

# **Brazilian Federalism as Polity, Politics and Beyond: Examining Primary Education with Case Studies in Ceará and Pernambuco**

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## ACRONYMS

APEOC	Associação dos Professores em Educação do Ceará
BNDES	Brazilian National Development Bank
CONSED	National Council of Education Secretariats
CSO	Citizens and Civil Society Organizations
CUT	Central Unico dos Trabalhadores
DIE	German Development Institute
FNDE	National Fund for the Development of Education
FNDE	National Fund for the Development of Education
FUNDEF/FUNDEB	Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério
IBGE	Brazilian Institute for Statistics and Geography
IDEB	Index for the Development of Basic Education
IDEPE	Educational Development of Pernambuco
INEP	National Institute for Educational Studies and Research
IPEA	The Institute for Applied Economic Research
LBD	Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional
MEC	Brazilian Ministry of Education
MEC	Federal Ministry of Education
OPPG	Operationalising Pro-Poor Growth
PAIC	Program of Literacy at the Right Age
PDE	Development Plan for Education
PL	Liberal Party
PMDB	Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party
PSB	Partido Socialista Brasileiro
PTB	Brazilian Labor Party
SAEB	National System of Evaluation of Basic Schooling
SAEPE	System of Education Performance of Pernambuco
SINDIUTE	Sindicato Único dos Trabalhadores em Educação
SINTEPE	Sindicato dos Trabalhadores em Educação de Pernambuco
SPAECE	System for the Permanent Evaluation of Education of Ceará (Sistema Permanente de Avaliação da Educação Basica do Ceará)
UNDIME	National Union of Municipal Education Leaders

## Executive Summary in English

Poverty reduction literature and international financial institutions have often claimed that decentralization enhances development because of policy interventions that are closer, hence more responsive and efficient towards local needs of citizens. It has been equally claimed that decentralization would be an important contributor to democratization processes. However, empirical results from federal systems in developing countries are quite mixed. There is no indisputable result, last but not least because of quite diverse institutional and political backgrounds of countries and their experience with federalism. The latest literature in decentralization speaks therefore of “partial decentralization,” whereby citizens are not able to hold governments accountable for budget allocations and their outcomes, attempting to provide clearer evidences by relating results to more specific parts of decentralization processes that are complex in their nature.

Taking a closer look at one crucial policy for development—education—reveals similar puzzling patterns. While many federal, developing countries with decentralized education systems have been able to provide almost universal coverage of primary education, much fewer have been able to provide it with universal quality. To understand such *outcomes of a policy* (for example education quality measured by student’s performance), not only institutional foundations structuring policymaking, but also interactions between political actors in the system of federalism in its respective, specific national frameworks have to be considered. Decentralization literature has addressed the politics of decentralization including in-depth empirical studies in education, health, and other sector policies. Yet, these studies being on one side of the research spectrum have not considered how politics as political interactions relate to the institutional or polity framework of federalism.

On the other side of the spectrum, many studies about federalism entirely focus on federalism as a polity, considering it as a static system of institutional rules and normative settings. It is without doubt that the institutional set-up of federalism plays an important role for the outcome of a policy. However, such vision does not offer to consider federalism as a dynamic system of political relationships and networks. A focus on the political process leading to policy outcomes in federalism, as well as how the political interactions or politics are intertwined with federal institutions, will provide a much more comprehensive explanation about how policy outcomes are achieved. This is precisely what this dissertation is about. *The main argument is that federalism needs a much more political reading to understand the policy outcomes it generates; federalism is much more than an institutional arrangement or a polity.* Using the empirical case of Brazil and its northeastern states Ceará and Pernambuco for two, most-similar case studies, it is assumed that the way in which federal institutions form education policy and quality is greatly determined by political relations and networks of various actors conditioned by this federal framework. The following three research questions will be addressed herein:

1. *Which institutional and political factors explain policy outcomes in primary education in two similar Brazilian states where quality of education should in principle be universal, as claimed by the Brazilian constitution?*
2. *How and why do these factors determine quality education outcomes in those similar states?*
3. *Which implications do the findings of questions 1 and 2 have for federalism as an institutional system?*

Since a strong interrelation between institutional and political factors (or between federalism as an institutional and political framework) is assumed, the main hypothesis is that different outcomes in educational quality exist because of either a constraining or enabling relationship between institutional and political factors. A positive bias on educational outcomes would be the result of a strengthening effect on federalism generated by the intertwining of both types of factors, while a negative bias on educational outcomes would be the result of a weakening effect on federalism of factors.

This dissertation understands institutional factors as formally, by the constitution determined rules that are meant to provide a clear, transparent framework for interaction of political actors. Political factors, by contrast, shall describe the types of interactions evoked by political networks between politicians, teachers' unions, state governments and others, which do not always follow existing institutions, but may also be clientelistic in nature or characterized by informal institutional behavior. These interactions may arise as the result of either too much leeway that federal institutional factors give to political actors (insufficient reach of institutions), or because of other causes to be explored. *In this sense, institutional and political factors and their respective explanatory power are strongly intertwined.*

Presupposing this intertwining of polity and politics in federalism, the main hypothesis of this dissertation assumes that different quality outcomes in primary education (as measured by students' performance) exist even in similar states in Brazil because the country's federal framework does not exclude that political relationships have constraining or enabling effects on institutions.

## **MAIN FINDINGS**

The studied cases of the federal states of Ceará and Pernambuco showed how each one responds to the challenges of a federal framework that is not sufficient to provide education quality in a universal way as proclaimed by the Brazilian Constitution. Depending on the specific context, the framework gives too much leeway to political actors (hereby including not only politicians and civil society organizations, but also employees of the public administration and state and municipal governments as such), opening many spaces for formal, informal and other types of behaviors lying in between. Both empirical cases revealed a different composition of political and institutional factors that explain educational outcomes and how these came about. At the same time, they revealed how closely

intertwined institutional and political factors are, and that these can often not be thought independently from each other.

Despite their socio-economic similarity, Ceará's and Pernambuco's state governments embarked on the road to achieve better primary education in distinct ways. Ceará's and Pernambuco's coping strategies are most distinct not in the type of policies initiated (as outlined in chapters 5 and 6, both states used very similar programs for literacy training, literacy education, and monitoring of results with high-quality evaluation systems developed at the state level, and both states initiated legislation to democratically elect school directors), but rather in how the state governments started to create networks with municipal education systems and how these have evolved over time.

Ceará's state government coped with the overall educational challenges and in 1995 newly created National Education Law by creating a strong institutional framework at state level, adding on and strengthening federal education institutions with innovative initiatives. It can be said of having not only used the leeway of federalism in a way giving positive bias to policy results, but it went much beyond of what was federally mandated. Ceará's state government articulated a strong denunciation of corruption, a clear call for a radical reform of public management, and the renunciation to "old" political elites. The most outstanding feature in Ceará's education policy has been the creation of strong institutional networks and continuous accompaniment of municipal education systems, closely monitoring their efforts in reaching better quality. These institutional achievements were partially conditioned by a low degree of party competition (resulting in a high degree of policy continuity given less remarkable political changes), the political cooptation of teacher unions, and a strong political alignment and support between political majorities at federal and state level. The overall conclusion from this case is that in Ceará, municipal institutions were strengthened, and that this strongly decreases the potential negative bias that political factors can have in a loose federal framework.

In the case of Pernambuco, I found a different prevalence of institutional and political factors and how these determined each other: Pernambuco experienced, in contrast to Ceará, strong party competition with a consequently high politicization of left- and right-wing parties, and ideological changes in education policy. This polarization also deeply affected the networks between the state government and teachers' unions moving from a very open, constructive dialogue until the mid-1990s, to a hostile confrontation. In addition, the strong, opposing views on how to undertake state and education policies were supported by respective party coalitions at federal level. The tendency of Pernambuco's state government to leave the possibility of a strong, municipally grounded collaborative federal regime to chance can be interpreted as a lost opportunity to strengthen federal education policy. In this case, the described lack of institutionalization of federal collaboration and the building of strong institutional networks with municipal governments opened the door for non-institutional types of behavior, potentially strengthening political networks and informal institutional behavior that do not necessarily have a positive bias towards education results. The overall conclusion from this case is that in Pernambuco, municipal institutions were not sufficiently strengthened to decrease the potential negative bias that political factors can have

in a loose federal framework. The result is that municipalities depend more on federal funds from the federal government in Brasilia making them dependent, and that local political forces gain weight negatively affecting overall educational objectives.

These empirical findings have three main implications for Brazil's collaborative federal regime: First, the federal framework in Brazil has to be revised in ways decreasing the likelihood that granted leeway can harm the constitutional claim to achieve high quality of education for all. Second, state governments have to be given institutional incentives to develop collaborative policies with their municipalities, and they must be held accountable for their implementation. And third, the stronger the institutional foundations at the smallest federal level (at municipal level), the more political power will this level gain within the federal framework as such. All three aspects deeply hamper that Brazil can reach the education quality it needs for its future socioeconomic development.

Looked at in a larger perspective and considering one main assumption in the theoretical literature about federalism, it can clearly be said that federalism is not only an institutional framework with three levels of jurisdictions, but that it also is a political and highly politicized framework with many political forces at play. These can alter many normative assumptions of any federal framework in unpredictable ways and produce diverse policy results where these are not necessarily planned, expected or even desirable.

## Executive Summary in German

Wissenschaftliche Forschung zu Armutsbekämpfung und internationale Finanzinstitutionen haben oft behauptet, dass Dezentralisierung Entwicklung verbessere, da Politikmaßnahmen so näher, an den lokalen Interessen von Bürgerinnen und Bürgern ansetzen würden – und damit auch reaktionsschneller und effektiver seien. Es wird auch davon ausgegangen, dass Dezentralisierung einen wichtigen Beitrag zu Demokratisierungsprozessen leiste. Die empirischen Befunde zu föderalen Systemen in Entwicklungsländern sind jedoch sehr unterschiedlich. Es gibt keine unbestreitbaren Ergebnisse, nicht zuletzt aufgrund ganz unterschiedlicher institutioneller und politischer Rahmenbedingungen innerhalb der Länder und deren Erfahrungen mit Föderalismus. Die neueste Dezentralisierungsliteratur spricht in ihren derzeitigen Erkenntnissen daher von „partieller Dezentralisierung“, denn entgegen aller Erwartungen sind Bürgerinnen und Bürger nicht in der Lage, Regierungen für Budgetausgaben und deren Resultate in Rechenschaft zu ziehen. Dieser Forschungsstrang versucht auch, klarere Ergebnisse zu spezifischen Aspekten von Dezentralisierung mit deren komplexeren Zusammenhängen in eine genauere Beziehung zu setzen.

Die nähere Betrachtung einer zentralen Entwicklungspolitik – Bildung – zeichnet ähnlich komplexe Muster ab: Während viele föderale Entwicklungsländer mit dezentralen Bildungssystemen in der Lage sind, Grundschulbildung fast flächendeckend anzubieten, so sind viel weniger Länder imstande, diese Bildung auch mit gleichbleibender Qualität bereitzustellen. Um die Ergebnisse einer solchen Politik (zum Beispiel die Qualität des Unterrichts gemessen an den Leistungen der Schülerinnen und Schüler) zu verstehen, müssen nicht nur die institutionellen Grundlagen und die Struktur der Politikgestaltung, sondern auch Wechselwirkungen zwischen politischen Akteuren im föderalen System und dessen spezifische nationale Rahmenbedingungen betrachtet werden. Dezentralisierungsliteratur hat die Politics-Ebene von Dezentralisierung in empirischen Studien in den Bereichen Bildung, Gesundheit und anderen Politikbereichen eingehend untersucht. Jedoch haben diese Studien, die sich auf der einen Seite des Forschungsspektrums befinden, nicht berücksichtigt, wie sich Politics als politische Interaktionen auf die institutionelle Grundlage oder die Polity des Föderalismus auswirken.

Auf der anderen Seite des Forschungsspektrums gibt es viele Studien, die sich auf Föderalismus als Polity konzentrieren und diesen als ein System von institutionellen und normativen Regeln begreifen. Allerdings lässt eine rein institutionelle Betrachtungsweise von Föderalismus es nicht zu, Föderalismus als ein System der politischen Beziehungen und Netzwerke zu verstehen. Wenn man jedoch den Betrachtungsfokus auf den politischen Prozess verlagert und zu verstehen versucht, wie politische Interaktionen und Politics prozesshaft mit föderalen Institutionen verwoben sind (dies bedeutet ein Fokus auf die föderale Polity und ihr Zusammenhang mit den in ihr existierenden Politics), so führt dies zu einer umfassenderen Erklärung, wie politische Ergebnisse zustande kommen und erzielt werden. Das ist genau das, was diese Dissertation leisten will. *Das Hauptargument ist, dass Föderalismus eine viel politischere Lesart braucht, um politische Ergebnisse zu verstehen;*

*Föderalismus ist viel mehr als ein institutionelles Arrangement oder eine Polity.* Mit dem empirischen Fall Brasiliens und den zwei most-similar Fallstudien in den nordöstlichen Bundesstaaten Ceará und Pernambuco wird argumentiert, dass die Art und Weise, wie föderale Institutionen Bildungspolitik von Qualität machen, stark von politischen Beziehungen und Netzwerken zwischen verschiedenen politischen Akteuren abhängt.

Folgende drei Forschungsfragen sollen in der vorliegenden Dissertation bearbeitet werden:

- 1. Welche institutionellen und politischen Faktoren erklären Policy Outcomes im Grundschulbildungsbereich in zwei ähnlichen brasilianischen Bundesstaaten, in denen Bildungsqualität im Prinzip universell gültig sein sollte, so wie es die brasilianische Staatsverfassung vorsieht?*
- 2. Wie und warum bestimmten diese Faktoren die Policy Outcomes von Bildungsqualität in diesen beiden ähnlichen Bundesstaaten?*
- 3. Welche Implikationen haben die Ergebnisse der Fragen 1 und 2 für Föderalismus als institutionelles System?*

Da ein enger Zusammenhang zwischen institutionellen und politischen Faktoren (oder zwischen Föderalismus als institutionellem und politischem Regelwerk) angenommen wird, geht die Hypothese davon aus, dass unterschiedliche Outcomes von Bildungsqualität aufgrund einer entweder einschränkenden oder einer sich gegenseitig verstärkenden Beziehung zwischen institutionellen und politischen Faktoren existieren. Ein positiver Bias in Richtung der Outcomes von Bildung wäre das Ergebnis einer stärkenden Wirkung der beiden Faktorenkategorien von Föderalismus, wohingegen ein negativer Bias für die Outcomes von Bildung das Ergebnis einer schwächenden Wirkung der beiden Faktorenkategorien bezüglich Föderalismus bedeuten würde.

Die vorliegende Dissertation versteht institutionelle Faktoren als formale, durch die Verfassung bestimmte Regeln, die einen klaren, transparenten Rahmen für die Interaktion von politischen Akteuren herstellen sollen. Politische Faktoren hingegen beschreiben die Art von Interaktionen, die von politischen Netzwerken zwischen Politikern, Lehrerergewerkschaften, Landesregierungen und anderen Akteuren hervorgerufen werden. Diese Interaktionen müssen nicht immer institutionellen Regeln folgen, sondern können auch klientelistisch oder durch institutionell informelle Beziehungen gekennzeichnet sein. Diese Interaktionen können entweder das Ergebnis von zu viel Spielraum sein, den föderale Institutionen ihren Akteuren einräumen (ungenügende Reichweite von Institutionen), oder aber aufgrund anderer Ursachen entstehen, die es zu verstehen gilt. In diesem Sinne sind institutionelle und politische Faktoren und deren jeweilige Erklärungskraft eng miteinander verwoben.

Da von einer solchen Verwobenheit von Polity und Politics im Föderalismus ausgegangen wird, nimmt die zentrale Hypothese der vorliegenden Arbeit an, dass unterschiedliche

Bildungsqualität im Grundschulbereich (gemessen an der Leistung von Schülerinnen und Schülern) in ähnlichen Bundesstaaten Brasiliens existieren, weil das föderale Regelwerk des Landes es nicht ausschließt, dass politische Interaktionen die Reichweite von föderalen Institutionen entweder einschränken oder erweitern und stärken.

## **HAUPTERKENNTNISSE**

Die untersuchten Fallbeispiele Ceará und Pernambuco zeigen, wie jeder der beiden Bundesstaaten auf die Herausforderungen der brasilianischen föderalen Rahmenbedingungen reagiert. Diese reichen nicht aus, um Bildungsqualität in der universellen Art und Weise herzustellen, wie dies die brasilianische Staatsverfassung vorsieht. Je nach spezifischem Kontext erlauben die existierenden föderalen Rahmenbedingungen den politischen Akteuren (zum Beispiel Politikerinnen und Politiker, zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, aber auch Mitarbeitern der öffentlichen Verwaltung in den Bundesländern und Kommunen) zu viel Spielraum. Dies eröffnet die Möglichkeit vielerlei formeller, informeller und anderer Arten von Interaktionen. Die beiden empirischen Fälle unterscheiden sich in der Zusammensetzung der untersuchten politischen und institutionellen Faktoren und darin, wie diese Faktoren die Policy-Outcomes im Grundschulbereich erklären können. Gleichzeitig zeigen beide Fälle auch, wie eng institutionelle und politische Faktoren zusammenhängen und diese in ihrer Wirkung nicht unabhängig voneinander betrachtet werden können.

Die Landesregierung von Ceará beantwortete die allgemeinen Bildungsherausforderungen und das im Jahr 1995 verabschiedete Nationale Bildungsgesetz mit der Schaffung eines starken institutionellen Rahmens, der föderale Bildungsinstitutionen mit innovativen Initiativen ergänzt und stärkt. Ceará's Landesregierung kann bescheinigt werden, es nicht nur geschafft zu haben, den im brasilianischen Föderalismus existierenden Gesetzesspielraum so genutzt zu haben, dass dieser sich positiv auf Policy-Ergebnisse auswirkt, sondern sich dabei weit hinaus über den verpflichtenden Bundesgesetzrahmen bewegt zu haben. Die Landesregierung hat Korruption vehement verurteilt, radikale Reformen der öffentlichen Verwaltung angesetzt und „alte“ politische Eliten von der Macht abgelöst. Die herausragenden Meilensteine in Ceará's Bildungspolitik sind die Schaffung von starken institutionellen Netzwerken, eine kontinuierliche Begleitung der Bildungssysteme der Kommunen und eine lokale Betreuung kommunaler Anstrengungen zur Verbesserung der Grundschulbildungsqualität. Diese institutionellen Errungenschaften gingen teilweise einher mit einem niedrigen Grad an Parteienwettbewerb (was aufgrund geringfügiger politischer Machtwechsel zu einem hohen Maß an politischer Kontinuität führte), der politischen Vereinnahmung von Lehrgewerkschaften und einer starken politischen Übereinstimmung und Unterstützung der politischen Mehrheiten auf Bundes- und Landesebene. Die allgemeine Schlussfolgerung aus der Analyse dieses Falles ist, dass in Ceará kommunale Institutionen gestärkt wurden und dass dies die möglichen negativen Folgen eines zu lockeren föderalen Rahmens politisch eingegrenzt hat.

Im Bundesstaat Pernambuco konnte ich eine andere Prävalenz der institutionellen und politischen Faktoren feststellen und wie diese sich einander bedingt haben: In Pernambuco



gab es – im Gegensatz zu Ceará – starken Parteienwettbewerb, aus dem eine hohe Politisierung zwischen Parteien des linken und rechten Spektrums und viele ideologisch bedingte Veränderungen in der Bildungspolitik resultierten. Diese Polarisierung betrifft auch die Netzwerke und Beziehungen zwischen der Landesregierung und den Lehrergewerkschaften, die sich von einem anfangs sehr offenen, konstruktiven Dialog Mitte der 1990er Jahre hin zu einer feindseligen Konfrontation entwickelten. Darüber hinaus wurden die starken, gegensätzlichen Ansichten darüber, wie staatliche Bildungspolitik auszusehen habe, von den entsprechenden Parteikoalitionen auf Bundesebene unterstützt. Die Tendenz von Pernambucos Landesregierung, die Möglichkeit einer starken, kommunal verwurzelten Zusammenarbeit zwischen Bund, Ländern und Kommunen dem Zufall zu überlassen, kann als eine verpasste Gelegenheit gesehen werden, föderale Bildungspolitik zu stärken. In diesem Fall öffnet der beschriebene Mangel einer institutionalisierten Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Landesregierung und den Kommunen die Tür für nicht-institutionelle Interaktionsformen, die politische Netzwerke und informelles institutionelles Verhalten potenziell stärken und keinen positiven Bias auf die Qualität von Bildung ausüben. Die allgemeine Schlussfolgerung aus der Analyse dieses Falles ist, dass in Pernambuco die Zusammenarbeit mit den Kommunen nicht ausreichend gestärkt und institutionalisiert wurde, um so mögliche negative Auswirkungen politischer Faktoren zu verhindern. Das Ergebnis ist, dass die Kommunen stärker von Bundesmitteln und der Bundesregierung in Brasilia abhängen und dass sich lokale politische Machtverhältnisse verstärkt negativ auf Bildungsqualität und Bildungsergebnisse auswirken.

Diese beiden empirischen Befunde haben drei wichtige Folgen für die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Bund, Ländern und Kommunen im brasilianischen Föderalismus: Erstens muss der brasilianische Föderalismus neu betrachtet und überarbeitet werden, und zwar in einer Art und Weise, die den von der Bundesverfassung ermöglichte Handlungsspielraum politischer Akteure so eingegrenzt, dass er die verfassungsrechtliche Garantie universeller Qualität von Bildung nicht verletzen kann. Zweitens müssen für die Landesregierungen institutionelle Anreize geschaffen werden, so dass diese mit ihren Kommunen eine kooperative Politik entwickeln und für deren Umsetzung zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden können. Und drittens, je mehr die institutionellen Grundlagen der kleinsten Bundesebene (also der kommunalen Ebene) gestärkt werden, desto stärker wird deren politische Macht innerhalb des brasilianischen Föderalismus werden. Alle drei Aspekte verhindern es derzeit, dass Brasilien die Qualität von Bildung erreichen kann, die es für seine zukünftige sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung braucht. Betrachtet man diese Erkenntnisse auf der Makroebene und hinsichtlich einer der Hauptannahmen der theoretischen Föderalismusliteratur, muss klar hervorgehoben werden, dass Föderalismus nicht nur ein institutionelles Regelwerk mit drei Ebenen von Gerichtsbarkeiten ist, sondern dass im Föderalismus auch politische und hoch politisierte Kräfte am Werk sind. Diese können viele normative Annahmen eines föderalen Regelwerkes in unvorhersehbarer Weise verändern und somit unterschiedliche Policy-Ergebnisse produzieren, wo diese nicht unbedingt geplant, erwartet oder gar wünschenswert sind.

## Acknowledgements

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A major part of this dissertation, including the financing of two out of three necessary field trips, academic and development-related advice, as well as important, cross-discipline discussions occurred during my time at the German Development Institute, DIE, in Bonn. I would like to thank Nicole Rippin, my co-researcher; Markus Loewe, our project supervisor of the Pro-Poor Growth project; Tilman Altenburg, our division chief; and many other members of DIE for the important insights they provided during my research process. This dissertation would not have been possible without the views that many of Brazil's excellent researchers shared with me. Two people, in particular, were crucial to the completion of this dissertation: Paulo Corbucci, of IPEA Brasilia, and Silke Weber, of the Federal University of Ceara. I was able to approach them with my research project at different stages, and received excellent comments that shaped many ideas included herein.

Last but not least, I must say that the most fascinating and mind-opening findings in this dissertation were made possible due to the openness and willingness of my interviewees, including public employees at high- and mid-level public administrations at the central, state, and municipal levels in Brazil; politicians from a wide array of parties; labor union and NGO-activists; journalists; businessmen/women; and, most importantly, the impressions of and conversations with members of poor communities in Fortaleza's and Recife's urban periphery. I dedicate my dissertation to these hardworking families, mothers, and children surviving every day in neighborhoods full of crime and violence. I do hope that my research and life experience with them will impact and change their lives to some extent. This is what keeps on driving me as an academic and, now, as a professional in development cooperation:

“Seven black pigs were searching for food in a garbage dump that was two blocks away from a public school in Jaboatão, Northeast Brazil. While a visit to the school made clear that it disposed of the federal minimum requirements in terms of infrastructure, 20 interviews with households sending their children to the same school evidenced quite the contrary. Not only did I ask myself how these families were able to stand the incredible smell in their neighborhood (the pigs showed up again in the “river” two meters from people's home), but also why none of them knew the number of pupils in their children's class, or about the fact that there existed a parents' council in order to cooperate with the school administration trying to increase one of the lowest education achievements in their country. How shall the children there, brought up in a slum-community by poor parents and taught by low-paid, low-motivated teachers, ever have the chance to find a qualified job on the crowded Brazilian labor market, or to ever compete for entrance in one of the prestigious public universities in Brazil?”

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Main Argument and Relevance of Dissertation

Literature on poverty reduction and international financial institutions have often claimed that decentralization enhances development, because of policy interventions that more closely meet the local needs of citizens, and hence are more responsive and efficient. It has been equally claimed that decentralization is an important contributor to democratization processes.<sup>1</sup> However, empirical results from federal systems in developing countries are quite mixed (cf. Ahmad et al. 2005; Shah 2006). There is no indisputable result, last but not least, because of quite diverse institutional and political backgrounds of countries and their experiences with federalism. The latest literature in decentralization speaks, therefore, of “partial decentralization,” whereby citizens are not able to hold governments accountable for budget allocations and their outcomes, attempting to provide clearer evidences by relating results to more specific parts of decentralization processes that are complex in their nature (Devarajan, Khemani, and Shah 2009).

Taking a closer look at one crucial policy for development—education—reveals similarly puzzling patterns. While many federal developing countries with decentralized education systems have been able to provide almost universal coverage of primary education, fewer have been able to provide this coverage with universal quality. To understand such *outcomes of a policy* (for example, education quality measured by students’ performance), it is important to consider not only institutional foundations structuring policymaking, but also interactions between political actors in the system of federalism in each country’s respective, specific national framework. Decentralization literature has addressed the politics of decentralization, including in-depth empirical studies in education, health, and other sector policies (Falletti 2010; Grindle 2007). Yet, these studies, being on one side of the research spectrum, have not considered how politics as political interactions relate to the institutional or polity framework of federalism.

On the other side of the spectrum, many studies about federalism focus entirely on federalism as a polity, considering it as a system of institutional rules and normative settings. It is without doubt that the institutional setup of federalism plays an important role for the outcome of a policy. However, such vision does not offer a viewpoint of federalism as a system of political relationships and networks. A focus on the political process leading to policy outcomes in federalism and how the political interactions or politics are intertwined with federal institutions—meaning a focus on the federal polity and its resulting politics in an intertwined process—will provide a much more comprehensive explanation about how

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<sup>1</sup> The arguments presented here reflect three main schools of thought about decentralization and its effects. Economists have been advocating that decentralization can increase allocative efficiency targeted towards local demand. Political scientists have argued that decentralization can enhance democratization, since it allows for higher degrees of participation at the local level, hereby potentially deepening democracy. Public management theory has argued that decentralization contributes to more responsive decision-making and outcomes at local levels where citizens can directly demand good quality of public services.

policy outcomes are achieved. This is precisely what this dissertation is about. *The main argument is that federalism needs a much more political reading to understand the policy outcomes it generates; federalism is much more than an institutional arrangement or a polity.* Using the empirical case of Brazil, it is assumed that the way in which federal institutions form education policy and quality is determined, to a large extent, by the political relations and networks of various actors conditioned by this federal framework. The following three research questions will be addressed herein:

1. *Which institutional and political factors explain policy outcomes in primary education in two similar Brazilian states, where quality of education should in principle be universal, as claimed by the Brazilian Constitution?*
2. *How and why do these factors determine quality education outcomes in those similar states?*
3. *Which implications do the findings of questions 1 and 2 have for federalism as an institutional system?*

Since a strong interrelation between institutional and political factors (or between federalism as an institutional and political framework) is assumed, the main hypothesis is that different outcomes in educational quality exist because of either a constraining or an enabling relationship between institutional and political factors. A positive bias on educational outcomes would be the result of a strengthening effect on federalism generated by the intertwining of both types of factors, while a negative bias on educational outcomes would be the result of a weakening effect of factors on federalism.

This dissertation understands *institutional factors* as, formally, by the constitution determined rules that are meant to provide a clear, transparent framework for interaction of political actors. *Political factors*, in contrast, shall describe the types of interactions evoked by political networks between politicians, teachers' unions, state governments, and others, which do not always follow existing institutions, but may also be clientelistic in nature or characterized by informal institutional behavior. These interactions may arise as the result of either too much leeway that federal institutional factors give to political actors (insufficient reach of institutions), or because of other causes to be explored herein. In this sense, institutional and political factors and their respective explanatory power are strongly intertwined.

*Presupposing this intertwining of polity and politics in federalism, the main hypothesis of this dissertation assumes that different quality outcomes in primary education (as measured by students' performance) exist, even in similar states in Brazil, because the country's federal framework does not exclude that political relationships have constraining or enabling effects on institutions.*

One should expect to encounter effects generated by exclusionary practices, such as clientelism and political networks that constrain institutions. This can negatively or

positively bias the expected results of universal policies (such as universal quality access to primary education, a claim of the Brazilian Constitution), depending on the intertwining of political and institutional factors. On the one hand, one could assume that federal institutions should be sufficient to regulate many types of political factors and interactions. On the other hand, institutions cannot regulate everything. This, in turn, creates also the possibility to discover new types of interactions that may positively bias the results of universal policies. Given these considerations, accountability is an important mechanism that needs an in-depth analysis. The stronger accountability is reinforced in an institutional framework and practiced by political actors, the higher the likelihood that envisioned policy aims and achieved outcomes will be aligned with one another. In this understanding, accountability is vital to decrease negative bias on policy outcomes that informal institutions and clientelistic networks can potentially have. It is a means to direct leeway, granted by institutions, given to the political actors to strengthen the outcomes, rather than allowing politics to weaken them. There are at least three good reasons why the argument of this dissertation is highly relevant, and why it will address three types of research gaps:

***Relevance 1: The polity-politics link of federalism matters to understand education quality as a policy outcome.*** My dissertation sees federalism less as a static **system** of pre-determined institutions (and the expectation that these will function accordingly and deliver respective results), but rather as a dynamic interaction process amongst different political actors, as well as their interplay with existing institutions. This is a research gap that has been addressed very little in literature about decentralization and federalism.

While both political and education scientists have emphasized the important, mutually enhancing link between decentralization and the quality of education, little has been said about the overarching link between federalism (being the institutional framework in which the normative functions of decentralization are embedded) and the quality of education. How are federalism and education quality interrelated, and which political factors matter to explain why institutionally intended outcomes in federal social policy are not congruent with factual outcomes? How does the dynamic intertwining of the polity and politics of federalism explain diverse educational results amongst similar subnational units that are supposed to produce similar outcomes within the same system? Better insights into these questions, which have not been sufficiently addressed in research about federalism, matter a great deal not only for education quality as an important part of human development (see paragraph below), but also for what is expected from federalism as an institutional framework and the policy outcomes it produces. As Chapter 2 discusses further, William H. Riker, the founding father of the study of federalism, assumed that federal institutions had no policy impact at all, and that they made no particular difference for public policy (see Section 2.1.1). This assumption has been revised by many scholars who claim that an equitable distribution of welfare in a federal system is connected to the intertwining of institutional federal rules and the way in which social policy actors relate to these rules through their policy preferences, strategies, and political influence. To better account for this intertwining, this dissertation does not pre-determine which institutional or political factor is the most relevant one to

explain the difference in both cases, but presents them in their conjunction and in context with one another.

My research design hereby addresses what authors researching the Latin American context have pointed out, namely that the models used by Riker and European and American scholars to explain federalism do not sufficiently account for the Latin American institutional context, where political factors have a considerable influence (Arretche 1999 and 2004; Arretche/Rodden 2004; Diaz-Cayeros 2004; Obinger et al. 2005; Pierson 1995; Souza 2002 and 2005).

If assuming that federalism should be a system with clearly assigned tasks at different institutional levels of a state where each of these has a clearly assigned role to deliver a public good such as education, then it is necessary to also understand potential institutional challenges stemming from this system and decision-making dilemma arising from this institutional division of labor. It might not always function the way it is laid out by a constitution. To understand if normative rules are sufficient to significantly improve the quality of education, it is important to consider whether the leeway given to political actors by a normative framework is adequate or too broad to achieve intended policy outcomes, and in which ways interactions of political actors interfere, hamper, or complement institutions that are producing social policy. The discussion of these issues will provide important insight for the study of federalism and the role it plays in delivering universal public goods on a large and equitable scale.

***Relevance 2: Universal education quality is crucial for human development, especially in large federal countries with intra-regional and social inequalities.***

Why did I choose to narrow down my research and focus exclusively on education as one out of many poverty-reducing policies? First and foremost, education itself is considered an important driver of human development. Throughout my research, I assume that better education contributes to poverty reduction, a claim that is theoretically and empirically justifiable, and that it can have an important influence on the poverty-reducing effect of other policies, such as health and nutrition (Baldacci et al. 2004: 27). Human capital theory suggests that more educated individuals are more productive, and for this reason earn higher incomes. This can lead to better conditions to invest in further education for individuals and their children, and allowing them to make the right choices, for example, in reproductive and family health. Poor families tend to have incomes that do not permit them to invest in schooling for their family members, especially in the enrollment of their children (Oliveira and Carvalho 2007: 17; Perry et al. 2006: 165).<sup>2</sup>

Hereby, non-schooling or poor schooling of children can perpetuate the stage of poverty in a low-income family, and contribute to a self-reinforcing mechanism, which can create a

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<sup>2</sup> By the same token, if poor families are able to send their children to school, they do so. This holds for any region of the world, as shown by a World Bank study (World Bank 2011: 56). The authors of the study emphasize that poor people in any part of the world are very conscious about the importance of education for their children, since they know that education is the only inheritance they can leave for their children.

vicious cycle of inter-generational poverty. Also, children born into disadvantaged families usually have home environments that are not very conducive to learning, and they tend to receive lower quality of schooling. Poor children tend to be exposed to long-term deficiencies in education quality, leading to higher likelihood of grade repetition, class-age distortion, and low transition rates to higher education grades (Perry et al. 2006: 170). In addition, I choose to specifically focus on primary education, since it is an important initial column of education upon which secondary, professional, and tertiary education rest. Shortcomings of education, such as lacking reading and math skills in the primary grades, cannot be easily overcome once a student reaches the secondary level, and will jeopardize the student's success in any subsequent levels of education.

Many large federal countries, such as Brazil, face the challenges of great intra-regional and social inequalities. The magnitude of such inequalities emphasize the importance of investments in education for a more egalitarian society (cf. Neri 2007), and the need for a well-functioning federal system to make these investments. Brazilian research highlights an elevated degree of income and social inequality amongst and between major regions, states, and municipalities, evidencing that equity and quality of access to universal education is an unresolved challenge. This has many implications, not only for individual households, but also for the emerging Brazilian economy as a whole. Extensive research on this topic concludes that social inequality leads to unequal access to labor opportunities in later stages of life across diverse Brazilian regions (Barros et al. 2001; Menezes-Filho and Vasconellos 2004).

Consequently, education is an important mechanism in generating inequality in salaries in Brazil,<sup>3</sup> but investment in education is also the best way to prevent inequality in salaries from replicating, which perpetuates poverty: "Investment in human capital is the most important of these factors,<sup>4</sup> as it tends to reduce poverty in the short-run and decrease inequality in the long run" (Menezes-Filho and Vasconellos 2004: 25).<sup>5</sup> Brazil's future development crucially depends on equal access of all citizens to high quality education, especially those groups and regions that lack it most, for example groups of African descent in Brazil's rural northeast. Improving education quality in Brazilian public schools will have an over proportional poverty-reducing effect, since they are predominantly frequented by students from lower- and middle-class families. If education policy fails to increase the access of the lower-income population to good quality education, the existing inequalities will eventually deepen and stipulate the economic and social exclusion of these people. A recent study of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas about inequality in the slums of Rio de Janeiro estimates that with

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<sup>3</sup> Langoni was one of the first economists to point out the importance of education as a factor in reducing inequality in Brazil. He showed that part of the increase of inequality in the country between 1960 and 1970 was due to the rising demand of qualified workers associated with the Brazilian industrialization (Langoni 1973). Ricardo Paes de Barros elaborated some of Langoni's arguments further, showing that one of the principal social problems in Brazil is the low level and bad distribution of education amongst the Brazilian population (Menezes-Filho 2001: 6).

<sup>4</sup> Other factors mentioned in this study include investments in infrastructure, as well as demography/information about contraceptive methods.

<sup>5</sup> Based on the assumption that growth-elasticity of poverty is negatively related to initial inequality, and that, if income inequality increases, the amount of people living in poverty will also increase.

the current education system in place, it will take about 60 years to achieve equality between the rich and the poor in the city (Frayssinet 2010; Neri 2010).



***Relevance 3: Pro-poor growth research needs better insights into the politics-polity link of federalism, given that major emerging economies including some of the BRICS have large federal systems.<sup>6</sup> However, I would caution to assume that the herein presented case could serve as a “Latin American model” of federalism, or a model for other BRICS countries given distinct influence of informal institutions.***

The dissertation presented herein initially stems from a mixed political-economy research framework on pro-poor growth in India and Brazil, asking how growth, poverty, and inequality in both countries can be explained within specific sector policies in these two large federal countries, and which conclusions can be drawn that can be useful for other emerging economies.<sup>7</sup> Currently, only 25 federal countries worldwide have federal political systems. However, their populations account for around 40 percent of the world's population, including all BRICS except China (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa). While this dissertation makes a contribution to the study of federalism and its polity-politics link (see above), the findings that focus on Brazil are highly relevant for pro-poor growth research in federal emerging economies. Many of these have large intra- and inter-regional disparities, which present a challenge for equitable growth and welfare distribution.

In very general terms, pro-poor growth research examines the linkages between poverty, inequality, and economic growth in order to determine what kind of sectoral and regional growth could benefit the poor most and, thus, implicitly reduce poverty (cf. Klasen 2003, 2).<sup>8</sup> This dissertation will understand poverty as proposed by Amartya Sen, being a multidimensional problem that includes absence of adequate nutrition, healthcare, and quality education, amongst others (Sen 1999).<sup>9</sup> These deficiencies deprive citizens of living a

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<sup>6</sup> The term “BRIC” goes back to Goldman Sachs’ classification in 2003. Brazil, Russia, India, and China were then mentioned as economies that by 2050 would be wealthier than most of today’s economic major powers.

<sup>7</sup> The German Development Institute (DIE) commissioned the studies following international research in this area. In 2002, three bilateral agencies (DFID, BMZ, and AFD) and the World Bank launched the “Operationalising Pro-Poor Growth” (OPPG) initiative. The OPPG work program aimed at providing advice to governments on policies that could encourage citizens in developing countries to participate in the growth trajectories of their countries. Until 2005, 14 country studies spanning Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe and a joint synthesis report had been produced.<sup>7</sup> The focus of the studies was on the distributional impact of growth, and the herewith connected macroeconomic and structural policies, labour markets, agriculture and rural development, pro-poor spending, institutions, and gender .

<sup>8</sup> Roughly, two broad distinctions are made: relative pro-poor growth requires that the income share of the poor increase and that inequality falls. Absolute pro-poor growth focuses on accelerating the rate of income growth of the poor and, thus, increasing the rate of poverty reduction. Inequality can either enhance or reduce pro-poor growth rates. Thus, faster pro-poor growth will not only require higher growth rates, but also will necessitate additional efforts to enhance the capabilities of households to take advantage of opportunities generated by growth (OPPG 2005, 19). For more differentiated definitions, and the pros and cons of these definitions, see Klasen 2003:3.

<sup>9</sup> The fact that the poor benefit from macro-economic growth is certainly at the heart of this debate.<sup>9</sup> It has led to the identification of specific policies (including health and education, as well as infrastructure) that are believed to have an impact in poverty reduction.

life free of any constraints of their basic capabilities.<sup>10</sup> Absence of education fuels poverty. When Sen argues, in “Development as Freedom” (Sen 1999), the importance of public expenditure in education for a whole population, he does so because he believes it directly increases one’s personal freedom (in the sense of capabilities to freely and self-consciously choose the life to which each assigns an individual value), and it indirectly increases one’s economic freedom. In this sense, education has the potential to increase personal freedom (micro-economic analysis) and positively affect an economic growth (macro-economic analysis). This dissertation shall contribute to a better understanding of which political and institutional factors matter for achieving a higher quality of education as a poverty-reducing policy outcome in a federal system.

Yet, one should be cautious to assume that Brazil can serve as a “Latin American model” of federalism. Why? Informal institutional behavior (yielding both positive and negative policy outcomes), opportunistic behavior of politicians, and clientelism are phenomena that do not only exist in Latin America and other young democracies, but also in democracies such as the United States and Germany. Academic literature about federalism in these latter two countries and other “developed” countries would be more complete if it started to reflect more deeply about how these phenomena interact with the “institutional research branch” of federalism. A deeper reflection in this sense would certainly acknowledge that these “developed countries” have institutional features that, in general, are associated with “developing countries,” which are assumed to be institutionally weaker. Therefore, qualitative and comparative quantitative research of federalism has to differentiate each case, knowing that each federal system is unique in its institutional and political path, and in the intertwining of both.

## **1.2 Existing Research Gaps and Contribution of this Dissertation**

An important assumption of this dissertation is that “politics matters” (Whitehead and Gray-Molina 1999),<sup>11</sup> *defining politics as political interactions and networks between political actors influencing the unfolding of federal institutions*. This dissertation assumes that state actors, such as public employees and bureaucrats at different levels, are not neutral at all, but rather that they pursue their own political interests within institutions. This is important, since it means that informal institutional behavior, including clientelism, can also originate from those that are entitled to guarantee the formal functioning of institutions. By the same token, the herein applied understanding of interactions and networks does not only comprise those occurring in formalized, institutionalized spaces, but also those that may not follow institutional rules, that may be informal, or that may be moving in between these theoretically constructed extremes (see Chapter 2 for a more comprehensive discussion of this argument). Much of the international poverty reduction and pro-poor growth literature

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<sup>10</sup> Instead of measuring a person’s wellbeing in terms of income or national GDP, Sen et al. (1999) understand poverty as presence of different types of capabilities. In order to develop these capabilities, freedoms, such as political freedom, economic circumstances, social choices, transparency, and security, are necessary. In absence of these freedoms, a person that is hungry, illiterate, and homeless or ill suffers from deprivation and, hence, poverty.

<sup>11</sup> Another reason for the arising of this claim is increasing international pressure on donor organizations to prove effectiveness of development interventions.

lacks explanations about the role of these politics in development processes, bearing the risk to present outcomes of poverty reducing policies, such as, among many others, education as outcomes of economic and technical processes.

Poverty reduction policies necessarily entail the redistribution of wealth and are therefore not free from political interests. Redistributive policies are not seldom influenced by unequal power structures, the dominance of informally organized groups pressing for their demands on base of different political weight (politicians, elites, social movements, etc.), and state institutions and bureaucrats responding to these demands in different ways. It means a field of operation with multilayered interest structures determined by politics (Heinelt 2003, 241; Kurtz 2003). The main debate of reference, to which I aim to make an empirical contribution, is the one on the politics of federalism in relation to federalism as a polity. Tullia Faletti, Edward Gibson, and Marta Arretche, among others, are some of the most important scholars in this field that focus on Latin America (Arretche 1999, 2004; Faletti 2010; Gibson 2004). These scholars have provided important insights, greatly extending the perspective of federalism and decentralization put forward by development agencies, such as the World Bank (Ahmad et al. 2005; Shah 2006).

The general debate on “politics matters” is replicated in development research in the education sector, precisely due to the described gap. Technical discussions of how developing countries (and certainly not only these) shall improve education quality conclude that this— even in presence of sufficient finances—will be impossible without deeper institutional reform of their education systems and connected politics. For these to be successful, political factors, such as political alliances and support structures, will have to be considered, since these are often the tipping point in education reforms (Grindle 2004).<sup>12</sup> Hanushek et al. state that

“Improving education quality requires a focus on institutions and efficient education spending, not just additional resources (...) [T]here is no relationship between spending and student performance across the sample of middle- and higher income countries with available data” (Hanushek and Wößmann 2007).<sup>13</sup>

This reflects the understanding of researchers attempting to move beyond the restricted evidence provided by mostly quantitative pro-poor growth studies that cover how politics matters for poverty reduction outcomes. These researchers have found that *institutional and political factors may indeed be decisive for understanding the outcomes of pro-poor growth* (Crook and Sverrisson 2003; Harriss 2003; Kurtz 2003; Moore and Houtzager 2003; Stein and Tommasi 2006; Whitehead and Gray-Molina 1999). These findings are relevant for what this dissertation seeks to understand better, namely, how political and institutional factors

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<sup>12</sup> This evidence also seems to hold for Latin America, where, according to Duryea et al. (2002), substantial gains of education reforms can only be expected if the reforms target better management of education administrations, for example through improved control and accountability mechanisms.

<sup>13</sup> Hanushek further elaborates Pritchett’s famous finding in “Where has all the education gone,” who found, on the basis of ample evidence, that just increasing spending within a given education system in developing countries is not enough to improve students’ performance (Pritchett 2001).

impact the quality of primary education as an important policy outcome of human development. This is a complex but highly relevant undertaking, because simply raising financial resources will not enhance quality of education if institutional and political dimensions are not addressed at the same time. I chose to focus on education, and, more particularly, to focus on the quality of primary education in two states in Brazil's northeast (see Section 1.3 for justification of selection of country and case studies).

The subnational level in federalism is an important unit of analysis to understand how these politics matters and unfolds in a federal polity, which is relevant for this dissertation. As argued further in Chapter 2, the networks and relations amongst actors at state and local levels have many political loyalties attached. As Chapter 3 shows, the municipal level in Brazil is the one situated at the very bottom end of its federal organization, and is equipped with the least political power, fiscal resources, and institutional strength, if compared to the central and state governmental level. Yet, the collaboration from state level as intermediary governmental level, which is of crucial importance to strengthen Brazil's federal regime, is not sufficiently regulated. The result is that the municipal level also bears most potential for the unfolding of politics in absence of strong monitoring and oversight mechanisms. An empirical understanding of how these municipal and state dynamics unfold in political and institutional terms will deepen theoretical insights about the intertwining of politics and polity in federalism. However, this analysis has not yet been the subject of the research about the politics of decentralization or of traditional policy analysis in Political Science.

In this dissertation, I do not aim to review the extensive literature on the pros and cons of decentralization and its effects with regards to democratization, governance, and economic efficiency (see the most recent examples in Grindle 2007), nor do I aim to add to the extensive cross-national research amongst decentralization scholars that seek to provide evidence of the decentralization reforms that have been successful in different sector policies and how this relates to the different polity structures across countries (such as the research of Falletti 2010). Rather I aim to provide an empirical, mostly qualitative, contribution that highlights the importance of the subnational politics of federalism, more precisely the intertwining of polity and politics in federalism. My research hereby contributes to the rather rare, comparative work on federalism and to almost inexistent research on the impact of federalism on social policy and social policy outcomes, a gap identified by Obinger et al. (2005) in developed countries and by Gibson et al. (2004: chapter 2) in the Latin American region. It will fill an important gap left by much research on decentralization, which has importantly clarified the technical functioning of subnational institutions, their respective responsibilities, and their constitutionality. However, much of this research has not looked at the constitution of the polity itself, seeing public institutions and their actors as political actors that negotiate and bargain for solutions impacting policy results. Decentralization literature looks extensively into the technicality of policymaking and the clear division of labor at each level of a federation, but without considering the intertwining of polity and politics.

By using the term “politics” as a main term in this dissertation, I need to better understand where it comes from and how it is connected to policymaking. Policy analysis, a concept founded in the United States and influential in German Political Science since the mid 1980s, examines what political actors do, why they do it, and what they finally achieve with their actions (Schubert and Bandelow 2003a). Additionally, it is not only of interest to understand what one actor alone does, but what actors do in coordination with one another (meaning within institutions), and how they interrelate and interact.<sup>14</sup> Policy analysis calls this political interaction process *politics*. It means the process of policymaking amongst formal and informal institutions, including interests, conflicts, and struggles. It is characterized by power, consensus, and enforcement (Schubert and Bandelow 2003b). Politics, however, is only one out of three dimensions that are looked at in policy analysis. The other two are polity—referring to the form of policymaking (e.g., the political system)—and policy, the content and result of policymaking (see Table 1.1). While this division into politics, polity, and policy is initially helpful to methodologically separate the different influences and determine where they come from, detracts from the focus on the intertwining of polity and politics, which is of major interest here.

**Table 1.1. Three Dimensions of Policy Analysis**

Term	Dimension	Application	Characteristics
Politics	Process of policymaking by collective actors, entailing their relationship with institutions created by the polity	Interests Conflicts Struggle	Power Consensus Enforcement
Polity	Form of policymaking	Constitution Norms	Organizations Code of practice Order
Policy	Content and result of policymaking	Duties and objectives Political programs	Problem solving Realization of tasks Values and goals Design

<sup>14</sup> One of the most applied frameworks of policy analysis is the advocacy coalition framework developed and revised by Paul Sabatier. It is an analytical framework for policy analysis that has been widely used in Political Science. It analyzes a policy problem based on the identification of coalitions, meaning interest groups that are analyzed according to their belief systems, or a set of basic values towards a policy problem that members of one coalition share (Sabatier 1987 and 1997).

Source: Author's elaboration, based on Schubert/Bandelow 2003a; b.

In order to answer my research questions, it is important to particularly consider institutions and networks, and the actors within both, existing in the particular federal Brazilian setting. This dissertation will explore how federalism—which most research treats as a polity and system of government—shall be looked at in much more political ways. Taking the example of teachers' unions as important actors in the making of education policy, it is crucial to understand how their positions and powers as political actors influence federalism and its institutions. In Brazil, salaries of teachers serving primary education level are negotiated and set at the municipal level. This means that parts of the political process impacting education quality (assuming that better paid teacher will most likely teach better and students' outcomes will improve) are passed on to the least important level of federalism, opening wide spaces for political negotiation, while simultaneously locating them at the weakest institutional level. By least important, it is meant that the municipal level is the smallest subnational unit with the least resources and influence, coupled with weak institutions. This example shows that important issues, such as the salaries paid to teachers, are not treated as such within the institutional framework, rather they are influenced by local political relationships and networks and, thus, politics. Thus, consequences on quality outcomes are not clear, or they are predicable by the institutional framework alone, and should be analyzed by looking at the intertwining of politics and polity.

### **1.3 Chosen Country, Case Studies, and Methodology**

Why did I choose to study Brazil for this dissertation? Brazil is one of the BRICS countries, which are now often used as major points of reference to exemplify future growth potentials in the world's major developing regions. However, the growth potential here is attached to many challenges, such as the reduction of poverty and inequality. On the upside, one of the reasons Brazil has been presented as Latin America's protagonist in fighting poverty and inequality is because of the current success of its conditional cash transfer program, Bolsa Familia (Economist 2008, 2009). On the downside, the low quality of public education can further retard development progress and the unfolding of its full growth and poverty reduction potential (Economist 2009).

“Perhaps more than any other challenge facing Brazil today, education is a stumbling block in its bid to accelerate its economy and establish itself as one of the world's most powerful nations, exposing a major weakness in its newfound armour”(Barrionuevo 2010).

Having chosen Brazil as country of reference has several implications for the methodology herein in investigating institutional and political factors in the education sector and the involvement of actors and relationships amongst them. Brazil is a federal country where primary education is provided by federal, state, and municipal schools, hereby

creating a three-fold structure of interwoven responsibilities and obligations.<sup>15</sup> These are also reflected upon in political, administrative, and financial realms. For example, while the union has almost exclusive political competence for policy formulation of education policy, state and municipal governments enjoy extensive autonomy for policy implementation (see Chapter 4). However, the structure is not “hierarchical.” This means that municipal governments, at least in primary education, do not have to adhere to the legislation of the state education system, and state governments have little political leverage over decisions taken in municipal education administrations.

Regarding the financial realm, Brazil has a comprehensive system of intergovernmental transfers, including mandatory transfers by the constitution and so-called “voluntary” transfers from actors such as the federal government and individual politicians. These actors establish financial and political networks between the union and specific states (in the case of the “volunteer transfers of the union”) and amongst parliamentarian deputies, states, and municipalities (in the case of “budget amendments of deputies”). This system connects three government levels and their respective actors. Not only do the transfers and where they are spent matter, but so do the relationships that are connected via these transfers, for example amongst legislative and executive power, the private sector, and teachers' unions. Not all interactions, such as the ones emerging from institutional rules (e.g., transfers), may occur in institutionalized ways, but may also be much more informal and entail positive and negative biases for results.<sup>16</sup>

Given that in Brazil, primary education is a policy implemented by state and municipal administrations, the subnational level is the primary level of research for this dissertation. The states of Ceará and Pernambuco were chosen for the empirical case studies of this dissertation because these states, while being very similar in socio-economic terms (see Chapter 3 for further details on comparison of indicators), provide distinctive answers of how the polity and politics of federalism are intertwined. Each state has treated the question of how to collaborate with the municipal level in order to achieve better quality of primary education differently. The answers found in the case studies are insightful for the chosen research questions herein since they show how the influence of political factors and politics in federalism can differ in its effect on outcomes, depending on how the state governments have made use of equally existing federal institutions and the federal polity arrangement itself.

This dissertation consciously opted for a mainly qualitative research methodology (see Chapter 3 for further details). The reason is because much research about pro-poor growth and poverty reduction is quantitative and would not allow an in-depth analysis of how political and institutional factors are connected and how they explain policy outcomes in

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<sup>15</sup> This is already different for secondary school, which beyond eighth grade is considered the exclusive competence of state governments.

<sup>16</sup> This argument refers to the discussion on formal and informal institutions in Latin America, as discussed by Lauth (2004), Helmke/Levitsky (2004), and O'Donnell (1996). These authors argue that the influence of informal institutional practice on policymaking might potentially be large and, therefore, must be considered.

their intertwining. A considerable amount of literature on pro-poor growth uses economic and econometric methodology to study the impact of institutions on development outcomes across a number of countries (Azfar 2004; Chong and Gradstein 2007; Dollar and Kraay 2002). These studies provide a good overview through cross-country comparisons and the policies that contribute, more or less, to growth and poverty reduction. However, there are several setbacks of such macro-approaches. They compare poverty and growth trajectories of very diverse low- and middle-income countries with different historical-institutional roots and political systems from which these policies emerged. The term “governance” is used to identify compound institutional and political factors relevant for growth and poverty reduction. Often, only one or two single indicators are used to capture a very specific institutional feature, while at the same time arriving at slightly differentiated conclusions about governance performance in general (Keefer 2004). In addition, some results turn out to be quite contradictory and, hereby, also reflect that quantitative studies do not have a common understanding about institutions or poverty, with the consequence that indicators and, consequently, what they measure, vary quite substantially (Resnick and Birner 2006, 39).<sup>17</sup>

While the described quantitative literature may be able to demonstrate correlation between institutional or political variables and amongst variables measuring poverty and growth, proving *causal chains* of such effects, especially in relation to institutions and political interactions, is quite complex and, therefore, has often been debated amongst development researchers (Grindle 2004, 558; Unsworth 2002). Due to the technical requirements of quantitative calculations—large datasets, importance of significance, and quantifiable measurement—the performance of institutions, impacts of diverse actors, and the political system must be treated broadly in order to arrive at clear conclusions. A finer separation of influences and effects between institutions and political interactions can hardly be captured by these types of applications, since quantitative indicators can, at most, be proxy indicators.<sup>18</sup>

#### 1.4 Presentation of Thesis Structure

My dissertation is structured in seven chapters. After this introduction, Chapter 1 will lay out the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 and present how literature on federalism and institutionalism discusses the role of polity, politics, networks, and relationships amongst

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<sup>17</sup> A set of indicators that is often used is the governance indicators of the World Bank and the team of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi. It is considered the most comprehensive dataset on governance worldwide (datasets are available for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006, covering 209 countries/territories) and has been an important contribution, especially through the link made between corruption, growth, and poverty reduction. The following are the indicators (and what they measure, in brackets): 1. Voice and Accountability (political, civil and human rights), 2. Political Instability and Violence (likelihood of violent threats); 3. Government Effectiveness (competence of bureaucracy and quality of public service delivery); 4. Regulatory Burden (incidence of market-unfriendly policies); 5. Rule of Law (quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts); and 6. Control of Corruption (exercise of public power for private gain) (Kaufmann et al. 2005).

<sup>18</sup> This is certainly part of the methodological “dilemma” between quantitative and qualitative studies and will not be discussed further here. Nevertheless, a combination of methods could bring greater insight to the pro-poor growth debate (cf. Grindle 2007, 558).



actors. The questions to be answered in Chapter 2, in theoretical terms and based on existing research, are (i) which institutional and political factors are relevant for the understanding of federalism as both an institutional and political space; and (ii) how do these factors influence or bias social policy outcomes in federalism. The chapter closes with the proposition of an alternative theoretical framework of federalism, seeing it both as a space of polity and politics, and the definition of political and institutional factors to be used as empirical indicators in the case studies.

Chapter 3 explains the methodological choices I made during my research process. It includes the justification of a most-similar case study design, the reasoning for the specific case selection at subnational level, and the justification of the chosen time frame of analysis (1995–2010). Further, I explain which types of resources were used, how I collected and analyzed quantitative and qualitative material, how I undertook initial field observations, and how I selected interview partners for expert interviews at the federal and state levels during different stages of the research process.

Chapter 4 explains the functioning of the Brazilian (primary) education system, with the question in mind of how its institutional structure and institutionalized mechanisms determine political weight, behavior, and networks of and amongst actors in a federal system. By outlining the institutional challenges that a decentralized education system faces in providing universal quality across a federation with many differences and actors involved, I present the main policies and institutions designed to cope with these challenges. This is empirically carried out by analyzing what has been expressed as challenging by different types of interviewees in the current Brazilian arrangement, by analyzing federal policies formulated and implemented during the presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994–2002) and Luis Inacio Lula da Silva (2003–2010), and by including an analysis about the respective party dynamics during both administrations. The latter will be necessary in order to understand the party relations and potential political and financial support from the union towards the subnational level (Chapters 5 and 6). Based on this analysis, Chapter 4 closes with a preliminary assessment of the institutional and political challenges for education quality that are embedded in Brazil's federalism. This assessment summarizes the potential interests of the union, state and municipal governments and contrasts these with their actual position in the federal polity. It concludes that even if subnational, state, and municipal governments carry a weaker weight in the federal system than the central government in Brasilia, these subnational levels can still constrain the role of the central government if they make use of their political autonomy and the loosely defined institutional space for federal collaboration.

Chapters 5 and 6 are the main empirical chapters in which I investigate my research questions at the subnational level (Chapter 5 is on Ceará and Chapter 6 is on Pernambuco). I do this in sections, each by exploring institutional (financial and administrative) and political determinants identified in my theoretical framework that are believed to explain most of the subnational politics of federalism in each state. Looking into the different types of financial transfers in the education sector that both states are receiving makes it possible not only to

get an idea about the finances available, but also to understand political networks, such as party links between federal and state level through respective transfers existing in Brazil.

In keeping with the structure of Chapter 4, I then move on to institutionalized policies formulated by the two respective state governments that are especially targeted at improving literacy skills at primary level. I am mainly interested here in understanding how the policies promoted arose and in which historical-political context, how much transparency and accountability occurred in the development of the policies, and how networks with teachers' unions thus emerged. State governments in Brazil do not have any constitutional obligation to offer institutional or technical support to municipal education systems at primary level. However, exploring this detail further will also reveal some differences encountered between the two state governments.

In the last part of Chapters 5 and 6, I explore how the two state governments have been implementing national and subnational literacy programs, and how they have created an information database with education statistics. The theoretical interest here is to tease out how these policies have enhanced accountability and transparency, since both principles are important in order to control for potential informal networks and behavior. The empirical chapters both close with a conclusion about how the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 2 is applicable to the empirical cases.

While Chapter 5 and 6 look separately at each policy formulation and implementation process in the selected states, the concluding chapter, Chapter 7, presents potential similarities and differences of both state experiences in comparison. By summarizing main findings from the empirical chapters, I show which explored factors prove to be most explanatory in answering my research question, and which ones potentially carry less explanatory weight than theoretically assumed. I seek to re-link here to my research hypothesis and confirm that a different combination of political and institutional factors has a strong influence on the policy outcomes produced in education policy in both states. I close with a reassessment of how to read federalism as a space for polity and politics, pointing out policy implications and recommendations stemming from the challenge of a loose, not overly defined, institutional system that at the same time allows room for innovative approaches.

## **2. Theoretical Orientation**

In this chapter, I explore my general hypothesis in light of existing theoretical literature and empirical applications. In a first step, I aim to understand how institutions and networks, and the actors within both, shape public policies and policy outcomes. I also discuss the importance of accountability as a mechanism to monitor and facilitate the functioning of formal institutions. This chapter will also include a discussion on federalism, because federalism is a specific system of formal institutions and, thus, it is important to understand the role and effects of federal institutions on policy outcomes. Yet, an interpretation of federalism as a mere institutional framework with formally agreed upon rules laid out in a federal constitution would miss another important political reading that includes non-formal institutions. Therefore, the second part of this chapter explores which roles non-formal institutions and institutional behavior play in a federal polity, hereby exploring the politics of federalism. It also points out the need to incorporate a layer of political interaction between formality and informality. Some types of relationships, networks, and behaviors are not regarded as formal in the institutional sense, nor do they have the negative impact on policy outcomes of types of institutional informality, such as clientelism. This third space of political interaction emerges because of federal rules that provide varying degrees of leeway to political actors (politicians, civil society, subnational governments), and discretionary practices of political actors can either strengthen or weaken federalism in its institutional foundation. Such a reading of federalism is absent in the discussion on federal systems, which is mostly based in the United States and the European Union, and needs to be explored further in the Latin American context. The chapter closes with the proposition of an alternative theoretical framework that integrates and situates the different types of relationships within federalism, reading it both as a space of polity and politics. The framework will also point out the types of policy outcomes that can be expected as a result of differentiated political interaction.

### **2.1 The Role of Institutions in General**

The general hypothesis of this dissertation assumes that policy outcomes can be explained by a conjunction of institutional and political factors. I assume that formal and informal institutions, and the hereby emerging policymaking process, with either positive or negative bias, influence the results of public policy in general and of education policy in specific. It is important to understand how this takes place, and which type of literature has discussed these or similar questions.

The first task is to define institutions, actors, and networks in the context of this dissertation, since politics is made up by these three terms and their interplay. In political science (with overlap to sociology and economics), the extensive literature on institutionalism treats these terms by asking what institutions are, how they structure political life, and how they determine political processes and their results. There are three main

schools of thought in the “new institutionalism”<sup>19</sup> (although others have emerged over time), namely rational choice, sociological, and historical institutionalism. The first type of institutionalism focuses on the rational choices and individual preferences of different types of actors (often called players) towards the rules imposed by institutions. In sociological institutionalism, emphasis is placed on the cognitive and normative account of institutions, with the possibility that institutions are socially constructed by its members, their perceptions, and cognitions, rather than being objective entities (Scott 1987: In Peters 2007: 117). Finally, historical institutionalism emphasizes that institutions, and the relations of actors within the rules of these institutions, have to be seen in their historical embedding, sequencing, and unfolding. While these three schools of thought are typically contrasted with each other, there are still some common characteristics, mainly because arguments developed by one school were often brought forward in response or critique to arguments of another.

Douglass North is a main advocate of institutional economics and commonly related with the school of rational choice. Despite not being a scholar of historical institutionalism, North won the Noble Prize in economics for his contribution to economic history focusing on the way in which economic institutions have long-lasting effects, and how they shape economic outcomes long after the initial decision has been made to create those institutions (Peters 2005: 72). In his work entitled “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance” (North 1990), North sees institutions as a dynamic entity closely intertwined with socially agreed upon norms and interactions. While being dynamic, he states, institutions still constrain the behavior of individuals or players:

“Institutions are the rule of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change” (North 1990, 3).

If we compare this notion of institutions to that of Peter Hall—an important historical institutionalist—we can see how close the two are, if considering definitions only. For Hall, institutions are “the rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy” (Hall 1986, 19). For both North and Hall, institutions are rules that structure the interaction of individuals and collectivities in economic and political realms. Institutions set out the norms, procedures, and conventions that society follows. Without them, individuals would likely live in a world of chaotic interactions without any external boundaries.

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<sup>19</sup> The term “new institutionalism” emerged in the 1980s based on the goal to move beyond the main assumptions of the “old institutionalism” in political science after World War II, namely rational choice and behaviouralism. Both of these approaches assumed that individuals would act autonomously as individuals in order to maximise their utility. Main proponents of the “new institutionalism,” such as March and Olsen (1984), argued that institutionalism had to find explanations reaching beyond individual, mostly utilitarian, interpretations, and that political science needed to reintegrate collective choice and central political in its discipline.

The relationships structured by institutions between the state and society have been a focal point of sociologists for a long time, and political scientists have heavily drawn from such analysis (Peters 2005: 111). Weber's "theory of bureaucracy," Durkheim's "science of institutions," and Parson's "functionalism" are the most prominent examples of sociological institutionalism seeking to understand institutions, organizations, questions of institutionalization, and institutional change. The process of institutionalization and the process of creating values and cognitive frames are central to this school of institutionalism (Peters 2005: 116). Jepperson defines institutions as "(...) socially constructed, routine reproduced (...) program or rule systems (...) operating as relative fixtures of constraining environments and (...) accompanied by taken-for-granted-accounts" (Jepperson 1991 cit. in Peters 2005: 116). Also, for Jepperson, "Institutions are those social patterns that, when chronically reproduced, owe their survival to relatively self-activating processes" (Jepperson cit. in Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 5). These authors, as well as others, place emphasis on the cognitive character of institutions and point out "the self-reproducing properties of institutions" that are cognitive in nature, as well as the fact that "(...) institutions may be so routine and 'taken for granted' that they are beyond conscious scrutiny" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 5).

Boundaries, particularly between rational choice and historical institutionalism, are not as defined as often assumed (cf. Thelen 1999), and the normative part of sociological institutionalism is especially close to the normative version of historical institutionalism in political science (Peters 2005, 117). However, main differences between rational choice, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism become more apparent in the ways in which researchers from each school approach empirical problems. While rational choice emphasizes the coordinating functions of institutions (they generate or maintain an assumed type of equilibrium), historical institutionalism highlights how institutions emerge, and how they are embedded in concrete historical processes. Sociological institutionalism, in turn, makes little differentiation between institutions and organizations, and is interested in investigating changes in institutionalization and de-institutionalization as a process of adding or increasing more roles and features in an institution via changes of cognitive frames (Peters 2005, 118).

The seemingly more accentuated distinction between rational choice and historical institutionalism has a methodological repercussion that is not necessarily dichotomic. In most cases, rational choice aspires to produce general theoretical claims on a larger scale. Therefore, historical examples are used less to express the intrinsic methodological importance of the claims and more to illustrate how widely applicable the established theoretical claims are (cf. Thelen 1999, 373). Historical institutionalism, by contrast, focuses on a few historical cases. These are carefully selected according to specific time and/or space criteria in order to explain, as well as illustrate, an overarching question. In this sense, rational choice researchers are more interested in obtaining far-reaching theoretical

explanations, while researchers in historical institutionalism produce—based on rather a limited amount of cases—midrange theoretical contributions (Thelen 1999, 372).<sup>20</sup>

For the purposes of this dissertation, historical and parts of sociological institutionalism seemed to be more adequate for the interpretation of institutions and networks, and the way actors behave and relate to each other within these institutions (see below). March and Olsen, main proponents of the “new institutionalism” in political science, provide a definition of institutions and political institutions that this dissertation primarily refers to:

“An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources (...) There are constitutive rules and practices prescribing appropriate behavior for specific actors in specific situations. There are structures of resources that create capabilities for acting. Institutions empower and constrain actors differently and make them more or less capable of acting according to prescriptive rules of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2006, 3).

This quote highlights some important features of historical institutionalism. For example, institutions are not created all of a sudden, rather there is a set of rules that constitutes an institution and the rules differ for different situations and people. Political institutions, in consequence, are constitutive rules structuring political life. For March and Olsen, political institutions “(.) are collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations” (March and Olsen 1989, 160).

Historical institutionalism sees political interactions as the result of historical, long-term processes in polity and society that are path dependent. Initial choices made in early stages of the policy development process, and the institutionalized commitments growing out of these, are argued to determine subsequent decisions of actors (Peters 2007, 19). However, the path is dynamic, assuming “a course of evolution rather than a complete following of the initial pattern” (Peters 2007, 74). An initial institutional choice will not evolve in a predictable or calculable way, but simply follow one path more likely than another. In contrast to rational choice theory, where emphasis is placed on an individual institution or actor seeking to maximize his or her interest, historical institutionalism analyzes how sets of organizations and institutions relate to each other, shape processes, and lead to outcomes of interest. Powerful effects are expected from interactions between institutions or between institutions and organizations (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 13).

The analytical challenge in this school of thought is how to explain institutional change when a central argument is that the initiation of a policy choice is crucial and will have long-enduring effects. How shall the course of events change once it has been initiated (Peters 2007, 76)? A promising avenue to address this question has been to efficiently determine how path dependence operates in practice, for example by using positive feedback loops to explain how initial choices become reinforced over time (ibid). Another avenue is to include the idea of “critical junctures” in the methodological framework, as shown by Collier and

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<sup>20</sup> See Bates (1998) for an example for how this methodological approach can be used.

Collier (1991) (in Peters 2007, 78). These authors argue that institutional change amongst Latin American governments in the mid-20th century would not have occurred unless there were a variety of internal political forces that in coordination, rather than individually, could evoke change.<sup>21</sup> Last but not least, institutions may also change through sharing and gaining knowledge, progressing with the new information that emerges (Peters 2007, 78).

Besides the long-enduring effects of policy processes spanning over long periods of time, it is important to mention a second, space related dimension. A discussion of federalism and the role played by the subnational level entails a deeper look at the relationship between spaces that are being occupied by policymaking and what this means for the exertion of political power and “the political.” Schroer, in his article “Räume, Orte, Grenzen: Auf dem Weg zu einer Soziologie des Raums,” proposes at least four different ways to consider political spaces. First, political power is often strongly associated with a location, for example the White House, the Kremlin, or the Bundestag, among others. Second, the spaces of the political are continuously being constructed and reconstructed. An example is the newly emerged, socially constructed divide in the “West” and the “rest,” or North and South, as a consequence of terrorist attacks worldwide. Third, the state, in its duty to make collectively binding decisions through policymaking, has to always consider what the reach of these decisions will be, if they will affect all of the citizens of a village, town, region, or even country. Fourth, being the result of globalization and apparently unlimited opportunities, it often seems that the space of the political in form of the nation state has lost its validity. Time, not space, seems to have gained more and more weight (Schroer 2006, 185). Schroer’s argument is relevant for the discussion herein because it means that federalism does not only entail at least three levels of formal hierarchy of power, but also that each level has implications in terms of political power. Each of these hierarchies is entitled to rule about different geographical and normative spaces.

