SIGNIFICANCE OF EXTERNAL F/ACTORS IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS: CASE OF TURKEY, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE KURDISH PROBLEM

by

Fidel Aksoy

Berlin, 2012

A dissertation submitted to the Department of Political and Social Sciences of Freie Universität Berlin in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate in Political Science (Dr. rer. pol.)
Advisor / First Reader: Prof. Dr. Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder

Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Helgard Kramer

Date of Thesis Defense: 27 January 2012
DEDICATION

to the peaceful coexistence between the Kurdish and Turkish people,
and
to my family.
CONTENTS

List of Maps, Figures and Tables.................................................................viii
List of Abbreviations....................................................................................ix
Abstract..........................................................................................................xi

Chapter 1 – Introduction...............................................................................1

I. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH.........1

II. CASE STUDY: TURKEY........................................................................4

III. THREE PHASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION.........................................7

IV. AIMS OF THE STUDY.......................................................................8

Chapter 2 – Literature Review and Methodology......................................10

I. DEFINING DEMOCRACY.................................................................10

1 – Democracy as a Regime Type and as a Social Model....................10

II. LITERATURE REVIEW....................................................................12

1 – Agent-based and Modernization Approaches in Democratization Studies.................................................................12
2 – Literature on the International Aspects of Democratization........15

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.......................................................18

1 – Inside-Outside Linkage......................................................................18

IV. METHODICAL CATEGORIZATION OF EXTERNAL F/ACTORS.......20

1 – Global Political/Ideological Order.....................................................20
2 – Conditionality and Security Support of Regional/International Democratic Community.................................................................22
3 – Global Capitalism and Effects of International Economics........25
4 – Diffusion Effect and International Communication.......................26
5 – Democratic Assistance......................................................................28

V. METHODOLOGY...............................................................................32

1 – Modernization Approach and Inside-Outsde Linkage....................32
Chapter 3 – Conceptual Framework: Modernization, Democratization and Socio-economic Research

I. BUILDING THE REPUBLIC AND THE ROLE OF WESTERN/EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

II. MODERNIZATION

1 – Modernization of Turkey

III. INCOMPLETE DEMOCRATIZATION

1 – Concealed Authoritarianism: Effects of Kemalism and Militarism
   A) Kemalism
   B) Militarism
   i) Military in Economics
   ii) Military in Public Eye
   iii) Military as a System Changing Force
       a) Coup d'état 1960
       b) Coup d'état 1971
       c) Coup d'état 1980
       d) Coup d'état (post-modern coup) 1997

Chapter 4 – Turkey’s Democratization Path

I. DEMOCRATIZATION QUEST

II. OBSTACLES ON THE DEMOCRATIZATION PATH

1 – Lack of Democratic Political Culture
2 – Fear of Change
3 – Economic and Social Inequalities
4 – Kurds and the Kurdish Problem
   A) Kurds
   B) Kurds and the New Republic of Turkey
   C) Kurdish Movements
   D) The Kurdish Problem
       i) Defining the Kurdish Problem

Chapter 5 – External F/actors in Democratization Process

I. THE EU AS AN EXTERNAL ACTOR AND EU CONDITIONALITY AS AN EXTERNAL FACTOR

II. THE ORIGIN OF EU CONDITIONALITY

1 – EU Conditionality in Southern Europe
2 – EU Conditionality in Eastern Europe

III. ROAD TO CANDIDACY
IV. THE COPENHAGEN SUMMIT: THE WAY IN……………………………97

V. THE ESSEN SUMMIT: DRAFTING
THE PRE-ACCESION STRATEGY……………………………………..98

VI. AGENDA 2000 PROPOSALS: COMMENCING
THE ACCESSION PROCESS…………………………………………99

VII. THE HELSINKI SUMMIT………………………………………………100

VIII. EU CONDITIONALITY AND CANDIDATES’
MINORITY ISSUES……………………………………………………100

IX. EU CONDITIONALITY IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE……………101

1 – Stricter Conditionality and Elevated Ambiguity……………………..101

X. CHANGING EU CONDITIONALITY……………………………….103

XI. APPLICATION OF EU CONDITIONALITY………………………..104

1 – Demarches……………………………………………………………104
2 – Agenda 2000 and the Opinions……………………………………..105
3 – Screening and Negotiations…………………………………………105
4 – Accession Partnership and NPAA…………………………………..106
5 – Progress Reports……………………………………………………106

XII. EFFECTS OF EU CONDITIONALITY……………………………106

XIII. CONCLUSIONS………………………………………………………109

Chapter 6 – EU-Turkey Relations: the pre-Helsinki-
Period……………………………………………………………………111

I. EU CONDITIONALITY AND TURKEY’S PURSUIT OF
MEMBERSHIP…………………………………………………………111

II. EU’S INFLUENCE IN TURKISH DEMOCRATIZATION……………112

III. KURDISH QUESTION: SOURING EU-TURKEY
RELATIONS………………………………………………………………114

IV. THE CUSTOMS UNION AND EU’S PRESSURE…………………..115

V. AGENDA 2000 AND TURKEY……………………………………116

VI. DETERIORATING RELATIONS………………………………………117

VII. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
AFFECTS ON TURKEY……………………………………………………117
Chapter 7 – Substantive Counts / Assessing Realities in the pre-Helsinki Period ..................................................125

I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND HUMAN (CULTURAL) RIGHTS SITUATION OF THE KURDS IN PRE-HELSINKI PERIOD ..........................................................125

II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT .............................................................................................................126


IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RANKING OF THE PROVINCES AND REGIONS 1996 .................................................................................................130

1 – Social Indicators ..........................................................................................................................131
2 – Economic Indicators .......................................................................................................................132
   A) First-degree Developed Provinces 1996 ..................................................................................134
   B) Fifth-degree Developed Provinces 1996 ..................................................................................135
   C) The Most and the Least Developed Regions of Turkey Compared ...........................................136
      i) The Most Developed Region: Marmara .............................................................................136
      ii) The Least Developed Region: Eastern Anatolia ..............................................................138

V. HUMAN (CULTURAL) RIGHTS SITUATION OF THE KURDS IN PRE-HELSINKI PERIOD .................................................................................................139

Chapter 8 – EU-Turkey Relations: the post-Helsinki Period .........................................................147

I. THE HELSINKI SUMMIT ..................................................................................................................148

II. THE ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP WITH TURKEY ......................................................................149

III. NATIONAL PROGRAMMES FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE ACQUIS (NPAA) .................................................................150

IV. THE BRUSSELS COUNCIL ..........................................................................................................151

V. CONDITIONALITY MECHANISM AND THE REGULAR REPORTS ON TURKEY ...........................................................................................................151

1 – Progress Report 1998 ..................................................................................................................151
2 – Progress Report 1999 ..................................................................................................................153
3 – Progress Report 2000 ..................................................................................................................155
4 – Progress Report 2001 ..................................................................................................................158
5 – Progress Report 2002 ..................................................................................................................161
Chapter 9 – Substantive Counts / Assessing Realities in the post-Helsinki Period

I. REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN TURKEY:
   THE POST-HELSINKI PERIOD (1999-2009)…………………..………………185

II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RANKINGS
    OF THE PROVINCES AND REGIONS 2003………………………..………..185

   1 – Social Indicators…………………………………………..……………..185
   2 – Economic Indicators……………………………………………186
       A) First-degree Developed Provinces 2003…………………186
       B) Fifth-degree Developed Provinces 2003…………………187
       C) The Most and the Least Developed
          Regions of Turkey Compared……………………………..189
             i) The Most Developed Region: Marmara……………..189
             ii) The Least Developed Region: Eastern Anatolia……191

III. COMPARING 1996 AND 2003 RESULTS……………………………..………..192

IV. EU-FUNDED PROGRAMMES / SUCCESS STORIES IN TURKEY……..195

Chapter 10 – Conclusions……………………………………………………………..200

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………..208
Maps, Figures and Tables

Figure 1: A Theoretical Framework: Inside-Outside Linkage…………………………………19
Figure 2: Regional Socio-Economic Development Index……………………………………136
Figure 3: Socio-Economic Development Index of Marmara Region………………………137
Figure 4: Socio-Economic Development Index of Eastern Anatolia Region………………138
Figure 5: Regional Socio-Economic Development Index…………………………………189
Figure 6: Socio-Economic Development Index of Marmara Region……………………..190
Figure 7: Socio-Economic Development Index of Eastern Anatolia Region………………191
Figure 8: Development Index Values of 1996 and 2003 Studies……………………………193
Figure 9: Socio-Economic Development Indices of Provinces……………………………193
Table 1 – Typology of External F/actors……………………………………………………31
Table 2: 1996-2003 Comparison of Socio-Economic Development of Provinces………..194
Map 1: Geographic Distribution of OYAK Group’s Companies and Facilities……………..54
Map 2: Geographical Regions of Turkey…………………………………………………….133
Map 3: First-degree Developed Provinces in 1996…………………………………………134
Map 4: Fifth-degree Developed Provinces in 1996…………………………………………135
Map 5: First-degree Developed Provinces in 2003…………………………………………186
Map 6: Fifth-degree Developed Provinces in 2003…………………………………………187
Map 7: Cities and Provinces According to Development Index…………………………188
Map 8: SELP I and SELPII Provinces of Turkey…………………………………………198
Map 9: Cities Covered by the Project………………………………………………………199
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP.................Motherland Party
AKP.....................Justice and Development Party
CARDS..................Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation
CEEC....................Central and Eastern European Countries
CHP......................Republican People’s Party
CIA......................Central Intelligence Agency
CSCE....................Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DAP......................East Anatolia Project
DDKO...................Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East
DEHAP...................Democratic Peoples’ Party
DEP......................Democracy Party
DIE......................State Statistics Institute
DKP......................Democratic Mass Party
DPT......................State Planning Organization
DTP......................Democratic Society Party
ECHR.....................European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR...................European Court of Human Rights
EEC......................European Economic Community
EIB......................European Investment Bank
EU.......................European Union
GAP.....................Southeastern Anatolian Project
GDP......................Gross Domestic Product
HADEP...................Peoples’ Democracy Party
HEP......................Peoples’ Labor Party
HRW.....................Human Rights Watch
ICCPR..................International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR..................International Convention for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICTY....................International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP......................Internally Displaced Person
IMF......................International Monetary Fund
INGO...................International Non-Governmental Organization
IPA......................Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
ISPA...................Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
JITEM..................Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight against Terrorism
KÖY.....................Priority Development Regions
MEDA...................Mesures D’accompagnement
MHP.....................Nationalist Movement Party
MIT......................National Intelligence Agency
MP.......................Member of Parliament
MSP.....................National Salvation Party
MYK.....................National Security Council
NATO...................North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO...................Non-Governmental Organization
NPAA ...................... National Programmes for the Adoption of Acquis
NUTS ...................... Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OPCAT ...................... Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture
OSCE ...................... Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OYAK ...................... Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund of Turkey
PACE ...................... Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PHARE ...................... Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
PKK ...................... Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PM ...................... Prime Minister
PSK ...................... Socialist Part of Kurdistan
RP ...................... Welfare Party
RTÜK ...................... Radio and Television Supreme Council
SAA ...................... Stabilization and Association Agreement
SAPARD ...................... Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Development
SHP ...................... Social Democratic Party
SIPRI ...................... Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSDF ...................... Defence Industry Support Fund
TBMM ...................... Turkish Grand National Assembly
TEC ...................... Treaty establishing the European Community
TIP ...................... Workers Party of Turkey
TRT ...................... Turkish Radio and Television
TÜİK ...................... Turkish Statistical Institute
UN ...................... United Nations
US ...................... United States
YTL ...................... New Turkish Lira
ABSTRACT

by
Fidel Aksoy

Significance of External F/actors in the Democratization Process: Case of Turkey, the European Union, and the Kurdish Problem

This study examines the role of external f/actors on the process of democratization through an in-depth case study. The case of Turkey, the EU and the Kurdish problem is put under scrutiny in order to investigate the exact influences of external f/actors in the democratization process. The aim of this thesis is: 1) to conduct empirical examination on the role of external f/actors on the process of democratization, 2) to present articulate explanations on the significance and competence of external f/actors in democratization process. I argue that a clear separation of the influences of external f/actors from the internally dependent factors is necessary in order to systematically analyze the precise effects of main explanatory factors.

Firstly, the results show that democratization in the case of Turkey was initiated as a result of global political/ideological order following the WWI. Transition of Turkey would not have been possible without the establishment of the Turkish national movement, which was prompted by the occupation of Constantinople and Smyrna by the Allies. Furthermore, the treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923 with the Allies led to the international recognition of the new Republic of Turkey. Nevertheless, inability of the Turkish leadership to resolve the Kurdish problem, since the early years of the new Republic, led to an incomplete modernization and, therefore to an incomplete democratization process. Therefore, I argue that Turkey is still in the consolidation period, relying on the near-abroad security and the sequential adaptation to the conditionality set by the EU; which makes the EU the most important and influential actor in Turkish democratization process. Secondly, by examining the socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds in pre- and post-Helsinki periods during the consolidation phase of the Turkish democratization process, I demonstrated that external f/actors could be regarded as an independent variable for the emergence and the survival of a democracy rather than a dependent variable located at the macro-level as often argued in previous studies. In other words, the more influence the EU exerts on Turkey, in terms of democratic consolidation, the better the welfare of the Kurds become, and, consequently, the more democratic Turkey becomes. Thirdly, the bettering of the socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds in Turkey, and therefore compliance with EU conditionality and realization of a comprehensive democratization process rests in the hands of EU foremost. The study proves that EU is able to generate the intended results in Turkey if it wishes to do so. And lastly, the Inside-Outside Linkage model indicates the identifiable and measurable nature of the external f/actors in the process of democratization.
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

I. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

The third wave of democratization presents a new stage for the analysis of the theory. Various scholars and theorists seek the opportunity to explore the context, indicating that a unilateral analysis of democratization, simply encompassing the domestic perspectives and excluding the input of external f/actors go against the intellectual responsibility of comprehensive scrutiny (Huntington 1991; Pridham 1994; Linz and Stephan 1996; Vanhanen 1997; Diamond 1999; Carothers 1999; Grugel 2001; Whitehead 2002). Traditional assumptions indicating that the process of democratization is merely a domestic matter and that the influence of external f/actors play “no more than a secondary role” have been challenged by the rising views, particularly, in the era of the third wave of democratization (Whitehead, 2002: 16). Subsequently, some scholars argue that external actors play an increasingly important role, by guaranteeing and/or determining, in the democratic transition (Kummel, 1998). World in transition and rising globalization indicate that the habitual deem supporting sovereignty of the domestic f/actors over the process of democratization experienced a process of change itself. Most of the studies conducted on democratization, however, refer to the functionality of the domestic f/actors and to the developments taken place on intra-governmental levels (Pridham 1994: 15). As thorough as other aspects of democratization have been researched, there seems to be a big gap in the literature dealing with the influence of external f/actors in democratization; above all examining the substantive counts seem to be disregarded the most.

Bearing in mind the concept of globalization of democratization, examples from Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and East Asia support the fact that, activities of external actors and international pressures played an important role in the initiation processes. Global actors, such as the European Union, the Unites States, various NGOs, and the World Bank, are in large part responsible for emergence of democratization as a global trend. The influence of international factors is also evident during the consolidation period; they can shape the outcomes or even redirect the route of political struggles. Democratization usually takes two major facades; an internal for domestic audience and an external for the international community. Political reforms, domestic regime changes or national reconciliations are not the sole important elements for democratization. It is also about responding to global/regional political and economic trends and satisfying powerful external observers that acceptable political systems are taking place.

Consequently, one can claim that democracy has become “globalized”. Transnational organizations and groups generate pressures at the international level thus set a trend. Accordingly, contemporary global order requires states to be plausibly democratic in order for them to become successful and attain international legitimacy. At a regional level the globalization of democracy takes on a diffusive structure. It becomes too costly and difficult for authoritarian regimes in a given region to argue that democracy is a foreign import and carries cultural bias when their immediate neighbors are trying, perhaps successfully, to
introduce it. Furthermore, external agencies often apply “recipes” or “best practice” formulae, civil society organizations imitate, adapt, and learn from tactics put in practice by neighboring countries or even further afield from successful examples.

Even though, there is a current trend by many scholars to make references to external factors and international context in democratization studies, there still remains a lack of studies dealing with the systematic integration and operationalization of international factors. Democratization is frequently described as an exclusively domestic affair concentrating on the transformation of the internal political systems. According to such domestically biased assumptions, external factors may, at best, play “a secondary role” in (re)democratization processes. Additionally, Pridham contends, most of the typologies of democratic transition, in terms of modes and outcomes, are intended to highlight the dominant explanatory power of internal forces and calculations (Pridham, 1994: 15). In fact, in their analysis of regime change both process-oriented and structuralist approaches argue that international factors have little influence. Democratization is seen, primarily, as a process that legitimizes the triumph of the new national political structures over the old existing ones. Analysts usually assume that the sovereignty of each nation-state prevents major interventions in its internal affairs from the outside (Morlino, 1995: 587). This ignores sharply increasing levels of interactions on the global scale and the many more subtle influences which cross national borders (Gurgel, 2001: 34)

The two main, modernization and agency-based, schools of thought in democratization studies share both similarities and differences. These doctrines differ in a way that agency based approach argues that interaction of choices by groups or individuals and the process of transition itself determine democratic consolidation and political change; whereas, modernization approach, mainly dealing with structures, believes that behavioral pattern presented by agents are epiphenomenal and can be trimmed down to material or other external conditions. Both approaches have their flaws. Agency-based theories fall short to clarify the reasons behind the decisions made by groups or individual actors to support democracy in situations of great uncertainty, whereas modernization approach is unable to give an explanation for similar results derived from different material conditions (Karl and Schmitter, 1991: 269). Moreover, “domestic bias” in democratization studies could be observed in both schools of thought when it comes to explaining democratic transformations. Modernization is a fundamentally inward-looking perspective while agency-based approaches tend to neglect international factors or treat them as a constant and unchanging background condition (Diamond, 1993).

Explicit causal relationships become difficult to establish, in terms of methodology, due to the wide range of external factors and the intrinsic complexity of international relations (Pridham, 1994: 11). As a result, while other aspects of democratization are studied quite comprehensively, external/international f/actors in this process are still under-researched; when it comes to in-depth case studies and quantitative research they are even mostly excluded.

The key mechanisms of the external impact on regime transformation are provided by some scholars and their comprehensive and methodical approaches. Such scholars, however, dedicated their works to comparing cases within or between regions and specific countries, and did not include any micro level analysis. In fact, most of the researches conducted on international context of
democratization tend to be devoted to cross regional or cross national comparative analysis, with special attention given to process-oriented examination. In addition, no study have attempted to analyze a minority based national case through an in-depth case study, using substantive counts in order to specify which pressure points were most significant; how, when and where they produced their main effect; and in what historical context they were embedded and constrained (Whitehead, 2002: 373). As a result, little is know about the true impact of democratization process from bottom-up, and significance of external f/actors in democratization in a given case examined through well-being of a specific ethnic group, which has a macro impact on the entirety of the population, is a first. This present the predicament that frameworks of certain examined cases are most likely to not be universally applicable, which in turn puts the credibility of generalizations in test.

In an attempt to bridge the gap in the literature, my research is based on the assumption that it can be helpful to examine a case that narrows down the pressure points and affects in order to best asses the true impacts of democratization and the degree of influence asserted by external f/actors, not exclusively on the state structure and legislature but more importantly on the social structure of the population. The research will deploy the categories and hypotheses distilled from earlier experiences of the third-wave democratizations. Due to the fact that examining the socio-economic variables of a population as a whole would overwhelm the scope of this research and generate misleading outcomes (for example regional studies dealing with the socio-economic indicators conducted in Turkey produce a different outcome than such studies done at national level). I have decided to explore the changes in socio-economic and human rights situation of the Kurds before and after the Helsinki Summit in the case of Turkey on its way to a potential EU membership. Furthermore, respecting the human and cultural rights and developing underprivileged regions was one of the most important prerequisities and policies of the EU. In the light of the, if there has been a noticeable and notable improvement in the human rights and/or socio-economic situation of the Kurds after the Helsinki Summit period, I will explain and argue that this is in large owing to the influence of the external f/actors, namely the EU and the EU conditionality; hence, my study will challenge the “domestically biased” assumptions and argue that the third wave of democratization is global in character in which external influences play an essential role.
II. CASE STUDY: TURKEY

Turkey, a predominantly Muslim country with modern/western course and envision, is a complex yet useful case to study the effects of international factors on domestic politics and domestic policies on the citizenry. Considering that it has been build upon the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire, commonly referred to as “the sick man of Europe” at the time, the republic of Turkey, from the time it was established, has been in a continuous search for international, and precisely European, legitimacy. Founding fathers of the Republic, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, have accentuated and admired the European way of governance for the new republic while aiming to not completely detach from traditions and cultural heritage. For them the European system of governance had verified its worthiness and success in the international arena. The exemplified European model, for the most part, put great emphasis on inclusion and socially cohesive groups while not overlooking to establish common institutions for a comprehensive modernization process, which in turn would bring about a much more stable and inclusive development and democratization processes.

Modernization, at this stage, was the key to transform the population in a way to facilitate the reception, implementation and comprehension of the new modern and democratic state system. A wave of political, social, cultural, educational, economic and legal reforms crashed over the, predominantly illiterate and agrarian, population of Anatolia without further consideration and assessment of its demographical characteristics. This put a great deal of responsibility and absolute control on the hands of state elite who considered themselves on a historic mission to modernize the population in order to assure a place for Turkey among the ranks of the most influential and powerful nations of the world. As a result, state elite established majoritarian institutions, which they have dominated, and created a system of political exclusion. Consequently, majoritarian practices, political exclusion and uneven emphasis on modernization efforts in various regions of the country, during the early stages of the new republic, tied the knot for inevitable problems for Turkey.1

Atatürk’s nation-state model, inspired by the European state system model, did not take the multi-ethnicity factor of the population into careful consideration as the society in its contemporary form was considered to be homogeneous. This was due to the fact that, “Kemalism never prescribed a universal doctrine on how best to organize political regimes…at most the principles left by Mustafa Kemal were specifically designed to oversee the development of Turkey alone.” (Ciddi, 2009: 6).

Initially, the nation states of Europe were built upon the principles of self-determination and sovereignty. In other words, the frontiers forming the modern European nation-states already handled the ethnicity and other demographical characteristics before settling for modernization and development. It is not to say

---

1 In a majoritarian system parties representing the majority gain a disproportionately large share of the votes and seats in the parliament for example; in 1950 general elections (first democratic elections in Turkey and the end of single-party rule) Democratic Party (DP) gained 55% of the votes and 85% of the seats at the parliament, in a similar fashion 2007 general elections resulted in 46% of the votes and 62% of the seats at the parliament for Justice and Development Part (AKP)
that the European system did not show any signs of malfunction; however, especially after the WW II, they opted to be inclusive not exclusive systems showing no tolerance for conflict. Nations having difficulties adopted appropriate institutions and systems according to their needs but avoided political exclusion and authoritarian modernism that shape the people accordingly to accommodate the system structure. For example, more than three-hundred German-speaking political entities roamed the Central Europe in the 19th century, which led to the formation of twenty-five states in the new German Empire of late 19th century and finally with the reunification of Germany in 1990 to a federal parliamentary republic system of sixteen states. Spain, on the other hand, has seventeen autonomous communities which helped solve its ethnic problems with Basques and Catalans recently.

On the other hand, rising criticism, by conservatives supporting an Ottoman style governance, on the role Islam played in the new republic were seen as an impediment for secularism and, therefore, for the development and modernization of the country. David Sorenson attests the system utilized by the Ottomans as one which, “held that the social order was of divine origin and hence immutable…Political power did not derive from society, but was imposed on it by the will of God” (Sorenson D., 2008: 262). According to some scholars this notion, which may have provided grounds for adoption, adaptation and implementation of “personal authoritarian rule”, is inherited by and still evident in modern day Turkish nation-state in various aspects of political and social life. (Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 98). Moreover, for Atatürk modernization meant dismantlement of the old religious structures and implementation of new secularist reforms; nevertheless, the constant struggle between the conservatives and Laicists produced a power vacuum that facilitated the presence of a strong military hand in Turkish politics and social life. As a result, the army established itself as the ultimate guardian of secularist-Kemalist state.

Atatürk’s envision of an ideal republic consisted of the elements embedded in modernity, secularism and homogeneity. His ideology drew on, “some of the more extreme concepts of modern nationalism which were current in the nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe. Homogeneity – one language, one religion, one Volk – was considered to be the prerequisite of a strong and independent state” (Ascherson, 1995: 197). Additionally, Esin Örücü argues that Kemalism “aimed at ‘changing the people’ and forging a new identity to fulfill the requirements of the vision [the Turkish nation-state]” (Örücü, 2008). In other words, instead of developing a system that would accommodate the specific characteristics and needs of the nation, the people were compelled to change to meet the requirements of the drafted system. Atatürk’s reforms, in a way, intended to dramatically amplify the role of the armed forces by placing them at the center stage, maintain traditions through indicating the value of religious awareness while at the same time trying to replicate the secular, industrial West to bring about modernization. (Lewis, 2002). “Between 1926 and 1930, by the adaptation and adoption of Codes of foreign origin from Switzerland, Italy, Germany and France, the elite created the legal framework and passed a series of social reform laws (Inkilap kanunlari)” (Örücü, 2008). These reform laws had centralized elitist orientations. On the quest for modernization non-collaborating elite assumed the role of both opinion-maker and decision-maker.

Consequently, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), under Atatürk’s leadership, instigated the single-party era of Turkish republic and “was greatly assisted by the law for the maintenance of order passed at the beginning of the
Kurdish and religious revolt of 1925, which was used to prevent all political activity outside the party itself” (Owen, 2004: 20). The CHP was becoming increasingly unpopular, especially, amongst the rural areas and segments of population concerned with Islamic religious practices. International atmosphere, on the other hand, also boosted CHP’s growing unpopularity allowing opposition to flourish. Economic and military dependence on the USA was mounting and the USA was gaining more leverage to exert its influence to push for political change in Turkey. These developments led to Democrat Party’s victory in 1950 elections marking the beginning of multi-party era as well as three decades of political unrest and military takeovers. The long period of single party rule had created structures that made life difficult for its successors, notably the close association between CHP and its supporters in both the army and the bureaucracy (Owen, 2004: 21)

Turkey’s ambition to join the EU and become a part of western democracies and civilization manifests itself through certain legislative, economic as well as social conversions. One can easily spot banks, multi national corporations, telecommunication moguls, restaurants, chain-stores, department stores and newly build impressive shopping malls that are often associated with elements in a “western” style liberal economy. These developments are good indicators of Turkey’s dedication to Atatürk’s legacy which emphasized the empowering nature of modernization for the progress of nation-state. On the other hand, these developments also indicate Turkey’s willingness to accept and adopt ideals associated with western/European liberal democracy.

That being said, keeping the equal opportunistic European liberal democratic system in mind, it becomes apparent that modernization without proper application and equal allocation only creates inequalities and pushes a nation further away from the democratic practices and more towards recession and conflict. A quick glance at Turkey’s geographic denominators confirms an unequal distribution pattern in terms of goods and services, industrial sites and capital. Consequently, due to the state policy to focus on the regions and cities that attract more foreign direct investments, which are considered to be “more productive”, Turkey has a solvent west with higher development rates and industrial advancement resulting in higher socio-economic cursors, versus a destitute east wrestling underdevelopment, under-industrialization with the lowest socio-economic indicators observed in Turkey.

Turkey enjoys a geo-strategic location serving almost as an authentic bridge between the middle-east, Russia and Europe; however, this advantage also carries various burdens. Balkans to the west of Turkey have, to a certain extent, been an unstable region, likewise Middle East especially Syria, Iraq and Iran are causing international concern. The global persona, of being a conduit between the continents and cultures, accompanied by an advantageous geo-strategic location has enabled the Turkish political leadership to use this advantage as a strong argument for country’s EU bid. Nevertheless, a country which claims to be a bridge between peoples, cultures and continents, assuming an important ushering role would lose a considerable amount of leverage and legitimacy if unable to bridge the gaps and disparities within its own borders. As some argue, while western provinces in Turkey are at the European levels of development, the poorest regions of East and Southeast Turkey are on par with some of the poorer

---

2 Current leader of CHP, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, in a speech given to some 25,000 supporters during his party’s general congress on December 2010 claimed that “CHP is a party which did not experience any genetic modifications”
developing countries (Zucconi, 1999:10). The winds of modernization and development seem to follow a westerly direction in Turkey almost entirely missing the windmills of the east.

Looking from a modernization point of view in democratization studies, this research will aim to understand the formation of regional disparities between Turkey’s eastern and western provinces, and furthermore to find out the triggering mechanism behind the development incentives and policies adopted to eliminate inequalities, and to assess whether these developments hail from internal acknowledgment or external conditionality. This will, then, indicate the influence of external factors upon the process of democratization in a practical manner, trying to explore the realities on the ground and establish an inside-outside linkage mechanism to determine their origins. Furthermore, I aim to explore how important guidance from external actors during democratization process could be, and why it is a win-win situation for Turkey to comply with the EU conditionality.

III. THREE PHASES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

This study assumes democratization as a process of regime change directed towards social and economic development to increase and promote popular participation and to establish an enhanced form of democratic governance, which is more stable, substantive and comprehensive in nature. The end result of democratization is, thus, more than the establishment of sets of institutions; it is the extension of comprehensive and significant rights to all citizens without exclusion. Therefore, it can be presumed that democratization is an ongoing process.

The evidence suggests that transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime can be divided into three overlapping phases (Baloyra, 1987: 9; Gurgel, 2002: 3-5). Firstly, the initiation phase encompasses a transformation of a political regime initiated by the elites in power who eradicate old rules and introduce new ones. The primary tool for change, at this point, is the introduction of civic rights at individual and group levels. New regimes undergoing the initiation phase do this with the intention of overcoming a crisis of legitimacy within the autocratic system (Schmitter, 1986: 7). This gradual liberalization creates an environment that grants more political rights and opportunities for political maneuvers to individuals and groups; it also abolishes the practices hailing from the authoritarian system (Przeworski, 1986: 61). Secondly, the transition phase marks the period from the collapse of the old regime to the official establishment of the new government where the new rules of the political game are defined (Schmitter, 1986: 6).

And thirdly, in consolidation phase the establishment, institutionalization and legitimization of the new political regime takes place; it is intended to make

---

3 In the assessment of the United Nations’ Human Development Report for Turkey, it is stated that “if some provinces in Turkey are at European levels of development, the poorest are on a par with some of the poorer sub-Saharan countries” Human Development Report, cit., pp. 77, 5. See also A Report by the Parliamentary (Temporary) Committee Established for Studying and Determining Necessary Measures to the Problems of Villagers who Emigrated Because of Village Evacuations in the East and Southeast (Ankara, 1997, p. 10.)
democracy more crises-resistant and durable (Morlino, 1995: 573). Generally, consolidation is considered to be a branching-out period where democracy extends beyond its formal aspects of merely introducing free elections. In this phase democracy takes on specific national characteristics and becomes truly meaningful for the majority of citizens. The process of consolidation aims at solidifying the new achievements, routinizing the new forms of political interaction and deepening the nature of the new democracy (Diamond, 1999: 64-73).

IV. AIMS OF THE STUDY

This research, primarily, argues that external factors play a more significant role in the domestic democratization processes than traditionally assumed, particularly in the consolidation phase. Initially, it is a supplementary approach to expand the scope of democratization studies evaluating the interplay between the internal and external dynamics in domestic political change (Pridham 1991, 1994, 1996, 2000; Whitehead 1986, 1991, 2002; Pridham and Vanhanen 1994; Collier, 1993). I suggest that modernization approach to democratization studies offers a more promising and comprehensive analysis of democratization process in a given case due to the fact that modernization perspective is a prerequisite for a meaningful and in-depth case study to identify the realities and substantive effects of democratization on the ground. As democratization is the result of a complex interaction of domestic and international factors I commence historic analysis through initiation, transition and consolidation phases aiming to identify the degree of influence exerted by the external actors and the reasons behind the success or failure of the consolidation in its present form.

Consequently, by analyzing the three phases of democratization, and directing the focus of the research more towards the consolidation phase, I can determine if and how external factors play a role in the three phases of Turkey’s democratization process and the extent of influence they exert, specifically, during the consolidation phase.

Overall, through an in-depth case study of Turkey, still undergoing consolidation phase and has incomplete transition and, hence, democratization processes, I attempt to refine existing theoretical framework and develop an analytical approach to investigate the causal relationship between external factors and democratization.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the role of external factors in democratization process and to determine their impact on the domestic environment not merely on the institutional levels but mainly on the societal levels to reveal the realities on the ground. The study further aims 1) to broaden the scope of democratization studies, 2) to identify different forms of influences broadly derived from theoretical approaches in international relations, 3) to assess the significance of external factors in the process of democratization, 4) to identify the real impacts of external factors and realities on the ground, and 5) to explore when these factors produce their main effects. Consequently, this research will probe the following questions:
1) Could democracy be encouraged, created or enhanced from the outside?
2) Could human (cultural) rights and socio-economic situation of a given group (namely the Kurds) be regarded as a dependent variable for the completion of democratization and survival of democracy in a given case (in Turkey)? And could the influence of external factors be regarded as an independent variable?
3) How and when do external factors play a more significant role in democratization process, in financial or social structures?
4) Is the democratization process systematically influenced by the external factors? Did the external factors exert more influence on the socio-economic development or human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds in Turkey? Did they produce the intended results? What are the realities on the ground?
5) Could it be argued that external factors play a more significant role and are in a way necessary for the democratization of a multicultural/multiethnic society during the consolidation phase?
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

I. DEFINING DEMOCRACY

1. Democracy as a Regime Type and as a Social Model

Defining democracy is rather problematic considering that there has been no universal consensus on the meaning, definition and indicators of the concept. This chapter, therefore, deals with the two major stances, substantive and procedural, of designating democracy, and clarifies the meaning of democracy and democratization for this study.

The liberal, political definition of democracy, as most of such procedural definitions do, dates back to the concept of Polyarchy, introduced by Robert Dahl. According to Dahl, democracy could not be truly achieved without having effective participation, competition for public office, and the rule of law that protects civil rights and liberties. These notions of democracy come up often in the literature (Bollen and Paxton, 2000: 59-60). Dahl operationalizes these general structural elements of Polyarchy in a series of procedural minimal prerequisites; free and fair elections, universal suffrage, freedom of expression, the right to run for office, alternative sources of information, and freedom of association (Dahl, 1989: 221). Nevertheless, these polarchic procedures may not create full democracy if, for example, poverty prevents political participation. Furthermore, these requirements should prevent a reversion to authoritarian rule, and ensure that the structures that allow for majoritarian rule also protect minority rights, thereby consolidating democracy (Albrecht and Shlumberger, 2004). Much of the studies conducted on the democratization and transition processes in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe have based their principle assumptions on Dahl’s criteria (O’Donnell/Schmitter/Whitehead 1986; Diamond/Linz/Lipset 1995; Huntington 1991).

Furthermore, the notion of procedural democracy has been correlated with the Schumpeterian concept of democracy. Joseph Schumpeter opposed “populism” and supported an elitist form of democracy. Schumpeter believed that common citizens could easily be manipulated by the politicians who set the agenda according to their own needs as oppose to those of the electorate. Schumpeter defined the method of democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1970: 267). Arguably, one of the most prominent contributions to the recent conceptualization of procedural democracy has been Schumpeterian elite based perspective of democracy that abates the “rule by the people” notion of popular democracy. Such procedural definitions of democracy could be found in Lipset’s work as early as 1959. Lipset defined democracy “as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for chancing governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office” (Lipset, 1981: 27). In addition, while some procedural definitions are broadened by such works
that indicate the importance of government accountability, respect for minority groups and the rule of law are for democracy (Diamond 1996; O’Donnell 1994, 1998, 2004), others emphasized on implementation of effective civilian control over the armed forces (Burnell and Calver, 1999: 3; Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997: 63).

As opposed to political or procedural definitions of democracy, the general trend in recent democratization studies has often been to address and observe substantive counts of democracy stressing upon the importance of political liberties (Collier and Levitsky, 1997: 433-4). This has been the most common in the case of developing countries where democracy is often regarded as a substantial concept. Rather than focusing on formal procedural forms of democracy, the genuine and participatory form of democracy, that does not necessarily ought to guarantee procedural minimal prerequisites but pursues the realization of actual populace participation, a true competition, and effective protection of human rights, takes the center of the stage. Human rights in accordance with protection of civil and political liberties are considered as “an essential foundation for all the other dimensions of democracy” (Beetham, 2004: 65). The emphasis is given to the results generated by the political process rather than the process itself; thus, instead of political system alone the social structures also have to be democratized. Democracy is formulated in a different way, from an objective in itself to an instrument with the help of which, other extensive goals are feasible to be achieved.

The scientific deployment of the concept of democracy does not only correlate with political philosophy or socio-economic and political realities of a given context, but also follows heuristic considerations. Critical authors judge the separation of the concept of democracy from the concept of development as an ineffective and irrelevant undertaking (Diamond/Linz/Lipset 1995; Whitehead 1993). In the case of Turkey, democracy has been, primarily, recognized to have an instrumental value as oppose to be having considered as a medium to enhance economic and social development, to have good and effective governance or as a medium that allows changes in the power structure. This point has been voiced by various scholars and authors dealing with democracy and democratization in Turkey (Rubin and Heper, 2002; Bayrak, 1999). From a political perspective, the realistic assessment of the achievability and possible progresses, that presents a value of its own, are hindered by overloading of the agenda; hence, reflecting the significance of the liberal approach to democratization studies, supported by unyielding socio-economic indicators. Whitehead states that, “where a more ambitious – authentic – vision of democratization is attempted it would seem that nothing can be consolidated. The choice would be between a stunted version of liberal democracy that works, or a generous vision of social democracy that remains a mirage” (Whitehead, 1993: 321).

Defining procedural and substantive forms of democracy becomes important when exploring the significance of an external actor upon the process of democratization in a given case. Additionally, an external actor’s understanding of democracy may shift between these two definition as was the case for the EU, “mainly procedural conditions of formal democracy…to include also criteria of substantive democracy, such as the role of political parties as a vehicle for political participation, the pluralism of the media, the importance of local government and an involved civil society” (Pridham 2001: 70).

For the purpose of this research a substantive, outcome focused understanding of democracy and democratic transition will be utilized by bringing the question
of human (cultural) rights and socio-economic elements and inequality to the
center of the analysis. Following this substantive definition this paper argues that
cultural/human rights and socio-economic substance is as equally important as
political procedures to the survival and prosperity of democracy (Przeworski,
1991). Social and economic inequalities not only effect human development in a
negative way but also diminish the promise of political equality. At a minimum,
therefore, expectations of what democracy should do also include material
components of economic delivery and social equality (Bratton et al., 2005: 87).

