øverland

DNA: Her ligger nøklene til framtidens

helseteknologi Foto: Erik Øverland

Slik kan størrelsen på framtidens befolkning se ut, alt etter hvor stor nettominnvandring vi årlig får.

Når oljeprisen falt, var det mye som raknet.

17. mai som eksportprodukt: Barnetoget er selve fredstanken manifestert i et årlig rituale.

Foto: Peter Butenschön.

Den norske identitet ligger i vår nasjonalromantiske fortolkning av natur.

Foto: Bård Løken/NN/Samfoto

Postkassen: Et minne om en svunnen tid

Foto: Espen Bratlie/Samfoto

Smått kan også være lønnsomt Foto: Jørn

Areklepp More/Samfoto

Oslo - Trondheim tar bare to og en halv time

Foto: Kent Klich/Mira/Samfoto

Byens puls: Det livet de fleste foretrekker.

Foto: Norsk Form

Skulpturlandskap Nordland: Lagde skole for regional kunstpolitikk

Byens avtrykk Foto: Norsk Form

Noen kjørte forbi: Inn til byen Foto: Peter Butenschön

Fabrikkrålerne råder havet alene Foto: Hans Hvide Bang/NN/Samfoto.

Hjerneøkonomi

Bilde av en cello som forvitrer: Smale

kunstarter sliter Foto: Trym Ivar

Bergsmo/Samfoto

Bilde av banner for forbrukerpartiet der det står: Forbrukerpartiet: et handlekraftig parti”

Kysten opplever en bonanza, den maritime

Engelsk tekst:

Einar Gerhardsen: an outstanding central planner. Photo: Helge Sundel/Samfoto

Herman Kahn: Pragmatist with a sense for the future.

Scenarios 2000: First Norwegian contribution

Earth: The world is increasingly viewed as “one”. Photo: Erik Øverland

DNA: Here lie the keys to the medical technology of the future. Photo: Erik Øverland

Future population figures dependent on the level of net annual immigration.

When the oil price fell, there was much that came undone.

Norway’s Constitution Day as an export product: The children’s procession is the concept of peace itself manifested in an annual ritual. Photo: Peter Butenschön

The Norwegian national identity is closely associated with our national romantic interpretation of nature. Photo: Bård Løken/NN/Samfoto

Letter box: a reminder of bygone days. Photo: Espen Bratlie/Samfoto

Small can also be profitable. Photo: Jørn Areklepp More/Samfoto

Oslo–Trondheim takes only two and a half hours. Photo: Kent Klich/Mira/Samfoto

The pulse of city life: the life most people prefer. Photo: Norsk Form

Artscape Nordland: Created a school of regional art policy. Photo: Norsk Form

The city’s footprint. Photo: Norsk Form

Some people drove past on their way to the town. Photo: Peter Butenschön

Factory trawlers rule the seas alone. Photo: Hans Hvide Bang/NN/Samfoto

Brain economy. Photo: Erik Øverland

Hard times for highbrow culture. Photo: Trym Ivar Bergsmo/Samfoto

Picture of banner for Consumer Party with the slogan: The Consumer Party: We get things done!”

The coast is experiencing a bonanza,

næringen gjør mange rike og skaper arbeid.  
Foto: Jon Låte  
Bylivet Foto: Erik Øverland  
Budda har stigende status i Norge.  
Foto: Øystein Søbye/NN/Samfoto

Fremmede hodeplagg er et vanlig syn i  
dagens Norge Foto: Kim Hart/Samfoto  
Lokal kultur står sterkt Foto: Jon Låte

Bilde av celledeling: Genteknologien står i  
fokus Foto: Erik Øverland  
Design er lønnsomt Foto: Norsk Form  
Bilde av en foss: Vann er det nye gull Foto:  
Espen Bratlie/Samfoto  
Skoleuniformen dukker opp med de private  
skolene Foto: Ken Klich/Mira/Samfoto  
Bilde av en flekssteinbit eller annet  
oppdrettsfisk: Våre husdyr Foto: Ragnar  
Frislid/NN/Samfoto  
Berlin 2030-I Foto Erik Øverland  
Berlin 2030-II Foto Erik Øverland  
tankens frie flukt: bilde av utsikt fra fil Foto:  
Erik Øverland

maritime industries make a lot of people rich  
and create jobs. Photo: Jon Låte  
Urban life. Photo: Erik Øverland  
The status of the Buddha in Norway is rising.  
Buddhist temple at Lørenskog in Akershus.  
Photo: Øystein Søbye/NN/Samfoto  
Foreign headgear is a common sight in  
Norway today. Photo: Kim Hart/Samfoto  
Local culture is on strong ground. Photo: Jon  
Låte  
Genetic engineering has priority. Photo: Erik  
Øverland  
Design is profitable. Photo: Norsk Form  
Water is the new gold. Photo: Espen  
Bratlie/Samfoto  
School uniforms are introduced at private  
schools. Photo: Ken Klich/Mira/Samfoto  
Our domestic animals - spotted wolf-fish.  
Photo: Ragnar Frislid/NN/Samfoto  
  
Berlin 2030-I Photo Erik Øverland  
Berlin 2030-II Photo Erik Øverland  
The free flight of imagination. Photo: Erik  
Øverland



## **12 Supplement**

### **Eidesstattliche Erklärung**

Hiermit erkläre ich an Eides statt,

- dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbstständig und ohne unerlaubte Hilfe verfasst habe,
- dass ich mich nicht bereits anderwärts um einen Doktorgrad beworben habe und keinen Doktorgrad in dem Promotionsfach Zukunftsforschung/Educational futures besitze und
- dass ich die zugrunde liegende Promotionsordnung vom 02.12.2008 kenne.

Berlin, April 10th 2014