Despite the challenges mentioned, to clearly define and relate institutions and actors, historical institutionalism proves to be sensitive to two goals of this dissertation, namely to present an understanding of politics as a slowly moving process within a specific historical context, and to provide a theoretical framework considering the interactions between one or several collectives, rather than individuals. Development entails a continuously changing, and certainly very slow moving, process. Poverty reduction means to bring about change in many different dimensions of people’s lives. In turn, it requires complex social changes that take place over a long period of time. For example, the process of increasing the literacy and math skills of a country’s uneducated population to improve overall education quality means to analyze an extreme slow process in society and economy. For a literacy policy to fully unfold its intended effects, it needs time and continuous adjustments. During its unfolding, political interests will change the initial policy design. The process leading to the desired outcome, such as achieving universal literacy, does not happen from one day to another, rather it takes several cohorts or even generations.

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<sup>21</sup> For a methodological approach following this argument and searching to bridge the divide between quantitative and qualitative research, see Charles Ragin’s work on fuzzy sets and qualitative comparative analysis in C. Ragin (2000): “Fuzzy-set Social Science.”

To wholly understand long-term processes and results, historic unfolding and sequences potentially offer meaningful explanations that otherwise would stay hidden. For example, Pierson argues, in “Politics in time”, that social scientists often risk misinterpreting social realities if they do not consider the particular course and unfolding of a policy process.

“Especially in economics and political science, the time horizons of most analysts have become increasingly restricted. Both in what we seek to explain and in our search for explanations, we focus on the immediate – we look for causes and outcomes that are both temporally contiguous and rapidly unfolding. In the process, we miss a lot [Goldstone 1998; Kitschelt 2003 qtd.]. These are important things that we do not see at all, and what we do see we often misunderstand” (Pierson 2004, 79).

Pierson and Skocpol make a similar argument, stating that institutions often have highly “layered effects” that need to be uncovered in order to understand present institutional situations and their results:

“Because of strong path dependent effects, institutions are not easily scrapped when conditions change. Instead, institutions will often have a highly ‘layered’ quality [Schickler 2001; Stark and Bruszt 1998]. New initiatives are introduced to address contemporary demands, but they add to, rather than replace pre-existing institutional forms. Alternatively, old institutions may persist but be turned to different uses by newly ascendant groups. In either case, the original choices are likely to figure heavily in the current functioning of the institution” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 14).

Both studies provide powerful arguments that the make-up and effects of present institutions are most likely the result of several sets of processes in the past.

While the emphasis on institutional continuity and institutional patterns is especially strong in historical institutionalism, Mahoney and Thelen (2010) point out that none of the three strands of institutionalism (rational choice, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism) explain particularly well the sources for institutional change. Most scholars explain institutional change as a function of an exogenous shock or event, but do not explore further the potential endogenous reasons of the institutions themselves that make them change over time. Mahoney and Thelen present different reasons as to why institutions may change dynamically based on internal, rather than external, circumstances, such as shifts in the balance of political power, the embedding of one actor in a multiplicity of institutions, and interactions allowing for unforeseen changes in the distribution of resources. The authors classify four main channels of endogenous institutional change: (i) displacement as the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones; (ii) layering as the introduction of new rules on top of, or alongside, existing ones; (iii) drifting as the changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment; and (iv) conversion as the changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 7). These channels shall be kept in mind as explanations that potentially affect the behavior of political actors in response to these institutional changes.



## 2.2 The Study of Federalism

As outlined in the introduction, a crucial debate of reference for this dissertation is on the politics of federalism. This debate provides important theoretical insights in order to understand what kind of mechanisms and incentives a federal polity, such as the Brazilian one, creates for actors and their political networks, how actors adhere to federal institutions in place, and how, accordingly, the quality of education is influenced. Earlier in this chapter, it was emphasized that the influence of institutions on actors is rather strong. Two subsequent questions emerge from here. First, how can institutional rules set up by federalism influence actors of a decentralized primary education policy? Second, how does informal behavior come into play and influence educational outcomes in either positive or negative ways?

### 2.1.1 Riker's Federalism and the Need to Look Beyond

The study of federalism and decentralization in relation to social policymaking and welfare outcomes is relatively recent in the study of federalism (Fenwick 2010). It has been undertaken in the context of both developed and developing countries. For many decades, William H. Riker greatly marked theoretical and empirical research on federalism. Riker, who between 1964 and 1995 published extensively on this topic, applied game theory and mathematics to political science and advocated rational choice in American Political Science.<sup>22</sup> Two important propositions, of relevance to this dissertation, emerged from this author. First, Riker saw the federal system of the United States as a model and standard case for the study of other countries. He also suggested that the decentralized federalism of the United States was in clear dichotomy to centralized federalisms of other federal polities. Second, Riker believed that policies were formed by individual choices and preferences rather than by institutions, following one principal assumption of rational choice. This general understanding also influenced his view on the connections among federal institutions, policies, and policy outcomes. Riker assumed that federal institutions had no policy impact at all (Stepan 2004, 46), as the following excerpts show:

“What counts is not the rather trivial constitutional structure but rather the political and economic culture. Federalism is at most an intervening and relatively unimportant variable” (Riker 1969, 144 emphasis added).

“Federalism makes no particular difference for public policy (Riker 1975, 143).

Scholars interested in theoretical and empirical studies on federalism in democratic systems have reviewed the propositions (Diaz-Cayeros 2004; Rodden 2004; Stepan 2004). The first proposition—U.S. federalism as a model case for other federal polities—is

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<sup>22</sup> Amongst Riker's most cited works are “Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance” (1964); a long article in the *Handbook of Political Science* (1975); “The Development of American Federalism” (1987); and a theoretical chapter on the future of federalism in the context of the European Union (1996).

traceable if considering that at the time of Riker's studies many Latin American countries had not yet embarked on the road to democratization, or even decentralization, but were in the midst of either democratic transitions or military dictatorships. The study of other cases beyond the model of the United States has advanced since then, yet it can be observed that literature on federal systems still has a strong U.S./EU bias in the arguments put forward.

It should be questioned whether this reading of federalism is indeed a valid one for the Latin American context, and if the theoretical assumptions made in the context of the United States and EU can be effectively applied to specific country cases in the southern hemisphere. This would imply that the strong historical differences in the formation of democracies between the United States and the EU and Latin America do not have a strong impact, even if, in reality, they certainly do. In addition, and by just comparing the most prominent federal countries in the region itself—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—one has to ask: Do these federal systems indeed have the same institutional organization? How many different types of federalisms, even within one major world region, are there?<sup>23</sup> Moreover, as a consequence of these different federal organizations, is it unrealistic to assume that there are considerable differences in the relationships amongst the different political actors involved as well as in how these differences influence policy outcomes? These questions call for a critical exploration of what federalism is and what definition could be useful in the research presented herein.

Riker's second proposition—federalism has no policy impact—is surprising, according to Stepan, if considering that the founding father of federalism himself did not believe in the power of his concept vis-a-vis policies. This can be explained by Riker's rational choice advocacy:

“Riker sees individual preferences as being the driving force behind social choice. From this premise Riker argues that, if an aggregate of individuals believe that any particular set of institutions such as federal institutions contribute to policy outcomes they do not like, it is relatively easy for them to change those institutions, and to change policy. This line of argument is what leads Riker to the seemingly peculiar position of being the world's most prestigious academic authority on federalism and asserting that the object of his scientific observation is actually a powerless chimera” (Stepan 2001, 337).

However, the author still acknowledged that one has to look beyond federalism as a system and to explore its “real forces:

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<sup>23</sup> Despite the fact that Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are all federal systems with subnational governments, many differences exist with respect to how much political and fiscal power is given to these provinces or states (this even differs by policy area when considering social policies or others such as infrastructure and foreign policy), which roles the capital provinces have (Buenos Aires for example concentrates much more socio-economic power than Brasilia that was created in the center of Brazil in the 1960s with the purpose to de-concentrate the country's development), and the extent of the influence that major parties in the center have within the political system (for example, the PRI in Mexico had a predominant role during a long period of seven decades, while in Brazil during similar periods, there was much more alternation of power at the center).

“No matter how useful the fiction of federalism is in creating new government, one should not overlook the fact that it is a fiction. In the study of federal governments, therefore, it is always appropriate to go behind the fiction to study the real forces in a political system” (Riker 1969, 146; in Stepan 2001, 337).

In a purely institutional, normative perspective, federalism is a political concept of government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing authority and constituent political units (e.g., states or provinces). Subnational governments are assigned specific roles, but they cannot merely be understood as a prolongation of will of the central government given their own territorial, economic, and political interests. These unfold over longer periods of time and through a complex process, as Jonathan Rodden denotes. He sees federalism to a lesser extent as a particular distribution of authority between governments, but “(...) rather [as] a process – structured by a set of institutions – through which authority is distributed and redistributed. Federalism can be traced back to the Latin *foedus*, or covenant. The word eventually was used to describe cooperative, contractual agreements between states, usually for the purpose of defense” (Rodden 2004, 489; emphasis in original). The notion of *federalism as a process* is crucial for this dissertation.

Federalism is a system in which, *in theory*, the power to govern is formally shared between national and provincial/state governments, hereby creating a federation. Finances (fiscal resources such as tax income and national transfers), territorial interests, and jurisdictional and institutional rules that regulate the behavior of government and nongovernmental actors all affect the sharing of power. In addition, there is a strong influence on this sharing of power by the political forces at the center and subnational levels, as well as respective bargaining processes, networks, and informal institutional behavior, such as clientelism. The understanding of federalism herein shall be restricted to the one proposed by Dahl, who only regarded democracies as federal systems in their strictest sense. Stepan justifies Dahl’s definition as the following:

“This is so, because for Dahl, federalism ‘is a system in which some matters are exclusively within the competence of certain local units—cantons, states, provinces—and are constitutionally beyond the scope of the authority of the national government; and where certain other matters are constitutionally outside the scope of the authority of the smaller units [Dahl qtd. in Stepan; emphasis in original]. Only a system that is a democracy can build the relatively autonomous constitutional, legislative and judicial systems necessary to meet the Dahlian requirements for a federation” (Stepan 2001, 318).

In their study on the impact of federalism on the development of welfare states in the European, North American, and Australian context, Obinger et al. (2005) define federalism as a phenomenon with five crucial characteristics. Here, federalism is understood as the following:

- Institutional arrangements and decision-making rules at the central governmental level with a certain degree of veto power to subordinate other levels/branches of government

- Jurisdictional arrangements that allocate policy responsibilities between different levels of government, including policy formulation and policy implementation
- Territorially-based actors with ideas and interests that may vary greatly in their number and heterogeneity (for example, municipalities)
- Inter-governmental fiscal transfer arrangements (depending on the type of fiscal transfers and to which federal level these belong or are passed on to)
- Informal agreements, both at the vertical and horizontal levels, between governments (Obinger, Leibfried, and Castles 2005, 9), and other actors

The list of these five complex characteristics supports the argument by Linz et al. that federalism is a very complicated form of government (Linz qtd. in Obinger et al., 2005, 383).<sup>24</sup> These authors confirm the formerly presented function of institutions and actors and their political networks as equally valid in a federal setting. From a strictly formal institutional perspective, being an institutional space with functioning norms, institutional configurations are based on federal rules. This function occupies most of Obinger's et al. definition, and informal agreements are only mentioned peripherally.

### *2.1.2 Associating Federalism with the Discourse of Decentralization*

When federalism is discussed with respect to Latin America, it is closely associated with decentralization and democratization processes. This connection is useful, to some extent, since it entangles the different layers of federalism that are, analytically, necessary to bear in mind, and clarifies how accountability is related to the policy outcomes produced by federalism. However, the connection also reveals a discourse on the expectations and hopes that international organizations in particular brought up when Latin American nations embarked on their route of political emancipation in the mid-1980s, advocating to give more power to the people and local levels after dictatorships in centralized authoritarian states. A second discourse exists here. If fiscal decentralization (being the part of decentralization that may matter most for political emancipation of local levels) cannot actually take place because of large socioeconomic inequalities, decentralization remains a discourse led by political elites to appease political masses, but it will not necessarily lead to better living conditions of disadvantaged social groups.

As the normative definition of federalism, decentralization means the distribution of power, resources, and interests (bearing in mind the above mentioned discourses) amongst the central government and subnational units. Decentralization takes place in political, administrative, and fiscal terms. Political decentralization—assuming well-institutionalized

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<sup>24</sup> Presently, 23 federal states worldwide comprise 40 percent of the world's population (ibid.).

procedures—is expected to increase the participatory character of decision-making processes at the local level. Administrative decentralization is expected to decrease different types of transaction costs that surround the provision of public services, including communication, transport, and logistics. By assuming that local levels of governments are geographically and culturally closer to the demands of the beneficiary population, they are assumed to be more knowledgeable and, hence, more responsive to these demands. The goals of fiscal decentralization are to make the use of finances more efficient, to provide better information about local preferences, and *to raise the possibility of the citizens to hold governments and politicians more accountable for the provision of public goods*. Reaping these benefits, however, assumes equal availability of taxable income and its equal distribution (Shah 2006; McGinn/Welsh 1999; Ahmad et al. 2005). With these arguments, institutions such as the World Bank have long advocated decentralization reforms in developing countries.<sup>25</sup>

Three main schools of thought exist about decentralization and its expected policy impacts. While economists have argued that decentralization would increase allocative efficiency of goods and services targeted towards local demand (Coase 1960; Tiebout 1956), political scientists believe that decentralization enhances democratization since it allows for higher degrees of participation at the local level (hereby potentially deepening democracy). Additionally, public management theory has argued that decentralization contributes to more responsive decision making and more balanced distribution so that citizens can demand good quality of public services at the local level (for an excellent review, see Grindle 2007, 7).

In education systems, a number of objectives can be gained through decentralization, such as to improve education by increasing the amount and quality of inputs in schooling via tailor-made solutions at the local level; to innovate programs and options available to students by letting them actively participate; to reduce inequalities in access to quality education by finding more specific support to vulnerable groups; and to increase learning outcomes through interventions integrating parents and communities more directly (McGinn/Welsh 1999, 28). Certainly, these assumed outcomes are equally related to the different schools of thought of decentralization.

In order to achieve the outlined benefits from decentralization, formal institutions must function in expected ways. As will be outlined in the course of this chapter, it is not always possible to assume that this will be the case. How decentralization can contribute to improving the quality of education equally depends on a variety of formal institutional, informal institutional, and other political practices, as well as corresponding relationships established amongst them (Lakshman 2003; Putzel/Moore 2003; Tanzi 1995). Decentralization is, following Crook/Sverrisson (2003), “(...) about the distribution of power and resources, both among different levels and territorial areas of the state and among different interests in their relationship with ruling elites” (ibid, 234). This definition captures both the political and territorial character of federalism (see discussion about territorial and political power below), as well as the role of political actors, such as elites in federal systems.

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<sup>25</sup> For an overview, see <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/what.htm> [27/04/2012].

Through which specific channels do federalism and decentralization become connected in ways affecting policies, policymaking, and policy outcomes? Gibson distinguishes between the “federalism as decentralization” school and the “federalism as alliance” school (Gibson 2004: 6). In his view, “federalism as decentralization” entails to look at “a set of practices in which the distribution of political and economic activities is spatially decentralized in any given national territory” (ibid.), while “federalism as alliance,” in the context of Latin American polities, constitutes “(...) a national polity with dual (or multiple) levels of government, each exercising exclusive authority over constitutionally determined policy areas, but in which only one level of government—the central government—is internationally sovereign” (Gibson 2004, 5). The second definition of decentralization accentuates the question of hierarchical relationships in federalism discussed above.

Based on how decentralization is supposed to unfold, and which effects have been expected from it, its outcomes have been somewhat unpredictable. Based on the assumption that federalism and processes of decentralization are closely related, it can be expected that outcomes of federalism will also be somewhat unpredictable. Grindle argues that because decentralization is a non-linear process unfolding over time<sup>26</sup> (as Rodden similarly maintains about federalism), its results are not necessarily similar: “*Decentralization can mean progress towards improved governance and democracy as well as the erosion of local conditions of well-being*” (Grindle 2007, 10). Similar arguments will apply to the subsequent discussion on federalism herein.

### 2.1.3 Assumed Continuum and Dichotomies in Federalism

Many scholars have debated Riker’s two main propositions on federalism, in particular with respect to the different political circumstances under which federalism in Latin America exist. Stepan himself rejects Riker’s second proposition by assessing four types of variables that he believes sufficiently show how strongly federal institutions matter for policy. The author classifies several federal countries, including Brazil, Germany, India, Russia, and the United States, on a “demos constraining” versus “demos enabling” continuum, emphasizing that “(...) at all points in the continuum federal institutions can have a great impact on policy” (Stepan 2001, 316). The term *demos* means “all the citizens of a polity.” *Demos-constraining* refers to a federation where formal institutions are strong enough to alter democracy against the will of its majority, while *demos-enabling* refers to a federation where the opposite would be the case (ibid.). To test this hypothesis on a variety

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<sup>26</sup> Tulia Falleti’s recent “*Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America*” studies the four processes of decentralization in education policy in Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico, and in health in Brazil. This author argues that during decentralization, multilayered effects are unlikely to occur at the same time, but are temporally staggered and institutionally built upon each other. By applying theoretical assumptions of historical institutionalism to qualitative methodology, Falleti advocates a sequential theory of decentralization where the sequencing of the three different dimensions of decentralization is determinant for the intergovernmental evolution of power at the subnational level. She challenges the assumption that decentralization would always increase the power of governors and mayors vis-à-vis the national government, hereby re-evaluating the causes and consequences of post-developmental decentralization. According to Falleti, how power is indeed gained by these two actors depends largely on what type of decentralization is implemented first, and on then on the sequencing of subsequent reforms (Falleti 2010, 15).

of federal countries empirically, Stepan uses four variables: (i) the degree of overrepresentation in the territorial chamber; (ii) the policy scope of the territorial chamber; (iii) the degree to which policymaking is constitutionally allocated to super majorities; and (iv) the degree to which the party system is polity-wide in its orientation and incentive systems. Stepan concludes that all four variables matter for the impact on policies, being the last (the role of political parties and their impact on federal institutions) the one that is most likely to change (Stepan 2001, 360).

Just as the federal countries can be situated on Stepan's demos-constraining/demos-enabling continuum, so can the policy effects that the systems evoke on this continuum. Policy effects can be either "demos constraining" (they constrain the outcomes advocated by a democratic majority) or "demos enabling" (they enable the outcomes advocated by a democratic majority). Yet, effects can be quite varied and can be the result of either formal patterns of political behavior (in the institutional sense), or "paraconstitutional patterns of political behavior that mitigate or exacerbate limits on the ability of a politywide majority to make policy" (Stepan 2004, 52).

Interestingly, in Stepan's continuum investigating Brazil, Germany, India, Spain, and the United States, Brazil is found to be the most demos-constraining case with a large number of parties, high volatility of party members, self-financed campaigns, and strong regional agendas in Congress (Stepan 2004, 72). A couple of institutional rules are peculiar in the Brazilian case, offsetting the power of the majority. For example, the Brazilian president can legislate via presidential decrees and hereby bypass Congress (a measure that Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in particular, made wide use of). Further, there is an over-representation of some states in the Senate, which, with only a few seats, account for more than half of the votes in this chamber. This leads to "patronage and logrolling," because decision making depends on these states with smaller populations (which do not necessarily represent the demos or majority of citizens, but nevertheless hold much political power). Also, even small minorities in Congress have the power to block decisions advocated by a political majority (Stepan 2001, 340). These are just a few examples to illustrate why Brazil's federalism is an extreme demos-constraining case.

In their case-study approach on the impact of federalism on social policies in Brazil (education, health, and social assistance), Abrucio and Francese (2009) discuss the extent to which another dichotomy often made in federalism, namely cooperative versus collaborative types of federalism, is useful to understand the Brazilian case. Collaboration and cooperation refer here to the types of relationships emerging amongst central, state, and municipal governments in a federal system. Competitive federalism entails that competences are distributed amongst governments based on the division of responsibilities according to a respective policy. This action separates the space of action of government level in order to preserve the policymaking autonomy of each federal unit and to foster competition amongst these. In this sense, it is a decentralized model in which tax jurisdiction is also divided, making the fixing of different tax values possible across different federal units (at the same level) that compete one against another. Again, the United States would be the prime

example for competitive federalism. In contrast, collaborative federalism means that political institutions incite territorial actors (at different federal levels) to collaborate amongst each other by functionally dividing power and foreseeing tasks to be jointly executed. In contrast to fiscal competition, tax jurisdiction is shared and fiscal equalization of funds exists horizontally and vertically. Germany is a case of such collaborative federalism (Franzese and Abrucio 2009, 26).

Abrucio and Franzese find that Brazilian federalism lies somewhere in between these two poles of competitive and collaborative federalism. In Article 23, the Brazilian Constitution promulgates the cooperation of public policy amongst municipalities, states, and the union in areas such as access to quality healthcare and education, cultural and historical heritage, protection of the environment, poverty reduction, and the preservation of cultural heritage. However, besides a potential complementary law in the future to regulate the norms of cooperation, Brazilian federalism does not establish a functional division of power amongst these entities that would clearly assign who is responsible for the formulation and the execution/implementation of social policy (Franzese and Abrucio 2009, 28). Chapter 4 goes deeper into these issues and explores the policy implications of the normatively loose “collaborative regime.”

The interpretations of Brazil’s federalism of “lying somewhere in between” the dichotomy of collaborative versus cooperative federalism, or situating countries on a demos-constraining/demos-enabling continuum, are helpful for normative thinking in formulating and implementing social policy. Yet, it may also lead to the polarization of models that may not always fit these categories, especially if federalism is perceived as both an institutional *and* a political system. To avoid this, one starting point is to regard federalism as a system of political relations.

#### *2.1.4 Federalism as a System of Political and Bargaining Relations*

Reconnecting to the first of Schroer’s proposition mentioned previously, one could claim that federalism is an institutionally defined, yet political space, where political power is defined by the geographical space where it takes place.

Gibson emphasizes that any system with a territorial organization has implications for politics at both the national and subnational levels. According to this author, political elites at the subnational level will pursue political strategies related to a defined territory that, in turn, are connected to overarching political objectives within a larger political system:

“Political geographer Robert Sack defines territoriality as ‘a spatial strategy to affect, influence or control resources and people, by controlling area’. ‘Controlling area’ in subnational politics often means monopolizing levers of power in other arenas as well. It requires controlling linkages between levels of territorial organization as well as exercising influence in national political arenas” (Gibson 2005: 106).



Gibson argues further that there is the need to consider “*the functional nature of relationships between levels of government and the implications this has for power and political outcomes*” (Gibson 2005: 106). Gibson writes:

“Today, federalization has meant a process of political decentralization that has given greater protagonism to subnational governments and political actors, has often heightened the importance of territorial representation (as opposed to population representation) in national political institutions, and has redistributed power and resources between levels of governments (Gibson 2004, 2).”

If Gibson’s arguments are reconnected to the organization of federalism as a space with a top-down organization and assigned functions, they will have implications for both political and fiscal resource allocations. In fact, in a federal system relations are hierarchically organized where the central government holds more power than subnational governments. In the public sector, hierarchy can be defined as “coordination by administrative means (...) that takes the form of rule-governed regulatory coordination and bureaucratic measures (Thompson 2003, 23). Yet, hierarchy in federalism can also be of political nature, going beyond the administrative order it seeks to put into place. Here political hierarchy can mean that subnational political governments are potentially subordinated to overarching, political, and party dynamics; or they are a function of the nationally proposed political agenda (this is the argument of Rokkan and Urwin, cf. Gibson 2005, 106). Gibson cautions such an assumption, though, and stresses the interdependent character of center and periphery (subnational) political forces in federal systems:

“However, the stress on subordination can obscure the importance of the periphery for a number of tasks of territorial governance. The periphery may ‘need’ the center for many things, but the center also ‘needs’ the periphery for vital functions, including maintaining political order throughout the national territory, delivering votes, or providing services. It is thus more fruitful to look at the mutual interdependence of center and periphery than to assume the subordination or marginalization of the periphery” (Gibson 2005, 106).

With regards to the fiscal organization in federal systems, the argument of interdependent relations between the center and subnational levels is also valid. While initially it may seem that subnational governments depend on the central government and their fiscal transfers, the central government also depends on the political favors done by subnational governments in turn for these resources (unless there is a rigidly controlled equalization of funds in place). Fiscal resources, especially when they are unequally distributed, have a strong political dimension and bargaining power. Even if state and municipal governments are institutionally entitled with fiscal, political, and administrative competences, these will not automatically translate into political strength. A federal organization, especially in the fiscal space (which is a clearly defined territory), paired with inter- and intra-regional socioeconomic inequalities has significant political implications, in particular when considering the increasing role of informal institutions and networks, as Braig and Groll demonstrate in their comparison of fiscal federalism in Argentina and Mexico (Braig and Groll 2011).

This finding coincides with what Stepan calls “asymmetrical federalism”. According to this author, asymmetrical federalism arises in the presence of an accentuated socioeconomic divide, which has implications for bargaining processes in a federation in general (Stepan 2001, 326). Following this argument, and given that in Brazil socioeconomic differences amongst regions and states as subnational units are large, these units will engage in bargaining processes in order to eventually obtain more financial and political support from the federal government at the center. Some Brazilian authors even argue that different types of decentralization potentially bear the risk increasing inequalities in a federation that already has one of the highest gaps between the rich and the poor (Bachur 2005; Franzese and Abrucio 2009; Portela de Oliveira and Santana 2010). There is a strong economic component that impacts the effects of decentralization through economic growth and connected tax incomes, especially in relation to the two geographic extremes of south and northeastern Brazil. These economic and fiscal imbalances crucially determine how Brazilian state and municipal governments have to make political and administrative choices (Arretche 2004; Souza 2002, 436).

Along with socioeconomic differences associated with different access to fiscal resources, other types of resources, such as information, translate into power asymmetries in federalism. Information is a crucial ingredient for transparency and accountability in a policy process following institutional rules. Lacking or differentiated access to information creates power

asymmetries amongst political actors that eventually lead to behavior not aligned with institutional rules.

Gibson (2004, 14) closely relates power asymmetries in a federal distribution with information asymmetries: “To a great extent, federalism is an institutional solution to the problem of power asymmetries between the constituent units of a federation (...).” This means, in turn, that these power asymmetries of federalism will have a policy impact—for example, during the process of resource allocation and distribution of intergovernmental fiscal transfers when units will differ according to tax income—compete for additional transfers, and therefore pursue their own political interests within a bigger federation. Financial resources become a sensitive topic, especially when these are scarce and in federations that are highly heterogeneous in tax incomes, for example in the case of Brazil.

Federal resource allocation can be associated with political relations, as well as with concrete party dynamics between central and subnational levels and vice versa. Presenting the case of Mexico and the rules and political practices in regional resource allocation, Diaz-Cayeros argues that political parties can exert pressure on centralization or redistribution of fiscal resources up to the point where their political practices, rather than institutional rules, become decisive:

“Parties can create political practices that change the outcome that would have been generated by formal rules and procedures (i.e., institutions). In this sense, parties can become a substitute for formal institutions in solving social choice issues. The Rikerian hypothesis about the ‘insignificance’ of federalism can be reformulated in the following terms: political practices, including but not limited to the working of the party system, determine the degree of centralization of federal regimes, which implies that although federal institutional arrangements might be similar in two countries, binding constraints are created by political practices, as expressed in party competition, political bargaining and internal procedures within political parties” (Diaz-Cayeros 2004, 298).

Other examples for the intertwining of fiscal resources and political dynamics are financial transfers of individual politicians (in Brazil, of state bancadas, regional bancadas, or commissions) towards subnational territorial spaces. These are transfers that are constitutionally allowed (since politicians as elected representatives of the legislative have a certain allowance, and can decide in which electoral district they want to invest it and on what), but give budget spending a political direction. In some cases, the final decision for the execution for these additional transfers is withheld by a central authority, such as the president, and thus increases the political implications that these allocations may have. Depending on the amount, such transfers undercut equality in terms of resource allocation amongst already unequal regions and municipalities. In Brazil, such transfers exist, namely voluntary transfers and budget amendments of individual politicians. For federalism as a constitutional space, they mean the politicization of an institutionally excepted leeway given to politicians. The consequences for federalism as an institutional system are not clear cut, because what an individual politician decides to do is left to his or her own discretion.

Arretche and Rodden analyze distributive politics in Brazil's federation, examining electoral strategies, legislative bargaining, and governmental coalition building at the federal and state levels. Their study puts forward two main assumptions. First, Brazilian presidents hold a comparatively large amount of power with respect to budget planning: "The possibility of using fiscal resources in strategic ways in order to give a premium to old voters or to conquer new ones is, in this sense, is a plausible hypothesis to be tested (...)" (Arretche and Rodden 2004, 551). Second, legislative bargaining of presidents and state governors is not a novelty for the distribution of fiscal resources. However, these authors challenge the argument that the federal bargaining is a "chaotic market", but rather a specific, strategically, and well-organized process that has a great deal to do with the norms in place.<sup>27</sup> In Brazil, electoral coalitions frequently originate from different governmental coalitions:

"Electoral rules do not create incentives for parliamentarians to support the legislative agenda of the president, because their mandates do not mutually depend on each other. The parliamentarians have very strong incentives to attain that governmental expenses are directed towards their own regions of origin. Empirical studies suggest that the candidates for electoral positions at federal level depend on the support from state governors, who play a relevant role in the composition of the electoral lists (Samuels, 2000)" (Arretche and Rodden 2004, 555).

The described process that Arretche and Rodden confirm with their empirical results has at least three very political implications for the federal distribution of resources in the case of Brazil. Not only do individual politicians have institutional leeway to influence budgetary processes with their own political priorities, but governors also have strong political leverage on how politicians allocate resources, since the parliamentarians politically depend on the governors. In addition, the president decides which of these amendments or transfers are indeed executed, thus giving him or her the institutional leeway to prioritize some amendments over others, for example according to party affiliation or what seems to be politically opportune in a particular moment in time. In turn, parliamentarians, in hopes that their individual transfers will be executed, are incited to stick to presidential coalitions (Arretche and Rodden 2004, 570). Such strong presidential leeway is especially important in countries with highly fragmented party systems, as it is the case with Brazil (Mainwaring 1999).

In summary, socioeconomic inequalities in a federal territory become accentuated by party and political dynamics between federal and subnational political levels, and especially in the extreme cases when governments at subnational and center level are aligned (their incumbents come from the same parties) or when they are politically opposed (further discussed below and in chapters 5 and 6). Gibson ascribes the subnational level a potentially strong role, denoting that it may turn out to be a type of subnational authoritarianism within a democratic nation state:

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<sup>27</sup> Souza interprets Brazilian decentralization in a similar way regarding decentralized, intergovernmental relations as a continuous bargaining game being not dichotomic, but a continuum (Souza 2002, 434).

“The existence of a democratic national government alongside a provincial authoritarian government within the nation-state creates a situation of regime juxtaposition. Two levels of government with jurisdiction over the same territory operate under different regimes, understood as the set of norms, rules and practices that govern the selection and behavior of state leaders. This creates strategic challenges for subnational authoritarian elites (and opportunities for local oppositions) that do not exist, when national and subnational regime types coincide. In these contexts political pressures from actors in the national territorial system are ongoing potential catalysts for subnational change” (Gibson 2005, 103).

### 2.1.5 *Interim Summary and Policy Implications*

The discussion in this chapter shows that federalism is something much more political than just a constitutional framework. This understanding assumes that center and subnational governments are also political actors, and that their influence is present not only in formal ways, but reaches far beyond. Depending on how much institutional leeway a federal system gives to its subnational governments and politicians, they will make different use of this leeway in their formal, informal, or other types of interactions allocated anywhere between these extremes. This especially holds true for the fiscal channels of federalism where the constitution itself may allow individual politicians to engage in discretionary practices, for example, through voluntary transfers and budget amendments (see the respective case of Brazil’s education transfers in subsequent chapters herein). Thus, even fiscal channels are powerful political mechanisms in federalism structuring political relations.

In his article “*Fragmented Welfare states: Federal Institutions and the Development of Social Policy*,” Paul Pierson (1995, 449) argues that the institutional rules of federal systems have major implications for social policymaking. He claims that federalism and federal institutions encourage three types of dynamics for the politics of social policy: “[Federal institutions] influence the policy preferences, strategies, and influence of social actors; they create important new institutional actors (the constituent units of the federation); and they generate predictable policymaking dilemmas associated with shared decision making.”

One central dilemma in federalism is the decision-making dilemma (including the coordination of fragmented resources) amongst a multitude of subnational actors where the question “*Who should do it*” is prioritized over the question “*What has to be done*” (Pierson 1995, 449).<sup>28</sup> At the same time, federalism modifies political capacities and power resources not only of different governmental units, but also of other key actors such as parties, unions, and business associations over time.

Due to these modifications unfolding over extended periods of time, federalism might not always contribute to a unified national policy strategy or the creation of a powerful welfare state (Obinger et al. 2005, 49). Pierson explains potentially ambiguous outcomes of social policies in federal systems with certain autonomy, but also interdependence of social policy

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<sup>28</sup> Abrucio calls this the “tragedy of the commons” (Abrucio/Franzese 2009).

initiatives brought forward by public officials that are, as individuals and in their conjunction, part of and coexist at central and state or municipal levels.

“[Central and territorially-distinct ‘constituent units’] may compete with each other, pursue independent projects that work at crosspurposes, or cooperate to achieve ends that they could not obtain alone. Their interdependence may allow them to draw on each other for ideas and aid, or entangle them in institutional and policy structures of Byzantine complexity and rigidity” (Pierson 1995, 451).

The described dilemma has closely related effects: decision-making processes will have potentially larger time frames than in a nonfederal system, and social policies and initiatives will take additional time beyond their already slow-unfolding processes, consequently hindering the building of welfare states with high quality results for human development. This is why other authors using historical-institutional analysis for the analysis of federalism such as Obinger et al. (2005) suggest a procedural and temporal perspective to capture the described effects. To foster more equitable economic growth, poverty reduction, and improved wellbeing, a federal system needs to assure—potentially more explicitly than other systems—that political, administrative, and financial competences are shared across governments and that national monitoring standards exist.

## **2.2 Actors, Networks and Clientelism in Federalism**

Federalism has been defined as both a polity system composed by institutional, normative rules, as well as a system of political relations. Political actors can reinterpret federalism as a polity through their interactions in order to reach individual or collective goals. These interactions will always entail the establishment of different types of relations amongst political actors. They will be characterized by power, resource, and information asymmetries, and either follow, violate, or reinterpret existing federal rules and/or institutions. State and municipal governments, their bureaucrats, politicians, labor unions, elites, and others will occupy different functions in these relations—or networks of relations—often involving hard bargaining processes, political interests, and overarching goals of macro contexts, such as polity and society. The next following subsections discuss the different types of relations and relationships emerging between actors and institutions and amongst themselves, including types of behavior that are not necessarily aligned with institutions, but follow either informal or other types of rules that political actors establish in a federal system when they interact.

### *2.2.1 The Relationship Between Institutions and Actors*

Having defined institutions and discussed their interpretation with regards to the time span of policy processes, it is important to mention the role of actors and their definition herein. The definition of actors is not restricted to national governments, but in this dissertation will also include actors such as subnational governments—especially members of their executive and legislative branches—parties, teachers’ unions, and representatives of civil society. In accordance with March and Olsen (1984, 738), these are “political actors in their own right.” Further, actors are not only individually but also collectively organized (Scharpf 2000, 78).

Some authors substitute the term “actor” by using the term “organization.” Leftwich, for example, describes the organizations as “the ‘players’ under the rules” that are established by formal and informal institutions (Leftwich 2007, 11). The term actors will be preferred and understood herein as a subset of institutions.

A big matter emerging from the discussion about politics, institutions, and actors is whether institutions shape actors or actors shape institutions. How shall we imagine mechanisms through which institutions shape the behavior of individuals, and through which individuals are able to form and reform institutions? This is a complex question to which institutionalism studies have not found a concluding normative answer, despite certain agreement that interactions between both are not unidirectional. Institutions link individuals with their context and between one another. According to Giddens, (1981; 1984 cit. in Peterson 2007, 36), relationships between a structure and individuals are “dual,” which means “there is a reciprocal causation of agent and structure. This in turn implies a continuing dynamic process linking these two basic concepts of social theory (...).” This case seems to be more or less straight forward, but is less so when attempting to understand how individuals relate to institutions. A way out here is the argument that politics are organized, and that institutions carry a “*logic of appropriateness*” in ways binding individuals more towards one institution than towards another (March and Olsen 1989, 160). Human action is driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized into institutions. Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. One who wishes to be a member of a certain institution will behave appropriately. For example, if one wishes to survive in his or her professional position, one will behave according to respective rules and their enforcement in order to stay employed.

“The process involves determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what the obligations of that role in that situation are. When individuals enter an institution, they try to discover, and are taught, the rules. When they encounter a new situation, they try to associate it with a situation for which rules already exist. Through rules and logic of appropriateness, political institutions realize both order, stability, and predictability, on the one hand, and flexibility and adaptiveness, on the other” (March and Olsen 1989, 160).

Actors learn, or are taught, the appropriate rules, but they also adapt to new situations by applying existing rules to those new to them, or by not complying with the rules for different reasons. The process occurs through interaction of involved individuals, organizations, and institutions. Interaction means that individuals are embedded in a complex series of relationships with other individuals or with collectivities (Granovetter 1985, cit. in Peters 2007, 26). *Interactions are complex because individuals create manifold types of binds with attached loyalties and networks.* One individual creates sets of different networks arising from a specific issue of interest that he or she is participating in. These networks might relate to other individuals, the respective issue networks, or to a collective following institutional rules. In summary, interactions do not happen without creating networks at the same time.

### 2.2.2 *Networks and Social Capital Theory*

What are networks, first of all? There are many different definitions and theories, and it is not the aim here to give a representative review of all of them. In his comprehensive review, Thompson discusses to which extent networks can be differentiated from hierarchies and markets as other forms of socioeconomic, political coordination, and governance mechanisms (Thompson 2003). Socioeconomic networks are both a conceptual category and an object of analysis regarding their mode of coordination and governance (Thompson 2003, 6). Yet, a third way of looking at networks is to look at them as “relations” (Strathern 1995 cit. in Thompson 2003, 10). This makes it easier to see the interactive character of networks, the kinds of connections they set up, how these work, and which other types of relations they may create, potentially organized in a system or type of order of elements and entities (ibid.). Following Thompson (2003, 10), the concentration herein is on networks as relations, interactions, and connections between things (for example institutions) and actors, with relations “(...) being the outcome of the process of networking. We are dealing then with a relational view of socioeconomic organization rather than a strictly resources view or transaction view (...). Networks both shape and regulate relations.”

Regarding networks as relations helps one look at federalism as a system made up by political relations or relations amongst political actors. The concept of “policy networks” shows how public policy is formulated and policymaking decisions emerge amongst political and economic elites or other types of actors involved in a policy process. If networks shape relations and interactions, they are an integral part of politics since they organize political expression of individuals in a group (Thompson 2003, 149). This view evokes at least five other ideas. First, not only is a government organized in hierarchical entities (e.g., central, subnational, and local governments) in charge of political interactions within a system, but also elites or experts can run politics and occupy a central position in terms of political power.

Second, networks in the context of politics can be “(...) interpreted as the means by which social interests, or the ‘social partners’, are mobilized into **a structure that actually conducts the business of government and governance somewhat independently of, or parallel to, the main axis of representative politics**” (ibid; emphasis added by author). This interpretation of networks is central in this dissertation since it means that networks allow for alternative political options, behavior, and interaction that are not necessarily prescribed by the institution or led by the government.

Third, networks in political realms are made up by both private and public actors, defining them through their linkages within their systems of political interaction. Fourth, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have a bottom-up dynamic, contrary to the top-down dynamic of networks of political elites. Fifth, policy networks as the type of networks described here “(...) account for interest intermediation in the formation of public policymaking” (Thompson 2003, 150).



Seeing networks as policy networks implies that they are part of a political system that occupies, in some cases, a simple relational function and, in others, a coordinating, directive role for political decision making. In the analysis of political relations in a federal system, it is crucial to not assume that networks are only characterized by equality of political power, but indeed they are also characterized by a certain degree of hierarchy between government levels and amongst other political actors, such as elites and NGOs. As outlined above, hierarchies in federalism are closely linked to inequalities in access to resources, information, and political power.<sup>29</sup>

Social capital theory extensively discusses the importance of trust, information flow, and norms/effective sanctions in network situations (Coleman 1988). All three can contribute to more effective utilization of social capital in political networks, meaning in ways closely linking policy objectives and outcomes. The main argument of the social capital theory is that civic engagement that relies on people that are closely related to each other can have a powerful role in the performance of government and social institutions (Burt 2000; Thompson 2003, 167). It is suggested that people who do better and can more effectively influence political processes based on their own engagement are better connected to others. What does this exactly mean?

“Social capital is the contextual complement to human capital. The social capital metaphor is that the people who do better are somewhat better connected. Certain people or certain groups are better connected to certain others, obligated to support certain others, dependent on exchange with certain others. Holding a certain position in the structure of these exchanges can be an asset in its own right. That is social capital, in essence, a concept of location effects in differentiated markets” (Burt 2000, 3).

Understanding networks as mechanisms that connect people more effectively via exchange of common interests does not determine if their behavior will bias political results positively or negatively. Putnam (1994), for example, argues for a positive bias and importance of civic influence in public decision making in his work “Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.” Putnam evaluates the institutional performance of 20 Italian regional governments using surveys, interviews and a diverse set of policy indicators. His central finding is that wide variations in the performance of the regional governments are closely related to the level of associational life in the region. A higher concentration of sports clubs, service groups, and choral societies in Northern Italy is correlated with efficient regional governments and policy implementation. By contrast, Southern Italy, where civic engagement and social networks are far weaker, regional

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<sup>29</sup> In a literature review on policy networks, Börzel (1984,738) discusses the different understandings of the concept existing not only in a variety of disciplines such as sociology, economics, political science, microbiology, and communication, but also between the United States and Europe, especially Germany. While Börzel’s contribution is relevant especially for the EU and U.S. context, some of her arguments can be less easily applied to Latin America and to policy networks in federal systems in this region. For example, Börzel defines relationships within policy networks as non-hierarchical, and some assumptions on governance assume the functioning of political institutions in the way they exist in Western Europe and the United States. Both assumptions do not necessarily hold for Latin American policy networks.

governments tend to be corrupt and inefficient. Putnam explains this relationship between strong citizen participation and positive institutional performance with “social capital,” the networks, norms, or reciprocity and trust that are fostered among members of community associations through their common experience of social interaction and cooperation. Much of these arguments go back to the foundation of social capital by Coleman (1998), who defines social capital as follows:

“Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspects of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure (...)” (Coleman 1988, S98).

Burt’s contribution to social capital theory defines the concept further with respect to networks: “Social capital here refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action” (Burt 1992, qtd. In Burt 2000, 3). Moreover, the author defines social structure as “a kind of capital that can create for certain individuals or groups a competitive advantage in pursuing their ends. Better connected people enjoy higher returns” (Burt 2000: 3). A better-connected person here means someone that meets with others more frequently (ibid.).

Some arguments discussed in social capital theory as being closely related to sociological institutionalism are relevant for this dissertation and the political understanding of federalism presented above. This includes the questions of what determines trust and trustworthiness between actors (what motivates them to interact and continue doing so), how strong these links or ties may be and why, how dense or weak a network can be, and whether or not actors are organized in a hierarchy. Coleman argues that not only “obligations and trust,” but also “information channels, norms, and effective sanctions” are crucial for assuring that social relations constitute a form of effective social capital (Coleman 1988, S.103).

Part of social capital and the resources each individual actor can rely on are the trustworthiness of a relation, or his or her social environment (which means that obligations will be repaid), and the extent to which these obligations will be effective. “Social structures differ in both these dimensions, and actors within the same structure differ in the second” (Coleman 1988, S.102). These differences exist because actor “A” may owe actor “B” a favor, because of a prior favor that actor “B” had given to actor “A.” These favors can be between neighbors, friends, colleagues or politicians and are made under the assumption that the person benefiting from a favor will feel obliged to give it back someday. This only works in social systems where people are used to doing things for each other, and where they trust one another, since formal rules (such as a constitution or regulation) may not necessarily regulate their initial behavior, rather it may be regulated by their personal or even emotional attachments to one another. In an advanced version—where high levels of trustworthiness and sense of obligations exist—the behavior of the collective group will eventually become an institution in its formal or informal sense. For example, people may either borrow money

from one another on an informal and continuous basis, or they may start forming an institutionalized credit cooperative to formalize their relations.

Differences in both trustworthiness and obligations can arise for various reasons. For example, different people have different needs for help; the source of aid may come from a governmental entity or a social welfare service; the degree of affluence can vary; cultural differences exist in when and what actors will ask and need help for; social networks will have different degrees of network closure, and so on (Coleman 1988, S.103). Network closure means “networks in which everyone is connected such that no one can escape the notice of others, which in operational terms usually means a dense network.” Networks with closure are argued to be the most effective source of social capital (Burt 200: 6), because a network becomes denser when more individuals exchange favors more frequently, leading to a higher amount of obligations and trust.<sup>30</sup>

“Whatever the source, however, individuals in social structures with high levels of obligations outstanding at any time have more social capital on which they can draw. The density of outstanding obligations means, in effect, that the overall usefulness of the tangible resources of that social structure is amplified by their availability to others when needed” (Coleman 1988, S103).

Network closure is believed to serve two purposes to people in a closed network. First, it affects access to information (and the quality of information will deteriorate when it moves from one intermediary in the network to the next [Baker 1984 qtd. in Burt 2000, 7; Coleman 1988, S104]), and second, as emphasized by Coleman, “network closure facilitates sanctions that make it less risky for people in the network to trust one another” (Burt 2000, 7). When people relate to each other in a closed way, social control based on outstanding obligations is much higher, thus the pressure on the individuals is higher too. This goes back to the point raised above: when interactions become institutions, they become a powerful social norm.

Granovetter argues that the strength of an interpersonal tie (which contributes to make a network denser, and thus, more closed) is determined by the “(...) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity [the smaller and denser the network, the stronger its emotional intensity], the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie. Each of these is somewhat independent of the other, though the set is obviously highly intracorrelated” (Granovetter 1973, 1361).

The last point to be discussed here is the question of hierarchy in a network. Hierarchy constitutes another form of network closure where either a minority of contacts, or in extreme case, one contact only, stand out and determine the networks’ closure (Burt 2000, 35). The entity is only able to occupy this central role because of a culturally accepted and ascribed form of hierarchy (for example, a chief of a community that is accepted by everybody because of tradition or cultural norms), or because of a rule-determined form of

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<sup>30</sup> According to Burt, density is one form of closure. Contacts in dense networks closely communicate and can effectively enact sanctions against those individuals that do not comply with shared beliefs or norms of behavior (Burt 2000, 35).

hierarchy (for example, a case in which a central government in a federal system has more authority than a subnational government, but this authority is constitutionally determined rather than culturally ascribed). As with the density, hierarchy assigns certain constraints to a network since it predetermines certain functions to certain individuals in the network accepted by the ones that constitute it.

A better understanding of networks and their interactions in the interpretation of social capital helps to clarify what role networks may play in the political making of federalism and its policy outcomes. For example, the more people are connected either via formal or informal types of relations, the more they trust each other, and the more successful they may be in influencing policy choices and outcomes. There are at least two directions in which these results can unfold. First, networks and interactions amongst various political actors respond to federalism as a system of constitutionally set norms if individuals accept and behave according to such norms, contributing to the polity of federalism. Second, networks and relations will be contrary to federalism as a constitutional system and favor it in its political sense, facilitating informal types of interactions that bias policy outcomes in either positive or negative ways (for a further discussion of this aspect see the section on informal institutions below).

### 2.2.3 *Networks and Clientelism*

In the Latin American social, cultural, and political context, clientelism is a type of relationship prevalent in many dimensions of daily life. Regarding networks as relations that can influence, complement, substitute or be part of governmental policymaking, it cannot be excluded that such networks also have clientelistic characteristics. The understanding herein shall be reduced to the nature of political clientelism as a term used to characterize the contemporary relationships between political elites and the lower/middle class population in Latin America, where goods and services needed in poor communities are traded for political favors of politicians (Auyero 2001).<sup>31</sup>

Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) see clientelistic relationships as a type of interpersonal relation between a “patron” and a “client,” which is often connected to the institutional matrix in which these relations develop.

“These interpersonal relationships, although in part seemingly informal, and which in one way or another are found in almost all human societies, are yet very often defined in very articulated symbolic and institutional terms (...). These relations are usually defined in terms of mutual intimacy, of moral and emotional obligations, stressing above all *trust and empathy*, and sometimes the sharing of common ‘pure’ pristine values, as well as some equality. In the relations of friendship, this mutual trust is consistently based on the relative equality of the participants in this relationship, while *patron-client relations entail*

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<sup>31</sup> Auyero presents a compelling analysis in this regard in his ethnography analyzing the political practices of the Peronist Party among shantytown dwellers in contemporary Argentina. Auyero looks closely at the informal problem-solving networks of slum-dwellers, which are based on their socioeconomic needs and material survival, and how the behavior in these networks is connected to the different meanings of Peronism (Auyero 2001).

*hierarchical differences between the patron and his protégé*” (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, 1; emphasis added by author).

Eisenstadt and Roniger, as representatives of sociological institutionalism, make several arguments that are relevant for the political character of federalism and that have larger implications for federal policymaking and policy outcomes. First of all, clientelism can emerge from interpersonal relations, but not all interpersonal relations are clientelistic relations per se. An interpersonal relation can be described as clientelistic if one person or group economically lacks a certain good or service (“client”), and where a second person or group is willing and able to satisfy these needs in exchange for a political favor (patron). The terms “patron” and “client” suggest that this exchange is not equal, because the client depends on the patron for his or her potential economic survival, while the client can obtain political favors from any other client with similar needs. This creates the character of a unilateral dependent and unequal relation, and can also be designated as a hierarchical type of relation, since one person has more power and resources to choose (the patron) than the other (the client). Consequently, clientelistic relations can be defined as hierarchical relations.

Other elements discussed above in the section on social capital theory stand out in clientelistic relations: the question of trust, feelings of moral obligation, and sense of control within a network organized around one main contact. Clientelism, as a system, functions based on an informal agreement and feelings of moral obligation, as well as “a special personal bond” of the client towards the patron (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, 10). It is based on trust, trustworthiness, and empathy to make clientelistic types of networks function.<sup>32</sup> In addition, and as pointed out by social capital theory in general, relations and networks also assume a set of obligations and the expectation that such obligations (or favors of a client towards a patron) will be repaid (Coleman 1988, S102). This also holds for clientelistic networks.

How are the relations of trust and friendship linked to institutions? Eisenstadt and Roniger point out those interpersonal, clientelistic relations entail certain tensions or contradict the institutional order in which they are established:

“The most important tensions inherent in these relations are, first, those between the emphasis on purely solidary or spiritual relations and concrete – power and instrumental – obligations; second, those entailed in *the tendency to institutionalise such relations as against seemingly taking them out of the institutional order*; and third, the one existing between the tendency inherent in these relations to uphold pristine values which stand at the basis of any social order as against a ‘subversive orientation’ to this order (that is, a departure from it), and a paradoxical concomitant ambivalence in relation to other types of subversive orientations or activities that develop in any society” (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, 15; emphasis added by author).

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<sup>32</sup> As Marques shows in his analysis of policy networks of urban infrastructure policy in São Paulo City, Brazil, networks are links that are established between individuals or groups based on long-term patterns. These patterns of relationships, which refer to institutional or personal links, develop over many years. They have various origins, such as family, friendship, politics, business, and corruption (Marques 2003, 52), and thus stand closely related to the social order in which they operate, just as described by the social capital theory.

The described character and functioning of clientelistic relations and associated networks are closely connected to the importance of party and political networks for the distribution of fiscal resources in federalism. The federal system in Brazil allows for an institutional leeway of politicians to spend resources based on their political priorities. However, the spending priorities of politicians at the state and local levels strongly correlate not only with the political power in place at the central level (the president deciding on the execution of transfers), but also with the (clientelistic) politics happening at the local level. The institutional order of a three-tiered system of federalism is replicated at the level of political networks at the central, state and municipal levels. Without a relationship with voters at the municipal level, a politician would not be able to determine his or her spending priorities or gain political support for such priorities. Spending priorities often reflect the clientelistic agreements at the municipal level and the agreed upon exchange of favors amongst voters and politicians (being “clients” and “patrons”). If, in turn, these agreements become institutionalized because the central level authorizes the execution of voluntary budget transfers, two things will happen. The system and clientelistic relations between the municipal and state levels are connected to the central government, thus interlinking political relations of federalism at all levels. As a result, clientelistic relationships will likely become part of an institutional order and influence policy outcomes based on resource allocation.

It can be concluded that networks as interpersonal relations (being either clientelistic or non-clientelistic) strongly interfere with the institutional order in which they operate, to the extent that they can disturb this order. For Marques (2003, 52):

“(…)[The] effect of networks of relations between individuals and organizations in the interior of state political communities is similar to the effect that institutions have as described by neo-institutionalism, structuring the field and influencing results, strategies, and forming and altering preferences.”

In this sense, networks occupy a similar function as institutions during a policy process. They shape outcomes, with a positive or negative bias, over extended periods of time.

### **2.3 Informal Institutions, Social Practices and Networks**

Along with a discussion of formal institutions, organizations, and rules of the state, institutionalism calls for analysis of informal institutions and networks. Why is this of interest here? When examining the outcomes of a policy process (e.g., education policy) and the factors shaping relations amongst actors, a high degree of informality potentially characterizes actors and their networks, interactions, and policy decisions, even more so in non-OECD countries (Leftwich 2007, 28; Risse 2007, 13; Searing 1991). In developing countries in particular, formal political institutions (e.g., courts, parties, politicians, the president, among others) and their rules are often weakly institutionalized and can be easily undermined by informal practices, such as clientelism and corruption, as explained above. Researchers often attempt to create a rigid classification of formal institutions versus informal institutions, but empirical reality makes it difficult to always classify behavior in

one or the other category (cf. Scharpf 2000, 78; Peters 2007, 74; Lauth 2000).<sup>33</sup> A rigid classification implies a socially assumed and constructed interpretation of institutional reality by the researcher, and is not attempted in this dissertation. *Rather, the argument herein is that there are many types of interactions, networks, and behaviors—be they institutionally aligned, informal, or beyond—that influence federalism.*

North argues that formal rules make up a small part of the organization of our modern lives, and that informal institutional behavior will produce different social and political outcomes depending on the contexts in which they occur:

“Yet, formal rules, in even the most developed economy, make up a small (although very important) part of the sum of constraints that shape choices. (...) That the informal constraints are important in themselves (and simply not as appendages to formal rules) can be observed from the evidence that the same formal rules and/or constitutions imposed on different societies produce different outcomes” (North 1990, 36).<sup>34</sup>

Hall does not sharply distinguish or create a rigid autonomy between formal and informal structures. Rather, he has an extended understanding of institutions that is more useful for the analysis herein:

“(...)[Institutions] have a more formal status than cultural norms but one that does not necessarily derive from legal, as opposed to conventional, standing. Throughout, the emphasis is on the relational character of institutions; that is to say, on the way in which they structure the interactions of individuals”(Hall 1986: 19).

Interactions that do not comply with official norms may not be automatically illicit, but they are part of the “grey zone” of informal institutions (cf. Helmke and Levitsky 2004; cf. Lauth 2004). In contrast to formal institutions, informal institutions do not always have a standard legal framework, the rules are usually unwritten, and they are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. For example, an informal institution can be a cultural standard that is commonly accepted within a community, assuming that everybody knows what this standard or rule is about. Informal institutions are mechanisms of obligations that can be both monetary and moral, and they often establish relationships between a “patron” and a “client.” Such behavior and its institutionalization can lead to outcomes that are counterproductive to federalism and in conflict or opposition to federal institutions.

Helmke and Levitsky define formal institutions and their rules as those with *openly and established frameworks of reference which are communicated in a widely accepted and semi-official or official way* (Helmke and Levitsky 2003, 8). Informal institutional behavior and networks are embedded in contextual cultural, social, gender, and political norms

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<sup>33</sup> Lauth analyzes elaborates this further and suggests that formal and informal institutions relate to each other in four different ways, which are not necessarily exclusionary.

<sup>34</sup> North elaborates further that informal institutions often originate in the culture and cultural behavior prevalent in societies (North 1990, 37).

inherent to one country, regional, or family setting, amongst others. An informal institution is a “rule” with behavior attached that is not openly communicated and does not depend on a formal structure, but rather on the individual or collective *will* of an actor. By presupposing that networks have similar influences on politics that institutions have, one can assume that the influence of informal networks should be similar to the influence of informal institutions. Yet, in all interpretations discussed herein, clientelism, bribery, and a lack of transparency within organizations, such as state bureaucracies and legislatures, can be classified as informal institutional behavior that relies on respective networks.

Informal institutions and networks can also have a positive impact on, and even complement and strengthen, an institutional order. Too much leeway may be counter-institutional, but informal behavior can only lead to positive policy outcomes in political spaces where institutions and norms are not predetermined. Without free space for interaction and leeway, political actors cannot try out new practices that may potentially strengthen an institutional order. *While the collective dilemma of federalism means, on the one hand, too many options and little decision making in some situations, it also means the autonomy of choices to develop political practices strengthening a federal system.* In this sense, weak institutional structures provide too much leeway for bargaining processes that carry a potential positive bias for policy outcomes in federalism.

On the basis of Lauth (Lauth 2000), Helmke and Levitsky suggest a typology of informal institutions where they relate in four different ways to formal institutions, namely in *complementary, accommodating, substitutive, and competing ways* (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 728; emphasis added by author). Hereby, informal institutional behavior is not always harmful but can potentially complement shortcomings of weak formal institutions—for example, a family providing a social safety net to an elderly when the state’s social security system fails to do so, or, in the case of Brazil’s federalism when a subnational government complements central federal norms by creating incentives that can positively bias quality education outcomes.

Networks do not necessarily have the same influence on a policy process that informal institutions have. Informal behavior within a specific social or political system may not have reached a strong degree of repetition of relations. In this sense, an informal institution exists if relations are already so established that they present a system with rules, even if they are unwritten (and in this sense not formally institutional). Not all networks have this character, since some networks may be established for a short period of time without turning into an established system or an informal institution.

## **2.4 Accountability and Institutionally Envisioned Policy Outcomes**

Institutions and networks are vital to understand outcomes of a policy process. The creation of institutional norms is important to guarantee access to quality education. However, norms and regulations alone do not guarantee this access precisely because it is unpredictable as to how relations and interactions of networks will play out regarding a policy objective. Close monitoring, as well as clear sanctions for the non-compliance with



normative oversight mechanisms, can improve the alignment of policy objectives with policy outcomes.<sup>35</sup> Accountability is a crucial mechanism to translate institutional norms into desirable policy outcomes, especially in institutional contexts where often too much leeway is given to political actors. For example, accountability can contribute to assure that behavior of actors complements and strengthens institutional norms instead of violating or substituting them.

Accountability has a horizontal and a vertical dimension. *Horizontal accountability* denominates empowerment and capability amongst state institutions. The most classical form is checks and balances between judicative, executive, and legislative powers. O'Donnell describes horizontal accountability as follows:

“(…)[As] the existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful” (O'Donnell 1999, 38).

This author discusses accountability in terms of its absence in Latin American democracies, blurred boundaries of power, and the importance of monitoring within and amongst state agencies (cf. Schedler et al. 1999). In response to O'Donnell, Schmitter emphasizes the relational aspects of horizontal accountability, defining it as “(…) the existence of permanently constituted, mutually recognized collective actors at multiple levels of aggregation within a polity that have equivalent capacities to monitor each other's behavior and to reach to each other's initiatives” (Schmitter 1999, 61).

This second definition suggests differentiating between actors at different levels of a polity—in this case, a federal polity in which horizontal accountability and horizontal control amongst central, state, and municipal bureaucracies should certainly be crucial. However, considering that federal relations amongst state actors are hierarchically organized—since the central level has more political and fiscal power than a single government or the conjunction of subordinated subnational governments—the “equivalent capacities” pointed out by Schmitter cannot be taken as given. While horizontal accountability amongst federal levels is normatively desirable, it cannot fully exist in a hierarchical federal system.

Accountability has a second dimension called *vertical accountability*. Vertical accountability is the account giving of a government and its actions vis-à-vis civil society. Citizens, mass media, and civil society organizations (CSOs) are actors that can reinforce the rule of good conduct of governmental doing in order to achieve what institutions promise, for example through the creation of formal control mechanisms such as councils (see below). While horizontal accountability entails mechanisms of account giving amongst governmental agencies of all kind, vertical accountability entails how society and its organizations can oversee government actions.

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<sup>35</sup> Coleman assigns sanctions in networks a vital role for social capital (aside with trustworthiness and information flow) since they assure clear consequences for non-compliance. Sanctions in forms of norms inhibit behavior that is not accepted in a special social structure and strengthens social capital (Coleman 1988, S.104). In this regard, accountability and control mechanisms will be much more effective if they are accompanied by sanctions.

For both dimensions of accountability to become fulfilled, *answerability and enforcement* are necessary conditions. Answerability means the obligation of public officials to openly inform and explain to other government agencies and citizens what they are doing. It thus involves a relationship between two actors, one being the target of accountability (the one obliged to provide information and to face sanctions) and the other the seeker of accountability, or the one who is entitled to receive explanations or to impose punishments (Goetz and Jenkins 2005, 9). Enforcement is the capacity of agencies to impose sanctions on those in power that violate their public duty. With both conditions in place, accountability should be potentially high and de facto translate policy objectives into intended outcomes during a policy process. In consequence, politics should become aligned in ways benefitting the original policy objective.

For reasons related to the operationalization of the research design (see Chapter 3), this dissertation concentrates on policy formulation and policy implementation as two possible steps out of many others in a policy process (e.g., agenda setting and monitoring or evaluation of a policy). While the empirical part of this dissertation is mostly concerned with state level politics and their respective institutions, networks, behavior, and accountability mechanisms, these are institutionally and politically linked to a federal polity. The federal government mostly formulates primary education policy in Brazil, but state and municipal governments are mainly responsible for its implementation. Thus, by considering the links between these government levels, one gets a more comprehensive, or path-dependent, “moving picture” about the factors that are crucial to understand the politics of primary education policy.

In order to reach high degrees of accountability in a policy process, access to *information* is a necessary condition for the different actors involved. On the one hand, citizens or civil society must have access to information to enable them to monitor a politician or bureaucrat. Information should be understood as a resource that gives or deprives citizens of their power over politicians and bureaucrats. For example, if information on the performance of schools and their teachers and students is nonexistent, unpublished, manipulated, or badly communicated, several problems arise in terms of accountability, an evidence base does not exist, citizens cannot effectively monitor, *transparency* is not given, and corrupt government activities remain unpunished. Consequently, the nontransparent use of statistical information can cause a government to lose its public credibility and create mistrust and loss of accountability. On the other hand, to achieve a good matching of policy formulation carried out by politicians and policy implementation carried out by bureaucrats, it is necessary that each administrative level of a federal state provides accurate and correct information within the dimension about the quality of education.

With both conditions fulfilled—meaning that the state and citizens/civil society have the necessary information and know the objectives of the other party—a high degree of accountability and matching of intended and produced policy results should be the case. However, this may not automatically arise because access to information does not automatically mean perfect control. Access to information during policy formulation and

implementation needs to be *used and managed* in accountable ways in order to produce the intended outcomes.

Through the two information conditions of accountability—presence of an informed state and informed citizens—institutions, actors, and their interactions become closely linked to one another. Accountability, if taken seriously, can turn into a powerful mechanism by which March and Olsen’s “logic of appropriateness” can move from theory into practice. Not only do individuals feel that they belong to an institution and their rules, but also practical, systemic mechanisms reinforce human behavior within institutions in ways that strengthen their envisioned functioning. The more these reinforcement mechanisms are practiced (and not only theoretically proclaimed), the closer the envisioned policy aims and achieved outcomes will be to one another. In this understanding, accountability is vital to decrease the negative impact that informal institutions and clientelistic networks can have on policy outcomes. It is a means to direct the leeway granted by institutions in ways that have a more positive impact.

## **2.5 The Politics of Federalism and Education Policy: Groups of Actors**

The two preceding sections discussed the roles of institutions and their networks and different types of behavior that potentially exist and influence federalism. These influences are determined by an institutional order and the existences of norms, but also by a certain amount of leeway granted to political actors. This section will address which political actors can influence this policy process and, in turn, have an impact on policy outcomes. It is assumed that all actors discussed can influence the policy process in ways complementing, accommodating, substituting or competing with the institutional order of federalism.

Different actors are involved in the policymaking process. Depending on the timing, each actor will have different a level of interest and access to networks and resources and, thus, have greater or lesser influence on the politics of federalism. These endowments will not be linear over time and will most likely differ during different stages of the policy process. During the stages of policy formulation and implementation, actors have different roles. This is simply because of their functions assigned by norms. For example, politicians will have more power during policy formulation, while bureaucrats have a greater influence on the policy process during its implementation. However, it is still possible that high-level politicians, such as party leaders or governors, have some influence in state-level policy implementation, since they elect some members of the executing bureaucracy.

At the same time, civil society groups, such as teachers’ unions and parents, can influence policy formulation and implementation to a certain extent. A president, depending on the legal framework, has power during both policy formulation and implementation. In these cases, the power constituting the actual influence of an actor is extended by his or her access to both informal and formal resources. Institutional rules laid out by a federal polity entitle actors with different formal means (e.g., financial means or electoral support from voters), but they are joined by other types of power based on their social capital constituted by networks, trust, information, and effective norms/sanctions. The conjunction of these

ingredients is not fixed, but varies over time, making the position of a political actor dynamic in a given hierarchy.

### *2.5.1 Federal, State, and Municipal Bureaucracies*

Federalism in the Brazilian case has three government levels that can influence education policy and thus the quality of primary education through their interaction: federal, state and municipal bureaucracies. As argued by Gibson, these “center” and “periphery” entities have a mutual interdependence regarding the political and fiscal support that they provide to each other (Gibson 2005, 106). Regional, territorial, and resource-related inequalities in a federal system assign different governmental hierarchies with a little or great deal of power. At the same time, these inequalities also exist amongst subnational units, even though they are assumed to be “equal.” These aspects are important as they can determine political interactions of governmental actors in a federal system.

It cannot be emphasized enough here that state bureaucracies and state bureaucrats of all federal levels (including the president as the chief of a state’s executive) have to be understood and their interactions analyzed as those of political actors. While bureaucrats are entitled with the control and monitoring of institutions and must look out for potential conflict to a normative order, they are also part of the informal interactions themselves. Bureaucrats can constrain or enable the functioning of institutions. Kingdon (1995, 31) assigns bureaucrats a predominant role in the policy process, especially during policy implementation:

“Implementation is one major preoccupation of career bureaucrats. Most of them are administering existing programs, not concentrating on new agenda items. The power of bureaucrats is often manifested in that implementation activity. Because careerists are so involved in administration, they have little time left for pushing new ideas. (...) If bureaucrats find a program is not going well in some particular [aspect], that recognition might feed into a policy change.”

Obinger et al. (2005), Gibson (2004), and Falleti (2010) clearly point out the power position or protagonism given to subnational governments in federal and decentralized systems. The state’s bureaucracies play a powerful role, especially during policy implementation, because public administrations execute existing policies of parliaments. The state, regional, and municipal government can also have powerful competences, hereby shaping a policy process and its outcome. A bureaucratic elite, with individual as well as collective interests and respective networks, manage the existence, compliance, and supervision of the legal framework that is already in place, as well as the allocation and distribution of public resources. Beyond a pure, administrative, and technocratic role, the state, its organizational subunits, and their own institutions are part of politics themselves. Hence, “the state” cannot be reduced to a neutral administrative agency or to its administrative capacity of guaranteeing public governance through reliable institutions and rules. In this regard, an effective state becomes part of politics and can “(...) best be thought of as the product of the way in which the political processes operate together, dynamically, to

forge fundamental rules and agreements (and ensure compliance with them) about the use and distribution of power and the political practices which are the necessary basis for the establishment and maintenance of public institutions” (Leftwich 2007, 19).

Given that state administrations are not neutral, the importance of accountability and accountability standards is even higher since they are one way to diminish the potentially negative impact of informal networks during policy implementation. In Brazil, state governments as intermediary levels of federalism (for example education secretariats) can occupy an important role in monitoring results and communicating these amongst central and local bureaucracies. At the same time, it is also possible that political and administrative decisions taken at the subnational level are strongly influenced, or even driven by, federal and municipal governments and their interests and networks. This has to be considered when empirically examining the role of Brazilian subnational governments.

For now, it is assumed that state governments in Brazil influence the implementation of primary education policy in state and, potentially, municipal schools through their relations with one another and in opposition or alignment with other political actors. Normative standards and accountability mechanisms must play a crucial role during policy implementation if higher-quality education is the goal. The following indicators shall operationalize this assumption:

- The level of use and dialogue about empirical evidences/challenges in primary education with civil society organizations
- The creation, publication, and open discussion of information pertaining to the education quality (availability and transparency of statistics)
- The accountable public enforcement of legal rights to universal coverage and quality of education
- The existence and practice of cross-governmental relations, networks, and collaboration with municipalities; the latter is crucial for education systems in federal countries to be able to address the dilemma of double-competences versus non-responsibility across several government levels, which could diminish the benefits of social policies.

### 2.5.2 *Parties*

Political parties are also important actors, since they especially influence policy formulation of primary education policy. Organized in state legislatures, political parties and their members supervise, evaluate, and control public administration and policy implementation that takes place at the state level. They are normatively crucial (even if not alone) to assure horizontal accountability, to control judicial and executive actions, and to eventually facilitate transparency about legislative processes towards citizens. Parties (especially in the presence of a stable party system) can hold policymakers accountable for their promises given their role in the democratic system. They are partially entrusted with the

supervision of institutions and their functioning. This is the normative interpretation of the role of parties and which spaces they should, in principle, occupy. However, the monitoring of a three-level, complex federal bureaucracy is rendered difficult and the political interests that politicians (and bureaucrats) have themselves affect the control of fiscal transfers between government levels. These party and electoral interests perpetuate all three federal levels and are closely interwoven, making federalism also a system of political relations.

As assumed for all actors examined in this dissertation, parties and party members pursue their own interests. Their primary interest is the granting of political survival during elections. To reach this goal, positions of politicians will be, to a certain extent, determined by financial resources and political networks at different government levels. In the Brazilian system, party members at the state level are able to influence education finances through individual budget amendments (Limongi and Figueiredo 2005, see chapter 4). How much weight this theoretically defined informal influence has during policy implementation (e.g., it may be counter-productive to nationally and state-wide education priorities) will be examined in the empirical chapters of this dissertation, including voluntary financial transfers of politicians (see chapters 5 and 6). Certainly, the impact of such informal networks is not necessarily negative (as is the case with informal institutions), but can entail non-transparent or clientelistic behavior, and potentially lead to unintended or even adverse effects on policy outcomes. Diaz-Cayeros remarks in his discussion on the importance of rules and political practice in the Mexican federal context that:

“[p]olitical parties are political devices that constrain social choice spaces, presumably bringing about stability in outcomes. Parties can create political practices that change the outcome that would have been generated by formal rules and procedures (i.e., institutions). In this sense, parties can become a substitute for formal institutions in solving social choice issues” (Diaz-Cayeros 2004, 298).