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Agent-based and Modernization Approaches in Democratization Studies

The impact of international aspects on domestic politics and the role of
domestic politics in international arena have been an interminable debate in
political science. Peter Gourevitch, for example, argues that international factors
such as trade, war and ideas have significant impact on domestic political changes
(Gourevitch, 1978). Moreover, Waltz argues that internal temperament of a state
determines the likelihood of international conflicts, and is seen as one of its major
causes (Waltz, 2001). In accordance, democratic peace theory states that
democracies do not wage war against each other; hence, hint that the type of
regime in a given country notably affects its decision making process and foreign
policy formulation, and how it is perceived by other states in the international
arena (Brown et al., 1996).

Democracy, and the process that the countries go through in order to attain
and flourish it, has been at the center of debate in international relations and
political science. The process of democratization took the center of the stage after
the “Carnation Revolution” in 1974, which brought an end to Salazar’s
authoritarian “New State” (Estado Novo) regime that presided over Portugal. This
event then guided the conception of the third wave of democratization
(Huntington, 1991). Soon after the fall of Portuguese dictatorship other
authoritarian countries throughout Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America
followed the trend and took a leap towards democratization. As a result of
democracy’s well established esteem throughout the world, democratization
became an increasingly popular topic for scholars to investigate, and
“democratization studies” emerged (Whitehead, 1996). Scholars have opposing
views regarding the process of democratization. Two schools of thought seem to
emerge in the literature; an agency-based approach with emphasis on process-
orientation, and a modernization approach with emphasis on structuralist-
orientation.

The first school of thought, agency-based approach, seeks to examine
interactions and behavioral patterns of multiple autonomous agents in order to
understand and forecast intricate phenomena of democratization. This agent-based
model (process-oriented emphasis) centers towards the process of transition and
performance of various actors involved. The most distinguished contribution to
the literature, regarding agent-based approach to democratization, has been made
by Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter. In their work, Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (1986), O’Donnell and Schmitter depict the uncertainty of the democratic consolidation, as it is not the only potential alternative for countries going thorough a transition process from an authoritarian regime. Scholars supporting the agent-based model argue that the emergence and survival of democracy in countries of transition could be identified by formulating a model and studying the data, such as “Modes of Transition to Democracy” (Karl, 1990: 9), which are collected by observing the different stages and routes that countries take during their transitions from autocracy to democracy.

The foundation for agency-based approach to democratization studies was initially developed by Dankwart A. Rustow, and became the leading method of analysis, benefiting from the deficiencies of structuralist approach. Rustow’s democratization model had four main stages; (1) Background condition – national unity is necessary to convince masses of their political entity status, (2) Preparatory Phase – democratization is set off by a prolonged and inconclusive political struggle, (3) Decision Phase – deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity, and (4) Habituation Phase – over time people will adapt and appreciate the importance of democracy itself (Rustow, 1970). Rustow’s ideas were, then, adopted by scholars such as Whitehead, Karl, Kitschelt, Schmitter, O’Donnell and Di Palma. They became highly critical of the structural explanations of the democratization process, which set social and economic developments as the most crucial prerequisites.

In their collective work consisting of four volumes, Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (1986), present an important, agency-based outlook regarding the different stages and advancements of transition process. They specifically underline the importance of economic conditions, international actors and bureaucracies to explain the process of transition. Although their research is restricted to specific countries in Latin America (Volume 2) and Southern Europe (Volume 3), it provides reliable information that can be applied to explain other examples around the world. Authors such as Prezowski (1991) Higley and Burton (1989) suggest, somewhat, diverse viewpoints considering the process of democratization.

A further framework has been provided by Herbert Kitschelt (1993), which depicts the most recent agency-based views regarding the democratization studies. In his work, Kitschelt suggests three main principles. First, the focus on democratization studies have shifted from identifying structural “preconditions” to the process of political interaction. Therefore, transition process is more decisive than structural prerequisites. Second, “democratic commitments are the result, not the prerequisites of democratization”. And third, recent democratic transitions have revealed the incorrect empirical assumptions in the literature, which focus on the preconditions (Kitschelt, 1993: 413).

Agency-based approaches all adopt a common hypothesis in regards democratization and political liberalization. According to these assumptions democratic transition and liberalization are caused, directly or indirectly, as a result of “important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 19). Nevertheless, it is crucial, for the success of transition, that there are compromises between opposing parties and alternative choices available, “what matters for the stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of this particular system of domination but the presence of preferable alternatives” (Przeworski, 1986: 52). Inability of a single group to dominate over and impose
their will upon others in looming ambiguous circumstances creates a natural paradigm of democratic procedures, “there is substantial evidence...that taming and institutionalizing elite competitions, settlements unleash a dynamic that gradually disperses cartels and fosters the emergence of modern democracy’s procedural features” (Higley and Burton, 1989: 28-9). In a situation of uncertainty as experienced in elections, most beneficial alternative for competing groups will be to boost the power of democratic institutions and hope to regain the power after elections (Przeworski, 1991: 19).

All in all, agency-based approaches have focused primarily on actors, their behavior, preferences and interactions for units of analysis, posing a challenge to the structuralist school. Agency-based theories do not simply present a supplement to conventional modernization theory but rather constitute a self-supporting alternative based on a ‘micro-perspective’ of societal change (Lipset et al., 1993).

The second school of thought, modernization (structuralist) approach, on the other hand, argues that democracy flourishes as a result of “social requisites” such as economic and social development; hence, underline the importance of economic and social development in laying the groundwork for emergence and survival of democracy (Lipset, 1959). According to Seymour Martin Lipset, a leading voice of structuralists, democracy is identified with the status of economic growth, “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy” (Lipset, 1959: 75).

Modernization approach, following the recent international accession to democracy and democratic values, proposes a causal relationship between democracy and socio-economic development (Lipset, 1959; Londregan and Poole, 1996; Diamond, 1992: 110). By doing so, modernization theorists believe that end results of democratization will become self-explanatory. According to such views, economic growth and industrialization will amplify political stability and decrease inequalities, thus lessen the need for elites to suppress the economically excluded; “democracy is dependent on market-based economic development but not on private ownership of productive capacity” (Hull, 1993: 582). The decline following the third wave of democratization supported the premise that countries could not go thorough a successful consolidation period without the presence of prerequisites (Lipset et al., 1993: 158). As a result, modernization approach seemed become the leading voice in academic circles.

The claims proposed by modernization theory, that there is a link between economic development and democracy, have not been a subject of in-depth examination. Safest assumptions, at the present stage of the research, could be summoned up by Przeworski and Limongi’s three points, (1) the probability that a democracy is born is widely scattered with regard to the level of development, rising at lower levels, and declining at higher levels; (2) the probability that a democracy dies declines monotonically with the increase of per capita income; and (3) as a result, the probability that a country has a democratic regime increases with the level of economic development (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997: 172).

Actually, the notion of alternatives in political action itself differentiates the fundamental thinking between agency-based and modernization approaches. Agency-based thinkers believe that choices constantly alter due to ever-changing needs and wants; “choices are caught up in a continuous redefinition of actors’ perceptions of preferences and constraints” (Kitschelt, 1992: 1028). For structuralists, choices characterize calculations considering given institutional
restrictions and preferences. Empirical proof, gathered from a cluster of South-American examples during the 1960s and 1970s, however, challenged the structural connection set by the modernization model (Smith, 1991: 610). For example, middle class in Latin America, contrary to modernization predictions, allied with ruling elite and helped creating authoritarian regimes.

In conclusion, the “third wave” of democratization served as an opportunity to both agency-based and modernization theories in refining their theoretical approaches, and these two perspectives provide useful and coherent information in explaining democratization. One striking difference between these two views is, undoubtedly, their diverse methodological approaches, and that they emphasize on different stages and characteristics of democratization. They not only distinguish from one and other in their approaches to democratization and democracy studies, but they also essentially differ in techniques of social science researching and the way they identify the social world. Even though, these different approaches proved to have both strengths and weaknesses they both seem to make the shared mistake of not paying enough attention to the international aspects of democratization studies.

2. Literature on the International Aspects of Democratization

Above approaches of democratization studies are primarily concerned with the internal scrutiny of the concept. Nevertheless, they provide insufficient explanations regarding regional and international dimensions of democratic expansion. In the literature it becomes evident that most notable works have domestic orientations and they rarely cross over the domestic borders (Moore, 1994; Pridham, 2000; Whitehead, 2002). International factors and actors became a subject of interest especially since the end of the Cold War. Accompanied by rising globalization, views that considered international factors of democratization inferior to the decisive internal factors saw a decline; more and more studies became increasingly engaged in screening the role of international factors in democratization processes. Scholars such as Diamond called this the “globalization of democracy” in the era of third wave of democratization (Diamond, 1999: 49). Following the globalization argument, examples of successful transitions and modes of social, political and economic relations in one country provided a “change of familiar alternatives” for other countries (Wiesenthal, 1996: 3).

Studying the international aspects of democratization has been partly foreshadowed by prior endeavors. Various, structuralist, scholars have directed the attention towards the institutional dimensions of the colonial systems and its affects on the colonized countries (Dahl, 1971; Lipset et al., 1993; Rustow, 1970). Lipset, for example, argued that chances for Anglophone colonies to become democratic were much greater than for Francophone colonies. Lipset’s work has gained much attention in this field of study.

In the literature the idea that there was, in fact, a so-called “globalization of democracy” or domino-effect prevails. Carothers’ research suggests that the US have been actively providing bilateral democratic assistance from the 1960s onwards, up until 1990s. He discusses four main democratic assistance strategies adapted by the US: (1) assistance to legislative bodies and institutions, (2) to civil society; (3) to political parties and elections; and (4) to the military (Carothers, 1999: 88). Additionally, according to Huntington democratization is “a group of
transitions form non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period” (Huntington, 1991: 15). Huntington, also, gives five descriptive reasons behind democratic transitions, between 1974 and 1990, three of which refer to external factors: (1) a change in policies of external actors; (2) a general demonstration, or “snowballing” effect across the globe; and (3) changes in doctrine and practice within the Catholic Church (Huntington, 1991: 45-45).

Scholars such as Linz and Stephan lay out a framework to study the actual impacts of international factors. They look at three dimensions of external factors, in their comparative work of democratic consolidation in South America, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe. First, diffusion effects take into consideration short-term current events and the way they are perceived. Second, *zeitgeist* - the spirit of the times- relates to long-term, prevalent international ideologies. And third, foreign policy indicates the effects of foreign policy decisions of a given power upon the democratization process of the others.

Pridham, in his study of South and Eastern Europe, suggests contrast between forms of external influence, different external actors and background and situational variables; furthermore, he presents a theoretical approach to the effects of external factor on the process of democratization (Pridham, 1994: 11). Forms of external influence contain economic, political, diplomatic, cultural and monetary, as well as coercive or persuasive, open or covert/subversive, direct or indirect means.

Whitehead and Schmitter put forward a complementary theoretical approach. According to Whitehead there are three distinct international aspects of democratization: (1) *control*: from some dominant powers; (2) *consent*: of the domestically involved parties, and (3) *contagion*: from other cases. In addition, Schmitter contributes *conditionality* aspect, which basically are the demands set by multilateral institutions. He also illustrates four dynamics of interplay between the internal and external *factors* in democratization: the impact of discrete events, the influence of the international context upon different stages of the democratization process; adjustment to trends in the wider context; and democratization waves. Works of Pridham, and Whitehead and Schmitter are good sources to encompass theoretical frameworks of international context.

From a realist point of view association with the internal political procedure when explaining how primarily domestic decisions have been influenced by external/international factors carries a lot of weight; “[external pressures] are unlikely to be fully determining…Some leeway of response to pressure is always possible, at least conceptually” (Gourevitch, 1978: 911). By means of military-security and economic developments, external actors generate, both, opportunities and limitation for democratization.

Various studies concentrate on a given geographic region. The important role of external factors in redemocratization of Eastern and Central Europe is clearly visible and irrefutable. The European Union’s conditionality and Gorbachev’s policy change guided transitions and set off regime changes in Eastern and Central Europe (Rupnik, 2000). In another regional attempt, Moore examines the transition process in the Arab world and the pivotal role external actors have played (Moore, 1994). According to Moore, foreign government policies and aid, cultural diffusion and demonstration effects, the regional defense climate,

---

4 See The International dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas 1996: 1-46
5 Ibid
international monetary scene, and pressures from non-governmental organizations indicate specific regional factors in the democratization process of the Arab world.

Furthermore, various studies, conducted primarily by the scholars of the European Union and International Organization, discuss an extensive range of domestic factors to evaluate the way international organizations, including the EU, generate a variety of domestic political outcomes. Amongst them, *Norms and Nannies* inspects the international causes of domestic political change in the Central and Eastern European States imposed by major Western organizations, specifically the NATO and the EU. The study assumes minority rights, civilian military relations, economic policy, social welfare policies, regional policy and intellectual policy as dependent variable. According to Linden, “this process [conditionality process] generates enormous pressure on the applicant states to conform to what the EU expects of them in the real of creating a democratic society and the ability to engage in international economic competition” (Linden, 2002: 370). Nevertheless, he also adds that the quality and compliance of the domestic acceptance determines the influence of international organizations, especially acceptance and embracement of international norms within the culture of a given society, as well as the structure of the state and state-society relations. In addition, when there is a strong presence of corrupt/authoritarian leadership, nationalists and/or opposition within the parliament the institutional impact of the EU is less likely to matter (Kelley, 2004).

Recently, some studies, centering on the empirical analysis on the effects of international factors on democratization, reveal the limitations and complexity of decoding international f/actors into variables and hard empirical data. Some of these empirically driven studies are: economic globalization (Przeworski, 1991); international organizations (Pridham, 2000); and pattern of diffusion (Brown, 2001). However, these studies find it difficult to provide consistent empirical indicator for international dimensions. Consequently, the majority of studies regard international factors in a more quantitative manner. Several researchers, therefore, exclude examining the importance of external factors when conducting research on democratization studies (Vanhanen, 1997: 161). This methodological dilemma highlights the challenges faced in both empirical and theoretical measurement methods. For example, quantitative research verifies the significance and influences of international dimensions in the process of democratization by categorizing the external actors and factors; however, identifying extensive consequences on domestic events due to interference of external f/actors is empirically and theoretically challenging.

On the one hand, international circumstances are viewed as factors that are affecting an extensive number of players (Schmitter, 1991: 4). On the other hand, investigating the genuine effects of international context proves to be rather complex in terms of both empirical and theoretical analysis. This is due to the fact that, “external actors tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role...external actors work in unintended ways through ostensibly national agents” (Schmitter 1986, 5). The course of transition is by no means determined

---

6 See Roland H. Linden *Norms and Nannies: The Impact of international Organizations on the Central and Eastern European States*. 2002
7 According to Whitehead “international context is almost by definition omnipresent since very few polities in the contemporary world are isolated from its effects” (p.28). The international Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford University Press: New York. 2002
by contextual grounds. Calculated relations between assorted political actors, the quality of political judgment and leadership, and human undertaking are the essential factors for the realization of the development of the transition process. In order to fully understand the interaction between institutions and structures, vital actors of transition process and explanatory factors would have to be identified.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1. Inside-Outside Linkage

As mentioned before, recent studies on democratization contemplate the importance of external factors in an era of “globalization of democracy” (Diamond, 1993). Nevertheless, these studies identify the international aspects of democratization as a complementary factor rather than an explicit, theoretical argument. For example, some scholars believe that external aspects have simply supportive roles, and are often utilized as means for transition process (Lipset et al., 1995; Huntington 1991: 270-276; Burton et al., 1992; Przeworski et al., 1995). Even the theories that specifically build their arguments on the affects of external factors (O’Donnell, 1986) are lacking a different perspective for the recent global rush towards democracy. Therefore, there is a lack of studies concentrating on the paths and conditions of diverse transition processes.

Pridham’s work, mainly centering on the influence of external factors in Eastern and Southern European transition processes, advances a contrast between forms of external influence, background or situational variables and different external actors (Pridham, 1994: 11). External influences could be categorized as political, cultural, economic, direct or indirect, open or covert, and in coercive or persuasive ways. Background or situational variables consist of: foreign policy patterns of the authoritarian era and changes taken place within these patterns in the course of transition, major international events in the transition era, geo-strategic situation, the character of the international system, and the condition of international economy. Different external actors are: international organizations, multi-governmental, non-governmental and inter-governmental organization, and various trans-national actors (see Figure 1).

Schmitter, on the other hand, provides a more general overview for identifying international factors and their courses of action (Schmitter, 1996: 4-24, 28-31). According to Schmitter, there are four international dimensions of political democratization: contagion from other cases; control from some dominant powers; consent in interaction with the internal actors; and conditionality imposed by multilateral institutions (see Figure 1).
Even though these studies are based on specific regions or cultural backgrounds, they present an extensive theoretical framework for studies of international dimensions of democratization. I will, further, evaluate and relate this analytical framework to the case of Turkey on its way to a potential EU membership. This will be a unique approach in the sense that I will examine the influence and impact of external f/actors (the EU and EU conditionality) in a substantive sense, on a specific segment of the population (specifically the Kurdish population) rather than a procedural analysis of the role of external f/actors in democratization process.
IV. METHODOLOGICAL CATEGORIZATION OF EXTERNAL F/ACTORS:

After analyzing, above mentioned, approaches and frameworks one can organize a methodical categorization of the International f/actors considering the democratization experience, of Turkey; and significance of external f/actors in the democratic transition.

1. Global Political/Ideological Order

Since the mid-1960s there has been a progressive global hunger for democratic principles and incentives. Most influential actors went through a process of policy shifts, precisely during the third wave of democratization, which encouraged and pressured other countries, directly or indirectly, to also adapt and adopt these incentives that seemed to be compliant to democracy. For example, policy redirections adopted by the European Union in 1980s and 1990s made EU the most reliable and important supporter of democratic advancement in Eastern, Southern and Central Europe (Pridham, 1994: 23-5). Furthermore, starting with Jimmy Carter era, where human right were made a crucial part of foreign policy formulation, promoting democratic expansion became increasingly important in the U.S. And lastly, Gorbachev’s policies, namely glasnost (openness) and perestroika (economic restructuring), in the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a new area and lifted the iron curtain to allow the free flow of democratic ideals and democratization efforts.

As a result of policy redirections attempted by these powerful and influential actors, the geopolitical order has shifted accordingly towards a more liberal and democratic direction. In theory, political or ideological order is determined by the nature of geopolitical environment and alliances in a region where regime change is taking place in a given country. Following this, there has to be clarifications in regards the availability of an encouraging climate for democratization, and whether the country in transition is an inferior state to a dominant power in the region. Therefore, examining to what extend is political change in a country is aligned with the political interests of the dominant powers or is there conflict of interests becomes very important.

Countries of the former Soviet Union, for example, benefited from a change in the geopolitical order, from the US standpoint on liberal democracy, and from policy shifts of Moscow. Therefore, they experienced a rather smoother transition towards democracy. The wave of shifting geopolitical order hit Turkey much earlier, namely with the end of World War II. Turkey took part in the Marshall

---

8 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, further, argue that, “democracy promotion has become a centerpiece of EU foreign policy activity and is backed up by considerable financial and personal resources. Just to give a rough idea: the EU foreign aid managed by the EU Commission represents 12% of all international financial aid. Combined with foreign aid by individual member states, the EU and its member states account for more than 55% of all financial aid worldwide (according to Perireville 2003, 138, fn. 7)...the EU and its members combined spent ca. $900 Mill. On various democracy programmes in 2001, compared to ca. $633 Mill. in the USAID democracy assistance allocation of the same year (according to Youngs, 2003: 128).” see p. 1

9 According to Thomas Carothers, “By the end of the 1990s the US government was spending more than $700 million a year on democracy aid in approximately 100 countries, with five US government agencies, three major quasi-governmental organizations, and dozens of government-funded American NGOs actively involved.” see p. 331
Plan of 1947 and received Marshall Plan aid (Turkey was the only non-western European nation to partake). In 1949 Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe, and has been an associate member of the EU since 1963. These examples clarify the effects of policy shifts attempted by major powers on altering the global political and ideological order, and their consequence on inferior countries that take up the ideologies and policies imposed or promoted by dominant powers.

Consequently, some scholars argue that there has been a predominant ideological order since the fall of the Soviet Union. Linz and Stepan call this the *zeitgeist* “spirit of the times” and argue that “when a country is part of an international ideological community where democracy is only one of many strongly contested ideologies, the chances of transiting to and consolidating democracy are substantially less than if the spirit of the times is one where democratic ideologies have no powerful contenders” (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 74). Furthermore Albright talks about a “historic opportunity that now exists to bring the world together in an international system based on democracy, open markets, law and a commitment to peace”  

So, democratic transition becomes less probable when there are opposing ideologies and ideological conflicts than when liberal values do not face a severe competition.

On the other hand, economic conditions are considered to be another defining factor of global political and ideological order. Especially in the “Western” world neoliberalism was identified as the fundamental ideological force (Przeworski et al., 1995: 5). At this point structuralist view could be added to the equation. Most influential and powerful actors could directly intervene with the affairs of marginal states due to a “shift in hegemonic powers” (Wallerstein, 1984: 1991). The global economy oriented towards less developed countries in the hopes to find low-cost labor and new markets to utilize capital. This orientation escalated after the WW II with the end of colonial powers. Accordingly, by the 1940s hegemonic power shifted from the UK to the US, and by the end of 1970s towards West Germany and Japan. The Third World had experienced an increase in urban migration, evolving new capitalists, formation of coalitions between wage labors and capitalists and the proletarianization of peasants. Nullification of Yalta agreement, which divided control over some parts of the world, between the Soviet Union and the US was a consequence of this shift in global hegemonic powers (Wallerstein, 1991). As a result of such shifts and their consequences, liberation of former communist states became feasible.

Moreover, the pattern of polarity suggests a more domineering mode of authority on democratization. Some scholars refer to this as “forced democracy” or “externally monitored installation”; Huntington labels this post-war democratization as “the second wave” (Huntington, 1991; Agh, 1995; Stepan, 1986: 71). For example, the Marshall Plan orchestrated by the US, in the mist of a bipolar system, provided direct economic and political supervision to defeated nations in order to implement a multi-party democracy and a modern market economy. According to Offe,

> The only circumstance under which the market economy and democracy can be simultaneously implanted and prosper is that one in which both are forced upon a society from outside and guaranteed by international relations of dependency and supervision for a long period of time. This,

---

at least, is arguably the lesson offered by the war ruined post-war democracies of Japan and, with qualification, of the Federal Republic of Germany.

(Offe, 1991: 874)

Likewise, the strong vested interest of the US accompanied by financial aid and direct military intervention made the establishment of democracies in various countries of Africa, Latin American and South East Asia relatively smoother (Schwartzman, 1998). A possible success of the Iraqi model could also mean a further addition into the list, and the first visible case in the Middle East.

2. Conditionality and Security Support of Regional/International Democratic Community

Conditionality exerted by regional or international actors could be seen as a two-way street. On the one hand, external actors such as international institutions or regional communities (also known as the “western countries”) set the standards and regulations, provide financial or intellectual assistance for the countries in transition and consolidation in order to bring their levels of bureaucracy, economy and judiciary systems up to a par with those of the conditionality setters’, so that the “under-democratized” countries could become true members of the international or regional community. On the other hand, the recipient country, itself, has to undergo several procedures to adapt and adopt the obligations set by the international community while trying to cope with domestic setbacks such as remaining legacy of the authoritarian era and cultural customs.

A prime example of this kind of institution building could be observed in Turkey’s efforts to join the international democratic community and more recently, efforts to meet the EU conditionality. Conditionality, set by the EU, is arguably the most important aspect of Turkish democratization. In order to become part of the international democratic community and ensure security and stability Turkey repeatedly turned to external guidance and support. Turkey joined the NATO in 1951 and participated in the US led Korean War. Later on, rising security and stability issues of the cold-war era, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis, pushed Turkey to open the doors to the US once again. Turkey allowed the US to deploy 15 medium-range ballistic missiles in 5 different locations operated by the US personnel, which in return meant US support in terms of security and monetary aid.

Looking at the security and conditionality issues at a regional level, directs the discussion, in case of Turkey, straight towards the EU. Turkey’s interest in joining the EU came as early as 1949 when Turkey became a member of the Council of Europe. It became clear to Turkey that countries belonging to this “exclusive club” had the privilege of mutual support in terms of security, stability and economic advancement; furthermore, being a European country meant belonging to the “international democratic community” prized by the most actors including the most powerful and influential countries of the world. In 1987, Turkey submitted its application for formal membership into the European Community. However, the European Commission found Turkey’s economy staggering, political freedoms and functionality (especially freedom of rights and minorities) inadequate, and its relations with another member state namely Greece and conflict over Cyprus reasons for announcing a pending period for
membership. Clearly, the EU’s conditionality became a major theme in Turkish politics and daily life since.

The EU conditionality has, undeniably, been a driving force behind recent reform waves in Turkey, referred to as the “silent revolution”11. Decision on Turkey’s candidacy in 1999 Helsinki Summit has been a turning point for Turkey’s reform process, which exemplifies the role of international institutions, particularly the EU, as a catalyst for domestic political changes (Kubicek, 2002, 2003, 2005; Türkmen, 2008; Grabbe, 2002). It is, however, inaccurate to suggest that domestic factors played little to no role in assessing this process, the role of domestic politics, civil society and social adaptation to the EU conditionality have been similarly decisive (Kubicek, 2003; Erdem, 2008). But the important question remains: whether domestic actors comply with the conditionality (democratization process) in order to merely become members of the union, or they do so out of genuine intentions and belief that the process of democratization, brought about by the EU conditionality, serves the best interests of the citizens and the state in long run.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the US was also announcing prerequisites for democratic governments throughout the region. Emphasis was given to the civilian control of the military, respect for minority rights and freedom of institutions (Przeworski et al., 1995: 9; Smith, 1994). As a result, countries that were unable to meet these standards at domestic levels were denied participation in liberal economic, defense and security organizations, such as the NATO or the EU, at international levels.

Integration of the various countries into the EU has been a challenging process at both institutional and social levels. The EU exercises its influence through conditionality that member candidates are obliged to fulfill. Following this model, regional community is viewed as a dispenser of economic, social and political construction. Conditionality of the EU is documented in 1993 Copenhagen Summit; (1) democracy and human rights; (2) economic readiness to join the single market; and (3) the capacity to implement EU legislation (Grabbe and Hughes, 1998: 46). Any country that seeks to become a member of the EU has to implement these terms or revise them to incorporate with domestic context. Although, they carry an equal weight in terms of democratic consolidation, willingness and ability of a member candidate state to implement the EU legislation seems to triumph above the others due to the fact that institutionalizing democratic legislative institutions might/would be necessary for a given country before harmonizing the domestic laws with EU’s.

This process has been and still is in effect in European countries, especially in former communist block of Eastern European countries, and becomes increasingly important for applicant countries such as Turkey. Even domestic political troubles seem to bypass this process; hence, validating its importance and fast pace. This fast proceeding was observed in 2004 when first group of candidate countries were accepted to the EU. There has been an extensive popular support for the EU membership amongst the many countries of Europe; this notion even spilled over the regional boundaries into the neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Morocco. Nevertheless, fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria does not necessarily produce immediate success; countries face immense difficulties in the institutionalization process. Thus, the point to make is that countries in search for ways to accomplish stable transitions and sustainable

democratization tend to go beyond the internal context and turn to the external factors and international field.

Furthermore, the popularity over the specific way of organizational structure, that being the deliberate compliance of countries in transition to international criteria, is explained by neo-institutionalist approach (North, 1989). The triumph of market capitalism, by the end of the Cold War, verified the standard-setting nature of western political and economic norms. As a result, countries hoping for a place in the global order had to implement these norms and standards, particularly the institution building aspects of Western-style democracies, which had now become a prototype (Agh, 1996). The logic behind such arguments are that in time economic and political institutions will mélange. Consequently, globalization as a process of interactions between domestic and international widens the sphere of influence of market economies and democracy.

From a regional security point of view, in search of protection from an external “security vacuum” becoming a NATO member has been an important objective for most Central and Eastern European countries, as well as Turkey. Realists point out that the early steps towards democratization was more durable in England than it was in France due to the fact that England enjoyed geographical protection from possible external threats. Likewise, compulsory retreatment of dominant states from their aspirations over regional hegemony created “zones of peace” (Thompson, 1996). Therefore, democracies are more likely to surface and prosper in regions with firm peace.

Bearing this popular global view in mind, Turkey has demonstrated a considerable degree of dedication and willingness to become a part of the regional/international democratic community. As mentioned before Turkey joined NATO in an attempt to avoid threats and inconvenience hailing from external circumstances such as the “security vacuum”. In return, Turkey supported NATO’s decision and operations in Korea, Bosnia, Iraq (first Gulf War) and most recently in Afghanistan. Whereas, joining NATO has been more or less an imposed process for Turkey due to the external circumstances and attitude of the external powers shaping the global environment, decision to join the EU has been rather voluntary. The EU meant joining a respected, economically developed democratic community, which would put Turkey in a legitimate position in the international arena. The requisites of EU conditionality for Turkey primarily included direct and indirect involvement of the EU in the domestic democratization process of Turkey. The EU’s Copenhagen criteria set rules as to how the countries in the process of democratization should adjust their policies and their legal, economic and bureaucratic frameworks in order to become a member of the Union. The EU also provides financial aid to Turkey in order to facilitate Turkey’s compliance process with Copenhagen criteria, and more generally with its democratization process. European Commission observes and publishes annual progress reports for Turkey in terms of recent developments taken place, and makes recommendations for further neglected areas of interest. This means that, in the course of democratization (transition and consolidation), domestic actors would tend to usually incorporate an international dimension into their political strategies.
3. Global Capitalism and Effects of International Economics

The global economic progress amplifies the rate of industrialization, and accordingly increases the number of working and middle class citizens, especially evident in the developing world. These classes, consequently, laid the groundwork for insertion of democratic values and economic equality demands in the society, which as a result encourages the spread of democratic ideas and the rate of democratization (Therborn 1977; Rouquie 1986; Stepan 1986; Huntington, 1991; Rueschmeyer et al. 1992). The post-war era witnessed rapid industrialization that supported the enlargement of working class; this was the main mechanism behind diffusing democratization in different parts of the world (Ost, 1990).

Globalization was identified, by neo-realists and structuralists, as a process in which distribution of power is becoming progressively unbalanced (Wallerstein 1991; Baldwin 1993). Rising codependence enables the center to have more control over the periphery. Therefore, global capitalism, steered by the US, reveals the notion that economic liberalization in authoritarian regimes and pre-transition countries is not entirely a voluntary move towards common values but rather a reflection of this new global capitalist order. There has been a decline in economic sovereignty of nation states as a result of export led growth, interdependence of credit structures on international financial markets, and high dependency on trading partners. Dependency on major trading partners, market forces and global economic climate pressures national governments in their economic decisions and policies, and loose control over the capacity of external trade or inflation and interest rates.

According to the world system approach there is a cyclical process within the world economic system that comes in periods of economic accumulation followed by periods of economic stagnation. In order to deal with the economic crisis and get over the stagnation cycle peripheral economies are required to reorganize, which as a result affects their political processes (Wallerstein 1984, 1991). It becomes important for these peripheral economies to regroup the emerging working class into citizens to allow peaceful transitions. In order to achieve this in a trouble-free, productive manner they often select democracy (Whitehead, 1986). On the other hand, democratization and a democratic regime also allow countries to integrate more readily into the global economy and drop their peripheral status. Following this argument, pro-democratic and liberalization route taken by then the Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s reforms during the 1980s, as a result of the worst economic crisis, in Turkey becomes more comprehensible.

In the late 1970s, Turkey has experience one of the worst economic crisis of its history. As a response to the deficit caused by the oil-crisis Turkish officials turned to short-term foreign loans to bridge the gap.12 To address this crisis Özal pushed on the augmentation of exports in order to finance imports, so that Turkey could break out from the world system cycle with irregular phases of rapid accumulation and stagnation. Consequently, a liberalization movement, an “outward oriented growth” of the Turkish economy took place, which made the economy more responsive to market forces (Canevi, 1994). As a result of the

---

12 “By 1979 inflation had reached triple-digit levels, unemployment had risen to about 15 percent, industry was using only half its capacity, and the government was unable to even pay the interest on foreign loans.” Federal Research Division. (1995) Turkey: A Country Profile. Washington DC: Library of Congress. p. 187
liberalization of the economy there has been spill over affect in social and political spheres. For example, in his presidency, Turgut Özal, the mastermind of economic reforms, stressed upon how the inability of Turkey to bring a peaceful and sustainable solution to the Kurdish problem hinders Turkey to play an active role in the regional and international politics (Gürbey, 2005).

The export oriented policies and trade dependence of various nation states involves a through integration into the world market. This causes a gradual spill over of economic influences into the political sphere. There, now, were more opportunities available for local urban population and elites to get in touch with external actors and democracies. As a result of these contacts local population and elites became increasingly aware that in order to be a part of and facilitate the integration into the global system as well as into the club of western industrialized countries there has to be a change in domestic political system towards democratization (Przeworski et al., 1995: 6; Diamond, 1992: 121). Keohane and Milner suggest two key domestic elements in regards to interaction between domestic factors and international economic relations. Firstly, international economic exchanges have resulted in new domestic alignments across different economic sectors; and secondly, domestic factor deals with domestic institutional dynamics such as public institutional, electoral changes, and veto players (Milner, 1996). For example, in Turkey after a devastating financial crisis in 2001 electorate aggravated with the scandals and erroneous economic and social policies of the ruling party voted them out in the national elections of 2002. Newly elected AKP government, “has been pushing ahead with economic reform in close collaboration with the IMF and political reforms aimed at satisfying the Copenhagen criteria…under the current government, EU harmonization efforts intensified” (Yesilada et al., 2004: 15). As a matter of fact, these new policy adaptations and orientations of the AKP government provided them with the majority of votes (34.29%) in 2002 elections, and consecutively (46.66%) in 2007 general elections.

4. Diffusion Effect and International Communication

External support and pressure may play a decisive role in shaping and restructuring the direction of the political power, especially when there is a political reform, shifting power and coalitions, on its way in the neighboring countries. According to the supposed “tipping model”, minuscule changes in external milieu may be sufficient enough to generate competition to redirect the route of political power (Schelling, 1971; Lohmann, 1994). The reflections of the political changes taken place in Hungary and Poland on the East Germany and Czechoslovakia are examples of such developments. According to Gleditsch and Wald, “tipping effects should lead to a clustering of transitions, with one transition increasing the likelihood of subsequent transitions in connected state” (Gleditsch and Wald, 2006). When this tipping effect reached Turkey’s neighbor Bulgaria a spill over to Turkey was inevitable.

Various examples from former Soviet block countries of Eastern Europe showed that pro-democratic ideas and values associated with the West were also possible in a “socialist” context, such as the 1989 transformation in Hungary. Furthermore, accommodating such values in a given country meant sparking of adaptation in a neighboring country, as was the case in Romania with the fall of
Ceausescu (Ash, 1990). Thus, a potential technique of influencing democratization by international actors comes into light when revising Central and Eastern European examples. Spread of western values, such as pluralism, personal liberty, freedom of political expression and a market economy, as well as the spread of specific tactics and models of democratization is evident. The result is the socialization of domestic actors (Diamond, 1993: 53).

Continuing our argument on diffusion effect, particularly, in the region of Europe, the Spanish model has gained lots of attention and was marked as an exemplary transition for democratizations in other parts of the European mainland (Baloyra, 1987). Methods of alleviating social quarrels, documented in the 1978 Moncloa Pacts during the Spanish transition, was taken on as an example by various European states such as Hungary. Thus, while democracy was seen as a contingent outcome of national struggles for power (Rustow, 1970: 353), the diffusion effect has led to an international recognition of the democratic idea (Franck, 1992). Countries, in order to deal with domestic policy dilemmas, may import policies or institutional models from other countries for strategic purposes.

A major driving factor behind the diffusion of ideas has undoubtedly been the recent developments in communication technologies. Improvements on global reception of radio and television broadcasting, as well as utilization of satellite technology for free and fast flow of a considerable amount of information, and most importantly the eruption of internet contribute greatly to the circulation of democratic values and ideas thorough out the world (Huntington 1991; Markoff 1996). In the course of globalization, global communication and transportation became undeniable factors for countries around the world, even for the ones in isolation. As a result withholding information from the masses about events taking place in different parts of the world became unbearably difficult and costly for the governments, this relatively free flow of information contribute to the initiation of comparable democratization processes in non-democratic countries (Huntington, 1991).

Isolationist approach followed by the socialist regimes in the late 1970s meant strict restrictions, not only in terms of economics but also on communications and cultural exchanges. However, the state began to loose its credibility, and its embargo on the flow of information eradicated as the media became more daring and outspoken about the lifestyle, wealth and positive outcomes of mass demonstrations in the advanced Western nations; one such media establishment was the Radio Free Europe, a US funded station broadcasting in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East where governments monopolized press and freedom of information. Images of Western way of life provided by such media organizations nourished the desire for similar quality of life in countries where such qualities were lacking. As a result, demonstration effect began taking place amongst the masses and contributed to the collapse in 1989.13

Communication technology, on the other hand, blurred the internal-external divisions during the 1989 revolutions. Transitions that have been successful in various countries became a point of interest in others. This also helped to

---

13 On a similar note, one of the largest video sharing website was banned in Turkey in 2007 on the grounds that videos insulting Ataturk and Turkishness have been posted in the website. Visitors to the site are greeted with "Access to www.youtube.com site has been suspended in accordance with decision no: 2007/384 dated 06.03.2007 of Istanbul First Criminal Peace Court". Only after the above mentioned insulting videos were removed from the site Turkey agreed to lift the ban. Turkey’s approach resulted in harsh international criticism, for not safeguarding freedom of speech and information.
conceptualize the image of global democratic revolution in the minds of concerned citizens, politicians and intellectuals in the countries of transition. As the public awareness rose, owing to the live media coverage of political democratic struggles, unjust treatments of demonstrators, and authoritarian oppression, Western countries had little choice but not to pay attention to such events, and to formulate their foreign policies accordingly to address human rights issues around the world. Thanks to the developments in communication technology world’s conscience was awaken and injustices in remote places did not go unnoticed, which would have been impossible in earlier decades.

5. Democratic Assistance

Democratic assistance encompasses the role of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and the impact of government-sponsored democracy assistance programs in the fields of democratic governance, human rights and other relevant democracy building issues (Smith, 2001; Keek and Sikkink, 1999; Welch, 1995; Carothers, 2000). Such external actors provide, when necessary, assistance to domestic actors in search for democratic reforms; hence, they promote democratization. Transnational actors and various states do this by providing support to the institutions or individuals who favor democratization, and by weakening the power of the regime that might be opposing democratization (Randle, 1991; Deutsch, 1954). For instance, the EU not only requires institutional conditionality but also sets up a series of assistance programs aimed to facilitate transitions and consolidation periods of the potential members. According to Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse democracy promotion has become a centerpiece of the EU’s foreign policy and it is backed up by considerable financial and personal resources (Börzel and Risse, 2006: 3). One of the earlier examples of such assistance programs, established in 1989, was Poland and Hungary Action for Restructuring of the Economy Program (PHARE). The PHARE aimed to:

support the activities and efforts of non-governmental bodies promoting a stable open society and good governance and focus support on the difficult or unpopular aspects of political reform and democratic practice, where local advocacy bodies are weak and professional expertise is particularly lacking.

(Commission of the European Communities, 1992: 9).

A more recent assistance tool utilized by the EU is the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) put in effect on January 1, 2007, which replaces PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, CARDS, as well as Pre-Accession Instrument for Turkey.14 The main structure of the IPA is to gather all previous pre-accession funding under a single roof. The IPA has five major components:

1) The “support for transition and institution-building” component, aimed at financing capacity-building and institution-building;

---

2) The “cross-border cooperation” component, aimed at supporting the beneficiary countries in the area of cross-border cooperation between themselves, with the Member States or with the framework of cross-border or inter-regional actions;

3) The “regional development” component, aimed at supporting the countries’ preparations for the implementation of the Community’s cohesion policy, and in particular for the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund;

4) The “human resources development” component, which concerns preparation for cohesion policy and the European Social Fund;

5) The “rural development” component, which concerns preparation for the common agricultural policy and related policies and for the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.

Furthermore, the IPA’s assistance can take the following forms: investment, procurement contracts or subsidies, administrative cooperation, involving experts sent from the Member States, action by the Community acting in the interest of the beneficiary country, measures to support the implementation process and management of the programs, and budget support. The importance of the IPA assistance for Turkey is indisputable; financial grants alone serve as an extra limb and help out Turkey considerably. In order to assess if the intended targets receive the needed assistance, the IPA program in Turkey incorporates several cross-cutting themes into all of its components: equal opportunities for men and women, environmental protection, participation of civil society, geographic and sectoral concentration, concerns of minority and vulnerable groups, and good governance. Assistance programs such as the IPA and PHARE have revealed that external, non-state actors can have positive impact on domestic political reform. Particularly in consolidation and transition stages these assistance tools have shown great dedication to the spread of values and norms of human rights and democratization. According to Diamond,

The most distinctive feature of the third wave is the considerable contribution that international actors have made to democratic development by enhancing the resources, skills, techniques, ideas, linkages, and legitimacy of civil society organizations, civic education efforts, the mass media, legislatures, local governments, judicial systems, political parties, and election commissions in the developing and postcommunist worlds. The prospects for democracy in the world will be much brighter if these many currents of practical engagement are sustained, refined, and widened.

15 “As of 01.09.2006, some €1.68 billion of EU grant financing is being managed in Turkey for projects committed between 1996 and 2006 inclusive (this figure does not include, however, the full envelope of € 450 million earmarked for the 2006 National Programme, for which not all the Financing Decisions have been adopted). Of this amount, approximately € 944 million will be managed through “Decentralised Implementation System” (DIS) structures, which were accredited in October 2003. The budgets allocated to Turkey are 61% contracted and 47% disbursed, reflecting considerable delays in implementation. The Commission considers that measures should be taken urgently to increase the staff of the DIS institutions, to broaden their qualifications in order to deal with new tasks, and to move to the full decentralisation of the programmes, with the waiver of ex-ante controls by the Commission services, as soon as possible.” The Commission of the European Communities: Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2007-2009 for Turkey. p. 6
When assessing the pre-transition phase, the role of NGOs fighting for human rights issues become critical. One of the major inputs of these organizations is to “raise the perceived costs of repressive action against them [regime opponents] and make them feel that they are not entirely isolated” (O’Donnell et al., 1986: 51). According to Pete Moore, “this dynamic goes some way in fulfilling Robert Dahl’s maxim that a regime will entertain policy change when the perceived costs of repression outweigh the perceived cost of toleration” (Moore, 1994). As a given regime limits its repressive methods because of such pressures, the way toward the democratic bargaining table may be made clearer (Dahl, 1989).

On the other hand, INGOs form a mutually beneficial relationship between themselves and the local audience. For example, local groups provide INGOs with much needed information, in some cases only available through local channels, and in return local groups seek protection from INGOs through publicizing their ill-treatment or struggle for rights. In case of Turkey, local branches of organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch base their charters on international goals and standards, utterly associating the international dimension of their cause (Arat, 2007).

Besides immediate exposure of human rights issues in a given country through raising public awareness in international arena, INGOs also sponsor the western way of comprehending democracy and present competing images of what a functioning democracy should look like. However, the success rate of INGOs largely depends on how the ideas about citizenship are received by the local audiences and how influential and powerful their local partners on the ground are (Pridham, 1996). In other words, channels of communication and partners inside the democratizing country are highly needed for external actors such as the INGOs in order to realize their visions.

In addition, it can be said that the process of democratization is unquestionably accelerated by external assistance. However, it is inaccurate to suggest that external non-state actors are the only decisive thrust in the democratization process. In fact, most of their success rate depends on how well their charters and visions are received by the local audiences, especially in terms of security condition, the attitude of the recipient government, and regional political order.

As observed above, I have provided methodical categorization of international factors; I further take into account Whitehead and Schmitter’s four forms of influence on democratization in domestic context. Even though, they might not be evident at all stages of transition, it is important to comprehend and analyze these forms of influence as according explanations.
Table 1 – Typology of External F/actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Factors/Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Political-Ideological Order</td>
<td>Main Power’s Foreign Policies/International Political Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Control)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and Geopolitical Order</td>
<td>Democratic Community’s Conditionality/Near-Abroad Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Conditionality) (Control)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Economic Order</td>
<td>International Economic Effects/Global Capitalist Trend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Contagion) (Consent) (Conditionality)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion Effect</td>
<td>Demonstration Effects/International Communication Order and Flow of Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Contagion)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Assistance</td>
<td>Activities of International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) and Governmental-Sponsored Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Consent) (Conditionality)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Chou, 2004)
V. METHODOLOGY

1. Modernization Approach and Inside-Outside Linkage

According to David Singer;

In any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several ways in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged...the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system...Whether he selects the micro- or macro-level of analysis is ostensibly a mere matter of methodological conceptual convince.

(Singer, 1961: 77)

Following this, the research will use a combination of methodologies with emphasis on case study based on a single case. According to Yin, case study research excels at bringing us to an understanding of a complex issue or object and can extend experience or add strength to what is already known through previous research (Yin, 2003). In addition, Stoecker defines case studies as those research projects, which attempts to explain holistically the dynamics of a certain historical period of a particular social unit (Kumar, 2008 49). Case studies emphasize detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships. Yin defines the case study research method as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 2003: 25).

This thesis uses content analysis of observations obtained from records, documents and field notes. Statistics are introduced in order to develop knowledge through the use of empirical data expressed in quantitative form. A major problematic for this thesis when researching for socio-economic development was finding a sufficient number of books dealing with statistical aspects of the disparities at regional levels in Turkey, in other words for provinces primarily populated by the Kurds.

Categorization of external/international f/actors gives me the basic idea about the form of external influence on domestic democratic transition. To further my research into an in-depth case study with socio-economic variabales I will examine the interplay and mutual relationship between domestic and external dynamics. Investigating inside-outside linkage will give me a good idea about the important f/actors and different forms of influences they exert, and interactions between external context and domestic elements in a given case, namely in Turkey. Furthermore, I can explore the dynamics of democratization process by tracing sets of chain reactions and assessing whether these have originated from internal or external contexts.

In addition, the inside-outside linkage would help analyze the relations between external and domestic contexts and facilitate the identification of the most prominent external f/actors and their spheres of influence. This would then outline the course of events, whether derived from internal or external context, which consequently shapes the dynamics of the process of democratization.
According to Laurence Whitehead, “any systematic analysis of the role of international factors in stimulating democratization...must carefully specify which pressures were most significant; how, when and where they produced their main effect; and in what historical context were embedded and constrained” (Whitehead, 1994: 46). Therefore, an in-dept analysis through a case study will be employed for this research, to not only offer a political explanation of democratization, as most agency-based studies do, but to assess the realities on the ground through structural/substantive explanations. Focus of the study will be on the socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds in Turkey before and after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, which would enable to assign the most important external f/actor in Turkish democratization process, and it would, further, help to indicate in which structural levels, socio-economic or cultural, the influence of the external f/actors were most significant. The main point of focus in the Inside-Outside Linkage cluster (see Figure 1) will be give to Conditionality (EU’s demands from Turkey) and Consent (Turkey’s ability to comply with EU conditionality, observed through the socio-economic and human (cultural) right situation of the Kurds before and after Helsinki), since they tend to demonstrate a tight-knit correlation, which would entail; regional security and geopolitical order, international economic order and democratic assistance clusters (see Table 1).

In my research I will utilize structuralist approach in democratization studies; main focus will be appointed to the modernization emphasis. I will investigate the changes taken place in the socio-economic and human, parenthetically cultural rights, situation of the Kurdish population in Turkey to assess the impact of external f/actors in democratization. Research on the socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds will be divided into two main sections: 1) 1987-1999 from the time when Turkey has formally applied for EU membership (14 April 1987) to the Helsinki Summit where Turkey was officially granted candidacy status; and 2) 1999-2009, a decade after Helsinki Summit, to best assess whether the changes in socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurdish population hail from inside or outside dynamics. I will use the conditionality and consent elements, in relation to the EU, of the inside-outside linkage principle (see Figure 1) to trace the origin of these changes.

For the evaluation of human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds I will utilize the data gathered from various newspapers and articles, but the main source of data collection will be EU’s Progress Reports and ECtHR Reports, to incorporate the influence of external f/actors. In additions, data from reports conducted by independent NGOs, namely Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International will, also, be utilized in order to obtain the most objective results as possible. For socio-economic evaluation I will utilize the single existing research conducted by same researchers using same methods that entails regional socio-economic development, shedding light on the socio-economic situation of the regions predominantly populated by the Kurds, which enables an ideal comparison mechanism for pre- and post-Helsinki periods in a more comprehensive and accurate manner. The research already conducted by Bülent Dincer, Metin Özaslan and Taner Kavasoglu for the State Planning Organization in 1996 and 2003 provides such a comparison mechanism.

I will assess both socio-economic and human (cultural) situation of the Kurds in both periods since; 1) there seems to be a scarcity of socio-economic indicators and data obtained from regional analysis in Turkey especially in pre-Helsinki period, which indicates that regional development incentives were not considered
a priority in Turkey during the period in question and/or there are other underlying factors; 2) therefore, a systematic assessment of the situation of the Kurdish population, merely from a socio-economic point of view without the input of human (cultural) rights aspects, in short- and medium-terms seems unfeasible; 3) effects of the global economic climate, ceteris-paribus, such as the economic crisis in 2001 would naturally have an impact on the socio-economic situation of the country as a whole, which would have similar impacts on the Kurdish population during the periods in question and therefore manipulate the outcome; 4) adding the human (cultural) rights situation element to the equation would intensify the level of analysis and it would also help determine and distinguish the circumstances in which the external f/actors play a more influential role; and 5) comparing the overall results obtained from socio-economic and human (cultural) rights research during the two periods in question will help determine various trigger factors in democratization process, whether rooted from internal or external factors, conditionality-consent dynamics, and it would also shed a light on the discourse of such trigger factors for further research.
CHAPTER 3 – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: MODERNIZATION, DEMOCRATIZATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESEARCH

I. BUILDING THE REPUBLIC AND THE ROLE OF WESTERN/EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

Turkey’s desire to be amongst the ranks of European nation states has a long history stretching as far back as the birth of the republic in 1923. By then, the founding father of the republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk constructs a series of reforms to transform Turkey into a secular and rational nation, emphasizing modernization in the fields of education, science and industrialization. In order to achieve this goal, Ataturk designs a six fold plan towards modernization. Ataturk’s six fundamentals are: Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, Reformism, Nationalism, and Statism. These imperatives then became known as “Kemalism”. These ideals, nevertheless, have a long history; they were formulated and developed by European philosophers and scholars and put in practice by the European nation states. These ideals took their place amongst the theories of international relations and contributed to the survival of European and world civilization alike.

Consequently, it can be argued that Kemalism in its primary form adopts ideologies employed by Europeans to create and to outline a governing mechanism for the new Republic, and acknowledges the effectiveness of such ideologies for nation building and for a well functioning state structure. After all it is relatively practical and less perilous to try a system that has been put to the test previously than to start from the scratch. This is not to say that Kemalism replicates the European model down to its exact blueprint but it foreshadowes a longing for international legitimacy through constructing a nation-state upon the European ideals and standards. Perhaps, it has been a mistake not to understand the actual purpose and theories behind these European ideologies and not to follow them accordingly. Subsequently, an intense reform process took over, which radically transformed the society with rushed modernization endeavors in order to put the development and democratization processes forth. Transformation of the society was appointed to and monopolized by the state elite who molded a society to make it fit in the system they have envisaged and considered as appropriate, rather than trying to find a system that best suited the demographical characteristics of the nation. On this regard Nicole Watts states that, “following the war of independence and the establishment of the republic in 1923, Turkish officials embarked on a project of authoritarian high-modernism, in which progressive but non-democratic elites attempt to re-map the new country using radically simplified designs for social organizations” (Watts, 1999).

Republicanism is one of the oldest ideologies emerging from “the West” with its roots stretching as far back as to the Ancient Rome and Greece. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner depict republicanism as “a shared European heritage” and point out that early examples of such an ideology are eminent in the
Considering the relationship between the State and citizens Van Gelderen and Skinner, furthermore, state that, “republican citizens could be governed, but not mastered” (Ibid: 3) In its simplest form it refers to an ideology claiming that a republic is the preeminent form of governing a nation, emphasis is given to open elections, opposing the inheritance of power as is common in monarchy. Republicanism, for Turkey, meant demolishing the monarchical system of the Ottoman Dynasty and implementing a constitutional republic. This brings about fundamental liberties to citizens, especially the practice of elections to appoint heads of state. Nevertheless, as argued by some scholars even though republicanism opposes power inheritance, in Turkey Ataturk’s “long term legacy” and “institutionalized personal authoritarian rule” is inherited by various political circles and by the military (Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 98).

Free elections, nonetheless, are not sufficient enough without a harmonious merge of the privileged elites and the relatively underprivileged masses to obtain majority endorsement. Populism, at this point, would serve as the glue that holds the nation building process for Kemalist ideology together. Populism has its roots in the Ancient Rome but in the early modern era coincides to the 14th to 16th century Europe. This political doctrine sparkled out of the movements bearing social and economic motives. Carter Lindberg describes this era as a series of revolts by the “simple folk” against the power-holders that “found expression in rebellions in Italy (1304-7), Flanders (1323-8), France (1356), England (1381), Bohemia (1419-34), northern Spain (1437), and Hungary (1514)” (Lindberg, 2000: 150). Other remarkable populist movements of the era are the Bundschuh movement believed to last from 1493 to 1517 involving a series of localized rebellions where peasants revolted to seek their rights, Deutsche Bauernkrieg (German Peasants’ War) (1524-25), and ultimately the English Revolution of 1642-1651.

Secularism aims to expel any religious intervention in political and governing bodies, as well as any governmental involvement in religious activity. This becomes especially important for a nation that has been built upon the ruins of an empire, which blends religion and politics as a governing practice. Roman and Greek intellectuals, such as Epicurus and Marcus Aurelius, first conceptualize secularism and provide a platform for its modern day interpretations. Later on during the Enlightenment this ideology is further observed and studied by thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson, Voltaire, John Locke, and various others.

---

16 For example, “The Dutch abjured their allegiance to their overlord, Philip II, in 1581 and went on to fight successfully for the establishment of a federated republic, while the English executed their lawfully anointed king, Charles I, in 1649 and set up a Commonwealth and Free State” Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds.) (2002) Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 2

17 “The feudal orders was their own position seriously threatened by the new development of things economic in the cities. The guilds were becoming crystallized into close corporations of wealthy families, constituting a kind of second Ehrbarkeit or town patriciate…the numbers of the landless and unprivileged were increasing in an alarming proportion…All these symptoms indicated an extraordinary economic revolution, which was making itself at first directly felt only in the larger cities, but the results of which were dislocating the cosis relations of the Middle Ages throughout the whole empire.” Ernest Belfort Bax. (1899) The Peasants War in Germany 1525-1526. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. p. 7-8

18 Secularism is believed to be coined by George Jacob Holyoake see, Holyoake, G.J. (1896). The Origin and Nature of Secularism, London: Watts and Co. p.51

19 The term “separation between church and state” was pinpointed by Jefferson. For more information see, Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbin, and
Revolutionism, derives from the notion of socio-political revolution\textsuperscript{20} such as the French Revolution of 1789 or the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. In its simplest form it refers to the necessity of a revolution in order to alter social structures to achieve a modern society. The formulation of the idea of revolution dates back to the era of ancient western philosophy. Aristotle believes that two outcomes emerge out of revolutions; revolutions either modify an existing constitution or they completely change from one to another.\textsuperscript{21} Earlier examples of most remarkable social and political revolutions take place in the western world and set an example for the rest of the world; the American and the French Revolutions in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century are the most renowned ones.

Nationalism is closely coupled with the thinking of Enlightenment and the principle of self-determination. This notion is derived from the ancient Greek idea of the polis, political community. Jean Jacques Rousseau is the most influential supporter of this idea; he lays the basis for modern ideas of democracy and the legitimacy of majority rule (Rousseau, 2008). Later democratic thinkers, such as John Stuart Mill, add to this with their stress on representative government as being the most desirable form of political system (Mill, 2010). It is believed that the French and the American Revolutions of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century fine tuned nationalism by adding loyalty to a nation rather than to a particular leadership or a community. However, regarding Turkey, nationalism is defined through and coupled with Kemalism and loyalty rests with the leadership and/or founding “fathers” rather than with the nation.

II. MODERNIZATION

As argued in the previous chapter modernization theory, in relation to and, to some extent, as a prerequisite of democracy and democratization, highlights the importance of “social requisites”, such as social and economic development (Lipset, 1959). Modernization, as Marx and Weber assess, initially assumes that socio-economic development brings major political, social and cultural changes.\textsuperscript{22} These changes under the umbrella of democratization, usually, lead to an emergence of democratic values and practices in a given country where such practices seem to be absent, and to a superior version in those where they already exist. Where, on the one hand, human progress is believed to outline the foundation of modernization (Carneiro, 2003); on the other hand, it is synonymized with Westernization owing to the diffusion effect. Furthermore,
studies indicate that there is a systematic correlation between socio-economic development and changing values and beliefs of the public, which in return has a significant impact on governance, equality and democratic freedom (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). More often than not, these changing values and adopted practices tend to alter in accordance with those observed in more developed, industrialized countries; hence, supporting the assumption that modernization, in fact, is relative to the context of Westernization.

According to Inglehart and Welzel, processes advancing human development could be categorized as follows: under socio-economic dimension with a process of modernization; under cultural dimension with value change, and under institutional dimension with democratization process (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Socio-economic development enables individuals to be materially, socially and intellectually more independent by reducing external restraints on their personal choices. As people’s existential and material needs are met, issues previously regarded as trivial break the surface. These issues, inevitably, deprioritized in developing countries by fundamental needs and services for basic existence, indeed, shape the keystone of modern western civilization. Only when a certain degree of socio-economic development is reached individual autonomy and human development are feasible, which consequently leads to exertion of greater individual and collective freedoms. A humanistic culture, as argued by Inglehart and Welzel, “that emphasizes self-expression values radiates into all major domains of life” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:3).

1. Modernization of Turkey

Examining the process of modernization in Turkey presents various essential insights on Turkey’s regime type, regime orientation and legitimacy. In addition, the very understanding and conceptualization of the Kurdish problem could best be achieved by exploring the characteristic that shape the modern Turkish nation-state (Keyman and Icduygu, 2005: 270). For the Kemalist ideology modernization means Westernization (Önis, 2003), and requires “the will to reach the contemporary level of [Western] civilization” (Keyman and Icduygu, 2005: 217). This means, first and foremost, that Turkey has to be an independent nation-state with effectual commitment to industrialization and construction of a homogenous national identity that harbors the notions of secularism and modernity. Consequently, this leads to a common conception shared by the Kemalist elite, who seize the control of the process of modernization and apply it from the top-down, so that the ultimate responsibility on this historic mission rests with them.

The course of modernization, to a large extent, is drawn by Turkish nationalism. According to Tanil Bora, Turkish nationalism has five variations: 1) official (Ataturk); 2) Kemalist left-wing; 3) Islamist; 4) ultranationalist; and 5) liberal. It has neither a static nor a dynamic discourse (Bora, 2003). Official (Ataturk) or Kemalist variation of Turkish nationalism is adopted for this study with special attention given to the task of establishing and perpetuating the nation-state. As one of the firm fundamentals of Ataturk’s “six arrows”, Turkish nationalism is primarily shaped by two factors which in return have a direct affect on the nature and the course of the process of modernization. Firstly, modern Turkey is established after a war of independence. Ataturk has been able to organize and mobilize Turkish nationalists following the partition of the Anatolia amongst the European powers, officialized in the Treaty of Lausanne. This creates
a nation-state that is rather sensitive in its approach towards issues such as threat acuity and survival (Bora, 2003). Traditionally, evident in modern day Turkey, separatist notions from internal and/or external elements and indivisibility unity of the nation-state are, still, amongst the most sensitive issues. Secondly, even though the main motivation behind Turkish nationalist movement, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, has been to chase out the “Westerners”, the notion has never been translated into an all out anti-western reaction; “instead, it aimed to locate a Turkish presence in an already accomplished model, rather than challenging the text in a civilizational relativism” (Keyder, 2005: 12). The West is, therefore, seen as an exemplary model for modernization and progression that the Turkish reformers ought to adopt.23

For Ataturk one of the most important components of modernization was laicism, as it has been the case observed in the modernization processes of various western countries, namely France’s. Therefore, transformation of Turkey from an Islamic state into a secular republic becomes crucial. This has not been an easy task, as the reactionaries and conservatives who were trying to bring back the Sultanate, formed the majority in the Grand National Assembly. To counter this Ataturk and his followers reacted by dissolving the Assembly on April 1, 1923. Ataturk’s power struggle appeared at this stage, Feroz states that, “as the country prepared for elections, Mustafa Kemal decided to remove the political struggle from the Assembly (where his control was limited) to the party which he dominated totally” (Feroz, 1999: 54). As a result, structure of power relations as well as the process of modernization has been dominated by the Kemalist elite.

One can discern certain historical facts about Turkish nationalism by examining the above mentioned course and objectives of Turkish modernization process. Firstly, according to the state the nation is homogenous (Kadioglu, 1995: 92) and everyone living with the borders of the Turkish republic is considered an ethnic Turk (Cagaptay, 2006). National identity is shaped by the elite to facilitate and cope with the process of modernization rather than molding a process according to the characteristics and needs of the nation. Turkish nationalism, instead of serving as an ideology to organize and unify the nation first, is utilized as an “instrument for purposes social control and mobilization towards modernization” (Keyman and Icduygu, 2005: 12). Secondly, for Kemalist elite the state has been seen as a dynamic agent that enables the restructuring of the nation to the level of contemporary civilization, which consequently inaugurates state-centrism. According to Keyman, “the Kemalist idea of the state was embedded in the question of how to activate the people toward the goal of civilization, that is, how to construct a national identity compatible with the will to civilization” (Ibid: 275). Evidently, the perception of threat and survival in accordance with elite dominance (top-down approach) brought in by the process of modernization molded together to craft a national identity as envisioned by the Kemalist ideology.

The organic vision of society, according to Kemalism, is crucial for modernization and, more importantly, for the survival and longevity of the state. Kemalist ideology imagines a nation culturally assimilated, politically obedient and economically dependent on the state, and gives the decision making duty to the state elite, on the grounds that the nation lacks necessary maturity to decide on its own, even though the sovereignty belonged to the nation foremost. For Kemalism citizenship rather than carrying rights has compulsory responsibilities,  

---

23 “For this reason Turkish reformers and their epigones were willing and apt followers of modernization theory” (Keyder, 2005: 12)
which according to Kemalist ideology forms the basis of the society (Keyman and Icduygu, 2005: 6). State-centered Turkish nationalism incorporates elements of French-style civic nationalism with emphasis on the principle of citizenship and German-style ethnic nationalism based on territoriality claims (Kadioglu, 1993; Bora, 2003). According to Saylan, while its civilizationist dimension suggests Turkish nationality is an expression of politico-territorially defined common will, its culturalist aspect has so far aimed to achieve a centralist, absolutist and monist national identity (Saylan, 2009: 6).

The literature has often acknowledges that the political life in Turkey, since 1924, is certainly shaped and directed by Kemalism; governments may change but the conceptual deem supporting Kemalist ideology is deeply embedded in state legislative, judiciary and executive as well as in the military institutions. Furthermore, preserving the Kemalistic notions is regarded by a significant portion of the society simply as cultural heritage. Centralized, elite-dominated reforms, consequently, create a system of authority and obedience, which in return enable and contribute, greatly, to the creation of social and economic disparities. Thus, not all fractions in Turkey are able to benefit from modernization in an equitable manner. As Kurds begin to challenge the homogeneity of the national identity and state’s attitude toward its imposition, which manifests itself more vigorously under the modernization umbrella, instead of appraisal and conciliation they are countered with forced assimilation and denial policies, so as to expedite the transition phase and to not put the process of modernization in jeopardy. There seems to be two options available for the Kurds, as one of the main prerequisites of modernization process is the presence of a homogenous nation, Kurds either have to accept assimilation or are to be denied the fruits of modernization. The official doctrine, in a way, preached that non-Turks are not eligible to and could not be modernized; this notion, as a result, has gravely contributed to the continued existence of feudal and tribal dynamics within the Kurdish society. Unequal distribution of benefits hailing from incomplete modernization creates an environment that is more likely to experience conflict and disarray. According to Hah and Martin, “when modernization or some other social change increases the level of inequality, higher levels of social tension result and conflict ensues. In a conflict situation, the level of group identification is intensified, and group integration develops” (Hah and Martin, 1975). Evidently, the first Kurdish uprising Sheikh Said Rebellion, which has deep nationalistic orientation of aiming to establish an independent Kurdistan, takes place in 1925 right after the birth of the Turkish republic when the reformist elites decide to impose a single ethnic identity upon the multi-ethnic population of Turkey to expedite the process of modernization.

As a result of these historic developments Turkey’s modernization in a factual and equitable sense never fully developed. Therefore, it intensifies group identification and conflict situation, creating a vicious cycle of past-present, survival-threat and guilty-innocent perceptions. Questioning the past events and Ataturk’s ideals, and attempting to change or challenge them, are regarded as anti-statist and retrogressive notions that hinder modernization and progression of the country; nevertheless, certain uncorrected flaws left by earlier governments become the constituting elements of the state system and are considered as legacy. The deeply rooted elements within the state system make any perception of legitimacy and evaluation virtually imposable, and, in fact, put a real challenge and obstacle for modernization of the nation. Deficiencies observed in modern day Turkish democracy, therefore, can be linked to inequitable and authoritarian
fashion that the modernization process has been imposed upon the population enhanced by a falsified legacy of fulfilling Ataturk’s dream to be in the league of western civilization. Forced assimilation policies, especially upon the Kurdish population, in the name of modernization create counter reactionary movements and contribute to the emergence and consolidation of Kurdish nationalism. Kurds who make up a considerable portion of the population, oppose such practices exercised under the pretense of modernization, and are therefore labeled as separatists and anti-modernizationists who want the old Millet system of the Ottoman era where they enjoyed, relatively, greater autonomy. Nevertheless, mass participation principle of democracy and the emphasis it puts on modernization and democratization have been ignored by the Kemalist elites who embark on an authoritarian mission where ideas are shaped by short-term goals and circumstances rather than well organized and calculated plans.

Consequently, single-sided and incomplete modernization provides the foundation of an equally unstable and deficient democratization that haunts Turkey to this day. Neither modernization nor democratization processes are accomplished in a complete and equitable manner in Turkey.

III. INCOMPLETE DEMOCRATIZATION

A basic definition of incomplete democratization is the inability of a certain political regime in a given country to attain democratic consolidation in an efficient, effective, comprehensive and factual manner. Mansfield and Snyder refer to “transition from autocracy to a partially democratic regime” as “incomplete democratization” and argue that “hostilities are more likely to break out when states have made only an incomplete democratic transition” (Mansfield and Snyder et al. 2007: 163) because, “a defective democratic system often lacks the appropriate mechanisms to integrate the contesting political ideas and groups” (Bünte, 2009: 297). In addition, Mansfield and Snyder point out the interplay between militarization and incomplete democratization and attest that, “states undergoing incomplete democratization are more likely than other states to be responsible for provoking these kinds of militarized interstate disputes: they may thus be the instigators of war even when they are not he initiators of the first large-scale attack” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005: 34). On the other hand, according to Charles Tilly, “De-democratization…results from…withdrawal of major trust networks from public politics, inscription of new categorical inequalities into public politics, and/or formation of autonomous power centers that threaten both the influence of public politics on the state and popular control over public politics” (Tilly 2007: 162-163).

A study conducted by Economist Intelligence Unit in 2010 dives countries according to their democratic performances into four different categories: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes.

---

Turkey is labeled as a hybrid democracy\textsuperscript{25} and was ranks 89\textsuperscript{th} out of a total number of 162 countries (Democracy Index 2010 Economist Intelligence Unit). Today, Turkey still struggles to reach European levels of stable and consistent democracy; hence, Turkey is considered by many scholars as a country with “incomplete democratization” (Whitehead 2002: 154, Diamond 1999: 28).\textsuperscript{26}

Third-wave democracies face a more vindictive challenge. They are obliged to correct their error of initiating free elections before creating institutions that would guarantee the rule of law, form a stable civil society, and create a system of accountability of administrators. Richard Rose describes this incomplete consolidation as “democratization backwards—a regime that is an incomplete democracy, with free elections but lacking essential elements of the modern state” and suggest three different ways that the third-wave countries can develop, 1) completing democratization, 2) repudiating free elections and turning to an undemocratic alternative, 3) falling into a low-level equilibrium trap in which the inadequacies of elites are matched by low popular demands and expectation (Rose and Shin, 2001).

As the most reasonable alternative out of the three presented by Richard Rose, Turkey, which seems to be falling into a low-level equilibrium trap, aims to complete the democratization process with a series of incentives and policy shifts. Turkey can be considered fortunate enough to rely on the guidelines, presented by the EU conditionality, to further its progress on democratization path. I argue that Turkey’s Third wave of democratization is directly related to and characterized by the realization of the Copenhagen Criteria required for membership to the EU, and that the EU and its conditionality mechanism are the most influential external factors for Turkish transition. Therefore, the success of Turkey’s democratization process goes hand in hand with the very understanding of an effective compliance with EU conditionality.

Additionally, the ongoing democratization process in modern day Turkey can be regarded as a continuation of and/or as an attempt to ameliorate Kemalist approach of “authoritarian high-modernism” where state-centric policies are carried out and implemented from top-down. Turkey’s efforts to democratize, especially in terms of human rights and finding a peaceful and sustainable solution to the Kurdish problem are found to be insufficient by the EU and outlined the basis for strong criticism. However, settlement of the Kurdish problem in a peaceful manner stands out amongst the other elements concerning Turkey’s compliance with EU conditionality as Turkey, throughout its history, has been unable to bring a reasonable resolution to the abiding problem. Therefore, it has been argued that Turkey’s democratization process would

\textsuperscript{25} Hybrid regimes: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates many be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies—in political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically there is harassment of and pressure on journalists and the judiciary is not independent. \textit{Democracy Index 2010} p. 31-32

\textsuperscript{26} Whitehead states that, “the new democracies in emerging markets provide a particularly vivid demonstration of the persisting uncertainties...these are not fully consolidated regimes that have been stress-tested in adversity. A certain proportion of them are likely to swing from weakly democratic to precariously authoritarian and back for some time to come. Argentina and Turkey are currently demonstrating the continuing potential for severe instability” (Whitehead, 2002b: 154). According to Diamond, “during 1990s the quality of democracy (as measured by the levels of political rights and civil liberties) has eroded in a number of the most important and influential new democracies of the third wave—Russia, Turkey, Brazil, and Pakistan.” (Diamond, 1999: 28).
remain incomplete and its EU bid a distant dream without dealing with the Kurdish dilemma foremost (Laciner et al., 2005; Salih et al., 2006; Arikan, 2006).

Furthermore, due to the extensive number of external actors and their influences on democratization, I argue that in order to form a systematic and coherent analysis an in-depth study on a specific external actor, especially if the impact of this actor is extensive and palpable, and its specific area of influence is necessary. In this case affects of the EU accession on the Kurdish population will be observed. Examining the affects of EU accession on Kurds provides a better conceptualization of the importance of external influences as the Kurdish problem in Turkey encompasses various economic, social, political and humanitarian aspects. Due to the fact that Kurds, in numbers, constitute a reasonable portion of Turkey’s population, any negative development on their socio-economic state eventually reflects on Turkey as a whole. Moreover, as a consequence of Turkey’s inability, throughout its history, to bring a rational and democratic solution to the issue, the Kurdish problem is argued to be one of the main obstacles on Turkey’s democratization path (Kubicek, 2002; Bayrak, 1999).

As attested before, many scholars consider Turkey as a country with incomplete democratization. In order to comprehensively understand the interplay between internal and external actors in democratization one must look at the underpinning elements of the state structure, and try to explore the basic reasons behind this incompletion. One vital factor for incompletion of democratization in Turkey seems to be state’s systematic policy to disregard and/or assimilate the Kurds, their culture and identity. According to Falk, “the litmus test of democratic credibility [of Turkey] will be willingness and ability to improve upon the situation of the large Kurdish minority” (Falk, 1993: 21). In the following section factors obstructing the progress on the situation of the Kurds are examined to determine the pathology of democratization and the Kurdish problem in Turkey.

1. Concealed Authoritarianism: Effects of Kemalism and Militarism

The fall of the Soviet block enabled ideologies of western powers to dominate the international political arena. Major powers, especially the United States, took upon themselves to act as ideological gatekeepers, propagating the inferiority of socialist values such as the state’s responsibility to answer the basic needs of its entire citizenry, ideal of equality and importance of social justice over economic policy, and the superiority of capitalist values such as the necessity for countries in transition to familiarize with western style democracy that takes a competitive capitalistic form. The perception that socialist content of welfare state jeopardizes the competitive nature of the world economy on doubt; it even puts the most efficient social democracies and welfare states, such as Sweden where certain welfare state features were cut back.

The notion that democracy is the only proper way to govern, in a way, encourages authoritarian states to take a more mellow appearance without renouncing basic dependence on intimidation and oppression entirely, which some may call “the wolf in sheep’s clothing” approach. According to Richard Falk,

In an age where some claim “the image is everything”, democracy has been frequently reduced to an image, associated with rituals: elections, political parties, human rights associations and reports. In some settings,
this embrace of a democratic imagery has indeed usefully increased the political space available for oppositional politics and citizen initiatives. But in others, democratization has obscured the persistence of authoritarian structures and practices, and has fastened an exploitative and painful capitalist discipline upon an impoverished people as if preordained in heaven.

(Falk, 1993:18)

Furthermore, there seems to be a link between the quest for democratization and nationalist conflicts, given that democratization enables the involvement of a large number of groups and empowers their role within the society, there are greater risks of ethnic conflict and international aggression (Snyder, 2000: 27). Snyder, at this point, includes the prospects of incomplete democratization, which can be identified as regime transition that does not necessarily lead to a tangible change in the permanent bureaucratic apparatus of the state; “democratization gives rise to nationalism because it serves the interests of powerful groups within the nation who seek to harness popular energies to the tasks of war and economic development without surrendering real political authority to the average citizen” (Ibid: 36).

Regarding Turkey, residual authoritarian legacy left over by the Ottoman dynasty and later by the Kemalism leads to incompleteness of Turkish democratization in the present day. Unspoken compromise between the government and the state presents a real obstacle for Turkey’s democratization; while on the one hand, the elected government takes enthusiastic steps towards democratization, on the other hand, it declines to confront the embedded state structure that carries authoritarian legacy of the past. Richard Falk argues that, “the degree of Turkish democratization seems modest enough and under sufficient state control, to make extremely unlikely a serious challenge directed at the authoritarian underpinnings of Turkish political life in the foreseeable future” (Falk, 1993: 20).

Over a period of three decades from 1960 to 1990, three coups overthrew democratically elected governments, one even leading to Prime Minister Menderes’ execution, and one so-called “post-modern coup” in 1997, which led to Prime Minister Erbakan’s resignation, ending the coalition government by announcing a memorandum without dissolving the parliament or suspending the government. The Turkish Military under the leadership of the General Staff in a National Security Council meeting stated that the military was not content with the way the country was governed. In Turkey, Military intervention has generally been acknowledged as the legitimate means to “correct” unsuitable legislative practices and re-establish the Kemalistic system that guarantees the indivisibility and secularity of the nation. According to Myers and O’Connor “coup and bureaucratic appointments” are “the most important alternative means of empowering governments, denote military rule and authoritarianism” (Myers and O’Connor 1998). On this issues Gülistan Gürbey, perhaps, makes one of the most accurate observations regarding the interaction between Kemalism, military establishment and authoritarian state,

27 Furthermore he attests that, “The contradictory realities in Turkey provide a fascinating “text” by which to appraise this emergent pattern of hidden authoritarianism, combining both the reality of at least limited democratization as an encouraging development on the surface, and the ugly manifestations of persisting authoritarianism that limit what is needed to liberate society from oppressive circumstances” (Falk, 1993: 19).
While the central dogmatic and traditional elements in the conception of nation and nationalism continue to exist, the foundation of the state tradition continue to exist too. They are based on the imperial character of the Ottoman Empire: the State is an independent body superior to society and politics. It is sacrosanct. In today’s political and social reality this conception is reflected in the terms “derin devlet” (the profound State) and “devlet baba” (Father State). While the former indicates the lack of definition of the omnipotent State (the invisible yet omnipresent power apparatus) the latter expresses hopes for the services it should render. The individual serves the State. In the Kemalist Republic this idea of the State is embodied by the state apparatus, i.e. the tip echelons in the administration, judiciary and military. Since the State is not a political instrument but rather politics serves the State, this conception of the State is authoritarian – a notion which was not alien to other countries in Europe till the early 20th century either.