Considering the specific Mexican context with the predominance of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) over decades, this quote says that, through the influence of parties, a policy outcome can considerably change in comparison to what was foreseen in normative theory or a policy proposal. How can parties have an influence and through which channels? And which indicators could measure this?

The following three indicators seek to examine the influence of political parties on federalism as a political system and on education policy outcomes:

- The effect that that political competition has on policy choices at the state level
- The role played by party networks between state and federal levels for the politics of federalism (politically aligned or opposed)
- Financial transfers of politicians (individual voluntary transfers) and wider political networks that are potentially affiliated with these transfers

The choice of the first indicator—*political competition of parties at the state level defined by the number of seats in the state assembly*—follows the argument that political competition between dominant parties is central for reaching universal policies that benefit the majority of the population. This includes education policies that, with adequate coverage and quality, are able to contribute to the reduction of poverty and inequality.<sup>36</sup> When dominant parties compete, it is likely that one will be more responsive to social policy questions than the other. Further, the presence of political competition makes it possible to provide viable alternatives to voters to the incumbent government. Without this competition, powerful groups of society remain in a strong negotiation position and are not questioned or replaced through elections. Instead, if traditional elite parties are challenged by political competition and voter pressure, political accountability will rise and pro-poor change will become more likely (Moore/Putzel 2003; Kurtz 2003).

The second indicator—*party networks between the federal and state levels measured by political alignment or opposition of parties at state and federal level*—shall account for the question of how a federal arrangement can impact politics and policy choices at the state level. Riker himself believes that the workings of a party system are central to the understanding of centralization and decentralization in federalism. For him, political parties, not federal institutions per se, carry policy significance (Riker qtd. in: Diaz-Cayeros 2004, 298). Researchers have revised this point of view and have started to explore the connection between federal institutions and party dynamics. Without being exhaustive, certain studies have explored this connection. For example, Samuels and Mainwaring (2004) examine the articulation of subnational interests in the Brazilian national congress. Fenwick (2010) uses majoritarian political dynamics and presidential coalitions as one out of three compound sets of variables to investigate how central-municipal coalitions have been able to bypass governors and institutions at the state level in the provision of social protection policy in Argentina and Brazil. On the question of what drives the political economy of fiscal decentralization and fiscal spending in federal systems, another study (Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999) discusses the importance of political bargaining processes in Latin America and considers the power of subnational politicians and centralized versus decentralized party structures.

Here, the exploring of party relations between the federal and state levels follows the assumption that in federal systems, formal and informal directives of a federal government can influence either compliance or opposition of state governments. In addition, assuming the case in which they are politically aligned with the federal government, state governments could potentially sign one-to-one binding agreements with municipal administrations in order to align state and municipal education systems. While there is room for strong political influence at the local level, such alignment or mainstreaming of a policy can also have the effect of making a policy more coherent, widely implemented, and universally applied. If

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<sup>36</sup> Using the case of India, Lakshman explains that political accountability tends to be maximized in systems where vigorous party competition exists between parties or factions of a dominant party (Lakshman 2003).

this line of argument holds, it is conceivable that the federal government does not only have a direct competence regarding the monitoring of quality standards in state and municipal schools, but that it can also gain indirect influence on actual policy implementation in municipal education systems through its party alignment with state governments.

With regards to political parties, it is for now assumed that they can have an influence on the outcomes of education policy, at the state level and, potentially, at the municipal level through the following indicators:

- Political competition amongst dominant (state) parties as measured by their presence in state assemblies
- Political networks between state and federal party levels and their political alignment or opposition during mandates

This dissertation could not systematically cover the extent to which ideology is a determinant factor for these three indicators nor to which extent the political economy of each municipality relates to state and federal political choices.<sup>37</sup>

### 2.5.3 *Civil Society Groups: Influence from Teachers' unions (and Parents)*

What is the influence of civil society groups, such as teachers' unions and parents' associations, towards education quality? Which resources (financial means, technical skills, and political support), interests, and power do these two selected groups have to participate in policy formulation on the one hand, and to control policy implementation of education administrations on the other? During both formulation and implementation, civil society groups, including organized teachers and parents, are important monitoring bodies.

Literature on the decentralization of education policy points out its implications for subnational and local participation and for accountability (Grindle 2007; Gropello di 2004; Gunnarson et al., 2009; McGinn and Welsh 1999; UNESCO 2005). Decentralization is believed to raise transparency and the control of local governments, especially during the implementation of education initiatives. This strongly corresponds to vertical accountability. Increasing the participation of local communities as actors is one way making demands and ensuring the accountability of the actions of local officials. In this way, it is hoped that institutions and networks can benefit more closely align their objectives and the outcomes, and that harmful bias of informal institutional behavior can be diminished.

In order to give civic participation the necessary pressure to alter quantity or quality of education (or any other public good), a certain degree of transparency and access to different types of information is crucial. *Information should be understood as a resource that gives or deprives citizens with power towards politicians and public officials.* If information on

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<sup>37</sup> Brazilian research is currently investigating the importance of municipal political factors on the quality of primary education. See, for example, the research project of Prof. Sofia Lerche at the State University of Ceará "Bons resultados no IDEB: Estudo exploratório de fatores explicativos" (unpublished). The project examines 40 municipalities in Mato Grosso do Sul, São Paulo State, and Ceará.



educational performance of schools, their teachers, and students is nonexistent, unpublished, manipulated, or poorly communicated, there is decreased transparency and accountability, and the wrongdoing of the government officials may go unpunished and without further consequences. Non-transparency leads to a loss of credibility and accountability on the part of the government, and increases distrust amongst the citizens. Thus, transparency during legislative and administrative processes will become an important empirical indicator in this dissertation.

The extent to which the increased participation of the citizens, as promised by democratic decentralization, is indeed responsive to local needs depends on local politics and the degree of effectiveness of accountability mechanisms (e.g., well institutionalized procedures in public bureaucracies or fair elections). Participation will not be sufficient without its institutional anchoring (Crook/Sverrisson 2003, 237). This points at a potentially positive correlation between accountability, transparency, and participation, but without certainty about specific causalities amongst these different variables. It is unclear what causes which effect. For example, higher degrees of accountability and transparency do not increase participation per se, or vice-versa, but both taken together can make for more effective citizen participation.

In decentralized settings, it is easier to increase the participation of civil society, which is vital in order to influence local administrations to make changes benefiting poorer segments of society and to make policy processes more democratic (see Avritzer 2009; Dagnino 2002). In terms of education, school councils that exist at numerous federal and policy levels in Brazil can become a channel for participation, especially amongst socially and economically disadvantaged population groups. However, it is important to consider the following three challenges that these councils may face. First, the closer the council is to the actual beneficiary, the easier it might be for local politicians to manipulate or exploit council members to serve their own political interests. Second, there is no guarantee that local council members will indeed represent, for example, disadvantaged and disarticulated population groups. Hereby, council members (parents, teachers and in some cases students) bear the risk of concentrating too much power in the hands of a few community leaders, or they may not be able to mobilize the group they are supposed to represent. Third, in order to control how school directors use their budgets, council members should have training on fiscal norms and more specific knowledge about how to efficiently achieve better quality education (for an empirical overview on the problems encountered in Pernambuco, see Sant'Anna Guimarães 2008, 142).

Given these challenges, this dissertation includes a few selective interviews with members of school councils, and investigates their influence through interviews with researchers and policy experts. Teachers' unions were chosen given this ambiguous role of school councils, and because they often ally with parents to increase political pressure.

Teachers' unions have a powerful political mandate and influence on decisions of education policy. Their main agenda focuses on decisions on issues such as salary increases

and working hours. Even if these issues primarily reflect the self-interest of the teachers, they simultaneously affect education quality. In Brazil, most teachers in public schools are underpaid. Consequently, they work long hours in two or three shifts, and often lack adequate pedagogical training and monitoring for working with children from lower-income groups and/or from violent neighborhoods. One has to acknowledge that education quality cannot improve in a system with underpaid, overworked, and inadequately prepared teachers. Without support from teachers' unions, most education reforms in Latin America in the 1990s would not have been successful (Grindle 2004, 119).

It is assumed here that accountability during legislative processes and administrative decision-making must be transparent for teachers' unions as representatives of an organized civil society. This transparency is reinforced when all actors involved accept the validity of the available empirical information. These assumptions shall be explored with the help of following indicators:

- Existence of interest-based networks created between civil society (e.g., state education councils, teachers' unions, and parents) and state governments
- The level of perceived dialogue between state governments and teachers' unions/parents to formulate policies

To account for the political interactions influencing federalism, this dissertation will discuss how transparent policy implementation can actually be in Brazil (even with adequate transparency) where the federal government in Brasilia has the legal authority to control and monitor administrative processes at the remote municipal level. In absence of strong, built-in accountability, the likelihood is high that local politics will drive policy implementation and either override or coop informed citizens.


## **2.6 Chapter Summary: Advocating for a Three-level Reading of Federalism**

Institutions, actors, and networks are closely related to one another in a policy process. March and Olsen (1984, 739) believe that political outcomes are a function of the distribution of preferences (interests) amongst political actors, the distribution of resources (power), and the constraints imposed by the rules of the game (norms). Each of these is endogenous to the political system, implying that preferences are developed within society or through the socialization of individuals; resources are distributed amongst political actors through broad social processes; and rules of the game are either stable or they change because of events such as a revolution that is exogenous to regular political activities.

This chapter has discussed federalism as a system of both institutional rules and political relations, pointing out how interrelated both are via the existence of the political actors and the roles that they play. While federal institutions can normatively be created and influence a certain amount of behavior among actors, not all of their actions can and should be normatively regulated, and they will have different consequences for policy outcomes.

The two-level model of polity and politics assumed in traditional policy analysis is insufficient for the political reality of federalism in Latin America. This dissertation advocates a theoretical model regarding federalism as a system with three levels of interrelated institutional and political relations. Figure 2.1 illustrates the type of behavior that potentially constitutes these relations and the links between a polity (the constitutional framework and the institutional side of federalism) and politics (interactions and the political side of federalism).

**Figure 2.1 Theoretical Understanding of the Three Levels of Federalism**



Level A displays what federalism and its policy outcomes could look like if politics as the conjunction of relations, the actors and their networks, and social capital were aligned with the constitution and regulations (institutions) laid out in federalism as a polity. In this assumed case, federalism would have a strong influence as a polity and lead to greater accountability. In this case, the assumption is that a positive bias from politics towards policy outcomes takes place.

In level B, federalism as polity as described in level A is weakened and influenced by a certain degree of interactions amongst political actors. The actors' behaviors will be mixed and either conform to federal institutions (formal behavior) or not (informal behavior),

carrying an either positive or negative bias from politics towards policy outcomes. These mixed interactions are possible if the federal constitution has not regulated everything, giving the political actors certain autonomy to discover new forms of interaction and creating networks that can either weaken or strengthen federalism as an institutional system, depending on how political actors decide to use this autonomy. Policy outcomes may be intended or unintended with respect to the initial policy objectives.

Level C can be interpreted as an extreme case in comparison to level A. It integrates elements of level B, but with a predominantly negative bias for policy outcomes. Federalism is driven by politics and certain informal behavior that violates, deteriorates, and potentially substitutes the institutional foundations of federalism as a polity. This creates a negative bias towards policy outcomes, as the actors' behaviors are characterized mainly by informality. This leads to a loss of validity and, thus, accountability, and a greater gap between the expected and fulfilled policy objectives laid out by institutions

The discussion in this chapter about the roles of selected groups of actors (federal, state, and municipal administrations; political parties; civil society organizations; teachers' unions) points out that the behavior of each is motivated by different interests, which are closely related to the position of each actor in the institutional and political system. A set of tentative indicators has been presented to analyze the actual influence of each actor in the policy process and assess their impact on policy outcomes. The actors and indicators are summarized in Table 2.1 below. These indicators are constitutive for behavior that is aligned with federalism as a normative system or for political interactions that have an impact on federalism through formal or informal behavior (respective levels A, B, and C as explained above).

**Table 2.1. Actor-specific Indicators Influencing Federalism as Politics and Polity**

<p>Indicators influencing federalism and policy outcomes primarily as a political interaction process</p> <p><b>Political factors:</b></p> <p>Political competition amongst state parties as measured by their presence in state assemblies</p> <p>Political networks between state and federal levels (politically aligned or opposed)</p> <p>Financial and political support of individual politicians via voluntary transfers</p> <p>Existence of interest-based networks between civil society (state education councils, teachers' unions, parents. etc.) and state governments</p> <p>Networks and type of relations between state government and teachers' unions (existence or non-existence of political dialogue)</p> <p>Political distance or closeness between state governments and teachers' unions</p>	<p>Indicators influencing federalism and policy outcomes primarily as a system of institutions/rules</p> <p><b>Institutional factors:</b></p> <p>Formulation and implementation of formal institutional rules to enhance education quality (federal/state/municipal level)</p> <p>Cross-governmental collaboration amongst state and municipal governments, for example via formal collaboration agreements</p> <p>Willingness and ability of state bureaucracy to base policy design and implementation on empirical evidence (e.g., official statistics)</p> <p>Availability and frequent publication of education statistics by state government</p> <p>Active existence of school councils and regular information transmission by governments</p> <p>Presence of specific rules of accountability and sanctions</p>
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### 3. Methodological Considerations

This chapter describes the methodological, mostly qualitative research choices made during the course of the research process for this dissertation. It describes the research design, the reasoning for the selection of each case and the particular time-frame chosen, the types of resources used, the collection and partially computer-based analysis of primary (e.g., expert interviews, field visits, field observations) and secondary data, as well as the challenges encountered during the process. Annex 1 and 2 provide further relevant documentation, such as a list of interviewees during different field stages and respective interview questionnaires (semi-structured).

#### 3.1 Most Comparative Case Study Design

This dissertation opted for a most-similar case study design at the subnational level. Schmidt (cit. in Nohlen 2006, 6) describes this method as especially adequate for an analysis of the different cases in relation to social and political evolution, which vary independently from basic structures. In the comparative case study design, contextual variables will not be analyzed. Dissimilar variables are the independent variables and are of primary interest herein to understand a given outcome in each case. In this way, it will be possible to determine the heterogeneous methodological status of the basic structures that pertains to each case. Mill (1978) calls this approach “the method of difference” where contextual variables—the ones that are analyzed—are assumed to be heterogeneous and have a heterogeneous causal effect on the outcomes. In order to facilitate the in-depth investigation of the heterogeneous contextual or independent variables, it is necessary to identify cases that are similar in as many contextual variables as possible, which will make it easier to concentrate the analysis on the independent variables of interest, and to isolate these and their effects on the given outcome.

In this dissertation, the outcome of primary education quality (determined by class-age distortion, repetition rate, and student’s performance according to the Brazilian indicators Index for the Development of Basic Education [IDEB] and National System of Evaluation of Basic Schooling [SAEB]) is considered as given and represents the dependent variable. Two states in Brazil’s northeast were chosen because of the similarities in their contextual variables—such as levels of poverty, inequality, and economic activity; geographical size; and administrative structure (number of municipalities)—in order to better control for the effects of these variables on the independent and dependent variables of interest.

According to Charles Ragin (1987: x), qualitative comparison is not “(...) radically analytically (because it breaks cases into parts – variables – that are difficult to reassemble into wholes),” but it is about examining *constellations, configurations, and conjunctures* (emphasis added).

“It is especially well suited for addressing questions about outcomes resulting from multiple and conjunctural causes (...). Multivariate statistical techniques start with

simplifying assumptions about causes and their interrelation as variables. The method of comparison, by contrast, starts by assuming maximum causal complexity and then mounts an assault on that complexity” (Ragin 1987, x).

Ragin’s perspective also helps to understand to which degree quantitative and qualitative analysis or data can indeed be combined, a question this dissertation addresses.

A central question when working with comparative cases is whether or not we can really assume that the macro-social and macro-political structures are indeed 100 percent similar, and in this sense, perfectly comparable. In the social sciences, in contrast to chemical experiments, for examples, one cannot assume such an absolute or total linear context of causality of variables. One case will never be identical to another. What is important, though, is to relate possible differences in contextual variables to effects observed from independent to dependent variables (Nohlen 2006), and to relate these effects to one or more different independent variables. For example, the two cases compared herein, Pernambuco and Ceará, which in the past were part of the same state,(at the time referred to as “capitania”),<sup>38</sup> are dissimilar in their historical-economic structure to the extent that this could possibly explain the difference in current policy choices.

Claudio Ferreira Lima, a well-known writer, who focuses on Brazil’s northeast economic history, and former economist at the Brazilian Regional Bank, Banco do Nordeste, explained in an interview that political clientelism flourished less in Ceará than Pernambuco due to recurrent severe droughts, a rather cattle-based economy, and the fact that Ceará does not have Pernambuco’s mass plantation of sugar cane. The author argues that because of Ceará’s geographically remote areas, constant heat, and economy based on less intensive human labor (cattle in comparison to sugar cane), the population is less exposed to clientelistic practices. Ferreira Lima uses this argument of economic history to explain why Ceará has put forward more collaborative forms of public policy up to present (Ferreira Lima 2009). While it is not the goal herein to empirically validate this argument further, the dissertation illustrates that historical circumstances and conditions can have a powerful effect on the political economy of a given country or state. Instead of trying to control for variables that are beyond the control of any social science researcher, the more important task is to note such historical conditions, take them as given, and relate them to the independent variable under investigation. By the same token, it is important to compare the statistical outcomes of education quality in both cases, as well as to ask how both states arrived at those outcomes, and to consider different historical contexts and constellations in order to interpret a given outcome in adequate terms.

Having discussed the pros and cons of comparative research in the social sciences, it remains to be understood what value added a small number of comparative cases (small N-comparisons), such as those presented herein, have for qualitative research, and what level of explanatory power they can reach.

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<sup>38</sup> Between 1680 and 1799, Ceará was a dependency of Pernambuco during the Portuguese empire. It only became an independent Captaincy after 1799.

Following Pierson's suggestion to move beyond the simple claim that federal institutions matter for social policy outcomes:

“(…) a comparative approach makes it possible to develop more nuanced propositions about the consequences of institutional arrangements and the interplay between institutions and other variables. Outcomes that single-country studies might ascribe to federalism *per se* can be seen to depend on the interaction of a particular kind of federalism with other political variables. This finding also highlights the limitations of using broad quantitative studies to investigate institutional effects” (Pierson 1995, 451; emphasis added in original).

Both Tulia Falleti and Peter Hall agree with Paul Pierson that in order to understand the unfolding of a process connecting its causes to outcomes, small-N comparisons can have significant explanatory power. A variables-oriented approach in relation to outcomes is still possible, and by choosing case locations that account for a comparatively large size in terms of geography and population, some generalization might be possible. However, in contrast to statistical regression analysis, this is not the primary goal of small N-comparisons (Falleti 2010, 27; Hall 2003b, 391).

The research project presented herein should be understood as a theoretically guided, but primarily empirical contribution to the research on the politics of federalism. As laid out in chapters 1 and 2, more knowledge is needed in order to understand how exactly federalism can impact policies and their outcomes through politics, and which causal chain of effects are at work connecting institutions, actors, and their networks. Quantitative, large-N studies cannot clearly identify such causal effects. Empirical or comparative case studies, such as the one presented herein, aim to fill these gaps and to identify which political and institutional variables might be more relevant than others to explain details of causal effects within a larger process.

The primary goal of an empirical case study is not to arrive at universally applicable conclusions or a high degree of generalization, but to provide an empirically based, in-depth explanation of causal effects. In order to achieve this, a case study has to be detailed and thorough in its description. It should examine the context of the case(s) and collect data in multiple ways. *The value of a case study lies in understanding, rather than in measuring, differences.* This implies capturing multiple perspectives that are rooted in a specific setting and providing, based on the described details, a holistic and contextualized understanding of reality (Lewis 2009, 52/75). Consequently, case study research does not involve high degrees of universally applicable generalizations, and the researcher has to carefully question the degree to which the examined case(s) can explain the reality of other possible cases that move beyond the context derived from one of the chosen case (Lewis and Ritchie 2009, 263; Rueschenmeyer 2003).



### **3.2 Stages of Comparison**

To arrive at a certain depth in the examined states, the cases as a whole are compared to others, as are the individual stages within each case. In the current analysis, Ceará and Pernambuco are examined according to the most-similar-criteria case study design to explain differences in education policy outcomes. By choosing cases with a high degree of assumed similarity in contextual variables, it is possible to minimize the effect of these variables on the framework. These states were chosen since they are similar in terms of their socioeconomic characteristics (poverty/inequality level, population size, economic activity), but different in terms of student performance, as indicated further below.

When examining each individual case, a diachronic comparison is applied first in order to capture each case in its historical pattern and political development and to assess their continuity or divergence over time. To facilitate this, the period under observation (1995 to 2010) is divided into four subperiods according to the respective electoral cycles simultaneously occurring at state and federal levels (see empirical chapters 5 and 6). This part of the analysis traces the different political actors and networks at work, to assess their impact in relation to formulated and implemented education policies, and to capture the relevant parts of the whole “moving picture,” as suggested by historical institutionalism. Hereby, it is possible to identify the most important causal variables in each case without having compared the cases to one another.

In the second step of analysis, a synchronic comparison of both states aims to disclose the most relevant variables formerly identified in each case in order to understand both the differences and the similarities between the two. This step is crucial since it helps to narrow down further unique key variables of each case. Having accomplished steps 1 and 2, it is necessary to further refine both the synchronic and diachronic descriptions to understand what differed most in both cases. It is especially important to not only understand the political subperiods of each state in isolation, but also to think about their connection to each other. This also entails the consideration of former political events, such as historical reform efforts in both states, since their examination helps to assess the origins and combination of effects of further developments in each state’s education sector.

### **3.3 Reasoning for Selected Cases (Ceará and Pernambuco)**

#### *3.3.1 Socioeconomic Criteria*

Since the aim of this dissertation is to understand differences in educational outcomes and herewith connected policies in a region with elevated poverty and inequality, it makes sense to examine two states in Brazil’s northeast, the poorest region in the country (for a comparison of indicators in Brazil’s major regions see Annex 3). Ceará and Pernambuco, in particular, were chosen because they are very similar in their general socioeconomic characteristics (poverty/inequality level, population size, economic activity), but different in their development of educational outcomes (see Table 3.1). Further, given their size and economic activity, they are important states for the northeastern region. Other states, such as

Piauí, are not considered herein because they are geographical outliers of the region under consideration or because of they are comparatively much bigger, such as Piauí and Bahia. According to these criteria, two pairs of states seem viable for this study: Ceará and Pernambuco or Sergipe and Alagoas. An email inquiry was sent to education experts at INEP, IPEA/IPC, IETS, and the University of Pernambuco in December 2008 to request advice about the viability of either comparison. These experts all agreed that the comparison of Ceará and Pernambuco regarding education and education policy would be much more fruitful, because of their size and because since both are highly important for the northeast as a region in terms of their history, economics, and levels of poverty. Both states have pursued different education policies, making them worthwhile for comparison, despite the fact that if the pure numeric educational outcomes were taken alone, other pairs of comparison would have been viable, too.

**Table 3.1. Comparison of Socioeconomic Indicators in Northeastern States**


State/ Indicators	Population (IBGE 2007)	Area in km <sup>2</sup>	GDP per capita (2004) in R\$	HDI 1991	HDI 2000	% change	HD- Education Index 1991	HD- Education Index 2000	% change
<b>Piauí</b>	3,024,458.00	252,378.00	2,892	0.566	0.656	15.90%	0.585	0.730	24.79%
<b>Ceará</b>	8,168,874.00	146,348.00	4,170	0.593	0.700	18.04%	0.604	0.772	27.81%
<b>Pernambuco</b>	8,466,785.00	98,938.00	5,730	0.620	0.705	13.71%	0.644	0.768	19.25%
<b>Alagoas</b>	3,036,673.00	27,933.00	3,877	0.548	0.649	18.43%	0.535	0.703	31.40%
<b>Sergipe</b>	1,987,480.00	22,050.00	6,782	0.597	0.682	14.24%	0.630	0.771	22.38%
<b>Bahia</b>	13,904,377.00	567,295.00	6,351	0.590	0.688	16.61%	0.615	0.785	27.64%
<b>Rio Grande do Norte</b>	3,027,393.00	43,910.00	5,370	0.604	0.705	16.72%	0.642	0.779	21.34%
<b>Paraíba</b>	3,612,218.00	56,585.00	4,165	0.561	0.661	17.83%	0.575	0.737	28.17%
Sources: PNAD 1998: CD Rom dos Microdados: 9; IBGE Coordenação de População e Indicadores Sociais - COPIS; UNDP Human Development Atlas Brazil 2007/2008									
Remarks: Note by that until 2004, PNAD did not survey rural areas in the north of Brazil (Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará, Amapá.									

### 3.3.2 Education Criteria: Quality

Even if Ceará and Pernambuco have similar education outcomes today—if measured by the UNDP Human Development Education Index (HD Education Index)—Ceará has undergone a much deeper change if compared to Pernambuco. Between 1990 and 2000, Ceará saw an increase of 27.81 percent for this indicator, while during the same period, Pernambuco only saw a 19.25 percent increase. Something similar happened with the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), which also improved at a faster pace in Ceará between

1990 and 2000 than it did during the same period in Pernambuco. The increase in the HDI and HD Education Index in Ceará compared to Pernambuco happened during less favorable economic conditions. While both states have a population of similar size, the GDP per capita (2004) is almost one-third lower in Ceará than in Pernambuco. Thus, albeit with lower economic growth, Ceará improved faster in these two indicators.

**Figure 3.1. HDI Education**



Source: Author's elaboration based on data from the UN Human Development Reports (Nations 2007/2008).

Education experts at INEP, the Federal University of Pernambuco, and IETS in Rio de Janeiro encouraged the choice of these two states for the analysis herein for the following three reasons. First, outside of education, other pairs of states in the northeast have different socioeconomic indicators. Second, Ceará and Pernambuco, along with Bahia, are very important states for the economic growth of the northeast and considered as test cases for measuring the development trends and potential of the rest of the region. Both states have large ports, as well as major national and multinational companies in their capital cities attracting foreign investment. However, both states also share what many other northeastern states consider as a future challenge: a very dry, poor, and underexplored interior. Third, Ceará has pursued a more clear education policy than Pernambuco, making this pair very worthwhile for comparison.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup> The experts consulted via email are Marcus Melo, Professor of Political Science, Federal University of Pernambuco (29.12.2008); Maria Ines Gomes, Director of Educational Statistics at INEP (17.12.2008); and Simon Schwarzman, Researcher at the Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade (IETS) (17.12.2008).

Table 3.2 summarizes the indicators for each state. The first part of the table displays similarities in variables such as population, size of geographic area, number of municipalities, GDP per capita, and poverty rates. The second part of the table, shaded in grey, shows the differences in the quality of primary education (independent variable) in terms of indicators such as illiteracy rate of 10–14 year old, school performance, and children lagging behind in their learning progress. Ceará displays better results for all these indicators, and in addition has a higher coverage rate in primary education. This means that more students are enrolled, and that a higher quantity of primary education is provided in Ceará than in Pernambuco. More data on quality of education in both states are displayed in Chapter 5 through 7.

<b>Table 3.2. Ceará and Pernambuco: Socioeconomic Circumstances and Educational Achievements</b>		
<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Ceará</b>	<b>Pernambuco</b>
Population (2009)	8,547,809	8,810,256
Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	148,825	98, 911
Number of municipalities	184	185
GDP per capita in R\$ (2007)	6,149	7,337
Poverty rate (2003)	53.89 %	52.5 %
Illiteracy rate of population aged 10–14 (2009)	3.9 %	5.7 %
Education performance by IDEB (Index for the Development of Basic Education), first through fourth grade (2009) <sup>40</sup>	4.4	4.1
Coverage of primary education (2009)	93.5%	87.7%
Children aged 10–14 who have been behind in school for more than 2 years (2009)	15%	20.1%
Teachers with higher education degrees teaching grades 1 to 4 (2009)	62%	42.7%
<i>Sources:</i> (IBGE 2003, 2007, 2009) online at <a href="http://www.ibge.gov.br/estadosat/">http://www.ibge.gov.br/estadosat/</a> (20/08/2010); (INEP 2010a) SAEB and Censo escolar at <a href="http://sistemasideb.inep.gov.br/resultado/">http://sistemasideb.inep.gov.br/resultado/</a> (20/08/2010).		
<i>Note:</i> Until 2004 PNAD did not survey rural areas in the north of Brazil (Rondônia, Acre, Amazonas, Roraima, Pará, Amapá).		

### 3.4 Reasoning for Chosen Time Frame

The time frame of analysis for this dissertation, 1995–2010, was chosen for two reasons. First, it falls into the period of Brazil’s redemocratization after 1988, during which many social rights were constitutionally laid out, including the right to universal access to education and healthcare. Second, the period after 1995 is especially relevant for understanding Brazil’s primary education sector, since many important laws were made that decentralized primary education in the political, administrative, and fiscal realms, while still

<sup>40</sup> Similar to the PISA test in European countries, the IDEB measures literacy and math skills of primary, secondary, and high school students in combination with their approval rates. It is calculated by Brazil’s National Institute for Education Studies and Research (INEP) in Brasilia, and used as a national performance test to rank education quality in all private and public schools across the country.

attempting to grant equal coverage and quality across the federal territory (see Chapter 4). Therefore, this time period offers fertile ground to investigate the politics of federalism in this particular policy field.

Following the suggested comparative sequential method by Falleti (2010) that is at the core of historical institutionalism, the strength of the argument presented herein on the influence/impact of state-municipal relations on quality outcomes has had an increasingly reinforcing effect on outcomes. By observing the period of interest here (1995–onwards), as well as relating the four chosen subperiods to events happening prior to 1995, a more comprehensive picture has emerged as to why state-municipal collaboration has been different in the two states, how this has influenced education quality, and which political networks may potentially account for this trend. Without having compared the political ruptures and reforms in both states prior to 1995, this dissertation would not have reached the same conclusion. Observing the sequence of political and economic events reveals an important answer in relation to outcomes. Hereby, a central argument of historical institutionalism—path dependence—is used, meaning that the timing and order of events are consequential and embedded in a more specific context. “The choice of a starting point in a trajectory of events has implications for the identification of the causal mechanisms that link initial events to later ones” (Falleti 2010, 25). Certainly, this type of sequential analysis implies that events of interest are properly chosen and conceptualized, and that a conclusion could change if other events were analytically chosen.

The chosen time period of 15 years also makes it possible to consider the long-term effects of education policies. In contrast to policy interventions in other policy fields such as health, decisions in education policies take longer and require a more time intensive analysis in order to capture the actual impact of education spending on social development:

“There is a significant time lag between increases in education spending and the realization of their full effects on social indicators and growth. Two-thirds of the direct impact of education spending is felt within five years, but the full impact materializes with a significant time lag of 10 to 15 years. Such a lag needs to be kept in mind when designing policy interventions. The impact of health spending, however, is immediate (Baldacci et al. 2004, 27).”

Having chosen to focus only on education makes it easier to structure the research design and questions presented herein, since this choice reduces the amount of possible causal mechanisms at work. However, it is important to consider the direct influence that other closely related fields, such as health and social assistance, have on the quality of primary education, as well as the indirect effect they may have via their respective institutional and political channels connecting policies amongst each other. Although these fields may have influenced the observed results, by having chosen most-similar cases, such effects can be reduced to a minimum.

### 3.5 The Combination of Quantitative and Qualitative Data

During the course of the research for this dissertation, both quantitative and qualitative data were used in a complementary way. While quantitative data were almost exclusively used to describe educational situations and the socioeconomic context, qualitative data were used to explain and understand the quantitative diagnosis (Neubert 2001, 11). What does the distinction between quantitative and qualitative data exactly mean? Witt distinguishes quantitative from qualitative data in the following way (Witt 2001, 2):

- Quantitative data are, first, numerically presentable, abstract data. They can, for example, be physiological measurement data, scalable data from tests or surveys, or time values for specific events. Abstract data by themselves do not carry a meaning unless the reader or analyst adds it on. For example, the Pisa results of a specific country do not have value unless the researcher qualifies them by saying from which year the data are, and in which relation they stand to either another year or another country. Additionally, unless this kind of data is further analyzed or origins of collection mentioned, it is not useful for scientific purposes.
- Qualitative data, by contrast, do carry a concrete value and meaning by themselves. They can be textual, visual (pictures, movies etc.), audible etcetera. However, their meaning is not instantaneous either, but is added by contextual conditions and, in contrast to quantitative data, qualitative data will carry more details and be more tangible. Comparable to quantitative data, the analysis and interpretation of quantitative data is not fixed, since this depends on additional characteristics of data, the research question, and the research focus. While with quantitative data the researcher has to fix the method of analysis up front, the nature of the qualitative data and their evolution during different stages of collection and interpretation will evolve over time and in a constant process until reaching a certain point of data saturation.
- Mixed forms of quantitative and qualitative data also exist since qualitative data can be ex post quantified by abdicating parts of their meaning in order to make them more abstract. The same may occur by assigning qualitative data to preformulated categories. In such cases, the researcher may abdicate part of the meaning of the data, or not analyze all the possible details of the data, yet without assigning numeric values or numbers to them. The inverse way (turn quantitative data into qualitative data) is not possible because details were not captured in the first abstract collection process and their meaning cannot be ex post added to make them useful as qualitative data and for qualitative analysis.

Extensive literature discusses how to address the challenges of integrating or combining quantitative and qualitative data (cf. Mayring 2001), often mentioning quantitative in contrast or in differentiation to qualitative work, or taking their dichotomy as given. In this sense, the approach advocated by Terry Hedrick is pertinent. This author argues that an

integration of qualitative and quantitative data is definitively possible and desirable, but that the researcher should be aware of the following challenges

“Generally, quantitative methods are focused on obtaining specific items of information, and great stress is placed on systematic approaches across people and places; qualitative methods are more likely to involve techniques that broaden the information base – adding more perspectives, raising additional issues, constantly accumulating more details with less attention to inconsistencies in data collection procedures. (...) Can quantitative and qualitative data collection methods be used in the same study? Absolutely yes, we do it all the time and the integration greatly enriches our studies” (Hedrick 1994, 48).

This dissertation partially faces the challenges described by Hedrick when combining both approaches. During the initial collection of data and some parts of the fieldwork, in particular, data collection is oriented towards a quantitative approach where very specific types of data are searched for and any initially seemingly irrelevant data are left out. The research presented herein is then one “sub-study” of a bigger research project with common research design and approach. This project, entitled “Pro-Poor Growth and Education Policies in India and Brazil,” was financed by the German Ministry of Development (BMZ; 2007–2010) and carried out by a research team of two economists and one political scientist (the author of this dissertation) of the German Development Institute (DIE). While two of the three field stages described below took place within this context and followed a mostly quantitative approach for data collection, the third stage concentrated primarily on qualitative methods for data collection. Both approaches are examined in this dissertation.

### **3.6 Collection of Material**

#### *3.6.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Data Collection*

During the course of the research process for this dissertation, different types of data were collected and analyzed in order to assess presented assumptions and empirical hypotheses, as well as their indicators. The quantitative data collection includes international development statistics; budget statistics; statistical data on coverage and quality of Brazilian education at federal, state, and municipal level; and socioeconomic data on Brazil, the northeast, and Ceará and Pernambuco. In all cases, official statistics were prioritized as long as these were available and seemed to be reliable in terms of the collection procedures and validity. Such statistics originate from the Brazilian Institute for Statistics and Geography (IBGE), the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), the Brazilian Ministry of Education (MEC), the National Institute for Educational Studies and Research (INEP), the Brazilian Senate, and think tanks and universities in Ceará and Pernambuco. Along with the Brazilian statistical information accessed via the Internet, partially unpublished statistical data were personally obtained from institutions such as the IBGE, INEP, MEC, the senate, and state institutions.

Qualitative data were collected and analyzed originating from the following four principal sources: (i) via a review of relevant international and Brazilian academic literature; (ii) via semi-structured interviews with different types of experts at the municipal, state, and federal levels (see below); (iii) via punctual field observations in selected neighborhoods and schools in both urban and rural areas of Ceará and Pernambuco; and (iv) via policy documents about education programs, finances, and policy formulation and implementation at the federal and state levels.

### *3.6.2 Sequence and Timing of Three Field Stages*

The presented information was collected, accessed, and analyzed in three different field stages. The first field stage, which took place in October 2008, aimed at prevalidating different research hypotheses to collect quantitative data, in particular, that was not available online and to build a contact network with national Brazilian researchers in think tanks and universities for interviews at a later stage of the research process. During the second field stage, which took place from March 2009 to May 2009, and during the third field stage, which took place from March to April 2010, roughly 60 semi-structured interviews were carried out in person (with a few exceptions of phone interviews) at the federal, state, and municipal levels with politicians (state assemblies) and public officials (policy executors); policy and education experts; researchers; school directors and supervisors; and representatives from selected business associations, state education councils, NGOs, and teachers' unions. During the third, much shorter field stage, some of the findings from the previous stage needed to be further explored and additional material had to be collected. The experts in the second stage were the same in about one-third of the re-interviews in the third stage (25 interviews; see Annex 1). The second field stage was meant to cover the remaining initially selected interview partners and, in order to triangulate the content of both stages, included secondary data from the interviews carried out during the first field stage. By contrast, the third field stage was meant to deepen the knowledge gained from the second stage.<sup>41</sup> At the end of both the second and third field stages, interviews were carried out with independent policy experts at the federal level to assess the validity of the knowledge gathered at the state level.

Education councils at the municipal and school levels were not systematically included in the data collection, since this would have gone beyond the feasibility of this dissertation. However, in order to account for the importance of civil society at the municipal level during the implementation of education policies, municipal interest associations were included in both Ceará and Pernambuco, as were their state councils. These associations are composed by policymakers and teachers, and meant to represent the interests of any professional engaged in municipal education.

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<sup>41</sup> For the purpose of this dissertation, “triangulation” means the cross-checking of similar types of data given by different interviewees in order to further assess inferences drawn from the data and determine if there is a convergence. In addition, triangulation can also be used for the cross-checking of different types of data, for example quantitative data from surveys or a literature review in comparison to qualitative data from semi-structured interviews.



It is important to acknowledge the scarcity of information in regards to the background and socioeconomic circumstances of the parents of pupils, which is partially due to the fact that those factors were not the focus of my research. Yet, since parents are a potential source of political support to teachers' unions, qualitative data that captures their perspectives on education quality and the respective policy initiatives was partially collected through conversations and observations carried out in municipal schools, surrounding communities, and households. As part of this step, I interviewed 30 rural and urban households, under municipal jurisdiction, that send their children to public primary schools in the second field stage. These interviews were carried out to validate the assumptions of academic literature on the institutional and political challenges faced in improving the quality of education at the municipal level in Brazil, and to gain a better understanding of the extent to which parents are indeed able to participate in education decisions in the public school system. This aspect is especially important to assure overall quality of primary education, since municipal schools in Ceará and Pernambuco serve roughly two-thirds of the students in primary education. My findings were that parents could only very restrictively influence and monitor school management at the municipal level in terms of the implementation of education policies (see Chapters 5 and 6).

### *3.6.3 Interview Guides and Their Use*

In order to carry out the interviews in the three different stages, it was necessary to establish an extensive and diverse network of contacts via electronic (Email) and face-to-face communication. This dissertation made equal use of both the informal and semi-structured interviews. While informal interviews were carried out to collect and complement data on existing statistics, programs, and political connections of other interviewees, semi-structured interviews were carried out to gather data from people that occupied key positions in relevant organizations or bureaucracies, or people that were identified in the informal conversations as key to understanding the specific processes or networks.

While informal interviews did not follow a predetermined catalogue of questions, but rather very specific questions on different types of information, semi-structured interviews followed pre-established guidelines with leading questions. These questions followed the main research topics and subtopics, and provided the main structure for the interviews by focusing on relations and processes, or characteristics of relevant individuals, groups, and organizations. Initial and contextual questions were asked in between, and their order was reassessed constantly to ensure a good conversational flow with the interviewees. Questions were neither fully fixed nor spontaneous, which made for a flexible use of the interview guide. Semi-structured interviews especially accommodated people with time constraints, such as policymakers, politicians, and policy implementing experts, precisely the group of people of interest for the research herein (Dannecker 2008; Rubm and Rubm 1995).

While collecting qualitative data, it is important to ensure that the knowledge and information base grows in ways that provide material to answer the research questions. With a rapidly growing base of material during three field stages, this dissertation constantly

assessed if relevant information was indeed collected and adjusted interview guidelines as needed, following Legard, Keegan and Ward, to improve the effectiveness of the interviews and determine the saturation point where any additional interview would not add on any new relevant information (Legard, Keegan, and Ward 2009). By the same token, the collected data was constantly reviewed to extract data and opinions that would be useful in other interviews, for example with an opposition party, to gather additional feedback and contextualization of interviews carried out with members from a party holding government. This type of data collection is known as “triangulation,” which has often been cited as a central means to validate qualitative data and research of content. Triangulation, as defined in the previous footnote:

“(…) involves the use of different methods and sources to check the integrity of, or extend, inferences drawn from the data. It has been widely adopted and developed as a concept by qualitative researchers as a means of investigating the 'convergence' of both the data and the conclusion derived from them” (Ritchie 2009, 43).

For the purpose of this dissertation, this method was followed carefully during the interview process, and usually only towards the end of a good interview when a solid relationship had been established with the interviewee.

Following a qualitative methodology, carrying out interviews means to reconstruct reality based on the perspective of interviewees (cf. Flick 2002). Therefore, the choice of experts cannot be random, but has to be purposeful since it will crucially determine the results one can obtain and interpret. By choosing a wide range of actors, it is possible to gather data that will reflect diversity of perspectives about reality. For this reason, during the research for this dissertation, interviewees were chosen based on their professional and technical experiences, as well as their political affiliations. Consequently, interview guidelines—albeit following a similar pattern—were adapted according to the different universe of interviewees chosen. Annex 2 displays the interview guidelines during the whole research process, including those from the first, second, and third stages.

### **3.7 Analysis of Material from Semi-Structured Expert Interviews**

There were two steps in the analysis of data collected during the semi-structured expert interviews. First, an analysis was conducted right after the interviews were carried out. A second analysis took place after a native speaker (Brazilian Portuguese) transcribed the recorded interviews.

### 3.7.1 *Analysis After Interviews*

Most semi-structured expert interviews were recorded, except in cases where either the personal or physical atmosphere did not allow for good quality interviews. Interviewees had to give permission for the recordings, and some of them received the transcribed interview text upon request. In each interview, the author of this dissertation took notes that were later compared with the transcribed text. These interview notes, together with any observations and impressions drawn from the interviews (e.g., regarding the general atmosphere, interruptions, tricky or inadequate questions, etc.), were assessed and complemented immediately after the interview. In addition, summaries were written to capture the profile of the interviewee, as well as highlighting his or her profile and central points of the interview.

### 3.7.2 *Analysis After Transcription According to Principles of Grounded Theory*

The semi-structured interviews—the ones that were recorded and that seemed to be central after reassessing interview notes and recorded material—were transcribed by a native speaker in their entirety, including questions asked by the interviewee and any interruptions. After gathering this base of raw data from qualitative interviews, several analytical steps followed.

First, the transcribed interviews were read through and comments were made regarding any detail that seemed to be relevant for either the research question or hypothesis, or that might raise elements that the author had not considered before carrying out interviews. Hereby, the interview was structured in different sections. Some sections of interviews showed a strong relevance for the research purpose or context, or for answers given by other interviewees. Hereby, the similarities and/or differences of the different interviewees were compared. The results were marked in Word in order to analyze them further during the second step of the analysis.

Second, after this “rough structuring” of all key interviews, a much finer analysis followed, which was supported by “Atlas-Ti,” a computer program used to analyze qualitative research. The transcribed texts of the interviews were saved first in this program, which does not allow for any changes after the text is uploaded. This feature facilitates to ensure the accuracy of the original and transcribed interview material throughout its further analysis. Once all interview material is uploaded in a working unit called the “hermeneutic unit,” the researcher can code (categorize) the interview text (Strauss 1994, 56) by using predetermined codes of the research design or by assigning ad-hoc codes (in-vivo codes) while “coding” the whole interview. Coding means to assign proportions of texts, such as central interview quotes, with codes and hereby structure the interview according to categories deemed relevant. More advanced features of Atlas-Ti include establishing nodes (i.e., connections between codes) to assign codes with memos to capture any relevant information to be kept with the material, amongst others. The biggest advantage of using Atlas-Ti is that the codes assigned to one interview can be used while coding other interviews of the same hermeneutic unit. Once all interviews are coded, their codes and

central quotes can be quickly compared, without having to browse through them interview by interviews (cf. Stanford 2008; Strübing 1997). Depending on the stage of the research and the timeline of the research project, the researcher can structure interview texts in rougher or finer steps until he or she feels that a certain point of data saturation is achieved. However, one can always go back to the coded interview and assign new codes, for example when new questions emerge during the course of a research process or when the data needs a respective reassessment.

Atlas-Ti is a program following the main principles of “Grounded Theory,” which was developed by Glaser and Strauss in the 1960s (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Grounded Theory is more a research style or strategy for the analysis of qualitative data, rather than a theory on its own. Its main contribution is to teach how—based on empirical, mostly qualitative data—to “discover” a theory/concept. In this sense, it is a method to develop a concept grounded in theory, which has been tested during different research stages and is based on different types of material and sources. Grounded Theory is not a method alone; rather it is rooted in the philosophy of science of hermeneutics. At the same time, it comprises a selection of several complementary techniques, such as interviews, field observations, documents, and statistics through which the researcher can develop his or her theory step by step (Legewie 2008 ).

According to the Grounded Theory, the data collected from multiple data sources, and the analysis of the qualitative data through the multiple coding processes, are based on multiple interactive steps. These steps connect deduction and induction, for example by determining codes from theory, reassessing these theoretically rooted codes in light of the gathered data, consecutively naming new codes, reassessing data accordingly, and, finally, drawing theoretical conclusions from such an iterative process. While deduction means to draw conclusions from the general (theory) to the specific (hypotheses about data), induction means to draw conclusions from the specifics of data to the general aspects of theory. Grounded Theory and the analytical methods based on the theory, such as the Atlas-Ti program, consciously use deduction and induction interchangeably to reach higher degrees of a theory that can indeed be grounded and show validity. With the different steps of collection and analysis of empirical data laid out, we will now turn to the empirical chapters of this dissertation.

“The municipality is the base of state and federal powers; it is a space of politics. For the state government, the municipality signifies the possibility to augment its political capital; in turn, there was not much interest in the past to have them develop their own technical capacities, leaving them more dependent. Instead of giving them conditions for indeed being autonomous, the objective was to make them dependent of the federal programs (...). Today, the Ministry of Education is an educational pharmacy; there are programs for everything.”

(Maria das Graças Correa de Oliveira, former State Director of Education Planning, Pernambuco).

#### **4. Brazilian Education Quality and Power Relations in a Federal System**

The main hypothesis herein assumes that constraining and enabling relationships emerging from institutional and political factors result in either negative or positive bias for educational results. Thus, institutional policies as well as political relations and networks have to be examined, including those at the central government level. Brazil's Ministry of Education and affiliated institutions are important participants in policy formulation and monitoring of policies. An understanding of the influence exerted from the central educational level is crucial. This chapter explores which institutional policies were formed at the national level in Brazil, with a focus on those that are relevant for state and municipal education systems. Policy directives are formulated and monitored at the central level in Brasilia, and then implemented at the local level by state and municipal governments. This creates challenges for achieving universal education quality across the country because of different institutional entitlements, the manifold interpretations of federal collaboration and leeway, and the different levels of influence the political actors have via their own loyalties, binds, and networks. Since the resources and political power of actors in federalism as a hierarchical system are different, power asymmetries arise, entailing political autonomy for some actors, while leading to dependency for others.

Interactions occur because actors start to relate to each other based on formal, informal, and other types of rules. Establishing relationships around different issues means to establish networks, which, as defined previously, are a type of political coordination mechanism based on common interests and the exchange of resources amongst involved actors. Networks shape and regulate relations in a federal system in financial, administrative, and political dimensions. In addition, in the peculiar Brazilian federal context, it is important to consider all three levels of jurisdiction (federal, state, and municipal) and, in particular, their diverse competences, responsibilities, and relations.

As pointed out by March and Olsen and cited in the theory chapter, not only do (federal) institutions create incentives, hereby determining how actors behave and interact with each other, but (federal) institutions also carry out "rules of appropriateness" according to which actors will behave or modify their behavior to achieve other ends. Universal education quality, albeit a constitutional directive, may not be a priority for all actors. In the process of working towards this goal, institutions not only shape the behavior of actors, but the actors shape institutions and help to develop them further, revealing that federalism is a space for the manifestation of both polity and politics. It is important to determine the kind of rules of appropriateness that federalism establishes in Brazil's education system and what drives the financial, administrative, and political behavior of the actors involved. A certain part of this behavior cannot be explained solely based on formal rules, but is also influenced by informal or other types of behaviour. Similarly, it is necessary to clarify what institutions can indeed guarantee; which policy preferences, strategies, and influences they provoke in actors; and what lies beyond the envisioned institutional behavior by offsetting unpredictable dynamics amongst actors.

These challenges relate closely to what Pierson termed as the “policymaking dilemma” associated with shared decision making in federal systems (see the theory chapter for further details). What this means is that policymaking dynamics have ambiguous consequences for social policy and welfare. Such consequences are potentially extreme in the Brazilian system, where many subnational actors have quite similar tasks and responsibilities (especially during policy implementation), but with dissimilar resources and political leverage. The institutional rules of the Brazilian legal framework are not sufficient to foster intergovernmental collaboration in primary education in ways that would enhance education quality. In addition, the institutional framework does not incite that subnational units achieve similar levels of educational quality, even amongst those that are socioeconomically similar.. In a nutshell, variations in primary education quality in Brazil arise due to the existing, often contradictory, federal framework (the great autonomy it grants but also the gaps that this autonomy can create), as well as the different uses of this framework by subnational units, depending on their particular local political contexts. Again, this reveals that federalism is a space for the manifestation of both polity and politics.

#### **4.1 Past and Current Challenges of Brazil’s Primary Education System**

Before looking at the institutional underpinnings of Brazil’s education system as a whole, it is necessary to examine what challenges its primary education system is currently struggling to overcome and why the country is still far from achieving education with universal quality for all.

##### *4.1.1 A History of Unequal Distribution of Education*

Chapter 1 briefly outlined that education and, especially, education quality is an important contribution to human capital development and the socioeconomic development of societies. Understanding why education quality is unequally distributed—and thus an obstacle for human development—requires an understanding of the distribution of quality of education, including the institutional, political, structural, historical, and cultural determinants. Considering these, the unequal distribution of high versus low quality of education did not happen by chance in Brazil, but has been and continues to be determined by social categories such as class, race, and ethnicity.

Claudio Ferreira Lima, a well-known writer of northeastern economic history and former economist at the Brazilian regional bank, Banco do Nordeste, explains the unequal distribution of education quality and its especially low level in Brazil’s northeast with reference to much of the historic socioeconomic struggles of this region. In an interview, Ferreira Lima describes how the economic structures of slavery, colony, empire, and republic have perpetuated intra-regional inequality in Brazil until the present day, hereby also affecting how education quality is being distributed in Brazil’s northeast:<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Researchers (Paulo Corbucci) and the deputy director (Jorge Abrahão) of IPEA, a policy think tank in Brasília that carries out research for the Brazilian government, including related to social policies and poverty-related research, have raised the same argument.

"First, there were the indigenous, the owners of the territory, when then the Portuguese arrived, and colonization took its course. During this process, great amounts of indigenous were killed. If they were not killed, they were culturally wiped out. (...) Later then, this continued albeit under the control of the colonizer [the Portuguese]. With them also came the poor Portuguese, later the black slaves, hereby starting to form a great part of the population that, with time, always remained at the margin of society and of the process forming it. Economic and political elites dominated this process, which continued in colonial times, in the empire, and the republic. What we at present witness is the result of an immense social group with low standards in education, health, and quality of life. This inequality originates in colonization (...). If we take together all socioeconomic questions, the economy [of Ceará based on a few rich people possessing most of the land] has never been able to include all of this population. Here in Ceará, there has been little influence of the black people because sugarcane has not been in such high demand [as for example, in Pernambuco]<sup>43</sup>, therefore requiring little force of labor. The slaves and the black people had much more house- and service-related tasks, but few in the production. All this population never became included in our economic activity".<sup>44</sup>

Today in Pernambuco, in contrast to Ceará, the described social inequalities are aggravated by a racial component. Pernambuco has been the main exporter of sugarcane in the past, a commodity crucially relying on African slaves imported from the Portuguese colonies in Africa. According to Rosângela Tenório, from the Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, a think tank based in Recife/Pernambuco, Brazilian society continues to unconsciously assume that the northeast can still serve as the nation's "army" for cheap labor as it has been in the past. In the past, a major part of northeastern population did not have equal rights, including the right to education. Understanding education as a universal human right is, according to Tenório, still something very recent in Brazil's historic memory. "It's the fruit of a perverse capitalism: Since cheap labor has been in need, this labor force can be badly educated. (...)." Despite the fact that today much awareness raising and political accomplishments exist concerning Brazil's considerable afro-descendant population:

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<sup>43</sup> In the past, Pernambuco, contrary to Ceará, almost exclusively relied on the production of sugarcane. In the colonial period, Pernambuco, due to its sugarcane called "white gold", one of the most prosperous regions of the Americas.

<sup>44</sup> Desde quando os Índios estavam aqui, os donos do território, chegam os portugueses e depois dum tempo começa a colonização. Neste processo, um grande número de índios foram matados. Se não mataram fisicamente, foram mortos culturalmente. (...). Depois sempre no controle do colonizador. Junto com eles vieram os portugueses pobres, depois os negros, assim se formando uma grande população que depois sempre ficou à margem de todo processo. Uma elite econômica e política dominava tudo isso. E assim se passou na colônia, no império, na república, e o que a gente vê hoje que é essa população imensa representa baixos índices na educação, na saúde, na qualidade de vida. Ela tem a origem na colonização. (...) Se a gente for ver juntando estas questões socio-econômicas, essa economia ela nunca foi capaz de incluir toda essa população. Aqui, a influência do negro foi pouca no Ceará por que a cana de açúcar não houve uma demanda tão grande da mão de obra (pela quantidade pequena). O escravo, o negro tinha um papel mais doméstico, mas não tanto na produção. E essa população nunca foi incluída na nossa atividade econômica." Interview with Ferreira Lima, C. in Fortaleza, Ceará (22/04/09).



“(…) these are social questions that we will not resolve all of a sudden. The school cannot resolve this for us either: even if the school might be nice; if the salary of the teachers might be good; if the parents of children did not get a job in a labor market requiring qualified labor, schools cannot resolve this” (Tenorio 2009).

The researcher herewith explains the cultural and conscious change that is needed if to comprehensively achieve education quality. The structure of Brazilian society has been highly unequal over most of the 500 years since its discovery. In order to improve the quality of Brazil’s education system, it will be necessary to also re-examine the deeply rooted inequality of its class system.<sup>45</sup>

The National System of Evaluation of Basic Schooling (SAEB - Sistema Nacional de Avaliação da Educação Básica) of the Brazilian government helps to assess the link between equity and quality of education further by examining the quality of the instruction in Brazilian schools at the primary and secondary level and how it affects the achievements and performance of students at different points in their studies.<sup>46</sup> The assessment includes two parts: the learning achievement of students and contextual factors correlating with learning achievements.

Results from a SAEB assessment of average scores in state and municipal schools from 1995 to 2005 showed a weakening in academic performance, especially amongst those enrolled in public schools. In particular, the performance of fourth and eighth graders in public schools had declined, both in absolute terms as well as in relation to students from the private system.<sup>47</sup> One possible explanation is that between 1991 and 2004, the number of students in the public school system increased to 4.6 million at the primary level and 5.2 million students at the secondary level. This increase can partially be explained by changes in national legislation to achieve a higher rate of education coverage, especially at the primary level. This mass of students formerly out of school mainly came from socially vulnerable educational backgrounds and were “ill-equipped” to overcome these conditions, such as, for example, the precarious infrastructures that were common in schools in the rural areas and urban outskirts where the government had paid less attention before (IPEA 2007b).

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<sup>45</sup> The right to universal education for all is a recent cornerstone. Incredible as it may sound, Brazilian illiterates have only been allowed to vote since 1986, just 23 years ago.

<sup>46</sup> SAEB was created in 1990 and has realized assessments of students every two years since 1995. The assessments take place according to three cycles relevant in the Brazilian education system: (1) pupils in the fourth grade of primary education; (2) pupils in the eighth and last grade of compulsory education; and (3) pupils in the third year of high school, or 11th grade, the last year of secondary education in Brazil.

<sup>47</sup> The here mentioned performance is based on SAEB results in Portuguese language for the fourth graders and mathematics for the eighth graders (urban schools in both areas).

### *Racial and Gender Inequalities with Regards to Education Quality*

Along with the evidence that socioeconomic conditions and income inequalities influence school performance of students in Brazil, racial and gender inequality contribute further to this trend (IPEA 2007b, 54). However, Brazil has been better in addressing the gender gap than the racial gap in this regard.<sup>48</sup>

Looking at the SAEB results with a focus on race evidence, the white students perform much better at school than the non-white students. In 2003, in terms of Portuguese language and math skills for fourth graders, white students scored above national average (169.4 points in Portuguese language; 177.7 points in math). For the same grade and subjects, all of the non-white groups scored below what is considered a satisfactory SAEB score (200 points).<sup>49</sup> “The difference between black and white is in fact big. In Portuguese language the score difference is of 25 points, and in math of 26 points” (INEP 2003, 139). The results for eighth graders confirm a similar trend: all non-white groups scored below the satisfactory SAEB score in Portuguese and math. The reasons for this stark variation between white and non-white students are as multiple as the reasons for inequality itself, including historical, cultural, and economic reasons, amongst others.

At the secondary level, these racial differences as well as other deficiencies of the public school system, are still prevalent. Not surprising in reading of students in public schools reaching the end of secondary education is relatively low, and illiteracy will leave consequences for the rest of the students’ schooling (INEP 2003, 140). For a school trajectory to be successful, there has to be a solid structure in place right from the start.

### *Illiteracy and Class-age Distortion*

Besides learning achievements, the level of illiteracy and class-age distortion (meaning the proportion of students in each grade that are older than they are supposed to be according to the grade<sup>50</sup>) are other means to evaluate the quality of education. Both are a countrywide issue, especially in the northeast of Brazil.

Literacy rates for the 15–24 age group are almost the same for males and females, but not when disaggregating them further according to gender and race. The illiteracy rate among afro-descendants (15.4 percent) is more than twice as high as it is amongst whites (7.0 percent). Even if this rate is lower amongst 15- to 24-year-old people, illiteracy amongst afro-descents (4.0 percent) is almost three times higher than it is amongst whites (1.4

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<sup>48</sup> However, this does not translate into equal opportunities in the labor market. Women’s progress in education does not make it easier for them to enter the labor market or to earn equal salaries as men in Brazil (IPEA 2007, 55).

<sup>49</sup> The distinction into these four racial groups occurred according to categories used by the Brazilian National Statistics Institute (IBGE) in the Brazilian household survey PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra ao Domicílio) and Brazilian census data. The indication of race is based on auto-declaration of interviewed individuals.

<sup>50</sup> In Brazil, the lagging-behind of students or age-grade distortion is considered if a child is aged nine years or older attending the first grade of primary school, aged ten years and over attending the second grade of primary school, etcetera.

percent). *The northeast, with a high proportion of afro-descendents, has the highest rate of illiteracy amongst both males and females for the 15–24 age group* (IPEA 2007b: 53).

Gender and race inequalities are equally present in the age-grade distortion rates of students in primary and secondary education. In general, this rate is high amongst the population as a whole, reaching nearly 40 percent of students in the last year of secondary education (11th grade). Again, if considering color/race aspects, the picture worsens, especially for males and for the black and brown population. Gender imbalances are less severe and start to even out when students move up in grades. Yet, racial inequalities aggravate along a students' school life. For example 38.2 percent of boys and 34 percent of girls of white and afro-descendant background attending the eighth grade were lagging behind in 2005 (this means they were 16 years old or older). Of these children, 25.7 percent were whites and 45.3 percent were afro-descendants. Amongst fourth grade, this class-age distortion is much less; but still, white females clearly have the lowest rate, while black/brown males have the highest (IPEA 2007b, 54).

In sum, when considering attendance, school dropout, and literacy rates—all indicators for a education quality with a very unequal distribution—the picture is quite mixed in Brazil. Even though Brazil continues to be seen publicly as a peaceful case of a “melting pot”, the school system is one example of the country's more general social development constraints, such as regional, gender, and racial inequalities. Unfortunately, the public-private divide of the Brazilian school system does not contribute to create a system with equal opportunities for everybody, rather it further nourishes a class-based society.

#### *4.1.2 Progress Starting in the Mid-1990s*

Since 2000, the OECD has been inviting Brazil to participate in the PISA assessment, which includes other non-OECD member countries as well, such as Argentina, Mexico (Pisa 2000), Chile, Thailand, and Macao China (Pisa 2006). In comparison to most developing countries or to other countries in Latin America, the results in Brazil evidence a disastrous situation. In the PISA assessment of 2000, Brazil was the lowest performing country, ranked below Mexico. Over 50 percent of the students scored at or below level one and less than 1 percent achieved top-level scores. In a further analysis of the PISA results carried out by Brazil's Education Institute INEP, results showed that only 25 percent of 15-year-old students at the end of ninth grade reached level 3 for reading, as compared to 76 percent in South Korea and 30 percent in Mexico. These results have not significantly changed in the more recent tests (OECD 2010, 183).

Notwithstanding the challenge of quality, Brazil has almost achieved universal coverage of primary education (see Table 4.1). In this regard, great progress was made between 1992 and 2005, a period when the country experienced a great decrease of regional inequalities in terms of school attendance. This is mainly due to a massive decentralization of the education sector with devolution of competences to the state and municipal levels, coupled with the granting of minimum funding across the nation through FUNDEF (see Section 4.2).

The decentralization of the education system meant an abrupt structural shift from a formerly centralized system, under a military dictatorship (1964–1984), to a system with constitutionally earmarked finances (1996 onwards), where states and municipalities, albeit having full autonomy in the implementation of combined minimum funds, have eventually been constrained by their own fiscal ability.

<b>Table 4.1. Net School Attendance Rate of 7 to 14 Year-old Children, per Age Group and Level of Schooling, by Gender, Color/Race, and Household Location – Brazil and Major Regions, 1992 and 2005 (in percent)</b>		
Selected characteristics	Primary level: age 7–14	
	<b>1992</b>	<b>2005</b>
<b>Total*</b>	81.4	94.5
North*	82.5	93.9
<b>NE</b>	<b>69.7</b>	<b>92.4</b>
SE	88.0	95.8
South	86.9	95.9
Midwest	85.9	94.7
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	79.9	94.3
Female	82.7	94.8
<b>Color/Race</b>		
White	87.5	95.5
Non-white	75.3	93.7
<b>Household location</b>		
Rural	66.5	92.5
Urban	86.2	95.0
Source: IBGE, PNAD 1992 and 2005; IPEA 2007b.		
*Excluding rural population of the states of RO, AC, AM, RR, PA, and AP where the household survey has not been carried out.		

Between 1992 and 2005, there was a considerable increase in the proportion of children attending school at the primary level in Brazil (1992: 81.4 percent; 2005: 94.5 percent). The region with the largest increase, if compared to other regions or to the Brazilian average, was the northeast (more than 20 percent) (IPEA 2007b, 42).

In addition, Brazil has significantly advanced in terms of reducing gender and racial inequalities at the primary education level. Based on 2005 data, attendance rates of boys and girls at the primary level are almost equal (boys in 2005: 94.3 percent; girls in 2005: 94.8 percent). Attendance rates in terms of race have also been improving, but there is still a small gap to close (white in 2005: 95.5 percent; non-white in 2005: 93.7 percent). A similar trend can be observed if analyzing school attendance according to rural/urban location.<sup>51</sup> All

<sup>51</sup> Comparing net attendance rates by age group and according to quintiles of monthly per capita family income, access to primary education oscillates between 91.4 percent (1<sup>st</sup> quintile), 95 percent (3<sup>rd</sup> quintile), and 96.6 percent (5<sup>th</sup> quintile), suggesting that the more prosperous the household, the higher attendance rate of its children in

together, it means that Brazil has been successful in getting children into schools and now faces the challenge to universalize the completion of primary education.

## **4.2 Legal Milestones and Implications: Constitution, National Education Law, and FUNDEF**

Brazilian schooling is often referred to as “basic education” (educação básica). It comprises eight years of primary, in Brazilian called “fundamental education” (ensino fundamental),<sup>52</sup> and three years of secondary education, officially called “middle education” (ensino médio) for 15- to 17-year-old youths. School education is currently compulsory up to the age of 15, and it remains under discussion if it will be raised to the age of 17.

### *4.2.1 Political and Administrative Decentralization*

Brazil is a federal republic and, with the Constitution of 1988, has passed major the responsibilities for the primary education sector on to its 27 federal states and 5,564 municipalities. This decentralization of educational responsibilities is often referred to as “municipalization,” through which the lowest level of Brazil’s federal system has gained extensive legal competences. The chapter in the Constitution of 1988 on education is the most detailed of all (Lerche Vieira 2008, 36). According to the Constitution, its related norms, and the National Education Law 9394/96 of 1996 (Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional, or LDB), the federal, state, and municipal governments are obliged to share responsibilities regarding the provision of primary education in a “collaborative regime,” and to organize their respective education systems accordingly (Constitution paragraph 211; LDB/Art.8).<sup>53</sup> The union is supposed to provide technical and financial assistance to all other entities in order to guarantee equal educational opportunities and minimum standards of education quality, hereby complying with its redistributive and supplementary function. Article 211 also states that the federal entities have to collaborate to guarantee universal coverage of the mandatory 15 school years for each child.

Peculiar in this setting is the fact that municipal governments are the third tier of government (Constitution/Art. 18), which means that they have the same power as the state governments in terms of policy formulation and implementation for primary education, unless otherwise regulated by federal law. *Federal states and municipalities enjoy considerable political and management autonomy concerning their schools* (public state system and public municipal systems), including control over the curriculum, the test-taking

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primary school. However, this trend towards universal access to schooling changes considerably if looking at the net attendance rate at the secondary level per quintile in the same year (2005). Here, the attendance rate is only at 22.4 percent for the 1<sup>st</sup> quintile, 43.5 percent for the 3<sup>rd</sup> quintile and 71.9 percent for the fifth quintile. The 2007 MDG Report Brazil explains this gap with the huge age distortion affecting most of youth, and especially those in the lower-income groups (IPEA 2007b, 42).

<sup>52</sup> Education data and other sources often distinguish between “ensino fundamental 1,” (grades 1–4) and “ensino fundamental 2” (grades 5–8).

<sup>53</sup> Article 211 of the Constitution also assigns the municipalities the responsibility for the organization of preschool education, and requires the states and the federal district to equally participate in the provision of primary education and to have only competence for the organization of secondary education.

and examination criteria for their pupils, and the selection, hiring, and continuous training of teachers. In this sense, federal programs (see below) targeted at primary education, such as those offered by the Federal Ministry of Education (MEC), *are not compulsory* in their execution at the state and municipal levels, unless these governments have formally accepted the federal offer of service supply and agreed upon the execution of these programs (Dantas 2008, 1; emphasis added). *All taken together, a substantial list of rights and obligations is given to the smallest unit of government, and entails a great deal of administrative, budgeting, and management authority* (Montero 2000, 65).<sup>54</sup> This power and authority can be illustrated, for example by considering the total revenue of Brazilian municipalities. In 2004, total revenue of Brazilian municipalities was equivalent to 7.44 percent of GDP (including one-third of the state's own revenue and federal transfers and taxes), and total expenditure equivalent to 7.26 percent (for example 44 percent spent on payroll and 11 percent on investments) (Afonso Rodrigues and Araújo Amorim 2006, 385).

Following the Constitution of 1988, municipal education secretaries are responsible for overall planning at the local level. According to the LDB, the municipality is responsible for authorization, licensing, and supervision of both public and private primary schools. Related tasks include, for example, control and responsibility for primary education development, as well as pedagogical development as a means of enhancing quality and management of primary education. The municipality is responsible for setting up the municipal education system (*sistema municipal de educação*), the municipal education plan (*plano municipal de educação*), and the municipal education council (*conselho municipal de educação*). Also, as part of the municipal education plan, municipalities are required to establish career development plans for all teachers and to provide access to tertiary level education, training courses, and other means of career enhancement (Hall 2003, 276).

The reforms of 1988 gave states and municipalities a much wider role and level of control than ever before in Brazilian history. Along with their role in education, municipalities also are entitled to collect specific types of taxes and other forms of incomes,<sup>55</sup> make expenditures, hire public employees and set their salaries, and contract debts (Afonso Rodrigues and Araújo Amorim 2006, 384). In terms of rights and duties, municipalities were given the same status as members of the federation as state governments.

In the education sector, the *carta magna* (as Brazilians call their Constitution) has the consequence that two autonomous systems co-exist and provide primary schooling in a public state system (“*rede estadual*”) and a public municipal system (“*rede municipal*”). Both are equally entitled to offer primary education, *but the LDB suggests that the state system*

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<sup>54</sup> According to Montero (2000), some Brazilian specialists argue that, although the Constitution of 1988 gives states and municipalities additional fiscal resources, it fails to delegate official duties *de jure* to those levels of government.

<sup>55</sup> In Brazil, municipalities are entitled to collect the following taxes: the service tax (Imposto Sobre Serviços, or ISS), the tax on urban land and property (Imposto sobre a Propriedade Predial e Territorial Urbana, IPTU), and the tax on the transfer for real estate property and the rights related to it (Imposto sobre a Transmissão de bens imóveis e de direitos a eles relativos, ITCD/ITBI). In addition, municipalities receive an important proportion of the state-collected tax on goods and services (Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Prestação de Serviços, or ICMS).

*shall prioritize secondary education while municipalities shall prioritize primary education* (LDB/Art.10, 11; emphasis added). The LDB, in principle, also allows municipalities to integrate within the state system or to offer a unique system of basic education together with the state system. Given concerns about efficiency, the current trend is that municipalities and state governments are moving towards repartition of labor, where municipally-financed schools offer the first cycle of primary education (grades 1–4), whereas state-financed schools offer the second part of primary school (grades 5–8) as well as secondary education.

Despite more recent trends, municipal governments are not subordinate to state governments in the least, and they do not have to adhere to the primary education policies formulated and implemented by their respective state governments. The Brazilian Constitution and National Education Law only mention that education policy should be jointly implemented in a cooperative regime (Art. 8-11) by states and municipalities, but neither framework defines this further (Ministério da Educação 1996). *One of the consequences of this normatively loose definition of collaboration is that state governments have little power to interfere in municipal affairs, even if they are geographically much closer than the federal government in a country of considerable size.* In contrast, the federal union can exert influence on both states and municipalities through financial assistance, including additional support for poorer states and municipalities.<sup>56</sup>

The described constitutional setting has many implications for the behavior of political actors. While municipal education systems have much political and administrative autonomy, their fiscal resources, especially in northeastern municipalities, are quite restricted. This raises the question of how politically independent municipal education systems can indeed be from both state and federal governments, because they depend on their financial resources. Thus, autonomy is institutionally granted, but financial and, thus, political dependency is a reality in many places. At the same time, and despite huge geographic distances, the Ministry of Education occupies an almost hegemonic role (see discussion below) and is institutionally and politically closer to many municipal governments than the state government. In reality, how the collaborative regime between municipal and state governments shall function under these circumstances is uncertain.

#### 4.2.2 *Fiscal Decentralization*

The Constitution of 1988 also regulates financial responsibilities for education amongst the federal, state, and municipal governments (see Table 4.2). While the federal government is obliged to spend at least 18 percent of its fiscal budget on education, state and municipal governments are obliged to spend 25 percent of their corresponding tax income. Further, Brazil possesses financial compensation funds for the municipal (FPM) and state (FPE) levels, which are supposed to outweigh regional and state imbalances, as well as prevent

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<sup>56</sup> This has happened through specific federal support programs, especially in Brazil's northeast, for example, through the program Programa de Ações Articuladas (PAR) by the Ministry of Education. Under this support program, municipalities with low Ideb receive additional support. Since many municipalities in the northeast fall under this criteria, they have received over-proportional support [http://portal.mec.gov.br/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=159&Itemid=369](http://portal.mec.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=159&Itemid=369) [10/4/2010].

further inequalities in service supply. According to the Constitution, the federal government occupies supplementary action regarding the financing of basic education. This function is supposed to guarantee a fairer distribution of resources, as well as a minimum level of quality, while, at the same time, considering the fiscal effort and supply capacity of each administrative instance (Lerche Vieira 2008, 55).

<b>Table 4.2. Public Education Spending of Basic Education in Brazil</b>	
<b>Level of jurisdiction</b>	<b>Sources</b>
<b>Federal Union</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Budgetary resources originating from federal taxes (18 percent)</li> <li>• Resources from “education-salary”<sup>57</sup> (1/3)</li> <li>• Other sources with different origins</li> </ul>
<b>Federal States</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Budgetary resources originating from state taxes (25 percent)</li> <li>• States’ Participation Fund (FPE), resulting from the transfer of federal funds (25 percent)</li> <li>• Resources from education salary share, corresponds to 2/3 of total taxes collected in all federal states</li> <li>• Other sources with different origins, including the federal education-salary share</li> </ul>
<b>Municipalities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ordinary budgetary resources, originating from municipal taxes (25 percent)</li> <li>• Municipalities’ Participation Fund (FPM), resulting from the transfer of federal funds (25 percent)</li> <li>• Other sources from different origins, including the education salary share transferred to municipalities</li> </ul>
Source: Lerche Vieira 2008, 56; translated from Portuguese by author.	

In principle, all states and municipalities are supposed to have the same infrastructure and spending opportunities. However, regional differences persist and cannot be resolved by redistributive financial measures, such as FUNDEF/FUNDEB (described below), alone, since these go beyond the education system and would mean a review of current fiscal decentralization principles. For the de-facto implementation of the social rights catalogue laid out in the Constitution of 1988 aligned with quality principles for all, the Brazilian government would have to make comprehensive adjustments and potentially engage in a more inclusive tax reform (Rezende 2010). Certainly, this would come at a high political cost.

<sup>57</sup> "Education-salary" or "Salário-Educacao" in Portuguese (article 212 of the Federal Constitution) is a funding source explicitly and exclusively destined to “fundamental education” of the public school system. Its base is a 2.5 percent aliquot of the total value of remuneration paid or credited by companies to paid employees. The distribution of resources of the education salary occurs automatically (IPEA. 2007. "Educacao." *Políticas sociais - acompanhamento e análise 13. Edicao especial*:155–192: 170).



### *FUNDEF and FUNDEB*

In 1996, the financial mechanism FUNDEF (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério)—which was replaced by FUNDEB in 2007, to include preschool and secondary schooling level<sup>58</sup>—was created through an amendment to the Federal Constitution. FUNDEF was established as a fund with accounting character in each of the units of the federation, meaning that each state tracks and receives exact amounts of additional funding according to number of students. Through this mechanism, 60 percent of resources destined to education are earmarked for primary education (grades 1–8), forcing states and municipalities to apply 15 percent of taxes and transfers to this level of education. The allotment calculation is based on the number of students enrolled in the state and municipal school system.<sup>59</sup> From these earmarked funds, 60 percent are allotted for paying teachers, and 40 percent to cover other costs, such as school infrastructure.

Since the inception of FUNDEF, national minimum standards were legally set in order to account for the different financial conditions that state and municipal education systems have, including differences between urban and rural areas (see Table 4.3).

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<sup>58</sup> FUNDEB follows the logic of FUNDEF, but financial regulations were extended to also include kindergarten, preschool education, three years of secondary education (grades 8–11), and education of youth and adults. The gradual implementation of this step until 2009 responded to the critique that preschool, as well as secondary education, have been disadvantaged by FUNDEF, hereby jeopardizing childhood development and quality of high school education which are crucial for a smooth transition of youth into the labour market. While this critique was certainly justified, the Brazilian Government opted to prioritize primary education over preschool and secondary education.

<sup>59</sup> This calculation base has been criticized by important NGOs, as well as other organizations, since the focus on the quantity of students distracts from focusing on the quality dimension. For example, municipalities with lower number of students were given less funding, regardless of their actual level of need for maintenance improvements. On the other hand, this has also incited smaller municipalities to think more efficiently about maintaining half-empty classes or schools, and to reduce the number of school buildings by merging entities. This has been taking place, for example, in small rural municipalities, such as the one visited for the current research in Ceará (Barreira).

**Table 4.3. Minimum Standard as Mandated by FUNDEF,  
1997–2006 (by class, in Brazilian Reais R\$)**

Year	Grades 1–8	Grades 1–4	Grades 5–8 and special education	Grades 1–4 in urban areas	Grades 5–8 in rural areas	Grades 5–8 in urban areas	Grades 5–8 in rural areas and special education in urban and rural areas
1997	300,00						
1998	315,00						
1999	315,00						
2000		333,00	349,65				
2001		363,00	381,15				
2002		418,00	438,90				
2003		462,00	485,10				
2004		564,63	592,86				
2005				620,56	632,97	651,59	664,00
2006				682,60	696,25	716,73	730,38

The objective of FUNDEF has been threefold: to assure the universalization of fundamental education, better payment of underpaid teachers, and the provision of more similar starting conditions with respect to school and classroom equipment across all municipalities and states. Under FUNDEB, more funds for teachers have been pooled towards northeastern states, thus acknowledging that it will take a special effort to ease out inequality patterns in this structurally disadvantaged region if compared to the rest of Brazil (Hall 2003, 279).

FUNDEF, which was introduced countrywide as of 1998, profoundly changed the education system in Brazil and its related political networks. Bringing the masses into the school system between 1991 and 2004 resulted in severe setbacks in terms of the quality of education, if measured by students' performance.<sup>60</sup> For municipalities, it meant a great increase of funding for education, with about 40 percent of education budget coming from volunteer transfers (Lerche Vieira 2008, 60). FUNDEF obliged the federal government to complement states' budgets where per capita educational expenditures fell below the nationwide established minimum standard (Borges 2008, 238). Under the LDB, municipal secretaries of education are responsible for administering educational funding allocated

<sup>60</sup> Between 1991 and 2004, about 4.6 million students at the primary education level and 5.2 million students at secondary education level were included in the public system. A comparison of the average scores of students in public state and municipal schools in 4<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> grade between 1995 and 2005 evidences the deterioration of their performance in both absolute terms as well as in relation to students from the private system (IPEA 2007b).

through FUNDEF comprising municipal, state, and supplementary federal revenues. A constitutional amendment of FUNDEF, furthermore, holds municipal secretaries of education accountable for spending the primary education budget properly.

FUNDEF has been important, not only regarding the significant expansion of educational coverage for grades 1–8, but it has also raised awareness about the existing disparities between federal states, and between the state and municipal school systems.<sup>61</sup> Mello and Hoppe interpret the creation of FUNDEF as “emblematic” for recent policy efforts to improve educational attainments in Brazil. The federal government has been required to top up spending in those states and municipalities that could not afford the national spending floor (Mello and Hoppe 2005, 4). One of the effects was also to stimulate active involvement of municipalities in basic education, and to reduce the size and bureaucracy of state education administration (Schwartzman 2003, 27).

Despite the implementation of FUNDEF and FUNDEB, quality with equity is still unresolved across the country. While FUNDEF has been crucial to outweigh regional and state imbalances, especially with regards to teachers’ salaries,<sup>62</sup> it does not adjust for inter-regional disparities, being the more fundamental problem. FUNDEF calculates cost-per-student based on each state’s enrollment rates and, simultaneously, adjusts finances to provide national minimum standards. However, the fund does not account for highly unequal tax bases (and thus differences in available education finances) amongst Brazilian states, which in the northeast are a fraction of those of São Paulo state. In order to account for the unequal financial situations, Brazil would need a comprehensive reform of its unequal tax system, a politically unpopular reform especially for the most prosperous southern states and São Paulo. Thus, despite the commitment to deliver universal education quality for all, political networks perpetuating the preponderance of Brazil’s most prosperous regions and states impede educational progress.

The available finances via FUNDEF and FUNDEB are not enough to guarantee high quality of education for all throughout Brazil. Education NGOs have criticized the quantitative measures applied by both funds (enrollment rates), which they say provide the municipal and state system with the incentive to enroll as many students as possible without guaranteeing quality.<sup>63</sup> Many interviews with education experts, who had themselves witnessed the implementation of FUNDEF as secretaries of education or as their advisors,

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<sup>61</sup> Concerning enrollment rates, FUNDEF is believed of having played a leading role in the increase of enrollment rates in primary and lower-secondary education after 1998. Nevertheless, decentralization of education has also played its part here, with enrollment rates increasing faster in jurisdictions where the municipalities were already more active than states in service delivery. Mello and Hoppe also find that FUNDEF seemed to have had a stronger enrollment effect in small municipalities (measured by resident population), which typically relied more heavily on funding from higher levels of government (Mello / Hoppe 2005,4).

<sup>62</sup> According to the OECD, FUNDEF reforms raised the salary of teachers at elementary school by 13 percent on average, and by more than 60 percent in the northeast (OECD 2010, 181).

<sup>63</sup> Some NGOs suggest, instead, to determine the allocation of educational finances according to quality criteria (cost-per-student by quality [custo de aluno por qualidade, or CAQ]). This approach would potentially point out the greater financial needs and allocate the funds accordingly, and to consequently provide a higher minimum standard for all (Amaral Gomes 2009; Carreira and Pinto 2007).

revealed that with FUNDEF, the school system discovered how enrolling as many students as possible under any circumstances would bring financial profit to municipal administrations: “*O aluno virou moeda*” - “*The student turned into a coin*” (Naspolini 2010; Vidal 2010).

Indeed, state and municipal systems have been competing for students, or have created “ghost students,” in order to capture additional funds (Hall 2003a). Being a fund with certain financial incentives, the overall process of increasing coverage started rather chaotically when many new students entered the system without being prepared for it, for example in terms of legal standardization, sufficient availability of teachers, or physical infrastructure. In those municipalities where school buildings were lacking, the famous “*escolas anexos*” (annex schools) were created, and served as additional school units subordinated to a main school, but without necessarily complying with any standards. By contrast, municipalities with fewer students received less funding, even though they had a great need for improvement and maintenance of school buildings. Despite the considerable critique that FUNDEF has been receiving, it has incited smaller municipalities to be more efficient and to merge half-empty classes or schools when necessary.

### **4.3 Interim Summary**

Given regional differences between the prosperous south and southwest and the poor north and northeast, financial, technical, and administrative aspects potentially result in varying policy formulation and implementation amongst state schools and municipal schools within the same state, despite the comprehensive federal support fund FUNDEF. How efficiently scarce resources are used depends greatly on local political and administrative factors, as well as on the influence of politics on the public administration (Lerche Vieira 2010a; Oliveira 2010b; Vidal 2010). In the presence of motivated mayors and well-trained directors, municipal and state school systems are more likely to be policy responsive. In the presence of clientelistic local politics, the results are likely to deteriorate further, even if institutional mechanisms, in terms of accountability and participation, are in place.<sup>64</sup> This contrast between merit-based and politics-based selection of teaching personnel evidences how much the functioning and quality of a federal polity depends on the political interactions of the different federal levels and their manifold networks, and how these determine the use of leeway granted by federalism. This contrast also indicates how much institutional and political factors are intertwined and, in their combination, how they may bias educational outcomes in negative or positive ways.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> An interview with a labor union representative in Pernambuco confirms the practice of “buying” votes from parents in return for food baskets, medical assistance, and the payment of household bills. Such bribing also happens throughout the school system during local elections, during which schools are often used as political strongholds in geographically defined electoral districts. Each district “belongs” to a certain deputy. Often, directors and teachers become what Brazilians call “electoral cables,” connecting the voter base to local deputies morally pressing parents, especially from poor families, for their electoral support (anonymous interview with labor union representative in Recife, 2010).

<sup>65</sup> The challenge of good municipal education management evidences why interventions of and collaboration with geographically closer state governments are potentially central for changing the quality of education. State governments should have an interest in supporting municipalities given the fact that secondary schools, which are

Small and relatively newly created municipalities, in particular, face great challenges in complying with the outlined institutional principles (between 1980 and 2006, 1500 new municipalities were created). If considering that until the early 1990s, all activities related to the management of fundamental education, as well as health, social assistance, sanitation, and popular housing, were concentrated entirely at the central level, it is possible to imagine the magnitude of this fundamental transformation within the different systems (Arretche 1999, 111). This fundamental change towards a rigorous decentralization with envisioned municipal autonomy is, amongst other factors, the institutional contra-reaction to a period of dictatorship, where the power was mainly concentrated at the federal and state levels (Montero 2000, 59; see further discussion below). Notwithstanding, many municipalities are administratively overburdened with managing the required paperwork, selecting and training their staff, and monitoring and reporting results to the federal government (Ramos 2009).

State governments, by contrast, have lost substantial authority and control with this decentralization of the education system and policies after 1988. Since primary education is supposed to be organized in a collaborative regime, state and municipal governments define together the methods of collaboration for the supply of fundamental education. These methods have to assure the proportional distribution of responsibilities according to the population in need and financial resources available in each part of the public system (LDB/Art.10). *In sum, state governments are not allowed to greatly interfere into municipal education affairs (kindergarten, preschool, and primary school) unless municipalities have decided differently.* Any method of collaboration is based on a mutual willingness of state and municipal governments, but not is necessarily regulated through formal rules and incentives.

The consequence for the education sector is that both state and municipal governments offer primary education based on two separate systems. This can lead to dissimilarities in education criteria and methods. Since municipal governments are not subordinated to state governments, they do not have to adhere to the criteria or programs that they establish. State governments, in turn, have little enforcement power to interfere, if necessary, with municipal education systems. By contrast, the union can have a potentially high influence through financial assistance. Poor municipalities in the northeast, in particular, rely on such assistance.<sup>66</sup> The constitution and the LDB only mandate that education policy should be established in a cooperative regime (Art. 8-11) amongst states and municipalities, but the regime is not defined further (Ministério da Educação 1996). This leaves an important political space for the creation of networks that can have positive or negative bias for educational results.

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managed by states, will receive mainly students that have been educated in municipal schools. If the quality of education in these primary schools is poor, state schools will have to address lack of basic knowledge and will not be able to pass the students on to the secondary level.

<sup>66</sup> Souza, with reference to Bremaeker, explains that in 1994, more than 200 municipalities in the northeast were not able to collect their own taxes, most likely due to the lack of significant economic activity and the size of the poor population. According to the author, in 2000, 75 percent of Brazilian municipalities collected less than 10 percent through own taxes, and 90 percent of municipalities with 10,000 inhabitants depended mainly on transfers from the municipal fund FPM or the municipal proportion of the state tax ICMS (Souza 2002, 432).

#### 4.4 Education Finances Today

Brazilian investment in education, as a percentage of GDP, has oscillated around 4.5 percent. This is comparable to countries such as Italy, Japan, and Spain, but below Korea, Mexico, and the United States, among other countries. Direct public investment per student oscillates between R\$ 1.200 to R\$ 1.500 in all cycles of primary and secondary education. However, Brazil invests more than R\$ 11.000 per student in higher education. If compared to OECD countries such as Finland, Germany, Japan, Mexico, and the United States, Brazil has the highest budget, per student, for public higher education (OECD 2008).

Education Level							
Fundamental Education							
Year	Total	Basic education	Child education	Grades 1–4	Grades 1–8	Middle school	Higher education
2000	1,465	<b>1,219</b>	1,395	1,200	1,224	1,163	<b>13,480</b>
2001	1,541	<b>1,285</b>	1,280	1,205	1,355	1,345	<b>13,537</b>
2002	1,607	<b>1,330</b>	1,259	1,470	1,365	989	<b>13,413</b>
2003	1,563	<b>1,313</b>	1,408	1,383	1,314	1,103	<b>11,415</b>
2004	1,628	<b>1,382</b>	1,477	1,462	1,478	1,011	<b>11,376</b>
2005	1,700	<b>1,440</b>	1,373	1,607	1,530	1,004	<b>11,363</b>

Source: INEP/MEC (INEP 2010c).

While it can be argued that the disproportional investment in higher education is crucial to support Brazil’s development trend and needs as an emerging economy, such spending patterns also reinforce and perpetuate Brazil’s high level of social inequality. Students from upper-class families, that could afford to pay tuition fees, enjoy free higher education in Brazil’s most prestigious federal universities. To make it into these universities, most of these students attend private school, since the public system is underfunded and, therefore, not of sufficient quality to produce university-bound students. However, students from middle- or lower-class families often cannot afford to pay for private education, and are forced to attend low-quality public schools. As such, they are usually unable to pass the challenging entry examination (vestibular) of the federal universities in Brazil.<sup>67</sup>

“Public institutions of higher education in Brazil (federal, state, and municipal) are highly elitist. Only 2.6 percent [IBGE 2001] of Brazil’s poorest 40 percent of the population has access to higher education, rising to 21 percent for the wealthiest decile. Some 40 percent of tertiary enrollments are in the public sector, where fees are non-existent or very low. Federal university students come from the top ten percent income brackets. [...] As has

<sup>67</sup> Hall discusses how to increase the quality of education in Brazil. According to the author, more funding for primary and secondary education is needed, for example, from the federal government. However, this funding is constrained by the fact that federal universities receive a comparatively high share of the federal education budget for public education (about 60 percent) (Hall 2003a).

been pointed out, private interests continue to successfully subvert the achievement of education policy goals” (Hall 2003, 281).<sup>68</sup>

Despite this great variation of spending between primary and higher education, between 1995 and 2005, Brazil still witnessed an overall increase of spending in primary education. Breaking overall spending for this level into spending at the municipal and state levels, the described decentralization of authority to the municipal level, initiated by FUNDEF, becomes even more evident. The municipal level saw a stark increase of finances, if compared to the increase at the state level during the same time, which was mainly due to the support of FUNDEF.

**Table 4.5. Education Spending for Fundamental Education (Grades 1–8) in Brazil According to Federal Unit** (*data reported at constant values in billion Reais R\$* )

Governmental level	1995	2000	2005
Federal level	2.5	2.5	1.7
State level	19.1	19.5	23.4
Municipal level	11.5	18.4	26.1

Source: Summary of data elaborated by Abrahão de Castro 2010 using data from Ipea/Disco, IBGE/MP, STN/Siafi, MEC/Inep and Almeida (2001).

As Abrahão de Castro rightly denotes, this expansion of financial ability, however, does not necessarily mean that municipalities increased funding or the quality of educational activities. It merely reflects an increase of available resources in the hands of municipalities, which is the result of a national policy prioritizing primary education and altering the structure of funding and legal competences (Abrahão de Castro 2010, 179).

Even if municipalities are now much better equipped in financial terms than in the beginning of the 1990s, this still does not reveal to which extent they are indeed willing and able to implement primary education targeted at increasing quality, given the local political contexts. Also, the increase of funding happened in proportion to a simultaneous increase in coverage, which at the municipal level was especially high. This municipalization of coverage meant that between 1992 and 2005, Brazil achieved the universalization of primary school attendance (1992: 81.4 percent; 2005: 94.5 percent). However, this accomplishment was accompanied by a deterioration of conditions in schools. Further, the increase of net school attendance has been highest in the northeast (1992: 69.7 percent; 2005: 92.4 percent) in comparison to all other regions (southeast 1992: 88 percent; 2005: 96.8 percent) and the Brazilian average (IPEA 2007a, 42).<sup>69</sup> This development reveals that at both the municipal

<sup>68</sup> Currently, the Brazilian Ministry of Education is reforming the higher education system, including the granting of scholarships for private universities through the University for All Program ProUni (2008) and a law waiting for approval by the National Congress that establishes a quota system in federal vocational education, technology, and higher education. Brazilian universities have full autonomy to decide about the adoption of a quota system. Public resistance is significant, causing lively debates amongst Brazilians and evidencing the structural challenge of social inequality embedded in the education system itself (<http://portal.mec.gov.br> [14/04/11]).

<sup>69</sup> With regards to *equity* of school attendance, Brazil has advanced much in reducing gender and racial inequalities at the primary education level. Attendance rates of boys and girls in primary schooling are almost equal (boys in

and regional levels, the northeast went through maximum changes, but with minimal financial resources. This will be elaborated further in the cases of Ceará and Pernambuco.

## 4.5 Beyond Constitutional Transfers

### 4.5.1 *Budget Amendments and Voluntary Transfers*

Beyond the financial mechanisms of the different executive branches discussed, Brazilian legislation also permits members of the National Congress and Senate to dedicate a certain amount of their electoral budget to finance policy interventions in any sector, including primary education. Individuals or organized groups of parliamentarians—be it from the same party, a distinctive party or a coalition—can decide where and on what to spend these *budget amendments* (emendas orçamentárias). Budget amendments are the only direct financial executive mechanism that parliamentarians and senators have under Brazilian law, and this mechanism gives them important political leeway and leverage towards local voters. In the case of a parliamentarian, the budget amendment is proportional to the percentage of the population that voted for him or her. In the case of a senator, there is not a great difference in the budget amendment, since each federal state can only elect three federal senators.

Budget amendments are relevant in the discussion on political networks and their significance within the federal system, since, in principal, they allow members of the legislative to interfere in the otherwise exclusive executive competences in primary education. In principle, they could even contribute to causing variance in education quality at the state and municipal levels.<sup>70</sup> Legislative transfers make it possible to distinguish the individual educational priorities of politicians in the federal state in which they are elected (as will be empirically investigated with respective data for Ceará and Pernambuco in Chapters 5 and 6), as well as what kind of political networks they belong to, and which organized coalitions or parties these networks represent and push forward.

According to the director of the statistical unit of Brazil's Federal Senate, the process of budget amendments and their final approval and execution by the federal government allows many possibilities for political interaction with positive and negative results for education quality. Political interests, and not necessarily needs, may guide where these additional funds will be invested (Gomes de Oliveira 2010). This decision-making process cannot be easily

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2005: 94.3 percent; girls in 2005; 94.8 percent). Attendance rates based on race have been improving, too, but there is still a small gap to be closed (white in 2005; 95.5 percent; African descent in 2005: 93.7 percent).

<sup>70</sup> Because of the possibility to have a potentially great dispersion of these transfers, which can be spent according to individual decisions of legislative members (such as for repair/reforms or schools that might politically be key and new constructions of schools in neighborhoods that are not necessarily underserved, but politically important to gain votes, among other projects), the Ministry of Education (MEC) has been putting forward yearly recommendations in line with the overall Development Plan for Education (Plano de Desenvolvimento da Educação, PDE). These guidelines do not have binding character but provide some orientation about current educational needs, where the government itself is already investing, and what kind of areas need further support from legislative members. In 2010, these recommendations included financing of school uniforms, school bicycles, and, especially, the support of higher education courses, vocational training, and federal universities (MEC 2010: 5).



controlled or monitored precisely because members of parliament and the senate are politically independent. Nevertheless, time and amount for the actual execution of budget amendments are still subject to authorization by the federal government, leaving it, for now, open in terms of their impact on education quality, given the weight of the other described funds.

#### 4.5.2 *Voluntary Transfers*

*Voluntary transfers* (transferências voluntárias) are funds transferred by the Union of States, Federal District, and municipalities due to the signing of conventions, agreements, arrangements, or other similar instruments whose purpose is to perform work or services of common interest to the three spheres of government.<sup>71</sup> These instruments include reforms to primary education. According to the Brazilian Law of Fiscal Responsibility, voluntary transfers are the delivery of current resources or capital to another member of the Federation, by way of cooperation, aid, or financial assistance not stemming from any constitutional provision or law, for example from FUNDEF/B. These voluntary transfers are easier to capture because they are less in number than budget amendments. However, as with budget amendments, there are limited restrictions on their dispersion at the state level. As such, they are often aligned with political networks and priorities (instead of with actual needs) and, therefore, potentially bias educational outcomes (see Chapters 5 and 6 for further detail).

### **4.6 Institutional and Political Factors of Federalism Determining Education Quality**

During the third stage of field research, education experts were asked about the ability of the current Brazilian federal arrangement to achieve high quality and how the current situation relates to the different types of institutional and political dynamics amongst relevant actors that emerged after 1988. Despite the slow decentralization of Brazil's education system, all interviewed experts (about 15 both from the federal and state level—see annex 2) unanimously agreed that they did not see how the development towards a highly decentralized system could have been any different, given Brazil's democratic history. They pointed out that the choices made were the right ones for Brazil's democratization, but that the rigorous post-1988 reforms were still slowly being implemented. Without municipalization, the conditions in municipalities would be even more chaotic and less adequate than they are today, partly because, under the former system, municipalities would not collect own revenues (Vidal 2010).

An assessment of Brazilian decentralization in the education sector provides a partial explanation as to why actors at the governmental and nongovernmental level behave and interact in certain ways, and what motivates their positions, resources, and interests that eventually translate into varied outcomes in education quality. An understanding of the consequences of this development indeed reveals a slow-moving process in achieving higher education quality in a federal system, as well as the political and institutional challenges

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<sup>71</sup> [http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/estados\\_municipios/transferencias\\_voluntarias.asp](http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/estados_municipios/transferencias_voluntarias.asp) [14/04/2011]

ahead for the Brazilian federation in terms of reducing the unequal distribution of quantity and quality.

A primary reason for a rather radical degree of decentralization in Brazil's education sector lies in the country's relatively recent move from dictatorship to democracy:

“Decentralization was a major issue of the Brazilian democratization agenda during the 1980s. The bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (1964–1984) concentrated decisions, financial resources and administrative capacities at federal level. The country became an extreme case of centralized federalism, almost undistinguishable from a unitary polity. Therefore, it was only too natural that democratic opposition to military rule took decentralization as one of its most cherished aims, together with social justice, rule of law and citizens' participation. Decentralization to the local level was argued for in the name of democracy as much as in the name of governmental efficiency and efficacy (M. H. T. Almeida 2005, 1).<sup>72</sup>

Brazil's subnational governors were known for greatly legitimizing the military regime and for forming the coalitions that were necessary for its survival (Souza 2005, 108). Given this, local politicians were striving to regain power during Brazil's democratic “opening” (cf. Almeida 2005, 1). This historical background partially explain what happened during the reconfiguration of power and autonomy that took place after 1984, and why interviewees have been quite clear in justifying that decentralization of education policy was the right choice for the country's democracy.

After 1988, Brazil went through different periods of its federal arrangement, of which three in particular can be distinguished. The first phase spanned most of the 1980s, and was characterized by a strong decentralization right after the end of the dictatorship. During this phase, state governments occupied an important role because of their support for the Brazilian redemocratization campaign “Diretas Já”! (campaign for the direct election of the president). This role was strengthened during the Constituent Assembly in 1987–88. The second phase occurred during the early to mid-1990s, which was a period of re-equilibration of intergovernmental authority during which all government units had difficulties in adopting the new constitutional rules. The third phase overlapped with the second, but took place mainly during Cardoso's presidency, which was a period of receding decentralization and the

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<sup>72</sup> This quote evidences the two most important strands of literature concerning the expected results of decentralization. Political scientists such as Almeida argue for the potential of decentralization to offset democratization since citizens can potentially reach higher degrees of political participation at local level. Economists argue that decentralization leads to higher efficiency and efficacy of policy results because of providing local, direct, and tailor-made solutions close to where citizens are. This goes back to Oates's decentralization theorem (1972). “This theorem states that under the conditions of regionally different preference orders and the absence of economies of scale in public good provision, a decentralized pareto-optimum provision of a public good will always be more efficient than, or at least as efficient as, a centralized provision. Decentralized systems provide public goods more efficiently, because they are able to reflect collective preference orders at a minor scale than centralized systems, thus reducing over- or under-consumption” (Haldenwang 2008: 12). By subjecting public spending priorities to local demand, Oates, together with economists such as Coase and Tiebout argue that allocative efficiency would rise in decentralized systems at local level.

subnational consolidation of policy innovation. This phase is deeply marked by Cardoso's "Real Plan," which marked the end to exorbitant levels of inflation and the beginning of Brazil's economic and financial stabilization (Montero 2000, 59; Souza 2005, 113).

These different phases set certain precedents for later developments in Brazil's political landscape, revealing that decentralization meant different things to different actors, and that actors followed and pursued distinctive rhythms at the federation's different levels (cf. M. H. T. Almeida 2005, 11), including being involved in the formulation and implementation of different kinds of policies. The three different federal entities were not passive actors, and the division of power within the Brazilian federation was marked by conflicts and negotiations around common, although sometimes competing, interests (Souza 2005, 113). Arretche confirms this in her comparative study of the main determinants of Brazil's decentralization in different policy fields (education, health, housing, and sanitation). This author concludes that intergovernmental relations have been quite diverse in each of the analyzed policies, and that—with the exception of fundamental education—the federal government occupied a predominant role in terms of authority (Arretche 2004).

The effects of the institutional and political development of this period are visible in the current education systems. Mozart Ramos, Executive Director of the NGO "Todos pela Educação" ("Everybody for Education"), and former secretary of education in Pernambuco, explains how these historically grounded politics operate at the municipal level, and what the political challenges are in achieving higher education quality across the country:

"The problem is that the municipality has some quite politicized management units that receive political support from a [federal or state] deputy, and sometimes political interests oppose educational interests. There is no infrastructure support to oversee all municipal schools. In the interior, the question of politics is even more accentuated. When a state or federal deputy is the foe of the mayor, the difficulties to collaborate are extensive. A collaborative regime is a prerequisite of decentralization."<sup>73</sup> (Neves Ramos 2010).

While the implementation of FUNDEF offset a big run for students (since funding under FUNDEF is granted according to number of students and enrolling any additional student would prompt additional funding), and led to the rapid construction of new school buildings and improvised annex schools, as well as improvements, although slow-moving, of payment conditions for teachers, little was done to effectively organize these fundamental changes in a collaborative way amongst the actors of the federation. In the northeast, where the change from the "old" to the "new" system was even more radical, interviewees explained this omission with the following reasons: lack of time given the rapid expansion of coverage needed; the pressure to comply with the norms and regulations rights laid out in the Constitution and in the National Education Law; a lack of binding, normatively anchored

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<sup>73</sup> "O problema é que o município tem gerências muito politizadas, recebem apoio político do deputado, e as vezes os interesses políticos se opõem aos interesses educacionais. Não há infraestrutura de apoio para supervisionar todas as escolas municipais. A questão política no interior é ainda muito mais acentuada. Quando o deputado estadual ou federal é inimigo político do prefeito, as dificuldades de colaboração são muito grandes. O regime de colaboração é o requisito da descentralização" (Mozart Ramos, executive director of "Todos pela Educação").

incentives for collaboration amongst municipal and state governments; and the fact that participation of actors continued to happen through already established channels, such as lobbies, yet without giving newly emerging actors, such as education councils, more participatory power (Ghanem 2010, 204).

Eloiza Vidal, former deputy secretary of state for education in Ceará, witnessed this period and was in charge of managing the radical change. She describes the rapid expansion and decentralization in the following way:

“Are the people ready for this? [Decentralization] has been a very necessary process, but in Brazil it happened very intensely and quickly; after 10 years of democracy already decentralization. We did not have time to learn what decentralization was all about. The experience needs time to mature. The Constitution of 1988 was a response to the regime of desertion. Many rights were granted, but it was not explained how these shall be implemented. [...] [Why was this so fast in the northeast?] There was very little structure, the money [administered by] the mayor [and the political implications that his had], a very big struggle for resources, and the [Brazilian] state agreed with this and the speed of the process. In the south, the system was already more homogenized, and the decision of the states there was different. Here there was no standardization of procedures” (Vidal 2010).<sup>74</sup>

#### **4.7 Implications of and Alternatives to the Current Federal Arrangement**

The consequences of moving towards a radically decentralized primary education system comprised to a certain degree what Paul Pierson advocates for social policies in federal systems in theoretical terms. He argues that federalism can cause policymaking dilemmas, because, in the Brazilian case, new actors emerged and old ones obtained new rights and duties. The creation of a collaborative regime in Brazil, in which municipal and state governments share rights and duties for the provision of primary education, was a historical-political choice. One main institutional priority of this step was to strengthen the autonomy and responsibility of the many municipalities by granting them new rights and responsibilities and extensive leeway. From the point of view of democratizing political and institutional structures from the bottom up, this has certainly been a crucial step, but with the caveat that lacking fiscal resources constrain municipal, political, and administrative autonomy.

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<sup>74</sup> “O povo está a pronto para isso? Tem sido um processo muito necessário, mas no Brasil isso se passou de forma muito intensa e muito rápida. Depois 10 anos de democracia já descentralização. Não tivemos tempo de aprender o que é descentralização: Precisa a vivência do tempo para amadurecer. A constituição de 1988 foi uma resposta ao regime de deserção. Se deram muitos direitos, mas não explicando como estes se deveriam implementar. [...] Por que isso foi tão rápido no nordeste? Havia muita pouca estrutura, o dinheiro do prefeito, uma luta pelos recursos muito grandes, e o estado concordou com isso e com a rapidez do processo. No Sul, o sistema já era mais homogeneizado, e a decisão dos estados ai era diferente. Aqui não houve normatização dos processos” (Eloisa Vidal, Former Deputy Secretary of State for Education in Ceará, 2010).

This step creates a bigger challenge in terms of reaching universal quality of primary education at a minimum level across Brazil, evidencing an enormous gap between normative mandate and political reality.<sup>75</sup> This is because there is a significant number of municipal governments (5,564) that are still learning what education management is about and how to achieve quality outcomes. It is also literally impossible for the federal government to monitor progress and support the municipalities with the detail and accompaniment needed to comply with what the Brazilian Constitution mandates about the functioning of the collaborative regime. “[...T]he state has neither arms nor eyes to reach all municipalities,”<sup>76</sup> In contrast to the health sector, in which a patient’s health can be diagnosed in a relatively short amount of time, treatments can be adjusted almost instantaneously, and clear results can be possibly obtained, *educational interventions need longer and continuous time horizons to show tangible results*. Even very specific interventions only yield clear results after a long period of time. It takes at least two years for an average-experienced municipal government in northeast Brazil to understand how to prioritize the main objective at stake in primary education, as well as how to achieve them and with which ingredients and budget allocations.. *Where more institutional continuity would be needed, the political cycle is often too short and the next municipal election may replace a whole line of public officials that just started to understand what it is all about* (Holanda 2010; Leitão 2010; Oliveira 2010b). This political incoherence institutionally weakens the federal arrangement in education.

In light of the above, interviewees were quite clear that the collaborative regime and leeway given by federalism in the education system needs to be revised and legally clarified if Brazil is to achieve universal coverage of primary and secondary education with equal quality across its territory—a crucial ingredient if the country wishes to close the gap showed by the last PISA study, and to give its economic growth trend a sustainable base. Mozart Ramos, the former head of the national movement “Todos pela Educação,” points out three aspects that still need to be resolved. First, the national, state, and municipal education plans have to be better aligned. For better collaboration, one needs to know the future challenges of state and municipal management in order to compare the plans of each entity to see their overlapping and embedding. This requires sound management of a complex bureaucracy. Second, it is necessary to identify the challenges from the plans of each entity (city and state) to define respective responsibilities in terms of regulation. Third, if all this is not embedded within a law of accountability (for example, showing which responsibility each unit carries and how these shall achieve set objectives), it will be difficult to achieve a regime of true collaboration. “Today in Brazil, we lack the implementation of this law, blaming those who do not implement it. We also need funding. What are we to do with a state management if it

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<sup>75</sup> Ghanem discusses this gap between constitutional norm and reality—the lack of education quality in many places—arguing that the Brazilian federal state does not wholly comply with its constitutional obligations in many sectors, including education (Ghanem 2010, 191).

<sup>76</sup> “Eu tenho a convicção que quando o município é bem gerido, é melhor, pois o estado não tem nem braços nem olhos para chegar a todos os municípios” (Mozart Ramos, executive director of “Todos pela educação”).

wants to implement a system of collaboration but has no leverage through respective norms or institutions?” (Ramos 2010)<sup>77</sup>.

What could be done in order to improve the current status quo? Two other interviewees with much experience in education planning at the state level extended the discussion even further. In an informal conversation, the former secretary of state for education in Pernambuco, Silke Weber, and her former chief advisor, Graça de Oliveira, opine that there is a direct relationship between municipalization and the collaborative regime.

*What would be desirable for the collaborative regime is a joint definition of policy management, and a unified public system where municipal and state governments would carry out joint capacity building, training, and management of student enrollment, offering available space to students that need it, independently of whether it was in a municipal or state school (Oliveira and Weber 2010).*

Additionally, it would be necessary to adjust and complement state and municipal education plans according to national guidelines, for example, by agreeing upon a certain goal (e.g., every child by the age of six shall attend school), and have municipal and state governments autonomously decide how to achieve the goal in their corresponding systems and planning cycles. Currently, there is little agreement about any of the policies, and vacation and holidays differ among some municipal and state schools, creating a challenge for families who have children of different ages attending schools in different systems, albeit living in the same state.

By contrast, in a joint system, where policies are formulated together but implemented with autonomy, it would be easier to plan education policy that indeed delivers quality education to students anywhere, and to discover the challenges and support needed at the municipal level. It would render a state policy—and not only governmental—pertaining to a government that is always likely to leave office because of losing an election. Such a solution would require closing the ranks to certain extent, even despite different political affiliations between municipal and state governments. The coordinator of the regional municipal representation UNDIME (National Union of Municipal Education Leaders) for the northeast, Leocadia de la Hora, points out that both systems have to overcome the feeling of competing for students because they mean monetary income to governments through FUNDEF/B, and state governments that think fraternally towards the municipalities in their state. More exchange of experiences is needed between both levels, for example, how to best support teachers, improve infrastructure, and coordinate training.

“If there were more collaboration, it would be better. In this country there are many laws, but if there would be more sensitivity, we would not need those laws. It is possible to make collaboration happen, but it often turns out being random. [Collaboration] depends on the

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<sup>77</sup> “Hoje no Brasil, falta a implementação deste direito, responsabilizando quem não implementa isso. Também precisa ter financiamento. O que fazer com uma gestão estadual se ela queira o regime de colaboração mas não tem nem o peso para criar normas nem instituições?” (Mozart Ramos, executive director of “Todos pela educação”).

competence to dialogue between people who are in institutions; it depends on the goodwill of governments. And this should not be. Collaboration has to be an ongoing process. That is why we [UNDIME] think that the regulation [of the collaborative regime] will help, and also because we hope that it will not be done within four walls; we hope that state and municipal leaders will be heard and that we will find a common way (Hora 2010).<sup>78</sup>

In an academic revision of the current debate of how to reconfigure and regulate the collaborative regime for the pending National Education Plan 2011–2020,<sup>79</sup> Cardoso de Araújo clearly points out and reconfirms the importance of collaboration among the actors, which many interviewees agreed is key to achieving higher education quality for all:

“In the regulatory process of the collaborative regime, one has to take into account the great challenge for intergovernmental relations in Brazil: the establishment of a just distribution of power, authority and resource allocation between the federal entities, guaranteeing the independence and interpenetration of national and subnational governments without any endangerment of a national development project, out of which one element is education” (Cardoso de Araujo 2010, 764).

As stated in the beginning of and throughout the dissertation, *state governments influence the implementation of primary education policy in state and, potentially, municipal schools through their power, interests, and networks*. Brazil’s education system needs the supplementary support not only of the union, but also of its federal states and respective state governments. *Without them committing further to provide technical, if not financial support, and to indeed share the responsibility for reaching quality of education together with the municipalities within their state, it seems very unlikely that a collaborative regime can indeed comply with the constitutional mandate of universal coverage with equal quality*. If, by contrast, state governments show ability and willingness to participate in a more fundamental collaboration with municipalities, their schools offering secondary education (to which students progress after having attending mostly municipal primary schools) will be able to receive students that are much better prepared and that drop out and repeat classes less, and hereby contribute to a very cost-effective use of the state governments’ resources.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> “[Colaboração] depende da competência de diálogo das pessoas que estão nas instituições, ela depende da boa vontade dos governos. E não pode. A colaboração tem que ser um processo permanente. É por isso que a gente acha que a regulamentação vai ajudar até porque não esperamos que seja feita em quatro paredes; esperamos que sejam ouvido os dirigentes estaduais e municipais e que se construa uma forma conjunta” (Leocadia de la Hora, regional representative of UNDIME North East; Olinda 2010).

<sup>79</sup> The discussion about how to reconfigure the collaborative regime in the education system has been one of the most prominent topics of the National Education Conference in 2010 (CONAE) with vivid debate amongst education activist from different governmental and nongovernmental organizations. In December 2010, the Brazilian Ministry of Education presented the new National Education Plan for 2011–2020 to the parliament. There were 20 goals laid out to be accomplished by 2020. Goal 15 states that federal, state, and municipal governments shall collaborate to provide equal standards of higher education to teachers in primary and secondary schools. The 10-year plan is currently being analyzed and awaiting approval by the National Congress in 2011 (MEC 2010b).

<sup>80</sup> This is because students that stay in school systems longer due to repeating a level are costly as more classes have to eventually be created, more teachers have to be hired, more schools have to be constructed etc. Equally, students that start secondary level but do not finish are a challenge for the school system in both financial and pedagogical terms. Both class repetition and dropout rates make it less likely to achieve education quality for all.

As the case of Ceará will show, state governments can make a huge difference by accompanying municipalities, yet without violating the political or administrative autonomy of municipal governments within the same state.

#### **4.8 Central Actors and their Interactions in the Primary Education System**

Having given an overview of the different historical developments and current institutional and political challenges in the federal education system, the principal roles of the different actors have to be clarified for a further assessment regarding their responsibilities and potential to influence outcomes. State governments are crucial players in the education system, and accountability is an important ingredient for responsive policy formulation and implementation at the state and municipal levels. Accountability is not only necessary, but it has to be coupled with a relatively high degree of intergovernmental collaboration in order to reach intended policy outcomes more frequently. The following will discuss the actors that are necessary for both.

##### *4.8.1 Influence from the Federal Level*

###### *The Ministry of Education, MEC*

Besides the already explained financial mechanisms and funds in which the federal government plays a crucial role in terms of resource allocation and distribution, the national MEC offers numerous federal programs. The programs provide both financial and technical support to state, municipal, and local levels in highly complex bureaucratic processes. While the MEC plays an important role in setting the policy agenda through national guidelines, such as the National Education Plan, and in designing or adjusting program interventions, its subordinated National Fund for the Development of Education (Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação; FNDE) is responsible for realizing financial transactions to state and municipal schools, for the delivery of goods (e.g., infrastructure and school books), for the monitoring of compliance procedures attached to these.

Five of the most important federal programs will be named here that are administered by the FNDE. These programs—some of which have existed since the 1930—benefit primary education and, partially, secondary education.

1. The National Program for School Alimentation (Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar), often colloquially referred to as “Merenda Escolar”. The objective of this totally decentralized program is to transfer federal funds to states and municipalities that are then responsible for logistics, preparation, and delivery of school alimentation in their respective school systems. It is meant to *partially cover* the nutritional needs of students. Especially in the richer states in southern Brazil, subnational governments tend to increase this amount since it is not sufficient to cover regular nutritional needs of students (Ferreira de Sousa 2009). Finances are directly transferred to states and municipalities according to the number of pupils published through the education census of the previous year. The resources applied to this program, which have existed since



1955, are considerable. In 2010, 3.034 million R\$ were spent to support 45.6 million students of all ages (preschool, primary/secondary level, vocational training and education for youth and adults).<sup>81</sup> The program is accompanied and fiscally controlled by the council for school alimentation (conselho de alimentação escolar), as well as by the TCU, and other federal control organs (Lerche Vieira 2008, 65; FNDE website 29/04/2011).

2. The School Transport Program (Programa Nacional de Apoio ao Transporte Escolar, or PNATE). Since 2005, the PNATE provides financial supplementary assistance to states, the federal district, and municipalities for pupils in public schools at the primary level (8<sup>th</sup>–11<sup>th</sup> grade). The decision for receiving a per capita value of R\$ 81.00 to R\$ 116.32 is based on whether the municipality is in a rural area, if a population resides in rural areas, and if the municipality ranks below the national poverty line. The administration of this program is similar to the Merenda Escolar and cofinancing by state and municipal governments is possible.
3. The National Program of the Didactic Book for fundamental education (Programa Nacional do Livro Didático).<sup>82</sup> This program supplies schools with didactic materials and is entirely executed at the federal level by the FNDE, contrary to the execution of the merenda escolar and the school transport program. The FNDE designs content, processes contracting of editors, and finances books for all grades at primary level for the subjects of Portuguese, math, history, science (biology and chemistry), and geography.<sup>83</sup> In 2009, the Brazilian government distributed 103 million books to 140,000 public primary and secondary schools, winning a worldwide award for the logistical execution (Setton 2009).
4. The Program Direct Money to Schools (“Programa Dinheiro Direto na Escola”). This program supplies financial assistance to public municipal and state schools for the acquisition of permanent material (in case financial capital is transferred), maintenance, conservation and small repairs of the school unit, acquisition of materials necessary for the functioning of the school, evaluation of learning, implementation of pedagogic projects, development of sports activities, and the functioning of schools over the weekends (for example for school or community meetings). Schools in rural areas, as well as schools that achieved the intermediary level of their envisioned target of the Basic Education Development Index (IDEB) receive 50 percent additional funds. Hereby, the Brazilian government aims at providing a monetary incentive to schools to

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<sup>81</sup> While kindergarden, preschool, and the primary level receive 0.30 Reais per student, this per capita payment doubles to 0.60 Reais in indigenous and quilombola schools.

<sup>82</sup> Beside the national book program at the primary level, there are two other federally financed programs, namely the book program for middle school, 9<sup>th</sup>–11<sup>th</sup> grade (Programa Nacional do Livro Didático para o Ensino Médio), and the national book program for the literacy of youth and adults (Programa Nacional do Livro Didático para a Alfabetização de Jovens e Adultos).

<sup>83</sup> The FNDE also distributes specialized books to blind students or students with visual needs, as well as to special public schools and schools of community or philanthropic character. Part of the National Book program is also the provision of schools with books for their school library through the *National School Library Program* (“Programa Nacional Biblioteca da Escola”), which has existed since 1997 (FNDE Website, 24/04/11).

perform better. In 2011, the overall budget of the PDDE accounted for R\$ 1.4 billion (FNDE website; 24/04/11).

5. The Literate Brazil Program (Programa Brasil Alfabetizado). This program was created in 2003 and is one of the flagship programs of the Lula administration. It aims at the developing literacy for youth and adults alike. In contrast to the other national programs mentioned before, Literate Brazil is entirely financed by the federal government. However, the role of the federal government during its implementation is supposed to be limited to the provision of finances, adequate infrastructure, and didactic material. The actual implementation is the joint responsibility of states and municipalities, but the FNDE distributes federal funds and controls their use according to established criteria.

Given the magnitude of the described national programs benefiting (primary) education in Brazil, it is evident that the Ministry of Education occupies a predominant role to improve infrastructure, alimentary, and pedagogical conditions in all public schools. Since the provision of financial and technical assistance is tied to needs as well as to the improvement of pupil's results via their close monitoring through national indicators, it hereby gains a central role in influencing education policy across the nation. This would not be possible without the comprehensive monitoring and evaluation carried out by the National Institute for Education Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira (INEP).

This great central authority of the MEC has both advantages and disadvantages. While it assures similar standards across the whole Brazilian territory, it diminishes political weight and leverage of state governments. Policy advice and monitoring of the central level cannot be as tailor-made and specific as many municipal education systems would require. Here, state governments should play a more dominant role since their insights into local circumstances are much more specific. However, augmenting the space of state governments also means to augment their political influence over municipalities and the risk of decreasing quality standards across the whole territory.

#### *The National Institute for Education Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira (INEP)*

INEP is the statistical institute and evaluation arm of the MEC. Especially since the mid-2000s, it has contributed to increase the influence of the federal government through the development of the education indicator IDEB. INEP is responsible for official data collection (e.g., education census, students' and school performance evaluation for IDEB, and teacher evaluations), producing extensive knowledge of current statistical trends and problems with the quality of education, and creating high-standard research about the causes for the outlined main problems. Employees of INEP that were interviewed for this dissertation seemed to be independent researchers of academic excellence with a demonstrated interest to point out and address the obvious challenges. INEP has been a very influential voice contributing to an informed public debate.

Opinions about the role and position of the federal level including the MEC and INEP vary, depending on the institutional affiliation of each interviewee. Those interviewed from the state administrations, as well as the NGOs, were rather critical towards the role that the federal government occupies in fundamental education. A common opinion is that the federal government is too powerful, and that state and municipal governments are powerless in both financial and administrative terms (Oliveira 2010b; Ramos 2010).

The role played by the union is also the subject of Brazilian academic debate. According to Arretche, the Federal Constitution of 1988 instituted a legal system where fiscal revenues are divided, limiting the spending capacity of the federal government, and consequently its capacity to coordinate policies. Primary education policy has been an exception amongst other policies where the union has exerted less authority. In contrast to sectors such as health, housing, and sanitation, where the federal government is more powerful (because it is the only financial power, and responsible for setting legal norms and for the overall coordination of intergovernmental relations), in primary education these responsibilities are partially shared with state and municipal governments (Arretche 2004, 17). However, several authors confirm that since the mid-2000s, a certain tendency of recentralization has been occurring in the education sector through nationally directed policies (D. M. Almeida 2005; Arretche 2004; Souza 2002).

#### *Federal Party Competition and the Executive level (1994–2010)*<sup>84</sup>

Important political actors for the formulation of education policy are political parties in the federal parliament. In Brazil, the House of Representatives (Câmara dos Deputados), or parliament, is one of two chambers of Congress. As such, it is responsible for the legislation that includes education policy. In contrast to other sectors, education, together with electric energy, transport, and mining, is one sector in which the proposing of new or altered legislation is the exclusive competence of the Union. This rule holds for any items listed in article 22 of the Constitution, and any areas of jurisdiction with competing competences amongst different federal levels.<sup>85</sup> While the president as head of government relies on congressional majorities (see below), he or she occupies a powerful role. The president can bypass Congress and govern with provisional measures up to 60 days.<sup>86</sup> Thus, the passing of any legislation that includes education policy also crucially depends on a committed president. Within the laid out interactions of Brazil's education system, an important question is to what extent did the parties and their competition influence education policy in the period between 1995 and 2010.

Political competition in the recent democratic period has been present at the national level. This is relevant since party competition gives insights into the political interactions and

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<sup>84</sup> Parts of this section were retrieved from currently unpublished manuscripts of Boekle-Giuffrida 2011 and Boekle-Giuffrida/Rippin 2011.

<sup>85</sup> Souza denotes that in areas of competing competences amongst federal units including education, Brazil is in great need for implementing national standards for various public policies (Souza 2005: 117).

<sup>86</sup> Fernando Henrique Cardoso, for example, passed 463 provisional measures between 1999 and 2002, hereby greatly defining and influencing the debates in Congress (Oliveira 2006: 329).

influence of parties on education policy, also with regards to the implementation of state-level education policy. In any of the six congressional elections after 1988, at least four major parties reached between 10 and 20 percent of total votes each. At the same time, an increasing number of smaller new parties that emerged after 1988 have fragmented Brazil's party system. Therefore, coalitions had to be formed to reach governing majorities.<sup>87</sup> The political environment after 1988 can be described as stable with two consecutive mandates of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC; 1994–2002) and two of Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva (2002–2010).

### *The Cardoso Era*

In the period 1994–2002, political competition took place. During the congressional elections of 1994, 18 parties from the whole political spectrum won seats in parliament—half of them had more than 15 seats, and the 5 biggest parties won more than 50 seats.<sup>88</sup> The results of the congressional elections of 1998 were similar regarding the repartition of seats, with some changes amongst parties. During both periods, a center-right coalition dominated Congress, maintaining President Fernando Henrique Cardoso for two consecutive periods, the second with a quite comfortable political majority. Cardoso's center party, PSDB, had to ally with, amongst smaller parties, the right-wing Liberal Party (PL) and the center-right Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) in order to reach a governing majority in the lower chamber. Lower-class citizens were not the primary electoral targets of this government; rather the targets were the middle class, entrepreneurs, and the rich.

While from this predominantly conservative or center voter base one would not expect legislation targeted to enhance quality of education in public schools (that are predominantly attended by students from lower-class households, thus most likely not from Cardoso's voter base), some promising steps have been taken. This can partially be explained by examining the aftermath of Brazil's return to democracy. The proclamation of the Constitution of 1988—the so-called citizens' constitution—was an important contribution to embrace demands from labor unions, feminists, and social movements in the new social rights catalogue. This included the universal right to education and health care.

Three major events took place during Cardoso's term. The events were prompted by his education minister, Paulo Renato Souza, who accompanied Cardoso in both his terms in office. First, the parliament approved the comprehensive National Education Law during Cardoso's first term in 1996. This event, however, cannot be considered a primary achievement of Cardoso himself, but of the political forces at work during the period. Second, FUNDEF was created, and as a result achieved the universalization of primary

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<sup>87</sup> The number of parties presented in the lower chamber rose from 11 in 1985 to 22 in 1989. Afterwards, legal impediments contributed to the merging smaller parties, hereby building four to five major parties (Costa 2008, 121). For further discussion of parties and party fragmentation in Brazil's recent democratic period see Mainwaring (1999).

<sup>88</sup> Data on election results for presidential elections, congressional elections, election of state senators, and state assemblies were retrieved from the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE 2010) and from the University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ 2010).

education by extending coverage backed with minimum funding from the federal level across the country, and positive effects on the raising of teacher's salaries. Third, and not mentioned yet, was Cardoso's move in 2001 to merge different, punctually implemented social programs and family subsidies into the program Bolsa Escola. This program was Brazil's first conditional cash transfer program designed to help keep children in school, being the predecessors of today's flagship program Bolsa Familia, one of the world's largest cash transfer programs in terms of coverage.

Needless to say, these three events occurring during Cardoso's first and second term have been vital for Brazil's primary education system, even if left-wing parties and movements severely criticized him for furthering the privatization of higher education by augmenting the quantity of private education instead of financing more institutions of public higher education (Bachur 2010).

### *The Lula Era*

During 2002–2010, there was continued political competition in parliament. Again, we can illustrate this by the number of parties competing during congressional elections. During Lula's first term, 19 parties of the whole political spectrum won seats, of which 5 reached more than 50 seats in congress. His government was a minority government with a slight advantage for the center-right opposition.<sup>89</sup> In his second mandate, Lula's leftist-center coalition won the support of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), becoming decisive for a center-left majority. Lula took office in 2002 as Brazil's first leftist president, and a biography much different from any of Brazil's former presidents. He comes from a poor family in the northeast, did not complete primary education, and was a political activist in the principal labor union CUT (Central Unico dos Trabalhadores). His government remained very popular until the end of his tenure, despite a deep corruption scandal that happened while he was in office.

With regards to social policymaking targeted at the lower-class population, Lula's government was not only been very successful by creating the conditional cash-transfer Bolsa Familia, but also with regards to enhancing education quality. Major achievements of three education ministers<sup>90</sup> have been the extension of the primary education fund FUNDEF to FUNDEB (2007), now including childcare and secondary education; the creation of the national performance indicator (IDEB), measuring the quality of education at school level and being in fact an accountability and monitoring system across the nation (2007); and the Literate Brazil Program, a program destined to develop literacy amongst youth and adults in municipalities with illiteracy rates at or above 25 percent.<sup>91</sup> All of these major achievements happened under the guidance of education minister Fernando Haddad (2005–current), a

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<sup>89</sup> The "Lulistas" won 254 seats, opposed by a center-right coalition with 259 seats, totaling 513 seats.

<sup>90</sup> Under Lula's two terms, following were the education ministers: Christovam Buarque (2003/2004), Tarso Genro (2004–2005), and Fernando Haddad (2005–current).

<sup>91</sup> 90 percent of such municipalities are situated in the northeast.

technically superb official who earned national and international applause, especially for the introduction of comprehensive evaluation criteria through IDEB.

The programmatic priority placed on education by the Lula government can be confirmed by two major facts. First, the budget of the Ministry of Education increased from 18 billion in 2002 to 49 billion in 2010 (Azevedo Abreu 2010, 140). Second, the National Development Plan Plano Pluriannual (2008–2011), entitled “Development with Social Inclusion and Education with Quality” (Plano Desenvolvimento com Inclusão Social e Educação de Qualidade), showed the high commitment that this government had for improving education quality.<sup>92</sup> Another notable achievement during Lula’s second term is also the introduction of curriculum elements on afro-descent history in primary schools and a newly emerging discussion about how to increase access of afro-descendants to higher education opportunities.

The electorates from the lower-class population showed support for this government. In 2002, Lula’s voter base was made up of 35.9 percent of the lower-income population earning up to two minimum salaries and 37.4 percent of the middle-class population earning between two and five minimum salaries (CESOP 2002, 8). Research shows the importance of the Bolsa Familia for Lula in the election of 2006, in which he won the most votes in the areas with the highest poverty rates, lowest socioeconomic indicators, and proportionally high amount of cash transfer recipients (Licio, Rennó, and Casto 2009). The approval rate when Lula left office was around 80 percent, higher than for any other outgoing president in recent Brazilian history.

In sum, under both Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula, education and education quality played an increasingly important role. This is partially because of the historic circumstances of Brazil’s democratic opening and, more recently, because of the country making increasing strives to compete with other emerging market economies in terms of economic growth and human capital development. Brazil has been recognizing that increased long-term investments in education quality are necessary to boost this trend. In this regard, Brazil’s national education policy has also demonstrated continuity and commitment, for example, through politically stable education ministers and, more recently, through education ministers with long-term visions and strategies.

#### *4.8.2 Influences from the State Level*

There are three challenges interviewees frequently named with regards to the involvement of state governments in fundamental education. First, under the current institutional rules, state governments do not have the financial incentives or the additional means to support municipalities. Second, and as a consequence of the first challenge, state governments do not have any systemic motivation for collaboration. Third, if they try to build up collaboration,

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<sup>92</sup> This four-year development plan led by the Ministry of Planning is a strategically important policy document valid for all other ministries and federal agencies. See <http://www.planejamento.gov.br/secretaria.asp?sec=10> [11/05/2011].

the union prejudices it because it occupies a predominant position. The following is the perspective of a former state secretary for education Ceará, Sofia Lerche:

“The union overruns the state [level] that has little room for intervention about what is not under its executive mandate. So I think the way that responsibilities for the provision of education were allocated may be good or bad [...]. With [the program “Direct Money to Schools”] this setting has changed a great deal; who will be worried about getting mere crumbs from the state government if so much money is already flowing through the mechanisms of the federal government? The federal government can decline to give resources, but quality control can only be exercised by the state [level] through technical cooperation that is poorly understood. So it is not solely a question of transfers, and municipalities absolutely lack the most basic things [such as the qualification of its human resources]. But initiatives are very punctual, and because you an office can be created in Brasilia, this means that things will work out? There are very basic needs at the municipal level that cannot be overcome with programs of this type. And if the state [level] had federal government support to develop something, maybe it would do it better? I don’t know, it’s not easy” (Lerche Vieira 2010a).<sup>93</sup>

Colleagues from government organizations and NGOs in the state of Pernambuco share this point of view. In Pernambuco, the predominant role of the union and the many other programs is referred to as the “pharmacy of the Ministry of Education” (Oliveira 2010b) or the “ready-made solution of the Ministry of Education” (Ramos 2010).

These strong statements contrast with the opinion of João Paulo Bacchur, the former chief advisor of the current Minister of Education, Fernando Haddad. Bacchur admits that the federal government has a powerful role because it controls the majority of the tax resources collected from the different levels. In regards to the participation and autonomy of state governments, he pronounced: “When autonomy is given to state governments to perform actions, they don’t realize them. Brazil cannot wait” (Bachur 2010).<sup>94</sup> Bachur believes that each state government has a different capacity to execute the finances provided by the federal government, and that its hesitance in policymaking (be it for political or institutional reasons) cannot be the reason for not improving education.

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<sup>93</sup> “A União atropela o estado que tem pouca margem de intervenção sobre aquilo que não é da sua execução. Então acho que a forma que as responsabilidades pela oferta de educação foram repartidas pode ser bom e pode não ser. [...] Com o PDE e o (Padas) Escola essa configuração mudou muito; quem vai se preocupar se vai receber migalhas do governo estadual se tem tanto dinheiro fluindo pelos mecanismos do governo federal? E aí o controle de qualidade do governo federal (...). Ele pode deixar de dar o recurso, mas esse controle de qualidade ele só pode ser exercido pelo estado através da cooperação técnica que é muito mal compreendida. Então não é uma questão de repasse e os municípios são absolutamente carentes das coisas mais elementares [recursos humanos]. Mas são iniciativas muito pontuais, porque você fez uma oficina em Brasília as coisas vão se resolver? Então há carências muito elementares no âmbito municipal que não são equacionadas por programas desse tipo. E se o estado tivesse apoio do governo federal para desenvolver algo talvez o fizesse muito melhor. Não sei, não é simples” (Sofia Lerche Vieira; former secretary of state for education in Ceará; 2010).

<sup>94</sup> “Quando se da a autonomia aos governos estaduais para realizar ações, ele não as fazem. O Brasil não pode esperar” (João Paulo Bacchur, former chief advisor of the Brazil’s education minister; Brasilia 2010).

Despite this disagreement with state-level interviewees, Bacchur points out certain disadvantages of the separated systems in which teachers serving state and municipal schools have been educated at the federal level (because higher education is the exclusive competence of the union). This creates a certain disconnection of the different systems, bearing the risk that teachers are not always educated in ways that will correspond to the realities of the state and municipal school systems. Bacchurs opines that the low qualification of Brazil's teachers can also be explained with the institutional disconnection amongst different systems that, in theory, are supposed to collaborate to achieve quality of education in Brazilian states (Bacchur 2010).

The academic debate differentiates between legislative and executive power and the competence of Brazilian states. Souza denotes that although Brazilian states have relatively little ability to formulate policies and to implement them accordingly, they still have some power, including in fiscal policies. State governments collect the tax on goods and services (Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Prestação de Serviços, ICMS), which is important for their overall fiscal revenues. Unlike in many other federal systems, the collection and partial distribution of taxes to municipalities is the responsibility of state governments in Brazil. In comparison to the former military regime, today state governments in Brazil administer more resources, even if their involvement in terms of total governmental revenue has declined in recent years. At the same time, state governments have effective administrative autonomy. "Yet, there is a wide gap regarding the actual decision making and financial and administrative capacity amongst states because of the economic differences amongst regions." As with the relationship between the union and the states, there are no constitutional provisions regulating relations among states with two exceptions: the National Council of the Treasury (CONFAZ) and the participation of governors of economically less-developed states in deliberative councils at the federal level in questions regarding regional development (Souza 2005, 115).

Other academic interpretations focusing on federalism and democratization, such as those of Abrucio, Mainwaring, and Montero, opine that state-level interests are dominating current Brazilian federation. The design of Brazil's political institutions is seen as increasing the informal power that governors exert towards their parliamentarian representatives in the National Congress. These authors associate the increase of informal power of states in Congress with governance problems, a certain decision-making paralysis, and the different periods of decentralization and recentralization that Brazil has been going through in the recent democratic period (Abrucio 1998; Mainwaring 1999; Montero 2000; Souza 2005).

In sum, the question of how state governments can empower municipalities without undercutting their autonomy, and how it is possible to encourage good municipal education management (see next section) are crucial. The search for answers reveals different layers of Brazilian federal political relations. A greater collaboration between state and geographically closer (municipal) governments is needed to enhance Brazil's primary education's quality. In theory, state governments should have an interest in supporting municipalities, given the fact that their secondary schools will receive students that have mostly been educated in primary



schools managed by the municipalities. If students do not receive a quality education at this level (for whatever reason), state schools will have to address the lack of basic knowledge, such as insufficient literacy and mathematics skills when they reach the secondary level. In practice, the actual financial motivation of state governments in education is low, and the position of the federal government is perceived as overly dominant.

#### *4.8.3 Municipal Governments*

As outlined earlier, the democratic opening of Brazil after 1988 was accompanied by a constitution giving more institutionalized power and competences to local governments, making them responsible for the provision of basic social services, including primary education. However, despite a widespread recognition that quality of fundamental education has to be nationally addressed and achieved, it does not necessarily mean that the municipal education system will make it a priority of their public policy at local level, or that they will conform to the most appropriate strategies to raise the quality of teaching. This is why the constitution laid out minimal rules for the earmarking of funds to at least partially address the potential gap between municipalities (Arretche 2004, 20).

The democratic movement in Brazil advocated that municipalities should account as much as possible for these services (Almeida 2005, 11; Souza 2005, 116). At the same time, the constitution, as well as support from international agencies, opened an avenue for the creation of municipal education and school councils in order to enhance civic control of resources (Souza 2005, 116). Since these resources mostly come from the federal government, a direct relationship emerged between the municipal and federal governments. Lins de Azevedo, while acknowledging the need to democratize Brazilian society from its roots, criticizes that instead of a bottom-up approach, a top-down relationship emerged. The result are a high financial dependency of municipalities, impeding them to develop their own potentials in the provision of primary education, and the inexistence of own municipal management capacity to administer and execute these federal funds in responsible ways (Lins de Azevedo 2002, 62):

“As various studies have shown, there is a perverse relationship between the size of the municipalities and the level of poverty encountered there. Consequently, there is a high degree of dependency on current transfers as part of their total revenues, which almost account for 90 percent in those [municipalities] that have up to 20,000 inhabitants [Gomes and Mac Dowell, 2000; Soares, 1998] (...). Almost without any sources of own income that would allow for more substantial investments such as the amplification of its structure, the mayor part of municipalities stays dependent on the transfers in order to cope with attending the demand for education that they receive” (Lins de Azevedo 2002, 62).

This author argues further that the creation of education councils varies substantially depending on the different social and political forces in the places where they are instituted (municipal or local/school level). There are still doubts as to whether the councils can indeed contribute to the effective democratization of education management, and if in general,

municipalities seek to guarantee the formal existence of councils in order to comply with the legal norm, but in reality fill them with their own specific power structure in each locality (Lins de Azevedo 2002, 61).

Interviews with state and municipal public employees, labor unions, and municipal interest representations in Pernambuco and Ceará illustrate further the overload of municipalities with given responsibilities and the bureaucratic follow-up duties related to the administration of federal funds and programs, including the creation of councils (Oliveira 2010b; Ramos 2010). How well and efficiently in the northeast scarce resources are used depends, to a large extent, on the local political and institutional contexts. In presence of motivated mayors and well-trained directors, municipal and state school systems are more likely to produce good quality educational outcomes. In the presence of clientelistic local politics, the likelihood is high that results will deteriorate, even if institutional mechanisms in terms of accountability and participation are in place.

An interview with a labor union representative in Pernambuco confirms that informal institutional behaviors, such as buying votes from poor parents in turn for the delivery of food baskets, medical assistance, and payment of household bills, are still quite common in the northeast during election campaigns. This mechanism works throughout the school system, in which school directors and teachers become focal points for the different local political forces at work. Each electoral district, and in turn its schools, “belongs” to a local or state deputy. Directors and teachers become what Brazilians call “electoral cables” connecting the voter base to local deputies, counting on a strong moral obligation that in lower social strata is strongly felt between beneficiaries of such populist benefits and the person running for elections (Araújo 2010).

Ceará’s current subsecretary of state for education, Mauricio Holanda, agrees with the labor union representative, even if both he and the labor union representative come from quite different institutional backgrounds. For Holanda, three major difficulties exist, especially in small and isolated municipalities. First, there is the question of insufficient training of the staff of municipal administrations, and second the question of social control of the poorest population by the mayor.

“This is a big problem. And the third is the question of patronage, a more serious problem at the Brazilian local level. When decisions that should be made in technical terms pass through the system of clientelism, it greatly compromises the capacity of municipalities to produce good results. This is complicated because these are systemic issues that are saying that it has to do with the general level of poverty of the people, and it is hard to work around this” (Holanda 2009).<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> “Isso é um grande problema. E o terceiro é a questão do clientelismo, um problema sério brasileiro mais local. Quando passam decisões que deveriam ser técnicas pelo sistema clientelista, ele compromete muito a capacidade dos municípios em produzir bons resultados. Isso é complicado por que são coisas sistêmicas que dizem que tem a ver com o nível geral da pobreza da população e é difícil mexer em isso” (Mauricio Holanda; Sub-secretary of education of the state of Ceará; 2009).

In the course of the interview, Holanda became even more explicit about how exactly clientelism at municipal level works within the school system:

"The system of clientelism and the system of electoral politics are symbiotic: the mayor is elected and he verifies who voted for or against him by comparing the votes of each district with the votes of the neighborhood. He tries to chase down the teachers that did not vote for him. He tries to nominate the director of a school as one of his political posts in case the director himself does not occupy a political post yet. Normally, the director has important leadership, and sometimes a school is the richest institution of a community and it establishes an important political ground. There he exchanges his political support with the working post of some of his allies" (Holanda 2009).