(Gürbey, 2006: 158)

On the other hand, the perpetual Kurdish conflict in the East and Southeast Turkey has been utilized by the “profound State” as a propaganda tool to maintain the pinnacle position in “Father State” apparatus; hence, this situation contributes to the continuation of “state over society” understanding and concealed authoritarian approaches, that often require the involvement of armed forces or paramilitary units, to resolve pragmatic problems. Authoritarian practices, such as military take-overs, forced assimilation and displacement, torture, kidnapping, and disappearances, adopted by state officials abusing the administrative authority given to them by the state, becomes systematic and common owing to the embedded notion of concealed authoritarianism, state supremacy over citizenry and appropriateness to use any means necessary to ensure state’s prosperity foremost before the prosperity of its citizens.

A) Kemalism:

Kemalism, as an ideology, is composed of Mustafa Kemal’s six fundamentals, aimed to modernize and democratize Turkey through a series of reforms. As argued before, Kemalism is understood as the “official” variant of Turkish nationalism and one of its core tenets (Bora, 2003). Kemalism, as argued by Soner Cagaptay, proposed three definitions of the Turkish nation. Territorial definitions, as legitimized in the 1924 Constitution, recognized all the inhabitant of Turkey as Turks; “this act promised to accommodate the Kurds, and the Armenians, and all others as equal citizens of the Republic” (Cagaptay, 2006: 77). Secondly, according to Kemalists all Muslims residing within the borders of the Turkish Republic were considered as Turks, “this was best demonstrated by the overall tone of the Kemalist immigration regime that facilitated the immigration of Ottoman Muslims in the Balkans” (Ibid: 77). And lastly, Kemalists used “ethno-religious” definitions when defining Turkish nation. Following the logic of the latter approach people who were ethnically Turkish and spoke Turkish as their mother tongue were seen as Turkish, and they categorized the rest, non-Turkic people, into Muslims and non-Muslims categories. The criteria and
categorizations utilized by the Kemalists to define Turkish nation demonstrated that,

Ethnic Turks were not a solid majority in Turkey. If the Kurds and the other Muslims assimilated, they could enhance the Turkish population. For this reason, helped by the legacy of the millet system [the Kemalist saw all Muslims in Turkey as Turks], the Kemalists were willing to accept the Kurds as Turks if they adopted the Turkish language, albeit without forgetting that they were not in reality ethnically Turkish. Accordingly, Kemalists carefully screened them to prevent their number from increasing and their national identity from blossoming. Paradoxically, such moves may have strengthened the Kurds’ national identity.

(Cagaptay, 2006: 77)

Furthermore, Cagaptay argues that the state favored and protected the section of the population who fit in the ethnic descriptions of Kemalists’ Turkish nation characterizations (Gülalp, 2006).

On the other hand, Bernard Lewis has proposed a different definition and concept (ethno-territorial) of Turks as put forward by the Kemalist theory, which he summarizes as follows:

The Turks were a white, Aryan people, origination in Central Asia, the cradle of all human civilization. Owing to the progressive desiccation of this area, the Turks had migrated in waves to various parts of Asia and Africa, carrying the arts of civilization with them. Chinese, Indian, and Middle Eastern civilizations all had been founded in this way, the pioneers in the last-named being the Sumerians and the Hittites, who were both Turkish peoples. Anatolia had thus been a Turkish land since antiquity.

(Lewis, 2002: 359)

Furthermore, Ismet Inönü, right hand commander and successor of Ataturk as the second president of the republic, in his speech to the Turkish Congress of the Turk Ojaghi (clubs for the propagation of Turkish culture) attested the official position:

We are frankly Nationalists…and Nationalism is our only factor of cohesion. Before the Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. At any price, we must turkify the inhabitants of our land, and we will annihilate those who oppose Turks or ‘le turquisme’

(Meiselas, 1997: 124)\(^{28}\)

While attempting to democratize the country Kemalist ideology, also, embraced ethno-nationalistic and concealed authoritarian notions. According to Eric Jan Zurcher, “Ataturk’s short term success and long term legacy is undoubtedly caused in part by the different degrees to which Ataturk was able to institutionalize the personal authoritarian rule and to transfer authority to

\(^{28}\)As cited by Sir Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Constantinople, May 4, 1925. British Public Records Office, Kew. FO371/10863/E2634 p. 124
collective bodies that were able to survive the death of the founding father” (Atabaki and Zurcher, 2004: 98).

Although his six fundamentals modernized and, to certain extend, developed Turkey there was still a certain amount of institutionalized authoritarian rule leaked into the governing bodies. This leakage was enough to escalate into a pool of problems and made it difficult for the government to accept and resolve neither past nor present problems, such as the Armenian Genocide and still pending Kurdish problem. This was mostly due to the fact that state apparatus was established to be superior to the society and that citizens were required to serve the state rather than the state serving them. Nicole Watts states that “following the establishment of the republic, Turkish officials embarked on a project of authoritarian high-modernism, in which progressive but non-democratic elites attempt to re-map the new country using radically simplified designs for social organizations” (Watts, 1999). Attempting to solve a problem meant accepting its very existence, and furthermore the failure of the “paramount republic”, this has made the solution process extremely difficult.

In an attempt to modernize the state, to move it away from Islamic fundamentalism and more towards secularism Ataturk designed a six rule plan towards modernization. Ataturk’s six fundamentals were: Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, Reformism, Nationalism, and Statism. These imperatives then became known as “Kemalism”. The political life in Turkey, since 1924, is dominated by Kemalism. According to Kemalism importance should be given to the homogeneity of the Turkish people, “national and religious minorities were not to be recognized by the state” (Lombardi, 1997). In order for Turkey to become a modern state Ataturk also believed that the conversion of Turkey from an Islamic state into a secular republic was crucial. Nevertheless, one aspect was elapsed or ignored in Ataturk’s modernization ambitions. Modernization was not comprehensive in character; it did not produce the same results in the western regions as it did in the eastern regions, and evidently regional disparities emerged. To this day a huge socio-economic gap remains in Turkey, a more modernized West versus a backward East. There was an unequal distribution of benefits brought in by the process of modernization. According to Hah and Martin modernization and social change escalate social tension and levels of group solidarity; “when modernization or some other social change increases the level of inequality, higher levels of social tension result and conflict ensues. In a conflict situation, the level of group identification is intensified, and group integration develops” (Hah and Martin, 1975).

Instead of organizing under an ideology to brace the nation, nationalism legitimized state patrimony. Kemalism seemed to modernize and develop, at times quite successfully, the remains of a broken empire into a nation. One can not deny the difference between most Middle-Eastern countries and Turkey today in the world, and Turkey’s slight advance on the others in terms of social, economic and political spheres. Nevertheless, this intense modernization and changed ambitions came at a price, inequality.

Kemalist nationalism has adopted a historical approach and imagined a nation culturally assimilated, politically subservient and economically dependent on the state. It can be said that building of the new nation-state embraced authoritarian elements of elite dominance and top-down installation, which survived until the

29 "As long as the masses live in poverty and ignorance, they will seek the protection of the state, hence they will seek to protect their stubborn nationalism, and the exalting of the state will continue." Turkish Daily News. “Rising Nationalism”, February 28, 2005.
modern day Turkish republic. Due to the immaturity of the nation to decide on its own, Kemalism gave this duty to the state elite. For Kemalism citizenship rather than carrying rights had compulsory responsibilities. The foremost responsibility was to obey Kemalism, which has made the nation an infinite servant of the state. Therefore, “Kemalist nationalism did not establish democracy but one-party rule during its reign from 1923 to 1945” (Dagi, 2007).

The elements of threat perception and survival, which have become a nation-state practice under Kemalism, then gave way and made militaristic measures more justifiable and acceptable, since security and protection is provided by the armed forces. Transformation of the society to adopt militaristic values was achieved through authoritarian high-modernism adopted by the Kemalist ideology. Therefore, concepts of Turkish nationalism and militarism tend to go hand in hand in Turkey. As mentioned before Ataturk has transformed the institutionalized personal authoritarian rule to collective bodies that were able to survive his death, and this was seen as one of his flourishing moves. To this day, the legacy of Ataturk dominates the military establishment and, consequently, the military dominates the political and social life since 1930s.

Today’s Turkey is still governed under the constitution written by the military junta in 1982, only in 2010 a governing party, facing harsh opposition, braved enough to make certain changes to the constitution through a public referendum. Nevertheless, “in Turkey, the army thinks it is the constitution” (Mardell, 2006). Military’s dominance and influence over Turkey could be exposed by the following statement of retired Turkish general Edib Baser, “If this building (the state) falls down everything... including democracy, freedom of speech, human rights... gets crushed underneath. So the roof has to be strong - the army keeps an eye on it” (Ibid). Furthermore, a Turkish historian Prof. Halil Berktay claims that “The army had a semi-colonial mission to the rest of society - and they've never ceased enthusiastically believing that they are the real civilizing elite in Turkey” (Ibid).

B) Militarism:

As argued by Zurcher institutionalized personal authoritarian rule of Atatürk was evident in modern Turkey because it was transferred to collective bodies that survived his death. Accordingly, the military was the primary body to receive and unconditionally accept and utilize these institutionalized authoritarian practices under the flag of Kemalism. In this regard, Gareth Jenkins states that,

> what makes the Turkish military unique is that it sees itself as having an almost sacred duty to protect and indigenous ideology, namely Kemalism…This ideological dimension to the military’s perception of its role has meant that its definition of security extends beyond public order and Turkey’s political or economic interests to include threats to the country’s Kemalist legacy. Kemalism is enshrined in the Turkish constitution and includes a rigorous commitment to secularism, territorial integrity and cultural homogeneity.

(Jenkins, 2001: 6-7)

Moreover, Richard Falk interconnects the link between incomplete democratization and militarism in Turkey; he states that, “moves to deepen
democracy and widen secularism in Turkey continue to face obstacles. Adherents of the old exclusivist secularism have not given up their struggle to reacquire control of the Turkish state, and their most extreme voices appear ready to sacrifice democratic principles to reinstate their hold on power. The Turkish Armed Forces remains a potent force. They threatened to take over the government back in April of 2007, and have issued warnings subsequent to the July elections” (Falk, 2007).

Following these above points one can say that they are related to security issues. Strengthening these factors will alarm a greater need for security. Governments have different approaches in maintaining and gathering this greatly required security. This notion could best be observed in a proverb frequently used by the armed forces, “Strong military, strong Turkey”.

Militarism, also known as militarist ideology, assumes that the society is best served when governed by concepts embodied in the military. Militarists believe that security is the highest social priority, and this priority will be fulfilled by the development and maintenance of the military at the greatest possible level. One of the most important, if not the most important, aims of the militarism is to expend military culture and ideals in areas of business, government policy, education and entertainment.

According to Alfred Vagts militarism, “presents a vast array of customs, interests, prestige, actions, and thought associated with armies and wars and yet transcending true military purposes. Its influence is unlimited in scope. It may permeate all society and become dominant over all industry and arts…militarism displays the qualities of casts and cult, authority and belief” (Vagst, 1937: 11). Furthermore, Arthur Mc. Donald depicts the measurable nature of the militarism through number of soldiers (including officers) in time of peace, relative to the population (Mc. Donald, 1915); nevertheless, this is extremely difficult to embark on in the case of Turkey because since the birth of the republic there has been no constant peace period owing to the low-intensity warfare against various Kurdish movements and rebellions in the East and Southeast regions.

Both, material and ideological symptoms are apparent in militarism. Identifying ideological symptoms proves to be rather problematic as they are usually internalized by the society. Ideological characteristic of militarism, which are complex to identify, include military symbols, values, and language. According to Colleen Burke, “ideological manifestation of militarism promote acceptance of hierarchies, nationalism which defines the other as enemy, and violence as a legitimate means of resolving conflicts” (Burke, 2006). On the other hand, material structure of the militarism include, wars and direct military interventions, destabilization of the other countries with proxy armies, foreign sponsored coups, foreign and colonial occupation, military rule and abuse of human rights. Additionally, institutional manifestations of militarism include the overspending on military and devotion to keep military budget high. Militarization is referred to military involvement in civilian transactions; local economy becomes reliant on the military and military contracts to solve its economic problems such as unemployment (Ibid).

Militarist ideology creates an “enemy” out of differences and then uses the existence of this enemy to justify the continuation of militarism. The military system of belief contends that one of the main ways of controlling society and ensuring social stability is through use of organized violence and force. Militarism provides a context for augmentation of violence in society. The militarization of the society cannot proceed without the compliance of the population. However,
the process of militarization can be legitimized and perpetuated through government propaganda, or more subtly, through popular culture and media which glorify military exploits or with curricula which prepare the next generation to participate in the military structure in schools. The degree to which a society has been militarized can be seen by the degree to which military institutions and solutions are considered acceptable and “common sense” by the populace (Ibid).

Retaining that militarism, ideologically, promotes ethno-nationalistic notions, which then creates enemies according to differences, it is important to note that these ideologies have a great degree of correlation. A nationalist effect also blends in as militarism cannot advance without the conformation of the population believing that the “enemy” has to be eliminated or controlled with brute force. The Turkish General Staff has made a public announcement on April 27, 2007 due to the recent developments in Turkey considering the Islamist candidacy to the presidency. In their Press announcement Turkish General Staff declared “anyone who opposes the concept of the founder of our Republic, the Almighty Leader Atatürk, “Happy is he who calls himself a Turk” is the enemy of the Republic of Turkey and will remain as such”. With this recent statement Turkish army considers millions of Kurds and other minorities, who do not consider themselves ethnic Turks, as enemies and demonstrates its devotion to ethno-nationalistic notions and Atatürk’s legacy. An enemy under the military code is a target that must be eliminated by any means.

Reminisce of embedded nationalism in “popular culture” additionally eases legitimation and perpetuation of militarism. Bearing in mind that nationalism increases the power of the state, and the looked upon powerful state becomes integrated with militarism, greater risks of inequalities spark between the Kurds and Turks in modern Turkey

Detrimental nature of militarism, and troubles it provides to the states which adopt it, has been discussed by scholars repeatedly. Scholars such as Steve Chan suggest a negative relationship between militarism and economic growth (Chan, 1985). Chan points out that economic growth became rather difficult to sustain due to an increase in military spending. In long term, “these expenditures are more apt to have a negative than a positive impact on investment, inflation, employment, balance of payments, industrial productivity, and economic growth.” (Chan, 1985).

According to Hakan Yavuz, historically, military as an institution was established as the superior organization to protect “turfism”; after the war of independence with the birth of the Turkish republic “Kemalism set the military above all as the guarantor of the state, regime and ideological correctness” (Yavuz, 2003: 46). Logical assumption would be that with time and relative peace the influence of militarism would fade away as the sovereign nation faces gradually decreasing confrontation from outside. Nevertheless, repeated coups and intimidating power vacuums in the aftermaths accompanied by persistence of social conflict with minorities fuel the fire of militarism. From 1960 onwards Turkey averaged a coup per decade up until 1997, the post-modern coup. These

coupst place the fading importance of the military once again on top of the agenda and reflect military as a vital institution for the prosperity of the nation-state. Constitutions written by the militaristic governments help spread the trend of militarism. Furthermore, overemphasis on military superiority undermines the ability to build regimes of trust and harmony. “Preoccupations with 'balance of power' and military prowess can only continue to produce a world of insecurity and war. Policies based on outmoded notions of realpolitik exacerbate insecurities” (Felice, 2003: 200).

The actual strength and degree of influence the armed forces possess over Turkey’s governing bodies and economy can be explored through various statistical data. The Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri) is composed of three main branches, Land Forces, the Naval Forces and the Air Forces. The Turkish Land Forces are composed of 4 Field Armies, 10 Army Corps, 2 Mech. Inf. Division, 1 Infantry Division, 14 Mechanized Infantry Brigades, 14 Armored Brigades, 12 Infantry/Regional Sec. Brigades, 5 Commando Brigades and 5 Training Brigades. The Naval Forces include, 13 submarines, 20 frigates, 21 fast patrol boats, 21 mine sweepers/hunters and layers, 52 various landing ships/craft, 23 various maritime patrol aircraft/helicopters, and amphibious brigade. Finally, the Turkish Air Forces deploy 19 combat squadrons, 2 reconnaissance squadrons, 5 training squadrons, 6 transportation and 1 tanker squadrons, and 8 surface to air missile squadrons. Of four armies, two are located in Eastern Turkey. The First Army is positioned in Istanbul, headquarters of the Second Army is in Eastern city of Malatya, Eastern city of Erzurum hosts the Third Army, and the Fourth Army is located on the west coast city of Izmir.

Article 72 of the Turkish constitution states that, “national service is the right and duty of every Turk. The manner in which this service shall be performed, or considered as performed, either in the Armed Forces or in the public service shall be regulated by law.” In accordance with Military Law No. 1111, liability for compulsory military service for duration of 15 months begins the year when males turn 20. Nevertheless, legislation also authorizes deployment of 15-to-18-year-olds in civil defense forces during national emergencies. National Defense Service Law 3634 states that, “in case of general or partial mobilization under a state of emergency, children under the age of 15…shall not be held liable.”

According to the Turkish Ministry of National Defense’s financial report, military expenditure as of 2009 was 14.405 billion Turkish Liras (approximately $8.952 billion); however, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), military expenditure of Turkey in 2009 added up to 26.314 billion Turkish Liras and $19.009 billion. The World Bank estimates Turkey’s military expenditure as a percent of GDP in 2009 to be 2.8%. According to 2009 estimates of the NATO Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defense report, the Turkish military, in terms of annual strength, ranks second with 493 thousand after the US with 1.3 million. Turkey employs more soldiers than some of the advanced European nations, France (243 thousand), Italy (192 thousand),

---

31 See, all the statistics are taken from Turkish Armed Forces website. Available at: http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/genel_konular/kuvvetyapisi.htm
32 For a detailed view of the Turkish constitution visit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/DiplomaticArchives/Constitution/
33 See country profile of Turkey. Available at: http://www.child-soldiers.org/document_get.php?id=933
34 See Milli Savunma Bakanlığı 2009 Yılı Kurumsal Mali Durum ve Beklentiler Raporı, July 2009
35 See, http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4
Germany (254 thousand) and UK (197 thousand).\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, recently Turkey’s Minister of National Education, Nimet Cubukcu, stated that “for the first time in the history of the republic expenditure on education surpassed the military expenditure” referring to the AKP era.\textsuperscript{38}

i. Military in Economics:

Unlike any other armed forces in the democratized world, the Turkish military also enjoys a bigger piece of country’s economic pie. More often than not the military assumes the chef role to decide on the ingredients; the armed forces have an overwhelmingly influential place in controlling Turkey’s economy. They do this through the Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK) established on 1 March 1961, which is bound by a special law, Law No. 205. According to the first article of this law, “OYAK is an administratively and financially independent legal entity attached to the Ministry of Defense and subject to special legal provisions. Article 37 states that all assets, revenues, and claims of the organization are eligible for the rights and privileges attached to state property and that violators/offenders are subject to similar charges received by violators of state property” (Akca, 2010:8). Moreover, OYAK “has massive assets which it has used to form a huge conglomerate of firms in Turkey. For instance...The OYAK enjoys a large number of tax benefits. Retired generals are much sought-after as directors or board members of major companies” (UN, 2001: 11).

Membership to OYAK is limited to military personnel including, commissioned officers, contracted officers, sergeants, commissioned sergeants, specialist gendarmes, specialist privates, and to individuals in the Pension Salary System, individuals working in the Ministry of National Defense and in Gendarmerie General Command, and in companies which OYAK owns more than 50%. OYAK has three main sources of income; first, membership fees are collected from permanent members (10% of their monthly salary) and from temporary members (5% of their monthly salary); second, revenues obtained from OYAK owned companies; and donations compose OYAK’s the third source of income. OYAK provides a range of services to its members; these could be summoned up in two main titles. First, Compulsory (Legal) Assistance Payments are paid to permanent members as pension salary and for retirement, death and disability benefits, and to temporary members (reserve officers) for death and disability benefits. Second, Social Services are provided to meet various needs of permanent members.

OYAK has three subsidiaries: Finance Group, Industry Group and Services Group. In their Finance group OYAK Bank has 307 branches throughout the country. Oyak Anker Bank Gmbh has 5 branches in Germany: Koblenz, Bonn, Berlin, Mannheim and Frankfurt. The bank also owns a legal consultancy firm in Germany under the name, \textit{Verrechnungsstelle für gewerbliche Wirtschaft GmbH} (VfG GmbH). \textit{Halk Finansal Kiralama A.S}, a leasing company providing services to national and international, private and public sector companies. Through their investment and securities firm, \textit{OYAK Yatirim ve Menkul Degerler A.S}, the group is active in capital markets with 21 branches (4 in Istanbul, 3 in Mugla, 2 in Izmir,


\textsuperscript{38} See, Republic of Turkey Ministry of National Education website. Available at: http://www.meb.gov.tr/haberler/haberayrinti.asp?ID=7972
Industrial Group of OYAK is composed of different industries including iron and steel, cement and clicker, automotive, energy, agricultural and veterinary medicine and food. ATAER Holding A.S., which is 100% OYAK subsidiary, working in iron and steel industry. ATAER Holding owns 49.29% shares of Eregli Demir ve Celik Fabrikalari T.A.S., Turkey's biggest iron and steel producer. Other large-scale steel and iron production companies of OYAK group are: Iskenderun Demir ve Celik A.S. (Turkey’s largest integrated iron and steel plant); Erdemir Madencilik San. ve Tic.A.S.; and Erdemir Romania SRL, which produces 108 thousand/tons of steel annually in Romania (Ibid).

OYAK Beton A.S. has over 40 ready-mix concrete facilities in Marmara, Aegean, Central-Anatolian and Black-sea regions of Turkey. Production capacity of OYAK Beton reaches 7.5 million cubic-meter of ready-mix concrete annually. OYAK coupled with Adana Cimento Sanayii T.A.S in 1963, which produces an annual 2.3 million tons of clinker and 5.5 million tons of cement for domestic and foreign use. In 1969 OYAK again associated with another cement producer, Bolu Cimento Sanayii A.S., which produces an annual 1.5 million tons of clinker and 4.0 million tons of cement. Other cement subsidiaries of OYAK are Unye Cimento Sanayii ve Tic.A.S. (annual production: 1.5 million tons of clinker and 2.6 million tons of cement); Mardin Cimento Sanayii ve Tic.A.S. (this plant, located in the Southeast, produces 2.0 million tons of clinker and 3.0 million tons of cement annually); Aslan Cimento A.S. (annual production: 1.2 million tons of clinker and 3.4 million tons of cement); and Bircim Cimento ve Madencilik Sanayi ve Tic.A.S. (Ibid).

OYAK also own 81% of the shares in one of the country’s biggest paper sack factories, OYAK Kagit ve Ambalj San. ve Tic.A.S., which annually produces 150 million pouches and 80,000 tons of paper. OYAK has a joint venture with Renault of France through OYAK-Renault Otomobil Fabrikalari A.S. established in 1969. The plant started production in 1971 and now annually produces 360,000 cars and has the largest production capacity besides Renault’s western-Europe plant (Ibid).

Iskenderun Enerji Üretim ve Ticaret A.S. owns Iskenderun Sugözü Power Plant and specializes in electricity production and sales. With an annual average of 9 billion kwh electricity production, which equals to 5% of Turkey’s national electricity production, it is the largest thermal power plant in Turkey. Other energy subsidiaries of OYAK group are: Erdemir Gaz San. ve Tic.A.S., which specializes in natural gas importation; OYAK Elektrik Enerjisi Toptan Satis A.S., specializes in wholesale of electricity energy; and Ayas Enerji Üretim ve Ticaret A.S. (Ibid).

Another subsidiary is Hektas Tic. T.A.S., which produces agricultural and veterinary medication. It products are sold through 7 regional directorates and over 2000 dealers throughout Turkey. Tukas Gida Sanayii ve Tic.A.S. has two factories (in Izmir and Balikesir) and produces more than 250 different items like olives, garniture, honey, sauces, paste, canned vegetables and fruits, ready-to-serve dishes, pickles, fruit preserves, ketchup, mayonnaise, powdered products etc. Tukas makes 25-30% of its total sales income from foreign export, which includes more than 60 countries. OYAK holds 26% of Eti shares, which distributes and markets the biscuits, crackers and cakes produced in the Eti Gida

---

39 All information concerning OYAK is obtained from their website. Available at: www.oyak.com.tr
and Tam Gıda plants through distributors nationwide. Eti has 195,000 retail stores throughout Turkey and export to 65 countries (Ibid).

In their Services Group, OYAK owns Mais Motorlu Araclar İmal ve Satış A.S. Established in 1968, Mais is the general distributor of Oyak Renault Otomobil Fabrikaları A.S. The company sells Renault and Dacia cars, provides after sales services and establishes maintenance and repair stations. Omsan Lojistik A.S., established in 1978, gives integrated logistics services to the firms in Turkey and abroad. Omsan has two local branches in Turkey (Omsan Havacılık A.S. and Omsan Denizcilik A.S.) and Omsan Logistique S.A.R.L in France, Omsan Lojistik EOOR in Bulgaria, Omsan Lojistik OOOR in Russia, Omsan Logistica SRL in Romania, Omfesa Logistica SA in Spain and Omsan Lojistik MMC in Azerbaijan.

Oytas Ic ve Dis Ticaret A.S. handles all kinds of export and import operations for the OYAK Group. Oytas has three subsidiaries: Oycem Hispania S.L. in Spain, Innovation Resources B.V. in Holland and Vize Agrega Asfalt Madencilik Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. in Turkey. Established on 22 November 2000, Oyak Savunma ve Güvenlik Sistemleri A.S. offers security services through armored vehicles and personal to transport valuables such as money, precious documents and valuables. The firm also provides research information and consultancy in armored security. OYAK Teknoloji Bilisim ve Kart Hizmetleri A.S supply computer technology solutions to OYAK Group, and to public and private sectors. Oyak Insaat A.S., established in 1982, undertakes the project, construction and installation works for all kinds of buildings such as housing units, hospitals, industrial plants, tourism facilities and military installations. It is especially active in building housing cooperatives for members. Oyak Konut Insaat A.S. was set up in 2002 by OYAK for developing housing projects for both OYAK members and the public (Ibid).

In year 2009, OYAK Group grossed around 19,093.0 million Turkish Liras (1 USD = 1.5016 TRY in 2009). Exports brought in 4,322.4 million US Dollars in 2009. The OYAK had 250,100 members and 28,506 employees in total. (Ibid)

Map 1: Geographic Distribution of OYAK Group’s Companies and Facilities

The Army is a shielded entity of its own; professional soldiers begin their carriers in military boarding academies and live in exclusive living quarters secured from the outside world. Professional or retired soldiers enjoy a great
variety of benefits in Turkey. They pay exceptionally low rent, shop in discounted supermarkets that exclusively serve the soldiers and their families, and receive medical care free of charge. The presence of OYAK strongly suggests that the military has an active and influential role in Turkey’s economy; OYAK Group and its subsidiaries compose a considerable portion of the country’s economy diversified in various important sectors.

Lack of security, trust and harmony, and an abundance of inequalities created by militaristic and Kemalistic notions laid the groundwork for the incompletion of democratization. Looking from a structuralist point of view, systematic inequalities, especially in terms of human (cultural) rights and socio-economic development, have a negative effect on the process of democratization and contribute to its deficiency and incompleteness. The pattern of incomplete democratization consists of a democratizing facade amid a continuing, if officially denied, authoritarian structure. Furthermore, this pattern is closely merged with the importance of public relations and appearances of governing elites. However, these appearances require approval and recognition from external actors that such practices are a part of an ongoing democratization process. In today’s world human rights surpassed achieving and establishing free and fair elections in the quest for an optimum democracy, which became a cornerstone of international legitimacy.

**ii. Military in Public Eye:**

The majority of the Turkish population has immense respect, fear and approbation for the army and military service. Some families do not permit their daughters to marry someone who has not fulfilled their military service, only then they believe a boy is sculpted into a man. This concept is also valid in the job markets; an individual who has performed his military service is more likely to be employed than an individual who still has to fulfill his obligatory national duty. According to Gareth Jenkins, “the role of the military in Turkey is rooted in Turkish society, history and culture” (Jenkins, 2001: 6). A considerable portion of the Turkish society seems to trust and respect the military establishment, the foundation of this notion is laid in the early schooling years, due to the common belief that the army is the embodiment of anti-corruption and highest virtues of the nation (Ibid).

In a survey in March 2001 in which the population was asked to give marks to various public bodies in Turkey, the army scored 7 while the President scored 7.9 (an office which has risen enormously in the public esteem since Sezer took over) and the government and political parties scored 1.9 and 1.8 respectively (UN, 2001: 12).

In the past an augmented amount of deployment of soldiers of Kurdish background into the Kurdish regions to fight against the PKK has been observed, under the reasoning that these soldiers were eligible for the region in terms of language, culture and local reconnaissance. This practice was most noticeable especially during the 1990s when the war between armed forces and PKK was at its peak. But the fact is that during this war, which has claimed over 30,000 lives, most of the casualties were of Kurdish origin. Furthermore, in 1985 with the intensifying persistence of the armed forces the cabinet has passed the law 9632 which formed local resistance forces against PKK insurgence called “temporary village guards” (*Gecici Köy Korucuları*). Village Guards were almost entirely composed of local Kurds and other than guns and ammunition they did not
receive any payment for the first eight years of their services; the government started paying the Village Guards in 1992. There has been countless reports indicating the abuses committed by the Village Guards on local people, from 1986 to 1996 some 23,222 Village Guards were fired and disarmed due to the crimes they have committed. Today there are over 62 thousand Village Guards and it costs an estimated 227 million Turkish Liras (approx. $160 million) annually to maintain such a force.

This has raised suspicion amongst the Kurds believing that this was an intentional tactic to turn Kurds against each other. According to Kevin McKiernan this was not the only incident where government attempted to turn the Kurds against each other; “Turkish military reportedly was arming the local Hezbollah, in the Southeast, for jihad against the PKK.” (McKiernan, 2006: 103). Ill-treatment of soldiers of Kurdish background has not been uncommon in the Turkish military. In August 1999 Amnesty International stated that there were an increasing number of reports concerning young man who had died in suspicious circumstances during their military service in the Turkish army. In the same document, Amnesty announced that in most of the cases the persons were of Kurdish origin.40

Turkish nationalism has been deeply imbedded with militarism since “the very idea of a Turkish nation had been born out of and sustained by a war of national liberation” (Kamrava, 2005: 53). This would, to certain extend, suggests the international scope of the Kurdish problem. Examining military’s attitude towards internal politics and minorities, especially towards the Kurds, (past coups, state of emergency in Kurdish regions, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force, human rights violations and increasing Military expenditure) would provide a measurement tool. Military has always had its prime position in the Turkish political and social arena. Decisions of political parties often have to go through the military’s filter, and armed forces see no need in camouflaging their notion of governing the country with rigid Kemalism. Therefore, military was seen as the only true, uncorrupted, and loyal protectors of the national values and Kemalistic modernization. Riding with the comfort of Kemalism on their side, military was then able to manipulate and alter the political agenda with self-justifiable measures.

Importance of the military as an institution and perseverance of militaristic ideals are introduced to Turkish children in the early years of schooling. Education is the cornerstone of civilization, and is the strongest advocate of democracy. There is an unwritten law in Turkey, whether private or public, primary or higher education institutions all school must carry a Turkish flag alongside with a stature of Ataturk next to it. Almost all classrooms have a portrait of Ataturk in between the national anthem and Ataturk’s Speech to Turkish Youth. One interesting remark here is that in some of his portraits in Turkish classrooms Ataturk is presented in his military uniform while in the others he is portrayed in a modern tuxedo. This ironically may also portray Turkish politics of today, while in tuxedo giving a modern and elegant impression there is still an army uniform underneath providing orthodox discipline and protection of Turkish values.

One unique class which distinguishes Turkey from most of the European educational systems is a class called “Vatandaslık” (Citizenship). This class is

compulsory for all primary and secondary school students aging between 6 and 15. High school students between ages 15 and 18 must take a class called “Milli Güvenlik” (National Security), usually thought by ex or in duty army officials who would show up to classes in army uniforms and teach about national security and pride, role and function of the military. Nevertheless, there are no classes on human rights, cultural diversity, or gender equality in public or private schooling systems in Turkey.

In a report published on 8 November 2006, the European Commission notes that the Turkish armed forces exercise “significant political influence”, the military has in law “a wide margin of manoeuvre” within “a broad definition of national security”. It concludes that the military should stick to speaking about defense matters and even these statements should only be made under the authority of the government (Mardell, 2006).

Turkish armed forces pose a clear challenge to the authority of the civilian government, even in today’s Turkey. Historically this has been standardized and fostered, not exclusively but primarily, by the four coups. Political theorizing generally views elections as the only acceptable democratic procedure for replacing governments, on the other hand, “coup and bureaucratic appointments, the most important alternative means of empowering governments, denote military rule and authoritarianism” (Myers, 1998). According to Susan Meiselas, all three military interventions, although quite different in character and in motivation, were at least to some extent a response to Kurdish involvement in politics: “the Democratic Party’s use of Kurdish agas and sheikhs as vote-getters in the eastern provinces in the 1950s; the left-wing Worker’s Party of Turkey’s advocacy of Kurdish cultural and economic rights in the late 1960s; and the proliferation of Kurdish nationalist associations and the radicalization of their demands in the late 1970s (Meiselas, 1997: 294). These Kurdish activities were neither the sole nor the primary reasons behind military interventions, but arguably the military repression hurt the Kurds the most, physically and ideologically. Kurds were subjected to horrendous tortures such as the unimaginable events taken place in the Diyarbakir Military Prison, today there is hardly a Kurdish family whose members have not been detained and tortured by the police or the military. Ideologically, as Kurdish reactions to counterpart these unfair treatments following the coups took the form of armed struggle, the movement was conceived as a terrorist one by the international community rather than a people’s struggle for freedom and justice. Hence, the Kurds lost a considerable amount of international legitimacy. The PKK’s presence and unconventional tactics were then used as a scapegoat and enabled the Turkish military to continue its dominance not only in the so-called “terror regions” but also within the body of politics, shaping domestic and to a certain extent foreign policies. In the light of these assumptions I will briefly discuss four coups (1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997).
iii. Military as a System Changing Force:

Armed forces have overthrown democratically elected governments on four occasions; the reasoning and conviction of these coups were that the leading governments posed a threat to national security and stability. The Turkish General Staff, in a way, took upon themselves to play the gatekeeper and protector role for the democratic, secular and Kemalistic nation state they envisioned for Turkey. As is oblivious in the following chapter, the armed forces acted upon their role and overthrew and changed the governments they perceived as unfitting or hazardous for Turkish nation. For that reason, an ideal Turkey for the military was one where the government and the nation unconditionally trusted the military establishment above all and carried militaristic, laicistic and Kemalistic notions at heart. Thus, the military was not shy to exert its power and influence to establish the ideal nation state they envisioned. As Ganser attests, “the Special Warfare Department ranged itself amongst the largest threats to the Turkish democracy as behind its secretive walls the Turkish military has repeatedly conspired against the elected governments” (Ganser, 2005: 227).

a) Coup d'état 1960

On 27 May 1960, General Cemal Gürsel led a coup that removed President Celal Bayar and Premier Adnan Menderes. Cemal Gürsel fought in WW I and was taken prisoner by the British in Palestine. After his release in 1919 he returned to Istanbul and joined the nationalist movement. He became a general in 1946 and commander of the army in 1958. Retired by the Democratic Party government for writing a critical memorandum on 3 May 1960, Gürsel was brought in by the conspirators to head the coup. After the coup he presided over the National Unity Committee. He was elected fourth president of the republic on 26 October 1961, and died in office in 1966 (Zürcher, 2005).

The Military coup of 1960 had its special character that has separated it from the similar developments in the Middle East during the era. It was special in the sense that the army retreated and returned the power to civilians in October 1961. Nevertheless, some officers refused to loose their newly concurred positions; among them was Alparslan Turkes who later became the leader of the ultra-nationalist Republican Peasants’ Nationalist Party. Many members of the former government have been arrested and put on trials. As a result 15 members of the parliament were given death sentences. Democratically elected Premier Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatih Rustu Zorlu and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were hanged in 1961. What has led to this coup and what did Menderes do to deserve death? These were some of the troubling questions citizens have been clandestinely asking.

The official reasoning behind this coup was “to prevent fratricide” and to “extricate the parties from irreconcilable situation into which they had fallen.”41

The military officials claimed that the coup had no partisan character and intentions. However, Altunisik and Kavli claim that the 1960 coup demonstrated “the quest of the military-bureaucratic elite to return to the center, to revive their diminishing role in the country’s politics” (Altunisik and Tür, 2005: 33). Furthermore, it is contested that even though the coup was welcomed with public

joy in the urban cities, where the students and the intelligentsia formed the opposition, rest of Anatolia, composing mostly of countryside, did not share this enthusiasm and remained silent. Eric Zürcher states that, “the upheavals...had been almost completely limited to Ankara and Istanbul and there is no evidence of any sharp drop in Menderes’ popularity elsewhere” (Zürcher, 2005: 241), signifying a visible demographic division amongst the population and disparities left over by the modernization process throughout the country, which is evident in the disposition of this coup, an elite/intelligentsia led upheaval in the west and a silent/excluded countryside in the east.

Menderes built on the liberalization measures that followed Atatürk’s death in 1938, including a relaxation of laws that restricted the role of minorities and Islam (Lombardi, 1997). It seems unreasonable and illogical that an organization such as the Turkish military, which claims to be the guardian of Kemalism, has overthrown and executed a democratically elected prime minister due to his political incompetence; Menderes wanted to modernize Turkey, by loosening the ties on minorities and Islam. The real intentions of the armed forces seem to be unclear but are hinting on an approach, which aimed to intensify the role of the military and dependency on it. Even though the post 1960 coup constitution may seem rather liberal and mild on civil liberties, the military carved itself a special place within the politics of the county via the establishment of a National Security Council (MYK), whose constitutional duty was to advise the government on different policy issues although it often overstepped its limitations. The MYK became more influential in time, exerting its influence on government’s domestic and/or foreign policies. According to Altunisik and Tür, the main idea behind formulating the new constitution in such a way “was to prevent elected governments from abusing the national will by instituting an authoritarian rule” (Altunisik and Tür, 2005: 33).

b) Coup d'état 1971

On 12 March 1971, democratically elected Suleyman Demirel was forced to resign; Military leaders “demanding a new government...asserted the urgent need for a ‘strong and capable government’ that could address the ‘anarchical situation’ in the country” (Lombardi, 1997: 205). Turkish politics were not immune to the marks left by the realm of the Cold War. It is believed that demonstrations between left and right-wing groups, which turned violent during the late 1960s, had significantly contributed to the advancement of the coup. Leftists opposed America and capitalist interests because they represented Turkish subservience to global capitalism and militarism in Turkey. On the other hand, right-wing groups targeted left-wing groups and outspoken secularists. Student protesters accused Demirel and Justice Party of being “American stooges”; overwhelmed by the pressures to make an executive decision, Demirel announced an all out crackdown on the “communists.”

The decade following the coup was marked by extreme violent conflicts in which the Counter-Guerrilla, the Grey Wolves and the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) backed by the military and the right-wing groups fought the political left as the country sank into a situation resembling outright civil war. In the name of bringing democracy and equality upon the nation, the military for the second time overthrew a democratically elected government. Therefore, it is accurate to say that military in Turkey could intervene anytime and with any type
of government if they see any challenges or attacks to Kemalistic ideologies, the Turkishness, and to the ultimate indivisibility of the nation. The decision by the military to impose its will on the government followed three years of political violence. Turkey was left under the leadership of a supraparty Cabinet until the elections took place in 1973. Bülent Ecevit became Prime Minister in 1973. Ecevit was succeeded by the president of the conservative Justice Party, Süleyman Demirel. Alongside with the ultra-nationalist MHP of Alparslan Türkes and Necmettin Erbakan of the fundamentalist MSP, Demirel formed a coalition of the Nationalist Front. Securing a place in the ruling coalition, MHP was able to penetrate state security and push harshly towards the left-wing opposition, aggravating the situation.

Consequently, engaged by the ultra-nationalist Counter-Guerrilla endorsed by MHP and their extremist Grey Wolves section, domestic terrorism persisted. Throughout the troubling, violent years of 1970s the major trade unions had organized a protest rally against these devastating developments. The protest took place on the traditional Labor Day in Istanbul’s famous Taksim Square. In 1976 the number of demonstrators summoned up to 100,000 in a peaceful demonstration. The following year, in 1977, this number augmented to more than 500,000 people. The May Day massacre took place in the very same day. Snipers on the surrounding buildings started firing at the speaker’s platform killing thirty-eight and injuring hundreds of peoples. The shooting lasted for 20 minutes, yet thousands of police in attendance did not intervene. Deputy State Attorney Dogan Oz, upon the investigation, found that “military and civilian security services were behind all this work”. The Contra-Guerrilla are subordinate to the (CIA-funded) Special Warfare Department whose task was, “in the case of a communist occupation or of a rebellion, to use guerrilla methods and all possible underground activities to bring an end to the occupation” (Cumhuriyet, 17 November 1990). In addition, according to Daniele Ganser, “MIT was directly involved in the massacres while all these activities are guided by the MHP [ultra-nationalist party formerly known as Republican Peasants’ Nationalist Party] members and cadres” (Ganser, 2005: 237)

An additional massacre took place in 1978, in the city of Kahramanmaraş. The violence, which left over 100 dead, was incited by the ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves who mainly targeted Alevis (a religious minority group) and left-wing groups. The Kahramanmaraş massacre was an essential factor leading the Turkish government to declare martial law, and eventually to the 1980 military coup. These developments leading to the coups resurfaced various underlying demographical problems in Turkey such as the disintegration between the Kurds and Turks, Alevis and Sunnis, city and countryside, developed and underdeveloped, which were disregarded by state elite who embarked on imposed, authoritarian practices to ameliorate these “defects” when establishing the new republic. In addition, these developments also revealed the long known secret of the special bond between the military, contra-guerrilla (Grey Wolves), and Turkish ultra-nationalists who have been occupying seats in the parliament. This intense unrest alongside with few other developments led to a further coup in 1980.
c) Coup d'état 1980

The military intervened for the third time in Republic’s 67 years of existence on September 12, 1980. Basic justifications given for this coup were: to end the social conflicts of 1970s, to replace the unstable parliament, and to ensure the perseverance of Kemalist tradition in Turkey. All parties and political activity were banned. On 7 November 1982 the new constitution was accepted and General Kenan Evren was appointed President for the next seven years. Kenan Evren’s government followed Atatürk’s ideals in many ways but foremost in terms of unifying and “Turkifying” the masses at all cost for the greater benefit of the nation state. Coup General’s believed that the social unrest swept over Turkey during the 70s was caused, primarily, by a range of societal disparities and by a lack of national unity amongst the population. According to the perspective of the generals, conflict could be conquered by unifying the society. Plurality of viewpoints could scarcely be tolerated, because plurality usually leads to variance and conflict. As Kaya attests, “the 1980 military coup…was a totalizing attempt to reconstruct Turkish society.” (Kaya, 2004: 101)

Nonetheless, little did the generals know that instead of resolving conflicts this imposed totalizing endeavor under the supra-identity of Turkism opened the door to other major conflicts in the short- medium- and long-runs, especially between the Turks and the Kurds. Rights and freedoms, which have been introduced in the 1961 constitution, were tightly restricted in the 1982 constitution, and Kurds suffered from this the most. The 1982 constitution contained important references concerning the future of the Kurdish issue. The military regime tried to repress all “divisive and destructive forces”, especially if left-wing and Kurdish. Article 5 of the constitution noted the fundamental task of the Turkish state as the “safeguarding of the independence and integrity of the Turkish nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic”, making it “illegal to express any idea that could be interpreted by the authorities as amounting to a recognition of a separate, Kurdish, ethnic identity” (Kurban, 2003: 194). The constitution also stated in the Article 26 that, “no language prohibited by the State shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought…in October 1983 Law 2932 was accepted, banning the use of the Kurdish language for the dissemination of information” (Altunisik and Tür, 2005: 44). According to Amnesty International over a quarter of a million people were arrested in Turkey after the coup and that almost all of them were tortured (Amnesty International, 1988: 1).

The 1980 coup seemed to widen the gap between the Kurds and Turks even further, and created a legitimate basis for “otherization”, alienation and exclusion. As a result Kurdish nationalism was observed to be sparked during the harsh years following the coup. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) adopted armed struggle in 1984 and grew in numbers after the coup. The coup was speculated to be US-assisted, which was later acknowledged by the CIA. The US monetary and military assistance was not a secret during this era; however, backing a national coup was rather a controversial undertaking. At this point it is important to understand the international developments during this era; the US due to the tense environment of the Cold War adopted militarism with an intense arms race, indoctrinating militaristic values within the society and its sphere of influence. Evidently, the US was more keen and supportive of a military government that shared the same anti-Soviet and anti-communistic notions as they did. In sum, the 1980 coup left a deep scar in the mind and heart of Turkish democracy, which will take a long time to heal.
d) Coup d'état (post-modern coup) 1997

Finally, the post-modern military coup on 28 February 1997 is a prime example to assess military’s influence on, and self-assumed patrolling duty over, the Turkish politics. This coup was mainly intended to stop the threat of a fundamentalist takeover; nevertheless, it still symbolized removal of a democratically elected government from power in an indirect way. Leader of the Islamist Welfare Party, and Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was harshly and publicly warned by the military officials. After a military muscle flexing, by rolling the tanks in the streets of Ankara, Erbakan was prompted to step down. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court banned the Welfare Party (RP) for anti-secular activities.

This coup may have taken an unconventional facade than the previous ones with no actual and active use of force; hence, it was characterized as a post-modern coup. The psychological war imposed on the people to create an environment suitable for the coup made life extremely difficult, full of fear and paranoia. In addition, the civil organizations and the media did not act their parts; they were more like civil servants waiting for orders from the military. Some generals even dictated newspaper headlines. High court officials were summoned to the General Staff and briefed. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, currently the Prime Minister of Turkey, was imprisoned for reciting an old poem that was actually included in school books.

The first elections after the February 28 coup brought Erdogan and his party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power with 36 percent of the vote (Dumanli, 2007). On a similar note, it can be said that coups in Turkey tend to produce the reverse outcome than initially intended. The frequency of the coups posed a real challenge to the establishment and prosperity of a real democracy. The military made it a habit to overthrow democratically elected governments through coups in order to reestablish its dominant position when felt threatened by the governments and their policies. Today, Turkey is still governed under the 1982 constitution written by generals of 1980-1983 military junta. The constitution is also criticized for giving the military too much power in political affairs vis-à-vis the National Security Council.42

An additional fact in terms of the relation between militarism and Turkish nationalism is the nature of the police forces in Turkey. The role of police forces cannot be ignored when discussing Turkish militarism. Militaristic values become easier to adopt, and passed on effortlessly when there is a presence of willing-to-adopt police force that comes in contact with the civilian population at a daily basis. On this matter Van Bruinessen states that, “the police, which after 1980 had been purged of left-wing elements, was in many places dominated by conservative Sunnis or right-wing nationalists” (Van Bruinessen, 1996).

Reactions from the Kurds, to some extent, seemed to follow a parallel path with the military coups. For example, Kurds have formed the first cultural organization, Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (DDKO), after the 1961 coup in 1969. The DDKO was the first legal Kurdish organization and had left-

---

wing orientation in opposition to the right-wing oriented military coup. As most of the emerging Kurdish political organizations, Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK) and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) were established after the military coup of 1971 in 1974 and 1978 respectively. However, the armed sections of the PKK were not created until after 1981 coup in mid 1980s, and they began armed struggle in 1984. Both the PSK and the PKK are left-wing opposition parties. Political activity was strongly restricted and censored following the few years after the coups; the period was marked as the “cooling down” stage.

Pathology followed by all these coups indicates a major element evident in Turkish politics and society today, the immense power the Turkish Armed Forces possesses over the government and the society. Military sees itself as the only and genuine protector of the foundation of Kemalism upon which the republic stands. According to this view if the military trembles, Kemalism would loose its holding ground and the republic would crumble. As demonstrated before, the military would spare no cost to maintain this status-quo. Facing such a fierce resentment individuals having opposing views find it extremely difficult to voice out their genuine opinions and beliefs. In some cases these views are even marked as terroristic or separatist to generate fear amongst the population. Backed up by the media the indivisibility issue and military’s important role are circulated to the masses and become a harsh reality. In order to maintain the course of their political struggle some leaders, and also electorates, conceal their true inspirations and agendas, and choose to communicate those that are at least to some extent in accordance with the ones who monopolize the power. Concealed authoritarianism breeds hidden agendas and opinions, which creates a mock democracy. Country’s real issues and problems merely see the daylight as it becomes easier for institutions and individuals harboring this concealed authoritarianism to distract masses from the issues that may potentially challenge their positions, which after all seems to be the major problem for Turkey to tackle. Again this serves as a huge obstacle for democratic voices and values to be heard and for the democratization process to fully get underway. Moreover, there is an understanding, well cloaked, amongst the military commanders and various sections of the ruling elite, who see themselves as the catalysts of Kemalism, that fear and intimidation are legitimate and effective ways of governing the population.

On the other hand, a state system where the military holds most of the legitimacy calls international and domestic concern due to its instable and unpredictable nature, which translates into an obligation and responsibility to democratize in order to obtain economic and social harmony, and perhaps more importantly the international legitimacy. Internally, the oppressed voices grow restless and impatient to have a say in the way they are governed, as observed in the 1970s and 80s Turkey, to some extend still ongoing, which may end in social or economic crisis if not defused. At an external level, this is clearly exemplified in Turkey’s bid to join the EU and EU’s requisites on Turkey to correct various institutional and social flaws such as inequality, economic stagnation, human rights and transparency issues; not only the EU but also other NGOs increase public awareness and report on these deficiencies of the Turkish system. Collective security and dependency becomes gradually more critical, especially with the rise of global terrorism. One school of thought, namely democratic peace theory, suggests that democracies do not wage war against one and other 43, hence

---

indicate that achieving democratic standards are becoming an obligation for
peace, security, stability and economic growth on a global scale. The internal
consent and external conditionality, which may take the form of “carrot” or
“stick” approach, encourages and pushes countries to democratize. Accordingly,
an increasing number of countries are set on a quest to democratize their
institutional and societal systems and provide better living conditions for their
citizens based on the principles of equality, inclusion and non-discrimination,
which again illustrates a less threatening and more welcoming manifestation to
the outside world.
I. DEMOCRATIZATION QUEST

Democratization is understood as a process, which increases and promotes popular participation in public affairs by establishing an enhanced form of democratic governance. “Democratization may be desirable for its own sake, or because it furthers other objectives such as political stability and economic growth” (Schmitz 2004: 404). As the process of democratization is foremost funneled through the legislative channels of the government to achieve a certain degree of legitimacy likelihood of the political elite to exert misleading targets, which may have concealed and/or self-serving orientations, becomes equally probable. The elite might set forth democratizing incentives for the purpose of simple vote accumulation and/or compliance with the conditionality of an influential external actor, which would in return guarantee the maintenance of the occupied power. On the contrary, the electorate may have genuine political legitimacy and economic development in mind or they may be allured by promises for votes. Consequently, misleading conceptions, erroneous policy adaptations and conceptualizations may take place during the process of democratization. And, in the end the process may lack to produce any tangible results.

On the subject of masses participation and recognition Robert Dahl, thus, argues that democracy and democratic principles would always surpass those provided by other alternatives. Hence, democratization incentives are more likely to be welcomed by the public even though the political elite, who seem to be sovereign over the process, may have ambiguous intentions in the agenda. Dahl states that, democracy provides ten fundamental benefits, attracting masses, that the other systems and forms of governances do not:

1) Democracy helps to prevent government by cruel and vicious autocrats,
2) Democracy guarantees its citizens a number of fundamental rights that nondemocratic systems do not, and cannot, grant,
3) Democracy insures its citizens a broader range of personal freedom than any feasible alternative to it,
4) Democracy helps people to protect their own fundamental interests,
5) Only a democratic government can provide a maximum opportunity for persons to exercise the freedom of self-determination—that is, so live under laws of their own choosing,
6) Only a democratic government can provide a maximum opportunity for exercising moral responsibility,
7) Democracy fosters human development more fully than any feasible alternative,
8) Only a democratic government can foster a relatively high degree of political equality,
9) Modern representative democracies do not fight wars with one another,
10) Countries with democratic governments tend to be more prosperous than countries with nondemocratic governments.

(Dahl, 2000: 60-61)
Turkey’s quest for democratization has various underlying reasons that have domestic, regional and global inspiration. The true underlying principle of democratization is seldom accredited by the Turkish political leadership; they are rather deduced from circumstances. Hence, internal and external developments converge to determine the path of democratization. One of the most important motivations behind Turkey’s democratization process, especially in the third wave of democratization, is the pursuit of economic and political legitimacy. Furthermore, Turkey’s third wave of democratization is directly related to and is characterized by the realization of the Copenhagen Criteria required for EU membership, and the EU is the most influential external actor for Turkish transition. By complying with the EU conditionality Turkey would prove to the international community its economic and political legitimacy. According to Richard Falk, “Turkish government seeks to enhance its international reputation, first of all, to gain admission to the European Community, which in many policy and business circles is regarded as essential for Turkish success in the world economy; and, secondly, as a respected participant in wider diplomatic relationships in the Middle East and beyond” (Falk, 1993: 20)

Implementation of the EU conditionality, outlined by the Copenhagen Criteria, would indicate Turkey’s willingness and ability to deepen its democratic experience in a series of essential reforms. Constitutional reforms, for example, are considered a high priority task, particularly considering the EU membership. Attempts to limit the power of military to stop interfering with the civilian rule and to establish respect for electoral outcomes and party competition have progressively increased since the last decade. However, the sincerity of compliance of the various governing bodies is still under suspicion as there seems to be a continuous insubordination and disarray between the legislative, executive and judiciary. For example, recently legislative and executive strived to pass a law, in accordance with the EU membership criteria, that would allow military personnel, accused of crimes against the constitution and national security to be prosecuted by civilian courts. However, Turkish Constitutional Court, the judiciary is the core secularist establishment next to the military, overturned this law indicating that the legislative and executive braches are dominated by the AKP supporters who supposedly aim to establish Islamic law by targeting the core secularist establishments such as the military.

Moreover, the referendum that took place on 12 September 2010, to change the 1982 constitution written by the 1980 coup generals, has gathered positive international feedback. With more than 77.37% participation rate, 58% of citizens voted in favor while 42% voted against to change 26 amendments of the constitution. With this new constitution, the power of parliament, in accordance with that of military, will be strengthened, private information of the citizens will be better protected, and the principal of equality will be enhanced so that state assistance for underprivileged segment of the population will be feasible. The US President Barack Obama “acknowledged the vibrancy of Turkey’s democracy as reflected in the turnout for the referendum that took place across Turkey”.44 Guido Westerwelle, German Foreign Minister, stated expressively that the results indicate a serious potentiality for the EU membership, “This discussion in society, also about the concrete form of the balance of power in the state, is very much to be welcomed”.45 The EU Commission has also welcomed the results. Stefan

---

44 See, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11279881
Fuele, Enlargement Commissioner, said that “As we consistently said in the past months, these reforms are a step in the right direction as they address a number of long-standing priorities in Turkey's efforts towards fully complying with the accession criteria.”46

Another, perhaps the most important, aspect challenging Turkey in its democratization path is the degree of progress made in human rights. The debate on the importance of human rights, and whether democratization and countries in transition really grant better protection for human rights is ever more present.47 Precisely, Turkey’s human rights issues are directly related to and are characterized by the abiding the Kurdish problem. As the comprehension of the EU conditionality determines Turkey’s legitimacy and democratization ambitions, complying with EU conditionality to solve human rights issues and provide grounds to minorities to fully express themselves become an indivisible part of the process of democratization itself, at times even surpassing other factors. Therefore, the EU is the most important and influential external actor in Turkey’s democratization process, and resolving the Kurdish problem is the essential element required to fulfill conditionality; hence, a possible membership to the EU would be critically jeopardized if the Kurdish problem was left unattended (Laciner 2005; Salih 2006; Arikan 2006).

II. OBSTACLES ON THE DEMOCRATIZATION PATH

Apart from the obvious obstacles such as the concealed authoritarianism, the constituting elements of militarism and Kemalism that are embedded in the state structure, inequalities, especially in terms of socio-economics and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds are undoubtedly one of the most important obstacles on Turkey’s democratization quest.

1. Lack of Democratic Political Culture

Democracy is not simply the result of clever elite bargaining and constitutional engineering. It depends on deep-rooted orientations among the people themselves. These orientations motivate them to demand freedom and responsive government –and to act to ensure that the governing elites remain responsive to them.

(Ingelhart and Welzel, 2005: 2)

The relation between democracy’s institutional arrays and supportive cultural developments has been an intangible yet a central debate in the field of social and political sciences. Many scholars have agreed upon the importance of public opinion concerning political, social or economic decisions that affect the way the state is governed, which initially reflects upon the quality of life of common citizens. As David Zaret puts it, “at the core of democracy’s formal philosophies

---

and institutional arrangements lies the elusive idea of public opinion” (Zaret, 2000: 8). Especially, with rising globalization there has been an increasing interest among scholars to explore cultural reactions in the rise of “value generalization,” “civic culture,” and “psychological modernity” (Parsons, 1977; Almond and Verba, 1989; Lerner, 1964). Furthermore, as Whitehead illustrates, “it is one thing to design good democratic institutions, quite another to educate or persuade citizens to live by democratic precepts” indicating the importance of public opinion and consensus (Whitehead, 2002b: 89).

At a more basic level, democracy is not just a matter of establishing democratic institutions and composing new constitutions but also a matter of the existence of a recipient appropriate democratic political culture within the society. Almond defines political culture as the “particular patter of orientations to political action” (Almond, 1956: 396). Hence, if certain values, regarding political ideals and governance, are embedded within the culture it is extremely difficult to hope for a bottom-up change that will transform the cultural perceptions towards a more democratic orientation. Human Development Report 2002 depicts, in relation to the difficulties facing young democracies to break free from authoritarian political culture and to suddenly curb the power of military, as “old habits die hard” (HDR, 2002: 88). At this stage the report gives the example of Turkey, “the military has a constitutional and traditional role as the ultimate guardian of the constitution, and especially of the state’s secular character. The 1982 constitution established a high-level National Security Council, with half its members drawn from the armed forces. The council’s influence on national policy has grown in response to regional security concerns” (Ibid). Furthermore, the keenness of the Turkish political culture in utilizing the military in social, economic and political grounds could be observed in a survey conducted in 2001 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees where the population was asked to give marks to various public bodies in Turkey, “the army scored 7…and the government and political parties scored 1.9 and 1.8 respectively.”

Therefore, it is not totally inaccurate to suggest that residual authoritarian legacy, both within the state structure and societal culture, presents a major obstacle on Turkey’s democratization path. It seems that the main concern in Turkey’s agenda is to democratize intuitions foremost, and little or no attention has been paid to educate the population and change misleading, authoritarian perceptions of military reliance to resolve political, social or economic problems, which is actually as well the duty of citizenry to alert their electives on concerns towards a democratic solution. At a societal level, citizens seem to be less enthusiastic to extend civil rights to the supporters of unpopular and taboo causes indicating a lack of genuine democratic culture; in Turkey proponents of unpopular causes generally advocate issues such as the Kurdish problem and the Armenian genocide.

Even though, it has been argued that once the elections are done the power of influence shifts from the public into the hands of elected officials and, therefore, the government; public opinion, in fact, has extensive weight on the regime type of a given country, “cultural patterns once established, posses considerable autonomy and can influence subsequent political and economic events” (Inglehart, 1990: 25). In Turkey for example, reform package of the AKP government referred as the “Kurdish expansion” (Kürt acilimi) had to be renamed

---

as “Democratic expansion” due to the increasing public criticism. This might have seem as a minor change, merely a rephrasing of the words but in reality this has altered the course and purpose of the process, as it planted the seeds into the minds of the people that if the problem could not be named then it was not necessary or noteworthy to put forth a solution. As the minds bewildered the reform process, once on top of the agenda, has been dropped down to the bottom of the list.

Nevertheless, one should not forget that it is rather problematic to expect qualities observed in a given democratic culture to generate similar results in another one; this again brings the question of universal definition of democracy. For example, what seems to be democratic and optimal choice amongst the public in a given country may be regarded, collectively, as undemocratic and culturally unacceptable in another nation. As in today’s world western style liberal democracy is considered to be the ideal form, countries in transition may experience social and/or cultural adoption problems with various “imported” aspects. It is, however, without a doubt that there has to be a welcoming ground, a public consent for arrays of democracy that are not necessarily on an institutional level but on a cultural one as well. Furthermore, masses tend to favor democracy due to unfavorable nature of the other alternative systems (Dahl, 2000).

2. Fear of change

The debate about the deficiency of democratic political culture leads us to observe the reasoning behind this deficiency. It is important to figure out the general perceptions of the citizenry to correct or to adjust political decisions in order for democracy to be welcomed and appreciated. Recently, there has been a heated debate in Turkey about the effects of various internal and external developments upon the public. Most intellectuals called out that Turkey has become a republic of fear. Consequently, in a state where majority of the population is in constant fear genuine opinions and demands are hardly voiced out, and where genuine opinions are concealed democracy only stays as a facade; hence, the public opinion tends to lean towards staying as is rather than changing for unknown.

It can be said that there are two main dimensions causing fear amongst the population, if the power of military, police forces and government officials were an internal fear factor, supposed direct or indirect interference of major external actors with Turkey’s internal affairs with intentions to weaken or divide and concur Turkey are the external fear generators. This externally fostered fear rooted in the events leading to the war of independence that carved fear and paranoia amongst the population. When the Central Powers lost the WWI, treaty of Sevres forced the Ottomans to surrender the control of the majority of their land to the Allied Powers, leaving Ottomans with very little room to move. This harsh situation mobilized and rejuvenated the Turkish nationalist movement. To this day there is a general consensus in Turkey, especially amongst the nationalist and republican fronts, that various issues, such as the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish problem, are merely a byproduct of foreign provocation. In a land once divided amongst the Greeks, Armenians, British and French, adopting such fearful notions became rather facile.

On the domestic level, long lasting rivalry between the Kemalist secularists and Islamist conservatives have created an environment constantly controlled and
driven by fear. Fearing what opposition may convey upon succeeding to power. Secularists blame conservatives of seeking to govern Turkey by the Islamic law, and attempting to make Turkey another Iran; while on the other hand, conservatives complain about keenness of secularists to keep the power in the hands of the military, and warn about the possibility of another coup. This cat and mouse game between the two opposing sides have kept the general public on their toes and seriously dented the possibilities of a mellow environment for the progression of genuine democracy and ability to spread the seeds of democratic culture. In order for democracy and democratic values to overcome such fears, an intense awareness and educative reforms have to be implemented. There has to be classes in the educative system about the various governing systems and advantages and disadvantages of such systems should be clearly communicated for the wider population to be able to understand and decide upon themselves which system they would like to be governed under.

Nevertheless, Turkey has a rather puzzling system; change does not necessarily translate into transformation and real outcomes in power politics and representative democracy but rather is limited to changing the occupants of governmental seats form one party to another. This creates a suspicion that there are concealed power players and dynamics at play. The Kurdish problem and tension over Cyprus are unanimously at the top of Turkey’s crisis list; nevertheless, up until the recent AKP government no ruling party or coalition has attempted to resolve the Kurdish problem or open a discussion ground to discuss and voice out the existing issues.

The current government’s intentions to solve the Kurdish problem generated fierce opposition and criticism. AKP government called their reform package “Kurdish expansion” (Kürt Acilimi) and was immediately condemned for supposedly opening a gap for the Kurdish separatists and enabling them to further their cause to divide Turkey and create and independent Kurdistan in the East and Southeast regions. As a result they had to rename their reform package to “Democratic Expansion” (Demokratik Acilim). This indicates that the society, due to the confusion inscribed by the state through systematic denial policies of the Kurds, and the state apparatus as a whole are not ready and able to make appease with the Kurdish issue by themselves in the domestic setting therefore, signifying the necessity of an external referee. Furthermore, existence of the steady fear of potential divisibility of Turkey, mainly amongst the Kemalist gatekeepers, if the Kurds are given more autonomy creates a vicious cycle of insolubility and, hence, makes democratization incomplete. The root cause of this fear might be the unequal and harsh treatment of the so-called “others” throughout the history of the Republic.

3. Economic and Social Inequalities

According to William Hurrell Mallock, “perfection of the society involves social equality” (Mallock, 2006: 27). Mallock points out that in this definition equality does not correspond to perfection, but rather relates to malevolent and imperfect nature of inequality. He, then, states that “the chief evil of life is the unequal distribution of rights and material luxuries” (Ibid, 28) such as access to health care, education, and other social securities, voting rights, property rights, and freedom of speech and assembly. Bearing in mind the above definition, social
inequality would be restrictions of these rights and services. According to Michael Kearl,

The ways in which inequality is institutionalized, in other words, the ways by which socially-defined categories of persons (ignoring differences in individuals' talents and abilities) are unevenly rewarded for their social contributions. These are the criteria by which the social worthiness of individuals are judged and discriminations made, such as the classifications of gender, ethnicity, race, religion, age and generation. These vary, in part, on the basis of a society's stratification order (i.e., caste, class, or mixed) and its cultural history (i.e., the legacy of slavery on race relations in the United States). And the "rewards" come in a number of forms: power, wealth, social power, prestige in the eyes of others, self-esteem and sense of personal efficacy, the number and welfare of one's progeny, and one's satisfaction and happiness with life.

(Kearl, 1996)

In this section I will look at economic and social inequalities, parenthetically discrimination based on ethnicity, in accordance with human rights issues funneling to the Kurdish problem. As Richard Falk suggests, "Turkey…experiences this pressure to democratize mainly in relation to human rights and, to some extent, with respect to the assurance of civilian rule. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the pressure is related to economic policy; specifically, whether Turkey will gain admission to the European Community, and thereby improve its prospects for growth and capital expansion. That is, the political content of legitimacy is greater in Turkey's case because of its economic motivations within the special context of Europe" (Richard Falk, 1993: 18).

Arguing or deciding on which social inequality has more impairment on the quality of life and on the harmonious togetherness of a society is very problematic. The malevolent nature of social inequality is absolute thus, some seem to have more immediate short term affects as access to clean water, food and health care while the others such as fair education has long term affects, most likely to show affects in future generations.

As is known, democracy and democratic principles promote and defend political and civil liberties with the root principle of “one person, one vote”. These principles are an indivisible part of political and social equality and evidently, of the effective functioning of democracy. Nevertheless, equal participation in the decision making process by no means are guaranteed under such a system. Therefore, it is important to go beyond institutional and political boundaries of democracy and go on the ground to observe social affects. According to Séverine Deneulin, “the idea of political equality lies at the core of democratic decision-making…political equality is not only determined by political conditions, but also economic and social ones. Economic, social and political inequality tend to reinforce one another” (Deneulin, 2009). Moreover, according to Dreze and Sen unequal distribution of power in a country obstruct democratic ideals to flourish (Dreze and Sen, 2002: 347).

Educational levels, for example, are a major factor for durability and efficiency of a democratic system, and for facilitating the formation of the democratic political culture. When people lack a certain educational level to follow and understand the programmes of different political parties, their votes may not reveal their ambitions and best interests. Their votes might be casted due
to social pressures, from tribal ties, neighborhood or family tradition, out of fear of sanctions from opposition, bribery or because they felt that the representatives of a political party were simply “nice” to them. Thus, the votes casted under such circumstances do not represent the genuine demands and ideas of voters, and create a mock democracy where democratization attempts become virtually unachievable or merely a replica. It is for that reason that such gaps and inequalities have to be corrected for a better functioning democracy and society. And catalysts behind such attempts of correction are important to find out when researching the weigh of external over internal factors in the process of democratization. Social and economic inequalities will be greatly dealt with in the next section of this research, comparing before and after to draw the entire picture.

On the other hand, economic inequalities do not only project malfunction in terms of equal access to education, employment, food and clean water, health care, transportation and housing but they also reflect uneven access to and exercise of power. Those with greater access to monetary funds tend to have easier access to power in all levels of the government and society than those who are less fortunate. Political campaigns, for example, are financed with money; interest groups who do posses more money have a large capacity to finance political campaigns that will be most beneficial to their own cause. Owing to their financial situation, they also have better access to quality education and therefore, better understanding of political issues; accordingly, they will also be more successful in influencing policies according to their own interests. Séverine Deneulin describes this as reaching “a perverse situation: political equality is undermined by social and economic inequality, resulting in political decisions favoring those already enjoying an economically- and socially-privileged position, thereby deepening social and economic inequality, and ultimately political inequality itself” (Deneulin, 2009: 196).

So, what can be done to overcome such inequalities to further the cause of democracy and democratization? The two main solution mechanisms involve “overcoming this association between social privilege and political power” (Dreze and Sen, 2002: 10) and “enhancing the political power of the underprivileged” (Ibid: 29). Another solution mechanism is to create an environment of understanding and solidarity. Elites rather than just defending their own rights make it a habit of considering the rights of underprivileged as their own and defending it accordingly.

We have seen the transformation of Turkey throughout the history with the framework of Kemalism and militarism, and the affiliation of these two factors creating social inequalities, especially, for the Kurdish population. Kemalism was deeply embedded with militarism; the very idea of a Turkish nation had been born out of and sustained by a war of national liberation. As nationalism emphasizes on security issues of a nation, military’s role as the main provider of state security becomes vital. The concept of Turkey as a "military-nation" has become inseparable from the modern Turkish model. Consequently, nationalism and militarism increase bias policies and perspectives toward the Kurdish minority in Turkey. This, then, elevates inequalities between the citizens of two different ethnic backgrounds. Failing to provide equal distribution of wealth and services to

---

49 First, the capability of the underprivileged for self-assertion must be enhanced by offering the marginalized incentives to organize in political organizations through which they can gain sufficient power to counteract the power of the privileged. Séverine Deneulin. (2009) Democracy and Political Participation. Earthscan: London. p.196
citizens reflects an image of ineffective governance and to a certain extent lessens the power of democracy.

4. Kurds and the Kurdish problem

Keeping the above mentioned points in mind, Kurds and the Kurdish problem are evident in social, political and economic stages of Turkey’s democratization process, and as well in the emergence, arrangement and persistence of the obstacles on its path. As recently acknowledged by the President Abdullah Gül, the long-lasting Kurdish problem is, and has been, the most important issue facing Turkey to this day. Granting that Turkey’s democratic legitimacy is determined by its fulfillment of the EU conditionality, steps taken towards a peaceful and consensual solution of the Kurdish problem would indicate considerable accomplishment in democratization process as a result. If, however, these potential achievements were made on accounts of pressure exerted by the EU, the role of external f/actors would attest to be primary.

A) Kurds:

Kurds are known as the largest ethnic group in the world without their own state. Throughout the ancient and modern history the plains of Mesopotamia have been the home of the Kurds. The area, today, encompasses parts of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria and is commonly referred by the name of Kurdistan. The exact population of the Kurds has been in continuous debate, due to unreliable census figures and due to the fact that a considerable amount of Kurds have been subject to internal and external displacement, migrating into the urban cities where more often than not subsistence have been a question of assimilation. With approximately 15 million, Kurds make up 23% of Turkey’s population, with 7 million 15% of Iran’s population, with 4 million 20% of Iraq’s population, and with 1 million 9% of Syria’s population (Yildiz and Muller, 2008: 6). Furthermore, according to Yildiz and Muller, “the Kurds in Turkey are concentrated into the south and east and form a majority of the population in provinces there including Mardin, Siirt, Hakkari, Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Mus, Van and Agri. The provinces of Urfa, Adiyaman, Malatya, Elazig, Tunceli, Erzincan, Bingöl, and Kars have also been traditionally dominated by Kurdish population” (Yildiz and Muller, 2008: 6).

Historians, on the other hand, have been debating the origins of the Kurds and the comprehensiveness of the Kurdish history. Various mythological and modern hypotheses are presented in an attempt to locate the place of the Kurds in the pages of history. As Mehrdad Izady rightly puts it,

Reconstruction of the Kurdish history is a difficult task. It frequently involves interpolation and extrapolation among a variety of sources written neither for nor about Kurds. Middle Eastern history has all too often (although not always) been written by its hegemons, and most recently the modern nation-states. The Kurds have not been hegemons

for over 800 years. The result is that Kurdish contributions to history have been ignored, or worse, appointed by other peoples.

(Izady, 1992: 23)

Therefore, without going into too much detail I will present various historical findings on the Kurds and Kurdistan. Although various resources fluctuate immensely in scope and conclusions the attention should be given to written data, derived from actual documents, rather than mythological records, in which oral exchanges constitute the main data source, to determine the origins and the place of the Kurds within history. However, it should not be ignored that, considering the circumstance of the times, oral traditions were considered as an indivisible part of Kurdish culture and history.

Geography and territory become even more significant when tracing the origins of the Kurds. Nevertheless, this opens the door to discussions concerning the ambiguity of findings in a situation where the geographical location was the sole denominator of the hypothesis. Some scholars have argued that due to the fact that the area in question has been a pathway for a variety of civilizations, determining the genuine origins of the Kurds was rather unfeasible. However, the Kurds, as they did during the times of mass population movements, have been successful to preserve their distinct characteristic, which can be observed in modern day Kurdistan. Wadie Jwaideh argues that, “the area [the Kurds] occupy today has from the earliest times been the scene of a ceaseless ebb and flow of various peoples. Successive waves of conquerors, imperial armies, and savage hordes swept across these lands, and each left behind a trace, however faint, on the racial, linguistic, and cultural character of the inhabitants” (Jwaideh, 2006:11).

According to some scholars Kurdish history stretches as far back as 10,000 BC. Izady, for example, suggests that, “the technological advancements and discoveries made in the Kurdish highlands 7,000 years preceding the rise of Mesopotamia (3,000 BC) forever changed the course of human history” and argues that the period between 10,000 BC and 3000 BC was, “by far the most noteworthy period in the history of Kurdistan” (Izady, 1992: 23). On the other hand, philological studies have been conducted to discover the origin of the name “Kurd” in connection with origins of the Kurds. G. R. Driver, at this stage, suggests that Sumerian clay-tablets of the third millennium BC mention “the land of Kar-da” or “Qar-da” in relation to the Kurds. The land of Karda was linked to the people of “Su” who inhabited the land to the south of Lake Van (Driver, 1923: 191).

A further theory concerning the origin of the Kurds was raised by Vladimir Minorsky. In a speech given during the 20th International Congress of Orientalists in 1938 Minorsky underlined the importance of historic and geographic evidence rather than philological data, which derives from and explores name similarities, when investigating the origins of the Kurds. According to Minorsky, the Medes (728-550 B.C.E.), who settled in the region to the south of Lake Van and expended westwards, were the forefathers of the Kurds (Minorsky, 1938: 152).

As argued by Minorsky, historical and geographical evidence shapes the cornerstone of the scientific research. Furthermore, the data becomes rather ambiguous and unsystematic for the purpose of this research, with all the varying philological and geographical facts presented by numerous scholars if a clear starting point in the history has not been appointed to indicate the origins of the Kurds in a more consensual fashion. Hakan Özoglu argues that, “in search of the origin of the group…one should begin with sources in which the term ‘Kurd’—
not any presumed precursor of it—is employed to refer to an ethnolinguistic group” (Özoglu, 2004: 25).

The word “Kurd”, according to Arshak Safrastian, first appeared during the third century C.E.; “in so far it is possible to ascertain from the extant literary documents, the name appears for the first time in a book in the Pahlavi language in the form of Kurd, Kurdan. Artakhshir-i Papakan, the founder of the Persian Sasanid Dynasty in 226 C.E., mentions among his many opponents, a Madig, the King of the Kurdan (Kurds)” (Safrastian, 1948: 16).\footnote{Safrastian cites Darab Peshotan Sanjana, *Karmane-i Artakhshir-i Papakan*. Bombay, 1896:22} In addition, the name Kurdistan was first mentioned in the twelfth century, “when the Turkish Seljuk prince Saandjar created a province of that name in modern-day Iran” (Yildiz, 2004: 5). The Kurdistan province had the village of Bahar as its capital; Bahar, near the ancient Ecbatana (now Hamadan), was also said to be the capital of ancestral Medes (Kreyenbroek and Allison, 1996). The Kurdish principalities of the Shaddadids, Ganja (951-1174) as their capital, the Hassanwahids (959-1015) in the south, and the Merwanids, with Diyarbakir as their capital (990-1096) inhabited the area around the Zagros Mountains before the rule of the Seljuk Turks (Allison et al 1996). Following the counts observed in the previous century, the twelfth century provides a more memorable record in relation to the Kurdish existence in history; “the youthful Kurdish prince, Saladin, who became afterward ‘Napoleon of the East’” (Lannin, 1922:131).