Summarizing both interviewees, municipal school systems and schools are highly politicized spaces of the education system, where political networks either strengthen or weaken federal institutions. This, in turn, produces positive or negative bias for educational results, confirming the main hypothesis of this dissertation. A former state director of education planning of the state of Pernambuco went even further in her analysis during an interview:

"The municipality is the base of state and federal powers, a space of politics. For the state government, the municipality signifies the possibility to augment its political capital; in turn, there was not much interest in the past to have them develop their own technical capacities, leaving them dependent. Instead of giving them conditions for indeed being autonomous, the objective was to make them dependent of the federal programs (...). Today, the Ministry of Education is an educational pharmacy; there are programs for everything" (Oliveira 2010).<sup>96</sup>

Oliveira interprets the relatively high degree of municipalization in northeastern states such as Ceará not necessarily as a contribution to Brazil's democratization from the bottom-up. Rather, she sees it as a historic consequence of a large oligarchic base with the current result that the municipalities are obliged to follow the orders of the Ministry of Education, and to become members of "*a regulated democracy*" (ibid.). While Oliveira made it clear that the democratization and empowerment of municipalities has been an important step for Brazil's democratization, she cautions not to be too optimistic in believing that new federal rules and arrangements are able to overcome a historically rooted system of informal practices. However, her former counterpart from Ceará, Eloisa Vidal, emphasizes that, especially in the northeast, great difficulty exists to make intersectorial policy collaboration happen. According to Vidal, there is little technical capacity at the municipal level, and this is why municipalities seek support from the federal level. The president of the education

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<sup>96</sup> "O município é a base do poder estadual e federal, um espaço de política. Para o governo estadual, o município significa a possibilidade de aumentar o seu capital político, assim não houve muito interesse no passado de criar estruturas técnicas nos municípios, deixando-os dependentes. Em vez de dar condições para realmente serem autônomos, o objetivo era de fazê-los dependentes de programas federais (...) O MEC hoje é uma farmácia educacional, existem programas para tudo" (Graça de Oliveira, former state director of education planning of the state of Pernambuco – 1987-90/1995-98; Recife 14/04/2010).

commission of Ceará's state parliament and member of the worker's party PT, Artur Bruno, confirms this evaluation, and notes that the municipalities can decide not join the federal programs; joining is a choice, but not an obligation. Yet, if municipalities do not have financial autonomy nor administrative capacity, they become consumers of, and potentially dependent on, federal resources, (Bruno 2010; Vidal 2010), confirming a theoretical assumption made in Chapter 2 herein.

Interviewees did not only mention the challenges of the current federal arrangements, but also spoke of alternative methods to improve education quality and to include municipalities differently in the process. Former members of the education administration of Pernambuco recommend giving full autonomy to states and municipalities so they can produce their own policy guidelines, instead of mostly implementing the ones formulated at the central level in Brasilia. Instead of the current arrangement where this is carried out by the federal level, this instance would continue to monitor and evaluate education quality (like it is now), but without engaging further in shaping policy at the municipal and state levels. One possibility could be to have states formulate their own guidelines, which could then serve as a basis to formulate regional guidelines, more specific state programs, and municipal programs in agreement with the latter. For example, the objective could be to have all children in school and to provide them with sufficient quality, while leaving municipalities and states to realize their own policies, instead of the Ministry of Education having to offer all the federal programs. These two interviewees emphasized that since neither level of jurisdiction, nor the people that formulate and execute policies are the same (and they often work thousands of kilometers apart from each other), the current arrangement fails to deliver what it is supposed to. Further, shortcomings between theory and reality would emerge, contributing to a gap at the different federal levels of Brazil's system (Oliveira and Weber 2010; cf. Lins de Azevedo 2002).

#### *4.8.4 Education Councils*

Comparing governmental influence in the education sector with other social sectors, such as health and social assistance, a social movement's specialist of the Brasilia-based NGO INESC (Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos) points out that the Ministry of Education occupies a "hegemonic" position if compared to other sectors. This can partially be explained by the less powerful role played by social movements in this field that did not emerge within Brazil's transition to democracy in the mid-1980s, rather they predate it.

The participatory movement for the right to education as a civil rights movement has had important weight from the point of view of civil society, and has also reinforced the role of legally existing participatory mechanisms, such as state and municipal education councils. The Constitution of 1988 lays out the education principles of democratic management, which were later refined by the National Education Law in 1996. According to Article 14, the public municipal and state school systems, including primary schools, are supposed to define their democratic management norms. This includes the participation of education professionals in the elaboration of the pedagogic school planning and the creation and

participation of the local school community in municipal and school councils. These councils exist all over the country and are, in principle, in charge of monitoring and controlling state, municipal, and school policy and program implementation.<sup>97</sup> In contrast to the health councils, the education councils are said to be less institutionalized and present (Ciconello 2008).

The second field phase carried out for this dissertation included informal interviews with members of education councils at the state, municipal, and school levels. These interviews with teachers and parents as members of the councils evidenced the importance, but also the difficulties, to indeed monitor quality and the use of resources to achieve it. A common assessment of interviewed education policy expert from universities, as well as from NGOs, is that especially school councils, being the smallest type of councils, struggle most with local clientelism perpetuating Brazilian schools. Corruption is rampant in many places. The more precarious the financial and technical conditions of a municipality and its schools, the more complicated the role of the council becomes in inciting a director to achieve better results. "Today, most Brazilian schools [of either system] have school councils. But in their majority they are rather figurative than de-facto councils. Counselors would need more training in order to effectively accompany the control of money spent by schools."<sup>98</sup> The regional representative of the municipal interest association UNDIME for the northeast, Leocadia de la Hora, expresses similar concerns and confirms that there are a lot of situations in which resources are poorly used. However, de la Hora also believes that over time, this will happen less and less, since she sees growing awareness for the importance of social control. For example, while many members of municipal councils controlling the use of resources of FUNDEB do not have the technical capacity to oversee a cost effective use of these available finances, this capacity will hopefully be built over time (Hora 2010).

During a discussion of the National Education Conference in 2010 in Brasilia, another representative of UNDIME urged that the education system should approve a norm stating that the funds available to municipalities in education must be separated from other municipal accounts (such as the municipal finance office), and that members of the municipal administration must manage these in conjunction with the mayor. This would facilitate to indeed control in- and outflow of resources applied (school infrastructure, teacher salaries, additional pedagogic material, etc.) as well as to align them with municipal education priorities instead of the political priorities of the mayor (Boekle-Giuffrida 2010). Another issue is that, under current legal frameworks, not only school parents and eventually pupils are members of councils, but also teachers and other members of the municipal education administration. Both teachers and municipal employees can certainly bring a high degree of knowledge into these councils; yet, eventually they represent the institutional interests, rather than their personal interests, and thus can in theory be manipulated by the

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<sup>97</sup> For example, for the oversight of funding channeled to municipalities through FUNDEF/B, the municipal education system is obliged to set up the FUNDEF/B-councils.

<sup>98</sup> "Quase todas as escolas hoje tem conselhos escolares. Mas a maioria deles é mais figurativo que um conselho de fato. Os conselheiros precisam de ter mas treinamento para poder acompanhar bem o controle dos gastos feito pela escola". <sup>98</sup> Interview with Liz Ramos, National Campaign for the Right of Education/Centro Cultural Luis Freire, Recife (14/05/09).

mayor at the extreme end of their hierarchy. Further, in case of the members of municipal administrations, these are allowed to use their work hours to dedicate to work in councils, while all other members will engage in this activity on a voluntary basis (Sant'Anna Guimarães 2008, pp.142). These issues, which require looking into the exact details of the norms established and how they are practiced, are not minor, but they do influence the type of democratic control that is exerted in the education system.<sup>99</sup>

In sum, there has been a certain degree of influence from civil society organizations in the education sector. However, the movement and pressure deriving from here could have been stronger, hereby affecting the potential degree of dialogue, openness, and transparency of information. Beyond the education councils, there have been further influences from other NGOs, and also initiatives led by the private sector, to make the quality of education a very present debate amongst Brazilian media and the public.

#### 4.8.5 *Interactions with Nongovernmental and Initiatives led by the Private Sector*

Other types of organizations that have had great influence from civil society on the education debate in Brazil are the National Conference for Education (Conferência Nacional de Educação, CONAE) and the National Campaign for the Right to Education (Campanha Nacional pelo Direito à Educação). While the National Conference for Education takes place once a year in order to stimulate and push forward the public debate by assembling civil society and nongovernmental and governmental organizations engaged in the education sector, the National Campaign for the Right to Education is one of the most influential ongoing nongovernmental initiatives in Brazil. It receives support from 200 organizations in 19 Brazilian states.<sup>100</sup> At the international level, it is connected to the campaign “Education for All” (EFA) led by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), a campaign striving for the provision of basic education for all children, youth and adults.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> See also Avritzer (2009) for a general discussion on the representativeness of Brazil’s democratic councils in general, and their role in civil society specifically. While councils can certainly become a channel to represent specific interests, especially amongst socially and economically disadvantaged population groups, they also bear the risk of concentrating power in the hands of a few community leaders who do not necessarily represent the group that they are claiming representation for.

<sup>100</sup> The directive committee comprises important national NGOs, such as Ação Educativa, ActionAid Brasil, Centro de Defesa da Criança e do Adolescente do Ceará (Cedeca-CE), Centro de Cultura Luiz Freire, Pernambuco (CCLF), Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Educação (CNTE), Fundação Abrinq pelos Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente, Movimento Interfóruns de Educação Infantil do Brasil (Mieib), Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), União Nacional dos Dirigentes Municipais de Educação (Undime), União Nacional dos Conselhos Municipais de Educação (Uneme). <http://www.campanhaeducacao.org.br> [05/05/2011]

<sup>101</sup> Once a year, EFA publishes an internationally well-known report on the current stage and challenges to achieve primary education for all. Recent topics include education in relation to governance (2009), marginalization (2010), and conflict (2011). Beyond this annual monitoring report, the initiative has also assessed the primary education situation in more than 180 countries, providing them with in-depth knowledge of their educational needs. [www. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/efareport/](http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/themes/leading-the-international-agenda/efareport/) [05/04/11]

Another important NGO is the “All for Education Movement” (Movimento Todos pela Educação), founded, financed, and advised by some of Brazil’s most prominent entrepreneurs, such as Jorge Gerdau Johannpeter (Gerdau S.A. Steel and Iron), José Roberto Marinho (Fundação Marinho e Organizações Globo), Viviane Senna (Fundação e Instituto Ayrton Senna), amongst others. Due to this high-level network, coupled with a network of many national and regional activists pushing the organization’s agenda, the All for Education Movement has had a considerable influence on the public debate about the quality of education in Brazil.<sup>102</sup> While in general terms, the main goal of the All for Education Movement is to raise Brazil’s educational standards, it has formulated five objectives to be accomplished by 2022:

- Each child and teenager aged 4–17 should be at school.
- All children should be wholly literate by the age of 8.
- Each pupil should learn adequately according to his and her grade level.
- All teenagers should have finished secondary education by the age of 19.
- Investment in primary and secondary education should be concluded by the age of 19.

Parts of this organization’s critique towards the Brazilian government and the Ministry of Education concerns the financial regulations attached to FUNDEF and FUNDEB and the consequences that these regulations have had for the quality of education. For example, instead of financing education based on the number of students in state and municipal systems as regulated by FUNDEF, the All for Education Movement demands that in order to reach a de facto quality of education—a right laid out in the Brazilian Constitution—financial transfers have to be calculated according to the needs of a student, and not according to financially viable minimum standards. For example, one of FUNDEF’s primary intentions was to even out financially different starting conditions amongst Brazilian states and municipalities. While, in principle, this means that the federal government has to complement finances of those states and municipalities that are insufficient according to the national standard set by FUNDEF, the opinion of the northeastern representative of the All for Education Movement, Liz Ramos, is that this never really happened.

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<sup>102</sup> The Colombian journalist and columnist Andrés Oppenheimer opined during a book release tour in the United States that in Brazil, in contrast to other Latin American countries, the entrepreneurial movement for education quality has been the strongest throughout the region. He states that organizations such as the All for Education Movement occupy an important role in making education with quality continuously present in the Brazilian public debate. Hereby, they are able to pressure the different Brazilian governments to fulfill their constitutional obligations, notwithstanding ongoing economic and political changes (Andres Oppenheimer: “Basta de Historias“ book release tour at the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington DC 07/03/11).

“While some municipalities in the interior of Sao Paulo state have a student per capita income of around 2000 Reais, in the northeast this value remains around 600 Reais. This creates profound inequalities, which are reflected in learning achievements and quality indicators” (Bittencourt 2006).

The NGO activist also points to other inequalities in the school system in the northeast. Part of the problem in this region is that children attend less school, in terms of daily hours, than established by the LDB:

“Another case in point is the time that the children attend school. The minimum demanded by the LDB is four hours. In the north, only 15.5 percent of children attend school for this amount of time. In the southeast, this percentage increases to 70 percent. In the northeast, schools function in three different day shifts of about three hours each [7h-11h; 11h-15h; and 15h-19h], as well as the night shift. How well can these children perform in school? They are poor children, coming from poor families, going to poor schools, and having poor teachers, since their salaries are also below the national standard. All this seriously impacts the matter of quality” (Bittencourt 2006).

Last but not least, the All for Education Movement has recently been supporting a call to improve the education of teachers in Brazil, in order to boost the achievements of the students and, ultimately, to increase education quality.<sup>103</sup>

#### 4.8.6 *Teachers' Unions*

Brazil's teachers' unions are important political actors in improving education quality. They have been influential in the shaping of education policy nationwide and in the creation of many political relations and networks. The unequal salary conditions of teachers within the public school system—another consequence of Brazil's regional economic disparities—are amongst the central topics for teachers' unions. In Brazil, several teachers' unions exist at the federal, regional, and local levels, and they are very well organized. While their activity radius certainly includes topics such as quality and equity standards of education, their action focus is predominantly on the current working and salary conditions of teachers. Both are especially precarious in the northeast.

The position of teachers' unions regarding the quality of education is ambiguous for several reasons: teachers' absenteeism is high in Brazil (because of doctor's appointments, private concerns, extended sick leave, or nonexcused) and the result of underpayment, which forces teachers to work in more than one school during the day.<sup>104</sup> These multiple shifts often result in increased frustration at work and high burnout rates. Teachers' unions reiterate the importance of higher salaries as a way to attract more qualified professionals to the education sector and to increase education quality (Alencar 2010; Araújo 2010). This argument has

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<sup>103</sup> <http://www.todospelaeducacao.org.br/comunicacao-e-midia/noticias/14852/todos-pela-educacao-lanca-campanha-de-valorizacao-do-professor> [04/05/11].

<sup>104</sup> For a further characterization of teacher in Brazil see INEP's exploratory study based on data from the 2009 Education Census (INEP 2010b).



been well-confirmed amongst international education experts because research has shown how important the role of the teachers is if an education system seeks to advance in terms of the performance of its students (UNESCO 2006; WorldBank 2011).

Given the fact that teachers are a principal actor in the debate on education quality, their working and payment conditions have to be compared in order to answer the question of why education quality varies across Brazilian states (see Table 3.1). Salary differences are not only unjust from the point of view of professional equity within the same system, but they also motivate teachers to a higher or lower degree. Students will benefit differently from more or less motivated teachers. Working and salary conditions are highly unequal, not only between state and municipal entities in different Brazilian regions, but even within the same state. This is possible because state and municipal schools have autonomy to determine how much out of their education budget they wish to allocate for teachers' salaries, despite major improvements in this regards with the standards laid out here through FUNDEF and FUNDEB. In addition, since salary conditions are poor, the best teachers do not stay in those schools that would need them most. Instead, they search for higher payment in the prestigious federal or private schools where better infrastructure and students from middle- and upper-class families constitute an easier working environment than the urban peripheries of northeastern cities, such as Recife (Pernambuco) and Fortaleza (Ceará). The result is that becoming a teacher in a public school is not regarded as a prestigious profession in Brazil, but means a tough job with little pay in neighborhoods with challenging social conditions.

The Brazilian Constitution only recently mandated the implementation of a monthly minimum wage for teachers of R\$950 for a maximum of 40 hours of weekly work (for teachers at the beginning of their careers; law 11.738). From the overall working hours, two-thirds are supposed to be spent in the classroom and one-third for pedagogical preparation. The basis for this law, passed in July 2008, was already set out in the LDB in 1996, but without concrete steps or a timeline for implementation in the public schools systems in all states and municipalities. Based on the new law, often referred to as "piso salarial" (salarial floor), states and municipalities were given a legal grace period to implement the minimum wage until December 31, 2009. After this grace period, state and municipal governments were to be charged a fine if they had not yet implemented the new wage. If a certain federal unit (being either a municipality or a state) is not able to comply with the new law, the union is obliged to financially complement its budget.

Two main problems exist with this federal rule that has caused a lively debate amongst the education policy community in Brazil, including Pernambuco and Ceará. First, not all federal states have accepted the implementation of this law but declare it as unconstitutional (Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraná, Santa Catarina, Rio Grande do Sul and Ceará), partially because of the condition that one-third of working hours should be spent outside the classroom, which implies a need to hire more teachers (see Chapter 5), possibly for political reasons. The second type of resistance regarding the law originates mainly from teachers, teachers unions, and NGOs and is about the set amount of the minimum wage. Even if the law is wholly implemented and teachers earn this minimum wage, from their point of view it

is still much too low in order to support a family.<sup>105</sup> In many municipalities, especially in the northeast, teachers' entry salaries are already below this R\$ 950 minimum floor. Based on a study from INEP comparing the different average salaries of teachers in public (municipal and state systems together) basic education for a 40-hour week in 2006, Pernambuco placed last out of 26 federal states (R\$ 831), with Ceará (R\$ 866) just above. For a comparison, the equivalent value in Rio de Janeiro is R\$ 2108 (upper end) and R\$ 1767 in São Paulo.

While it has been remarked that great improvement is still needed in terms of teachers' education, continuous training, and the selection process, interviewed researchers at universities and think tanks in Brasília, Fortaleza, and Recife also opined that teachers in Brazil, until very recently, have not been evaluated and held accountable for their service and performance. Teachers in Brazil do not want to be evaluated. The discussion of monitoring and quality control as a necessity to raise the quality of teaching (as INEP has been suggesting with the creation of IDEB) has only been initiated very recently.

With regards to assumptions made in Chapter 2, important demands from teachers' unions, such as salary and working conditions, have been subject to wider political discussions in Brazil. Brazilian teachers' unions are quite powerful, but are often publicly criticized for their “selfish” fight for a better salary, instead of connecting this justifiable demand with the general challenges of the system as such. Better education has much to do with remuneration and working conditions of teachers, as well as with their educational preparation. An honest discussion of these bigger forces at work often remains silenced for political reasons and makes it appear that teachers' unions are opponents in the goal of reaching education quality in the public debate.

#### **4.9 Chapter Summary**

Chapter four provides important answers to the research question. One of the most important insights is that political interactions within the Brazilian federal education system can explain the weakening or strengthening of federalism as an institutional framework. It confirms the main hypothesis that differences in education quality have to do with a constraining or enabling relationship between institutional and political factors coexisting in this system. The current solution of the legally lenient collaborative regime of Brazil's federalism does not sufficiently encourage the collaboration of subnational units, nor does it sufficiently encourage those public administrations at the state and municipal levels to be more responsible for transparent and accountable policy implementation.

Even if state and municipal governments are powerful political actors, they have mixed levels of financial resources and power—higher (state governments) versus lower (municipal

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<sup>105</sup> While this is a subjective argument, objectively spoken, salaries of Brazil's teachers of basic public education are not necessarily low compared to other professional groups. INEP published data displaying that teachers in Brazil earn 75 percent more than other professionals. However, at the same time, it is important to consider that teachers in the municipal and state system are, if compared to the average of other professional groups, much better educated. Comparing the average here, teachers have 13.5 years of education, while other professionals have only 5.6 years of education (INEP 2007).


governments)—and therefore interact differently. The federal government, by contrast, still maintains a powerful, mostly policy formulating role. However, in the case of a lack of resources, especially in fiscally weak municipalities, the federal government can strongly influence their political autonomy in implementing policies, making them more dependent subordinated units. In addition, federal, state, and municipal politicians may influence education quality, in both formal and informal ways, through political and financial channels.

While Brazilian municipalities are the backbones of the country's primary education system, they are its weakest unit in institutional and financial terms. Parts of the "federal dilemma" can be observed here. First, municipal governments need more specific support, given the general lack of technical expertise in the municipal administration and management of education quality. Second, the federal government is not able to cope with its oversight duties in the education sector, as it is not possible to monitor the systems and progress of more than 5,000 municipalities on a regular basis. Third, geographically closer state governments do not have to support municipal governments unless they choose to do so voluntarily and in presence of high political commitment or financial capacity at this intermediary level. Fourth, the federal government greatly influences political interactions between municipal and state governments because of the important financial role it occupies (chapters 5 and 6 will assess whether this financial power is also accompanied by political power in the form of interactions and networks between federal and state governments and their respective parties). Amidst such a federal dilemma (see Figure 4.1), education quality at the municipal level is progressing slowly, because this most fragile level has had to absorb most of the consequences of decentralization after 1995. The autonomy granted to municipalities via the Brazilian Constitution allows them to decide how to structure and implement their resources, and how to relate to state governments. Formal federal rules and regulations are in place including the collaborative regime. Since these regulations are formally agreed upon and written in legislation, they represent formal institutions. However, they are insufficient if universal education quality is the goal.

As this chapter confirms, insufficient institutional regulation can have both negative and positive bias for education quality, depending on the type of influence of local political networks, including relations between municipal and state governments, as well as between municipal governments and the federal government in Brasilia. The absence of more regulations creates space for bargaining, informal behavior, and clientelism and patronage in the education system (resulting in negative bias for policy outcomes) or it incites a handful of innovative state governments to test out new, promising models for state-municipal collaboration (potentially resulting in positive bias for policy outcomes). While this loose collaborative regime is, in principal, positive for autonomy, it turns into a dependency on federal financial resources for especially fiscally weak municipalities. *This confirms findings from the theory chapter arguing that fiscal resources, especially when they are unequally distributed and accompanied by inter- and intraregional socioeconomic inequalities in a federal system, entail a strong political dimension and bargaining power.* The institutional entitlement of fiscal resources at the municipal level does not translate into political strength, but rather it leads to dependency at the lowest federal level in Brazil.

The arguments brought forward in this chapter confirm an important assumption of the theoretical framework: federalism as a polity is deeply influenced by federal politics, altering its normative institutional arrangement via the political networks taking place in a federal system. It is equally emphasized that state governments could play an influential role in the forging of education quality in Brazil by enhancing policy collaboration amongst the state municipal administrations. This assumes that states would use their leeway in ways that produce a positive bias in results, and that their networks, even if partially informal, would not substitute or weaken, but rather strengthen federalism as a polity. It can be argued that without any additional collaborative engagement of Brazil's 26 state governments towards municipal education systems, the country's primary education quality (which is mostly determined by municipal administrations) will not improve faster this decade than during the last one.

**Figure 4.1. The “Dilemma” of Federal Collaboration Amongst Actors in Brazil’s Primary Education**



“You look at the data of the state of Ceará, which is not very different from the data of other Brazilian regions; but yes the state always pointed out something different, a small difference compared to other states, for example states such as Bahia, which have a very different economic condition. Then, in the northeast, something different began to happen from the mid-1990s onwards, yet the jump towards quality takes much longer. The [black] box [to understand education quality] requires a set of circumstances, which were given in Ceará that advanced because of these. If you examine this in a historical perspective, you will see that this collaboration [in Ceará] is ancient. But it is a collaboration involving many instances of the state.”

(Sofia Lerche, former Secretary of State for Education in Ceará)

## **5. Policy and Politics of Primary Education in Ceará**

Chapter 5 analyzes the case of Ceará by empirical testing the main hypothesis. Which political and institutional factors explain policy choices and quality education outcomes in this state? Which roles play federal institutional rules, political interactions, and networks, and what is their bias on policy outcomes? Which political actors have been important in this particular case during both policy formulation and implementation? These questions are addressed in this chapter to validate the three-level reading of federalism and the outlined political and institutional indicators in Chapter 2. The following chapter structure shall facilitate this.

In the first part, the financial situation of Ceará's primary education policy is laid out by presenting both formal (constitutional) and less formal (additional transfers from politicians) types of financial transfers at the state level and, where possible, at the municipal level. This provides the understanding that education finances remain potentially scarce to confront the current education challenges, especially with regards to literacy at the primary education level. It is outlined that municipalities currently face the biggest challenge in terms of quantity of students and subsequent quality of their education, since the smallest and fiscally weakest unit of Brazil's federal system serves the highest proportion of students at the primary level. The end of this section examines the influence of budget amendments and voluntary transfers as additional financial sources of Ceará's education system. The second major section of the chapter dives deeper into the subnational politics in Ceará. It gives an overview of the political and educational trends in political-historical perspective. Main politicians, education secretaries, and education programs are outlined to provide the analytical background necessary to assess today's education policies and politics. This section already crystallizes how important political decisions made in the early 1990s focused on the establishment of collaborative networks with municipal administrations in place that strengthened federalism as an institutional system. At the same time, the state administration has emphasized accountability in public management through comprehensive reform efforts. After this analysis, political factors, such as political competition, party networks, networks, and relations with teachers' unions and parents, are examined. It will be pointed out that relations with Ceará's teachers' unions are partially being perceived as collaborative, but also as politically cooped by the state government during some mandates. The last section of chapter 5 analyzes the implementation of three political milestones, which are the state's literacy program, Program for Literacy at the Right Age (PAIC), the implementation of a federal literacy program in Ceará, and the implementation of democratic management principles in the education sector. In light of these policy examples, the reliable information, transparency, and statistics of education quality are examined, underlining a high prevalence of accountability mechanisms enacted at municipal and state schools, as well as regarding teachers' unions. The chapter's conclusion summarizes the case of Ceará as a case of federalism belonging to level A (high validity of institutional rules) and B (mixed interactions including formal and informal types of behavior), with prevalence of a positive bias for quality education outcomes.

## 5.1 Fiscal Income and Education Spending at the State and Municipal Levels

Annex 4 displays the fiscal situation of Ceará (and Pernambuco; a comparison of both is presented in Chapter 7) for selected years between 1995 and 2009, the latter being the latest available year reported by the Ministry of Finance/National Treasury (Ministry Finance and Nacional 2009). The following budget positions, including state and municipal finances in aggregated form, were chosen: the total budget revenue, the tax revenue detailing one of the most important state taxes ICMS (of which municipalities receive their proportional quota), the States' Participation Fund FPE,<sup>106</sup> and the expenditure for education (disaggregated by level of education only available after 2004). The general trend is that the named budget positions increased between 1995 and 2009, including the ICMS. This is especially important for two reasons. First, a rising ICMS means that municipalities received additional funding from this tax over time. Second, in the case of Ceará the state government decided to partially tie the transfer of the municipal quota of the ICMS to literacy results in municipalities, being a legally possible option (see further below).

Considering the disaggregated data on education spending available after 2004, it can be observed that, in general, Ceará dedicated most of its education expenditures to primary education (ensino fundamental). While this budget position accounted for a total of 592 million R\$ in 2005, it went through a low in 2006 (92.7 million in primary education but 459.8 million in secondary education), and then almost doubled to 1.053 billion R\$ in 2009. Comparing the expenditure in primary education to the expenditure in the remaining parts of education (secondary education, professional education, higher education, child care, education for youth and adults, special education, and other subfunctions), Ceará gave spending priority to primary education until 2009 when education expenditure for secondary education was higher (1.549 in secondary education versus 1.053 in primary education).

Comparing education expenditure to other social policies, such as health, for example, education has not only received an important fraction of the state's expenditure in social policy, but it can be said of having been an increasing financial priority of the state government. The overall expenditure in health of 723 million R\$ in 2005 (composed by primary care, ambulatory and hospital care, prophylactic and therapeutic support, health surveillance, epidemiological surveillance, food and Nutrition, and other subfunctions) was considerably lower than the overall education expenditure, which amounted to 1.5 billion R\$ in the same year. This trend persisted in 2009, when the overall health expenditure accounted for 1.3 billion R\$ compared to 2.9 billion R\$ in education expenditure (Ministry Finance and Nacional 2009).

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<sup>106</sup> The Municipalities' Participation Fund (FPM) was not included here since the data does not exist aggregated for all of Ceará's 185 municipalities, but only if retrieving separate data bases in each case.

## 5.2 Constitutional Education Funds: FUNDEF and Salário Educação

Annex 5 displays the different sources of education finances in Ceará (and Pernambuco) for selected years between 1998 and 2010. Data on FUNDEF is available between 1998 and 2006 and disaggregated by four different sources: (1) transfers that originate from the union to the state, (2) from the union to the municipalities, (3) from states to municipalities, (4) and from states to states. These different fractions of FUNDEF (later FUNDEB) exist because of the decentralization of Brazil's education system with three levels of jurisdiction. Consequently, transfers that originate from different levels with differing tax incomes have to be calculated accordingly (refer to Chapter 4 for further details). The same holds for education finances originating from the Salário Educação, for which disaggregated data is only available for the years 2000–2005 (see Annex 5).

In general, Ceará displays a steadily increasing trend of education finances sourcing from FUNDEF/FUNDEB and Salário Educação for the period between 1998 and 2010 (except for the FUNDEF transfer between the union and the state government, which decreased 1998 to 2006). A comparison of the FUNDEB transfer fraction from the union to the state in 2010 to the corresponding fraction of the last year of FUNDEF (1998) shows that it more than doubled from approximately R\$ 88 million to more than R\$ 187 million. This is mostly because FUNDEB, in contrary to FUNDEF, now includes financing not only for primary schools, but also for preschools and secondary schools, and thus the budget has to be considerably higher. Additionally, FUNDEB has received increasing financial complements from the union.<sup>107</sup>

Ceará's 184 municipalities and their schools received major proportions of the funds through transfers from the union and other states in order to finance up to 60 percent of teachers' salaries and other school supplies as legally determined (see Chapter 4 for details). While in 1998, Ceará's municipalities received approximately R\$ 301 million jointly from union and states through FUNDEF, in 2006, this accounted for R\$ 557 million. Ceará's state schools have also benefitted from transfers originating from the union and other states, but to a lesser extent than the state's municipal schools. In 1998, state schools received approximately R\$ 167 million from transfers of the union and other states, compared to R\$ 161 million in 2006. The difference between what municipal and state schools have been receiving is not surprising when considering how these values are calculated: they are based on enrollment rates in primary education from the previous year according to the national school census. As discussed further below, Ceará's municipal schools cover a much higher proportion of students in primary education than state schools, and municipal schools exclusively offer the first four years of primary education, as mandated by federal regulations. This explains why the mentioned FUNDEF finances, which are passed on to the state government for state schools, are lower than the corresponding municipal value.

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<sup>107</sup> R\$ 2 billion in 2007, R\$ 3 billion in 2008 and R\$ 5 billion in 2009; from 2010 onwards, the Brazilian federal government will complement the FUNDEB budget with 10 percent of the states' and municipalities' contribution <http://www.fn.de.gov.br/index.php/fundeb-funcionamento> [29/06/2011].



Despite the described amounts, education finances in Ceará are, in comparison to the more prosperous regions of Brazil, scarce. They reflect that fiscal transfers amongst federal states do not sufficiently account for the great socioeconomic inequalities amongst Brazil's regions:

“Because being a very poor state (Ceará is extremely poor and has a population aspiring to education), this desire and a strong demand for education [contrasts with] the responsiveness that has been poor and far beyond the state's operational capacity (...) Since FUNDEF is an accounting fund which operates in each unit of the federation, regional differences turn out to deepen to the extent that the central government does not satisfactorily fulfill its task and what the Constitution calls 'redistributive function'. [...] But then Ceará is amongst those states that have had a high demand for education and few resources, even after the redistribution of funds through the transfer system (Lerche Vieira 2010a)

In addition to the official transfers of the Brazilian federal state, another source of financing for the education sector are potential agreements with development banks, such as the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES). Between 1995 and 2010, Ceará borrowed R\$ 885 million from BNDES to finance buses for school transportation in public, state, and municipal schools in 2009, and to construct buildings for preschooling in 2010 (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 2010). In addition, Ceará's primary education sector has potentially benefited from lending operations with multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).<sup>108</sup>

It is important to address what these finances have translated into, and to which extent the students at the primary level indeed have benefited from them. In 2009, FNDE reported that the state of Ceará directly invested R\$ 4.483 per student per year for grades 1–8 and increased this funding to R\$ 5.733 in 2010. By contrast, investment per student in secondary education (grades 9–11, inclusively) was much lower. In 2009, it accounted for R\$ 2.697 and increased to R\$ 2.809 in 2010, respectively. In terms of students in professional training, an area where Brazil has yet to make great progress, Ceará invested R\$ 935 per student in 2009 and increased it to R\$ 1.784 in 2010 (Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação 2011). In sum, Ceará spent most of its education finances in primary education during the period studied, showing that this level is still the priority in the Brazilian education sector. This might change in the future, since especially secondary and preschool education will start to receive increased funding and attention due to the inclusion of these two areas in FUNDEB in 2007.

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<sup>108</sup> This data was not listed here further because these loans have not only addressed primary education, and because they do not represent funding from the Brazilian federal system being the scope of interest here.

## 5.3 Beyond Constitutional Funds

### 5.3.1 Volunteer Transfers

In the period between 1997 and 2007, Ceará's education sector benefited from 37 volunteer transfers sponsored by the union of federal states, the Federal District, and the municipalities. The 37 transfers amounted to an additional budget of R\$ 477 million in Ceará's education spending, which, on average, totaled an additional R\$ 43.4 million per year. Table 5.1 displays the number of proposed voluntary transfers and executed transfers, detailing the different levels of education in each case. With regards to the difference between proposed and executed transfers, the table shows that not all proposed or envisioned transfers were indeed executed. This occurred likely due to changing budget priorities, untimely budget execution put off until the end of a certain fiscal year, or execution that was not authorized by the federal government. With respect to the different levels of education, each benefitted from transfers in different years. For example, between 2003 and 2005, a greater amount of transfers were executed in higher education in Ceará. In contrast, between 1999 and 2001, more transfers were executed in primary and secondary education.

<b>Table 5.1. Volunteer Transfers in Ceará's Education Sector, 1997–2007</b>				
<b>Year</b>	<b>No. of voluntary transfers proposed</b>	<b>Level of education benefitted from proposed transfers (no. by level)</b>	<b>No. of voluntary transfers executed</b>	<b>Level of education benefitted from executed transfers (no. by level)</b>
1997	0	ND	0	ND
1998	8	Primary (7); environmental education (1)	2	Primary (1); environmental education (1)
1999	5	Primary (4); secondary (1)	1	Primary (1)
2000	5	Primary (3); secondary (1); primary/secondary (1)	2	Primary/secondary (2)
2001	9	Primary (2); Primary/secondary (7)	5	Primary/secondary
2002	6	Higher (1); primary/secondary (5)	5	Higher (1); primary/secondary (5)
2003	7	Higher (3); primary (3)	3	Primary/secondary (1); higher (1)
2004	7	Higher (4); primary/secondary (3)	2	Higher (2)
2005	12	Higher (6); primary (3); primary/secondary (3)	7	Higher (4); primary (1); primary/secondary (2);
2006	11	Higher (3); primary (2); secondary (1); primary/secondary (5)	4	Higher (1); primary/secondary (3)
2007	9	Higher (3); primary (1); Primary/secondary (3); child care (2)	6	Higher (1); primary (1); primary/secondary (3); child care (1)

Source: Author's elaboration based on data provided by the Sub-secretariat for Technical Support of the Federal Senate, Brasilia [http://www9.senado.gov.br/portal/page/portal/orcamento\\_senado/Consultoria](http://www9.senado.gov.br/portal/page/portal/orcamento_senado/Consultoria) November/October 2010]

Note: ND: data after 2007 not available in disaggregated format.

### 5.3.2 Budget Amendments

As with the case of voluntary transfers, Ceará's education sector also benefitted from budget amendments proposed by individual politicians belonging to different parties, as well as by state committees without specific party affiliation. Annex 6 summarizes the data provided by the Federal Senate, displaying the *executed amendments only*, hereby leaving out many amendments that were originally envisioned and approved, but never executed. The summary shows that between 1998 and 2010, Ceará's education sector received R\$ 1.3 billion, which was a considerable amount of additional transfers complementing those from FUNDEF and FUNDEB. While during certain years not a single budget amendment was approved or executed in education (1999; 2001; 2003; 2009), in more recent years (2005; 2006; 2007; 2008), executed budget amendments in education increased, culminating in 24 amendments in 2008 alone.

As displayed in Table 5.2, Ceará received a total of 48 budget amendments between 1998 and 2009 (data on executed amendments are unavailable before 1998 and for 2010), which benefitted primary education directly, as well as higher education, vocational training, school infrastructure (such as university expansions and sports fields), and other areas. Municipalities across Ceará benefitted from these amendments, depending on the local political priorities of sponsoring politicians. Fourteen different parties sponsored the amendments, as education was regarded as important by parties across the entire political spectrum. However, more amendments were sponsored and executed by party members from the left (13 and 9 by the PCdoB and PT, respectively) and center-left (6 by the PSB), but only very few were executed by the right, center-right, or center parties (3 by the PSDB, 2 by the PFL/DEM, and 2 by the PMDB) (see annex 6). The case of Pernambuco will show a quite different result here, as discussed in Chapter 6.

Further analysis and comparing of the information in Table 5.2 with the party affiliation of incumbent state and federal governments during the same periods (see Annex 5) reveals no specific trend. The data do not allow one to make the conclusion that the party affiliations, and thus political networks of either the state or the federal governments, influenced or guided the sponsoring patterns of individual politicians of education amendments. Thus, it does not allow validating the respective assumption made in the theory chapter for case of Ceará.

Year	PSDB	PC do B	PT	PFL/ DEM	PSB	PPB	PDT	PPS	PTB	PR	PSol	PMDB	PL	PP
1998								1						
1999	No education amendment executed in Ceará in 1999													
2000		1												
2001	No education amendment executed in Ceará in 2001													
2002		3		1		1								
2003	No education amendment filed in Ceará in 2003													
2004	2											1		
2005		1	4									1	1	
2006		3	1								1			
2007		1	1		4		2			1	1			
2008	1	4	3		2		2	2	1					1
2009	No education amendment executed in Ceará in 2009													
<b>Total: 48</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
Note: 48 education amendments were executed by individual party members; in addition, 13 education amendments were executed by entities without party affiliations (9 by the Bancada do Ceará in the state parliament, 9 by the General Rapporteur, and 4 by the state's education commission).														

## 5.4 Institutional Policies to Benefit the Quality of Primary Education

Ceará has made great progress in changing both coverage and quality of education. Before examining the political milestones in Ceará's education sector, including institutional agreements between the state and municipal governments, the following will provide a brief overview about the development of both coverage and quality between 1995 and 2010. This section details subnational data in addition to the federal trends presented in Chapter 3.

### 5.4.1 Coverage and Quality

In Ceará, education coverage expressed by enrollment rates at the state and municipal levels developed as follows: state schools saw decreasing numbers of enrollment, while municipal schools considerably increased enrollment rates. The school enrollment in the state system in Ceará decreased from 38.87 percent in 1991 to only 11.88 percent in 2005, which is less than half of the enrollment rate in the state schools in Pernambuco in 2005 (28.26 percent; see Chapter 6 for further detail). Consequently, the municipal system experienced the contrary. Here, enrollment rates increased from 45.2 percent in 1991 to 76.65 percent in 2005. Today, the municipal system of primary schools in Ceará serves more than three-quarters of totally enrolled students at the primary level, while municipal schools in Pernambuco serve 20 percent less if compared to Ceará. Comparatively, state schools in Pernambuco continue to play a more important role since almost a third of students are enrolled (see further information in Chapter 6). This trend towards municipalization in Ceará

already took place by state-led policy interventions that happened prior to the correspondent national jurisdiction of FUNDEF (INEP 2009).

Beside federal-, state-, and municipally financed schools, private schools serve primary education and accounted for approximately 13 percent of enrolled students in Ceará in 2006 (similar to the percentage in Pernambuco). The percentage of enrolled students in private primary schools decreased from 21.42 percent in 1995 to 12.69 percent in 2006, as the table below shows.

**Table 5.3. Enrollment Rates in Ceará for all Types of Schools at the Primary Level** (*ensino fundamental, 1st–8th grade*)

	<b>Federal</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Municipal</b>	<b>Public</b> (sum of all three systems)	<b>Private</b>
<b>1991</b>	0.11%	34.87%	45.20%	80.18%	19.82%
<b>1995</b>	0.01%	31.09%	47.48%	78.58%	21.42%
<b>2000</b>	0.03%	23.54%	66.16%	89.73%	10.27%
<b>2006</b>	0.03%	11.14%	76.14%	87.31%	12.69%

Source: INEP/Edudata

This total change of coverage between the state and municipal system created a great challenge to maintain quality. However, the data displayed in Table 5.4 demonstrate that Ceará’s municipal education systems managed this challenge well. If comparing students attending public and private municipal schools to students attending state schools respectively in indicators such as completion, repetition, dropout, and class age distortion rates, the result is the following: Ceará’s municipal schools had higher or similar completion rates for students in the 4th and 8th grade in 1999 and 2005. Class repetition and dropout rates were, except for in one case, better or the same in municipal schools in comparison to state schools in 1999 and 2005.

Year/level of jurisdiction (public + private aggregated)	Completion 4th grade and (8th grade)	Class repetition 4th grade and (8th grade)	Dropout rates 4th grade and (8th grade)	Class-age distortion by grade		
				1st	4th	8 <sup>th</sup>
1999 municipal	83.5 (88.3)	6.1 (2.3)	10.4 (9.4)	36.8	68.4	76.6
1999 state	81.7 (85.9)	6.2 (3.1)	12.1 (11)	42.4	45.8	73.9
2005 municipal	79.9 (79.2)	14.4 (6.1)	5.7 (14.7)	19.7	34.3	56.3
2005 state	80.6 (76.1)	13.8 (8.6)	5.6 (15.3)	39	22.8	49.4
2010 municipal	Not available					
2010 state average	90.5 (85.9)	7.9 (9.8)	1.6 (4.3)	Not available		

Source: Brazilian Ministry of Education and INEP at <http://www.edudatabrasil.inep.gov.br/> and Todos pela Educação at <http://www.todospelaeducacao.org.br/educacao-no-brasil/numeros-do-brasil/dados-por-estado/ceara/> [26/6/2011]

The performance indicators for IDEB in 2005, 2007, and 2009 are similar, which are unfortunately unavailable as an average of all municipal schools in Ceará.<sup>109</sup> However, by comparing the average IDEB of the whole state to the IDEB of state schools only, one has to assume that the municipal school systems fared similar to the state systems, or slightly better. However, one must apply caution to such an assumption since a students' performance from a handful of prestigious federal schools is also included in the state's average IDEB.

Year/Level	End of grade 4		End of grade 8	
	State average	State schools only	State average	State schools only
2005	3.2	3.2	3.1	2.8
2007	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.4
2009	4.4	4.2	3.9	3.6

Source: SAEB and Censo Escolar at <http://ideb.inep.gov.br/Site/> [24/06/2011].

<sup>109</sup> Data for IDEB exists by municipality only. A calculated average of all municipal IDEB's would have to control for population size, urban/rural characteristics, poverty rate, and other socio-demographic conditions of each of the 184 municipalities of Ceará, with a risk of not being perfectly comparable. These data, therefore, were left out in this study.

#### 5.4.2 *The Long-lasting Impact of Jereissati's Mudança (Change) Government in 1987*

Ceará has gone through a substantial reform-oriented process of its public administration, which started under its influential governor, Tasso Jereissati, in 1986. Jereissati was reelected in 1995 and 1999.<sup>110</sup> Today, this governor and entrepreneur is the principal initiator of a business-oriented public management reform voicing a fundamental critique against corporatist and clientelistic practice in public administration. This is remarkable given the context of a formerly very poor and underdeveloped state (which partially holds for today) “where one would expect to find the prevalence of individualistic modes of political intermediation as opposed to collective action” (Borges 2008, 259). In his analysis of two decades of political power in Ceará, Sousa Bonfim describes the great power shifts that took place in Ceará prior to 1995 when the reform of the education sector took place:

“The rise of young entrepreneurs to the state’s political power in the elections of 1986 represented a moment of rupture with the traditions of policymaking in Ceará. First, it was a group of businessmen with roots and interests in Ceará (...) entailing the reaction of other conservative movements and shaping the common feeling that something was not on the right track. Rather than working through the so-called bureaucratic rings, or through other mechanisms of pressure and connections towards the local political class, those businessmen promoted a break with the most traditional political class of the state, allying with communists and disputing the state government with the colonels (...). The political discourse that elected the entrepreneur Tasso Jereissati governor of Ceará pointed out the need to moralize policymaking, and to withdraw from it personalities that were linked to clientelistic and physiological practices which, in the future vision of the new governor impeded the state’s development” (Sousa Bonfim 2002, 35).

However, this extreme rupture with old elites—three coronels with good connections to the executives of Brazil’s military dictatorship during the 1970s<sup>111</sup>—did not mean a total rupture with elites or long-standing political leaders, but the emergence of new ones in order to control political opposition: was not followed by a rupture with elites as such:

“(...) Jereissati and his loyal group of business leaders would smash right-wing forces organized around the three colonels and coop part of the left-wing opposition, dominating the political scene. In spite of their ‘modernizing’ agenda, the so-called ‘young-businessmen’ only dismantled the political machine of the colonels to create their own, relying on renovated mechanisms of political control to avoid the growth of the opposition at any cost” (Borges 2005, 206).

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<sup>110</sup> The trend set by Jereissati had deep repercussions. His successors continued with different types of public management reforms. In 2003, a results-based management program for key sectoral programs was introduced, serving as a model for other states in Brazil. Ceará’s current governor, Cid Gomes, has confirmed the government’s commitment to the deepening of the reform program through sound fiscal management and support to selected high impact investment programs.

<sup>111</sup> Three major political bosses made oligarchic agreements in the state of Ceará guaranteeing them “the absolute and almost unchallenged dominance of their political groups. Former army colonels Vírgilio Távora, Adauto Bezerra and César Cals based their domination on the tight control of local political machines and on the helpful support of military rulers in Brasília” (Borges 2005, 206).

Ceará's particular case became subject of national and international research in the mid-1980s and 1990s. In her research entitled "Good Government in the Tropics." Judith Tendler, MIT professor of political economy, explains what made reforms in Ceará possible, sustainable, and successful. Her research team investigated different policy sectors (health, drought relief, employment creation, agricultural extension, and microenterprise support), and described the innovative spirit of service delivery in Ceará in the mid-1980s. Tendler points out the professional leadership approach of Ceará's state government characterized by removing power from local elites, initiating a highly decentralized and orderly system of decision-making, including communities into decision-making processes and carrying out service delivery with high quality standards (Tendler 1997). However, since education was only reformed in the mid-1990s, it was included in Tendler's study.

Ceará was also a model case for successful public reform in the 2000s, proving to the Brazilian education experts that it was possible to improve education quality in a comparatively short amount of time and even in places with great poverty. Yet, this second, more recent trend would not have been possible without the first one. The general public reform that took place under the leadership of governor Jereissati from the mid-1980s onwards greatly influenced the quality of the state's education system today. In her review of education reforms in Latin America, Merilee Grindle explains that policy entrepreneurship and leadership choices in the education sector are often tied to larger political and economic objectives of political executives. "These leadership choices are critical to the birth of education policy initiatives," and can be regarded as being more explanatory for policy change than solely example economic conditions, electoral cycles, and interest group mobilization (Grindle 2004, 28).

While Jereissati's leadership choices meant a historic rupture with old elites, at the same time it meant the renovation and emerging of a new elite power. This influenced not only policymaking in terms of education in the mid-1990s and onwards, but also enduringly influenced the relations with teachers' unions. To date, Ceará's principal teachers' union has shown surprisingly little resistance or opposition against the current education policy reforms (see the section on teachers' unions further below).

Jereissati's first term and his leadership choices in 1986 explain why education policy became one of the state's priorities from 1995 onwards.<sup>112</sup> During Jereissati's first term, harsh budget adjustments were made in different policy sectors either because of lack of finances or because of their inefficient use. In his first 100 days in office, a long list of "decrees of change" (*decretos mudancistas*) was introduced to achieve a routine discipline of Ceará's public administration and to counter a highly corrupt and nontransparent bureaucracy suffering from numerous budget irregularities. These decrees, many of which were emergency measures, included the annulment of all public contracting of the former administration between 1986 and 1987; the requirement that all public servants had to personally pick up their paycheck and that it would be cancelled in case of non-compliance

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<sup>112</sup> In this sense, it strengthens the argument of historical institutionalism laid out where early policy choices can be traced back at a later point, and have political and institutional repercussions stretching beyond the initial decision.



after two months; the requirement that all state public officials had to physically show up at work every day; and the suspension of the autonomy to change the salaries of public officials of the direct and indirect public administration, amongst others (Abu-El-Haj 2002, 83).

In the education sector, university professors and employees no longer received any gratifications, and any gratifications of teachers in public schools were rigorously cut if they did not teach classes. The most drastic step of this period was the dismissal of 10,000 teachers, which was justified as necessary because of budget constraints and in order to clear the school bureaucracy from political irregularities. These steps resulted in a massive strike of the whole public sector for 43 days, and a negative public image of the incumbent government. After his first term, Jereissati was not immediately reelected, but he was in the next term in 1995. Against this background, Jereissati understood the strategic importance to prioritize education in his campaign agenda in order to gain further votes (Lerche Vieira and Sabino de Farias 2002, 345).

#### 5.4.3 Ceará's Education Sector Under Jereissati II: 1995–2002

##### *“All for Education with Quality for All” with Antenor Naspolini*

“All for Education with Quality for All” did not remain a mere campaign pledge but became the core objective of Jereissati's social policy after his reelection in 1995. Much of the success of education policy during Jereissati's two subsequent mandates (1995–2002) has to be credited to the personal engagement, technical expertise, and policy continuity brought with the chosen secretary of education, Antenor Naspolini. Due to his previous position as the coordinator of UNICEF in Ceará, Naspolini brought with him expertise of public communication, transparency, mobilization, and collaboration.<sup>113</sup> In an interview, Naspolini describes how he experienced Jereissati's radical breaking with Ceará's clientelistic traditions:

“I am from Santa Catarina in southern Brazil and came to Ceará to coordinate UNICEF in 1988. I was the first coordinator of the UNICEF office in the state, and in 1995 was invited by Tasso Jereissati, governor elect, to become Secretary of Education of the state of Ceará. To be honest, it was a great surprise for me for many reasons. First, I was not born in Ceará (but am today the state's citizen, because the state assembly gave me the title ‘citizen of Ceará and Fortaleza’). Second, I was not a friend of the governor, and third, I had no party affiliation. Consequently, his invitation seemed strange to me. By the time I took office and explained my surprise to [Jereissati] he whole-heartily laughed and said that he had chosen me for precisely those three reasons” (Naspolini 2010).

The current education expert of UNICEF's Ceará office states that these three reasons became very important in terms of making education policy technically grounded, publicly acknowledged, and politically convincing in Ceará (Aguiar 2010). The three programmatic

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<sup>113</sup> In 1991, UNICEF gave Naspolini an international award for his contribution to decreasing infant mortality in Ceará in the 1980s, faster than in any other Brazilian state.

paradigms “All for Education,” “Education with Quality,” and “Education for All” resulted in the slogan “All for Education with Quality for All.” This slogan appealed to the public with the message that in order to guarantee quality education for all, joint efforts, willingness, and alliances would have to be built amongst all involved (Lerche Vieira and Sabino de Farias 2002, 360).

The universalization of primary education in Ceará—an institutional right formulated by the constitution—was a target that became ambitiously pursued. It was reached in only three years, during which coverage of primary education jumped from 78.3 percent in 1995 to 97 percent in 1998. Ceará municipalized its primary education system by state law prior to the creation of FUNDEF by establishing minimum criteria for statewide redistribution of funds. In 1997, Ceará started this process with a pilot project amongst six municipalities, providing them with a stipend of R\$ 180 per student per year. The other 124 municipalities followed, and agreed to be responsible for providing primary school enrollment for all children (Lerche Vieira 2010a, 2010b). However, according to Naspolini, the state was only able to sustain this system because of the subsequent creation of FUNDEF (Naspolini 2010). Notwithstanding the prioritization of coverage, Ceará registered the best qualitative performance indicators for the entire northeast regarding approval, repetition, and dropout rates in 2000 (WB cit. in Lerche Vieira and Sabino de Farias 2002, 365).

Besides the early municipalization of primary education, a second, very important institutional reform took place in the education sector in this period. In 1995, Ceará passed a state law mandating the democratic election of directors in public state schools, making their selection dependent on their technical preparation rather than their political ties. At the same time, school councils, as well as student committees, were created in state schools. In Brazil, both steps are seen as democratic decentralization of the education sector, where directors were often political appointees and the school community had never participated before (Borges 2005). Therefore, its early implementation can be considered as pioneer example in the education sector of one of the most impoverished Brazilian states. In Pernambuco, respective state legislation was passed in 2002.

Part of this school modernization process was a management-training program for directors (Programa Pro-Gestão) as well as a teacher-training program in order to decrease the number of amateur or semi-illiterate teachers. At that time, hiring these types of teachers were hired and used as intermediary figures in local contexts to influence voting decisions in local elections (Naspolini 2010). In 1998, the first statewide public selection process of teachers took place. A total of 153 municipalities participated, reaching 67 percent of both state and municipal public networks. In an institutional context, where teachers had previously been chosen because of their personal or political relationships to directors and mayors, this reform increased public credibility of education policy.

Another important development in Ceará’s education policy, which took place in 1997,, was the creation of 21 regional centers and regional managers for the joint development of education policy (known as CREDE). The CREDE act as mediators between state and

municipal governments across the state in order to raise the quality of primary education and, especially, secondary education, which both the state and municipal governments provide.<sup>114</sup> Ceará's education policy later developed features that are based on the initial idea of the CREDE, as discussed further below.

#### 5.4.4 *Education Policy After 2002: Coping with the Post-Decentralization Reforms*

Having become a strong focus of statewide policies between 1995 and 2002, the described inter-state cooperation has remained important. The state- and nationwide induced process of decentralization (during which municipal and state schools started to compete for students, since FUNDEF finances were provided based on the number of matriculated students) lacked adequate legal standardization, with the consequence of service delivery and quality management getting out of control, as a former education deputy secretary of state and director of education planning in Ceará explains in retro perspective:

“The initial conditions for expansion of enrollments in the state were primarily motivated by the creation of FUNDEF. And, of course, this process accelerated with a very large number of students, being not only those in the system, but also those who entered. This process was fairly chaotic. The state had set some criteria for the municipalization, however there was little standardization”(Vidal 2010).

The speed of decentralization jeopardized not only an adequate professional and timely preparation of teachers, but also the technical skills in municipal administrations. According to one municipal secretary of education in the metropolitan region of Fortaleza/Ceará (Farias Lima 2010), current municipal education secretaries lack necessary technical skills, such as the setting of budget and fiscal priorities per annum, the planning of teachers' remuneration and professional preparation, and the alignment of these specific tasks to increase learning quality and students' performance.

Given the described scenario of national, regional, and local challenges, Ceará's state education secretaries have been focusing on two principal tasks: first, to improve the quality of education by assuring literacy in the first years of primary education and, second, to technically support municipalities in carrying out literacy goals by incorporating principles of public management and accountability.

#### *2003–2006: Constructing a Collaborative Regime under Sofia Lerche Vieira*

Sofia Lerche Vieira started her position as secretary of state for education with the background of an academically trained education researcher and professor at the Federal University of Ceará. She had a very realistic vision about what was politically feasible. As shown in the following interview, Lerche placed great emphasis on education quality, especially at the primary level:

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<sup>114</sup> If such coordination is not adequately addressed, it is possible that municipal education policy could follow totally different priorities than the ones set by the state government. In turn, it will be difficult to achieve coherent performance results of schools, teachers, and, consequently, students.

“When we took office and assumed the education plan, we set basic education as the main, important focus, and the collaborative regime between the state government and the municipalities as the second one. We chose a management focusing on the obvious, which was to guarantee school quality with pupils so that they would indeed learn. When we started, it was very clear that the school had to focus more on learning (...). I also want to emphasize that our education plan was not a plan that came from the mind of the education secretary and her team, something that often happens in Brazil when people take the sky’s horizon as the boundaries of their work. I was very concerned that our education plan would not promise anything that it could not hold, and that it would not become ruined by false promises later on (...). Our education plan was much more gathered towards the motto ‘Let’s put our feet on the ground and try what is possible’” (Lerche Vieira 2010a).

Lerche and her team identified the following 10 priorities when they took office in 2003 (Ceara 2004, 53):

- To improve the quality of basic education in Ceará by increasing quality and learning indicators to match national performance indicators.
- To improve physical infrastructure, materials, and human resources in order to serve—with quality—the demand for secondary education from students in the primary grades attending public and private schools in rural and urban areas.
- To support actions geared towards the implementation of an education policy for the development of a kindergarten program and the inclusion and social equity of youth and adults, as well as the indigenous population and students with special needs.
- To increase the level of schooling of the population of Ceará by offering literacy and post-literacy programs to youth and adults aged 15 and older.
- To lengthen the school day, while optimizing physical school and community spaces and assuring the improvement of learning in all its dimensions.
- To implement a collaborative regime between the state and the municipalities, guaranteeing the organization and rationalization of the public school system.
- To increase activities in the schools that help to develop oral and written skills.
- To create a support network for professionals in basic education, assuring integration between new and veteran teacher in the different regions of the state, with the ultimate goal of contributing to the students’ performance.
- To deepen the modernization process of the education systems and their democratic management, assuring monitoring and control mechanisms that grant efficiency and effectiveness of learning.

- To further develop a culture of evaluation by amplifying the System for the Permanent Evaluation of Education of Ceará (SPAECE, a state-level evaluation system existing until today) in order to provide policies and strategies directed at the improvement of education quality.

One of the biggest achievements of Lerche's mandate became the significantly increased coverage of primary education combined with adequate quality. Based on the original education plan, estimated resources for education would potentially cover up to half of the activities necessary to achieve this goal. Consequently, success would crucially depend on the technical and political competence, as well as creativity, of everybody directly or indirectly involved in education policy (Ceara 2004, 57).

This last part of the last sentence sounds more like a wish than a technically achievable goal. However, it expresses well what seems to have become an important and persistent key message for Ceará's education policy: increased quality is possible only if everybody takes responsible for it. In order to implement a systematic collaboration of the different education systems across the state (which in fact means the de facto implementation of the federal collaborative regime), Lerche's administration established guidelines and processes that would provide an institutional orientation for all involved, such as which steps could improve education quality, how to make the best use of the existing school infrastructure, and how to partner with the municipalities to organize more efficient school transportation methods. Today, her academic contributions in terms of taking on the challenges as well as realizing the possibilities in building an effective collaborative regime between state and municipal governments in the education field are well recognized amongst education experts (Lerche Vieira 2010b).

The explicit goal of the four-year education plan under Lerche was "the effective realization of the collaboration between the state and the 184 municipalities of Ceará in four years" (Ceará 2004, 72). Lerche emphasized that state governments should get more engaged with municipalities and support them in this collaborative process, which could work better than the creation of separate mechanisms based in Brasilia, where the expertise of the National Fund for the Development of Education often seems to be inadequate or insufficient to meet the basic education needs of municipalities in Brazil's northeast (Lerche Vieira 2010a). With regards to the relationship between the state government and teachers' unions, Lerche emphasized the importance of collaborative dialogue, despite differences in opinions:

"We always had a dialogue with the unions, although with very explicit differences. Government is government and there is no way this could be different. We always invited the teachers' unions to participate in the different discussions; all of them were always invited, here for a convocation or call, there to discuss the education plan or new projects of the state assembly" (Lerche Vieira 2010a).

*2007–2010: “Literacy at the Right Age” under Maria Izolda Cela de Arruda Coelho*

Maria Ezolda Cela, a psychologist, started her mandate as state secretary for education with a good understanding about the education challenges at municipal level. This understanding came from her experience as the former municipal education secretary in Sobral, a large city in the north of Ceará. The education policy of Sobral, which included a very successful literacy program from 2001 to 2004 led by Cela, was featured as best practice by the Ministry of Education and INEP because of the systemic changes promoted by the administration; the clarity of municipal management to diagnose and define strategies, goals, and priorities and to effectively monitor literacy results; the creation of conditions to change teaching and learning routines implemented by the schools themselves; and, most importantly, the absolute priority given to education in municipal policy (INEP 2005, 12).<sup>115</sup>

In the state of Ceará, the sufficient command of reading, interpretation, and writing had already been a priority under Lerche’s education policy. However, this goal was further prioritized to meet the significant challenges that still lay ahead to improve education quality in Ceará. The starting point in 2007 for the creation of the Program for Literacy at the Right Age (PAIC) was the alarming evidence of illiteracy amongst children aged 7 to 14, based on the IBGE Census 2000. In fact, 58 of the 184 municipalities of Ceará, had illiteracy rates between 30.1 and 50.54 percent; 94 municipalities had illiteracy rates between 20.1 to 30 percent; 32 municipalities had rates up to 20 percent (Aguiar, Gomes, and Campos 2006, 24).

Given this alarming evidence, the state parliament commissioned—in collaboration with the National Union of Municipal Education Leaders (UNDIME) and mayors (APRECE), as well as with UNICEF and other civil society organizations—a series of studies led by the state’s universities. The results showed not only that literacy was not a priority in schools’ curricula, but also that teachers were insufficiently prepared to teach literacy skills. Through public debates and discussions statewide, a high degree of awareness of the severity of the problem was reached. The results of the studies were discussed when planning for the next steps of interaction (Aguiar, Gomes, and Campos 2006).

This transparent process leading to the creation of PAIC partially explains the success of the program today. First, it was not an initiative by the state government designing and implementing a program on its own, but has involved executive, legislative, and civil society organizations during its formulation. Second, information about the performance of the students and the schools has been made public from an early stage, for example through the statewide education performance system SPAECE (Sistema Permanente de Avaliação da Educação Básica do Ceará), which was created in 1992 and was one of the first times a Brazilian state created its own evaluation systems. This monitoring system greatly facilitated

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<sup>115</sup> The progress made amongst Sobral’s primary school was evidenced, for example, by the class-age distortion rate amongst 1st and 5th graders, which was cut by more than 50 percent between 2001 and 2004 (from 28.5 percent to 13.6 percent). For comparison, the respective Brazilian class age-distortion rates went from 33 percent to 24.9 percent during this same period (INEP 2005, 16; Holanda 2006).

transparency of information, not only through its mere existence, but also because the state government decided to publish data from municipalities that had not been fairing well, notwithstanding potential political conflicts caused by this disclosure. Third, Ceará had the advantage of having a pioneer literacy initiative in place at the municipality of Sobral since 2001, providing validated pilot insights for a program to be designed at the state level.

The principal objective of the program is to enable all students to be literate by the age of seven. One important financial detail is that PAIC has been tied to a fiscal incentive for municipalities to participate. Brazilian state governments are obligated to transfer 25 percent of the ICMS tax (state tax levied on circulation of merchandise and services) to the municipalities with the option to tie proportions of ICMS-transfers according to self-established criteria. In Ceará, the transfer of ICMS taxes has been primarily tied to indicators of education quality at the primary level (including literacy results of 2nd graders and performance results of 5th graders). According to Mauricio Holanda, the deputy state secretary for education, this gives the municipalities a direct incentive to perform well in the program, and to become part of a results-based management system:

“The motivation of the participating municipalities and schools is clear and follows the following logic: ‘If you do not improve [students’ performance indicators] you will lose money. Do you want to improve? If not, you will also lose prestige with other municipalities and with your citizens’” (Holanda 2010).

PAIC has led to an elevated degree of horizontal accountability during policy implementation, which will be discussed further in the section below on administrative explanatory factors.

## **5.5 Interim Summary**

There were many changes in the national education system between 1995 and 2010 that also affected policy development in Ceará. Brazil’s first comprehensive National Education Law in 1995 gave a strong signal to universalize primary education and provided a great deal of autonomy to municipalities to take their own political and administrative decisions in primary education. As argued in Chapter 4, this last step was an important one in terms of democratizing “from below,” but it also revealed an absolute non-preparedness of the education system to cope with the responsibilities regarding the quality of education. At the same time, a new space for political negotiation and networks suddenly emerged in a recently constituted democratic federal system. This led to the rapid empowerment of newly constituted municipal actors in terms of their ability to test resources and to assign civil society power to monitor the activities of the government. These changes were significant both for democratization and education itself, considering that Brazil was a dictatorship until 1986, and coverage of primary education was far from being attained.

Ceará’s state government coped with these macro-challenges by creating a strong institutional framework, adding on and strengthening federal education institutions with innovative initiatives. It can be said that Ceará used the leeway of federalism in a way that

gave positive bias to policy results, but it went much beyond what was federally mandated. Ceará's state government articulated a strong denunciation of corruption, a clear call for radical reform of public management, and the renunciation of "old" political elites (even if these were replaced with a new entrepreneurial one under Jereissati).

The most outstanding feature in Ceará's education policy has been the creation of a sound dialogue and continuous accompaniment of municipal education systems, entailing a close collaboration between the state and municipal governments in methods to achieve better quality results in primary education. This collaboration, which in the 2000s was institutionalized via binding agreements with all municipalities and strengthened via fiscal incentives, is remarkable. Until 1995, municipal education administrations did not have any exposure to the planning, formulation, implementation, and budgeting of public education policy. This massive inexperience with a public bureaucracy put weight on the local political forces and opened new spaces for political networking and local political clientelism. This is why the early experience of collaboration with municipal administrations stands out in Ceará. Also, this approach was maintained over 15 years, despite changing coalitions in the state government.

## **5.6 Political Networks in Ceará's Education Sector**

### *5.6.1 Political Competition and Party Networks with National Party Level*

Political competition increases vertical accountability during the formulation of education policies. At the same time, it is a space where political networks emerge and are either maintained or abandoned overtime because of changing resources and interests of involved actors. In Brazil's recent democratic history, there has been a great deal of political competition amongst parties. In fact, it has been a concern, since many parties emerged and began to compete after 1988. Often, this competition impeded governing majorities if coalitions were not formed, and contributed to an unstable party system.<sup>116</sup>

Across Brazil, there is a prevalence of either slim or coalition majorities in state level parliaments, including in Ceará. While between 1995 and 2006, the Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira/PSDB)—one of the two biggest parties of the center—ruled Ceará, the PSDB did not reach absolute majorities in any of the parliamentary elections of the state assembly. The PSDB started with 43.1 percent of votes in 1998, decreasing to 31.5 percent in 2002, and then went down further to 22 percent in 2006. Likewise the votes for the second center party PMDB fluctuated (from 23.8 percent in 1998 to 19.2 percent in 2002 to 21.1 percent in 2006.<sup>117</sup> While the absolute number of PSDB

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<sup>116</sup> At the national level, for example, since 1988 the number of parties presented in the lower chamber of Congress rose from 11 in 1985 to 22 in 1989. Afterwards, legal impediments contributed to the merging of smaller parties, hereby building four to five major parties (Costa, 2008). For further discussion of this period, see Mainwaring (1999).

<sup>117</sup> Data on election results for presidential elections, congressional elections, election of state senators and state assemblies were retrieved from the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE 2010) and from the University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ 2010).



seats in Ceará’s state assembly does not seem high (21 seats in 1998; 17 in 2002; 15 in 2006; and 10 in 2010), it is considerable in comparison to what other parties have won in state elections during the same period (IUPERJ 2010).

With missing absolute majorities, the PSDB had to ally with other smaller parties, such as the left-wing Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro; PSB). Table 5.6 summarizes these results. Two things stand out here: first, the dominance of the PSDB in Ceará and second, the fact that 12 out of 23 years were governed by the same person, Tasso Jereissati. During his first election campaign in 1986, Jereissati allied with leftist parties, including the two communist parties PCB and PCdoB, in order to compete against the uninterrupted dominance—since 1964—of three alternating colonels marking 20 years of military dictatorship in Ceará. What was interpreted as the cooptation of the left in 1986, which included the cooptation of generally left-oriented teachers’ unions (Borges 2005), turned into a long-standing type of political collaboration.

In consequence, political competition in Ceará should be judged as being rather low, since the dominance of the PSDB has never really been broken, despite the recent change to the PSB. The current governor, Cid Gomes, is the brother of the former governor Ciro Gomes (now also member of the PSB), and former mayor of Sobral. Therefore, the change from the PSDB to the PSB cannot be seen as a real change of power or ideology, since both parties, at least under this leadership, are moving within the same political spectrum.

**Table 5.6. Party Competition at the State Level and Party Relations with the National Level in Ceará**

Periods	1987–91	1991–94	1995–98	1999–2002	2003–06	2006–10	2011–14
Party and governor at state level	PMDB Jereissati I	PSDB Ciro Gomes	PSDB Jereissati II	PSDB Jereissati III	PSDB Alcantara	PSB Cid Gomes	PSB Cid Gomes
Party and president at national level	PFL J. Sarney	PRN/PMDB Collor/Franco	PSDB F.H.Cardoso	PSDB F.H.Cardoso	PT Lula	PT Lula	PT Dilma Rouseff

It is surprising that education policy gained importance under a conservative government, considering that the PSDB voter base is mainly from the upper and middle class, which tend to send their children to private schools. A catalyst pushing this further is an incident from Jereissati’s first term (1989–91). Then, the state government made harsh adjustments in public finances, including through the dismissal of many teachers. This resulted in strikes in the public sector for 43 days. Subsequently, education became strategically important for the state government for maintaining its voter base, and by 1994, it was a priority of Jereissati’s campaign agenda (Vieira and De Farias, 2002).

With regards to the political networks between national and state parties and their influence on Ceará's education policy, one particular detail stands out: Ceará's PSDB benefitted from the fact that its political lead coincided with the PSDB in power at the national level between 1995 and 2002. Interviews with two of the main developers of Ceará's education policy of that period revealed that the state's early municipalization of primary education (the redistribution of some education funds across the state) inspired the creation of FUNDEF at the national level (Aguiar, 2010; Naspolini, 2010). This, and other examples, can potentially be seen as indicators of how close the political education projects were aligned between the federal and state levels. However, as the examination of voluntary transfers of individual politicians above showed, a clear trend could not be observed between the party affiliation of politicians sponsoring amendments at the state level and the incumbent governments in power at the federal level during the same periods of time.

### *5.6.2 Networks and Interactions with Teachers' Unions*

Who are Ceará's teachers? As outlined in Chapter 3, 62 percent of Ceará's teachers instructing grades 1 through 4 have higher education degrees. This is much higher than the respective average for the northeast (40.4 percent) and just higher than the national average (61.3 percent). For most of the other indicators characterizing teachers at the primary level, serving grades 1 to 8, Ceará displays similar results to the Brazilian average. In 2007, 81 percent of the teachers in Ceará were women (Brazil: 82 percent); 84 percent worked in one school only (Brazil: 81 percent); 70 percent worked in urban areas (Brazil: 83 percent); and 62 percent worked in municipal schools (Brazil: 44 percent). The last point is not surprising, considering the high proportion of students at the primary level that now attend municipal schools (MEC/INPE/DTDIE 2009).