The sixteenth century was a critical moment of truth in the Kurdish history. Kurds were caught in between the powerful Ottoman and Safavid Empires that were progressively growing hostile toward each other. Both empires were aiming to gain the control of the Kurdish lands in order to create a buffer zone. Consequently, Ottomans gained the control of “northern Kurdistan” after defeating the Safavids in the battle of Chaldiran in 1514 (Izady, 1992). The Ottoman Sultan, Selim the Grim, promised a closer relationship and cooperation with the Kurds and Kurdish notables. “To the able Kurdish statesman Idris Bidlisi he [the Sultan] entrusted the organization of Kurdistan and the integration of the Kurdish autonomous principalities into the Ottoman imperial system…the very wide powers given to Bidlisi are evident from a farman (royal decree) issued by the sultan in the year A.H. 921/A.D. 1515” (Jwaideh, 2006:17). In other words, Ottomans would grant and recognize Kurdish autonomy in exchange for Kurdish (military) support against the Persian Empire. Izady states that this Turk-Kurd alliance “soon deteriorated” as the Ottomans no longer saw the Persia as a strong competitor. Following these developments, from “1650 to1730, the Ottomans suppressed most of the autonomous Kurdish principalities in Diyarbakr-Van area” (Jwaideh, 2006: 17).\footnote{In addition Hassanpour states that “Kurdish destinies changed radically around this time, when the Ottoman and Persian empires divided Kurdistan into spheres of influence, agreeing on a border in 1639. In order to protect their sovereignty, the principalities supported one or the other power, for most of the next three centuries a prevailing war economy destroyed the agrarian system, devastated villages and towns, precipitated massacres and led to forcible migrations of Kurds and settlement of Turkish tribes in parts of Kurdistan. All of this inhibited further growth of urban areas and settled agrarian production relations, reinforcing tribal ways of life.” Amir Hassanpour. (1994) “The Kurdish Experience”, Middle East Report, 24(3): 2-7.}

Fifteenth and sixteenth centuries saw a rise in native tongue literacy, especially in Kurmanji dialect, owing to the rise of Kurdish nationalism and political movements (Hassanpour, 1992: 49). From this point on, not only the foreign scholars and researchers but Kurds, themselves, became engaged in composing literary works with regard to the Kurdish history, language and
culture. One of the earliest works written by a Kurdish notable in relation to the origins of the Kurds is, the often cited, Serefname written in 1597 by Sharaf Khan Bidlisi; the original hand-written copy of the book is kept in Bodleian Library in Oxford. Furthermore, “the most important literary manifestation of political awareness was Ehmede Xane (1651-1707), who in 1694-95 rewrote the Kurdish popular ballad Mem u Zin…the second apostle of the Kurdish nationalism, Haji Qadiri Koyi (1817?-1897), was also a mullah and a poet, but even more secular” (Hassanpour, 1994: 2). In addition, Ehmede Xane’s (1651-1707) poems depicted the distinctiveness of the Kurdish heritage from those of Arabs, Iranians and Turks and revealed a clear group consciousness.53

Even though some raise concerns over the factuality of the content and applicability of it in a historic research, above mentioned works provide useful insights on linguistics, ethnic identity and civilization patterns of the Kurds, and are considered to be the catalysts of national awakening and Kurdish nationalism. Evidently, legends and popular ballads constitute an important part of oral traditions in the Kurdish history because “throughout their history, the greater part of the Kurds’ perceptions of themselves, their past and their everyday lives has been transmitted orally; any serious study of Kurdish culture cannot afford to ignore the oral traditions” (Kreyenbroek and Allison, 1996: 30). During the nineteenth century literary works on Kurds boomed; historical, philological, cultural and mythological works on Kurds heightened national awareness and were considered an important contribution to the emergence and endurance of Kurdish nationalism. On this matter, Hobsbawn’s proto-nationalism hypothesis, perhaps, describes Kurd’s development as an ethnic group towards nationalism in more of a methodical way. It is not uncommon for proto-nations to inhabit large areas and to even live in dispersion. Their common ethnic backgrounds enable them to bond and formulate group identification; however they lack a common polity. Where proto-nationalism exists, it is possible to mobilize the existing national symbols for creating a modern state (Hobsbawn, 1990: 64, 73, 77).

Following a period of deteriorating relations with the Ottomans accompanied by flourishing national awakening, some Kurdish notables opted for independence of Kurdistan. The most noteworthy of such attempts, perhaps, were made by Prince Muhammed of Rewanduz (1839) and Badir Khan Bey of Botan (1847). Nevertheless, the Ottomans, backed up by the British and the Germans, were able to extinguish these challenges (Izady, 1996).54 Even though these independence attempts were unsuccessful they helped develop the Kurdish identity in an official and modernist way. During a period where independence movements, such as the Armenian and Turkish, were on their way Ottoman’s erroneous decisions and incapacitation amplified Kurdish aspirations for independence, leading to the publication of the first Kurdish newspaper/journal, Kurdistan, in Istanbul in 1898 (Izady, 1992: 166).

53 See, Mem-u Zin (1695).
B) Kurds and the New Republic of Turkey:

The World War I was another important turning point for the Kurdish people; it was a “Zugzwang” for the Kurds. They had little or no choice but to pick a side and enter the War, while their only viable move was actually not to move. In the hopes of regaining the lands lost in the Balkans, the Ottomans, confident that they would bring in a victory, sided with the Germans and entered the War on October 28, 1915. As Manafy attests, “the war was labeled a ‘holy war’, and the Kurds, being Muslims, considered participation in the war an important religious duty” (Manafy, 2005: 28). Additionally, David Mc Dowall states that Kurds remained loyal to the Ottomans and provided considerable manpower to their armies; “thousand of Kurdish conscripts perished with the Third Army at Sarikamish, and on other fronts...greater part of the Ottoman forces in the region were Kurdish.” (McDowall, 2004: 105).

On the other hand, some Kurds decided to ally themselves with the Russians and fought against the Ottomans. This indicated that the Kurdish leadership lacked a certain degree of centralization in decision making and execution, and that unity amongst the different fractions of the Kurds was a rather complex issue. These developments, accompanied by Ottoman’s defeat and partition of the Kurds between modern-day Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, evidently incapacitated Kurdish independence endeavors.

The inability of the Kurds to endure autonomy and/or to achieve independence throughout their profound history has various underlying factors. Internally, Kurds were disorganized and lacked experienced, credible statesmen. On this shortcoming, Izady comments that, “when independent states were being created thanks to professionalism, wit and political prowess of other local ethnic leader, Kurdish politicians could hardly have been any less professional and convincing to the European powers” (Izady, 1992: 58). Moreover, emergence of Kurdish nationalism, prior to the establishment of a profound nation, in an agrarian society with feudal and tribal components rather than in the middle class milieu created, “a persistent contradiction between its [the Kurdish movement’s] traditional leadership and the relatively developed society it seeks to liberate” (Hassanpour, 1994: 2)

On the other hand, especially after the fall of the Ottoman Empire with the birth of the new Republic, external factors became more implicated and influential in the Kurdish dilemma. The Treaty of Sevres was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious Allied Powers on 10 August 1920. The Treaty, emphasizing on the self-determination ideal of Woodrow Wilson, concluded that an independent Kurdistan and an Armenian State would be established in their respective regions. The emergence of Turkish Nationalists, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, and his triumph over the Allies in the Turkish War of Independence annulled the terms of the Sevres, which were never enacted. Moreover, the October Revolution that brought Bolsheviks to power exposed a secret imperialist agreement between France and the Great Britain known as Sykes-Picot Agreement. In response, French and British, already in disarray, restructured their imperial strategy and mingled their objectives concerning Turkey and Soviet Russia, “to prevent Kemal from aligning with Soviet forces, and to use Turkey as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and

Furthermore, the Eleventh and Twelfth Armies at Elazig and Mosul respectively were entirely Kurdish, while the Ninth and Tenth Armies at Erzurum and Sivas were largely Kurdish. Kurds also provided 135 cavalry squadrons, gendarmerie forces and border guards (McDowall, 2004: 105).
the Western colonies in the Middle East. It was this consideration that led to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne” (Manafy, 2005: 31).

With the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923 between the Allies and Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkey regained the lands lost in the Treaty of Sevres annulling its obligations towards the Kurds. Turkey gained the control over the Kurdish lands, which also seemed to be in accordance with the British ambitions. An independent Kurdistan within the Anatolian peninsula would surely jeopardize British control over central Kurdistan containing rich oil deposits (Nash, 1976). Human rights and protection of minorities were such great importance at the time that they could not be left out from the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty granted various rights to minorities, without specifically mentioning by name, such as the Section III, Articles 37-45, states the rights of minorities, and Turkey’s legal duties towards its Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. Article 39 specifically details the use of mother tongue; “no restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language before the Courts.” The Allies had no implemented monitoring mechanism for Turkey to assess the realization of these prerequisites.

According to Izady on March 3, 1924, about a year after Lausanne, Turkish republic officially banned the use of Kurdish in teaching, private interactions and the press (Izady, 1992:180). Kurds felt betrayed by the republic. Kurds helped build the republic by taking part in the War of Independence, after which Mustafa Kemal, “immediately broke his promises of Kurdish autonomy and dissolved the National Assembly which had included seventy-five Kurdish Representatives” (Nezan, 1996: 11). Infuriated by empty promises, on February 1925, under the leadership of Sheikh Said, Kurds staged the first of a series of general uprisings against the Turkish republic. Prior to the uprising Sheikh Said, a Kurdish chieftain, was primarily known for his religious character which has led some scholars to believe that the rebellion actually had religious not nationalistic motivations (Cemal, 1955; Toker, 1968). Nevertheless, Robert Olson states that, “the Sheikh Said rebellion was a turning point in the history of the Kurds in that nationalism was the prime factor in its organization and development…[it] clearly demonstrated the direction that Kurdish nationalism was to take” (Olson, 1989: 154). Additionally, the declaration given on 28 June 1925 by the president of the military tribunal that tried the rebels further demonstrated the nationalistic characteristic of the rebellion,

Certain among you have taken as a pretext for revolt the abuse by the governmental administration, some others have invoked the defence of the Caliphate, but you are all united on one point: to create an independent Kurdistan

(Viennot, 1974: 108)

58 Ibid, Part I
59 Latter president Süleyman Demirel claimed that PKK was the 29th Kurdish uprising.
For the first time in modern history Kurds showed a sense of unity and organization under a common goal; religious Kurds, Kurds opposing governmental abuse as well as reactionary Kurds gathered under the umbrella of independent Kurdistan. From this moment on the wheels of Kurdish nationalism were in motion. This was an alarming situation for the young republic, which was accustomed to witness unorganized and dispersed Kurdish factions. The government, hence, had two different options on hand; first choice was to follow bureaucratic streams and hear out the Kurdish demands and negotiate, which may possibly open the doors to autonomy or even to the independence of Kurdistan. Second choice was to adopt assimilation policies and impose them with armed forces if necessary to dissimulate Kurdish nationalism before it grew out of hand. Consequently, latter approach was favored and implemented; according to Soner Cagaptay this was a “widespread policy during the 1920s…one reason for this may have been that Turkey’s view toward the Kurdish population gave priority to security” (Cagaptay, 2006: 68). In 1930, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Foreign Minister of Turkey at the time, told the British representative to the League of Nations in Geneva,

For the moment, the Turkish Government’s Kurdish policy consists of military occupation for the purpose of maintaining order and the complete and absolute disarmament of the population. It is possible to envisage in the future an intense colonization so that the Kurds may be drowned in the huge mass of the Turkish population.

(Cagaptay, 2006: 68)

Furthermore, new Republic’s stance on the issue of Kurds and Kurdish nationalist movements is further reflected in a speech given by then-Justice Minister, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt in 1930 in Manisa which was published in Milliyet Newspaper 31 August 1930; Bozkurt stated that,

There is no use in hiding the truth. Turks are the sole owners and sole masters of this country. Individuals who do not have Turkish origins (who are not Turks) have only a single right in this country: to be flawless servants and slaves to the noble Turkish nation…

(Kirmizitoprak, 1997: 74)

In addition, various scholars have argued that soon after the birth of the republic systematic forced assimilation of the Kurds turned into state policy and were documented in a secret plan. Sark Islahat Plani (East Restructure Plan) prepared on 24 September 1925, precisely specifies techniques and means to assimilate the Kurds and to eliminate the possibility of treats stemming from the East (Bayrak, 1993: 452-489). Some of the infamous articles of the East-Restructure Plan were as follows,

---
60 Translated from Turkish: “Gercekleri saklamasin geregi yoktur. Türkler bu memleketin yegane sahipleri ve yegane efendileridir. Türk orijininden gelmeyenlerin (Türk olmayanların) bu memlekte sadece birtek hakları vardır: Asil Türk milletine kusursuz olarak hizmetkarlık ve kölelik etmek…”
Article 14

Despite being ethnic Turks, themselves who have began to surrender to Kurdistan, people in the cities and districts of Malatya, Elaziz, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Van, Mus, Urfa, Ergani, Hozat, Ercis, Adilcevaz, Ahlat, Palu, Carsancak, Cemiskezek, Ovacik, Hisnimansur, Behisni, Arga, Hekimhan, Birecik, Cermik, in the governmental buildings, other associations and establishments, in schools, in markets and bazaars speaking languages other than Turkish will be considered as conflicting and resisting the government and the municipality, and will be punished accordingly.

Article 17

Kurdish language should be banned from the Kurds who reside randomly in various parts of the cities to the west of Euphrates; through emphasizing the importance of the schooling for girls, women should be imposed to speak Turkish.

(Bayrak, 1993: 486-487)

Undoubtedly, the role and the influence of the Allies (external powers) had immense affect on the geographical restructuring of the region. The allied powers were more concerned about the oil deposits and exerted their influence towards a more self beneficial mapping of the Middle East. Accordingly, collaborating Arab notables and tribes were rewarded with nation states while the ethnic disposition of the region was ignored and the Kurds, being less responsive to the Allies, witnessed a deeper submergence of their self-determination and independence ambitions. However, as I will argue in the next section if explaining the emergence of the Kurdish problem as merely a play of the external powers goes against the intellectual scrutiny so does reasoning the failure of the establishment of a Kurdish nation-state with the same rationale. Kurds, themselves, were unorganized, immature and inexperienced in the body of politics to establish a strong lobbying power to bid for autonomy or independence. The historic imposition of the Kurdish question, stemming from externally imposed borders, erroneous policies of the Republic toward the Kurdish population and emergence of Kurdish nationalism, has bred fluctuating yet continuing conflict in Turkey.

C) Kurdish Movements:

Historical pathology of nation-state construction and military coups, especially the 1980 coup, have, naturally, ignited reactions within the Kurdish community in Turkey, owing to the fact that Kurds suffered the most as a result of these events. Reactions to these imposed, elite-dominated developments varied in character and tone; some could be considered beneficial to the Kurdish cause and the others rather hazardous (Olson, 1989). Although some followed a more democratic path and believed in the solution of the problem within the framework of dialogue and democracy, the others turned agitated pursuing armed struggle to demand and maintain their national identity and rights. Democratic persuasions seemed to have little or no influence and importance in the short- or medium-terms due to a combined suppression of state sponsored militarism and Turkish nationalism; nevertheless, their value will be evident in the long-run. Armed
struggle, seemed to be the repulsive choice in short-term for the Kurds living in rural areas who perceived armed resistance as the most effective and responsive option against the present and imminent oppression; thus, beside its immediate harms, grave and detrimental nature of armed struggle will prove to be progressively deteriorating for the Kurdish cause in the long-run.

Despite all the severity caused by the coups and post-coup policies, the Kurds gradually began to develop a social consciousness during the mid 1960s. They started to organize demonstrations. However, their efforts were countered with immense coercion, and with a systematic state propaganda against the Kurds and their very existence; if Kurds declined to become Turks, they would simply be considered and treated as the “others”. Cemal Gürsel, general of the 1960 coup and then the President, voiced out his government’s policy towards the Kurds, “if these ‘mountain Turks’ do not calm down the army would not hesitate to bomb their cities and villages. There will be such a blood bath that they will disappear with their lands from the map” (Kauz, 1995: 68). In 1967 people in the East rushed into the streets with slogans, “we don’t want police stations but schools, we don’t want soldiers but teachers, in the West there are factories and streets but in the East commandos and police”. These reasonable demands were countered, once again, with an official prohibition of the Kurdish language on 25 January 1967 by Süleyman Demirel’s government. The prohibition generated opposite effects; under the leadership of Kurdish students landless farmers also became anxious. The development peaked with the establishment of Revolutionary Cultural Society of the East (DDKO) in 1969 by Kurdish intellectuals in Ankara. The Cultural Union adopted a targeted political struggle against discrimination and within a few months it has spread all over Turkish-Kurdistan and they became a target immediately. On this matter Kevin McKiernan states that, “nationalist authorities acting under military law secretly looked for ways to close down civilian Kurdish societies and to disband cultural groups.” (McKiernan, 2006: 91). Due to high poverty farmers also began to rise against the local landlords, known as the Aghas. Farmers attempted to seize Aghas’ lands, and in response Aghas immediately collaborated with the Turkish security forces to stop farmers form disseminating their lands and authority.

The 1971 coup, gave the military the exclusive war-rights over the Kurdish regions. After a few years, where Army command had denied the existence of the Kurds and called them “revolting mountain-Turks”, Ministry of Justice, composed of various Generals, blamed Kurds for the coups and speculated that millions of Kurds have planed armed struggle against the republic in the eastern provinces (Kauz, 1995: 70). Consequently, thousands of Kurds and Turkish left-wing partisans were incarcerated. DDKO and Workers Party of Turkey (TIP) were banned and their members were imprisoned. Elections which took place in 1973 brought the social democrat Bülent Ecevit to power. Ecevit’s naïve coalition with somewhat undemocratic and Islamist National Salvation Party proved to be unstable for a solid democracy to breed. His government’s involvement in Cyprus and seizure of northern part of the island did not provide the anticipated political advantage. Consequently, Ecevit’s government was dissolved in 1975 by a coalition of National Front parties. Following the years of public unrest, mainly caused by left and right-wing clashes, military seized the power once again in 1980. A terror wave swept over the country and intensified in the East and

61 Translated from German, “Wenn diese Bergtürken nicht Ruhe geben, wird die Armee nicht davor zurückschrecken, ihre Städte und Dörfer zu bombardieren. Es wird ein solches Blutbad, daß die auch mit ihrem Land vor der Bildfläche verschwinden”
Southeast provinces; the major driving force behind the dispersion of terror was a hyper-nationalist paramilitary group called “grey wolves”. Coup general Kenan Evren became the new president; during the following four years approximately 650,000 people were detained, 230,000 people stood trial, 7000 people were charged with capital punishment, 50 people were executed by hanging, 300 people died in suspicious circumstances, 30,000 lost their jobs, and 39 tons of newspapers and magazines were destroyed. Amongst those were mainly Turkish and Kurdish leftists, intellectuals, workers, peasants, students, authors, politicians and ordinary citizens. Around 30 thousand people, mainly of Kurdish origins, fled to Europe for political exile; and 14 thousand people have been thrown out of citizenship.

Various circles in Turkey consider the 1980 coup as a remedial mechanism aiming to reinstate the lost order, so they believe that it was a welcomed development for the majority of citizenry. This notion indicates, yet again, that Turkish society repulsively turns to the military and militaristic means without exhausting the democratic channels beforehand. Turkish citizens themselves became actual victims of the coup and the paramilitary groups not only the inept government. Countless people were tortured and/or killed before even proven guilty in front of a court, disappearances became a part of daily life and people have suffered financially, physically and psychologically for the years to come. Furthermore, 1980 coup reinforced the support for the PKK, which adopted armed struggle in the years following the coup; surprisingly other existing Kurdish organizations were virtually eliminated. According to Van Bruinessen, “the PKK was the only organization that managed to survive and even grow in these circumstances. Establishing an extensive cross-border network — with guerrilla training by Palestinian and Syrian instructors and base camps in the mountains of northern Iraq and western Iran — it initiated an offensive guerrilla in 1984 with a series of attacks on military and police installations.” (Van Bruinessen, 2003).

In 1983 Turgut Özal became the elected president of the nation. Economic situation of the country continued to fragment; between 1975 and 1988 unemployment increased tenfold (Pauli, 1990: 54).

Political situation of the Kurds did not change much under Özal’s government. Activities of the opposition had been sanctioned with laws passed by Generals. Persecutions, imprisonments and torture continued to be the part of everyday life. At some point in this period Kurdish parties and organizations have emerged, aiming to unshackle the Kurds by assuming different programmatic approaches. Two of the leading amongst these movements were, the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK), established on 31 December 1974 under the leadership of Kemal Burkay, and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) established on 27 November 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. Even though these movements were labeled as illegal organizations, upon their establishments, they have, to a certain extent, contributed to the emergence of Kurds’ longing towards legitimacy and establishment of pro-Kurdish parties within the framework of Turkish laws.

Developments – such as militarism and nationalism - within the Turkish body of politics and state structure produced diverse Kurdish responses. PKK’s armed struggle in the region seemed to justify heavy military presence and prolongation of the “state of emergency” in the East and Southeast regions. Nevertheless, making incorrect decisions and choosing the wrong path to solve a problem may transform the solution into a problem itself, and the person attempting to solve it

---

from an oppressed to an oppressor. Furthermore, one should also keep in mind that even though numerous cease-fires took place between the government forces and the PKK, the absence of an uninterrupted, permanent peace situation, and the imminent threat of violence breakouts, to a certain extent, facilitated the creation of new inequalities and the prolongation of existing social and economic disparities in the East and Southeast Turkey. In most cases inequalities imposed and created in the past tend to draw alongside with the present situation and bring a second wave of affects in the medium- and long-terms; today the Kurds are still haunted by the disparities carried along from the past.

The PKK was established as a Marxist-Leninist organization aiming to eliminate feudal structures enslaving the Kurdish people, and to create an independent, free Kurdistan. Rising urbanization and urban population in the region since 1970s, further, enabled the PKK to anchor within the urban population and to boost support, especially among the young population who had to abandon traditional life in order to fit into the recently emerging industrial urban life. With the intention of achieving the set objectives, leadership of the PKK considered armed struggle as the only efficient and effective way to liberate the Kurds; according to them this was the only possible way because the Turkish Republic, as the oppressor, has continuously closed the negotiation doors and disregarded everything resembling the Kurds or Kurdish throughout the history with forced-assimilation and denial policies. In addition, the Republic also heavily relied on its military and adopted militaristic measures to resolve the Kurdish problem.

The PSK, on the other hand, was established as a socialist party emphasizing on the diplomatic and peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem. They believed that by fighting against undemocratic circumstances in Turkey they would also free the Turkish people too as they also suffered under such a system. For this reason they believed in the necessity of harmonious coexistence and mutual collaboration between the Turks and the Kurds to alleviate and to eliminate the common burden on both Turkish and Kurdish shoulders.

In response to the military coup and perpetual repression of the Kurds in its aftermath, the PKK took on armed resistance against the government on August 15, 1984. Around the same time, official news coverage reported PKK attacks on governmental buildings; as merely rebel attacks on state property overlooking the political characteristic of the movement. One of PKK’s foolhardy tactics in the 1980s was to target schoolteachers and encourage young people in the East and Southeast to drop out of school in order to be free from ideological indoctrination and state propaganda. The benefits of freedom are superficial and debatable if one was denied the necessary education to conceptualize it. This has been one of the most important oversights of PKK; the impending freedom ambitions have served as a curtain blurring the vision to address the problem pragmatically. The number of illiterate people was overwhelming in the mostly feudal, underdeveloped Kurdish regions even without PKK’s school embargoes. On the other hand, various intellectual circles have hypothesized that the Turkish military deliberately persisted the war in the East in order to cut a larger piece of the budget pie in the name of national security, to put the military back in the spotlight by fighting a war and increasing paranoia, and to keep the East underdeveloped so that a possible threat form the East would be easy to sustain.

---

Numerous sources agree that the war in the East and Southeast Turkey between the government forces and the PKK has claimed around 37,000 lives, more than in the conflicts on the West Bank and in Northern Ireland combined. According to official counts given by the former Chief of the General Staff of Turkey (retired in August 2010), İlker Başbug, between 1984-2008 PKK terrorism has claimed 5,560 civilian lives, 6,482 security forces lost their lives and 32,000 terrorist were killed. There are no official records, however, on the number of terrorist killed in a battle situation since according to previous Turkish laws many non-violent offences were also considered terrorism. It is evident, in the given numbers that Kurds suffered the most in this conflict and paid the highest price, whether as PKK guerillas or simply as civilians caught in the crossfire.

The PKK, succeeding its establishment, was a small organization of Kurdish students and intellectuals, workers and farmers were a miniscule minority. Nevertheless, PKK succeeded in linking the social and ethnic problems of the Kurds in a rather simple technique during a very tense and fragile period, so that the organization could find its holding grounds within the Kurdish society over the following years. Not only did the PKK push for an independent Kurdistan, which to a great extent moved the masses, but it also tried to reveal various deficiencies of previous Kurdish revolts and attempted to replace those with new theoretical concepts. The stated objective of the PKK, in that sense, was not merely political and militaristic against the enemies of Kurdistan but also “revolutionary” to crack down centuries old feudal incrustations of the Kurdish society. This process, according to PKK, would triumph over the shortcomings of previous Kurdish revolts. However, this did not facilitate the efforts of Kurdish resistance. Feudal structures proved to be rather hard to crack; feudal leaders, fearing they would loose their land and power, contrary to modernization predictions, as observed in the case of the middle-class in Latin America during the 1960s, allied with ruling elite and helped creating authoritarian regimes. Feudal and tribal leaders received monetary and military supplies from the government and fought alongside with the armed forces against the PKK as “village guards”, and became the determining factors in the region. On the other hand, PKK’s insistence on being the sole-representative of the Kurds burdened the Kurdish nationalist movement and prevented the establishment of a potential coalition encompassing all the Kurdish movements.

The group could not contra the might and firepower of the Turkish military. Only reasons they have lasted this long against a professional and fairly modern army were, the commitment of its members and followers, reconnaissance of the area, monetary and material support from within and without, and hit and run guerilla tactics. Consequently, a suspension of armed struggle was called by Abdullah Öcalan on 3 August 1999, following his capture on February 15, 1999. Öcalan asked his fighters to lay down their arms and leave Turkey. The extent to which the PKK fighters heeded Öcalan’s commands is clear from figures in a report announced in May 2000 from the high command of the Turkish army, which stated that out of 5,500 PKK fighters only 500 were still in Turkey. The same report stated that in the first five months of the year 2000 the number of...
confrontations between the army and PKK militants dropped to 18, whereas the figure reached 3,300 at its peak in 1994 (UN, 2001).

Nevertheless, presence of the military never ceased to exist in the East and Southeast Turkey. As a preemptive measure, in case the PKK regroups or other such Kurdish militias emerge, military continues to command the region with an iron fist. People of East and Southeast are terrified of the armed forces knowing that, at any given time, they could be falsely labeled as terrorist because the government has made very limited effort to distinguish between violent and non-violent activities in connection with the Kurdish cause. Exploring diverse Kurdish movements enables a comparison mechanism for opposite perspectives. The Socialist Party of Kurdistan and Workers’ Party of Kurdistan have chosen different approaches to find a solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey; hence, implying the comprehensiveness and willingness of the Kurdish movements to try different methods towards the solution of the problem. Some movements, such as PSK, believed in the democratic process to resolve the issue; whereas, others, such as PKK, follow armed resistance to deliver their point across. Consequently, PKK’s armed struggle in a way gave a reason to the Turkish military to intensify and maintain their presence in the Kurdish regions. One should not forget that, if militarism and nationalism is an obstacle to Turkish democracy and democratization, so is the armed struggle and militarism of PKK to the Kurdish people’s quest for equality, democracy and self-determination.

Besides PSK and PKK, which were labeled as illegal organizations by the state, Kurds tried to legitimize their political struggle through political parties in the parliament. Pro-Kurdish political parties emerged during the 1990s in an attempt to represent the Kurdish minority and to have a say in the decision making process in the Turkish parliament. The first pro-Kurdish political party, Peoples’ Labor Party (HEP), was formed in 1991 by ten members of the Turkish parliament elected on the Social Democratic Party (SHP) ticket. Soon, HEP’s pro-Kurdish tendency evoked alarm for the Turkish authorities. Turkish authorities, though, had little tolerance for anyone advocating the “equality of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples...within the framework of the legitimate principles of law,” as former HEP chairman Feridun Yazar put it during his trial (Kutschera, 1994). The founders of HEP were charged with spreading “separatist propaganda” by the State Security Court in July 1992. Consequently, the Constitutional Court banned the HEP on July 15, 1993. Some deputies of HEP, not giving up, resigned to form the Democracy Party (DEP) a few days after the closure of the HEP. The headquarters of the Democracy Party was bombed on February 19, 1994 by anonymous assailants. The fate of DEP was even harsher; on March 3, 1994, the parliament voted to lift the parliamentary immunity of seven DEP deputies claiming that they had ties to PKK. They were immediately arrested in the parliament and charged under Article 125 of the penal code with "crimes against the state", which carries the death penalty. Six deputies, and one former member of DEP as independent deputy, received a verdict of imprisonment ranging from 3 to 15 years on 8 October 1994; consequently, the DEP was also outlawed (Ibid).

Kurdish politicians in search of legitimacy, convinced that democratic framework and parliamentary interaction were essential for the solution of the Kurdish problem, pursued their mission even under continuous harassment; later, they formed another party called the Peoples’ Democracy Party (HADEP), in 1994. In 1995 elections HADEP won 4.2% of the vote but were unable to obtain representation in the parliament due to the 10% national threshold of the Turkish parliamentary system. They also took part in 1999 national parliamentary
elections but failed to surpass national threshold. Subsequently, HADEP was banned from political activity on 13 March 2003 by the Constitutional Court on charges of “separatism and supporting terrorism”; additionally, the Court prohibited 46 HADEP members from being founders, executives, members or supervisors of any political party for the rest of their lives. Upon HADEP’s closure a new party was founded on 24 October 1997 under the name Democratic Peoples’ Party (DEHAP). DEHAP won 6.2% of the national vote at the last national parliamentary election on 2 November 2002; thus, unable to gain any seats in the Assembly.

There are currently 96 members of the Turkish Parliament representing provinces of the East and Southeast region elected in 2007. Out of a total number of 541 members East and Southeast MPs occupy 18% of the seats in the Parliament. According to Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜIK) in 2007, Turkey’s population is 70.5 million; the East and Southeast regions constitute 16% of this total number with around 11.2 million people. Keeping these figures in mind, it could be said that these regions are proportionally represented in the Turkish parliament; yet, the MP candidates have to find refuge under various parties, which have a long history in the Turkish Parliament and rigid party codes, in order to be elected into the Parliament even if this means they have to abandon the ideologies and policies they whish to pursue, consequently they are forced to adopt the ideals of the “hosting” Party and chose to be quite. The national 10% threshold, furthermore, empowers the majoritarian system of governance, which demands less diplomatic or bureaucratic knowledge from citizens and requires specialized knowledge of groups of citizens, and impedes a pluralist model. Pluralist model also grants better representation opportunities, especially for minority groups. As a result, representatives of minority groups are forces to enter the Parliament under the wings of unrepresentative parties or as independent candidates.

Subsequently, not only did the Kurds find no factual and equitable representation in the Parliament but they also had to live under martial laws and constant military inspection. Nevertheless, adopting armed struggle did not facilitate this situation; on the contrary, it provided the armed forces with the pretext they were seeking to maintain their heavy presence in the regions, it further anchored the Turkish military to the everyday life of the Kurds. On the other hand, emergence of Kurdish armed struggle not only mobilized the military but it also pulled the Turkish civilian population into the battleground and made it easier for them to turn towards militaristic and ethno-nationalistic notions. During the years following arduous clashes between the government forces and the PKK, the word Kurd was synonymized with the word “terrorist” in the eyes of the majority of the citizens who considered themselves ethnic Turks. The tense period of 1990s created a political vacuum where politicians and the media capitalized on the sentimental atmosphere and used it as a propaganda tool to advance their political agenda. Increasing frequency of PKK's armed attacks on civilians carried their reputation abroad and put them on the list of terrorist organizations of various European and NATO countries. Additionally, a stain on the reputation of the Kurds in the international arena was created; attacks on civilian targets could no longer be considered freedom movements by the international audiences. Kurds, especially those who struggled to find a peaceful and legitimate solution through democratic means, suffered under this the most. While the hands of Kurdish democrats were tied due to a loss of international legitimacy resulting from PKK’s attacks on civilian, Turkish democrats did little to none to find a
democratic, peaceful solution to the problem. Party closures (especially pro-Kurdish or those sympathizing with the Kurdish cause), suspension of Kurdish MPs, raids on cultural and/or human rights organizations, disappearances under police custody, torture and ill-treatment and unsolved murders roamed the Kurdish regions in a constant and extensive way throughout the 1990s. And finally, continuation of the Kurdish problem and deactivation of democratic movements and measures indicated that democratic framework was not probed in a factual manner for the resolution of the problem, and that militaristic approaches, both on behalf of the Kurdish movements and the Turkish government, proved to be ineffective and erroneous for the solution of the problem.

D) The Kurdish Problem:

The question of inequality as observed through the lens of social, cultural and economic aspects, in terms of fair distribution of generated wealth among the various sections of the society, equal access and accession to the political power and higher standards of living brings the debate to the very understanding and characterization of the Kurdish problem\(^{67}\). Generally, there appears to be various schools of thought revolving around the Kurdish problem in the literature. The first school of thought argues that Kurdish problem is a problem of ethnic identity and democratization. Followers of this school believe that the problem would fade away once adequate and efficient reforms have been put in practice in terms of democratization and respect for human and minority rights. The second school of thought is more concerned with the security issues and sees the Kurdish problem as a problem of terrorism and separatism. They believe that the problem could only be solved through military intervention and elimination of the terrorist and separatist movements. The third school believes that there basically is no such thing as the Kurdish problem and argues that external powers deliberately impose such a diversion upon the Turkish public to control the nation and even to dive and concur if they please to do so. The fourth school typically suggests that Kurdish problem is merely an economic problem and a question of under-development. And finally, the fifth school argues that it is a national problem and a question of self-determination, which could be resolved by declaration of a independent nation-state, a free Kurdistan.

Ethnicity and ethnic identity intensifies the notions of belonging and group emergence. A basic concept of sociology is that, for “one” to identify himself/herself as such an “other” is needed with different characteristic. According to Max Weber, "ethnic groups" are “those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of custom or both, or because of the memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists” (Weber, 1978: 389). Furthermore, Götte argues that, “the term ethnicity is commonly associated with migration, but also with lower class and minority status.” (Götte, 2005: 10).

---

Associating the Kurdish problem with the concepts encompassing ethnicity and ethnic identity signifies Turkey’s democratic deficiencies, and signals the need for further democratization. Various circles believe that denial of the Kurdish ethnic identity and fundamental rights that go along with it have been a pivotal contributor to the escalation and prolongation of the Kurdish problem. Ethnic identity is generally acquired by birth without the possibility of individuals’ consent, for that reason rejecting one’s ethnic identity or imposing forced-assimilation to convert it is considered to be undemocratic, immoral and inhumane in today’s world. In a country where such practices manifest, international legitimacy is often lost and the democracy is considered to be in jeopardy; therefore, finding a solution to such a hitch becomes crucial for the survival of democracy, and arguably of the nation-state itself. In the light of this, finding a peaceful and reasonable solution to the Kurdish problem, which requires genuine democratization efforts that lead to recognition of ethnic, religious and ideological differences under constitutional guarantees, is regarded as a vital move for Turkey and Turkish democracy.

Examples seen around the world suggest that a peaceful coexistence of ethnicities and peoples in a given nation state is not unfeasible. Nevertheless, problem arises when denial and oppression policies are systematically institutionalized, directly or indirectly, as a policy tool to single out and target a specific ethnic group, especially if this ethnic group constitutes a considerable portion of that country’s population. It is, however, not convenient and consistent in today’s world system, where globalization obliterates borders, brings different ethnicities even more closer to each other than before and where nations try to unite under an umbrella of international organizations, to grant every single ethnic group with independence, without identifying the proper qualifications, deliberations and consequences.

The second school of thought considers the Kurdish problem as merely a problem of terror and separatism. According to this belief all citizens under the roof of Turkey are equals and no actual socio-economic, ethnic and cultural problems exist in the internal dynamics of the state; however, various external actors, who seem to be in collaboration with separatists, spread propaganda and play with certain internal balances. On the other hand, this notion also intensifies group identification and polarization in Turkey. For example, Kurds were stereotyped as “terrorist” or “separatist” not only by common citizenry but also by the state itself through unjust and irrational execution of the legislative.

The paranoia of separatism through the endorsement of external actors was not a new phenomenon for the Turkish republic but rather an inheritance from the Ottoman past. Yet, tagging the Kurdish problem with the PKK and the PKK with terrorism is exclusive to the new republic. Advocates of such notions claim that the emergence of the PKK surfaced the so-called Kurdish problem, which did not exist before. However, even by then the president of the republic, Süleyman Demirel, has claimed that the PKK was neither the cause nor the source of the problem, and that the PKK was not the first but the 29th Kurdish rebellion that has taken place since the birth of the republic. Contrary to the common belief shared by the people who understand and recognize the Kurdish problem as a matter of

---

68 Various Kurdish intellectuals, politicians, artist, farmers, were detained under Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Law which broadly made propaganda directed against the indivisibility of the Turkish Republic a crime, see also “Tas Atan Cocuklar” (rock throwing children), where Kurdish children were detained as adults with heavy sentences.
terrorism, the PKK (terror) was not the cause but the outcome of the Kurdish problem (Tan, 2009).

The arguments of the third school of thought, on the other hand, emerged simultaneously with the birth of the republic as a result of erroneous and inconsiderate policies and laws adopted by the state elite involved in nation building process, which were then hastily constitutionalized. For example, Article 88 of the Turkish constitution that came into effect on 20 April 1924 reads, “in Turkey regardless of their religion and race, in terms of citizenship, everybody is considered as a Turk” (Resmi Gazete - Official Journal. 15 January 1945). This stance generated heated discussions in the parliament and several MPs suggested that the constitution instead of forcing a single ethnic identity upon the multiethnic populous by referring to them as “Turks” should assume a more considerate approach and replace the term “Turks” with “Turkish” or “citizens of Turkey”. Nevertheless, this proposal was overruled by the opposition and eventually dropped (Kirisci and Minrow, 1997).

The Republic, with the 1924 constitution, was not denying the existence of various ethnic entities, other than Turks, living within the borders but was rather showing its intention to not constitutionalize this notion (Yegen, 2006: 52-53). This harsh approach of the Republic regarding ethnicity and ethnic identity has intensified in the following years. Especially, concerning the Kurdish identity and ethnicity, observing the emergence of Kurdish ethnic demands the Republic has taken a different approach and perused denial policies from here on out. Evidently, Cemal Gürsel who became the president after leading the 1960 military coup, claimed that Kurds were “diluted Turks” and that “scientific and academic evidence, which made it impossible to prove otherwise” suggested that “no such distinct ethnic identity as a ´Kurd´ exists on the face of the earth” (Firat, 1970: 67). Similar ethnic denial policies continued under Kenan Evren’s presidency, he as well came to power after plotting a military coup on 12 September 1980, where Kurds were labeled as “Mountain Turks”.69

The fourth school of thought suggests that economic underdevelopment and feudalism lay at the heart of the Kurdish problem. Accordingly, appropriate measures and corrections in relation to economic inequalities, underdevelopment and the feudal system of the regions in question would conventionally lead to dissolution of the Kurdish problem. May it be a state policy, as argued by some, intended to control the Kurds by deliberately turning a blind eye to underdevelopment of the East and Southeast regions and making the Kurds highly vulnerable and dependent on the state, may it simply be an economic cost factor, in terms of high transportation cost due to the mountainous geography of the regions, lack of skilled labor due to inadequate education and high risks of running a business in conflict regions, or may it be a mistake of the Kurds to express their economic problems with “Kurdism” through ethnic channels the undeniable fact is that the socio-economic gap between east and west is ever expanding in Turkey.

Nevertheless, it is not accurate to totally link Kurdish problem to an issue of economic wellbeing and underdevelopment, and that pursuing ethnic identity and

---

demanding rights will halt once people have reached a sufficient level of socio-economic development and adequate quality of life. Humankind, thus, require much more than food and wealth to carry on their existence; they desire to identify themselves within a society especially if they share common interests and characteristics. Besides, Basque and Catalonia regions where locals struggled to establish their ethnic identities and rights, are amongst the most developed and prosperous regions of Spain (Tan, 2009: 20).

And lastly, the fifth school of thought considers the Kurdish problem from a national perspective and argue that in respect of the principles of self-determination, the problem can only be resolved if an independent Kurdish states was to be established. Enthusiasts of this vision essentially suggest that inability of the Kurds to become a nation-state and declare independence shape the foundation of the Kurdish problem.

i. Defining the Kurdish problem

In today’s world system legitimacy rests with the nation states to conduct diplomatic, economic and social relations with other nation states in the world. As is know, this system encompassing international regulations were established with the Peace of Westphalia in 1649, where after decades of wars (the Thirty Years’ War in the Roman Empire and the Eighty Years’ War between Spain and the Dutch) European kingdoms agreed on the basic principle of sovereignty guaranteeing political self-determination, territorial integrity and non intervention in the internal affairs. Two elements are of great importance in nation states; first, the identification of self with and within a group, and second, a defined territorial claim. One of the pioneers of romantic nationalism Johann Gottlieb Fichte describes this as,

The first, original, and truly natural boundaries of states are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human art begins; they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole. Such a whole, if it wishes to absorb and mingle with itself any other people of different descent and language, cannot do so without itself becoming confused, in the beginning at any rate, and violently disturbing the even progress of its culture. From this internal boundary, which is drawn by the spiritual nature of man himself, the marking of the external boundary by dwelling place results as a consequence.

(Fichte, 1968: 190-1)

The nations in dispute of obtaining their rights and claiming their national identities tend to resort to political and territorial independence ideals as they perceive it as the only possible way to defuse the dilemma (White, 2000: 1). The nation-state principle suggests that conflicts would only cease to exist when all nations are able to exercise their rights to self-determination; “self-governance, however, implies sovereignty over a piece of the earth’s territory” (Ibid: 1). And, according to the Montevideo Convention of 26 December 1933, the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualification: a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other state. Consequently, during the 19th and 20th centuries, particularly deepened after the birth of the Turkish republic, the pioneers of the Kurdish nationalist movement, bearing in mind that a superior form of legitimacy could only be achieved through statehood, have adopted national liberation objectives stressing on the necessity of an independent Kurdish state (Olson, 1989; Özoglu, 2005).

However, rising globalization accompanied by radical concerns in terms of state patrimony, legitimized by national sovereignty, on issues such as crimes against humanity, environmental pollution, women’s rights, national minorities, human rights and genocide have blurred the vision and made the Westphalia state system more obsolete (Falk 1981; Van Ham, 2001: 98-99; Segell, 2000: 149-150).

Moreover, in the literature it has been argued that Kurdish problem has emerged as a result of external provocations and was sustained with foreign support, hypothesizing that amongst a verity of ethnic minorities living in Turkey, such as Bosnians, Armenians, Albanians, Pomaks, Circassians, Laz and Chechens, Kurds were the only group to demand self-determination, which according to this view could only indicate a foreign interest and involvement in the issue. However, at this point a simple fact seems to be overlooked by such theories; other ethnicities that have the required characteristic of a nation living with the borders of Turkey either have made their territorial claims already elsewhere, such as in Bosnia, Armenia and Albania, or they do not possess the necessary qualifications to make territorial claims, and/or they basically have no such claims.

Condensing the Kurdish problem into a specific perspective cluster goes against the intellectual responsibility of comprehensive scrutiny. Above mentioned schools of thought indicate that Kurdish problem is multidimensional, transnational and dynamic. Kurds are the third largest ethnic group residing in a highly militarized region, the Middle-East, where conflict never seems to cease over ethnic and religious differences, and the Kurdish lands hold some of the richest mineral and oil deposits in the world; even more importantly, however, water flow of the Middle-East is regulated by 22 dams build on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in Kurdish East and Southeast regions of Turkey. Furthermore, due to its multidimensional nature one can assume that most of the problems facing Turkey today would surface when one was to dig under the Kurdish dilemma and explore the situation of the Kurds throughout the history. Kurdish problem may be shaped as a result of changing conditions and dynamics of international system but one element tends to remains static that is the irresolvable nature of this conflict. When defining the Kurdish problem, this research follows a multidimensional approach and parallels with Richard Falk’s proclamation on the interplay between economic policy and human rights issues in accordance with democratization of Turkey (Falk, 2007). Therefore, the research will consider the Kurdish problem as a component of democratization in Turkey and as one that encompasses socio-economic and cultural rights issues at its core without disregarding the importance of self-determination demands of the Kurds as a nation.
CHAPTER 5: EXTERNAL ACTORS IN DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

I. THE EU AS AN EXTERNAL ACTOR AND EU CONDITIONALITY AS AN EXTERNAL FACTOR

This chapter will explore EU’s road map and capacity to become an influential external actor guiding democratic consolidation and persuasion of human rights policies in applicant states. One comes across with two major reasons as to why the EU is resolute on democratic fundamentals and human rights advocacy in its enlargement processes. Firstly, the gridlock in Turkey’s candidacy, as regards to human rights and democracy, points out that the EU is dedicated to and pays a great deal of importance to make democracy and human rights a key element in the enlargement process. Secondly, the EU has altered and modified prerequisites of conditionality in an extensive fashion in order to effectively promote democracy in the applicant states.

When analyzing the EU conditionality three general agreements emerge in the literature. First, the process of democratization in candidate states and the conditionality of the EU are closely related and complementary. Second, EU’s democratic conditionality in terms of policies, character and approach alters accordingly in each given cases; therefore, conditionality could be regarded as dynamic not static. And third, there has to be hope for full membership in order for applicants to truly understand, adopt and attain the conditionality.

For instance, the EU has followed a different democratic conditionality approach in consolidation processes of Eastern and Southern European countries. Conditionality on Central and Eastern European Countries seemed to have matured from that of Southern European cases, and put forth a more systematic advancement. On the other hand, recent enlargements, such as that of Turkey and the South Eastern European states, faced a further wave of alteration concerning the rules and regulations of the EU conditionality. It has been argued that the EU has exerted a much stricter approach to the recent enlargement incentives, which has blurred the purpose of conditionality and in the case of Eastern European states clearly led to full membership. However, one should not forget that the dynamics and certain requirements change according to ever changing world, what seemed to be appropriate for Eastern European countries may be unethical or inappropriate for other candidates of recent enlargement wave. In addition, as domestic dynamics of a prospect candidate change, the EU conditionality has to be tailored in accordance. Turkey, for example, is a special case of its own as it is separated culturally and religiously from the rest of the EU countries and candidates.

Furthermore, there is a tight-knit relationship between democratization, accession processes and EU conditionality. Accession processes enabled and facilitated conditionality to progress and engrave. The effectiveness and nature of conditionality would be affected by policy changes made in accession process; as

---

70 Olli Rehn states: “Conditionality only works if the countries can trust in the EU’s commitment to eventual membership, even if that is many years away” cited in Pridham, 2007: 464
Pridham puts it, “the drive behind conditionality has been predominantly extrinsic” (Pridham, 2007: 450).

In order to best assess EU’s role and impact as an external actor one must look at the origins and dynamics of EU conditionality, which is considered to be the backbone of Copenhagen Criteria and ultimately the enlargement processes. In the following section the origins of EU conditionality will be explored, and conditionality in the case of Southern European countries and CEECs will be compared to understand the nature, scope and typology of EU conditionality leading towards enlargement.

II. THE ORIGIN OF EU CONDITIONALITY

The political committee of the European parliament published The Birkelbach Report (1962) specifying the conditions for membership, and emphasizing on the significance and necessity of democracy as the prime governing system for each member state. According to this report, “only states which guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms can become members of our community” (Pridham, 1991: 215). The report also set limitations for, “the states whose governments do not have democratic legitimation and whose people do not participate in government decisions, either directly or through fully elected representatives, cannot aspire to be admitted into the circle of nations which form the European Communities” (Pridham, 2005: 30).

The EU, since the publication of this report, has constructed a successful conditionality mechanism which has gradually matured in guiding and controlling transition processes of applicant states. The bureaucratic structures of the EU, in its present improved form dealing with enlargements, the rules and regulations that applicant states must comply to become full members, have been a by-product of gathering experiences at various stages of accessions. In order to fully grasp conditionality mechanism of the EU and the ways it has been evolving since looking at various cases proves to be of use.

1. EU conditionality in Southern Europe

The literature in democratization studies has acknowledged the EU as an influential actor in democratization process (Pridham 1991; 2005; Whitehead 2001). For example, none of the Southern European applicants were formally accepted as members until they had succeeded in fulfilling most of the EU criteria (Schmitter, 1994: 25). Nevertheless, during this “preliminary phases” conditionality remained simply as a principle and the EU conditionality adopted an indulgent approach that just required possession of a constitution and the presence of free and fair elections. In addition, formal monitoring mechanism was absent during the enlargement phases of Southern European members (Pridham, 2007: 451).

Perhaps, the first challenge to the EU in terms of consolidation has been the case of Spain. Spain under the military dictatorship of Franco showed interest in joining the EU during the 1960s, and applied for association status with the EEC.
in 1962. The EU has responded in two different ways to this development. While the Benelux countries opposed Spain’s involvement under the Franco regime, West Germany and France were more willing to open negotiations doors to Spain. This disaccord also signaled that there were yet to be a collective consensus on conditionality issues amongst the Six. The EU institutions also had opposing views on the issue; while the Commission President Walter Hallstein favored to have closer relations with Spain, the European parliament rejected such a relationship. Due to rising pressure the EEC Council of Ministers signed a basic commercial agreement with Spain in 1970 without involving much of the political grounds. This development, for the first time, revealed that “political incompatibility with European democracies prevented association not to mention full membership of the EEC” (Pridham, 2005: 30). The end of Franco era in Spain eventually enabled the country to apply for membership in 1975. After reviewing the first democratic elections in 1977 the Commissions gave the green light and Spain became a member in 1986.

The EU’s role and influence as an external actor in democratization and transition processes could also be reviewed by examining the Greek case. Although Greece was the first country to sign an Association Agreement with the EEC in 1961 (Treaty of Athens), where the country was set to be associated at a later date, the agreement was put on hold by the Community after the military seized the power with a coup in 1967. There has been opposing views to these developments by various authors; while some believed that EU’s conditionality eventually led to the fall down of military regime in Greece due to the fact that economic pressures were unbearable, and as a result of regime choice the country further isolated itself from the Community (Verney and Couloumbis, 1991). The others reasoned this collapsed to the defeat in Cyprus in 1974 against the Turks, which shattered the trust in the military establishment (Tsingos, 2001). However the reason may be the EU’s approach in the case of Greece was an important step toward the development of a firm conditionality, “the EU once again learned a lesson about the complications of DC [Democratic Conditionality]. The collapse of the Colonels’ regime got it this time out of a dilemma, but the message was now obvious the need to develop a less reactive line. By and large, the Greek case reinforced the decision reached over Franco’s Spain that conditionality is best exercised in advance of membership, whether associate or full.” (Pridham, 2005: 32)

Another example that strikes out is Portugal. Similarly, Portugal first under Salazar from 1932 to 1968 then under Caetano from 1968 to 1974 was governed under authoritarian regimes. Under the slogan of: Democratization, Development and Decolonization (Three D’s) the Armed Forces Movement gained power in 1974. Following the fall of the authoritarian era Portugal applied for a membership to the EU in 1977 and became a member in 1986. The conditionality of the EU on Portugal has, without a doubt, been the main driving force behind Portugal’s democratization process (Magone, 2004). Moreover, Royo attests that, “the most important lever was, obviously, the democratic precondition for EC entry in the early phases of democratization in Portugal” (Royo 2004: 102).

According to Pridham democratic conditionality set by the EU in the case of Southern European prospects had three main problems. Firstly, there was a conflict of opinions between the political parties in the European parliament and the parliament itself and the role of the European Commission seemed to be trivial at the time. Secondly, “factors which could be called high politics intervened in determining when and how political requirements could be applied
and even waived” (Pridham, 2005: 34). And lastly, “although the existence of a democratic regime was a pre-condition for membership, this understanding of democracy was highly limited and was reduced mostly to the very minimum of conditions” (Pridham, 2005: 35).

2. EU conditionality in Eastern Europe

The cases of Central and Eastern European Countries integration into the EU are perhaps more obvious examples when analyzing the assistance of the EU, through conditionality mechanism, in democratization and transition processes. Scholars of interest have explored the nature and impact of various policy incentives of the EU, especially political conditionality, on altering domestic politics and dynamics (Pridham, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). This thesis argues that the EU, over time, has developed an effective and efficient mechanism of democratic conditionality that turns candidates into more democratic regimes in due course. Moreover, certain flaws of previous enlargement conditionalities such as the lack of formal monitoring mechanism during the enlargement phases of Southern European countries have been corrected and became stricter for CEECs, “while democratic conditionality emerged within the EU’s predecessor organisations from the 1960s, this did not become a strategy central to the enlargement process until the 1990s and then not clearly so until the second half of the decade” (Pridham, 2005: 60).

In the case of CEECs enlargement process and conditionality mechanism, the EU has adopted a more substantive understanding of democracy, through keeping an eye on labor rights, minority rights, corruption and women’s rights besides monitoring just the formal requirements of democracy. As Pridham points out the EU’s understanding of democracy has moved from one that is mainly procedural to one that is more substantive (Pridham, 2005: 21, 39). Furthermore, Pridham argues that, although satisfying some minimal conditions of democracy sufficed to meet EU conditionality standards in the past, the Commission and the EU itself lacks a systematic perception of democratic consolidation and democracy. (Pridham, 2005: 40). Recently, there has been a general understanding that the Copenhagen criteria, which are considered to be the cornerstone of the EU conditionality, were devised in an ambiguous fashion (Grabbe, 2002). Pridham, additionally, argues that this ambiguity may be deliberately allowed “for some flexibility in their application on grounds of high politics” (Pridham, 2005: 40). Again, elements of substantive democracy are evident in the Commission since the Commission has implemented a “checklist approach” and since there has been growing interest on gender equality, socio-economic rights and women’s rights. (Pridham, 2005: 41).

When comparing the conditionality criteria of the Southern European cases to those of the Eastern European ones, it can be said that EU democratic conditionality became wider through adding new elements and “it has moved decisively from the then essentially formal criteria, concentrating on institutional matters, to embrace areas of substantive democracy involving political society. This is particularly noticeable over human rights, which have in general become more of an EU concern over the past decade” (Pridham, 2005: 42). A further important requirement of the EU has been the “administrative capacity” of the candidates because most of the post-Communist candidates lacked strong
administrative capacities, which as a result has led to widespread corruption in such cases.

Considering the enlargement process of the CEECs alterations on the Commission’s role has been another significant factor. In order to direct the candidates to fulfill the conditionality criteria the Commission has prepared progress reports which have been “the centerpiece of the Commission’s activity concerning the DC…monitoring…the political and other Copenhagen criteria” (Pridham 2005: 44). In this regard, many believe that decisions made by the Commission are rather technical and objective than political. Nevertheless, Pridham argues that, “applying political criteria is to a large extent qualitative…This has left open some room for political decisions about candidate countries which could be influenced by subjective…considerations” (Pridham, 2005: 45).

III. ROAD TO CANDIDACY

The Europe Agreements, which were classified under Article 238 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), were seen as an association tool created to forge relationships with potential members. The negotiation talks between the EU and various Eastern European countries began as early as 1989 (King 1996: 99).

Turmoil in Yugoslavia steered the EU to take stricter measures on conditionality, especially in terms of human rights issues, and in its agreements with third parties. The 11 May 1992 declaration, on the subject of the EU’s dealings with the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) states came about as a result of such concerns. The main issue underlined in the declaration, referring to the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Agreement and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, was that human rights and democratic principles would constitute one of the most important elements of agreements between the EU and CSCE partners. This new essential element clause has been put in effect from May 1992 onward, starting with the dealings with the Baltic States.

One of the qualities seen in the organization of the EU and its institutions was its ability to find, analyze and correct certain errors. The Baltic clause of the Albanian agreement, for example, attracted heated criticisms due to the fact that it allowed for immediate suspension without the ability to defend if violation of human rights were evident, “the parties reserve the right to suspend this Agreement in whole or in part with immediate effect is if a serious violation occurs of the essential provisions of the present agreement.” Consequently, the Commission came to a decision to allow some consultation and the Community’s Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Slovenia on 5 April 1993 was the last time Baltic clause was utilized.

The Baltic clause had a short life and after a period of trials it was abandoned. The Commission adopted the Bulgarian clause instead, “whose main characteristic…was the setting up of a system of consultations prior to the suspension of the agreement…the term ‘suspension’ was substituted by

71 “Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Albania, on Trade and Commercial and Economic Co-operation” in OJ L 343/2 of 25.11.1992
appropriate measures’” (Fierro, 2003: 218). The Bulgarian clause was first used in the Association Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria in February and March 1993, and subsequently in agreement with CEECs, including Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Lithuania (King, 1996: 108-111).

The influence exerted by the EU fluctuated during the 1990s. There seemed to be two major factors; one was the possibility of a reasonable solution for the CEECs to be anchored in the European harbor (Phinnemore 1999) due to the Association Agreements, and the other was that the EU still did not come to a final conclusion on CEECs’ membership. The human rights clause had been installed within the Association Agreements. Diplomatic tools, such as demarches, were employed to influence the domestic politics of potential members owing to EU’s concerns on human rights issues. Yet, there seemed to be an absence of a genuine system that would enable the EU to influence and transform domestic policies of the applicant states.

IV. THE COPENHAGEN SUMMIT: THE WAY IN

Rising questions voiced out by associate countries about the step by step process, and set date of integration were not satisfied by the Europe Agreements, even though the Agreements seemed to move Eastern European countries towards a membership and also seemed to present a general political framework in terms of economic and political cooperation. Up until the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993 these complaints were seen as a secondary concern. Two historic moves came out of the Summit: first, all the CEECs countries with Europe Agreement after fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria should become full members.  

Furthermore, the main criteria demanded from the candidate countries were as follows:

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces with the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.

(Council of the European Union, 1993)

Some authors claim that the chaotic situation of Russia and Yugoslavia pushed the EU to announce a comprehensible statement on the accession of CEECs (Smith, 1999). For example, the coup attempt in Moscow on 19 August

---

72 “The associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required” Council of the European Union 1993.
1991, to bring down the pro-Western government, bewildered the EU member states and led them to pursue a more realistic approach. There was a growing concern amongst the EU countries that rising popularity of the ex-Communist parties and the coup attempt would reawaken Communism and eventually cause a wave of destabilization in Europe as a whole. Realizing that transition for ex-Communist block into liberal democracies would rather be problematic, the EU granted a greater compromise in the case of the Eastern European states, such as giving them the opportunity to become EU members.

Although it has established a solid groundwork for membership conditions, the Copenhagen criteria were too extensive and open to interpretations, and were considered by some to be rather indistinct (Grabbe, 2002: 251). The criteria lacked to address the intentions of the EU in taking concrete steps to guarantee viable democracy.

Secondly, formal supervision system between the EU and the applicant states were reduced to political discourse and merely went beyond it. This left the applicant states in the dark as to what they need to achieve to fulfill the criteria. Additionally, the EU was short of an aid mechanism that would facilitate important economic and political transformations required for membership to the Union.

V. THE ESSEN SUMMIT: DRAFTING THE PRE-ACCESION STRATEGY

The Essen Summit (1994) marks the point of setting a pre-accession strategy, which would provide further strategies and clarifications on the way to membership. One of the key declarations made by the EU in Essen was that the EU would help provide for and was dedicated to the lasting peace and stability of the European continent and neighboring regions. Essentially, the pre-accession strategy concentrated on the Phare programme, the White Paper of May 1995 and the Europe Agreements in order to situate precedence on the coordination discourse and to define important strategies concerning the internal markets. This came as a result of requests from the Commission to formulate a more articulated plan to get the candidates ready for accession (European Commission 1994a, 1994b, 1994c).

The main focus in the Essen Summit has been on legislative, economic and financial aspects of enlargement than on the political ones. The Summit laid out procedural provision for candidate countries but filling the gap of the political criteria commenced with the setting of Agenda 2000 proposals in 1997.

---

73 “The essential element of the strategy is their progressive preparation for integration into Internal Market of the Union…This strategy will be supported by the implementation of policies to promote integration through the development of infrastructure…This integration will be supported by the Phare programme” Council of European Union 1994
VI. AGENDA 2000 PROPOSALS: COMMENCING THE ACCESSION PROCESS

As mentioned above the main focus on Agenda 2000 proposals have been to screen and evaluate the political criteria, of candidate countries, that has become an indivisible requirement for membership. According to the Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty the Commission is entailed to offer its Opinion before the negotiations on accession with applicants can continue.74

To form an opinion concerning the “political criteria” various sources are available to the Commission such as the NGOs, the High Commissioner for Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), academic circles, the Council of Europe, and members states themselves (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 39). Opening of accession talks and their success would, therefore, highly depend on candidates’ regard of the political conditions and performance concerning the political criteria. The notion that priority has to shift more towards political criteria than towards the others was now acknowledged by the Commission (Avery and Cameron, 1998: 38). The Treaty of Amsterdam in June 1997 for example signaled the Commission’s shifting orientation towards political measures such as the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as specific clauses.


The applicant states of East Europe were not exempt from the “accession process” as the Luxemburg Council clearly stated that the Eastern European countries would as well be included in the accession process and the decision on whether and/or when to enter into negotiation talks will depend on compliance with Copenhagen criteria after an evaluation by the Commission has been completed.

As a result, in March 1998 negotiations commenced with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Nevertheless, pre-negotiation and negotiation periods experienced the most effective direct leverage of the EU over the applicant states due to the fact that the EU, assuming the gatekeeper role, kept a close eye on the domestic developments of the candidate states. (Pridham, 2002: 958).

74 Furthermore, Madrid Summit of 1995 granted new thrust to the process of enlargement according to which the Commission had to 1-“expedite preparation of its Opinion, so that it can be forwarded to the Council as soon as possible after the conclusion of the Inter-governmental Conference; and 2-“embark upon preparation of ‘a composite paper on enlargement’, to complement the Opinion by providing an overall approach (to how to incorporate new applicant states)”
VII. THE HELSINKI SUMMIT

The Helsinki Summit (1999) marks the era of a more systematized enlargement process as the decisions taken during the Summit strengthened EU’s accession criteria and monitoring abilities (Magen 2004: 16). The Commission recommended that Turkey should become a non-negotiating candidate as opposed to a potential candidate that was ultimately approved by the council. In addition, accession negotiations with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Malta and Latvia began.

By now, the EU has expanded its wings over to the Balkans by using carrot of membership and political conditionality (Pippan, 2004). Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed with Macedonia in 2001, and upon the Commissions recommendation on 9 November 2005 Macedonia was granted candidate status on 17 December 2005 with the Brussels Council.

EU’s dedication to consider the political criteria as a main aspect of enlargement process also came into light in the case of Croatia. The Council approved to open accession negotiations with Croatia in June 2004 upon the country’s application to become a member in February 2003. However, the main hindrance on Croatia’s membership status was that the country has been brought to tribunal in The Hague since there were some war crime issues left open. Therefore, the accession negotiations, which were set to begin in spring 2005, were postponed until March 2005. Formal accession negotiations were opened on 3 October 2005 and shortly thereafter on 20 October 2005 screening process was initiated.

Even though the Commission has reported on the improvement in the fields of human rights and formation of a stable democracy in Croatia, there were some visible problems, concerning the conditions set by the EU prior to membership, such as allowing ethnic Serbs who fled during the Yugoslavian civil war to return, full cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal, and reforming judiciary and public administration to fight corruption. Upon the ICTY’s statement that Croatia was “cooperating fully” with the tribunal, the country’s bid for accession was at last accepted in October 2005.

VII. EU CONDITIONALITY AND CANDIDATES’ MINORITY ISSUES

It is without a doubt that the wellbeing and general condition of ethnic and/or national minorities have been a key and a sensitive aspect for the EU in general and more so in the enlargement processes. Atrocities experienced in Yugoslavia have served as an important lesson and encouraged the decision makers of the EU to grant democratic and specific minority rights to minority groups in candidate states. By doing so the EU aimed to contribute to not only domestic peace and security but also to the security and welfare of the entire European region. For that reason, all candidates were required to resolve their minority problems within

---

75 The EU for example pressured Zagreb in the case of the former general Ante Gotovina who was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in July 2001
a democratic framework. The EU took a strong stand on the minority issues and was resolute to not allow candidates with serious minority crisis to join the club. The EU’s sensitivity concerning the protection of minorities and minority rights were clearly evident in its dealings with the candidate countries such as Romania, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Pentassuglia, 2001; Johns, 2003; Hughes and Sasse, 2003).

An important minority issues problem concerning the continental Europe had been the case of the Baltic States; especially in Estonia and Latvia where the ethnic languages had been debarred in the Soviet era and Russian had taken the status of official language. Following the declaration of independence, Estonia and Latvia had introduced major language policies, requiring individuals to pass proficiency exams. This was believed to be directed towards the Russian speaking minority to assimilate them but the EU once again exerted pressure on the Estonian and Latvian governments, “to promote integration of the Russian minority by, in particular, continuing to accelerate the speed of naturalization procedures, and by taking other proactive measures to increase the rate of naturalization”. (Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Estonia’s Preparations for Membership 2003). As a result in Latvia, for example, the government augmented the number of groups entitled for reduced naturalization fees in September 2003 and initiated new information campaigns on naturalization procedure.  

Although some assume that concerning the respect for and the protection of minorities in its Copenhagen criteria the EU showed double standards (De Witte, 2000; Hughes and Sasse, 2003), evident in Estonian and Latvian cases where they were allowed to join on 1 May 2004 with many problems unsolved (Adrey, 2005), the EU’s monitoring mechanism and pressure produced positive results in the view of minority issues. Estonia and, in particular, Latvia have shown considerable improvements on their democratization quests, confirmed repeatedly by the EU since 1997 having monitored and inspected the political regimes, and satisfied political criteria to commence membership talks (Muiznieks and Kehris, 2003). Muiznieks and Kehris defined the minorities issue in Latvia, in accordance with the EU candidacy, as an “issue-specific reluctant democratizer” (Ibid: 30).

Evidently, conditionality, specifically in terms of minority issues, has not led to an automatic solution of the minority problems; nevertheless, it has remained as an imperative factor escorting candidates that eagerly or reluctantly accept these conditions to tackle their minority issues in accordance with the EU conditionality.

IX. EU CONDITIONALITY IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGE

1. Stricter Conditionality and Elevated Ambiguity

As mentioned before the conditionality of the EU has had more of a dynamic than a static nature. Since the last enlargement of the Eastern European countries the EU enlargement process has been under alteration which gave way to new guidelines. According to Pridham these patterns could be summed up under following points: 1) the recent candidates and potential candidates are more

---

difficult cases than the EU has had to deal with previously in terms of conditionality and democratization; 2) the Union has gained much experience from the Eastern enlargement with regard to the application of democratic conditionality; 3) a new Commission has been in office since late 2004, and new commissioner Olli Rehn, who is in charge of enlargement of the EU, ‘has differentiated himself from his predecessor Gunter Verheugen in some key aspects of conditionality policy’; and 4) the crisis of the European constitution has demonstrated the so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ among people of the EU member states (Pridham, 2007: 454).

These new aspects, alongside with an overall democratic deficiency in the Western Balkans, have led the EU to employ a much stricter conditionality.\(^{78}\) Therefore, the EU implemented a more demanding, tougher political conditionality; new sections, such as detaining war criminals, were introduced.

These reforms and demands came as a result of the preceding experiences of the EU. Moreover, the Commission has exerted self criticism as regards to the Commission’s erroneous outlook that simple adaptations of legislation were adequate enough to fulfill political reforms without considering the reality on the ground more directly (Pridham, 2007: 460).\(^{79}\) To counter the deficiency in operationalization of reforms in candidate countries, the Commission has set up new techniques such as, “applying benchmarks for provisionally closing and also opening negotiations chapters…the introduction of safeguard clauses to extend monitoring; and a more routine and flexible procedure for suspending negotiations” (Pridham, 2007: 460). Croatia and Turkey were the countries to face these new reforms in their negotiation agendas in 2005.

The EU’s political conditionality, besides the introduction of tougher conditionality and new mechanisms, has been altered by the ambiguous character of the accession process. Negotiating Framework 2005, for Croatia and Turkey, indicated that, “by their very nature, the negotiations are an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand” (Negotiating Framework 2005: 1). Another criterion raised in the Negotiating Framework 2005 was, “the Union’s capacity to absorb” (Ibid: 3), which were seen in the declaration of the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 but have not affected the process of Eastern enlargement. This basically meant that a candidate, albeit fulfilling the requirements of the conditionality, might be refused membership after all due to the fact that the EU is unable to “absorb” this country.

Following the successful enlargement process leading to integration of various countries into the EU, “enlargement fatigue” set in. The Dutch and French referenda in 2005 were clear indicators of public opinion turning against further enlargements, which explains the pressure felt by the EU to implement issues of “absorption capacity” and open-ended nature of conditionality in future enlargements; “political conditionality has become broader in its scope, much tighter in its procedures, and less easy to control within a less enlargement-friendly environment in the EU and against less certainty about enlargement prospects” (Pridham, 2007: 468).

\(^{78}\) “There was a significant gap in political and economic transformations between the Western Balkans and East-Central Europe…Countries in the Western Balkans could therefore be fairly easily categorised as defective democracies, especially as regards progress with ‘stateness’, the rule of law, institutional stability, and political integration.” (Pridham, 2007: 457)

\(^{79}\) In addition, Jacoby (1999) called this inadequate monitoring of reforms as ‘Potemkin Harmonization’
As argued by Pridham, the imbalance between push and pull aspects of conditionality exerts, undeniably, the most harm to the strength and esteem of EU conditionality (Pridham, 2007). On the one hand, stricter conditionality, and a better monitoring mechanism for the progress of candidates have reinforced the push-effect of conditionality, while on the other hand, implications on the open-endedness of the accession process, inhospitable environment, and absorption capacity have diluted the pull-effect and disturbed the balance.

X. CHANGING EU CONDITIONALITY

As stated before, EU conditionality is dynamic and is prone to constant change. The main reason for this is the continuously changing nature of the international dynamics and relations. Historically, the European states endured two devastating World Wars and witnessed a civil war spreading over ethnic disputes. These dynamics influenced EU’s foreign policy formulation and alteration regarding third parties into one, which is established upon democratic fundamentals with utmost respect to human rights (Donnelly, 1994). With the Cold War coming to an end, the EU has shifted its human rights policy in its foreign affairs. The Union has adapted a more idealist foreign policy approach with human rights gaining the utmost respect. The Single European Act in 1987 is an example where the European parliament, with its newly gained power of assent, exerted its pressure on the other EU institutions to consider human rights as an indispensable part of EU’s external affairs, becoming increasingly apparent in the post-Cold War era.

Maastricht Treaty on 7 February 1992 marks the point of formal recognition and entry in force of this new policy shift. The Treaty made explicit references, for example Article 130, to human rights, rule of law and democracy. Another formal recognition, which integrated the human rights into the EU’s main legal order, came with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999.

A further factor behind EU’s changing conditionality was Europe’s incessant security demands. It has been argued that the European continent would be secure and stable only when the CEECs were integrated into the Union after a process of further democratization that leads to a successful realization of the conditionality (Kahl, 1997; Sperling and Kirchner, 1998). European Agreements, in this regard, were considered to be the most effective way of dealing with the security issues in relation to the CEECs, and set up a climate of confidence (Smith, 1999). Security and stability understood and aspired by the EU would only be achievable if CEECs would implement the norms of market economy and liberal democracy into their own state order. Membership to the EU and the conditionality it contained within enabled the EU to use this, mutually beneficial situation, as a carrot for CEECs, and furthermore, as a sanction tool. It can be said that CEECs have experienced a much tougher conditionality in order to balance out push-pull dynamics to enable the formation of more liberal and democratic candidates. The conditionality on CEECs had to be altered towards a stricter direction to fit the specific conditions due to the fact that former socialist CEECs were new to the values of Western style liberal democracy.

The unfriendly environment boosted by the enlargement-fatigue led the EU to apply a tougher conditionality for potential and new candidates. For example,
potential candidates in the Western Balkans showed poor results in terms of human rights, rule of law and minority issues, which has led the EU to be stricter when exerting conditionality (push-effect) for new or potential candidates.

XI. APPLICATION OF EU CONDITIONALITY

Considering the enlargement processes, it can be said that the role of the EU has changed from a “passive democratic hub” into an “active democratic hub” (Magen, 2004: 21). The EU was able to exercise the most efficient leverage over the governments and population of the candidate states through formalizing the Copenhagen criteria, alongside with Accession Partnership agreements and active monitoring through progress reports. In other words, for the first time in the history of enlargement, the EU has constructed a methodical, comprehensive and an active plan to amplify the pace and depth of democratization in candidate countries.

One such active role assumed by the EU has been its involvement and control in all stages of the accession processes; the EU has been acting as a “gatekeeper” permitting the applicants to proceed or rejecting their entry altogether (Grabbe, 2002a). Seven stages of the accession process are: 1) privileged trade access and European assistance; 2) Signing an enhanced Association Agreement; 3) recognition of an official candidate state; 4) opening of accession negotiations; 5) opening and closing of the chapters in negotiations; 6) signing of an accession treaty; and 7) ratification of the accession treaty by national parliaments, the European parliament and possible referenda in some countries (Vachudova, 2005: 126).

A major step, which changed the milieu of relations, between the applicant countries and the EU was the recognition of the associated state as a candidate state. The instruments used by the EU to effectively steer the applicant states through the stages of accession process, as observed in the accession of CEECs, were demarches, Agenda 2000 and the Opinions, Screening and Negotiations, Accession Partnerships and National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), and Progress Reports.

1. Demarches

Demarches take the form of public opinion and criticism in the enlargement process of the EU. Demarches come into effect, especially, for those candidates with blemished records of democratic performance, and are considered EU’s primary tool of active leverage. Public criticisms are an effective instrument of the EU for the application of conditionality in the sense that, “the most dramatic and sustained public criticism by the EU was of the third Meciar government in Slovakia, starting with a demarche in October 1994 and ending only once it lost power in 1998” (Vachudova, 2005: 127). Besides demarches, official protests and diplomatic notes are some of the other effective tools utilized by the EU (Pridham, 2005).
2. Agenda 2000 and the Opinions

As an important and influential instrument utilized by the EU, Agenda 2000 and the Opinions assess and screen applicant countries in accordance with the Copenhagen political criteria: democracy, human rights and minorities, and the rule of law. The EU’s understanding of democracy coincides with liberal definitions of democracy, a multi-party system where fair and free elections take place. The key points that are put under the loop are: the structure of the executive, the significance of parliaments, the existence of civilian control over the military and relations between central and local governments. “Human Rights and Protection of Minorities” clauses assess whether or not there is adequate respect for fundamental human rights and protection of minorities. In this respect the Commission evaluates human rights violations such as restrictions on civil and political rights, the use of death penalty, freedom of speech and association, freedom of religion and education, and the rights to property. Judicial systems are put under scrutiny considering the extent to which the judiciary can function independently, free of any de facto or de jure influences such as the military.

The significance of the Opinions in EU’s accession decision can be observed through the example of 1997 Opinions where the Commission advised to begin accession negotiations with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. The negotiations would be put on halt in the case of Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania and Slovakia due to the lack of compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. Consequently, Slovakia was rejected owing to political criteria and Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania and Lithuania for economic reasons.

According to Vachudova, the Opinions reveal two groups considering the EU accession, “ins” and “pre-ins” rather than “ins” and “outs” (Vachudova, 2005: 114). Pre-ins were the countries which had gained a membership status that was pending an approval. In this respect, the EU has extended the reach and effectiveness of the conditionality that persisted for the “ins” and the “pre-ins” alike.

3. Screening and Negotiations

Screening process is another important instrument forming the foundation for the bilateral negotiations between the EU and the candidate countries. The process includes the involvement of both the various candidates and the Commission together. Negotiations facilitate the preparation for the candidates to realize the conditions of membership, which in this case would be implementation and adoption of the Acquis. There are various chapters in the Acquis and negotiations take place in each chapter individually.

Considering the democratic conditionality, candidate countries must prove a certain degree of progress in term of implementation and adoption of the Acquis in order to begin negotiations and open the accession chapters after reaching certain benchmarks. Intergovernmental conference decides on whether certain chapters will be opened or closed, and this must be unanimously approved.
4. Accession Partnership and NPAA

Accession partnership, a pre-accession strategy, is designed to serve as a guiding mechanism for each candidate country during their membership quest. In accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, the Accession Partnership specifies short or medium term prerequisites of the EU for candidate countries. A National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) is drawn by each candidate state to establish a timetable for putting the partnership into effect.