Ceará's teachers are organized either in municipal teachers' unions (such as the SINDFORT in Fortaleza) or in statewide labor unions, amongst which include the Ceará teachers' association, APEOC, created in 1962, and the Ceará State Education Workers' Union SINDIUTE, created in 1992. Their separation into two organizations is relevant in order to understand the political networks that emerged over time between the two teachers' unions and the state government. Interviews with members of the APEOC and the SINDIUTE in 2010 evidenced that many teachers had strong political positions against the dominant occupation of the political space by APEOC. Investigating these political positions further revealed that, in the early 1990s, teachers created the SINDIUTE as a resistance to the hegemonic and governmental-friendly behavior of APEOC.

In his doctoral dissertation, Borges describes the political conflict amongst the SINDIUTE and the APEOC, the latter being "a highly bureaucratized and government-connected association" with its workers' leaders being cooped by Ceará's state governments, including the governments of Jereissati (Borges 2005, 207). During the 1970s, hegemonic leader Francisco Teixeira Brillhante was the leader of APEOC:

“Controlling the union with an iron-hand, Brilhante established close relations with the oligarchic forces that dominated the state’s politics, seeking to extract benefits from his unconditional alignment to the political establishment.<sup>118</sup> Whereas in Bahia and Minas Gerais teachers organized major strikes already in the late 1970s, in Ceará, teacher mobilization was virtually inexistent, reflecting the cooptation of the union by the state government” (Borges 2005, 208).

Since 2007, there have been teacher strikes in Ceará due to salary disputes of teachers working in municipal and state schools, as their state governments have not yet implemented the national minimum wage for teachers. Despite the general public affirmation that raising teachers’ salaries is an important step to improve education quality, Ceará’s state government has refused to implement the constitutionally set minimum wage for teachers. Since 2009, together with the states of Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul, Ceará has claimed that the law is unconstitutional because it touches upon the budget autonomy of state governments and imposes the hiring of new teachers (since under the law teachers have to spend more time for class preparation and thus has less time available to spend in the classroom).

Notwithstanding these recent developments, an interview in 2010 with the interim president of APEOC at the time, Penha Alencar, confirms Borges’ characterization of the teachers’ association, and validates that it continues to be governmental friendly. However, his remarks below also reflect that little progress had actually been made in terms of concrete coordination between APEOC and the state government during former mandates, and that the implementation of the minimum wage remains a pending item, too:

“The APEOC union has always opted for dialogue because we believe that through dialogue we can achieve many things for education. Each governmental mandate is a different government. The government of Tácio Jereissati was a government with which we had a lot of dialogue (...) We had several dialogues, but they were dialogues without much success, because we understand dialogue as something that discusses and moves things forward, but this has not happened“ (Alencar 2010).

Since the reelection of governor Ciro Gomes in 2010, the position of APEOC as an organization relatively cooped by the government has not changed, at least not from the point of view of the teachers fighting for better salaries. An article from a leftist newspaper in June 2011 titled (as translated) “*The Leadership of APEOC – Sold to the Oligarchy Government of Gomes – Impedes the Break-out of a State Strike*” is certainly an extreme, but potentially valid position from the standpoint of political activists (Internacionalista 2011). Also, a violent reaction of the municipal police of Fortaleza against teachers demonstrating for the implementation of a minimum wage in the state’s capital show how highly politicized the climate actually is between the state government and Ceará’s teachers (Belchior 2011).

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<sup>118</sup> According to Moreira, the headquarters of the APEOC was donated by Ceara’s education secretariat in the 1980s when the organization apparently also “counted on financial support of the state government to run its daily activities, such as routine trips to the state’s interior” (Moreira 1990 cit. in Borges 2005, 208).

On the side of the state government, all interviewed state secretaries for education mentioned that they had searched for a positive relationship with the teachers and teachers' unions even if this was not always possible due to the financial constraints and different political agendas (Lerche Vieira 2010a; Napolini 2010). The spirit of a positive search for collaboration with governmental and nongovernmental entities has been present in most of the reviewed state planning tools and management reports. The organization UNDIME appreciates the approach of the state government to collaborate with employees of the education sector in the implementation of PAIC. UNDIME points that, thanks to the state government and their management of the literacy program, a system to evaluate the pupils' results has been put into place. This development has been accompanied by the involvement of municipal governments and the training of teachers in each municipality in terms of how to implement PAIC (Leite 2010).

According to representatives of Ceará's state government, teachers' unions have been called to participate in the debates leading to the implementation of PAIC, even if they did not occupy a powerful position, such as that of UNDIME or APRECE. Critics consider this as a strategic mistake given the importance that PAIC has been occupying in the public debate and in the performance of schools in Ceará. This is, for example, the opinion of Artur Bruno, a member of the Brazilian worker's party PT, and former chief of the education commission of Ceará's state assembly. He laments that Ceará did not sufficiently raise teacher's salaries throughout the 1990s, but counts on the teachers' unions' cooperation to improve education quality:

“I think the government committed an error by not involving the teachers' unions in this education project that is taking place (...) There is a great dissatisfaction amongst teachers vis-à-vis the state government. They do not feel that they are appreciated the way they should be. The government has considerably increased investment in education. In addition to its investment in PAIC, it has invested in full-time high schools and vocational training, which has concomitantly generated a great expectation in Ceará's society. However, teachers in Ceará still have the worst wages in Brazil, and in my opinion, one does not achieve quality education when teachers are discouraged. There is a culture to construct [school] buildings, to purchase equipment, to invent programs in order to improve the quality [of education], but not the same importance has been given to training and remuneration of teachers (...) There is a historic neglect of governments in general regarding the remuneration of teachers” (Bruno 2010).

Bruno's opinion reflects, in a nutshell, what teachers' unions, not only in Ceará but also in Brazil in general, have made clear during the recent debate about minimum wages for teachers: raising education quality greatly rests on the shoulders of teachers. If their efforts are not sufficiently acknowledged, for example, through higher pay, the quality of education will remain jeopardized, to a certain extent, because the profession itself will not be able to attract and keep the best teachers. Whether or not APEOC or SINDIUTE can push the government further to finally implement the minimum wage for teachers in Ceará remains open at this point.

## 5.7 Polity-Enabling Policy Outcomes

### 5.7.1 Accountability During Policy Implementation

Vertical accountability within a bureaucracy was outlined in Chapter 2 as being crucial in order to control for negative effects of informal rules and institutions, and to offset the positive biases of federalism by allowing leeway to political actors. Accountability can be assessed by considering if and how governmental policies and programs have been implemented, which parties have been called to participate, and who has occupied which role in this part of the policy process. In Ceará, the biggest indication of how the state government has been driving accountability down to the smallest federal level is the implementation of the collaborative regime with the municipalities. It can be illustrated with three examples: first, the implementation of the state's literacy program PAIC; second, the implementation of a federal literacy program; and third, the democratic election of teachers. These examples are seen as steps to offset educational outcomes "enabling" the constitutional potential of Brazil's federal collaborative regime.

#### *Example 1: The State's Literacy Program PAIC*

How does PAIC's experience relate to accountability? Not only is the availability of information within a bureaucracy required to increase its vertical accountability, but also it is crucial to determine how the information is publicly treated and transformed into tangible results.<sup>119</sup> Using data on the quality of municipal education with transparency, which did not give positive credit to municipal administrations in all cases (and therefore resulted in tension between the municipal and state government), still created a high degree of answerability on the part of the state government. To institutionalize the process, the state government signed binding agreements with all 184 participating municipalities, and these municipalities in turn committed to continue participating through the formulation of corresponding municipal laws. This collaborative process with a wide array of formal agreements and corresponding networks between state and municipal actors should be interpreted as an important step towards government policy. This is an indication that institutionalization is something that Brazilian policies often lack, which results in discontinuity of many social policies. At the same time, it implies a potential solution to Brazil's federal dilemma and how to achieve education quality.

Today, PAIC is the flagship program of the education sector in Ceará, and strongly contributes to a state modernization process in the education sector across the whole state. It

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<sup>119</sup> Sofia Lerche, Ceará's secretary for education from 2003 to 2005, has extensively written about Ceará's experience, including its evaluation system. She points out that it is not enough to produce results in terms of information about performance, but it is also important to focus on how to best transform this information, through a "pedagogy of diffusion", into better teaching and learning practices. Results-based education management directed towards accountability should therefore create a culture of processes and accept the challenge to create a "culture of results" (Lerche Vieira 2007, 51).

has a sound structure in terms of teacher preparation, technical training of municipal administrations, and detailed accompaniment of quality indicators, results, and administrative challenges. Municipalities and schools are guided through project management in the education sector where they are instructed to define objectives, concrete steps, and financial means in order to reach set targets each month (Ceara 2009). The described steps have increased the accountability of municipal bureaucracies, the institutional backbones of Brazil's primary education system. Also, the opposition in Ceará's state assembly, represented by the worker's party PT, has a good opinion of the program. The former head of the state's assembly education commission, Artur Bruno (PT) provided the following remarks:

“I think that the Program for Literacy at the Right Age is a necessary policy and quite successful (...) The government has been very competent in providing an evaluation of students aged eight years and older and in rewarding good practices. Since Ceará the municipalities greatly depend on the state in financial terms, the leadership of the [state] government has been decisive for convincing [the municipalities]. Since the application of resources for policies is in the hands of municipal administrations, and since the state government gives pedagogical and financial support for capacity building, I did not perceive any discomfort coming from the municipalities” (Bruno 2010).

The current secretary of state for education, Maria Izolda Arruda, thinks that the program allows the state government to work based on measurable criteria, and to use quality outcomes of students and schools to judge the performance of teachers, directors, and other public employees based on their hard work and merits. Her explanation for the functioning of the program as follows:

“Our challenge is to make sure that public schools are good schools, and that a good school is one where students learn, and where they learn what they will need in order to continue their lives successfully after completing basic education. Therefore, we are obsessively committed to the elevation of learning indices and it has been our focus to link all activities such as diverse improvements towards the program (...) Hereby, the management gets its message across to the state and municipal schools and administrators, making it more clear every time because it is very easy to have tasks related to literacy being mixed up. We try to work in a systemic way and to have few priorities” (Cela de Arruda Coelho 2010) [in this case, being literate in the first grade of primary education].

Three important issues stand out regarding the choices made in education policy in the recent period that have a potentially high accountability impact on the type of social capital and networks established amongst the different federal levels. The first and foremost is the voluntary commitment of the state government to create a literacy program inciting all municipalities and their municipal schools to participate, disregarding any political affiliations. This step certainly counters parts of Brazil's federal dilemma, where eventually too much leeway can have a negative bias on policy outcomes. The second is a cautious way of interaction with the political autonomy of municipalities, showing awareness of how sensitive this issue is and the acknowledgement that the smallest unit of Brazil's federation

still needs to be institutionally strengthened. The third is the decision to prioritize primary education, and to strengthen and institutionalize this priority by tying it to tax incentives.

### *Example 2: The Implementation of a Federal Literacy Program*

The second example—the implementation of the federal program Literate Brazil (“Brasil Alfabetizado”)—closely relates to some of the most important features observed with the state literacy program PAIC, namely the participation of the municipal level by establishing policy related networks with these.

The Literate Brazil program has only recently started to collect data on the number of people that are factually literate under the program, which does not allow measure its actual impact to improve education quality. However, the national coordinator of Literate Brazil (whose name is kept anonymous here) points out that policy implementation in Ceará is characterized by a strong connection between the state and municipal governments. The state government has focused on the institutional empowerment of municipal administrations by assigning them with actual responsibilities. According to the same national coordinator, this has resulted in higher efficiency with regards to the logistical organization and better geographic coverage. In Ceará, the coverage of the program is very high, with 182 out of 184 municipalities participating and sharing responsibilities with the state government.

### *Example 3: The Implementation of Democratic Management Principles*

The third example to show Ceará’s tendency towards institutionalization of policies by strengthening accountability is the implementation of democratic management principles in schools. This includes the democratic election of school directors and the existence of school councils. The formation and implementation of these two policies indicate to which extent information and transparency of bureaucratic doing have been present, impacting the significance of accountability.

Borges classifies Ceará, together with Minas Gerais, as a case where the democratic election process of directors is already more firmly institutionalized than in other states in Brazil. In Ceará, public school communities have been electing their principals since 1995, being a “permanent” tradition that apparently is not affected by electoral cycles or changes of state governments (Borges 2008, 241). Ceará implemented this process quite early, considering that the passing of this legislation took place in the same year of the proclamation of the National Education Law. It is not surprising, however, considering that it also coincided with Jereissati’s second term, when education policy gained more importance and merit-based principles became established. Napolini, the secretary of state during that period, expresses the importance that this norm was not implemented as a decree or an initiative, but had to pass the state assembly for approval with almost three votes against it. According to Napolini, this was only possible because of a prior information campaign during which the education secretariat held public debates discussing the law and its details in both urban and rural municipalities of Ceará (Napolini 2001, 2010).

Unfortunately, the norm does not guarantee that all 184 municipal education systems of Ceará follow suit. No quantitative statistics exist about the exact number of municipal administrations that have implemented democratic management principles. The current deputy state secretary for education, Mauricio Holanda, estimates that very few of Ceará's municipalities have formulated and implemented this type of legislation, even if the state government encouraged municipal education systems to do so (Holanda 2010).

Notwithstanding this mix, encouraging examples exist, for example, in the municipality of Maracanaú, an urban municipality adjunct to Ceará's capital Fortaleza. Here, the highly committed mayor José Marcelo Farias Lima has been in office for a considerably long period of time (1993–2004, 2008–2012), and is trying to reform the public administration. This also includes the education sector, for instance, through funding biweekly professional training meetings for teachers and introducing a performance-based component in the salaries of directors and teachers. This translates into the following: teachers of first-year classes of primary schools implementing PAIC in which at least 90 percent of students are literate receive a salary increase of 10 percent during 12 subsequent months. Directors of schools enhancing their IDEB receive another bonus. In addition, a recently passed municipal law now holds directors responsible for their school's progress, thereby overriding the common practice of directors to delegate their responsibilities to supervisors. In Maracanaú, meetings that include the municipal government, school administrations, and parents have been established (in addition to school council meetings). This allows parents to become more aware of the programs and the intended and actual learning progress of their children (Farias Lima *ctd.* in Boekle-Giuffrida and Rippin 2011, .22).<sup>120</sup>

As part of democratic management principals, state legislation was passed in 1995 establishing school councils in state schools. They also exist at the municipal level, but only if they were institutionalized by respective municipal norms. How effective are these municipal councils in terms of resource control, which would mean de-facto participation? During informal interviews with teachers and parents in the state's municipal schools, it was confirmed that school-level councils are quite fragile and the space given to them also depends on the school director. These observations confirm the general analysis made in Chapter 4.

With regards to the effectiveness of municipal councils that are supposed to control municipal education resources, it does not seem to be much better, at least according to Marta Codeiro, a member of Ceará's state education council. She was quite frank in her reaction when asked how the control of education resources works in Ceará's municipal councils. She pointed her thumb down and then elaborated further:

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<sup>120</sup> According to Mauricio Holanda, other municipalities in Ceará have been able to greatly improve quality of education through rigorous evaluation and monitoring processes. He cites the case of the very poor municipality of Senador Pompeu, which is situated in Ceará's central region. The municipality undertook many autonomous evaluations with great frequency in municipal and state schools based on own technical agreements. This has apparently also happened in other municipalities, such as Jaguaripe and Brejo Santo (Holanda 2010).



“The control of funds does not work, or it is centralized in the cabinet of the mayor. The municipal councils should analyze everything, and the labor unions should also have access to the information. But, the mayor assigns the majority of municipal councilors. Yes, they are supposed to be elected, but there are always ways around this [um jeito], right? You know that Brazil is the country of the jeito, or not?” (Codeiro 2009 ).

### 5.7.2 *Information, Transparency, and Availability of Statistics*

The collection of education statistics is important for accountability, since it allows parents and public bureaucracies to obtain information based on empirical evidence. It is also a reflection of formal normative procedures and how well they are followed. If information is publicly disseminated and published, transparent, formal processes are created and potentially become part of an institutional routine. In Brazil, national statistics on coverage and performance of students provide a good picture about education quality in each state. Furthermore, state governments have started to collect additional performance statistics for two main reasons: first, national statistics only include a sample of randomly chosen schools, and second, state-produced information allows state governments to engage in closer monitoring and dialogue with municipal administrations when these local results are collected and produced.

In 1992, Ceará was one of the first Brazilian states to create its own education evaluation system, the Permanent System for the Evaluation of Basic Education in Ceará (Sistema Permanente de Avaliação da Educação Básica do Ceará; SPAECE). SPAECE measures students’ performance at the primary, secondary, and middle school levels. It follows the methodology of national performance tests of the Ministry of Education. In contrast to these national tests, SPAECE is universally applied and adds on certain information, for example contextual information on the socioeconomic status of each student or about the profile and working practices of teachers and directors. SPAECE-ALFA evaluates literacy skills of second graders annually to monitor the progress of schools in the state’s literacy program PAIC. Both types of performance data are published on the state government’s website, and discussed with municipalities. In some cases, such as in Fortaleza—the state’s biggest municipality and capital of Ceará— results create political tension. Fortaleza has repeatedly had negative performance results, creating negative press for its public administration. Nevertheless, the state government continues to publish these results, hereby showing a high degree of transparency and accountability (Holanda 2010). Holanda explains why this process is so important for the strengthening of accountability between federal institutions:

“When we distribute the results of the performance test measuring literacy students in the first through fifth grade, this gives recognition to the ones that tell them that they are doing a good job. At the same time, it identifies the ones that have been neglecting changes and punishes them. It lets them wonder, and they have to ask themselves [what went wrong]. I defend this as both a public official and academic. The Brazilian democracy is very young and very limited. It passes through the strengthening of

municipal management and through the improvement of quality of municipal service that the municipalities give to the citizens” (Holanda 2009).

The continuous publication of education performance data is also important for vertical accountability. In this case, parents and school communities obtain an independent information base that allows them to monitor the activities of the government. It may also strengthen the position of these civil society actors and undercut potential clientelistic behavior, since a school director or mayor will no longer be able to hide the schools that are not producing quality results.

## **5.8 Chapter Summary**

The case of Ceará shows interesting details with regards to the political and institutional factors that the theory chapter assumed as being decisive for policy outcomes in primary education and their respective bias. The analysis of this empirical chapter showed that political competition amongst state parties has not been very high, but that two parties, the PSDB and the PSB, politically dominated the state’s political landscape in Ceará between 1995 and 2010. Interestingly, the low party competition and predominance of the PSDB has led to an elevated degree of policy continuity in the education sector, with strong emphasis given to areas such as the universalization of primary education. This happened comparatively early for the rest of Brazil, and there was a strong focus on improving quality of education and literacy, especially in the first years of primary education. Yet, another theoretical factor with respect to the larger political networks in Ceará can be validated: the PSDB’s party lead at state level coincided with PSDB leadership at the national level during eight years, creating the opportunity for the establishment of respective political support structures, as the analysis of the affinity between Brazil’s president Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Ceará’s governor Jereissati showed.

Political networks between national and state parties have not been the only political factor influencing the positive development of Ceará’s education quality. Political networks with the state’s teachers’ unions are also factors. The interactions between the state government and the teachers’ unions have historically been dominated by the government’s priorities and the political history of Ceará. The breaking of habits of “old” elites and their replacement with a strong business orientation in public administration from the mid-1980s onwards has not necessarily led to increased dialogue with teachers’ unions. There are signs of political cooptation of the principal teachers’ union, and other teachers’ unions emerged because of great disagreement with these facts. The described cooptation of one of the major teachers’ unions, coupled with low party competition and a strong support of the federal government, point to a relatively low degree of accountability between civil society and parties, which contrasts the above described high degree of accountability between state and municipal education institutions.

The positive institutional development of federalism and the strengthening of the collaborative regime between the state of Ceará and its municipalities go back to the radical reform in public administration put forward by Jereissati in the beginning of the 1990s. This

had long lasting consequences both for the public administration (see below) and for networks and the political relationship between the state government and the state's teachers' unions. The latter were cooped and their political autonomy was used or abused, strengthening the political direction of incumbent governments. In this sense, political closeness and dialogue between the state government and teachers' unions, a factor that the theory chapter assumed as being impactful for federalism as politics, is validated in the case of Ceará. However, in this case, teachers' unions seemingly lost their political autonomy and independence from the government because of the close networks that were established between both actors. In this sense, it can be hypothesized that the political cooptation of teachers' unions might have been the price in Ceará for the institutionalization of a strong federal, collaborative regime between municipal and state governments.. On the other hand, a long record of strong networks with municipal public administrations (both at executive and technical level) is the major reason for Ceará's success in the primary education sector. These networks were formed through systematic dialogue, rigid evaluation systems, high availability of information and transparency, the willingness and ability of the state government to base policy design and implementation on empirical evidence, and institutional support to municipal education systems in public policy planning. All of these factors are outlined in the theory chapter as being important indicators to strengthen federalism as a system of institutions. At the same time, the state government created a fiscal incentive system for municipal tax transfers, linking these to the improvement of education results in early primary education. This is a major achievement and shows how the constitutional leeway of Brazil's federalism can have a positive bias towards educational results.

Today, Ceará is cited as a leader in Brazil in improving education quality at a fast pace. An analysis of how these results have been achieved provides a potential answer of how to institutionally counter Brazil's federal dilemma and how to support institutionally weak municipalities in the northeast. Through the different steps of institutionalized collaboration, Ceará's state government has gained political ground, modifying the predominant position of the central government in Brasilia. In this respect, the case draws an institutional lesson learned for federalism as a polity that is being modified by federalism as politics: the institutional leeway left by the normative framework regarding a loosely defined collaborative regime between state and municipal levels has led to the emergence of new political relationships and networks. This progress signals an alternative way of collaboration that is not commonly prescribed and that would not have remained undiscovered in absence of the leeway and autonomy given by the federal constitution.

Table 5.7 summarizes these details and relates them to the three-level reading of federalism discussed in Chapter 2. Ceará is tentatively being classified as a case mixing and complementing characteristics of both levels A and B. Federalism as a polity is being strengthened not only because of the institutions and incentives additionally created to enhance its functioning (level A characteristics), but also because of initially informal types of relationships (level B characteristics) that, due to their ability to produce positive policy outcomes, become part of an institutionalized space (level A). Yet, formal, informal, and

other types of political networks amongst parties, between the state government and the teachers' unions, and between municipal and state governments carried a strong weight in this case. However, these networks have had a positive bias towards education quality.

**Table 5.7. The Politics of Federalism in Ceará's Education Sector: A Case of Level A and B Interactions with the Achievement of Intended Policy Outcomes**

<b>Level A</b>	<b>Polity findings</b>	<b>Politics/polity findings</b>	<b>Polity/policy findings</b>
Politics aligned with institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Formal existence of institutions to improve quality of education</li> <li>* Additional financial regulations/incentives set at state level (tying of fiscal transfers to municipalities to primary education's quality)</li> <li>* Presence of formal agreement for collaborative regime</li> <li>* Reinforcing institutions created with all municipalities by signing binding agreements</li> <li>* Municipalities agree to comply with primary education premises proposed by the state government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Formal consultations with civil society organizations on a regular basis</li> <li>* Frequent and relatively open dialogue with teachers' unions</li> <li>* Public and mostly transparent exchange of information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Rigorous enforcement of created institutions to improve quality of primary education the state and municipal levels</li> <li>* Continuity in education interventions (little gap between formulation and implementation of policies)</li> <li>* Built-in accountability mechanism in primary education interventions (frequent meetings and training of municipal administrations to track progress)</li> <li>* Sanctions in place: Non-compliance with agreed upon state regulation prompts lower payment of state-municipal fiscal transfers (ICMS tax)</li> <li>* Positive bias towards educational outcomes</li> </ul>
<b>Level B:</b> Mix of conforming and nonconforming behavior towards federalism, but with positive bias for results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Mostly political and administrative continuity, including the education secretariat</li> <li>* Clear behavior towards federal rules</li> <li>* Leeway for collaboration has positive bias and eventually institutionalizes relationships</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Political networks between the state and municipal levels</li> <li>* Political influence of mayors still strong, but controlled through close monitoring</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Little unintended results and increasing quality of primary education</li> </ul>
<b>Level C:</b> Behavior mostly ignores existing norms; Federalism gives leeway for individual interpretation and informality, but with negative bias for results	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Little room for noncompliance with state-municipal collaborative regime due to clearly prescribed sanctions and accountability mechanisms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Throughout examined period, presence of formal and informal political support from federal level (Jereissati/Cardoso alignment; Gomes/Lula alignment)</li> <li>* No influence from private sector regarding collaborative regime</li> <li>* Low amount of budget amendments in education sector executed by individual politicians</li> </ul>	

“I am convinced that when the municipality is well-managed, it is better because the state government does not have enough arms and eyes to reach out to all municipalities. The problem is that the municipalities have an overly politicized management. They receive political support from [federal or state] deputies and, sometimes, political interests are opposed to educational ones. There is no supporting infrastructure to supervise all municipal schools. The political question is even more pronounced in the interior. When the federal or state legislator is the mayor's political enemy, the difficulties of collaboration are very large.”

(Mozart Neves Ramos, former Secretary of State for Education in Pernambuco).

## **6. Policy and Politics of Primary Education in Pernambuco**

Chapter 6 analyzes the case of Ceará by empirically testing the main hypothesis. Which political and institutional factors explain policy choices and quality education outcomes in this state? Which roles do federal institutional rules, political interactions, and networks play, and what is their bias on policy outcomes? Which political actors have been important in this particular case during both policy formulation and implementation? These questions shall be addressed in this chapter, and will serve to validate the three-level reading of federalism and the outlined political and institutional indicators in Chapter 2. As in the preceding chapter, the first section is dedicated to examine the financial situation of Pernambuco's primary education sector, which will include an overview of the constitutionally set transfers, but also volunteer transfers and budget amendments. The latter two funding types are important to understand, especially with regards to their origin. Budget amendments are voluntary transfers calculated by politicians, and if their amounts are large, these transfers can have an impact on educational outcomes or skew impact of other resources, such as federal and state government transfers.

The chapter goes on to analyze the institutional education policies from a historical perspective, pointing out which institutions were created under which state administration, which objectives they envisioned, and what types of results they evoked. In Pernambuco, strong collaborative efforts and respective networks emerged among municipalities, teachers' unions, and civil society organizations during the leftist administration of Miguel Arraes in 1987 and then in 1995, which coincided with Brazil's democratic opening. However, this progressive start was considerably slowed down during the two subsequent mandates of the conservative government under Vasconcelos, during which political networks that were aligned between the state and federal government under Fernando Henrique Cardoso became increasingly important. Given this changing political landscape, the state government and its political ideology affected the position of parties, the building of political coalitions and networks, and processes of informal bargaining. Two important indicators for accountability—transparency and public information management—will be observed at the end of this chapter, since the level of accountability created by a public administration is indicative of how serious institutional processes are taken to strengthen federalism as a polity.

### **6.1 Fiscal Income and Education Spending at the State and Municipal Levels**

Annex 4 displays fiscal income and education spending of Pernambuco gathered from the same data source of Brazil's National Treasury. As in the case of Ceará, from 1995 to 2009, Pernambuco had steadily rising total budget revenues; tax revenues, including the ICMS tax; and States' Participation Fund FPE. By the same token, Pernambuco's total expenditure in education increased from R\$ 414 million in 2000 to almost R\$ 2 billion in 2009. Primary education has constantly received the highest proportions of funding if compared to secondary, professional, or higher education. In 2005 (the first year for which disaggregated expenditure data for the education sector is available), Pernambuco spent more than half of

its overall education budget of R\$ 911 million on fundamental education (R\$ 542 million), followed by R\$ 75.7 million on secondary education, and R\$ 49.6 million on higher education. In 2009, this trend continued. Out of the total education budget of R\$ 1.84 billion, Pernambuco spent more than half (R\$ 969 million) on fundamental education; increased spending in secondary education to R\$ 357 million R\$ (which is four times the amount spent in 2005); and spent more on professional training (R\$ 83.4 million R\$) than higher education (R\$ 74.4 million R\$) (Ministry Finance and Nacional 2009).

Despite this trend, the reading of Pernambuco's budget situation changes if compared to Ceará. In relative terms, Pernambuco had higher total budget and tax revenues between 1995 and 2009 than the total budget and tax revenues in Ceará during the same period. In 2009, the total budget revenues in Pernambuco accounted for more than R\$ 16 billion, compared to R\$ 13 billion in Ceará, and total tax revenues accounted for R\$ 7.8 billion and R\$ 5.8 billion respectively. With a slightly better overall revenue and fiscal situation, one could expect that Pernambuco spent more of its budget in the education sector than Ceará, but it actually spent less. While this difference in total education spending was still low in 1995, the difference became more obvious in 2000 (Ceará: R\$ 764 million; Pernambuco: R\$ 413 million); was greater in 2005 (Ceará: R\$ 1.5 billion; Pernambuco: R\$ 911 million); and was extreme in 2009 (Ceará: R\$ 2.9 billion; Pernambuco: R\$1.8 billion).

Consequently, Pernambuco has spent less per student when compared to Brazil as a whole and Ceará. . In 2009, Brazil's average direct investment per student aged 4 to 17 was R\$ 2.948. While Ceará almost spent R\$ 2.759 in 2009 per student, Pernambuco's respective investment accounted for R\$ 2.157 (INEP/MEC/IPEA/DISOC/IBGE cit. in T. p. Educação 2011).

When comparing education expenditure to the money spent on other social policies, such as health, for example, it is apparent that education in Pernambuco was not the state's priority. The overall expenditure in health of R\$ 1.33 billion in 2005 (composed by primary care, ambulatory and hospital care, prophylactic and therapeutic support, health surveillance, epidemiological surveillance, food and Nutrition, and other subfunctions) was considerably higher than the overall education expenditure of R\$ 911 million in the same year. This trend persisted in 2009, during which the overall expenditure in health accounted for more than R\$ 2.74 billion, compared to 1.84 billion in education. This trend is the inverse of the situation observed in Ceará, where the education budget has received higher priority if compared to the health budget (Ministry Finance and Nacional 2009).

## 6.2 Constitutional Education Funds: FUNDEF and Salário Educação

Annex 5 displays the different types of education finances from FUNDEF, FUNDEB, and other sources already explained in the respective section in Chapter 5 on Ceará. The state of Pernambuco received increasing financial resources for education from FUNDEF, FUNDEB, and the Salário Educação between 1998 and 2010. Transfers from the federal to the state government rose from R\$ 107.7 million in 1998 to R\$ 200 million in 2006 and to R\$ 286 million in 2010, respectively. The story in Ceará was different. Pernambuco's state government received higher transfers from the federal government under FUNDEF and FUNDEB than Ceará during all observed years. For example, Ceará received R\$ 97 million under FUNDEF from the union in 1998, and Pernambuco received R\$ 107 million. In 2010, Pernambuco's received R\$ 286 million from FUNDEB transfers, while Ceará received only R\$ 187.6 million (Ministry Finance and Nacional 2009). One explanation for this difference is the number of students served at the different school levels, given the fact that both FUNDEF and FUNDEB transfers are calculated by number of students reported in the education census of each state in the respective years.

An even more remarkable funding increase can be observed in terms of the FUNDEF and FUNDEB transfers to municipalities in Pernambuco. Pernambuco's constitutionally allocated education finances greatly increased in the observed period, and especially benefitted the state's municipalities. The state's 185 municipalities received R\$ 117 million in 1998 and R\$ 403.8 million in 2006 (data for 2010 are unavailable). There was a similar increase in FUNDEF transfers from the state to municipalities. Transfers increased from R\$ 129.8 million in 1998 to R\$ 482 million in 2006. By the same token, the transfers between states also rose under FUNDEF for mentioned years. As in the case of Ceará, these increases can be partially explained by the rising proportions of students entering primary education. Between 1995 and 2010, universal access to education was a constitutional goal and municipalities received the most students at this level. However, as the enrollment data shows in Section 5.5, municipalities in Ceará received more students than those in Pernambuco.

The database of the National Development Bank, BNDES, does not provide any information on the financial operations of Pernambuco's education sector for the time period between 1995 and 2010. In a phone interview, a representative confirmed that Pernambuco did not have any isolated lending operations in education for the mentioned period. Ceará, on the other hand, as mentioned in Chapter 5, did. However, Pernambuco also had lending operations with both the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).<sup>121</sup>

Students in primary education in Pernambuco have benefitted from the described financial base. In 2009, the National Fund for the Development of Education (FNDE) reported that the

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<sup>121</sup> Based on the websites of these institutions, there are not further details herein regarding these operations because these loans do not address primary education exclusively, and because they do not represent funding from the Brazilian federal system being the scope of interest here.



state of Pernambuco directly invested R\$ 3,930 per student per year for grades 1 through 8, and increased respective funding to R\$ 5,285 in 2010. If the spending patterns in primary education are compared to the patterns in other areas, such as childcare (cost per student spending in 2010: R\$ 450) or secondary education for students in grade 8 through 11 (cost per student funding in 2010: R\$ 983), primary education has received higher priority, if measured by direct investment in education. This trend is similar in Ceará; however, direct investment per student at the primary level has, on average, been R\$ 500 lower than in Ceará in 2009 and 2010 (see Chapter 5) (Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação 2011).

### **6.3 Beyond Constitutional Funds**

#### *6.3.1 Volunteer Transfers*

Between 1997 and 2007, Pernambuco's education sector benefited from 54 volunteer transfers sponsored by the union of federal states, the Federal District, and municipalities (Ceará benefitted from 37). These 54 transfers amounted to an additional total budget of R\$ 492 million in Pernambuco's education spending (Ceará: R\$ 477 million), which, on average, meant an additional R\$ 44.8 million per year (Ceará: R\$ 43.4 million per year). Table 6.1 displays the number of proposed voluntary transfers compared to the number of executed transfers, detailing the different levels of education respectively. As evidenced, not all proposed or envisioned transfers were indeed executed, which is mainly because of changing budget priorities or untimely budget execution until the end of a certain fiscal year.

With respect to the different levels of education, these benefitted from transfers in different years. For example, between 1997 and 2002, primary education was a clear priority in terms of transfers. This trend changed between the end of 2003 and 2007 (the last observed year), when higher education received increasing transfers in comparison to primary and secondary education and daycare. This trend of prioritizing primary education in the earlier years and higher education in the later ones was similar in Ceará between 1997 and 2007.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of voluntary transfers proposed</b>	<b>Level of education benefitted from proposed transfers (number by level)</b>	<b>Number of voluntary transfers executed</b>	<b>Level of education benefitted from executed transfers (number by level)</b>
1997	21	Higher (1); primary (20)	0	No data available
1998	21	Higher (2); primary 18; day care (1)	7	Primary (7)
1999	10	Higher (2); primary (8)	1	Primary (1)
2000	20	Higher 2; primary (17); secondary (1)	4	Higher (2); primary (2)
2001	15	Primary (15)	5	Primary education (5)
2002	10	Higher (3); Primary (7); environmental education (1)	8	Higher (3); primary (4); environmental education (1)
2003	10	Higher (2); secondary (3); primary (4); daycare (1)	4	Higher (1); secondary (1); primary (2)
2004	18	Higher (5); secondary (3); primary (10)	3	Higher (3)
2005	12	Higher (4); primary (8)	9	Higher (3); primary (6)
2006	16	Higher (6); primary (9); environmental education (1)	5	Higher (2); primary (3)
2007	22	Higher (9); primary (8); secondary (2); day care (3)	8	Higher (2); primary (5); secondary (1)

Source: Author's elaboration based on data provided by the Sub-Secretariat for Technical Support of the Federal Senate, Brasilia [http://www9.senado.gov.br/portal/page/portal/orcamento\\_senado/Consultoria](http://www9.senado.gov.br/portal/page/portal/orcamento_senado/Consultoria) November/October 2010]; NB: Data after 2007 not available in disaggregated format.

### 6.3.2 Budget Amendments

Pernambuco's education sector received a considerable amount of budget amendments from individual politicians, as well as from state committees without specific party affiliation. Annex 6 summarizes the data provided by the Federal Senate, displaying the *executed amendments only*, hereby leaving out many amendments that were originally envisioned and approved, but never executed. The summary shows that between 1998 and 2010, Pernambuco's education sector received R\$ 950 million, a considerable amount when added to the constitutional funds FUNDEF and FUNDEB. While in some years, no or very few budget amendments were approved and executed in education (1999: 0; 1998: 1; 2000 and 2003: 6; 2001: 9), in other years, between 20 and 30 executed amendments were released (2002: 22; 2004: 18; 2005: 27; 2006: 14; 2007: 20; 2008: 25).

As in Ceará, these funds did not only benefit primary education, but also higher education, vocational training, school infrastructure (such as university expansions and sports fields), amongst others. Municipalities throughout Ceará benefitted from these amendments, the extent of which depended on the local political priorities of sponsoring party members. Party members from the left, center, and right equally sponsored education

projects, and sometimes, the same party members sponsored education frequently in the mentioned period (see Annex 6). As displayed in Table 6.2, a total of 136 budget amendments were executed in education between 1998 and 2009 (data on executed amendments are unavailable before 1998 and for 2010). Politicians from 12 different parties sponsored these executed amendments. Yet, it is possible to observe the support of only three parties to which these politicians belong, namely the worker's party, PT (44 amendments by politicians from the PT); the liberal party, PFL/DEM (40 amendments by members of the PFL/DEM); and the center-left party, PSB (26 amendments by politicians of the PSB). This means that politicians of these major parties almost equally sponsored education amendments, and that parties across the political spectrum prioritized education. However, support is quite dispersed and does not seem to be well coordinated. Additional analysis of the information in Table 6.2 when crossed with the party affiliation of incumbent governments of respective periods (see Annex 5) reveals no specific trend. The party affiliations of the different state governments do not seem to have influenced or guided the sponsoring patterns of individual politicians regarding education amendments (as was the case in Ceará).

**Table 6.2. Executed Education Budget Amendments, Pernambuco, 1998–2009 (by party affiliation)**

Year/ Party	PSDB	PSL	PC do B	PT	PFL/DE M	PSB	PPB	PDT	PPS	PSC	PTB	PR
<b>1998</b>					1							
<b>1999</b>	No budget amendment for education was executed in 1999 in Pernambuco.											
<b>2000</b>		1			2		1		2			
<b>2001</b>	1	1			4	3			1			
<b>2002</b>		1	2	7	2	8						
<b>2003</b>					4	1						
<b>2004</b>				5	3	4					5	
<b>2005</b>				13	6	5		1			1	
<b>2006</b>			1	14	4	1			1			
<b>2007</b>					6	3				1	2	1
<b>2008</b>					8	1						1
<b>2009</b>				5				1		1		
<b>Total: 136</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>

Note : individual party members executed 136 education amendments. In addition, 6 amendments were executed by the Bancada do Pernambuco in the state parliament, 12 by the General Rapporteur, and 5 by the education commission of the state parliament.

## 6.4 Institutional Policies to Benefit the Quality of Primary Education

Between 1991 and 2005, Pernambuco, like Ceará, struggled with the challenge of how to universalize primary education while achieving higher quality at the same time. The following section discusses this challenge, and is followed by a historical analysis of institutional policies for primary education under the different secretaries of state for education.

### 6.4.1 Coverage and Quality

The rapid expansion of the public school system at the primary level in Brazil in the 1990s had a positive effect on the enrollment rates in the public municipal system in Pernambuco, whereas the federal and state enrollment rates decreased (see Table 6.3). Between 1991 and 2005, enrollment rates in municipal schools in Pernambuco increased from 40.64 percent to 58.20 percent, while in state schools rates decreased from 43.74 percent to 28.26 percent for the same period.

Due to the constitutional demand to provide universal primary coverage, municipal public schools had to handle more students at the primary level (INEP 2009). Notwithstanding, the expansion of coverage in these schools was not as accentuated in Pernambuco as it was in Ceará, where coverage rates of primary education in 2006 were almost 20 percent higher (see data in Chapter 5). With regards to private schools in Pernambuco, the percentage of enrolled students enrolled slightly decreased from 15.53 percent in 1995 to 13.98 percent in 2006.

**Table 6.3. Enrollment Rates in Pernambuco for all Types of Schools at the Primary Level** (*ensino fundamental, 1st–8th grade*)

	<b>Federal</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Municipal</b>	<b>Public</b> (sum of all three systems)	<b>Private</b>
<b>1991</b>	0.14%	43.74%	40.64%	84.51%	15.49%
<b>1995</b>	0.05%	42.10%	42.31%	84.47%	15.53%
<b>2000</b>	0.06%	34.09%	53.50%	87.66%	12.34%
<b>2006</b>	0.04%	27.49%	58.49%	86.02%	13.98%

Source: INEP/Edudata.

As in the case of Ceará, the incremental increase in enrollment in municipal schools of almost 20 percent in Pernambuco over 15 years meant a challenge to maintain equal quality among the schools and across the municipal systems. As Table 6.4 displays, quality indicators for education, such as rates on completion, class repetition, and dropout, were challenged between 1999 and 2005. If comparing students attending public and private municipal schools those at state schools in indicators such as completion, repetition, dropout, and class age distortion rates, the following can be observed. In 1999 and 2005, Pernambuco's municipal schools had lower completion rates (except for 8<sup>th</sup> graders in 1999), higher-class repetition rates (except for 8<sup>th</sup> graders in 2005), and higher dropout rates (except for 8<sup>th</sup> graders in 1999) if compared to state schools. Concerning class-age distortion rates, the picture is a bit more mixed. While municipal schools had double amount of class distortion for 1st graders in 1999, this is not the case for 4th and 8th graders in the first year. In 2005, class-age distortion rates at municipal level were only lower for 1st graders, but almost double for both 4th and 8th graders, if compared to students at state schools. Thus, a clear trend is not really decipherable, especially for the case of class-age distortion, making it difficult to explain these fluctuations. What is clear is that municipal schools in Pernambuco have not produced much better quality indicators than state schools.

Year/level of jurisdiction (public + private aggregated)	Completion 4th and (8th) grade	Class repetition 4th and (8th) grade	Dropout rates 4th and (8th) grade	Class-age distortion by grade		
				1st	4th	8th
1999 municipal	65.8 (82.6)	18.8 (8.2)	15.4 (9.2)	50	37.5	52.5
1999 state	83.6 (78.6)	9 (6.5)	7.4 (14.9)	24.7	38.7	53.3
2005 municipal	71.7 ( 82.4)	19.1 (11.6)	9.2 (6)	22.3	35.3	47.3
2005 state	82.4 (85.7)	12 (10.7)	5.6 (3.6)	29.7	14.3	24.6
2010 municipal	Not available					
2010 state average	87.8 (78.5)	9.6 (14.2)	2.6 (7.3)	Not available		

Source: Brazilian Ministry of Education and INPE at <http://www.edudatabrasil.inep.gov.br/> and Todos pela Educação at <http://www.todospelaeducacao.org.br/educacao-no-brasil/numeros-do-brasil/dados-por-estado/pernambuco/> [05/08/2011]

Considering the composed performance indicator IDEB (partially calculated with some of the quality indicators explained above), there was a slow improvement of the performance of both 4th and 8th grader between 2005 and 2009. As data for the municipal schools are not available, and the state's average IDEB also includes performance data from the handful of prestigious federal schools existing in the state, it is not possible to accurately compare the performance of the students at the municipal and state levels.

<b>Table 6.5. IDEB Performance Indicator for Pernambuco</b>				
	End of grade 4		End of grade 8	
Year/level	State average	State schools only	State average	State schools only
2005	3.2	3.1	2.7	2.4
2007	3.6	3.5	2.9	2.5
2009	4.1	3.9	3.4	3.0
Source: Saeb and Censo Escolar at <a href="http://ideb.inep.gov.br/Site/">http://ideb.inep.gov.br/Site/</a> [05/08/2011].				

#### 6.4.2 Miguel Arraes' Democratic Start

As was the case in Ceará, Pernambuco had a milestone government between 1987 and 1991, just after Brazil's return to democracy. Yet, in terms of political direction, the incipient governments were different in both states, with Miguel Arraes being an open opponent of the Party of the Liberal Front and the conservative forces in Pernambuco and against the intertwining of public and private interests in governmental policy. Arraes, like Jereissati, was the first governor breaking with old elite forces; however, in contrast to Jereissati, Arraes was politically opposed to the federal government in Brasilia:

“(...) Arraes had been the only politician to break with the continuity of [the PFL] in the government of Pernambuco; this, within the context of a national conjuncture, led to the firing of a real steamroller of the PFL and its allies, since that party, becoming one of the bases of support to President FHC, now had some of its members occupy positions of trust in the federal government (...)” (Albuquerque Canuto 2006: 307).

In Pernambuco, Arraes, who came from a small farming family in Ceará's dry interior Sertão, was governor elect in 1987. Before his election, he practiced as a lawyer and economist and was a member of the PMDB (as Jereissati during his first term). Arraes won the elections with support from both the left (PCB, PB do B, PT and PMDB) and conservative forces.

Similar to Jereissati, Arraes had to break a long-standing political hegemony of conservative forces:

“The election of Arraes meant the rupture of political hegemony from the same party group that, during four legislative periods, had been alternating in power in different historical moments, including the period of strongest authoritarianism (1971–74) until the re-democratization of the country (1983–86)” (Oliveira and al. 2006, 286).

However, Arraes had a different political background from Jereissati, making headlines as early as 1962. He won a landslide victory as governor of Pernambuco, defeated a long-standing sugar-cane oligarchic family, and fought for the implementation of a minimum wage for rural workers. With the advent of the military coup in 1964, Arraes was first imprisoned and later forced into political exile. He was allowed to return to Brazil in 1979.

Retaking his political legacy during the electoral campaign for the governorship of Pernambuco in 1987, Arraes especially appealed to small farmers and rural workers, as well as other low-income groups mobilizing for democracy and citizenship (cf. Weber 1991). His support alliance, the Popular Front, was presented as an alternative way to achieve political democratization. This method encouraged citizens to participate during the design, management, and implementation of public policy, with the goal to de facto realize the de jure social rights catalogue of the Constitution of 1988. After his first year as governor, Arraes pointed out five priority programs as important achievements: (i) one to serve the basic needs of the population; (ii) one to increase the supply of food; (iii) one to promote the expansion and improvement of social services; (iv) one to support the development of small urban and rural production; (v) and to encourage the widening and transformation of the productive base of Pernambuco. All these programs were designed to address the needs and demands of the lower-income population. Oliveira referred to Arraes’ approach as “the new practice of governing,” which meant to make peoples’ participation not only a constitutive, but an integral part of the exercise of governing itself (Oliveira and al. 2006, 268.).

The education policy that started during Arraes’ first term (1987–91), and continued during his second mandate (1995–98), left deep marks in Pernambuco’s political landscape. Arraes he chose Silke Weber as secretary of state, a university professor from the prestigious Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE). As radical as his governing principles were if compared to Brazil’s and Pernambuco’s political landscapes then, the changes Arraes introduced in the education sector during his first mandate were fundamental. Education was emphasized as a social right for all, which, until the Constitution of 1988, was a right from which the majority of Brazil’s rural population was excluded. It is notable that Arraes’ advocacy for this fundamental right started even before it was mandated by the Constitution of 1988.

After the Constitution of 1988 was adopted, challenges to develop and improve education policies and the necessary actions to confront these challenges became subjects of intensive public debate in rural and urban areas, naturally including municipal administrations, their mayors, and diverse civil society organizations through a comprehensive mobilization process. Mobile brigades in Pernambuco led to a new line of interaction and the

establishment of networks based on the belief that positions of different actors had to be heard in order to formulate a pluralistic education policy. The state secretary of education, Silke Weber, organized public forums in the state's regional education departments to introduce the new education principles laid out in the Constitution, the National Education Law, and the state's education policy. In a personal interview, Weber described these early attempts as follows:

“A great path was embarked on in Pernambuco. This included the systematization of the debate about the construction of existing public policies (for example the itinerant debates), the discussion of problems, and the best ways to guide and create networks among the municipalities so they would start supporting each other. This way it is possible to know how to support the wealth and poverty of each municipality. The big question in the Brazilian case has always been the question about the continuities and discontinuities of public policy” (Weber 2009).

Some remarkable steps were made during Weber's first mandate. As a result of the mentioned public mobilization, these included (i) the prioritization of literacy education for children in grades 1 to 4, youths, and adults; (ii) the improvement of teachers' working conditions, for example through the creation of support educators (*educadores de apoio*) that supported both the state school teachers their supervisors in classroom engagement; (iii) the introduction of a public, competitive selection processes of directors and teachers in state schools (and the failed attempt to streamline municipal legislation accordingly); (iv) and shared management among the state and municipal governments (*gestão compartilhada*) together with jointly formulated education priorities and the creation of a unified school system. In an interview in 2009, Weber emphasized the shared management principles as an important tool to change education quality:

“We had a program that we called ‘shared management’, which was a joint effort among the state, the federation and municipalities. We sat down with the municipalities to discuss how we were distributing the budget, as well as the wages and what would be the counterparts to be financed by the municipalities. In a state government, one cannot run a school without talking to the municipality, and the municipality cannot run a school without talking to the state and so on” (Weber 2009).

To encourage these principles, a set of 10 programs were included in the state's education plan 1987–1991 (Oliveira and al. 2006, 273; Weber 2009). The overall focus was the quality of public education and access of the population to primary education. However, and in contrast to Pernambuco's prior state education policy, Weber's education administration made consciously autonomous choices that were not always in agreement with the Federal Ministry of Education (Oliveira et al. 2006, 272) or the federal conservative government of President Sarney. This political autonomy had disadvantageous repercussions in terms of receiving needed federal financial support. According to Antunes and Oliveira, Pernambuco's education sector received less than half of 1986's federal finances between 1987 and 1991, when the state's government left-leaning progressive approach greatly



contrasted with the federal government of Sarney, which was viewed as being clientelistic and hegemonic (Antunes cit. in Oliveira et al. 2006, 272). Weber describes the complicated financial situation as following:

“[The financial situation was one of] a national political-economic conjuncture, being unfavorable for the development of programs in the education area [...] Pernambuco required the state education secretariat to develop initiatives based on local resources, whose multiplier effect would be able to irradiate the entire public education system” (Weber 1991 cit. in Oliveira et al. 2006: 273).

Criticism towards Arraes’ leadership also emerged amongst public employees, state deputies, and civil society organizations.

“During the whole period, the government of Arraes had to confront difficulties [...] especially with the public functionalism when sectors of the labor unions accused Arraes of not being able to introduce a more popular and progressive content in its administration, and for being caught up with the compromises he made with anti-popular segments of its political alliance” (Sampaio and Ferreira 1996 cit. in Oliveira et al. 2006: 269).

Arraes was even accused of taking a centralizing and authoritarian practice with regards to his democratic discourse (ibid, 270). The different interpretations presented in Oliveira et al. 2006 point out that Arraes became caught up between the political-clientelistic play of the federal government of President Sarney, which led to an increasingly difficult national economic situation with high levels of inflation, an extreme centralization of financial means in the hands of the federal government, and the withdrawal of Arraes’ political support at state level due to these ruptures. Arraes was not reelected as governor of Pernambuco in 1991,<sup>122</sup> and was replaced by Joaquim Francisco, a center-right, Sarney-supported conservative (PFL; 1991–1994).<sup>123</sup>

#### 6.4.3 Pernambuco’s Education Sector Under Arraes II, 1995–1998

Despite Arraes defeat in 1991, and after a strongly conservative, federally aligned governorship under Joaquim Francisco, Arraes was reelected as governor of Pernambuco in 1995. He again opted for Silke Weber as his secretary of education, allowing her to continue the lines of action proposed previously between 1987 and 1991.

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<sup>122</sup> According to Oliveira et al. (2006, 271), despite different viewpoints of authors about Arraes, all of them unanimously conclude that his 1987–1991 term was an important milestone for Brazil’s fight of redemocratization. Some said that his approach might have been too radical and premature for its time, and that he had taken progressive steps that the federal government in Brasilia was not ready to embrace yet (ibid.).

<sup>123</sup> The contrast between the leadership of Arraes and Joaquim Francisco could not have been stronger. After Arraes progressive, left governorship, the reigns were handed to Joaquim Francisco, the cousin of a former political ally of Ernesto Geisel, one of Brazil’s most cruel military dictators and former Minister of the Interior under President Sarney. Needless to say, the state experienced a drastic shift in the political situation during these four years, with two different secretaries of education.

The biggest challenges that Weber had to cope with from 1995 onwards were access to education and, to a much greater extent, education quality. The innovative approaches initiated in 1987 were retaken, with a clear absence of policy continuity during the mandate of the PFL 1981–1995 due to political-ideological differences. Public mobilization was reemphasized and extended in the form of interactive regional fora, and meetings with mayors, municipal education secretaries, and sectorial commissions.

An important goal of the decentralization of education in Pernambuco was the formulation and implementation of a common education strategy for the state and the municipalities. Weber stresses the validity of this concept, developed in Pernambuco in 1995, and its relevance for the current discussion about quality of education:

“The relationship between municipalization and the collaborative regime is a very close relationship. What would be desirable for the system of collaboration would be a common definition of management policy, a single public network with joint training and joint enrollment: common schools where vacancies are offered to those who need them independently of whether it is a municipal or a state school vacancy” (Weber 2009).

In striving to strengthen school management, pedagogical planning, and financial autonomy of municipal administrations, the impact of clientelistic practices were weakened, for example, through the establishment of a state legislation, creating school councils across the state; the initiative for the democratic election of directors in both state and municipal schools (which failed in the state assembly on the municipal part); two public statewide teacher recruitment processes in 1997; and joint teacher training (Albuquerque Canuto 2006, 313).

Following the initial attempt under Arraes to enhance a shared management system between state and municipal schools, Weber reiterated the importance of collaborative and cooperative thinking and action in regards to the two existing education systems (it is a similar approach put forward in Ceará’s education policy under Sofia Lerche 15 years earlier). In order to universalize education with quality, public action was necessary and would be more effective by avoiding any duplication and dispersion of efforts (Oliveria et al. 2006, 282). As part of shared management, the state government signed agreements with 155 municipalities and the municipal education association UNDIME (Albuquerque Canuto de 2006, 323).

At the end of Arraes second mandate in 1998, Weber presented the results of a comprehensive and detailed 200-page action plan reviewing the main principles, policy guidelines, specific programs, the financing of these agreements, the educational situation, the principal problems detected, and the respective education statistics (Seduc 1998). Positive results were detected for all students aged 10-year-olds, including illiterates, and 12-year-olds that had only received at least one year of schooling before. Coverage of primary education increased from 83.3 percent in 1995 to 92.6 percent in 1998. Completion rates for primary education increased from 61.8 percent in 1995 to 70.8 percent in 1998. Consequently, repetition rates dropped from 22.4 percent to 13.8 percent during the same

period. At the same time, the portion of the budget spent in education more than doubled, from 14 percent in 1995 to 28.9 percent in 1998 (Albuquerque Canuto 2006, 324).

As during his first mandate, state and education policy under Arraes' second mandate remained quite autonomous from the federal policy. In fact, Arraes was an outspoken opponent of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who came into office in 1995 (during Arraes' second term). Arraes deeply disagreed with the neoliberal approach put forward by Cardoso and the clientelistic relationship he encouraged between the private and public sector:

“In relation to the central government, Arraes fundamentally disagreed with the ‘agenda of modernization’ and with ‘the new project of development’ which, linked to the president’s proposal, had the basic premise the unavoidability and internationalization of the economy given the process of globalization, especially in relation to capital flows and technology. He also diverged with the direction defended by FHC [Fernando Henrique Cardoso] for the project of development since it was opposed to the national-developmentalism started with President Getúlio Vargas” (Albuquerque Canuto 2006, 306).

Some authors argue that Arraes' open opposition against Cardoso was costly for his own political survival in Pernambuco.

Which preliminary conclusions can be drawn when comparing the situations in Ceará and Pernambuco for the period prior to 1998, and which historical factor has remained present in today's education policy in both states? To a certain extent, there are similarities in the approaches taken in the education sector in both cities; yet, they were undertaken under quite different political paradigms in Pernambuco. Three main differences stand out here. First, there was a close collaboration between the city and the municipalities in terms of the management of education systems in a very early period (and much earlier than in Ceará). Second, there was an attempt to incorporate demands from civil society organizations and teachers' unions into governmental policy without necessarily undercutting their political autonomy. Third, there was an open opposition to President FHC which led to a very autonomous, albeit politically unsupported state education policy from the national government. Ceará, by contrast, implemented the education policy directives of the Ministry of Education, and governor Jereissati had FHC's full political and party support.

#### *6.4.4 Education Policy After 1998: Discontinuities and Coping with Post-Decentralization Reforms*

Pernambuco's education sector has seen impressive, early policy initiatives, but also many discontinuities, especially after 1998. Over 16 years, six secretaries of education held office, each with different political opinions, ambitions, and approaches. Likewise, management approaches of how to achieve education quality have been different, decreasing the likelihood of generating continuous policies with sustainable results, which is in contrast to what happened in Ceará.

*The Discontinuity of Progressive Education Policy, 1999–2002*

The cooperation between state and municipalities was reemphasized under all subsequent education administrations after Silke Weber, but with decreasing importance. Between 1999 and 2006, Jarbas Vasconcelos, from the center-right party PMDB, governed Pernambuco. Vasconcelos had been an ally of Miguel Arraes against the military dictatorship in 1964, but became one of his largest opponents during this later period.

Despite efforts during Vasconcelos' eight-year governorship, education policy weakened and became less visible. At least two out of the four secretaries of state for education that served under Vasconcelos were recruited based on their political ideology rather than their technical preparedness:

“[The] mentioned education secretaries—Efreim de Aguiar Maranhão, ex-Rector of the UPFE; Raul Henry, ex-vice mayor in the last mandate of Jarbas in the city hall of Recife; and Francisco de Assis, who concluded the governments' mandate [of 1999–2002]—were recruited according to their political affiliation, and, with the exception of the first one, giving a sequence to a tradition only interrupted by Arraes' governments (Oliveira et al. 2006: 335).

Further, competitive teacher recruitment processes did not take place during Vasconcelos' first mandate, being a ground-breaking principle during Arraes' terms to decrease clientelism in the public administration. The head of the education department at the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE) believes that the education policy was abandoned; was not politically autonomous; was extremely inefficient during this period; and was only seriously retaken in 2007 (Batista Neto 2009). The head of the state's parliamentary education commission, Teresa Leitao, also shares this opinion:

“I would prefer autonomy of intellectual formulation and implementation of public policies generated and implemented by the Secretariat of Education. Obviously it needs partners, but the secretariat has lost its identity [...]. You have a state education plan to get through that remained in the drawer for ten years. First of all, with this type of program, you will not affirm a public space for justice and rights. Second, why don't you affirm public space in a way it produces and builds up its competence and effectiveness?” (Teresa Leitao, 07/04/2010).

Success was acknowledged though for the passing of state legislation in 2001, enabling the election of state school directors based on technical criteria and direct vote by the school community (Pernambuco 2001b ). This was an important step to decrease political indication in the education sector (Henry 2010). In the same year, the statewide performance indicator, the System of Education Performance of Pernambuco (SAEPE) (similar to the methodology of the national SAEB), was created to closely measure the performance of students in Pernambuco's schools (Pernambuco 2001a).

A fundamental change in the funding sources took place under Vasconcelos. First, the state was able to considerably increase its financial budget due to the privatization of the electric company Celpe, providing Pernambuco with its best financial standing in the state's history. Second, during his two mandates, the education secretariat actively involved the private sector and other parties' funding, both from the state and international level (World Bank and UNCESCO), inciting its financial participation in education policy (Oliveira in Oliveira 2006, 335). This step evidences the strong ideological difference between Vasconcelos and Arraes. Private sector financing was not present in Pernambuco's education policies, at least at the primary and secondary levels. Interviewees from Pernambuco's education sector had different opinions on this lack of funding. Supporters argued that private funding was fundamental in a poor state like Pernambuco, while the opponents, represented mainly by left-wing parties and teachers' unions, argued that granting the social right to equal quality education for all should be the exclusive responsibility of the public sector (Araújo 2010; Henry 2010; Leitão 2010; Neves Ramos 2010; Nunes 2010).

#### *Progress Under Mozart Nemes Ramos (2003–2007)*

During the two terms of Jarbas Vasconcelos (1999–2006), Pernambuco's education sector struggled, as did the education sector in Ceará during this period, which raised the question of how to achieve increased coverage and quality of education after the decentralization boom under FUNDEF in the second half of the 1990s. Given the multilayered problems with coverage in preschool and secondary school, and with the quality of primary education, the appointed state secretary of education, Mozart Neves Ramos, decided to prioritize primary education between 2003 and 2007, especially literacy education of primary level students. In order to reach this goal, the participation of municipal schools, which serve most students at this level, was crucial. State and federal funds were used to improve the physical infrastructure of public primary schools, and to cofinance the literacy and acceleration programs (Neves Ramos 2010).

“I came as rector of the UFPE from higher education to basic education, encountering a totally different reality, and, as secretary, finding a difficult state school network with one of the worst education indices, lack of infrastructure, and lack of staff and teachers; there was no integration with the municipalities. Thus, it is very important that there is coordination with the municipalities (...). I created a unit that took care of the collaborative regime and a council for inter-municipal cooperation. The objective of this council was to establish joint activities with the municipalities, and to define joint priorities with them” (Neves Ramos 2010).

Following this principle, the education secretariat signed binding agreements with 181 out of the 184 municipalities, inciting them to join the literacy efforts of the state government. In 2001, education performance indicators in Pernambuco revealed that despite the fact that 65 percent of the students in second grade passed and continued on to the third grade, many of these students still were still illiterate. An estimated 45 percent of students from all fundamental state schools had prevalence of class-age distortion, and 40 percent of these

were illiterate (Pernambuco 2004). Given these indicators, in 2003 the state government of Pernambuco introduced the literacy program “*Literacy with Success*” (Alfabetizar com Sucesso), with the main objective of ensuring literacy amongst 1st and 2nd graders (children ages 7 and 8). Until 2011, it was the main public program to teach literacy at early school age.

A second program, Be Alert and Accelerate (Se Liga e Acelera), is aimed at correcting class-age distortion of students aged 9 to 14 that still do not know how to read or write, despite being in school for many years.<sup>124</sup> Together, the state government of Pernambuco, the Ayrton Senna Institute, and the “Entrepreneurial Leadership Group Entrepreneurs for Human Development” (Líderes Empresários pelo Desenvolvimento Humano; LIDE/EDH) finance both programs. In 2007, the programs were offered in 894 schools in 179 municipalities.

Despite a relatively high financial liquidity stemming from the privatization of the electricity network, Neves Ramos points out the lack of funding for the education sector during his mandate. He argues that the challenges faced in 2003 could not have been tackled without private sector funding and development loans from the World Bank. The continuity of two institutional principles during Mozart’s mandate can be highlighted: the enhancing of democratic management principles with respect to the recruitment of school directors and the furthering of collaboration with municipalities:

“I wanted to end the political appointment of school directors, and achieve a democratic implementation of management principles. Therefore, I made it a condition that in order to be director, he or she had to pass a qualification test, a community vote, training, examination, election, and had to sign a management contract. School directors sometimes get confused. When they are elected, they confuse their responsibility with sovereignty, and without any pedagogical orientation regarding their goals and duties. We needed a culture of management control. This principle seems to apply to business companies only, but this is not true. It has to be applied universally to everybody” (Neves Ramos 2010).

Neves Ramos states that the collaboration with municipalities is important because the collaborative regime is normatively insufficient. It is necessary to decrease clientelism at the municipal level and to support the quality control efforts of the federal government, which is overwhelmed with its duties:

“I am convinced that when a municipality is well-managed, it is better because the state has no arms and eyes to reach out to all municipalities. The problem is that the management of the municipality is overly politicized. It receives political support from [federal or state] deputies, and at times political interests are opposed to educational interests. There is no supporting infrastructure to supervise all municipal schools. The

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<sup>124</sup> In 2003, more than half (56.9 percent) of the students in primary education suffered from class-age distortion. Illiteracy for children aged 10–14 accounted for almost 10 percent (9.81 percent), while for children over 15, this rate is more than twice (21.74 percent; *ibid*: 14).

political question is even more pronounced in the interior. When the federal or state legislator is the mayor's political enemy, the difficulties of collaboration are very large. The collaborative regime is a requirement of decentralization” (Neves Ramos 2010).

In this very last aspect, Neves Ramos’ opinion is quite similar to that of former secretary of state for education Silke Weber, despite the fact that both ex-secretaries did not necessarily share similar political backgrounds; however, they both had technical preparedness.

Neves Ramos’ suggestion for how to deal with the loosely collaborative regime in Brazil’s federalism is threefold. First, it is important to have a national education plan in which the challenges of each federal level are acknowledged. With this acknowledgment, complementary and aligned action of educational strategies could more easily be put into place amongst the different federal levels. Second, it is necessary to define appropriate legislation for each federal level in normative terms. Third, lawmakers must create an accountability law in order to make each federal level responsible for the achievement of certain objectives. At the same time, the state level needs sufficient funding for the proper accompaniment of municipal education systems (Neves Ramos 2010). Partially, the vision of Neves Ramos has been influenced by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, emphasizing accountability mechanisms as part of a set of institutional recommendations when lending to state governments such as Pernambuco.

#### *Recent Education Policy (Post 2007)*

In the most recent period, many former education programs are being continued or extended. With the inception of FUNDEB in 2007, the state government continued to focus on improving the quality of primary education; however, the focus was extended to programs targeting secondary education and childcare. The following is a selection of Pernambuco’s education programs:

- Program “Learn More” was created in 2008 for students at the end of each educational level in Brazil: grades 4, 8, and 11. Through this program, students receive additional, media-based afterschool support to improve their competences in math and Portuguese. The program adds one hour of teaching in these two subjects, not only to raise learning achievements but also to keep students associated with higher dropout risks in school.
- The program “Knowledge of the Earth,” jointly financed by the state (transportation and information) and federal government (didactic material and information), aims at increasing the attendance of rural students aged 18 and older who had dropped out at some earlier point in their schooling. Given the age group and different cultural contexts, the program has a mixed theoretical and practical learning approach. Students alternate between attending classes some days and working others. The program integrates actors such as unions and social and municipal movements.

- The program “Active School,” a federally financed and managed program for state and municipal schools created in 1998, benefits rural students in grades 1 through 4. In contrast to the common class structure, this program groups rural students of different ages in the same class (multi-serial classes). With Pernambuco’s big rural interior, 182 out of 184 municipalities are currently active in the program.
- Besides the literacy and acceleration program, the program “Mother Owl of Pernambuco” is the only non-federally managed program that the state government of Pernambuco has developed. It aims at increasing the school attendance of pregnant teens and teenage mothers. It is run by the state’s first lady, and combines regular curriculum with cultural, literacy, health, and employment components.

Most education programs offered by Pernambuco’s state government have—with the few exceptions mentioned herein—followed the advice and management principles of the federal government in Brasilia. This tendency was especially strong during the first mandate of Vasconcelos, and also after 2007. In addition, the public sector invited the private sector to join efforts, which gave a mixed picture with respect to the politics of federalism at Pernambuco’s state level. Federally or privately financed and managed programs have gained certain autonomy, not only from the state, but also from municipal governments. This might come as a surprise if considering that from 2007 onwards, Eduardo Campos, the grandson of former governor Miguel Arraes, has been Pernambuco’s state governor. Campos has been elected twice (in 2007 and in 2011), with the support of the center-party PSB.<sup>125</sup> During his first mandate, a minimum wage was implemented in Pernambuco (see section below). Campos’ education secretary also introduced incentive-based payment for teachers. This so-called “Bônus por Desempenho na Educação” (BDE) is a system by which each school of the state system sets performance measures for each school based on their average school flux and the grade levels of students in the state evaluation exams. If a school complies with the set measures, all teachers receive an additional monthly salary at the end of the year. If it cannot comply, the state government will provide funding for extra teaching time for students and pedagogical interventions. Within the first year after the system was put into place, more than 700 state schools and 470 teachers in the state system received the bonus payments (Pernambuco 2009a).

With regards to the Brazilian federal arrangement, in 2009 the education secretariat disseminated a technical note entitled “Orientation for the collaborative regime between the policies of the state and the municipalities.” This note provides a legal review and institutional orientation about the collaborative regime between the state and municipal governments in Pernambuco. It defines this regime as “a change of relationship culture between the federal entities” (Barbosa cit. in Pernambuco 2009b, 26).

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<sup>125</sup> Unfortunately, a more comprehensive judgment of the secretary of education between 2007 and 2010, Danilo Cabral, was not possible since the education secretariat did not support the respective field research for this dissertation.



The author of the document, Maria das Graças de Oliveira—a very knowledgeable researcher and former chief advisor of secretary of state Silke Weber—shows that the current state administration is reinforcing some of the institutional principles developed in Pernambuco at the end of the 1980s.

### **6.5 Interim Summary**

At the beginning of the 1990s, Pernambuco, similar to Ceará, faced many challenges in its goal to offer universal, quality primary education. Schools at the state and municipal level struggled to cope with the challenges at hand, such as illiteracy amongst students, insufficiently trained teachers, overwhelmed public administrations, and the complexities of administering resources, planning their budgets, and implementing education policy.

Remarkably, in 1986, right after the end of a military dictatorship, the first democratic governor, Miguel Arraes, was elected in Pernambuco. Having gone through torture and persecution of the dictatorship, Arraes stood for the empowerment of impoverished rural and urban classes, including through education. Until 1998, the impact of his vision was visible in Pernambuco's education sector, including in the institutionalization of open and critical dialogue among civil society, parents' associations, teachers' unions, and, most importantly, the municipal education systems. These systems grew stronger and more integrated into a holistic system of state education policy in which the goal of most policies was the improvement of the management capacities of municipal administrations. A strong collaborative regime and management systems shared between state and municipal education systems was at the forefront of the efforts of the state secretary of education under Arraes, Silke Weber. Weber acknowledged that this was the only way to achieve universal quality and coverage of primary education for all. Yet, this progressive start in the education sector was interrupted and often altered by the political changes after Arraes' left office.

While Pernambuco's education administrations emphasized the importance of a strong collaborative regime on paper and in public education plans, municipal education systems were often not included in policy efforts of the state government. Given the many political changes and the establishment of different political networks (see section below), Weber was torn between the many different political opinions, ideologies, pedagogical concepts, and political power struggles. Through 2003, at least, this resulted in many discontinuities, a loss of political autonomy of municipal administrations, and political favoritism in the social policy sector, where continuous efforts are crucial to achieving long-term quality education. In this sense, unlike Ceará, Pernambuco has not shown how to positively use the leeway granted by Brazil's federalism. The following section will explore the role of political networks in Pernambuco's education sector.

## 6.6 Political Networks in Pernambuco’s Education Sector

### 6.6.1 Political Competition and Networks with the National Party Level

During the period 1995–2010, there was considerable party competition in Pernambuco, a contrast to the situation in Ceará. As mentioned throughout the previous section, continuity of education policy was often interrupted because of changing party affiliations and ideological differences between the different incumbent state administrations.

**Table 6.6. Political Affiliations and Leaders at the State and National Levels, Pernambuco**

	1987–91	1991–94	1995–98	1999–2002	2003–06	2006–10	2011–14
Party/governor at the state level	PMDB/ Miguel Arraes I	PFL/ J. Cavalcanti	PSB/ Miguel Arraes II	PMDB/ Jarbas Vasconcelos	PMDB/ Jarbas Vasconcelos	PSB/ Eduardo Campos	PSB/ Eduardo Campos
Party/president at national level	PFL/ J. Sarney	PRN/PMDB F.Collor/I. Franco	PSDB/ F.H.Cardoso	PSDB/ F.H.Cardoso	PT/ Lula	PT/ Lula	PT/ Dilma Rouseff

Due to strong political competition, there were few governing majorities in the period under observation in both Pernambuco and Ceará. However, in Pernambuco, elections indeed brought about fierce party competition between the left- and center-right until 1999. Miguel Arraes’ two terms were interrupted by a four-year intermezzo of the Party of the Liberal Front, a center-right party. In 1999, Arraes lost the elections again, this time handing power over to the Party of the Democratic Brazilian Movement (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB), one of the largest center-oriented Brazilian parties.

The PMDB had to ally with the PFL during two consecutive terms (1999–2006) in order to attain the necessary political majority in the so-called “Union of Pernambuco” (PMDB/PFL). During the elections of the state assembly in 1998, the PMDB only won 11.1 percent of votes, while the PFL won 19.3 percent. In 2002, votes for both parties decreased (PMDB: 14.7 percent; PFL 10.8 percent), but were still enough to lead to a governing majority in conjunction with other center-right parties allied (TSE 2010). In comparison to the 1990 and 1994 elections, in the 2002 and 2006 elections, votes were distributed more evenly across several parties. While in 1990 and 1994, only three parties obtained above 10 percent of the total votes in the state assembly (and the PFL’s share increased from 26.3 percent to 30.2 percent), in 2002 and 2006 five and four parties, respectively, claimed between 10 to 15 percent of the total votes. Given that the voter base of the PFL is (neo-) mainly liberally oriented businessmen and entrepreneurs, it is not surprising that the private sector was asked to provide financial support for education policies, and that the pluralist-democratic approach of Arraes faded out (IUPERJ 2010).

Political networks between the federal and state administrations in Pernambuco greatly affected the way in which state education policies were formulated and implemented.

Diverging party affiliations were prevalent, especially between 1987 to 1991 and 1995 to 1998. During these periods, Miguel Arraes was an outspoken opponent of the center-right national leader, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. According to the historical analysis of education policy presented in the above section, this opposition between Arraes and Cardoso resulted in a lack of political and financial support from the national government. Party affinity between the two government levels was reestablished under Jarbas Vasconcelos (PMDB) in 1999. Vasconcelos aligned with President Cardoso, whose presidential election was supported by a coalition between the PSDB and the PFL, PTB, PP, and parts of the PMDB. Vasconcelos testified to this change: “He...[FHC] told me several times that he could not help Pernambuco [previously] because he had no affinity with Arraes. Now he has a faithful co-religionist” (Vasconcelos cit. in Oliveira et al. 2006, 335).

Eduardo Campos, the grandson of Arraes and supported by the PSB, was elected as governor in 2006 and is now in his second term (2010–14). His governance seems to indicate a potential return to Pernambuco’s leftist legacy under Arraes, however in a very different national political landscape. Campos served as Arraes’ chief of staff in 1987 and as his state secretary for finance in 1994. Later, in 2004 and 2005, he served as federal Minister for Science and Technology under leftist President Lula. Campos successfully defeated political opponents supported by Vasconcelos and the PFL in 2006, and won his first governorship with more than 60 percent of votes in the second round. In 2010, Campos had the full support of the federal government and President Lula, enabling him to win with more than 80 percent of the votes, hereby directly defeating Vasconcelos who had run for the PFL as candidate. With the state’s political alignment with the center-left PSB (as was the case in Ceará), and the national level’s alignment with the left PT, Pernambuco will likely have continuous support from the federal level, including for its education policy.

In summary, both party competition and political networks between the state and federal level are prevalent factors in the case of Pernambuco. A difference can be observed in Ceará where there was little party competition during the observed period, and party networks with the national level strengthened its education policy during more periods than in Pernambuco. Another difference can be observed in the political networks between the state government and state teachers' unions in Pernambuco.

### *6.6.2 Networks and Interactions with Teachers' Unions*

As outlined in Chapter 3, in 2009, 42.7 percent of Pernambuco’s teachers of grades 1 through 4 had higher education degrees, while in Ceará, 62 percent did. While Ceará’s numbers were higher than Brazil’s average, the amount of teachers in Pernambuco with a higher education is just slightly higher than the northeastern average (40.4 percent). As in Ceará and the rest of Brazil, Pernambuco’s primary education teachers are predominantly women (84 percent). They work mostly in one school (87 percent versus 84 percent in Ceará and 81 percent in Brazil) and predominantly in schools in urban areas (74 percent versus 70 percent in Ceará and 83 in Brazil). Differences exist between the two cities, however, with regards to the administrative system to which teachers belong. While in Ceará more teachers

work in municipal schools (61.5 percent), in Pernambuco more than half (52.3 percent) of teachers work in municipal schools. At the same time, 23.9 percent of the municipal teachers in Pernambuco teach at the proportion of teachers in state-led schools (23.9 percent), being almost 10 percent higher than in Ceará (14 percent) (MEC/INPE/DTDIE 2009). This means that Pernambuco's municipal school coverage is lower than the coverage in Ceará. Consequently, the degree of administrative decentralization at the municipal level is lower, as pointed out in the section above displaying a lower proportion of primary school coverage at municipal in Pernambuco.

In 2009, a senior public official of Pernambuco's state administration described the considerable challenges in the education and training of teachers at the primary and secondary levels:

“In Pernambuco's state schools, we have 27,000 teachers, and 16,000 do not teach subjects that they have appropriate studies for. For example, teachers that studied physics have to teach math. In order to resolve this, we are offering, together with the Ministry of Education within the National Education Plan, a second specialized degree for teachers, but with less working hours in the classroom at the same time. In this way, we hope to offer more open positions to match the existing demand” (Porto 2009).

As in Ceará, Pernambuco has several teachers' unions at the municipal level; but in contrast to Ceará, there Pernambuco has only one teachers' union at the state level (SINTEPE, Sindicato dos Trabalhadores em Educação de Pernambuco). Four separate groups united and formed SINTEPE in 1990. Today, SINTEPE has approximately 20,000 members representing the interests of teachers and teaching staff in the state's education sector. Through separate agreements, SINTEPE also collaborates with the municipal teachers' unions. During an interview, the current president, Helena Araújo, pointed out the strong commitment of Pernambuco's teachers' union to improve the teacher's working and salary conditions. However, she also highlighted the real interest of the teacher's union to improve education quality. Since 1987, the relationship between the teachers' union and the state government has evolved, as summarized by Araújo:

“From 1995 to 1998, we had a third term: the third government of Miguel Arraes. This was a period during which the relationship with the union was based on dialogue. Silke Weber was the secretary of education, and we had the opportunity to build two very important laws for the organization of the category [the teacher union]: law 11,329 of 1996 setting the rules and regulations of teaching and law 1,559 of 1998, establishing a career plan for teachers. It took 12 years to work and agree on both (...) from the onset of the first administration under Arraes who started a dialogue about these two instruments. After Arraes' first term, the government of the PFL took over and suspended any dialogue. Then Arraes' government returned [in 1995] and dialogue was retaken (...) From 1998 to 2006, (...) under Jarbas Vasconcelos (...), we lost our relationship [with the union], characterized by dialogue that lacked its process in the sense of constructing a

base that could strengthen and professionally value education. This space of dialogue and this strengthening was dismantled” (Araújo 2010).

In 1987, an education policy was instituted in Pernambuco that emphasized the democratic debate about what the state’s education sector would need to be in order to provide quality education; however, this approach was later abandoned. Civil society organizations, and especially the teachers' union, were not consulted as equal partners in the design and implementation of public policy. In an interview in 2010, Pernambuco’s secretary of education under governor Vasconcelos, Raul Henry, defended this decision:

“I call it the contamination of unions. I think that the role of the union is a legitimate role, and they must have a place in society. You cannot manage the system without taking the quality of education as a first reference. There cannot be corporate interests that take priority, because the interest of the pupil has to be the interest of society and the interest of the quality of education. And very often, when educational leaders come from the unionized base, they put their corporate interest first. This is my critique” (Henry 2010).

Despite the fact that Araújo characterized the eight years of the governorship of Vasconcelos as a lost period, Mozart Neves Ramos, a former secretary of education discussed previously, had a different attitude towards teachers' unions:

“The relationship between a government and the labor unions is political engineering. Sometimes they did not agree with what I did, but this is part of democracy, and I always tried to integrate them however possible. When I entered the state government, the relationship between SINTEPE and the state government was very bad. You can never marry the unions, but you need to flirt with them. And one has to have an enormous level of patience for the political process. There are also several policy fronts within the unions, and [at the same time] you need to feel the majority within your own party to reach collaboration. You have to know the value for which you can negotiate; you have to create a bridge between the unions and the hard basis of the government. In the first place, the unions want to be heard. But what could I have done without the support of my own basis? I tried to understand how to resolve this [dilemma], but at the same time, knowing that I could not change the financial budget. Consequently, I could not promise anything to the unions. I called the unions to participate in policy and its planning in decisive moments (...) I tried not to cause any confusion with the unions, and they acknowledged the progress that was made during my tenure; at least this is what they told me at the end of it” (Ramos Neves 2010).

In this interview passage, Neves Ramos shows respect for the teachers' unions and their demands, but at the same time the realistic knowledge that governmental policy has to take its own positions and decisions at a certain point.

SINTEPE argues that, with the exception of education policy under Silke Weber, government policies were almost exclusively about teachers' salaries. SINTEPE’s representatives felt they had never been treated as political partners in decision about

education policy and its quality (as, for example, was reflected above in the interview with Raul Henry). The opinion of the teachers' union and the current head of the state's assembly education commission is that the state government was authoritative and increasingly conservative in the education sector, at least until 2007 (Araújo 2010; Leitão 2010).

The teachers' union also felt excluded from discussions of the implementation of the state's literacy and acceleration program, *Se liga e Accelera*. The head of the state's assembly education commission, Teresa Leitão, confirmed that the teachers' unions were not included in such dialogue, resulting in institutional challenges for making this program an integral part of education policy for all:

“The unions have had great difficulty in their dialogues with the government. The debate is frustrating and very limited to questions of wages and working committees (...) The government does not make space to discuss pedagogical formulation. We do not discuss the techniques used by teachers in the classroom, who are monitored by the Institute of Management Development [of the program *Se liga e Accelera*] (...) Temporary professionals are hired for this, working for a short period of time. These professionals work inside schools, teaching content to students, counting the amount of classes taught, their quality etc. I do not know how this will be evaluated. How will teachers improve their teaching practice (...) I don't think that the government sees the [teachers'] unions as a political-pedagogical subject. And the two strikes that took place shook up the relation. There is no more confidence in the relationship—neither on one side, nor on the other” (Leitão 2010).

According to the Leitão, something similar has happened with the municipal interest organization UNDIME, which represents municipal teachers. UNDIME was neither called for a capacity building of teachers, nor did it participate in the planning and teaching process of the *Se Ligue e Accelera* program.

Despite the lack of communication with teachers, their unions, and municipal interest representation, Pernambuco was the first state of the Brazilian federation that committed to the implementation of the constitutionally set monthly minimum wage of 950 Reais for teachers in 2009, and later decided to voluntarily raise it to 1050 Reais.<sup>126</sup> This is a considerable improvement, given that salaries of Pernambuco's teacher were amongst the worst in Brazil before the reform (Melo; Tenorio 2009). However, raising teachers' salaries will not automatically change education's quality. Teacher's wages in Brazil are the worst in comparison to any other professions, including other public employees, lawyers, or

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<sup>126</sup> The Brazilian Constitution with law 11.738 requires the implementation of payment of a monthly minimum wage for teachers of R\$950 for a maximum of 40 hours of weekly work for teachers at the beginning of their careers. From total working time, two-thirds of the hours are supposed to be spent in the class room, and one-third for pedagogical preparation. The basis for this law passed in July 2008 was already set out in the LDB since 1996, but without demanding concrete steps or a timeline until when to implement it in the public schools of basic education in all states and municipalities.

university professors.<sup>127</sup> The result is that teachers work several shifts, are frequently overworked, and are often poorly prepared for classes and their students. Comparative data of the National Council of Education Secretariats (CONSED) gives an overview of teachers' salaries in Brazilian states before the law in 2009. In some cases salaries were extremely low, and also extremely unequal compared to those in other states, as well as amongst states of the same region:

Acre	North	1,498.00
Bahia	Northeast	648.79
Distrito Federal	Center	827.42
Mato Grosso	Center south	723.31
Minas Gerais	Center	328.88
Pará	North	370.79
Paraná	South	665.23
<b>Pernambuco</b>	<b>Northeast</b>	<b>369.60</b>
Rio de Janeiro	Southeast	540.65
Rio Grande do Sul	South	504.20
Santa Catarina	South	579.28
São Paulo	Center	863.84
Sergipe	Northeast	818.40
Source: CONSED <a href="http://www.ac.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=1564&amp;Itemid=116">http://www.ac.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=1564&amp;Itemid=116</a> [05/11/09]		

## 6.7 Polity-Constraining Policy Outcomes

### 6.7.1 Accountability During Policy Implementation

As outlined in chapter 4, Brazil will not be able to reach higher education quality at the primary level if municipal education sectors are not properly integrated and supported in their policy planning and execution. In Ceará, the strong collaboration between state and municipal governments has been the core of developing strong education policy and in enabling and strengthening the education institutions created by federalism. However, in Pernambuco, policies have been implemented with much less control and monitoring, leading to a fragile type of accountability within the public education administration, which has constrained, rather than enabled, a federal collaborative regime. This lack of collaboration between state and municipal levels can be observed in the poorly formulated

<sup>127</sup> According to the Brazilian household survey PNAD in 2006, a Brazilian judge earned a monthly salary of 13,000 R\$, a federal politician 5847 R\$, a doctor 4802 R\$, a university professor 3555 R\$, a police officer 1585 R\$, and a primary teacher 1088 R\$ on average. This means that school teachers in Brazil belong to the worst remunerated group of professionals (PNAD 2006).

and implemented education programs, such as the state's literacy and acceleration program, the state's federal literacy program, and the democratic management principles.

*Example 1: The state's literacy and acceleration program "Literacy with Success and Be Alert and Accelerate"*

Physical infrastructure and student performance has been a constant challenge for Pernambuco's education sector. In 2003, 56.9 percent of students in primary education suffered from class-age distortion (Pernambuco 2006, 17). Moreover, 9.81 percent of children aged 10 to 14 were considered illiterate. This rate more than doubled for children over 15 to 21.74 percent (Ibid: 14).

Despite the promising planning and design of the state's literacy and acceleration program, it has been severely criticized for its lack of both vertical and horizontal accountability. The main reason is a low participation rate of several types of actors. First, municipal governments are not involved in selecting and training teachers, and thus there is no horizontal accountability. Second, civil society, such as school parents and the municipal communities, are not involved in the analysis of teacher performance and decisions about consecutive steps. In fact, the monitoring of teachers has been outsourced to a private institute (as mentioned in the section above).

The head of the state assembly's education commission, Teresa Leitao, finds that the involvement of the private sector in the program undermines the institutional autonomy of school administrations, municipalities, and the state secretariat without putting these central actors in charge of policymaking—precisely what is required if one wants to achieve accountability within a bureaucracy:

"I have a very critical opinion about programs that are first designed as transitory programs, but then become incorporated into regular governmental policies. This is what I think happened with the Accelera program, a program that has remained in the system for a very long time, and is being evaluated and diagnosed externally and not by the municipal education system itself. I think that it takes away the intellectual capacity of the municipal systems to formulate their own proposals for public policies. It is a program that was outsourced, and often collides with the perspective of municipal education administrations. The program's management does not communicate with the [municipal] network, and I think that this is very technical. There is only focus on the learning flow and that is it. There is a very strong pressure amongst schools to present results, and, at the same time, a very strong pressure for society to show results. This has practically taken away any pedagogy of public employees who have to prove results. The process leading to these results is outsourced with strange objectives" (Leitão 2010).

Decisions on training and adjustments of the program are also made without prior consultation with civil society organizations, such as the teachers' unions and the municipal interest representation UNDIME (Leitão 2010). This implies an additional factor that was pointed out as being crucial for accountability: information management and transparency,



both being absent in the implementation of the literacy and acceleration program in Pernambuco. While students are continuously evaluated, the information is not available on either the website of the education secretariat or the website of the private entities involved. Furthermore, it is unclear if the results of the literacy and acceleration program are biased, because students that do not progress are eliminated from the program after one year (Rosa 2010).

In sum, there are striking differences in how Pernambuco's literacy and acceleration programs were formulated and implemented if compared to Ceará's literacy program. First, in Pernambuco, both programs were entirely designed by the state government without consulting the state assembly and were financed by two entrepreneurial foundations and the private sector. In Ceará, PAIC is a wholly public- managed and -financed program of the state government. Second, besides the statistical data on students' performance that are available via federal and state indicators, the state government did not commission inception studies to evaluate the origins of the problem further (in Ceará, an inception study was sponsored by the state assembly and publicly debated). Third, there is a lack of participation of municipal governments, teachers, and the municipal interest organization UNDIME in the implementation of the programs in Pernambuco. Forth, until 2005, the literacy programs in Pernambuco did not include municipal schools — a big omission if considering that Pernambuco's municipal schools are the major suppliers of primary education.<sup>128</sup>

Despite the problems discussed here, the Federal Ministry of Education strongly encouraged Pernambuco's state and municipal education systems to continue to implement the literacy and acceleration program (the program is currently being implemented in other Brazilian states).<sup>129</sup> Notwithstanding, Pernambuco's capital Recife waited until 2009 to implement the program, since the leftist administration under the PT disagreed with the privatized education approach. Esther Rosa, the person responsible for primary and secondary education during the PT's 2005–2008 administration, describes the position of the federal government as hegemonic, top-down oriented, and leaving little autonomy to municipalities to develop their own education programs. This included, for example, the decision of Recife's municipal administration to not participate in a program advocated by the Federal Ministry, even if it caused the Ministry to question Recife's alternative education policy. Rosa believes that “ready-made” programs, such as the “Literacy with Success and Be Alert and Accelerate,” are not enough to improve the quality of education, and that much more has to be done. From a pedagogical standpoint, and in agreement with Teresa Leitão, Rosa advocates programs that are managed jointly by school administrations and their best teachers. She strongly criticizes that the Federal Ministry of Education has been pushing Pernambuco's education sector to accept this federal “supply catalogue” (oferta de pacote), which, she believes, is formulated out of context, takes away autonomy from teachers, and

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<sup>128</sup> In 2003, municipal schools in Pernambuco provided more than 80 percent of coverage of students from grades 1 through 4 (Tribunal de Contas do Estado de Pernambuco 2004: 40).

<sup>129</sup> According to the website of the Instituto Ayrton Senna, one of the private entities sponsoring the *Accelera Brasil* Program has been adopted as public policy in school systems in the states of Espírito Santo, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Roraima, Rio Grande do Sul, Sergipe and in the Federal District. Currently, it is present in 727 Brazilian municipalities (Senna 2011).

applies methods outside of students' regular classroom. This is because students participating in the Accelerate programs are taught in classrooms that are separate from their regular classmates. She adds on that, despite the problems with the state program, Recife's municipal education sector was still able to greatly improve its primary education indicator Ideb between 2005 and 2007, thanks to an individually designed and differentiated program for the state's capital (Rosa 2010).

*Example 2: The implementation of a federal literacy program*

Pernambuco has been implementing the federal literacy program Literate Brazil (Brasil Alfabetizado), but has given it its own name "Program Paulo Freire," hereby honoring one of Brazil's most famous educators, Paulo Freire. As in Ceará, the program offers literacy training to youth and adults above age 15 in line with the outline of the federal program. According to the numbers provided by the federal manager of the Literate Brazil Program, they confirm that municipalities in Pernambuco have not been as involved as in Ceará. In both states, municipalities—and thus municipal schools—have participated. In Pernambuco, the quantitative participation rate is quite different. Until the second half of 2010, less than a third (59 out of 185) of municipalities had started to implement this program in Pernambuco, compared to 182 out of 184 municipalities in Ceará. This indicates that the state government has not strongly advocated that municipalities join the program.

*Example 3: The implementation of democratic management principles*

According to the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2, vertical accountability, as a means for citizens to be able to hold politicians and governmental officials accountable, is an important factor. As in Ceará, Pernambuco has introduced democratic management principles to let civil society, such as parents and school communities, participate in the implementation of education policy.

While Pernambuco's state education secretariat attempted to implement democratic management principles in 1995 under education secretary Silke Weber, this attempt failed due to resistance amongst the opposition parties in the state assembly and resulting lack of political majority for the ruling party PSB. According to a member of the opposition party that primarily accompanies education policy, legislation on democratic management could not be passed in 1995, because state deputies themselves relied on the votes received by school directors, who were not interested in becoming democratically elected. These directors, in turn, were supported by state deputies, a fact very common in local education politics in Brazil:

"(...) The deputies had influence in the indication of the directors. These were politically indicated. Afterwards, there has been another secretary and experience. There are shortcomings that we are now, together with the unions, trying to improve" (Leitão 2009).

Finally, in 2002, Pernambuco's state assembly approved a norm for the democratic election of school principals in state schools, recommending the same for municipal

schools.<sup>130</sup> In Pernambuco, this step happened six years later than in Ceará, where democratic management principles were introduced in 1995. Despite the passing of the legislation in Pernambuco, the teachers' unions still see the need to change parts of it in order to increase the participation of the school community during the election of its directors (Araujo 2010).

While in Ceará, interviews with state secretaries for education left the impression of a very integrative and collaborative approach with civil society organizations, some of Pernambuco's former education secretaries showed a rather hostile approach, especially in relation to teachers' unions (see section above). Likewise, parents of pupils were not often consulted, in particular in the implementation of the Be Alert and Accelerate Program. By not asking for permission from parents when their children are put into separate classes, and not letting some students participate in leisure activities due to their placement in a more rigid program, both the parents and the students are denied their right of participation.

UNICEF's education coordinator for the northeastern region, Rui Aguiar, criticized how the Be Alert and Accelerate Program was implemented in Pernambuco. First, the parents and the students were not able to freely decide if they wanted to participate in the intervention. Second, pupils were teased by classmates that were not in the program, because they were withdrawn from the regular classroom, creating a potential stigma of "intelligent" versus "less intelligent" pupils. Aguiar pointed out another general weakness: acceleration classes should only be an emergency measure, but not become part of a regular policy. Once acceleration classes become institutionalized, as it is now the case in Pernambuco, their continuous existence indirectly suggests that students in the regular education system cannot perform well if they attend regular classes (Aguiar 2010).

Pernambuco's state government institutionalized school councils in state schools (which happened in Ceará as well). Some of the state's municipalities also put forward respective municipal legislation; although no compiled database exists to determine which municipalities this applies to. Moreover, no clear-cut evidence is available as to which councils are indeed democratically functioning and which ones are not.

Silke Weber points out that, while Pernambuco's education sector has n-councils, these are often more figurative than anything else. Often, people are members of more than one city council, and they tend to use the council as a political stepping-stone in their political career in the municipality and beyond. According to Weber, education councils can be regarded as the reproduction of local political forces. Despite these setbacks, Weber opines that councils are a modus to produce more critical policies, and in some of Pernambuco's municipalities, a well-functioning education council can be the sign of better education policies and better schools (Weber 2009).

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<sup>130</sup> However, municipal schools have to pass their own, autonomous jurisdiction, and therefore the state legislation cannot be implemented in municipal schools if no respective municipal legislation exists.

Edla de Araújo Soares, a member of Pernambuco's state education council, agrees that local control mechanisms, such as the school councils, are highly desirable, due to their potential benefits for the quality of education. However, she also agrees with Weber that financial control of councils may or may not work depending on local politics:

“The question of [transparency of] finances passes through the municipalization [decentralization at municipal level] and also through quality issues. [Municipal] social control should have an eye on it in this sense. Bigger municipalities and some metropolitan municipalities have a more democratic management than municipalities in the countryside. We have everything, ranging from the colonel administering the municipality to parties like the PSDB [center-right party] and the PT [left-wing party] controlling it, as well as very democratic municipalities” (Araújo Lira Soares 2009).

The Federal University of Pernambuco has researched the effects of the democratic power and reinforcement of civic control by school councils, to include a study on education council of Recife between 2001 and 2004. This study concluded that Recife's education council did not greatly contribute

“(…) to an effective type of participation of the population in municipal education [and] the council appears, according to the examined data, as fragile with regards to the incorporation of popular segments [of society], confirming our initial assumption that the municipal education council did not effectively contribute to amplify the public space of municipal education policy” (Morais Melo 2005, 161).

Francisco de Andrade complemented Morais Melo's analysis and found that between 2001 and 2006, 217 out of 226 municipal schools of Recife had education councils, which, according to this author, signifies great progress in comparison to Pernambuco's smaller or rural municipalities. Notwithstanding this progress, this author is not more optimistic when it comes to measure the effective democratic control and influence of public policy that these councils are indeed able to exercise:

“With regards to the dialogue between the different participatory instances [public administration and councils], we did not observe a systematic practice of dialogue that would be able to bring together the different perspectives of the segments that make up the municipal education system (...) Therefore, the data confirms the hypothesis of our research that, despite the fact that school councils are the collaborative instance for the deconcentration of school and education management, they still do not effectively intervene the political decisions of the education system” (Francisco de Andrade 2007, 167).

Similar to the case of Ceará, in Pernambuco the democratic management principles have not proven effective. Municipal school councils often do not have a de facto political influence on public policymaking, either because local governments and public officials are not ready to have councils indeed control governmental budgets in schools, or because the

political space available to these councils is being “abused” by its members for other political purposes.

### 6.7.2 *Information, Transparency, and Availability of Statistics*

As previously mentioned, the lack of accountability and collaboration amongst Pernambuco’s education administration has been criticized. Indeed, this criticism can be extended when considering the transparency of information that is publicly available, which, in terms of education programs and performance, is either scarce or very broad (for example, the website of the secretariat for education provides only very basic information. However, the information available does convey how the actual programs are implemented and leaves the impression that, despite promising program interventions, the actual scope of these might be limited.<sup>131</sup> Despite the scarcity of information, the overall statistical base of Pernambuco’s education system is not limited.

In 2001, almost 10 years after Ceará, Pernambuco created a system to evaluate student performance, the System of Education Performance of Pernambuco, SAEPE. In 2008, another system, the Index for the Educational Development of Pernambuco (IDEPE), was created. In accordance with the national performance indicator IDEB, the state performance indicator IDEPE was initially calculated through the results of testing students in the 8th grader, being, at the time, the last grade of primary education. In conjunction with the approval and repetition rates from SAEPE, it provides precise information about student performance. In July 2011, the state governor of Pernambuco announced the reform of the state’s evaluation system, which included extending the testing to students in all levels of secondary education (7th, 8th, and 9th graders).

In summary, education statistics are available in Pernambuco, but the positive influence that this solid information base could have for the improvement of actual programs and administrative decisions is partially decreased because it is not used to its full possible extent. At the same time, it remains unclear as to how performance results of the SAEPE are used to plan and adjust current program interventions, such as the literacy and acceleration programs. Moreover, based on informal interviews with teachers and school directors in Recife’s periphery and adjacent municipalities of Recife (Jaboatao dos Guararapes and Cabo de San Augustin), the state lacks a consistent dialogue with municipalities and their representative organizations, such as the UNDIME, on how to improve their education quality based on the statistical information available.

These findings differentiate Pernambuco from Ceará, where information about students’ performance is already an integral part of policy planning and for the collaboration with municipalities implementing the state’s literacy program PAIC. Pernambuco’s current education administration has yet to use available statistical information for more accurate

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<sup>131</sup> It was difficult to collect information for this article because public officials would not release or did not possess simple types of data, such as the number of students and municipalities participating in the state’s flagship programs. This left the impression of little transparency and inaccurate knowledge.

policy planning the state and municipal levels. This shows the need for greater collaboration between the state and the municipalities in education—an important step for offsetting the potential of the federal leeway and federal “overpower”.

## **6.8 Chapter Summary**

The case of Pernambuco provides interesting empirical insights for the theoretical discussion carried out in Chapter 2. Today, major federal programs are in place in Pernambuco, and they seem to be relatively well articulated with the federal government. In addition to these programs, the state government has introduced several state program interventions to improve the quality of education. The existence of both federal and state programs would suggest a strong institutional framework for education quality. However, it is important to distinguish between two different time periods, namely between the governorship of the clearly left-leaning Miguel Arraes until 1998 and the rather center-oriented governments that followed his last term between 1998 until 2011. During both periods, school directors were elected through democratic elections and school councils were created. Moreover, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were implemented in schools. Yet, the effects of these interventions were quite different in both periods with respect to their depth of institutionalization and the anchoring of municipal institutions. While during Arraes’ mandates program interventions were implemented jointly with municipalities, the scope of these programs was publicly discussed in mobile brigades amongst a wide range of civil society members and separately with teachers' unions. These steps proved that institutional accountability was much weaker in later years, as municipalities were often left out of the discussion of state program interventions dedicated to state schools only.

The tendency of Pernambuco’s state government to leave the possibility of a strong, collaborative regime to chance (despite the proof under Arraes that strong collaboration could yield improved education quality) can be seen as an example of one of the many lost opportunities in Brazil’s federal education system. In this case, the lack of institutionalization of federal collaboration can open the door for non-institutional types of behavior, potentially strengthening political networks and informal institutional behavior that do not necessarily have a positive bias towards education results. For example, because school directors were not always democratically elected (but politically hand-picked), the recruitment of school staff was often driven by political opportunism of local politicians. Also, leaving the municipal education administrations out of important discussions on structural interventions in their schools shows a lack of transparency. Only recently, this trend seems to be changing, but the impact cannot be evaluated yet.

It is important to point out another empirical fact. Pernambuco experienced, in contrast to Ceará, strong party competition with a consequently high politicization of left- and right-wing parties, and ideological changes in education policy. This polarization deeply affected the relationship between the state government and teachers' unions, which was very open and constructive until the mid-1990s, and then became hostile. In addition, the strong, opposing views on how to effectively manage state education policies were supported by respective

party coalitions at the federal level. There are clear signs that Arraes' leftist, PSB-led government in Pernambuco was defeated in 1998 for reasons beyond strong inner-state political forces. Arraes was an outspoken opponent of the conservative federal government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his neoliberal agenda. Some authors argue that this fact may have conditioned Arraes' defeat. It seems that once Arraes left office, there was a complete turn-around in education policy in order to clearly differentiate the new administration, despite the fact that Arraes' education interventions were technically grounded and had good results. This is a common feature of politics in Brazil. The denial and discontinuity of a solid education policy was conditioned by political networking and informal behavior within the federation, as well as by the political support of the liberal party necessary to guarantee the political survival of Arraes' opponent. Thus, political networks and informal support structures behind the scenes at the federal and state levels make a strong case in Pernambuco, hereby increasing the negative bias of federalism as politics towards education results, while at the same time weakening the institutions of federalism as a polity.

Table 6.8 summarizes these details and relates them to the three-level reading of federalism advocated in Chapter 2. Pernambuco is tentatively classified as mixing characteristics of levels B and C. Federalism in Pernambuco's education sector appears as a mix of conforming and non-conforming behavior regarding what the federal constitutional framework suggests regarding the collaborative regime (level B). While important policies were institutionalized and brought forward, their implementation was not always aligned with the envisioned goals, yielding ambiguous results in terms of quality. The state government has the opportunity to engage in a state-municipal collaboration, however it has not fully committed to respective steps, and has left attempts unclearly defined.

**Table 6.8. The Politics of Federalism in Pernambuco’s Education Sector: Mostly a Case of Level B and C Interactions**

<b>Level A</b>	<b>Polity findings</b>	<b>Politics/polity findings</b>	<b>Polity/policy findings</b>
Politics aligned with institutions	*Formal existence of institutions to improve quality of education	*Some formal consultations with civil society	*Policy outcomes not always aligned with institutionally designed programs
<b>Level B:</b> Mix of conforming and non-conforming behavior towards federalism	*Frequent political and administrative changes *Mixed behavior of state government towards federal and state institutions	*Absence of formal agreements for collaboration *Validity of political bargaining especially at the municipal level *Conflict with teachers' unions (recent period)	*Changing program interventions with diverging results *Monitoring mechanisms in place, but weak enforcement especially at the municipal level
<b>Level C:</b> Behavior mostly ignores existing norms; federalism leaves leeway for individual interpretation and informality	*Leeway left by federalism weakly used to guide behavior * Weakened enforcement of and commitment to federal institutions *Weakly institutionalized collaboration with municipalities *No additional financial incentives created to enhance collaborative regime	*In early periods, absence of formal and informal political support from the federal level (Arraes/Cardoso conflict), even if in presence of a state government committed to the strengthening of federal institutions *In later periods, presence of informal political support from federal level (Vasconcelos/Cardoso alignment) *Informal influence from private sector investors	*Absence of universal enforcement of policies that could improve education quality at subnational level *Weak institutionalization of accountability in public administration, despite monitoring mechanisms in place

What do these details entail in terms of the political space for other actors in the education system as such? The potential to strengthen federalism as a polity is being diminished because of an insufficient integration of municipal education systems into the state’s education policy. One consequence is that the Ministry of Education as a central planning authority is able to maintain a strong political role, influencing and potentially narrowing Pernambuco’s policymaking autonomy. Since the state government has not yet proven how to improve educational results at the municipal levels, MEC’s influence is certainly stronger than would be the case in the presence of a strong, autonomous, and functioning state education policy. At the same time, teachers' unions have not been sufficiently included into the political debate on education policy, often leading to confrontation and making collaboration with municipal teachers and teachers' unions more complicated. In sum, this case shows that the leeway given by federalism, if not taken as an opportunity to strengthen institutions, can also yield adverse results and weaken the collaborative regime.



## 7. Conclusion: Theoretical and Policy Implications

The main argument of this dissertation is that federalism is much more than an institutional arrangement or a polity. The way in which federal institutions form policies and increase the quality in terms of education in Brazil is greatly determined by political relations and networks amongst various actors conditioned by this federal framework. Three research questions emerge from this argument:

1. *Which institutional and political factors explain policy outcomes in primary education in two similar Brazilian states where education standards should, in principle, be universal, as claimed by the Brazilian constitution?*
2. *How and why do these factors determine education outcomes in those two states?*
3. *Which implications do the findings related to questions 1 and 2 have for federalism as an institutional system?*

Since a strong interrelation between institutional and political factors (or between federalism as an institutional and political framework) is assumed, the main hypothesis is that different levels of education quality exist because of either a constraining or an enabling relationship between institutional and political factors. A positive bias on educational outcomes would be the result of a strengthening effect on federalism by these two factors, while a negative bias would be the result of a weakening effect.

The empirical insights of both cases summarized in the first part of this section confirm some of the institutional and political factors as relevant in theoretical terms, while others could not be confirmed as such based on the empirics of the selected cases. The second part presents the theoretical implications that the findings herein have for the academic debate on federalism, which leads to three recommendations to be addressed in Brazil's collaborative federal regime to achieve universal quality of education in the country. First, the federal framework in Brazil must be revised to decrease the likelihood that leeway in governance can impair the constitutional objective to achieve high quality of education for all. Second, state governments need institutional incentives to develop collaborative policies with their municipalities, and they must be held accountable for the implementation of such policies. Third, institutional foundations at the municipal level have to be strengthened in order to control the impact that politics can have on the federal framework as such. All three recommendations can deeply hamper efforts to reach the level of education quality Brazil needs for its future socioeconomic development.

## 7.1 Presentation of Empirical Findings from Cases in Comparison

### 7.1.1 Education Quality in Ceará and Pernambuco

Both empirical chapters presented data on educational quality for Ceará and Pernambuco. These particular states were selected based on their socioeconomic similarity, which facilitates a most-similar comparison and the examination of factors influencing federalism and the quality of primary education. Here, a summary comparison is given: **data on completion, repetition, school dropout, and class-age distortion (indicators that measure the quality of education) for all school types at the primary level taken together indicate better trends in Ceará over time than in Pernambuco.** While the difference for all indicators considered was especially apparent at the end of the 1990s, to the advantage of Ceará, it decreased by 2005.<sup>132</sup> By the same token, dropout rates in Ceará dropped to only 8 percent in 2005, while in Pernambuco they were 12.2 percent for the same year. The same holds for class-age distortion for students at the end of fourth and eighth grade. Ceará and Pernambuco started almost at the same level in terms of this indicator in 1999, but later Ceará ameliorated its class-age distortion considerably in comparison to Pernambuco, where this indicator almost stagnated (INEP Educata 2009).<sup>133</sup>

Since 2005, INEP has released more complete and locally traceable data with the performance indicator IDEB.<sup>134</sup> Table 7.1 shows respective IDEBs for primary education (and middle school for additional reference) in Ceará and Pernambuco, as well average data for the northeast as a whole. São Paulo was the best performer amongst Brazilian states.<sup>135</sup> The Northeast's IDEB ranks below Brazilian average, as well as the IDEB in São Paulo. **In regards to the two states compared herein, Ceará clearly ranks above the average of the northeast, while Pernambuco ranks only slightly above. In 2009, for the first time, Ceará's IDEB exceeded Pernambuco's IDEB, as well as the IDEBs of the nine other states of the northeast.** The state made national headlines, passing national expectations by far with an increase of 15.7 percent in the indicator for first through fourth graders compared to 2007. Brazil as a whole only improved 9.5 percent during the same period (Lima 2010). This improvement was important for the country as a whole, as it demonstrated the possibility to improve education quality, even in poorer states and in a relatively short timeframe. Often, directors and teachers in the northeast argue that in absence of resources,

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<sup>132</sup> Still, while in Ceará in 2005, 79 percent of enrolled students completed primary education (they managed to reach 8th grade), in Pernambuco these accounted for 72.4 percent only.

<sup>133</sup> INEP's definition for class-age distortion is the following: class-age distortion is given if a pupil's age exceeds two years or more of the required age of the class. This assumes that in a basic education cycle of eight years, pupils start the first year at the age of seven. For example, taking the class-age distortion for the fourth grade in Ceará in 2005, a total of 30.40 percent of students were 12 years or older.

<sup>134</sup> Being calculated by students' approval rate in the education census and their performance in SAEB, this indicator has the advantage of evaluating the progress in each school across the country, evidencing each school's quality to parents and the school community. Being an index with a scale of 1 (worst performing) to 10 (best performing), the current Brazilian average IDEB is of 4.0 with the objective to reach 6.0 by 2022. An IDEB of 6.0 corresponds to the best PISA results achieved in OECD countries.

<sup>135</sup> We do not consider excellent performance data from the Federal District Brasília since its situation cannot be compared to "regular" Brazilian states.

such improvement is not possible. Further, it confirms that, in principle, the majority of students in public schools—most of which are children that come from low- or lower-income households—have the potential to be successful in school. This second finding is crucial for education in its (human) development stages and its contribution to poverty reduction.

Region/State	São Paulo			Northeast			Ceará			Pernambuco		
IDEB for available years	2005	2007	2009	2005	2007	2009	2005	2007	2009	2005	2007	2009
1st–4th grade	4.7	5.0	5.5	2.9	3.5	3.8	3.2	3.8	4.4	3.2	3.6	4.1
5th–8th grade	4.2	4.3	4.5	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.5	3.9	2.7	2.9	3.4
Middle School	3.6	3.9	3.9	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.0	3.0	3.3

Source: (INEP 2010) Saeb and Censo Escolar at <http://sistemasideb.inep.gov.br/resultado/> (20/08/2010).  
Note: IDEB results by state and region only include urban private and urban public schools.

### 7.1.2 Formal and Informal Education Transfers in Ceará and Pernambuco

Comparing **formal education expenditures** in Ceará and Pernambuco, the following conclusions can be drawn (see Annex 4.1 and 4.2):

- Between 1995 and 2010, both states had steadily increasing total budget revenues and tax revenues, including from the state-collected tax ICMS (relevant to compare state-municipal transfers including primary education), as well as increases in the States' Participation Fund FPE. Between 1998 and 2010, Ceará's state government received a lower amount of education transfers via the federal education system FUNDEF than Pernambuco. However, Ceará's municipalities received a higher amount of FUNDEF transfers than Pernambuco's municipalities for the same period.
- **In 2000 and 2009, the two states greatly increased their total expenditure in the education sector, but Ceará spent much more in both years. In Ceará,** expenditures were R\$764 million in 2000 and R\$ 3 billion in 2009, compared to R\$ 414 million and R\$ 2 billion in Pernambuco. In 2009, Ceará spent more in the education sector than Pernambuco did in its health sector, and it spent more than Pernambuco in both primary and secondary education. Also, the direct annual investment per student in grades 1 through 8 was higher in Ceará than in Pernambuco in both 2009 and 2010 (Ceará: R\$ 4.483 and R\$ 5.730; Pernambuco: R\$ 3.930 and R\$ 5.285 respectively).
- In 2007, Ceará decided to partially tie the state-municipal transfer of the municipal quota of the tax on goods and services (ICMS) to literacy results in primary

education in municipal schools, hereby rewarding municipalities for increasing literacy rates of 6- and 7-year-old students. This fiscal incentive institutionalized in state-municipal agreements in Ceará shows that **Ceará used the leeway granted by federalism to strengthen the collaborative regime in its primary education system. Pernambuco has not made such attempts.**

The following conclusions can be drawn when comparing **additional education transfers made via budget amendments or voluntary transfers**:

- Between 1997 and 2007, Ceará received 37 volunteer transfers sponsored by the Union of Federal States, the Federal District, and municipalities, while Pernambuco received 54. **Despite the difference in the total number of transfers, the total monetary amounts transferred per year during this period were similar: R\$ 43.4 million in Ceará, and R\$ 44.8 million in Pernambuco.** During this period, both states prioritized primary education in earlier years and higher education in later years.
- With respect to budget amendments sponsored by different politicians, Ceará received a total of R\$ 1.3 billion between 1998 and 2009, while Pernambuco received only R\$ 950 million during the same period; thus **Ceará had R\$ 230 million more resources available via transfers sponsored by politicians than Pernambuco.** However, it is interesting that there was a significant difference in actual numbers of transfers of this type during this period: in Ceará, there were only 48 amendments sponsored and executed, while in Pernambuco there were 136. This brings up two interesting points. First the actual influence of a single party member in Ceará's education sector was higher because each amendment was bigger in terms of its size. Second, in Ceará many parties did not sponsor any education amendments at all during this period.
- In Ceará, party members from 14 different parties sponsored the budget amendments, while in Pernambuco, 12 different parties were represented. In Ceará, more amendments were sponsored and executed by party members from the left (PCdoB: 13; PT: 9) and center-left (PSB: 6) than by party members from the right, center-right, and center (PSDB: 3; PFL/DEM: 1; PMDB: 2). **In Pernambuco, three parties from the left and center sponsored and executed the majority of the amendments that benefited the education sector** (the worker's party, PT: 44; the liberal party, PFL/DEM: 40; and the center-left party, PSB: 26). The types of parties sponsoring amendments in each state were similar but in Pernambuco amendments originated from more parties than in Ceará.
- Additional analysis and comparison of data on budget amendments sponsored by state party affiliations and incumbent state and federal governments of respective periods (see Annex 5) reveals no specific trends in either state. **This particular data does not allow for the conclusion to be drawn that the party affiliations, and thus the political networks of either the state or federal governments,**

**influenced or guided the sponsoring patterns of individual state politicians.** However, other sources discussed below reveal political networks between state and federal governments.

### *7.1.3 Differences in Institutional State Policies in Ceará and Pernambuco*

The empirical chapters herein examining the institutional state policies in Ceará and Pernambuco—which are complementary to the federal education policies outlined in Chapter 4—reveal that both states have introduced many innovative initiatives since 1995, as both have had to transfer a significant amount of responsibilities from the state to the municipal level. Until the Constitution of 1988 was enacted, all activities related to the management of primary education were concentrated at the central federal level. After the enactment, municipal education administrations suddenly became wholly responsible for policy planning, budgeting, and implementation at the primary education level. The smallest and fiscally most fragile unit of the Brazilian federation had no time to learn how to develop and manage effective education policies that would lead to universal quality in primary education. This change was especially severe, considering that in both states the majority of students attend municipal schools.

Despite being faced with similar challenges, Ceará's and Pernambuco's state governments embarked on the road to improve better primary education in distinct ways, mostly in terms of how they collaborated with municipalities. **Ceará's and Pernambuco's coping strategies were similar in terms of the types of policies initiated** (as outlined, both states had similar programs for literacy training and education, as well as equally strong evaluation systems developed at state level, and both states had already initiated legislation to democratically elect school directors), **but differed in how their state governments have created networks with municipal education systems and how these evolved over time.** The different approaches of the respective state governments responded distinctively to the challenges imposed by a federal collaborative regime. While the federal constitution leaves many of the relations and networks of actors unregulated (stating that states and municipalities shall jointly work in a collaborative regime), the state governments in Ceará and Pernambuco have used their policymaking autonomy to manage municipal actors in quite different ways.

**While the initial attempts by Pernambuco's state government to collaborate with municipalities through dialogue were promising until the late 1990s, these attempts eventually began to weaken. Over time, the state government seemed to show less interest in institutionalizing networks with municipalities and in treating them as equal partners in terms of rights and institutional autonomy.** For example, the state introduced a literacy program without prior authorization of municipal education secretaries, and continued it without their participation in an open debate. This created resistance in the municipalities, which was counter-productive for the development of successful programs. Such behavior did not support the institutional strengthening of the municipalities in Pernambuco; rather, it extended the state's political area of influence without an honest and

transparent integration. The municipal institutions weakened as they were denied political autonomy, which in turn weakened the federal collaborative regime. This has had severe consequences, including a low degree of accountability amongst state and municipal administrations.

**In Ceará, the state government also sought to extend its political influence through a stronger collaboration with the municipalities, yet their efforts were manifested in ways that strengthened the municipal education administrations instead of undercutting their political autonomy (as in Pernambuco).** From the onset, municipalities were consulted in the development of initiatives to improve primary education quality, which was the result of a larger, independent study evidencing and detailing the challenges faced by municipalities. Thus, policies were initiated based on empirical evidence, and then developed further through a public debate in the state parliament. As outlined in Section 5.8, **collaboration between Ceará's state government and the municipalities in developing and improving education policies was gradual, systematic, and enforced with dually signed agreements, and later reinforced by tying municipal education commitment to fiscal incentives.** This innovative, bottom-up approach helped the state to develop strong networks with the municipalities, while at the same time the municipalities maintained institutional autonomy. This positive collaboration strengthened Brazil's federal collaborative regime. In contrast, the state government in Pernambuco never offered the same institutional autonomy to its municipalities, nor did they offer them fiscal incentives through binding agreements. The approaches taken in each state had different effects on the accountability and transparency between the state and municipal governments.

At the same time, these different ways in collaborating with the municipal level have had distinct consequences in terms of the relationships each state has with the central government in Brasilia. While in principle the federal government offers similar types of support to the state and municipal governments (and hereby it can expand its political influence at the state level), the interviewees for the present thesis described that the predominant influence of the Ministry of Education has weakened in Ceará over time, given the state's own proactive engagement with municipalities. From the perspective of the Ministry of Education, Ceará's state government has shown that it can cope with the challenges more effectively on its own in the long term. In contrast, interviewees in Pernambuco saw the Ministry of Education's involvement in state education policies as an interference with its own institutional autonomy, which is a potential sign of a weak institutional emancipation process.

Both cases point out different options of how to use the "leeway" granted by Brazilian federalism. The empirical comparison revealed what has theoretically been said about the federal dilemma and its repercussions for the quality of social policies; however, different types of networks (specifically networks between the state and municipal governments) and how these networks are being used to improve education quality lead to different results. Ceará would not have discovered a solution if the Brazilian federal constitution had not given leeway to and under-regulated the policymaking autonomy of its federal states. By the

same token, too much leeway is given if state governments do not establish long-term relations and networks with municipalities (see the discussion in Section 7.1.5).

#### 7.1.4 *Political Competition, Party Networks, and Networks with Teachers' Unions*

The theory chapter laid out two indicators of the influence that political parties have on education policy in each state. First, political competition amongst parties can effect policy implementation at the state level. Second, the state's party networks can influence state, and potentially federal and municipal, education policies.

Comparing the results of **party competition** in the state parliaments of Ceará and Pernambuco by counting the number of seats occupied by major parties revealed that party competition in Pernambuco was stronger than it was in Ceará throughout the examined period (1995–2010). **In Ceará, two details are worth mentioning.** Lacking absolute majorities in the state elections in 1995, 1999, and 2003, Ceará's center party, PSDB, had to ally with other smaller parties, such as the left-wing Brazilian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro, PSB). Despite the strong coalition built by the center-left, the PSDB dominated the political landscape in Ceará for 15 years (1991–2006). The predominance of the PSDB was complemented with the leadership of Governor Jereissaiti, who was elected for two consecutive terms during the mentioned period. The PSDB was able to put forward a convincing and long-term policy to improve education quality. It is notable that weak party competition in Ceará went hand in hand with policy continuity in the education sector.

In the case of Pernambuco, drastic political and ideological shifts between the different incumbent state administrations increased party competition, and also disrupted the continuity of education policy. Because of the strong political competition, there were slight governing majorities during the period under observation in Pernambuco, as was the case in Ceará. However, in Pernambuco, elections indeed brought up fierce party competition and an accentuated political polarization between the left- and center-right parties until 1999. The liberal party PFL played a key role in Pernambuco between 1999 and 2006, since the conservative governor Vasconcelos depended on a coalition with this party to gain support from a politically wider electorate. **The shaping of education policy and its discontinuity in Pernambuco is mainly a reflection of how strong political competition and party coalitions evolved there over time. Steep ideological differences between the radical leftist rule of Miguel Arraes and conservative-liberal leadership of Vasconcelos interfered with the structure and continuous implementation of effective education policy, particularly at the primary level.** This political discontinuity greatly impacted institutional continuity and, thus, clearly illustrates the intertwining of political and institutional factors. In the case of Pernambuco, political factors occupied a predominant role because the institutional framework itself was still too weak in the beginning of the 1990s, and because the federal government aimed at dismantling the opposing leftist government of Arraes.

Another important difference exists in terms of the political networks between Ceará and Pernambuco, which are intertwined to the above-mentioned question on inner-state party

competition. The party ties and the networks between the federal and state administrations greatly affected each state's political decision making, including the (primary) education sector. **In Ceará, the PSDB's leadership at the state level coincided with its eight-year term in the federal government, giving rise to strong political networks and support structures between the two levels.** This was confirmed in the empirical analysis in Chapter 5, which provided evidence of the great political affinity between Brazil's president Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Ceará's governor Jereissati. Yet, the contrary happened in Pernambuco. **Some authors argue that the defeat of Arraes' leftist, PSB-led government in Pernambuco in 1998 was due not only to strong opposing inner-state political forces, but also because Arraes was an outspoken opponent of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his conservative, neoliberal agenda.**

In both states, the networks and dialogue between the state government and teachers' unions were influenced by both party competition and the state-federal networks discussed above. **In Ceará, political competition was weak; a strong government took the lead; and teachers' unions became involved and integrated, but also politically coopted by Governor Jereissati.** As outlined in Chapter 5, the political cooptation of teachers' unions in Ceará by a strong, politically influential state government might have been the reason for the institutionalization of a strong federal collaborative regime at both the municipal and state levels. This is because resistance shown by the teachers' unions was pacified early on, enabling the state government to work directly with the municipal administration with little political interference.

**In contrast, in Pernambuco, the strong political competition between left- and right-wing parties created many ideological divergences in terms of addressing education policy, resulting in conflictive relations between the state and the teachers' unions and, thus, policy discontinuity.** The open, constructive dialogue that developed between teachers' unions and the state under Arraes' leftist government (who, general, showed great interest in incorporating the demands and ideas of teachers' unions and civil society into education policies) became hostile after 1998, as teachers' unions lost much of their trust and confidence in the state. The relationship gradually started to recover after mid-2000.

In sum, the theoretically assumed political networks greatly influenced education policy and outcomes, proving a strong intertwining and potential conditioning of relationships in the education sector. Given that these relationships were partially influenced by the aftermath of the dictatorship in Brazil and the country's shift to a democracy, under different historical-political circumstances, it is likely that political networks would have turned out differently. It cannot be emphasized enough that the political support, or lack thereof, for the education sector under Cardoso, Jereissati, and Arraes had important repercussions for education quality in both states.



### 7.1.5 *A Three-level Reading of Federalism in Ceará and Pernambuco*

In Chapters 5 and 6, Ceará and Pernambuco were classified as different cases in the three-level typology (A, B, and C) to examine the politics of federalism (refer to Section 2.6 for the theoretical assumptions made there). Ceará was classified as a case mixing and complementing characteristics of both levels A and B. Federalism as a polity (level A) is strengthened not only by the institutions and incentives created to enhance its functionality (level A characteristics), but also by initially informal types of relationships (level B characteristics) that, due to their ability to produce positive policy outcomes, became part of an institutionalized space (level A). Yet, formal, informal, and other types of political networks amongst parties, the state government, and the teachers' unions, and between the municipalities and the state and the state and federal governments played an important role in this case, as summarized above. In this sense, although Ceará reported some informal networks and behavior, overall the political networks had a predominantly positive bias towards education outcomes. There was lower prevalence of clientelism and corruption in public administration in Ceará (which went through a ground-breaking reform process in the early 1990s), as well as a high degree of monitoring and regulation, most importantly over the activities of the municipal administrations.

Pernambuco was classified as a case mixing characteristics of both levels B and C. Federalism in Pernambuco's education sector appears as a mix of behavior that partially conforms with what the federal constitutional framework suggests regarding the collaborative regime (level B). While some important policies that complemented federal laws were institutionalized and brought forward by the state government, the implementation of these policies was not always according to the original objectives, creating a negative bias towards education quality. The political and administrative autonomy of the municipalities were not always respected, resulting in a rather tense relationship between the state and some municipalities. By the same token, relations with the state and teachers' unions were often characterized by conflict rather than collaboration, often creating resistance amongst the teachers' unions to some of the state education policies. Yet, Brazil's federal collaborative regime did not offer Pernambuco the same leeway and support to find a solution as it did in Ceará. As such, the only option was for the state government to develop strong relationships with the municipalities; however it only partially committed to the required steps, and did not monitor and regulate these relationships in ways that strengthened Brazil's federalism and institutions. This created further openings for informal networks, which were even more difficult to transparently monitor and regulate.

Despite the fact that the constitutional federal framework was the same for both states, they implemented different education policies and thus had different outcomes in terms of performance. While in Ceará, the comprehensive intertwining of polity and politics strengthened federalism, in Pernambuco, this intertwining was not as easy to observe. However, this was not because of missing or overpowering influences (for example, strong teachers' unions that were not coopted by the state government), but rather it was because many of the political interactions and demands, such as those of the teachers' unions and

municipal administrations, were considered differently in the institutional design of state-level policies. While in Ceará, municipal administrations were strengthened through their collaboration with the state government—hereby relativizing political factors—in Pernambuco the collaboration between the municipal and state levels was weak and ineffective.

These results reveal and confirm the main hypothesis of this dissertation: there is a significant difference in the quality of primary education, and hence performance results, in Ceará and Pernambuco, two similar states in Brazil. One reason is because the federal framework does not consider that political relationships can have both constraining and enabling effects on institutions, based on how they interrelate. In Ceará, political relationships intertwined with institutions in ways that strengthened federalism, while in Pernambuco, this intertwining weakened the principles of federalism regarding quality of primary education.

## **7.2 Relevance of Empirical Results for Theoretical Discussion**

### *7.2.1 Relevance for the Debate on Federalism as a Polity and Politics Framework*

The empirical findings herein are highly relevant for the theoretical debate of what federalism is, and which influence it can have as both an institutional and political framework. Clearly, contrary to what Riker assumed many years ago, federalism has an impact on policy and policy outcomes. This dissertation did not only find that both polity and politics of federalism matter on their own, but also that they matter in their intertwining, and that an analysis “in between and beyond” is necessary to discover new explanations.

Experience in Brazil confirms that the interactions, relations, and networks amongst political actors can have a positive or negative bias on education policy outcomes. On the one hand, the effect depends on the extent to which formal rules of the federal framework have become institutionalized at the subnational level. On the other hand, it depends on the nature of the subnational political interactions (which is more than what the present hypothesis assumed, namely “constraining” versus “enabling”), such as party continuity versus discontinuity, political cooptation versus collaboration with labor unions, and more versus less in terms of political coordination between the federal and state levels.

Which implications do these findings have for federalism as an institutional system? As confirmed earlier, federalism as a polity is deeply influenced by federal politics, altering its normative institutional arrangement via the political networks at the federal level. Federal institutions can guide and regulate many of these political interactions. However, in some cases the relations may become much stronger than predicted, resulting in positive or negative bias towards social policy outcomes. In other cases, federal norms lead to successful policy formulation and implementation. However, in all cases, too much institutional regulation can hinder attempts to test out and implement innovative policies.

The Brazilian framework can constrain or enable outcomes advocated by a democratic majority, such as the constitutionally proclaimed right to quality primary education. The Constitution of 1988 did not conclusively regulate how federalism as a polity should function, but inferred that political actors should find out in a “collaborative regime” how to ensure quality primary education for all. This “unresolved” polity arrangement gave political actors enough leeway and autonomy to make use of their political networks according to their individual interests, which are not always aligned with the constitutional rights. This dilemma of regulating federal decision-making resulted in roughly two types of situations. In strengthening their democratic base, municipalities are not entirely autonomous financially and politically. They have achieved what Gibson termed “political protagonism,” but have done so in symbolic ways. This is because fiscal decentralization did not take place (funds are not allocated equally amongst major regions, accentuating territorial inequality). If municipalities lack financial autonomy or administrative capacity, they will likely become consumers of and potentially (political) dependent on federal resources. The result is that at the lowest government level, political factors weigh more than institutional mechanisms, even if they are in place. For example, considering the school council as an institutionalized accountability mechanism, the more precarious the financial conditions of a municipality and its schools are (fiscally constrained), the more constrained the municipality will be to control performance results and internal politics (politically constrained). This example suggests that having a weak institutional foundation in the federal framework can indeed strengthen political opportunism and clientelism at the local level, while simultaneously manifesting the political position of the federal government. In fact, one could say that weak and corrupt local public institutions (and potentially their continuity) are an automatic justification to increase the presence of the central government.

A second situation, discovered in this dissertation, is that even with a lack of local resources and a weak municipal government, the dominant position of a central government can be reduced or altered if state governments develop strong collaborative policies with municipalities. If these policies complement the gaps left by an overly lenient federal administration, political interaction, and the associated building of new social capital, can lead to innovative solutions. This represents a theoretical framework in which the creation of informal networks and respective social capital does not substitute or weaken, but rather strengthens formal institutions. Under this framework, the politics of federalism can also be intertwined with the polity of federalism in ways that create a positive bias for policy results. Certainly, it would be naive to assume that state governments do not follow their own political interests in policymaking. Indeed, the strengthening of the state’s political positioning vis-a-vis the support of the central government and other powerful state governments may drive this behavior (referred to as “asymmetrical federalism”).

These two types of empirical observations show that politics determine, to a great extent, how federal institutions function and that federalism as a polity can only be enabled and strengthened if its fiscal and political principles coincide. The findings also justify the two policy implications discussed below, namely the importance of increasing accountability at

the federal level to counter federal hierarchies and strengthening social control mechanisms, especially at the municipal level.

### 7.3 Policy Implications

In the specific case of Brazilian federalism investigated herein, the final question is how to make better use of the collaborative regime in order to achieve quality primary education for all students and to diminish the potential negative bias that political interactions and networks can have on achieving this objective. The Brazilian federal framework must be revised to prevent political actors from using federal leeway to deter the constitutional objective of achieving quality education for all. Bargaining processes have to be closely monitored to ensure that basic standards and principles are maintained in all cases. Otherwise, the political networking process could easily become corrupt and give even further leeway to actors. At the same time, it is important bear in mind that not everything can be resolved with rules and that constitutional rules are not always impartial.

To continue to strengthen educational outcomes in Brazil, the in-built protection and accountability mechanisms must be increased at the federal level to counter federal hierarchies. In addition, the federal level must be held responsible for the achievement of certain concrete objectives. One path could be to give full autonomy to states and municipalities so they can produce their own policy guidelines, rather than being obligated to implementing those formulated at the federal level, as is currently the case. At the level of policy planning in the education sector, it is important to build a structured and systematic collaboration amongst all government levels in order to anticipate and effectively plan for future challenges on a national level. At the same time, it is necessary to identify the challenges at the state and local levels to define respective responsibilities in terms of regulation. Lastly, without a law of accountability (for example, to officially allocate responsibilities to each unit), and additional incentives for collaboration, it will be difficult to achieve a regime of true collaboration (cf. Ramos 2010).

At the junction of politics and society where political networks, personal loyalties, and relationships often determine policy outcomes, social actors must be empowered with stronger formal positions and authority to regulate the work of politicians and public administrations. Interviews with many politically active people during the fieldwork for this dissertation evidenced that enforcing additional federal rules cannot overcome the historically rooted, informal practices in Brazil's education system. Some voiced the belief that social control is being shaped over time so that newly emerging social actors learn how to better use the political space they were assigned. The continuous existence of harmful informal practices proves that *more adequate* institutionalization of social control, rather than more rules, needs to be envisioned. This means that some rules have to be redesigned and repurposed, ensuring that all concrete steps are in place in specific situations and assigning differentiated functions that make sense in normative and real terms.

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### Annex 1: List of Interviewees During Three Different Field Stages

Name	Institution/Place	Year interviewed
<b>Research Institutes/Universities</b>		
Sergei Soares	IPEA Brasilia	2008
Jorge Abrahão	IPEA Brasilia	2008; 2010
Roberto Santana Matos	IPEA Brasilia	2008
Paulo Corbucci	IPEA Brasilia	2008; 2010
Anna Maria T. Medeiros Peliano	IPEA Brasilia	2008
Naercio Aquino Menezes-Filho	IBMEC Sao Paulo (phone interview)	2009
Ricardo Paes de Barros	IPEA Rio de Janeiro (Phone Interview)	2009
Marcos Costa Holanda	Instituto de Pesquisa do Ceará (IPECE), Fortaleza	2009
Eveline Barbosa S. Carvalho	IPECE, Fortaleza	2009
Valmir Lopes de Lima: Programa de Pós-Graduacao em Sociologia	Universidade Federal do Ceará (UFC)	2009
Flávio Ataliba Flexa D. Barreto	UFC, Departamento de Teoria Econômica	2009
Jawdat Abu-El-Haj	UFC Ciências Sociais	2009
Irllys Barreira	UFC Ciências Sociais	2009
Prof. José Raimundo Carvalho	UFC, Departamento de Teoria Econômica	2010
Danusa Mendes Almeida	Universidade Estadual do Estado de Ceará (UECE)	2009; 2010
Profa. Francisca Rejane Bezerra Andrade	UECE	2009
Sofia Lerche Vieira	UECE	2009; 2010
Idevaldo da Silvae Bodiao	UFC, Departamento de Educacao	2009

Alexandrina Sobreira de Moura	Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, Recife	2009
Clóvis de Vasconelos Cavalcanti	Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, Recife	2009
Joanildo A. Burity	Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, Recife	2009
Rosângela Tenório de Carvalho	Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, Recife	2009
Marcus Costa da Lima	Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE)	2009
Esther Rosa	Professor for pedagogics, Federal University of Pernambuco	2010
Silke Weber	UFPE, Programa de Pós-graduação em Sociologia, Ex-Secretary of Education, State of Pernambuco	2009; 2010
Maria das Graças Correa de Oliveira	Ex-State Director of Education Planning, State of Pernambuco	2010
José Batista Neto	UFPE, Centro de Educação (phone interview)	2009
Marcus Melo	UFPE, Ciências Políticas	2009
Raul da Mota Silveira Neto	UFPE: Centro de Ciências Sociais Aplicadas, Dept. De Economia	2009
Mozart Neves	UFPE, Ex-Secretary of Education, State of Pernambuco	2010
Izolda Cela de Arruda Coelho	Secretary of Education, State of Ceará	2010
Raul Henry	Ex-Secretary of Education, State of Pernambuco	2010
Antenor Napolini	Ex-Secretary of Education, State of Ceará	2010
Public administration (all levels)		

João Paulo Bacchur	Ministério de Educacao (MEC), chefe do gabinete do Ministro, Brasilia	2010
Romeu Caputo	Ministério de Educacao (MEC), Secretaria de Articulacao e Apoio aos sistemas de educacao básica, Diretor, Brasilia	2008
Elaine Pazello	Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira (INEP), Diretora de Estudos Educacionais, Brasilia	2008
Carlos Eduardo Moreno Sampaio	INEP, Coordenador Geral de Sistema Integrado de Informacoes Educacionais, Brasilia	2008
Maria Inês Gomes de Sá Pestana	INEP, Diretora de Estatísticas da Educação Básica, Brasilia	2008
Luiza Uema	INEP, Diretora SAEB, Brasilia	2009
Leonei Gomes de Oliveira	Director of the Statistical Unit of the Federal Senate, Brasilia	2010
Sonia Coelho	MEC/Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento (FNDE), Programa do Livro Didático, Brasília	2009
Albaneide Peixinho	MEC/Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento (FNDE), Programa da Alimentação Escolar, Brasília	2009
Coordenador-Geral de Apoio à Manutenção Escolar	MEC/Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento (FNDE), Programa Dinheiro Direto na Escola, Brasília	2009
Eliana Ferreira de Sousa	Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação; Coordenação do Programa Alimentação Escolar	2009
Mauricio Holanda Maia	Deputy State Secretary of Education, State of Ceará	2009; 2010
Teresa Leitão	Deputada Estadual, Estado de Pernambuco; former secretary of state for education	2009; 2010
Eloiza Vidal	Ex-Deputy secretary of state and director of education planning in Ceara	2010

Nelson Filho	Conselho Estadual de Educação, Ceara	2009
Marta Codeiro	Conselho Estadual de Educação Ceara, Secretária Municipal de Educacao	2009
Edgar Linhares, Presidente	Conselho Estadual de Educação, Ceara	2009
Francisco de Queiroz Maia Juniór	Ex-Secretary of Planning, State of Pernambuco	2009
Zélia Granja Porto, Gerencia de Políticas Educacionais da Educacao Infantil e Fundamental	Secretaria de Educacao; State of Pernambuco	2009; 2010
Mirtes Cordeiro	Secretaria de Educacao; Jaboatao; State of Pernambuco	2009
Fátima Lacerda	Secretaria de Gestao; Jaboatao, State of Pernambuco	2009
José Marcelo Farias Lima	Municipal secretary of education in Maracanaú, Ceara	2010
International Organizations		
Michele Gragnolati	World Bank Brasilia	2009
Madalena dos Santos	World Bank Brasilia (Email inquiry)	2009
Degol Hailu	UNDP: International Poverty Center for Inclusive Growth, Brasilia	2009
Ana Márcia Diogenes	UNICEF Fortaleza, State of Ceará	2009
Rui Aguiar, Coordenador na Área da Educacao	UNICEF Fortaleza, State of Ceará	2009; 2010
Ana Maria Azevedo	UNICEF Recife	2009
NGOs, Labor Unions and Politicians		
Stephan Görtz	DED Fortaleza, State of Ceará	2009
Anja Czymmeck	KAS Fortaleza	2009
Angela Küster	KAS Fortaleza	2009

Daniel Cara	Campanha Nacional pelo Direito à Educação, Brasília	2009
Bernadete Andrade	Obra Kolping, Fortaleza	2009
Suzany Costa	CEARAH Periferia, Fortaleza	2009
Margarida Marques	CEDECA - Centro de Defesa da Criança e Adolescente, Fortaleza	2009
Márcio Moreira	CEDECA - Centro de Defesa da Criança e Adolescente, Fortaleza	2009
Iram Pereira	Prefeitura de Barreira, Secretário de Meio Ambiente, State of Ceara	2009
Camila Ferreira	Instituto da Juventude Contemporânea (IJC)	2009
Paulo Cesar Arns	IADH: Instituto de Assessoria para o desenvolvimento humano: <a href="http://www.iadh.org.br/">http://www.iadh.org.br/</a>	2009
Petronio Omar Querino Tavares	Instituto Brasileiro PRO-Cidadania; <a href="http://www.procidadania.org.br/intranet.php">http://www.procidadania.org.br/intranet.php</a>	2009
Nadiel Torres	Procidadania, Assessor Técnico, Sertao Central	2009
Vera Moura	Procidadania, Assessora Técnica	2009; 2010
Elisabeth Ramos	Centro de Cultura Luis Freire, Recife	2009; 2010
Heleno Manoel Gomes de Araújo Filho	SINTEPE - Sindicato dos Trabalhadores de Educação do estado de Pernambuco, Presidente	2009; 2010
Penha Alencar	APEOC – Associação dos Professores em Educação do Ceara	2010
Edla de Araújo Lira Soares	Conselho Estadual de Educação de Pernambuco (CEEPE)	2009
Artur Bruno	Camara Legislativa de Pernambuco; Presidente da Comissão Estadual para Educação	2010
Terezinha Nunes	Camara Legislativa de Pernambuco; Vice-presidente da Comissão Estadual para Educação	2010
Others		

Claudio Ferreira Lima	Banco do Nordeste, Fortaleza	2009
Bertram Dreyer	DEG do Brasil Representações Ltda., - Grupo de Bancos KFW - Diretor Mercosul (Phone interview)	2009
Alexander Busch	Handelsblatt Brasilien, Journalist (Phone interview)	2009
Roberto Macedo, Presidente	Federacao das Indústrias do Estado do Ceará (FIEC)	2009
Wanderley Gradela,	Servicio Nacional de Aprendizagem Comercial (SENAC), Pernambuco	2009
Antonio Carlos Maranhao, Diretor Regional	SENAI Pernambuco (Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial)	2009
Eduardo Anacleto de Souza Veiga	SENAI Cabo Sto. Agostino	2009
Rafael de Castro Albuquerque	Serviço de (SEBRAE) Fortaleza	2009
Leocadia de la Hora	Representative of the north eastern chapter of UNDIME, Recife	2010
Sandra Leite	Associate of UNDIME Ceara, Fortaleza	2010



## Annex 2: Interview Guidelines of Semistructured Interviews

**Stage 1:** Collection of statistical data at federal level – October 2008 (informal interviews in order to gain access to unpublished official statistics)

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**Stage 2:** Expert/semistructured interviews with experts at federal and state level – March – May 2009 (initial data collection)

### *Interview guidelines for experts in:*

- Think tanks and university research centers (policy, poverty, and education experts)
- Program coordinators of education programs at federal level
- NGOs, teachers' unions, and state-level education councils
- State bureaucracy
- Business associations at state level

1. 2A. Interview Guidelines for Poverty and Education Experts
2. Do seu ponto de vista, como contribui educação à um crescimento pro - pobre, ou seja, como afeta educação: Renda? Desigualdade? Crescimento?
3. Que tipo de educação parece ser a maior necessidade no Brasil: Primária, secundária, ou educação superior? Por que você acha isso?
4. De acordo com a sua própria opinião, que são os maiores desafios para o Brasil na área da educação em relação ao crescimento pro - pobre?
5. Quais dois ou três programas educacionais com cobertura nacional você considera como sendo particularmente eficaz para lidar com estes desafios?
6. Que dois ou três programas educacionais com cobertura nacional você considera como sendo particularmente eficaz para lidar com estes desafios?
7. Você sabe de eventuais diferenças no funcionamento (implementação/execução) destes programas em todos os estados, especialmente entre Pernambuco - Ceará?
8. Você tem uma explicação para estas diferenças?
  - De acordo com o seu próprio juízo, para qual programa essas diferenças são mais aparentes?
9. De acordo com a sua própria opinião, os programas atualmente existentes são suficientes para superar as necessidades descritas do sistema educativo no Brasil?
  - Se não, o que deve ser feito ainda?
  - Como você avalia a viabilidade política das suas sugestões?
10. Iremos realizar algumas entrevistas domiciliares. Especificamente, nós gostaríamos visitar domicílios urbanos, bem como domicílios rurais com e sem acesso ao programa específico que você identificou como sendo o mais distinto entre estados. Ficaríamos muito gratos pela sua assessoria na escolha duma zona rural e duma zona urbana onde família tem e não tem acesso ao regime, respectivamente.

## **2B: Interview Guidelines for Coordinators of Federal Education Programs**

1. Quais são, do seu ponto de vista, os maiores desafios para o Brasil na área da educação?
2. Qual área da educação você considera mais importante para liderar com estes desafios?
3. Como os programas do FNDE podem contribuir a liderar eficientemente com estes desafios?
4. Quais são os passos mais importantes na execução dos programas do FNDE, quais instituições são mais importantes?
5. Você conhece eventuais diferenças na implementação/execução destes programas nos estados no Brasil?
6. As diferenças existentes têm a ver com quais fatores, p.ex. sendo estruturais, financeiras, políticos, outros? (by program)
  - Programa da Alimentação Escolar
  - Programa do Transporte Escolar
  - Programa Dinheiro Direto na Escola (PDDE)
  - Programa do Livro Didático
7. Por que existem diferenças entre estados? Como você as explica?

## **2C: Interview Guidelines for Representatives of NGOs, Teachers' Unions and Education Councils**

1. Quais são, do seu ponto de vista, os maiores desafios para o Ceará na área da educação?
2. Quais têm sido as respostas por parte do governo do estado e dos municípios para liderar com estes desafios?
  - *Programas estaduais*
  - *Piso Salarial*
  - *Apoio para professores*
  - *Relação com sindicatos dos professores*
3. Quais foram as decisões mais importantes para implementar políticas educacionais neste sentido?
4. O que você acha do IDEB?
5. O que é uma boa política de educação para você?

6. O que é preciso para fazer “boas políticas” na área de educação?  
(função IDEB, formação de professores etc.)
7. Como funciona o controle dos gastos?
8. O que falta para melhorar a educação no Brasil e no estado do Ceará/Pernambuco?

### **2D: Interview Guidelines for State Bureaucracy**

1. De acordo com a sua própria opinião, que são os maiores desafios para o Brasil na área da educação no Ceará?
2. Quais tem sido as respostas a frente destes desafios pelo governo estadual do Ceará?
3. Qual é a relação entre o governo estadual e os governos municipais na questão de implementação de políticas públicas na área de educação? Qual é o papel de coordenação estadual?
4. Alfabetização e Municípios
5. Quais limitações existem em municípios com pouco financiamento e pouca capacidade?
6. Como se explicam estas diferenças em gestão e resultados se tem um ponto inicial igual?
7. Que faz o controle dos gastos dos municípios?
8. Que tipo de contacto (formal e informal) existe num município, por exemplo entre uma escola e a prefeitura?

### **2E. Interview Guidelines for Business Associations**

1. Segundo a sua experiência, quais são as barreiras mais importantes que obstaculizam investimentos nas empresas do seu ramo da indústria?
2. Em caso que a falta de pessoal qualificado foi mencionado:
3. Como que é que isso é uma barreira importante?
4. Qual é a importância desta barreira em comparação às outras barreiras mencionadas?
5. - Em caso que a falta de pessoal qualificado não foi mencionado: como você descreveria a situação no que diz respeito à mão-de-obra?
6. O que é um típico perfil em termos de qualificação para os trabalhadores no seu ramo da indústria?
7. Quão importante é a graduação escolar em comparação com outras qualificações?
8. Se for difícil encontrar trabalhadores com o perfil das qualificações exigidas no seu ramo da indústria, o que precisamente falta?

9. Com o que você atribuía esta falta de qualificação?
10. O que é mau no sistema educacional do Brasil?
11. O que é uma típica faixa salarial para um empregador a.) do sexo masculino e b) do sexo feminino com o perfil de qualificação descrito no seu ramo da indústria?

**Stage 3:** Expert/semistructured interviews with experts at the federal, state, and municipal levels – March – April 2010 (advanced data collection)

***Interview guidelines for experts in:***

- State legislatives
- State bureaucracies (secretaries of state; coordinators of education programs)
- Teachers' unions

**3A. Interview Guidelines for Members of the Legislative (stage 3, 2010)**

**I. A sua experiência como política na legislativa na área da educação**

1. Quais tem sido iniciativas ou programas importantes no estado para melhorar a educação básica, por ex. na área da alfabetização, na questão do salário?
  - a. Por que tem sido importantes? Quem os estimulou?
  - b. Os municípios foram incluídos desde o início? De qual forma – na formulação, na execução? A sua participação foi regulamentado?
  - c. Quais foram os resultados destes programas?
  - d. Quais foram as dificuldades na realização da iniciativa, e por quê?
  - e. Qual era a relevância do governo federal nestas iniciativas? (Apoio e oposição política por causa de partidos iguais/opostos?)
2. Qual tem sido a posição e a influencia dos sindicatos na formulação e implementação destes programas?
3. Quais desafios permanecem no programa neste momento e por que?  
(Capacidade limitada: Institucional, fiscal/financeiro, político, administrativo, preparação técnica)

**II. Efeitos da municipalização e regime de colaboração**

4. Qual efeito quantitativo e qualitativo você observou nas escolas municipais e estaduais desde a implementação do FUNDEF? (Diferenças urbanos/rurais?)
5. Você acha que a municipalização desde 1995 tem aumentado as diferenças na oferta da educação básica dentro do estado aonde você atua?
  - a. Entre quem?
  - b. Por quê?
  - c. Quais explicações você tem para isso?
6. O que você diria: A municipalização favoreceu ou não a qualidade de educação dentro do estado?
7. Se o Brasil não tivesse decidido em municipalizar a educação básica em 1988, como seria a situação hoje?

8. Qual rol os governos estaduais poderiam ocupar hoje para apoiar os governos municipais na oferta de uma educação de qualidade para todos (colaboração ou concorrência?)

(incentivos fiscais, apoio no controle e fiscalização dos recursos? Treinamento em lidar com a burocracia? Apoio na formação de conselheiros? Monitoramento?)

9. Quais outras melhorias você consideram necessário para corrigir os efeitos desiguais da municipalização? (Opinião sobre CONAE)

### **3B. Interview Guidelines for Secretários Estaduais de Educação**

#### **I. A sua experiência como secretário de educação no estado**

1. Quais foram iniciativas marcantes durante a sua gestão? (Alfabetização, Qualidade, etc.)
  - a. Por quê? Quem os estimulou?
  - b. Houve iniciativas para apoiar a qualidade de educação nos municípios do estado?
  - c. Quais momentos difíceis houve? Por quê?
  - d. Qual era o rol do governo federal nestas iniciativas?
2. Quais foram pessoas, organizações ou instituições importantes no apoio de suas iniciativas? Houve oposição?  
(Influência ideológico do governador? Sindicatos?)
3. Como você caracterizaria a relação com os atores anteriormente mencionados?
4. Quais eram os desafios na política de educação básica no estado que ficaram depois que você deixou o cargo?
5. Por que continuaram a ser desafios? Em qual sentido?  
(Capacidade limitada: Institucional, financeiro, político, administrativo, preparação técnica)

#### **II. Efeitos da descentralização e regime de colaboração**

6. Qual efeito quantitativo e qualitativo você observou nas escolas municipais e estaduais na época em relação a implementação do FUNDEF? (Diferenças urbanos/rurais?)
7. Você acha que a descentralização desde 1995 tem aumentado as diferenças na oferta da educação básica dentro do estado aonde você atuou?
  - a. Entre quem?
  - b. Por quê?
  - c. Quais explicações você tem para isso?
8. O que você diria: A descentralização favoreceu ou não a qualidade de educação no estado aonde você atuou?
9. Se o Brasil não tivesse decidido em descentralizar a área da educação básica em 1988, como seria a situação hoje?
10. Qual rol os governos estaduais poderiam ocupar hoje para apoiar os governos municipais na oferta de uma educação de qualidade para todos?  
(incentivos fiscais, apoio no controle e fiscalização dos recursos? Treinamento em liderar com a burocracia? Apoio na formação de conselheiros? Monitoramento?)  
Qual é a tua opinião sobre um sistema único de educação? Como deveria ser?

### 3C. Interview Guidelines for Coordinators of Education Programs

#### I. A sua experiência como gerente do programa de alfabetização

1. Em qual estado estava o programa quando você começou em trabalhar como gestor/a dele?
2. Como se tem desenvolvido antes e durante a tua gestão?
3. Quais momentos foram de sucesso, momentos difíceis?
4. Quais são os desafios presentes para fazer o programa funcionar melhor?
5. Cooperação:
  - a. Quais são pessoas, organizações ou instituições importantes no apoio do programa, e por quê?
  - b. Governo estadual: papel na formulação e implementação
  - c. Governos municipais
  - d. Financiamento? (Setor privado?)
  - e. Oposição? (Sindicatos)
6. Como você caracterizaria a relação com os atores anteriormente mencionados?
7. Professores:
  - a. Como são preparados e acompanhados os professores?
  - b. Eles são das escolas aonde é aplicado o programa?
  - c. Qual e a continuidade do corpo docente? (dados) (Dados sobre falta de alunos?)
  - d. Qual e a formação destes professores? (dados)
8. Municípios:
  - a. O programa foi desenvolvido para ser implementado em escolas das duas redes? Foram firmados convênios com os governos municipais? (Normatização)
  - b. Quais diferenças na capacidade de execução por parte dos municípios você tem observado? Quais explicações você tem para estas diferenças?  
(Capacidade limitada: Institucional, financeiro, político, administrativo, preparação técnica do corpo docente)
  - c. Qual apoio e quais medidas existem se o município não realize as atividades no sentido do programa?
9. Financiamento:
  - a. Como funciona o financiamento do programa?
  - b. Qual e o custo aluno numa turma do programa em comparação com uma turma comum?
10. O programa x funciona da mesma maneira? Quais são as diferenças?



### 3D. Interview Guidelines for Members of Teachers' Unions

#### **I. A sua experiência no acompanhamento da política estadual no estado**

1. Como você caracterizaria a política da educação básica do governo estadual atual em relação aos sindicatos? (temas, tratamento, diálogo)
  - i. Diferenças nos salários entre a rede estadual e a rede municipal
2. Como você caracterizaria esta relação em comparação a gestão anterior?
3. Quais têm sido os pontos marcantes desta gestão? Iniciativas? Programas?
4. Qual é a avaliação do sindicato do programa xxx?
5. Qual tem sido a posição e a influência dos sindicatos na formulação e implementação deste programa?
6. Qual relação tem este programa criado entre o governo estadual e municipal?

#### **II. Efeitos da municipalização e regime de colaboração**

7. Com UNDIME: Qual efeito quantitativo e qualitativo você observou nas escolas municipais e estaduais desde a implementação do FUNDEF? (Diferenças urbanos/rurais?)
8. Você acha que a municipalização desde 1995 tem aumentado as diferenças na oferta da educação básica dentro do estado aonde você atua?
  - a. Entre quem?
  - b. Por quê?
  - c. Quais explicações você tem para isso?
9. O que você diria: A municipalização favoreceu ou não a qualidade de educação dentro do estado?
10. Se o Brasil não tivesse decidido em municipalizar a educação básica em 1988, como seria a situação hoje?
11. Qual rol os governos estaduais e os governos municipais poderiam ocupar hoje na oferta de uma educação de qualidade para todos (colaboração ou concorrência?) (incentivos fiscais, apoio no controle e fiscalização dos recursos? Treinamento em liderar com a burocracia? Apoio na formação de conselheiros? Monitoramento?)
12. Quais outras melhorias você considera necessário para corrigir os efeitos desiguais da municipalização? (Opinião sobre CONAE)

### Annex 3: Selected Human Development Indicators for Brazilian Regions

<b>Table A3.1. Selected Human Development Indicators for all Brazilian Regions</b>								
Region	Personal nominal income per capita, in (2000) and 2006 (R\$/month) a/b	Illiteracy rate for age 15 and beyond, 2006 (percent)	Formal employment, 2005 (as percentage of total employment) c	Years of schooling, 2006	Gini coefficient, 2006	Poverty rate (percent) 1992	Poverty rate (percent) 1999	Poverty rate (percent) 2004
North	675	11.3	50.27	6.2	0.508	46.42	39.13	32.82
NE	551	20.7	47.59	5.2	0.556	62.46	54.63	49.17
SE	1036	6	68.52	7.5	0.529	31.43	24.05	17.43
South	984	5.7	71.36	7.1	0.510	21.81	16.25	14.02
Center-West	992	8.3	61.99	6.9	0.558	23.41	17.97	12.13
Brazil	873	10.4	62.74	6.7	0.547	35.87	29.30	25.08
a. Average income of persons above the age of 10 and with nonzero nominal income; b. 1 R\$ = 0.59 US\$ or 0.39 EUR [09/11/09] c. Calculated from IBGE - PNAD data.								
Sources: (IBGE 2008) (based on IBGE Demographic Census 2000 and PNAD 2006); Poverty rates: estimates by Getulio Vargas Foundation based on IBGE Demographic Census and PNAD, extracted from: <a href="http://www3.fgv.br/ibrecps/queda_da_miseria/Sumario_q.htm">http://www3.fgv.br/ibrecps/queda_da_miseria/Sumario_q.htm</a> [28.10.09].								

#### Annex 4.1: Fiscal Finances of Ceará and Pernambuco

<b>Table A4.1. Fiscal Finances of CE an PE for Selected Years and Budget Positions in R\$</b>		
Item/year	Ceará	Pernambuco
<b>1995</b>		
Total budget revenue (receita total)	1,902,585	1,996,442
Tax revenue (receita tributária)	985,458	1,231,275
ICMS	950,665	1,181,327
FPE	566,570	532,847
Expenditure in education and culture (disaggregated not available for this year)	342,067	316,026
Expenditure in health and sanitation	184,258	181,096
<b>2000</b>		
Total budget revenue	3,798,700,663	5,860,597,111
Tax revenue	1,962,242,596	2,259,927,161
ICMS	1,838,435,051	2,116,784,349
FPE	1,051,546,823	988,958,253
<b>Expenditure in education and culture (disaggregated not available for this year)</b>	<b>763,583,605</b>	<b>413,795,497</b>
Expenditure in health	276,387,854	118,699,824
<b>2005</b>		
Total budget revenue	7,787,382,523	9,479,968,230
Tax revenue	3,519,657,745	4,911,182,631
ICMS	3,097,416,554	4,277,778,270
FPE	1,246,243,698	2,067,097,128
Expenditure in health	723,363,702	1,335,477,580
Expenditure in social assistance	120,535,511	27,597,889
<b>Total expenditure in education</b>	<b>1,511,773,716</b>	<b>911,438,900</b>
Expenditure Ensino Fundamental	592,514,362	542,059,772
Expenditure Ensino Médio	302,118,570	75,743,652
Expenditure Ensino Profissional	0	3,366,372
Expenditure Ensino Superior	0	49,650,620
Educação Infantil	0	5,426,472

Educação de Jovens e Adultos	33,029,929	16,506,424
Educação Especial	0	957,708
Demais Subfunções	584,110,855	217,727,880
<b>2009</b>		
Total budget revenue	13,063,965,688.95	16,196,339,923.48
Tax revenue	5,799,444,303.05	7,771,719,329.49
ICMS	5,026,590,617.06	6,710,356,371.59
FPE	3,320,535,245.38	3,122,893,497.33
Expenditure in health	1,332,701,895.02	2,735,866,438.01
Expenditure in social assistance	150,952,874.02	28,809,546.61
<b>Total expenditure in education</b>	<b>2,995,989,826.61</b>	<b>1,844,167,864.74</b>
Expenditure Ensino Fundamental	1,053,191,753.25	969,911,695.76
Expenditure Ensino Médio	1,549,616,058.74	357,381,388.88
Expenditure Ensino Profissional	27,808,738.60	83,439,557.87
Expenditure Ensino Superior	204,036,275.54	74,416,556.77
Expenditure Educação Infantil	0.00	1,094,677.69
Expenditure Educação de Jovens e Adultos	14,154,641.69	9,152,885.83
Expenditure Educação Especial	2,894,915.22	397,531.99
Expenditure Demais Subfunções	144,287,443.57	348,373,569.95
Source: <a href="http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/estatistica/est_estados.asp">http://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/estatistica/est_estados.asp</a> [28/09/2010]		

#### Annex 4.2: Formal Education Transfers in Ceará and Pernambuco

**Table A4.2. Formal Education Transfers in Ceará and Pernambuco, 1998 Onwards**

Type of Transfer/Year	Ceará	Pernambuco	São Paulo
<b>Fundef Union - State in R\$</b>			
1998	97,268,924.12	107,756,955.11	249,923,836.38
2000	89,156,126.46	116,137,166.87	395,306,185.12
2006	88,558,470.71	200,368,863.87	532,282,436.16
2010	187,863,834.24	286,064,249.09	53,648,613.24
<b>Fundef Union - Municipalities in R\$</b>			
1998	175,252,139.39	117,338,848.11	58,016,416.81
2000	215,291,052.72	143,359,631.57	146,530,986.68
2006	557,461,063.97	403,877,313.07	376,628,512.76
<b>Fundef State - Municipalities in R\$</b>			
1998	125,740,001.16	129,811,980.90	649,270,095.09
2000	18,687,747.59	14,795,472.98	105,598,440.70
2006	456,303,536.15	482,025,765.29	3,563,728,979.05
<b>Fundef from State to - State in R\$</b>			
1998	69,788,561.74	119,211,533.33	2,796,933,782.31
2000	80,425,447.87	131,097,606.75	3,326,217,603.63
2006	72,404,266.02	239,216,395.39	5,034,593,171.27
<b>Salário Educação in R\$</b>			
2000 (distribution of state quota available for this year only, no municipal quota)	2,573,485,056.00	4,160,526,692.00	80,412,827,476.00
2005 (Transfer of state and municipal quota)			
State	7,799,913	23,314,124.32	869,573,989.91

Municipal	42,752,959.11	46,623,208.42	663,466,992.16
2010 (Transfer of state and municipal quota)			
State	27,690,088.68	63,183,051.86	1,500,672,999.07
Municipal	85,519,989.56	91,025,493.60	1,241,707,138.38
Lending in the education sector at state level from the Brazilian Development Bank BNDES 1994-2010; in million R\$	885,272,480.14	*	n/a
* According to a BNDES representative, the state of Pernambuco did not borrow any finances from this Brazilian Development Bank in the education sector for the period after 1995 [01/11/2010]. However, it is likely that both states received either grant or debt financing benefiting the education sector from multilateral organizations such as the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank.			
Sources: Ministry of Finance/National Treasury (2009); FNDE (2011); BNDES (2010)			

## Annex 5: Political Affiliations Ceará, Pernambuco, and Federal Level

<b>Table A5.1. Political Affiliation in Ceará, Pernambuco, and National Levels with Education Ministers/Secretaries of State</b>			
	<b>Ceará</b> Party in power at state level	<b>National Level</b> Party in power at national level	<b>Pernambuco</b> Party in power at state level
1991-1994	Governor: Secretário de Educação: Maria Luiza Barbosa Chaves		Governor: Secretário de Educação: José Jorge de Lima (15.03.91 - 17.02.93) Roberto José Marques Pereira (17.02.93 - 31.12.94)
1995-1998	Governor: TASSO RIBEIRO JEREISSATI (PSDB) Secretário de Educação: *Antenor Manoel Naspolini	President of the Republic: Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) - PSDB	Governor MIGUEL ARRAES DE ALENCAR (PSB) Secretário de Educação: *Silke Weber
1999-2002	Governador: TASSO RIBEIRO JEREISSATI (PSDB) Secretário de Educação: *Antenor Manoel Naspolini (01/01/1995- 05/04/2002) *Jaime Cavalcante de Albuquerque Filho (04.02-12.02)	FHC, PSDB	Governador: JARBAS DE ANDRADE VASCONCELOS (PMDB) Secretário de Educação: *Éfrem de Aguiar Maranhão (01.01.99 - 23.01.01) *Raul Henry (24.01.01-08.04.02)
2003-2006	Governador: LÚCIO GONÇALO DE ALCÂNTARA (PSDB) Secretário de Educação: <u>*Sofia Lerche Vieira</u> (02/01/2003- 06/01/2006) *Luís Eduardo de Menezes Lima (06/01/2006-29/12/2006)	President of the Republic Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, PT	Governador: JARBAS DE ANDRADE VASCONCELOS (PMDB) Secretário de Educação: *Francisco de Assis (09.04.02 - 03.02.03) *Mozart Neves Ramos (03.02.03 - 01.01.07)

2007-2010	<p>Governor:  <b>CID FERREIRA GOMES</b>  (PSB)</p> <p>Secretário de Educação:  *<b>Maria Izolda Cela de Arruda Coelho</b> (02/01/2007- ...)</p>	<p>President of the Republic:  <b>Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, PT</b></p>	<p>Governor:  <b>EDUARDO HENRIQUE ACCIOLY CAMPOS</b> (PSB)</p> <p>Secretário de Educação:  *<b>Danilo Jorge de Barros Cabral</b> (PSB)</p>
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**Annex 6: Executed Budget Amendments in the Education Sector in Ceará and Pernambuco, 1998–2010**

<b>Table A6.1. Budget Amendment in Education in Ceará, 1998–2010</b>						
<b>Sponsoring individual</b>	<b>Part y</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Budget unit</b>	<b>Subproject/Activity</b>	<b>Amount of approved amendment in R\$</b>	<b>Amount executed in R\$</b>
<b>1998</b>						
OSÉ AUGUSTO	PPS	ICAPUI	MIN.M.AMB. REC.HID.AM AZ.LEG	EDUCAÇÃO AMBIENTAL EM ICAPUI - CE	150,000	104,999
Statistics 1998: 9 education amendments from PSDB (2), PMDB (3), PT (2), PPB (1), PPS (1); 1 got executed in environmental education (Jose Augusto PPS 105,000 R\$)						
<b>1999</b>						
Statistics 1999: 1 education amendments only (PSDB) which was not executed.						
<b>2000</b>						
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PC DO B	FORTALEZA	UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DO CEARÁ	PRODUÇÃO E MELHORIA DA PESQUISA UNIVERSITÁRIA E DIFUSÃO DE SEUS RESULTADOS - REFORMA DAS INSTALAÇÕES FÍSICAS DO LABOMAR - FORTALEZA - CE	80,000	78,901
Statistics 2000: One education amendment only (Inacio Arruda; PC do B) which was executed in higher education (78,901 R\$).						
<b>2001</b>						
Statistics 2001: 2 education amendments (PSDB-1; PPB-1) which both were not executed.						
<b>2002</b>						
<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PC DO B	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	TREINAMENTO ESPECIAL PARA ALUNOS DE GRADUAÇÃO DE ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - PET - TREINAMENTO ESPECIAL PARA	100,000	99,376

				ALUNOS DE GRADUAÇÃO DE ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - ESTADO DO CEARÁ		
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PC DO B	FORTALEZA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DO CEARÁ - FORTALEZA - CE	100,000	100,000
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PC DO B	FORTALEZA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - CEFET- CE - FORTALEZA - CE	120,000	119,999
JOSÉ LINHARES	PPB	ARACOIABA	FUNDO NACIONAL DE ASSISTÊNCIA SOCIAL	ATENDIMENTO À CRIANÇA E AO ADOLESCENTE EM ABRIGO - MANUTENÇÃO DA ASSOCIAÇÃO DOS EDUCADORES DE ARACOIABA - ARACOIABA - CE	50,000	50,000
OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PETROLINA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - FUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PETROLINA - PE	300,000	299,805

Statistics 2002: 8 education amendments (PCdoB-4; PPB-1; PFL-2; PSDB-1); 5 were executed (3 in higher education, 1 in vocational training, 1 for an education association)

26 amendments for CE in 2002 (national comparison: total of 7795 amendments; 527 in education)

<b>2003</b>						
Statistics 2003: 238 amendments in 2003 in Ceará (7469 in total in Brazil) sponsored by 28 individuals; however, none in education in Ceará (but 641 nationwide).						
<b>2004</b>						
<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
ARIOSTO HOLANDA	PSDB	LIMOEIRO DO NORTE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR ESTADUAL - LIMOEIRO DO NORTE - CE	120,000	120,000
BANCADA DO CEARA	BANC CE	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	COMPLEMENTAÇÃO PARA O FUNCIONAMENTO DAS ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - APOIO ÀS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	7.570.800	1.000.000
PASTOR PEDRO RIBEIRO	PMDB	FORTALEZA	FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL - APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL - INSTITUTO EDUCACIONAL DANIEL BERG - FORTALEZA - CE	65.000	64.994
REGINALDO DUARTE	PSDB	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A UNIVERSIDADE REGIONAL DO CARIRI - URCA - ESTADO DO CEARÁ	100.000	100.000
Statistics 2004: In general: Nationwide 7923 amendments, being 223 in Ceará sponsored by 26 individuals. In education: 779 amendments nationwide sponsored; 7 in education in Ceará (PSDB 3x: PSDB; 1x PT; 1xPMDB; 1x PL; 1x Bancada of Ceará); only 4 executed (3 in higher education, 1 in primary education)						

2005						
Autor	Partido	Localidade	Unidade Orçamentária	Ação + Subtítulo	Valor da Emenda	Liquidado
JOSÉ PIMENTEL	PT	MARACANAÚ	CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DO CEARÁ	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE CAMPUS DO CEFET DO CEARÁ - CONSTRUÇÃO DA 1ª ETAPA DO CAMPUS EM MARACANAÚ - CE	100,000	590,910
ROBERTO PESSOA	PL	MARACANAÚ	CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DO CEARÁ	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE CAMPUS DO CEFET DO CEARÁ - CONSTRUÇÃO DA 1ª ETAPA DO CAMPUS EM MARACANAÚ - CE	500,000	590,910
PASTOR PEDRO RIBEIRO	PMDB	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A PROJETOS ESPECIAIS PARA OFERTA DE EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA A JOVENS E ADULTOS - INSTITUTO DANIEL BERG - ESTADO DO CEARÁ	30,000	30,000
JOÃO ALFREDO	PT	FORTALEZA	FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL - CONSTRUÇÃO DE ESCOLAS - FORTALEZA-CE	700,000	700,000
BANCADA DO CEARÁ	S/PARTIDO	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO ÀS UNIVERSIDADES ESTADUAIS DO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	4,700,000	499,999
JOÃO ALFREDO	PT	FORTALEZA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - FORTALEZA - CE	200,000	200,000
JOÃO ALFREDO	PT	IGUATU	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - IGUATU - CE	100,000	100,000
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PC DO B	ITAPIPOCA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APARELHAMENTO DA BIBLIOTECA DA	150,000	150,000

				UECE/FACEDI - ITAPIPOCA-CE		
<p>Statistics 2005:</p> <p>In general: nationwide 8280 amendments, being 349 in CE and 509 in PE</p> <p>In education: 12 amendments in education (PTx5; PCdoBx2; PSDBx2; PFLx1; PMDBx1; w/out partyx1); 8 were executed (6 in higher education; 2 in primary education)</p>						
<b>2006</b>						
<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
BANCADA DO CEARA	S/PARTIDO	CEARÁ	MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA	APOIO À PESQUISA E INOVAÇÃO PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO SOCIAL - INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	4,930,000	2,892,959
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PC DO B	FORTALEZA	MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - CONSTRUÇÃO DE PISCINA SEMI-OLÍMPICA - COLÉGIO MARTINS DE AGUIAR - FORTALEZA - CE	150,000	150,000
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PC DO B	FORTALEZA	MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - CONSTRUÇÃO DE GINÁSIO DE ESPORTE NO COLÉGIO JENNY GOMES - FORTALEZA - CE	150,000	150,000
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PC DO B	JUAZEIRO DO NORTE	MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - IMPLANTAÇÃO E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE QUADRA DE ESPORTE	150,000	150,000

				COBERTA NO CEFET-UNED - JUAZEIRO DO NORTE - CE		
JOÃO ALFREDO	PSOL	FORTALEZA	FUNDO NACIONAL PARA A CRIANÇA E O ADOLESCENTE - FNCA	APOIO A SERVIÇOS DE ATENDIMENTO DE ADOLESCENTES EM CUMPRIMENTO DE MEDIDAS SOCIOEDUCATIVAS E EGRESSOS - NO MUNICÍPIO DE FORTALEZA - CE	200,000	200,000
JOSÉ PIMENTEL	PT	MARACANAÚ	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	FOMENTO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - CONSTRUÇÃO DE UNED - CEFET - MARACANAÚ - CE	150,000	135,262
<p>Statistics 2006: 14 amendments in education (1xw/out party; PCdoBx3; PSOLx3; PTx1; PMDBx6) but only 6 were executed (1xhigher education; 3xprimary education; 2x vocation training)</p> <p>nationwide 8541 amendments, being 338 in CE and 507 in PE</p>						
<b>2007</b>						
ANDRÉ FIGUEIREDO	PDT	CRATO	24101 - MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA	FOMENTO À ELABORAÇÃO E IMPLANTAÇÃO DE PROJETOS DE INCLUSÃO DIGITAL - CRATO - CE	52,696	51,379
ARIOSTO HOLANDA	PSB	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26101 - MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	150,000	300,000
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PCdoB	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26206 - CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DO CEARÁ	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DE INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	150,000	1,771,686

JOÃO ALFREDO	PSo 1	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26233 - UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DO CEARÁ	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA- ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	200,000	12,495,237
JOSÉ PIMENTEL	PT	FORTALEZA	26233 - UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DO CEARÁ	ACERVO BIBLIOGRÁFICO DESTINADO ÀS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - BIBLIOTECA DO CURSO DE DIREITO - FORTALEZA - CE	50,000	49,996
RS 6 - EDU CULT CIENC TECN, ESP TUR		JUAZEIRO DO NORTE	26233 - UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DO CEARÁ	EXPANSÃO DO ENSINO SUPERIOR - CAMPUS DO CARIRI - NO MUNICÍPIO DE JUAZEIRO DO NORTE - CE	499,456	5,116,504
PASTOR PEDRO RIBEIRO	PR	CASCADEL	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVI MENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMEN TO DO ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL - ASSOCIAÇÃO PRÓ- DESENVOLVIMEN TO DE CAPONGA - CASCADEL - CE	50,000	50,000
ARIOSTO HOLANDA	PSB	ITAREMA	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVI MENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMEN TO DO ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL - ITAREMA - CE	250,000	250,000
PATRICIA LUCIA SABOYA FERREIRA GOMES	PD T	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVI MENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO À REESTRUTURAÇÃ O DA REDE FÍSICA PÚBLICA DE EDUCAÇÃO INFANTIL - NO ESTADO DO	650,000	650,000

				CEARÁ		
RELATOR GERAL		CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	COMPLEMENTAÇÃO DA UNIÃO AO FUNDO DE MANUTENÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA E DE VALORIZAÇÃO DOS PROFISSIONAIS DA EDUCAÇÃO - FUNDEB - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	16,773,862	282,559,770
ARIOSTO HOLANDA	PSB	RUSSAS	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - RUSSAS - CE	500,000	500,000
ARIOSTO HOLANDA	PSB	LIMOEIRO DO NORTE	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - LIMOEIRO DO NORTE - CE	400,000	400,000

Statistics 2007: 26 amendments in education (ANDRÉ FIGUEIREDOx1; Bancada of Ceara x1; Ariosto Holanda x4; Inacio Arruda x2; Joao Alfredo x8; Jose Pimentel x1; RS 6x3; PASTOR PEDRO RIBEIRO x2; Moroni Torgan x1; Tasso Jereissait x1; PATRÍCIA LÚCIA SABOYA FERREIRA GOMES x1; Relator Geral x 20; Only 12 amendments were executed (Higher education x4; fundamental education x4; vocational training x1; education association x1; child care x1); nationwide 9570 amendments, being 341 in CE and 503 in PE.

#### 2008

Autor	Partido	Localidade	Unidade Orçamentária	Ação + Subtítulo	Valor da Emenda	Liquidado
ARIOSTO HOLANDA	PPS	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	24101 - MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA	APOIO A PROJETOS E EVENTOS DE DIVULGAÇÃO E EDUCAÇÃO CIENTÍFICA - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	300,000	300,000



ARIOSTO HOLANDA	PPS	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26101 - MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	200,000	400,000
CHICO LOPES	PCdo B	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26101 - MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DO CEARÁ - FAFIDAM - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	130,000	130,000
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PCdo B	FORTALEZA	26206 - CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DO CEARÁ	REFORMA E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA - FORTALEZA - CE	200,000	350,000
RELATOR GERAL		CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26206 - CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DO CEARÁ	FUNCIONAMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	6,150,849	44,171,018
RELATOR GERAL		CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26206 - CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DO CEARÁ	ASSISTÊNCIA AO EDUCANDO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	1,035,000	1,235,000
ARNON BEZERRA	PTB	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26233 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO CEARÁ	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - CARIRI - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	50,000	38,900
INÁCIO ARRUDA	PCdo B	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26233 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO CEARÁ	REFORMA E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - DIRETÓRIO CENTRAL DOS ESTUDANTES - DCE - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	200,000	396,406
PATRÍCIA SABOYA	PDT	FORTALEZA	26233 - UNIVERSIDADE	REFORMA E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE	300,000	4,045,818

			DE FEDERAL DO CEARÁ	INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ		
RELATOR GERAL		CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26233 - UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DO CEARÁ	FUNCIONAMENTO DE CURSOS DE GRADUAÇÃO - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	7	344,343,779
JOSÉ GUIMARÃES	PT	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	50,000	49,494
JOSÉ PIMENTEL	PT	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO TRANSPORTE ESCOLAR PARA A EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - CAMINHO DA ESCOLA - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	600,000	595,485
JOSÉ PIMENTEL	PT	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO À REESTRUTURAÇÃO DA REDE FÍSICA PÚBLICA DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - CONSTRUÇÃO DE ESCOLAS EM MUNICÍPIOS DO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	2,000,000	2,000,000
PATRICIA SABOYA	PDT	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO À REESTRUTURAÇÃO DA REDE FÍSICA PÚBLICA DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - CONSTRUÇÃO DE CENTROS DE EDUCAÇÃO INFANTIL - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	6,300,000	5,578,911
RELATOR GERAL		CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO À ALIMENTAÇÃO ESCOLAR NA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	25,000,000	71,447,612
RELATOR GERAL		CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE	COMPLEMENTAÇÃO DA UNIÃO AO FUNDO DE MANUTENÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO	205,000,000	419,601,353

			DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA E DE VALORIZAÇÃO DOS PROFISSIONAIS DA EDUCAÇÃO - FUNDEB - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ		
TASSO JEREISSATI	PSDB	VIÇOSA DO CEARÁ	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO À REESTRUTURAÇÃO DA REDE FÍSICA PÚBLICA DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - CONSTRUÇÃO DE UNIDADE ESCOLAR - VIÇOSA DO CEARÁ - CE	400,000	400,000
RELATOR GERAL		CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26315 - ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE CRATO - CE	FUNCIONAMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	637,657	8,144,335
RELATOR GERAL		CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26315 - ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE CRATO - CE	ASSISTÊNCIA AO EDUCANDO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	50,000	136,579
RELATOR GERAL		CEARÁ (ESTADO)	26317 - ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE IGUATU - CE	FUNCIONAMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	417,179	8,913,361
ARIOSTO HOLANDA	PSB	ARACOIABA	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - ARACOIABA - CE	180,000	175,500
ARIOSTO HOLANDA	PSB	RUSSAS	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - RUSSAS - CE	180,000	175,500
EUGÊNIO RABELO	PP	CEARÁ (ESTADO)	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	FUNCIONAMENTO DE NÚCLEOS DE ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - NO ESTADO DO CEARÁ	460,000	0

INÁCIO ARRUDA	PCdo B	FORTALEZA	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - FORTALEZA - CE	300,000	292,500
<p>Statistics 2008: 31 amendments in education but only 24 were executed (higher education x7; scientific education x1; vocational training x5; fundamental education x11;  nationwide 11956 amendments, being 368 in CE and 553 in PE</p>						
<b>2009</b>						
<p>Statistics 2009: 18 amendments in education but none was executed.  nationwide 9642 amendments, being 222 in CE and 512 in PE</p>						
<b>2010</b>						
<p>Statistics 2010: 27 amendments in education but not information available how many got executed.  nationwide 10087 amendments, being 240 in CE and 495 in PE</p>						
<b>Total of all executed amendments 1998 – 2010: 1,224,655,343R\$</b>						
<p>Source: Author's compilation based on data provided by the Sub-Secretariat for Technical Support of the Federal Senate, Brasilia <a href="http://www9.senado.gov.br/portal/page/portal/orcamento_senado/Consultoria">http://www9.senado.gov.br/portal/page/portal/orcamento_senado/Consultoria</a> [October/November 2010</p>						
<p>NB: 1. Data prior to 1998 is not available. 2. Party affiliations of individual party members are not available in the existing dataset after 2007 but were individually searched and added by the author according to the information available on governmental websites in 2012.</p>						

**Table A6.2. Budget Amendments in Education in Pernambuco, 1998–2010**

Sponsoring Individual	Party	Location	Budget Unit	Subproject	Amount of approved amendment in R\$	Amount executed in R\$
<b>1998</b>						
MENDONÇA FILHO	PFL	PERNAMBUCO	26308 EAF-BELO JARDIM	COORDENAÇÃO E MANUTENÇÃO DO ENSINO	150,000	3,307,372
Statistics 1998: 18 education amendments sponsored by PT (5), PFL (3), PSB (5), PPB (2), PMDB (2), PDT (1); 1 executed in day care (Mendoca Filho, PFL)						
<b>1999</b>						
Statistics 1999: 10 education amendments sponsored by PT (3), PFL (1), PSB (1), PMDB (2), PPS (3); none executed						
<b>2000</b>						
Autor	Partido	Localidade	Unidade Orçamentária	Ação + Subtítulo	Valor da Emenda	Empenho Liquidado
CLEMENTINO COELHO	PPS	PETROLINA	26101 MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	CONSTRUÇÃO E AMPLIAÇÃO DE BENS IMÓVEIS DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - IMPLANTAÇÃO DE CAMPUS AVANÇADO DA UFRPE - PETROLINA - PE	400,000	450,000
JOSÉ MUCIO MONTEIRO	PFL	RECIFE	26101 MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO-FEDERAIS - APOIO A INFRAESTRUTURA DE ENSINO E PESQUISA DA ESCOLA POLITÉCNICA DE PERNAMBUCO-FUND.UNIV.DE PERNAMBUCO	80,000	80,000
LUCIANO BIVAR	PSL	PETROLINA	26101 MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	CONSTRUÇÃO E AMPLIAÇÃO DE BENS IMÓVEIS DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - IMPLANTAÇÃO DE CAMPUS AVANÇADO DA UFRPE - PETROLINA - PE	50,000	450,000

OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PETROLINA	26215 CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DE PERNAMBUCO	CONSTRUÇÃO E AMPLIAÇÃO DE BENS IMÓVEIS DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - CONSTRUÇÃO DE ALOJAMENTO PARA ESTUDANTES EM PETROLINA - PE	200,000	170,190
PEDRO CORREA	PPB	NACIONAL	36901 FUNDO NACIONAL DE SAÚDE	ASSISTÊNCIA MÉDICA QUALIFICADA E GRATUITA A TODOS OS NÍVEIS DA POPULAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO DE ATIVIDADES EDUCACIONAIS E DE PESQUISAS NO CAMPO DA SAÚDE - SERVIÇO SOCIAL AUTÔNOMO ASSOCIAÇÃO DAS PIONEIRAS SOCIAIS - NACIONAL	50,000	216,965,721
PEDRO EUGÊNIO	PPS	RECIFE	26101 MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO-FEDERAIS - APOIO A FORMAÇÃO DA REDE CORPORATIVA DE INFORMÁTICA DA FUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDADE DE PERNAMBUCO	50,000	50,000

Statistics 2000: 13 education amendments from PT (1), PFL (4), PSB (1), PPB (2), PPS (13), PSL (1);  
6 executed (4 in higher education, 1 in primary, 1 in secondary education)

**2001**

<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação+Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Empenhos Liquidados</b>
CARLOS BATATA	PSDB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - AQUISIÇÃO DE VEÍCULO PARA TRANSPORTE DE ANIMAIS DA CLÍNICA DE	45,000	44,940

				BOVINOS - GARANHUNS - PE		
EDUARDO CAMPOS	PSB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUC O	CONSTRUÇÃO E AMPLIAÇÃO DE BENS IMÓVEIS DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - CONSTRUÇÃO DA CLÍNICA-ESCOLA DE FISIOTERAPIA	110,000	110,000
DJALMA PAES	PSB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUC O	CONSTRUÇÃO E AMPLIAÇÃO DE BENS IMÓVEIS DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - CONSTRUÇÃO E AMPLIAÇÃO DE BENS IMÓVEIS DA UNIDADE PERIMENTAL DO HOSPITAL DAS CLÍNICAS	50,000	50,000
JOAQUIM FRANCISCO	PFL	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUC O	APOIO AO FUNCIONAMENTO DE HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - APOIO AO FUNCIONAMENTO DO HOSPITAL DE ENSINO	100,000	200,000
LUCIANO BIVAR	PSL	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUC O	APOIO AO FUNCIONAMENTO DE HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - APOIO AO FUNCIONAMENTO DO HOSPITAL DE ENSINO	100,000	200,000
OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PETROLINA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - APOIO A UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO - PETROLINA - PE (CAMPUS AVANÇADO)	40,000	40,000
OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PERNAMBUCO	CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGIC A DE PETROLINA	CONSTRUÇÃO E AMPLIAÇÃO DE BENS IMÓVEIS DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	48,000	70,000

OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PETROLINA	CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DE PETROLINA	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO AOS CENTROS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - AQUISIÇÃO DE ENSILADEIRA PARA A UNIDADE DE PETROLINA - NO ESTADO DE PERNANBUCO	6,400	6,400
ROBERTO FREIRE	PPS	PERNAMBUCO	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	180,000	379,998

Statistics 2001: 27 education amendments sponsored by PT (2), PFL (7), PSB (4), PMDB (3), PPS (7), PSL (3), PSDB (1); 9 executed (7 in higher, 2 in secondary education)

**2002**

<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
BANCADA DE PERNAMBUCO	BANCPE	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	7,874,800	820,000
EDUARDO CAMPOS	PSB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - AQUISIÇÃO DE EQUIPAMENTOS PARA O LABORATÓRIO IMUNOPATOLÓGICO	300,000	300,000
EDUARDO CAMPOS	PSB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO	150,000	150,000



				SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - CONSTRUÇÃO DA CLÍNICA-ESCOLA DE FISIOTERAPIA EM RECIFE - PE		
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	GARANHUNS	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADE DE ENSINO SUPERIOR-FACULDADE DE FORMAÇÃO DE PROFESSORES - GARANHUNS - PE	100,000	100,000
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	RECIFE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - APOIO PARA A MANUTENÇÃO DE MORADIAS ESTUDANTIS NAS UFPE E UFRPE - RECIFE - PE	100,000	100,000
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	FUNDAÇÃO NACIONAL DO ÍNDIO	FUNCIONAMENTO DAS ESCOLAS NAS COMUNIDADES INDÍGENAS - APOIO AO ENSINO DA POPULAÇÃO INDÍGENA NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	100,000	82,929
GONZAGA PATRIOTA	PSB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - IMPLANTAÇÃO DO PROJETO CIBERC@CAMPUS PARA EDUCAÇÃO À DISTÂNCIA - ESTADO DO PERNAMBUCO (SERTANIA E SALGUEIRO)	50,000	50,000
GONZAGA PATRIOTA	PSB	ARARIPINA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - ASSISTÊNCIA FINAN. P/ AUTARQUIA EDUCACIONAL DO ARARIPE - ARARIPINA - PE	50,000	50,000
HAROLDO LIMA	PC DO B	OLINDA	MINISTÉRIO DO MEIO AMBIENTE	FOMENTO A PROJETOS INTEGRADOS DE EDUCAÇÃO AMBIENTAL -	100,000	300,000

				FOMENTO A PROJETOS INTEGRADOS DE EDUCAÇÃO AMBIENTAL - OLINDA - PE		
BANCADA DE PERNAMBUCO	BANCPE	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	7,874,800	820,000
EDUARDO CAMPOS	PSB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDAD E FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - AQUISIÇÃO DE EQUIPAMENTOS PARA O LABORATÓRIO IMUNOPATOLÓGICO	300,000	300,000
EDUARDO CAMPOS	PSB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDAD E FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - CONSTRUÇÃO DA CLÍNICA-ESCOLA DE FISIOTERAPIA EM RECIFE - PE	150,000	150,000
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	GARANHUNS	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADE DE ENSINO SUPERIOR- FACULDADE DE FORMAÇÃO DE PROFESSORES - GARANHUNS - PE	100,000	100,000
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	RECIFE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - APOIO PARA A MANUTENÇÃO DE MORADIAS ESTUDANTIS NAS UFPE E UFRPE - RECIFE - PE	100,000	100,000

FERNANDO FERRO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	FUNDAÇÃO NACIONAL DO ÍNDIO	FUNCIONAMENTO DAS ESCOLAS NAS COMUNIDADES INDÍGENAS - APOIO AO ENSINO DA POPULAÇÃO INDÍGENA NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	100,000	82,929
GONZAGA PATRIOTA	PSB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - IMPLANTAÇÃO DO PROJETO CIBERC@CAMPUS PARA EDUCAÇÃO À DISTÂNCIA - ESTADO DO PERNAMBUCO (SERTANIA E SALGUEIRO)	50,000	50,000
GONZAGA PATRIOTA	PSB	ARARIPINA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - ASSISTÊNCIA FINAN. P/ AUTARQUIA EDUCACIONAL DO ARARIPE - ARARIPINA - PE	50,000	50,000
HAROLDO LIMA	PC DO B	OLINDA	MINISTÉRIO DO MEIO AMBIENTE	FOMENTO A PROJETOS INTEGRADOS DE EDUCAÇÃO AMBIENTAL - FOMENTO A PROJETOS INTEGRADOS DE EDUCAÇÃO AMBIENTAL - OLINDA - PE	100,000	300,000
JOEL DE HOLLANDA	PFL	CAMARAGIBE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - CAMARAGIBE - PE	100,000	100,000
LUCIANO BIVAR	PSL	CAMARAGIBE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO À FACULDADE DE ODONTOLOGIA - CAMARAGIBE - PE	80,000	80,000

OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PETROLINA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR FEDERAIS - FUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PETROLINA - PE	300,000	299,805
PEDRO EUGÊNIO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A CONCLUSÃO DA REDE CORPORATIVA DE INFORMÁTICA DA FUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDADE DE PERNAMBUCO	50,000	50,000

Statistics 2002: 25 education amendments sponsored by PT (7), PFL (5), PSB (8), PMDB (1), PSL (2), PSDB (2); 22 executed (18 in higher education, 2 in primary, and 2 in environmental education)

**2003**

<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
BANCADA DE PERNAMBUCO	BANCPE	PETROLINA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	IMPLANTAÇÃO DA FUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO VALE DO SÃO FRANCISCO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	14,000,000	3,318,039
EDUARDO CAMPOS	PSB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - CONSTRUÇÃO DE ESCOLA-CLÍNICA DE FISIOTERAPIA - RECIFE - PE	100,000	40,049
JOAQUIM FRANCISCO	PFL	RECIFE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO FUNCIONAMENTO DE HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - APOIO AO FUNCIONAMENTO DE HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - RECIFE - PE	100,000	100,000

JOSÉ JORGE	PFL	ARCOVERDE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADE DE AUTARQUIA DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - ARCOVERDE - PE	100,000	100,000
OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PETROLINA	CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DE PETROLINA	ASSISTÊNCIA AO EDUCANDO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - MANUTENÇÃO DO ALOJAMENTO E DO RESTAURANTE - PETROLINA - PE	100,000	95,684
OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA AGRICULTURA, PECUÁRIA E ABASTECIMENTO	PROMOÇÃO DO ASSOCIATIVISMO RURAL E DO COOPERATIVISMO - APOIO AO DESENV. DA EDUC. PROF. RURAL PELO MOVIMENTO DE APOIO E INCENTIVO SOCIAL NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO - PE	200,000	200,000

Statistics 2003: 29 amendments in education sponsored by PT (4), PFL (12), PSB (2), PMDB (1), PPS (5), PSL (2), PSDB (2) and Banca de Pernambuco (1);

6 were executed (4 in higher, 2 in secondary education)

**2004**

<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
ANDRÉ DE PAULA	PFL	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INST. FED. - ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO (FAC. DE DIREITO)	50,000	150,000
ANDRÉ DE PAULA	PFL	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A	100,000	100,000

				ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO (UPE/FOP)		
BANCADA DE PERNAMBUCO	BANCPE	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - IMPLANTAÇÃO, REFORMA E EQUIPAMENTOS PARA INFRA-ESTRUTURA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS - ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	4,176,799	1,650,000
EDUARDO CAMPOS	PSB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DA CLINICA-ESCOLA DE FISIOTERAPIA - ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	200.000	200.000
EDUARDO CAMPOS	PSB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - LABORATÓRIO IMUNOPATOLÓGICO - ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	100.000	100.000

FERNANDO FERRO	PT	GARANHUNS	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A CLÍNICA DE BOVINOS - GARANHUNS - PE (CAMPUS)	100.000	91.597
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	VITÓRIA DE SANTO ANTÃO	ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE VITÓRIA DE SANTO ANTÃO - PE	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DE INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DE BIBLIOTECA - VITÓRIA DE SANTO ANTÃO - PE	150.000	149.880
JOAQUIM FRANCISCO	PTB	CAMARAGIBE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - FACULDADE DE ODONTOLOGIA DE PERNAMBUCO - CAMARAGIBE - PE	100.000	200.000
JOAQUIM FRANCISCO	PTB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO - RECIFE - PE	100.000	100.000

MAURÍCIO RANDS	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA- ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	100.000	2.700.577
MIGUEL ARRAES	PSB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - AQUISIÇÃO DE EQUIPAMENTOS PARA O LABORATÓRIO KEIZO ASSAMI - RECIFE - PE	250.000	249.943
MIGUEL ARRAES	PSB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - DESENVOLVIMEN TO DE VACINAS TERAPÊUTICAS PELO LABORATÓRIO DE IMUNOPATOLOGI A KEIZO ASAMI - RECIFE - PE	250.000	250.000
OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PETROLINA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	FOMENTO AO DESENVOLVIMEN TO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - FOMENTO A EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL EM ÁREAS URBANA E RURAL - PETROLINA - PE (MOVIMENTO DE APOIO E INC. SOCIAL)	500.000	500.000



PAULO RUBEM SANTIAGO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	220.000	2.700.577
PAULO RUBEM SANTIAGO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO (UPE - FFPNM - FFPG)	100.000	100.000
ROBERTO MAGALHÃES	PTB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INST. FED. - ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO (FAC. DE DIREITO)	100.000	150.000
ROBERTO MAGALHÃES	PTB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DO DEPARTAMENTO DE COMUNICAÇÃO - RECIFE - PE	100.000	100.000

ROBERTO MAGALHÃES	PTB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	FUNDO NACIONAL DE ASSISTÊNCIA SOCIAL	SERVIÇOS DE PROTEÇÃO SOCIOASSISTENCIAL À JUVENTUDE - SERVIÇOS DE PROTEÇÃO SOCIOASSISTENCIAL À JUVENTUDE - MOVIMENTO PRÓ-CRIANÇA - ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	50.000	50.000
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Statistics 2005: 31 education amendments sponsored by PT (12), PFL (3), PSB (5), PPS (3), PTB (6), PSDB (1), and Bancada de Pernambuco (1);

18 were executed (15 in higher education, 3 in secondary education)

**2005**

<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
PAULO RUBEM SANTIAGO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DE PETROLINA	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DE INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	100,000	97,595
OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PETROLINA	CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DE PETROLINA	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DE INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - IMPLANTAÇÃO DOS LABORATÓRIOS DE PROCESSAMENTO DE LEITE E DE CONTROLE DE QUALIDADE DE FRUTAS FRESCAS - PETROLINA-PE	80,000	79,995
MIGUEL ARRAES	PSB	CATENDE	FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL - CATENDE-PE	150,000	150,000
ROBERTO MAGALHÃES	PFL	JABOATÃO DOS GUARARAPES	FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL - JABOATÃO DOS GUARARAPES-PE	150,000	150,000

PAULO RUBEM SANTIAGO	PT	SALGUEIRO	FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO À AMPLIAÇÃO E MELHORIA DA REDE FÍSICA ESCOLAR NAS COMUNIDADES REMANESCENTES DE QUILOMBOS - SALGUEIRO-PE	100,000	100,000
JOAQUIM FRANCISCO	PTB	CAMARAGIBE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - FACULDADE DE ODONTOLOGIA DE PERNAMBUCO - CAMARAGIBE - PE (UNIVERSIDADE DE PE)	50,000	50,000
MARCO MACIEL	PFL	CAMARAGIBE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - FACULDADE DE ODONTOLOGIA DE PERNAMBUCO - CAMARAGIBE - PE (UNIVERSIDADE DE PE)	400,000	50,000
ROBERTO MAGALHÃES	PFL	CAMARAGIBE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - FACULDADE DE ODONTOLOGIA DE PERNAMBUCO - CAMARAGIBE - PE (UNIVERSIDADE DE PE)	100,000	50,000
PAULO RUBEM SANTIAGO	PT	GARANHUNS	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - FACULDADE DE FORMAÇÃO DE PROFESSORES DE GARANHUNS - GARANHUNS-PE	200,000	200,000
LUIZ PIAUHYLINO	PDT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	FOMENTO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - INSTITUTO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO SOCIAL DO TRABALHO DE PERNAMBUCO - PE	200,000	200,000

OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	FOMENTO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - MOVIMENTO DE APOIO E INCENTIVO SOCIAL DE PETROLINA (FUNDAÇÃO MAIS) - ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	200,000	200,000
OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PETROLINA	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - APOIO AO ACERVO BIBLIOGRÁFICO E DE INFORMATIZAÇÃO DA BIBLIOTECA DA UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE PERNAMBUCO - CAMPUS DE PETROLINA - PETROLINA-PE	100,000	100,000
MAURÍCIO RANDES	PT	GRANITO	MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - CONSTRUÇÃO E EQUIPAMENTO DE QUADRA DE ESPORTE EM ESCOLA MUNICIPAL - GRANITO-PE	150,000	150,000
MAURÍCIO RANDES	PT	RECIFE	MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - CONSTRUÇÃO E EQUIPAMENTO DE QUADRA DE ESPORTE NA ESCOLA MUNICIPAL - RECIFE-PE	150,000	150,000
MAURÍCIO RANDES	PT	TRINDADE	MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - CONSTRUÇÃO E EQUIPAMENTO DE QUADRA DE ESPORTE EM	150,000	150,000

				ESCOLA MUNICIPAL - TRINDADE-PE		
MAURÍCIO RANDS	PT	XEXÉU	MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENT O DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - CONSTRUÇÃO E EQUIPAMENTO DE QUADRA DE ESPORTE EM ESCOLA MUNICIPAL - XEXÉU-PE	80,000	80,000
LUIZA ERUNDINA	PSB	RECIFE	SECRETARIA ESPECIAL DE POLÍTICAS PARA AS MULHERES	APOIO A PROJETOS EDUCATIVOS E CULTURAIS DE PREVENÇÃO À VIOLÊNCIA CONTRA AS MULHERES - APOIO À MANUTENÇÃO DA ESCOLA FEMINISTA DE FORMAÇÃO POLÍTICA E ECONÔMICA PARA A IQUALDADE - AFOGADOS DA IGAZEIRA - RECIFE - PE	100,000	100,000
PAULO RUBEM SANTIAGO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	FUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DO VALE DO SÃO FRANCISCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	100,000	2,924,484
BANCADA DE PERNAMBUCO	S/PARTIDO	PETROLINA	FUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DO VALE DO SÃO FRANCISCO	IMPLANTAÇÃO DO CAMPUS DA UNIVASF - EM PETROLINA-PE	9,019,3 00	3,505,973
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDA DE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUC O	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - IMPLANTAÇÃO DE LABORATÓRIO MULTIDISCIPLINAR	200,000	200,000

				PARA A ÁREA DE ENGENHARIA BIOMÉDICA		
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - IMPLANTAÇÃO DE LABORATÓRIO MULTIDISCIPLINAR PARA A ÁREA DE ENGENHARIA BIOMÉDICA	200,000	200,000
JORGE GOMES	PSB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - REFORMA DO PRÉDIO PARA INSTALAÇÃO DO SISTEMA INTEGRADO DE SAÚDE - ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	150,000	150,000
MIGUEL ARRAES	PSB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	200,000	4,099,941
PAULO RUBEM SANTIAGO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	200,000	4,099,941
MIGUEL ARRAES	PSB	RECIFE	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA	300,000	300,000

			PERNAMBUCO	DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - RECIFE-PE		
PAULO RUBEM SANTIAGO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	200,000	2,643,704
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	VITÓRIA DE SANTO ANTÃO	MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA	APOIO À IMPLANTAÇÃO E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE CENTROS VOCACIONAIS TECNOLÓGICOS - NA ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE VITÓRIA DE SANTO ANTÃO-PE	200,000	144,537

Statistics 2005: 37 education amendments sponsored by PT (15), PFL (11), PTB (2), PSB (5), PDT (1), PPS (2), without party affiliation (1); 27 were executed in higher education (16), primary education (7), and secondary education (4)

**2006**

<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	PERNAMBUCO	ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE BELO JARDIM - PE	ACERVO BIBLIOGRÁFICO PARA AS INSTITUIÇÕES DA REDE FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	200,000	158,299
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	PERNAMBUCO	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - CASAS DO ESTUDANTE UNIVERSITÁRIO - NO ESTADO DE	300,000	300,000

				PERNAMBUCO		
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	VITÓRIA DE SANTO ANTÃO	ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE VITÓRIA DE SANTO ANTÃO JOÃO CLEÓFAS - PE	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DE INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - LABORATÓRIO DE ANÁLISE DE SOLO - VITÓRIA DE SANTO ANTÃO - PE	200,000	195,413
INOCÊNCIO OLIVEIRA	PL	GARANHUNS	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - AQUISIÇÃO DE ÔNIBUS PARA TRANSPORTE DE ESTUDANTES DA UNIVERSIDADE DO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO - UPE (CAMPUS DE GARANHUNS) - GARANHUNS - PE	150,000	150,000
JOSÉ JORGE	PFL	ARCOVERDE	MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - ARCOVERDE - PE	300,000	300,000
OSVALDO COELHO	PFL	PERNAMBUCO	MINISTÉRIO DA AGRICULTURA, PECUÁRIA E ABASTECIMENTO	PROMOÇÃO DO ASSOCIATIVISMO RURAL E DO COOPERATIVISMO - EDUCAÇÃO, CAPACITAÇÃO, TREINAMENTO - FUNDAÇÃO MAIS - MOVIMENTO DE APOIO E INCENTIVO SOCIAL DE PETROLINA - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	270,000	270,000
PAULO RUBEM SANTIAGO	PT	OLINDA	FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL - OLINDA - PE	100,000	97,961



JORGE GOMES	PSB	PERNAMBUCO	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	150,000	7,369,060
MAURÍCIO RANDS	PT	PERNAMBUCO	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	150,000	5,504,573
MAURÍCIO RANDS	PT	PERNAMBUCO	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	150,000	7,369,060
ROBERTO MAGALHÃES	PFL	PERNAMBUCO	UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	200,000	5,504,573
RENILDO CALHEIROS	PC DO B	PERNAMBUCO	FUNDO NACIONAL DE SAÚDE	APOIO À MANUTENÇÃO DE UNIDADES DE SAÚDE - FACULDADE DE ODONTOLOGIA DA UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE PERNAMBUCO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	30,000	27,000

ROBERTO FREIRE	PPS	RECIFE	MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA	APOIO À IMPLANTAÇÃO E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE CENTROS VOCACIONAIS TECNOLÓGICOS - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO - UFRPE - RECIFE - PE	100,000	89,368
Statistics 2006: 23 education amendments sponsored by PFL (9), PT (8), PSB (2), PL (1), PTB (1), PCdoB (1), PPS (1); 14 were executed in higher education (8), secondary education (4) and primary education (1)						
<b>2007</b>						
<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>UO (Cod/Desc)</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
MARCO MACIEL	DEM	PETROLINA	26101 - MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - FACULDADE DE FORMAÇÃO DE PROFESSORES DA UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE PERNAMBUCO - PETROLINA - PE	100,000	100,000
BANCADA DE PERNAMBUCO		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26101 - MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A ENTIDADES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR NÃO FEDERAIS - IMPLANTAÇÃO DE CAMPUS DA UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL DE PERNAMBUCO - PE	16,200,000	16,200,000
RS 6 - EDU CULT CIENC TECN, ESP TUR		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26215 - CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DE INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	426,784	2,828,367
BANCADA DE PERNAMBUCO		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26230 - FUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO VALE DO SÃO FRANCISCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE	21,200,000	25,094,877

				ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO		
RS 6 - EDU CULT CIENC TECN, ESP TUR		PETROLINA	26230 - FUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO VALE DO SÃO FRANCISCO	EXPANSÃO DO ENSINO SUPERIOR - CAMPUS DE PETROLINA - NO MUNICÍPIO DE PETROLINA - PE	900,000	5,999,458
ANDRÉ CARLOS ALVES DE PAULA FILHO	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26242 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	200,000	200,000
JORGE GOMES	PSB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26242 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	430,000	8,277,611
LUIZ GONZAGA PATRIOTA	PSB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26248 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - AQUISIÇÃO DE ÔNIBUS - SERRA TALHADA - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	150,000	150,000
INOCÊNCIO OLIVEIRA	PR	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26248 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DE INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - CASA DO ESTUDANTE - SERRA TALHADA	250,000	250,000

				- NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO		
ROBERTO MAGALHÃES	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26248 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - CONSTRUÇÃO DE BLOCO NA SEDE DO COLÉGIO DOM AGOSTINHO - ESCOLA PROFISSIONALIZANTE AGRÍCOLA VINCULADA À UFRPE - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	200,000	199,907
ARMANDO MONTEIRO	PTB	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26248 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	150,000	149,956
RS 6 - EDU CULT CIENC TECN, ESP TUR		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26248 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DA INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E DOS HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	669,455	5,031,208
RS 6 - EDU CULT CIENC TECN, ESP TUR		SERRA TALHADA	26248 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	EXPANSÃO DO ENSINO SUPERIOR - CAMPUS DE SERRA TALHADA - NO MUNICÍPIO DE SERRA TALHADA - PE	600,000	5,289,852
MARCO MACIEL	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO À REESTRUTURAÇÃO DA REDE FÍSICA PÚBLICA - EM MUNICÍPIOS DO ESTADO DE	550,000	400,000

				PERNAMBUCO		
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	COMPLEMENTAÇÃO DA UNIÃO AO FUNDO DE MANUTENÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA E DE VALORIZAÇÃO DOS PROFISSIONAIS DA EDUCAÇÃO - FUNDEB - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	2,142,650	38,356,488
OSVALDO COELHO	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26323 - CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DE PETROLINA	MODERNIZAÇÃO E RECUPERAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DE INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	100,000	63,371
CARLOS EDUARDO CADOCA	PSC	OLINDA	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - OLINDA - PE	150,000	150,000
JOSÉ JORGE	PFL	SANTA MARIA DA BOA VISTA	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - SANTA MARIA DA BOA VISTA - PE	200,000	200,000
JOSÉ CHAVES	PTB	GARANHUNS	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - GARANHUNS - PE	100,000	400,000
JOAQUIM FRANCISCO	PSB	ARCOVERDE	55101 - MINISTÉRIO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO SOCIAL E COMBATE À	APOIO À AGRICULTURA URBANA - CENTRO DE EDUCAÇÃO E	100,000	99,946

			FOME	DESENVOLVIMENTO - CEDEC - ARCOVERDE - PE		
Statistics 2007: 36 education amendments sponsored by different parties (not captured in dataset but were added by author upon individual search);						
20 amendments were executed in higher education (12), secondary education (3), and primary education (5)						
<b>2008</b>						
<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
ANDRÉ DE PAULA	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26215 - CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DE PERNAMBUCO	FUNIONAMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	300,000	47,813,310
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26230 - FUNDAÇÃO UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO VALE DO SÃO FRANCISCO	FUNIONAMENTO DE CURSOS DE GRADUAÇÃO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	1,046,563	26,468,749
ANDRÉ DE PAULA	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26242 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	REFORMA E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - FACULDADE DE DIREITO DO RECIFE - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	150,000	174,000
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	RECIFE	26242 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	REFORMA E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - CASA DOS ESTUDANTES - RECIFE - PE	200,000	200,000
MAURÍCIO RANDS	PT	RECIFE	26242 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	REFORMA E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - FACULDADE DE	190,000	334,584

				DIREITO - RECIFE - PE		
PAULO RUBEM SANTIAGO	PDT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26242 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	REFORMA E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE INFRA- ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	600,000	200,000
PEDRO EUGÊNIO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26242 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PERNAMBUCO	INSTRUMENTAL PARA ENSINO E PESQUISA DESTINADO A INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR E HOSPITAIS DE ENSINO - AQUISIÇÃO DE EQUIPAMENTO PARA EDITORA UNIVERSITÁRIA DA UFPE - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	250,000	250,000
ANDRÉ DE PAULA	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26248 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	REFORMA E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE INFRA- ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	100,000	300,000
FERNANDO FERRO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26248 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	REFORMA E MODERNIZAÇÃO DE INFRA- ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DAS INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - CASA DO ESTUDANTE - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	200,000	200,000
MARCO MACIEL	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26248 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	AMPLIAÇÃO DA INFRA- ESTRUTURA FÍSICA DE INSTITUIÇÕES FEDERAIS DE ENSINO SUPERIOR - CONSTRUÇÃO DE BIBLIOTECA SETORIAL - NO	200,000	200,000

				ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO		
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26248 - UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL RURAL DE PERNAMBUCO	FUNCIONAMENTO DE CURSOS DE GRADUAÇÃO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	8,737,315	102,324,953
FERNANDO COELHO FILHO	PSB	QUIPAPÁ	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO À REESTRUTURAÇÃO DA REDE FÍSICA PÚBLICA DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - QUIPAPÁ - PE	360,000	360,000
MARCO MACIEL	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO À REESTRUTURAÇÃO DA REDE FÍSICA PÚBLICA DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - EM MUNICÍPIOS - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	300,000	300,000
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO À ALIMENTAÇÃO ESCOLAR NA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	20,000,000	63,524,716
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	COMPLEMENTAÇÃO DA UNIÃO AO FUNDO DE MANUTENÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA E DE VALORIZAÇÃO DOS PROFISSIONAIS DA EDUCAÇÃO - FUNDEB - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	55,000,000	167,523,629
ROBERTO MAGALHÃES	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO AO DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - EM MUNICÍPIOS - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	100,000	99,000
ROBERTO MAGALHÃES	DEM	JABOATÃO DOS GUARARAPES	26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	APOIO A AQUISIÇÃO DE EQUIPAMENTOS PARA A REDE PÚBLICA DE	200,000	200,000



				ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL - JABOATÃO DOS GUARARAPES - PE		
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26307 - ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE BARREIROS - PE	FUNCIONAMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	719,326	7,286,121
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26308 - ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE BELO JARDIM - PE	FUNCIONAMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	527,780	6,692,830
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26308 - ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE BELO JARDIM - PE	ASSISTÊNCIA AO EDUCANDO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	97,550	97,102
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26323 - CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DE PETROLINA	FUNCIONAMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	2,245,877	20,057,893
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26323 - CENTRO FEDERAL DE EDUCAÇÃO TECNOLÓGICA DE PETROLINA	ASSISTÊNCIA AO EDUCANDO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	150,000	148,497
RELATOR GERAL		PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	26338 - ESCOLA AGROTÉCNICA FEDERAL DE VITÓRIA DE SANTO ANTÃO JOÃO CLEÓFAS - PE	FUNCIONAMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO PROFISSIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	598,524	7,598,429
PEDRO EUGÊNIO	PT	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - ESCOLAS PÚBLICAS - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	360,000	351,000
ROBERTO MAGALHÃES	DEM	PERNAMBUCO (ESTADO)	51101 - MINISTÉRIO DO ESPORTE	IMPLANTAÇÃO DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO ESPORTE EDUCACIONAL - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	480,000	468,000

Statistics 2008: 46 education amendments sponsored by different parties (party affiliation not available in dataset); 25 were executed in higher education (10), secondary education (7), and primary education (8)

**2009**

<b>Autor</b>	<b>Partido</b>	<b>Localidade</b>	<b>Unidade Orçamentária</b>	<b>Ação + Subtítulo</b>	<b>Valor da Emenda</b>	<b>Liquidado</b>
CARLOS EDUARDO CADOCA	PSC		26298 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA EDUCAÇÃO	PROMOÇÃO DE EVENTOS PARA DIVULGAÇÃO DO TURISMO INTERNO - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	2,500,000	25,080,760
RELATOR GERAL			54101 - MINISTÉRIO DO TURISMO	APOIO À ALIMENTAÇÃO ESCOLAR NA EDUCAÇÃO BÁSICA - NO ESTADO DE PERNAMBUCO	28,081,661	80,077,145
GONZAGA PATRIOTA	PSB		36901 - FUNDO NACIONAL DE SAÚDE	EXPANSÃO DO ENSINO SUPERIOR - CAMPUS DE SERRA TALHADA - NO MUNICÍPIO DE SERRA TALHADA - PE	140,000	1,416,162

Statistics 2009: 58 education amendments sponsored by different parties (no party affiliation available in dataset); number of executed amendments not available yet

**2010**

Statistics 2010: 55 amendments in education but no information available about how many were executed.

**Total of all executed amendments 1998 – 2010:**

**949,613,454.5 R\$**

Source: Author's compilation based on data provided by the Sub-Secretariat for Technical Support of the Federal Senate, Brasília [http://www9.senado.gov.br/portal/page/portal/orcamento\\_senado/Consultoria](http://www9.senado.gov.br/portal/page/portal/orcamento_senado/Consultoria) [October/November 2010]

NB: 1. Data prior to 1998 is not available.

2. Party affiliations of individual party members are not available in the existing dataset after 2007, but were researched and added individually by the author.

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