As for political conditions, requirements of the EU in terms of human rights, democracy and democratization, the rule of law and minority rights from the candidates are instructed in the documents of the Accession Partnership. In order to meet the terms of the EU requirements, charted in the Accession Partnership documents, candidates are asked to prepare national reform programmes and incentives. For that reason, the NPAA and the Accession Partnership are considered to be effective instruments of the EU, which can change the domestic political structure of the candidate counties.

5. Progress Reports

The steps taken by the candidate countries in compliance with the EU conditionality are documented in regular reports, agreed upon on the Council Meeting in Luxemburg in 1997. Furthermore, the European Council meeting in Cardiff in June 1998 called for the presentation of the progress reports and composite paper prepared by the Commission, taking the techniques used for the Opinions in Agenda 2000 into consideration. The progress reports and composite papers analytically assess Economic and Political Criteria, Ability to Assume the Obligation of Membership and Common Foreign and Security Policy of candidates (in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria). The Political Criteria of the progress reports and composite paper contains examination and evaluation in the areas of the executive, parliamentary and judicial systems, protection of minorities and human rights. 

XII. EFFECTS OF EU CONDITIONALITY

The degree of effectiveness and the impact of EU conditionality can be evaluated by a cost-benefit analysis, as illustrated in the existing literature of EU studies. According to cost-benefit analysis if total expected benefits outweigh the total expected cost the intervention or the process is most likely to occur. In other words, if the candidate countries expect their benefits, in terms of welfare,  

---

80 Composite paper, for example, states that, “A common problem for all the candidate countries remains the inherent weakness of the judiciary…On the issue of minorities, the EU has already welcomed the outcome in Latvia’s recent referendum on the citizenship law…The situation of the Roma continues to be problematic in Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic” (European Commission 1998c: 3-4)
international legitimacy, socio-economic growth and security, to be greater than their costs, such as potential ethnic rivalry and certain loss of national sovereignty, they would be more willing to comply with the membership requirements.

This unbalanced relationship between the EU and the candidate countries is defined, by some, as an “asymmetrical interdependence” which “is a basis for power” where “potential power accrues to the less dependent actor in a relationship” (Keohane, 1990: 37). According to this relationship the EU, being the less dependent actor, identifies and even enforces the conditions of relations between the candidates and the Union. If the candidates do not comply with the terms and conditions set by the EU they will be ruled out of the enlargement process.

Besides cost-benefit evaluations in determining the impact of EU conditionality, the advancements in this asymmetric relation should be based on individual ability or achievement of the applicants, in other words should be meritocratic. Furthermore, costs and benefits of conditionality process should be plausible. Vachudova describes meritocracy as, “an applicant’s place in the membership queue” which “has corresponded to the progress it has made toward fulfilling the EU’s requirements”. In addition she states that, “all of the candidates are subject to the same requirements and are evaluated in a manner that has proves to be more or less based on merit” (Vachudova, 2005:112).

In order to sustain an effective conditionality the EU utilizes meritocracy and consistency to assess candidates’ performance and eligibility. However, the EU has been subject to criticism due to its asymmetrical application of conditionality demands on candidates. Some candidates have received more mellow conditionality whereas others had to go through a much tougher process. Smith argues that, “membership conditionality has not been applied consistently and other considerations will continue to play a role in enlargement decision” (Smith, 2003: 105). This inconsistency, in a way, reduces the power of EU conditionality. However, it is also evident that identical requirements can not be applied consistently on all the applicants due to the fact that each candidate brings certain dynamics and issues that are specific to that country, and a meritocratic approach enables the EU to address these case specific problems in likely manner.

Critics of EU’s approach towards exerting its conditionality argue that the EU at times prioritize certain elements such as politics, geopolitical concerns and overall expected benefit of the candidate to the Union as a whole along with pressures of individual member states over a merit-based accession process. For example, although Romania and Bulgaria failed to fulfill the political criteria as instructed, their membership was seen as necessary to maintain stability in the Balkans (Pridham, 2007: 453). Also, the Union turned a blind eye to the Russian minority issues in Estonia and Latvia during their accession processes (Pridham, 2007; Vachudova, 2005: 114).

A further shortcoming of the EU conditionality is its indistinct definition that includes slippery and controversial concepts, which can lead to extremely politicized process (Pridham, 2006: 377; Grabbe, 2002: 251). This leads to, “possibility for ‘wiggle room’, both on the side of the EU and the targeted state” (Kubickev, 2005: 182). However, “the more transparent the EU conditionality is, the higher the probability is of rule adoption taking place” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2005: 52).

Regarding the effects of EU conditionality in transforming the domestic political and social structures in the candidate countries, two distinct approaches
come into light; first a passive leverage, “the traction that the EU has on the
domestic politics of credible candidate states merely by virtue of its existence and
its usual conduct” (Vachudova, 2005: 65); and second, an active leverage where
the EU systematically exercises direct influence on the whole political system to
democratize candidate countries (Vachudova, 2005: 143).

Passive leverage includes the cost-benefit dynamic of the EU membership.
Benefits such as international legitimacy, economic assistance from the EU and
increasing foreign direct investment; and the costs of exclusion, losing legitimacy
and being labeled as an outsider. The EU had not taken a systematic approach, in
the passive leverage phase, to supervise democratic performances of the
candidates; however, the existence of the EU had been a factor in the political
transformations in the candidate countries.

Governing elites in the applicant countries make it difficult for the EU to exert
direct influence due to the fact that they perceive the EU requirements as a
dangerous threat to their domestic political status. Nonetheless, EU’s active
leverage produces several visible changes in the political dynamics of the
candidate states such as in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia; “the greatest and
clearest impact of EU leverage was...in shaping the political forces that won
those elections...EU leverage...strengthened pro-EU civic groups and shaped
how opposition parties portrayed themselves in the election campaigns...and how
they governed once in power” (Vachudova, 2005: 140).

When discussing EU’s democratizing force on the candidate countries, the
concepts of convergence and conditionality in democratization theory has to be
taken into account. According to Pridham convergence is a “gradual movement in
system conformity with a grouping of established democratic states that has the
power and institutional mechanisms to attract transiting regimes and to help
secure their democratic outcomes. The EU is the most ambitious example...of this
kind of grouping” (Pridham, 2001: 4).

The convergence has an influence on content, policy choices and socio-
economic interest of candidate states. The effects of elites’ mentalities also play
an important role at this stage (Pridham, 1999a: 61). In relation to convergence
the process of socialization or international socialization has increasingly gained
attention. According to Schimmelfennig, international socialization is “a process
in which states are induced to adopt the constitutive rules of an international
community” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006: 2). Furthermore, Schimmelfennig
states that, “material and political external incentives and domestic costs prove to
be one of the most important conditions for an effective impact of international
organizations on democratic consolidation” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006: 5).

The EU has gathered an adequate amount of experience and understanding,
throughout its history and enlargement processes, to develop an effective
conditionality mechanism that monitors candidates’ performances both actively
and passively. In addition, EU’s democratic conditionality has become much
more comprehensive in detailing the democratic criteria, which have shifted
towards substantive understanding of democracy from procedural conditions
(Pridham, 2005: 21).
XII. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, this chapter depicts the importance and necessity of the EU conditionality in the accession process; the conditionality enables the EU to exert its influence in transforming domestic politics and policies, and revitalizing democratization in candidate countries. The impact and effectiveness of the conditionality depends on various conditions, such as push-pull/const-benefit dynamics of EU conditionality. This dynamic signifies that as long as the candidate states successfully comply with all the democratic conditions of the conditionality, the EU opens its doors without any reservations. Nevertheless, there seems to be a change in the course of push-pull dynamics, which has been successfully utilized by the EU, during certain enlargement periods, namely post-Eastern enlargement. While the EU has put forth tougher and stricter conditionality on the candidate countries, especially in the post-enlargement period the benefit of becoming an EU member has become more ambiguous. However, it is evident that the EU and its conditionality have played a vital role, directly and indirectly, in democratization processes of the candidate countries on their way to membership.

In the next section of the thesis main focus will be on the impact of EU conditionality on Turkey observed through variations in socio-economic and human rights (cultural rights) situation of the Kurdish minority in pre and post Helsinki periods. This will lead the research into not only examining EU’s role in Turkey’s compliance with the political criteria in terms of human rights and minority issues but also into an overall micro analysis on the effectiveness of EU conditionality, which ultimately produces macro outcomes. Even though, Turkey has applied for a membership as early as 1987, it only gained the candidate status in 1999. Some believe that it actually took that long for Turkey to comply with the conditions of pre-candidacy, while the others argue that EU’s double standard have been at play. It is, however, agreeable that Turkey either lacked the basic motivation to comply with the conditionality or there were other internal dynamics in effect such as the indecisiveness and apathy to resolve the Kurdish issue.

Nevertheless, EU’s pressure has generated a number of political reforms in Turkey. The unenthusiastic approach towards these reforms on behalf of Turkey is believed to be as a result of misconceptions of the Turkish political leadership that implementation of substantial reforms alone sufficed for membership without proving effective results. Another scenario is that Turkey deliberately did not comply with the conditionality to keep the leverage and sovereignty on such issues as the protection of minorities, human rights, and various other political, geopolitical and economic reasons. In other words Turkey was ambiguous to join the EU because, “once membership begins…the indirect effects of European integration in helping to consolidate democracy increase through the very intensification of networking that goes with membership” (Pridham, 2002). Expressly, once a member Turkey would have no choice but to abide by the rules and regulations of the Union, even in delicate subjects such as the Kurdish problem, secularism and Islam, Cyprus and Armenia.

The next section will discuss that the reforms made by Turkey in this aspect were too feeble to produce a meaningful transformation of the political system. It
is for that reason the EU was unable to grant Turkey a membership owing to the incomplete democratization process and lack of substantive results on the ground. In addition the hypothesis is that through observing the situation of the Kurds in pre and post Helsinki periods, the comparison would enable the effectiveness of the EU conditionality and impact of the EU as an external actor in democratization process. Improvements observed in socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds in post-Helsinki period, considering various domestic and external factors, would indicate that the EU as an external actor and EU conditionality as an external factor play a much more significant role in the democratization process than internal factors, and that data is generated from substantive results as “the decision on EU accession of a country can only be made on the basis of a sound assessment of the reality on the ground and not only by screening the transposition of EU law into national law” (Committee of the Regions Press Release 15 April 2010).
CHAPTER 6: EU-TURKEY RELATIONS: THE PRE-HELSINKI PERIOD

The purpose of this chapter, as stated above, is to demonstrate the actual impacts of the EU conditionality upon the Turkish democratization and democratic consolidation through evaluating the minority issues, precisely the Kurdish issue. The period in question is between 1987, the year of Turkey’s application for EU membership, and 1999 the year the EU granted Turkey with candidate status. In order to assess the situation of the Kurds in relation with EU conditionality and Turkey’s compliance, the relations between Turkey and the EU during this period has to be observed. Furthermore, the link between the EU and Turkey’s relationship and Turkey’s relationship with its Kurdish minority will be presented to see if there is a linkage. In other words, did the fluctuations in the situation of the Kurds, if there were any, have domestic orientations or did they come as a result of external pressure, namely due to EU conditionality.

During the period in question Turkey’s status has been that of a prospective candidate in the pre-candidacy phase. Regarding the pre-Helsinki relations between the EU and Turkey it can be said that no accession mechanism has been created for Turkey until the Helsinki Summit in 1999. This has led to a lack of motivation on behalf of Turkey to fulfill the prerequisites of the conditionality. However, this motivation shortage may have been generated due to various internal factors such as decisions made by power players in domestic politics to ensure their authority, and fear of losing national sovereignty and leverage in negotiations and decision making. Nevertheless, with the pressure exerted by the EU several reforms took place during this period.

I. EU CONDITIONALITY AND TURKEY’S PURSUIT OF MEMBERSHIP

The initiation of the EU-Turkey relations dates back to 31 July 1959 with Turkey’s official application for an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC). The Association Agreement between the Community and Turkey signed in 12 September 1963 came into effect on 1 December 1964. The Additional Protocol, signed on 23 November 1970, and the Ankara agreement of 1963 has formed and formalized the basis of relations between the Community and Turkey. With the support of the Additional Protocol and the Ankara agreement, framework for 1995 Customs Union was realized. Since then, human rights record and political (democratic) performance of Turkey have become the most sensitive and controversial issues in the EU-Turkey relations.

The relations between the EU and Turkey came to a halt as the EU preferred to watch the developments in Turkey from sidelines and became relatively ineffective and uninvolved in promoting human rights and democracy in Turkey. This, first and foremost, came in as a result of the military coup that took place in
Turkey on 12 September 1980, where the existing constitution was dropped and a new constitution was drafted by the generals. A further reason was that international political environment at the time forced Turkey to prioritize security over the deliberation of human rights and democracy. According to Ugur, Turkey could not and would not put its political stability and security at risk owing to any “soft” issues like democracy (Ugur, 2000: 269-70). This asymmetry, putting all the effort on one short-term priority and totally neglecting other priorities that would show effect in the long run, however may have caused Turkey a deeper scar than initially anticipated, which would eventually take far too long to heal.

Considering democracy and human rights, the EU has intensified its pressure on Turkey, noticeably, after 1986. It can be said that EU developed a new approach towards Turkey and Turkish accession during this period. A major reason behind this policy change was that the EU has made human rights, successful democratization and protection of minorities a prerequisite and has integrated these norms into its legislative. On the other hand, equally important, factor was Turkey’s application for EU membership. Turkey was becoming increasingly eager to overcome the deadlock that has been in effect, since the 1980 coup took place, by submitting an application. Policy makers of Turkey had realized the benefits of membership; Prime Minister Özal, especially, was a big advocate of EU membership. In his letter to Jacques Delors, the head of the European Commission, Özal stated that incorporation with the EU represented the prominent devotion of Turkish foreign policy (Milliyet, 30 January 1986).

Consequently, a formal step towards the normalization of relations was taken on 16 September 1986 during the EU-Turkey Association Council meeting in Brussels. The meeting underlined various points and acknowledged the necessity to rejuvenate relations with Turkey. Another point raised by the EU was that the indispensable condition for the smoothening of relations was Turkey’s respect for human rights and ability to re-establish effective democracy.

II. EU'S INFLUENCE IN TURKISH DEMOCRATIZATION

Following the normalization period of the EU-Turkey relations, progress made by Turkey in democratization quest was often considered, by the EU, as rather deficient, which would significantly obstruct Turkey’s further integration with the Union. In this regard, Leo Tindemans, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Jaque Chirac, French Prime Minister declared that before applying for membership Turkey needs to extensively improve its democratic basis (Tekeli and Ikin, 2000: 86).

Recognition by Turkey to allow individuals to file complaints to the European Commission of Human Rights on 23 January 1987, particularly, demonstrated that the pressures exerted by the EU were starting to generate results in Turkey. The Commission and the Parliament considered this move as a show of dedication on behalf of Turkey in making progress to address and accurate human rights issues, and to improve its democracy.

As a result, Turkey’s official application to become an EU member was submitted on 14 April 1987. Ali Bozer, the minister in charge of relations with the
EU, made the following statement, “we demonstrate Turkey’s dedication to become European through this application” (Milliyet, 15 April 1987). As stated before, constitution composed by the military general in 1982, made the realization of any legislative changes extremely difficult; this was also a main concern considering the application process and its aftermath. Sharing this concern, Prime Minister Özal said that in relation to democracy and human rights Turkey would have been able to make more progress if the constitution could be changed more easily (Milliyet, 15 April 1987). Evidently, it took Turkey an additional 23 years and a public referendum to change various articles in the constitution on 12 September 2010; therefore, one should not be surprised that even though Turkey was one of the first applicants its membership is still pending.

Turkey’s official application to the EU has been considered as a decisive moment in the EU-Turkey relations. Turkey, by submitting an official application, moved into the European sphere of influence and lost a certain degree of leverage to EU’s conditionality mechanism, in particular on the subject of democracy, democratization and human rights issues. Ali Karaosmanoglu states that, “this move led to a considerable increase in European influence on the process of democratization in Turkey” (Karaosmanoglu, 1994: 129).

As anticipated, the European institutions became more concerned and involved in Turkey’s political system and state structure. The European Parliament frequently conversed issues with reference to Turkey. The Association Council meeting, on 25 February 1988, brought various concerns to the table such as the position of the Kurds, relations with Greece and the Cyprus problem, the anti-democratic policies of the Turkish state and the status of Armenians. Human rights and democratization in Turkey were the main focus of the meeting; however, various economic issues including a decrease in custom duties and the free movement of goods and peoples were also discussed.

Furthermore, Özal held a speech in the Council of Europe meeting on 27 September 1989, calling attention to the historical place of Turkey in Europe, to strengthen the ties between the EU and Turkey and to highlight Turkey’s dedication to EU membership. Özal explicitly talked about his preparations to make further reforms to intensify democratization process in accordance with EU conditionality. He stated that crimes of thought would be abolished by removing Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Turkish Penal Code, and that Turkey would recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights promptly.

Keeping Özal’s speech and Turkey’s observed progress in mind, the Commission gave its Opinion on Turkey’s application on 17 December 1989, and stated that developments in human rights and minority issues “have not yet reached the level required in a democracy” (European Commission 1989). However, the Commission has not completely closed the door on Turkish membership, “the Commission recommends that the Community propose to Turkey a series of substantial measures which would enable both partners to enter now on the road towards increased interdependence and integration, in accordance with the political will shown at the time of the signing of the Ankara Treaty” (European Commission 1989).

The Commission’s Opinion has generated diverse reactions in Turkey. While for President Özal this seemed to be a positive development on behalf of Turkey; political leaders such as Erdal İnönü blamed the government for being deficient in democratic practices and respect for human rights. Consequently, the Council did not take Turkey’s application into consideration and Turkey’s application, submitted in 1987, was left on the shelf and signified the end of the period in which Turkey attempted to formally acquire accession to the EU.

III. KURDISH QUESTION: SOURING EU-TURKEY RELATIONS

Forming a Customs Union alliance with the EU exposed Turkey to rising EU criticism on human rights issues and democracy. Building a Customs Union with the EU, however, was not enough for Turkey to embark on political reforms on sensitive issues, specifically the Kurdish problem. During the period of Customs Union discussions, Kurdish question and human rights abuses were the main focus, and seemed to be the exclusive discussion topic, of EU-Turkey relations.82

Intensification of the war between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) during the 1990s was, perhaps, the most significant factor effecting EU-Turkey relations. Increasing death toll due to the clashes in the East and Southeast provinces called for state of emergency in the regions. This has, evidently, made the armed forces the supreme state organ, overpowering the parliamentary, legislative and judiciary functions of the government in the regions in question. The state of emergency, which has lasted 15 years from 1987 to 2002, resulted in countless human rights violations and state repression in the Kurdish East and Southeast. This has, consequently, led to souring of EU-Turkey relations. Not only the decision makers of the EU seemed to distance themselves from Turkey due to the atrocities in the East and Southeast, but also the EU citizenry was concerned with the Kurdish minority. EU’s public opinion turned against Turkey and Turkish candidacy especially after observing the killings of at least 90 civilians (45 in Cizre alone), of Kurdish origins, during the 1992 Newroz (spring) celebration in the hands of the Turkish Special Forces units (Zaman, 1993: 8).83

Upon these developments, in the eastern and south-eastern provinces, EU citizens voiced their concerns to their respective governments about the issue. For example, German civil society urged the German government to stop providing Turkey with military equipment, stressing that Turkey was utilizing tanks donated by Germany against the Kurdish civilians. Consequently, Germany decided to discontinue military aid to Turkey (Sabah, 28 March 1992). This also meant a deterioration of relations between Germany and Turkey.

Nevertheless, the European institutions and decisions makers were having a hard time to understand the conspiracy surrounding the Kurdish problem. On the


83 See also The Economist 1992
one hand, Turkey was quick to turn the blame on the “Kurdish separatist movement” and on the armed movement of the PKK for raging terror and causing atrocities and human rights abuses, may they be directly caused by the PKK themselves or indirectly by the armed forces (collateral damage). On the other hand, any legitimate move attempted by the Kurds, to pursue their cause through democratic and parliamentary channels, was countered by the Turkish state in a harsh discriminatory manner. The pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP), for example, was banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court and eight Kurdish MPs were imprisoned. This incident invoked a considerable response from the European public opinion and numerous EU leaders; German Chancellor Helmut Kohl became involved in this event.\(^{84}\)

Another significant European reaction to the situation of the Kurds in Turkey came with the Brittan Report, prepared by Sir Leon Brittan Vice-President of the Commission, while the negotiations to finalize the Customs Union were on the way. The report was presented to the Council on 13 July 1994 and underlined the Kurdish question, in particular the situation of the DEP and MPs. According to the Brittan Report these developments have incited profound reactions in Europe, and indicated that Turkey might not be capable to realize its requirement concerning the Customs Union (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2000: 362).

Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minister, gave a speech on the importance of, and the EU’s dedication to, international human rights and democratic norms in the Association Council meeting on 19 December 1994. Special reference was made on Turkey’s poor human rights records and insufficiency to promote effective democratization. Following Kinkel’s speech, Murat Karayalcin, Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey, responded by declaring the efforts made by the coalition government to gather support for democratization. He also stressed upon the point that the EU would play an important role in Turkey’s democratization process if the Union pulled Turkey closer to its harbors. In addition, Turkey’s intentions to finalize the Customs Union at the first Council meeting on 6 March 1995 were expressed by Karayalcin (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2000: 396).

IV. THE CUSTOMS UNION AND EU’S PRESSURE

As expected, the Customs Union agreement was finalized on 6 March 1995 at the Association Council meeting. Greece’s veto was eventually lifted in exchange for hopes to speed up the solution of the Cyprus issue. Douglas Hurd, the Foreign Secretary, and the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe, both voiced their concerns on Turkey’s human rights abuses, including the detention of journalists, writers, human rights activists and Kurdish deputies. Alain Juppe openly asked Turkey to release the Kurdish DEP members of the parliament (Turkish Daily News, 6 March 1995). He, furthermore, emphasized the fact that Turkey had

\(^{84}\) In addition Hans van den Broek, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, also paid a visit to Turkey following DEP’s closure and MPs imprisonment voicing his concerns over the Kurdish problem. Furthermore, the Essen European Council concluded that, “The European Council made a statement to the press expressing its concerns that freely elected Members of Parliament had been sentenced to imprisonment in Turkey and urging for respect for human rights” (Council of the European Union 1994)
agreed with the OSCE principles, and further improvements in EU-Turkey relations would depend on Turkey’s compliance with these principles.

In response to such concerns and arguments, Karayalcin stated that Turkey was, currently, aiming to make changes in the constitution, including the amendments to 21 articles, to enable the emergence of a framework that would facilitate the settlement of such issues in question. He argued that effective realization of these reforms would augment the quality of Turkey’s democracy to the European levels. In addition, Karayalcin also stated that the realization of the reforms might be a long term process, and that Turkey would necessitate EU incentives and support to accomplish these goals (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2000: 427).

These developments were followed by a visit of EU officials, including the term President Alain Juppe, the previous term President Klaus Kinkel, the next term President Javier Solana and the Commissioner in charge of the EU’s external affairs, to Ankara on 23 March 1995. The purpose of this visit was: firstly, to remind Turkey of its duties concerning the operationalization of the Customs Union on 1 January 1996, and secondly, to push for human rights advocacy and democratization in Turkey.85

The EU appeared to be particularly firm on human rights advocacy, and increased its pressure, in relation to EU conditionality, to improve human rights record if Turkey was to successfully finalize the Customs Union agreements. The Union, in particular, emphasized that Article 8 of the Turkish Anti-Terror Law, which basically prosecuted separatist propaganda as an act of terror against the state, needed serious revisions.86 Prime Minister Tansu Ciller addressed the European politicians by stating that due to some political reasons the amendments of Article 8 was not possible until the end of December, upon which Kinkel and Santer, the President of the Commission, responded by stating that the abolition of Article 8 was the condition that the European parliament was putting on ratification of the Customs Union agreement. Consequently, on 27 October 1995 Turkey made the necessary changes to Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law. Prime Minister Ciller stated that this indicated the government’s dedication to democratize Turkey, and the road to ratification of the Customs Union had been cleared.

V. AGENDA 2000 AND TURKEY

As conferred before, Agenda 2000 was an important and influential instrument utilized by the EU in assessing and screening applicants’ compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria; in terms of democracy, human rights and minorities, and the rule of law. On the subject of Turkey’s eligibility the Commission raised two fundamental setbacks in Turkey’s political regime: firstly, the Kurdish problem, and secondly, civil-military relations. The Commission’s recommendations generated strong criticism amongst the Turkish politicians and institutions. During his visit to Ankara, Jaques Poos, the President of the EU and Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, said that Turkey would not become a full

85 During the same period in question, Turkey, with 35,000 soldiers, has launched an attack against the PKK rebels in the northern Iraq - Daily Telegraph, 21 March 1995
86 See for example Case No TK/64 – Ibrahim Aksoy – Turkey of the Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarians. http://www.ipu.org/hr-e/159/tk64.htm
member of the EU unless it solved the Kurdish problem through initiating a dialogue (Hürriyet, 3 September 1997). Furthermore, Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minister, stated that, “Turkey has had a place reserved for it on the European train since 1963 but there is no chance of it getting on the train in the near future… [Turkey] has to deal with its domestic tasks…The first of these are human rights, the Kurdish problem and economic problems” (Turkish Probe, 19 September 1997). In a similar fashion, France also insisted on the implementation of large scale reforms in Turkey dealing with human rights and freedom of expression issues (Ibid).

VI. DETERIORATING RELATIONS

The year following the recommendations of the Commission in 1997 regarding the Kurdish problem and human rights, Turkey’s relations with some of the most influential EU countries witnessed further deterioration. Relations with Germany soured after Bonn declared in 1998 that it did not have a positive outlook on Turkey joining the EU. In addition, relations with France, an important factor in Turkish membership, took a negative turn when French deputies put forward a resolution that requested the recognition of the Armenian genocide carried out by the Ottoman Empire.

Relations between Turkey and Italy were also on the edge. The PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, after fleeing from Syria and Greece found refuge in Rome. Additionally, the Kurdish Parliament in Exile held a two day meeting in Italy in September 1998, to which various Italian MPs have attended. This has generated an enormous amount of anger, on behalf of the Turkish political leadership and public, against Italy. Mesut Yılmaz, Prime Minister of Turkey, said that “Italy cannot carry this shame. If it does, Turkey will not leave this unanswered” (Turkish Probe, 29 November 1998). This tense atmosphere led to a wide spread public demonstrations against Italy, and it went as far as calling for a boycott of Italian goods by various Turkish business groups and companies. The EU’s response was tough, in support of the Italian Prime Minister Massimo D’Alema’s statement in Brussels that Öcalan was not just Italy’s problem but Europe’s problem, Jacques Santer, the Commission President, cautioned Turkey about retaliatory sanctions form the EU and all its members if it boycotted Italian imports (Turkish Probe, 29 November 1998).

VII. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND AFFECTS ON TURKEY

In the pre-Helsinki period it can be argued that the European parliament had been effective and significant, particularly in terms of enforcing political criteria and the consent it generated in Turkey. The conditionality mechanism for Turkey, during this period, did not exist since Turkey had not been officially recognized as a candidate country. Dealings with Turkey has been handed over to the European parliament by the other EU institutions, given that it was the most effective organ of the EU in this regard at this period.
Turkey’s human rights record and quality of its democracy was the focus of attention for the parliament in the pre-Helsinki period between 1987 and 1999. The European parliament has concluded various resolutions concerning such issues in Turkey. Some of the most frequently emerged issues were: the Kurdish problem, torture, mass trials, death penalties and political restrictions on former politicians. The parliament recommended that Turkey resolve these issues in a sustainable and democratic manner.

In addition, the European parliament took the Water Report under scrutiny and consideration. The Report was proposed by Gerald Water, a German parliamentarian, on 15 September 1988 stating that even though some progress has been made, the human/cultural rights of the Kurdish and Christian minorities were being violated in Turkey (Walter, 1988).

Evidently, the Kurdish problem took the main stage during the European parliament discussions over Turkey on 17 May 1990. The parliament insisted that recognition of social, political and cultural rights of the Kurds were necessary for a peaceful solution of the problem. Moreover, the parliament asked Turkey to lift the state of emergency in the Kurdish dominated east and south-east regions due to the fact that the state agents, under the pretext of combating terrorism and under the shield of governmental authority, carried out severe human rights violations in the region.  

Between 1991 and 1992 PKK attacks intensified and reached a peak. In response, the Turkish army heavily mobilized in the region close to the Iraqi border against the PKK rebels. In the pursuit of the rebels the Turkish army frequently crossed the border into Iraq, which generated criticism in the European parliament and turned the European public opinion against such operations carried out by Turkey. When the Newroz celebrations in Cizre on 21 March 1992 turned violent, many reports concurred that Turkish Special Forces units opened fire on civilians; the final straw in EU-Turkey relations was reached. A resolution was prepared on 9 April 1992 in relation to the events and the European parliament called for an international investigation. In addition, the parliament demanded peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem, which was recognized by the parliament as a vital aspect for democratization in Turkey. Deputies from various European countries advised the establishment of Kurdish institutes, TV and radio stations, and urged a collaboration between Turkey and HEP (People’s Labor Party) to achieve these goals (European parliament 1992). Furthermore, Italian parliamentarian Jas Gawronski prepared a report in June 1992 on the Kurdish problem stating that the Kurds had been stripped of their basic human and cultural rights and that Turkey should not put all its energy and efforts towards resolving this issue by militaristic means, which it does.

A further report had been issued by the European parliament on Euro-Turkish relations, produced by Belgian parliamentarian Raymond Dury in November 1992. In this report Turkey was asked to deliver what it had promised and proceed with democratization reforms and to respect fundamental human rights in its combat against the PKK. The Dury Report stated that the future and the nature of relations between EU and Turkey would precisely depend on the Kurdish, Cyprus and human rights issues (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2000: 284-5).

The European parliament assembled on 18 July 1994 with its new 567 members to discuss the agenda. Main theme of the meeting was the Kurdish

---

87 Police violence in the May Day parades, torture in police custody and the cases of Ismail Besikci, Haydar Kutlu and Nihat Sargin were often mentioned in the European parliament resolution (European parliament 1988a)
question, specifically the situation of the DEP parliamentarians and banning of the party. As a result the parliament passed a resolution asking Turkey to release DEP parliamentarians. To impose this, the parliament decided that activities of the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) would be frozen until the conclusion of the case (European parliament 1994 a and b). The only other time the parliament had decided to freeze its relations with Turkey was the period of military intervention in 1980.

The parliament was not eager to give its consent to the conclusion of the Customs Union with Turkey because of the abiding Kurdish problem, and Turkey’s deteriorating human rights issues. The European parliament insisted that Turkey should deal with these issues before the approval of the decision. The European parliament’s demands concerning the Kurdish problem and human rights generated a negative outlook; many circles in Turkey claimed that this was, in fact, interference with internal affairs and an issue of national sovereignty. However, Turkey was well aware that the parliament could not be convinced without the realization of certain political reforms. For example, when the Turkish military marched into Iraq on 20 March 1995, the European parliament asked Turkey to stop this military operation and peruse political solutions. In addition the parliament concluded that the human rights situation in Turkey were at such a low level that it would prevent implementation of the Customs Union.

Consequently, the ratification of the Customs Union agreement became not only a European and Turkish concern but also a regional and international one. The US and Israel indicated the geostrategic importance of Turkey in the region, and recommended the European parliament to ratify the agreement. Various other factors, such as a possible Islamic fundamentalist take over if the EU were to distance itself from Turkey, were also laid on the table to persuade the parliament to ratify the Customs Union agreement. Within the EU itself the general understanding was that by ratify this agreement the EU would pull Turkey into its sphere of influence; therefore, the EU would be able to play a decisive role in Turkey’s domestic politics. In other words Turkey would be less likely to play sovereignty card and would have little to no choice but to comply with the European standards.88

During the same year, the Sakharov Prize of the European parliament for freedom of thought was given to the banned pro-Kurdish Democratic Party (DEP) parliamentarian Leyla Zana. Zana received two hundred and seventeen votes from the Socialist group in the parliament. Leader of the Parliamentary Group of the Party of European Socialist, Pauline Green, called on Prime Minister Tansu Ciller to release Zana to collect her prize (Turkish Daily News, 11 November 1995).

The Customs Union agreement was approved on 13 December 1995 alongside with a draft resolution on the human rights situation in Turkey. The draft resolution stated that “[The parliament] appeals to the Turkish Government, the PKK and other Kurdish organizations to do all in their power to find a non-violent and political solution to the Kurdish issue...[and] calls upon the Turkish Government...to consider ways and means of allowing citizens of Kurdish origin to express their cultural identity” (European parliament 1996a: 46). The parliament as well asked the Commission and the Council to monitor human

88 When asked for the reasons behind approving Turkey’s Customs Union agreement Pauline Green, the leader of the socialist group in the European parliament, answered “We have chosen to do it purely on the trade agreement in order to exercise leverage on democracy and human rights” (Turkish Daily News, 30 December 1995)
rights situation and democratic performance in Turkey and to present their findings on annual reports.

After the finalization of the Customs Union agreements, the European parliament declared, yet, another resolution on 18 January 1996 bringing almost all the issues in Turkey to the table. Main agenda in this resolution was: Turkey’s human rights issues, insufficient democratization efforts, and peaceful resolution of the Kurdish problem (European parliament 1996b). Few months later another resolution was passed on 19 September 1996, which has also used strong wording considering Turkey’s problems and its approach in managing them. The European parliament requested, from the Commission, a suspension of financial assistance to Turkey from the MEDA (Mesures D’accompagnement) funds, apart from human rights development project. The Southeast Anatolia region was referred, by the parliament, as “Kurdistan”, and the parliament requested from Prime Minister Ciller to deliver her promises and initiate a peaceful settlement in Kurdistan (European parliament 1996c: 187).

**VII. THE IMPACT OF EU CONDITIONALITY**

The impact of EU conditionality and the influence of the EU on Turkey were rather limited in the pre-Helsinki period. As depicted above, the EU imposed various political conditions on Turkey such as the implementation of reforms to enhance the pace of democratization and human rights record, and to find a peaceful resolution for the Kurdish problem. Nevertheless, these pressures did not generate the intended results in the pre-Helsinki era due to the fact that, pull side of conditionality was too weak during this period, which as a result distorted cost-benefit dynamics for the applicant states. The monitoring mechanism was also non-existent to implement necessary changes in Turkey to comply with the conditionality. Although, this has led to the realization of various legal reforms in Turkey during this period, the exact and intended impacts of these reforms were not analyzed to assess the real impact of EU conditionality in Turkey, and this will be the main focus of this research in the following sections.

Turkey’s application for EU membership in 1987 generated an intensification of the reforms, especially in the judiciary. A rise in amendments to various existing laws and passing of new bills were observable in accordance with Turkey’s application to the EU, such as the adjustment made to Law 2969, which made it an offense for former politicians to express their opinions, on 9 April 1986. Turkey’s recognition of the ECHR’s capacity to address individual complaints was seen as a crucial development indicating EU’s significance for Turkey and Turkey’s willingness to comply with EU conditionality. In addition, a referendum took place in Turkey on 6 September 1987, as a result of EU’s pressure to abolish restrictions on former politicians, regarding the Provisional Article 4 of 1982 constitution. The Article 4 was removed by a 50.2 per cent in favor to 49.8 against public vote (Resmi Gazete: 12 September 1987 no.19572). Tekeli and Ilkin argue that pressures exerted by the EU led to this public referendum (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2000: 148).

Considering the reform process of Turkey during this period, the law passed on 18 May 1987 to change Articles 67, 75 and 175 of the constitution, was,

---

arguably, one of the most significant developments. In particular, adjustment to Article 175, which in its previous form required two-thirds majority membership vote of the entire parliament, facilitated the procedure of further constitutional amendments if perceived as necessary. In addition a committee was established in Turkey to monitor human rights issues, “Act No. 3686 of 4 December 1990 setting up the Turkish Parliament’s Human Rights Monitoring Committee was published in the Official Gazette on 8 December 1990. The Committee is composed of members of the True Path Party, the Motherland Party and the Social Democrat Populist Party in proportion to the size of their groups in Parliament. The Chairman announced on 27 February 1991 that the Committee had started work… Its purpose is to monitor human rights practices in Turkey and worldwide and to ensure that Turkey keeps pace with developments in the matter of respect for human rights.”

The Law 2932, which made it a crime to publish in languages other than Turkish, was also eradicated. This was of particular interest for Turkey’s Kurdish minority since publications in Kurdish were considered a serious offence under constitutional law. The President Turgut Özal believed that this would be the first step towards a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish problem, and suggested that federalism amongst other possible solutions should as well be considered and discussed to find a solution (Cumhuriyet, 31 October 1991). However, Özal’s enthusiasm was not welcomed by the cabinet and even by his own party group, fearing that this would lead to further demands and promote separatism.

As a final point it can be said that above mentioned legal reforms, alongside with various others, were realized as a result of EU pressure exerted on Turkey, “the decision was, to a large extent, prompted by the need to prepare the country internally and internationally for the bid to join the EC” (Dagi, 2001: 35).

Following these developments, on 18 May 1994 the coalition government with Prime Minister Tansu Ciller put forth a democratization package in order to realize the prerequisites set by the EU. Main theme of the democratization package was to tackle the democratic deficiency by making certain amendments to constitution, specifically to the State of Emergency Law. Tansu Ciller stated that 1982 constitution was a hindrance to democratization efforts and that Turkey needed a new constitution to speed up the democratization process (Office of the Prime Minister, Press Review 1994). However, the democratization package was never operationalized even though Prime Minister Ciller had promised it would.91

EU-Turkey relations took, yet, another blow when Turkish State Security Court reached a verdict in the case of former DEP deputies; eight deputies received sentences ranging from fifteen to three years in prison. In response, the European parliament issued a decision stating that under these circumstances the Customs Union meeting would be postponed and that if such human rights violations continued to take place a Customs Union with Turkey would be impossible. Fearing a possible exclusion, Turkish government, almost overnight, changed its stand and put a bill, which was eventually approved by the

---

91 On 4 October 1993 Tansu Ciller made a statement concerning the individuals who may have helped the PKK, "We know the list of businessmen and artists subjected to racketeering by the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] and we shall be bringing their members to account.” After Ciller declaration there was a wave of kidnappings and unsolved murders throughout the country, “Beginning on 14 January 1994, almost a hundred people were individually picked up by commandos wearing uniforms and travelling in police vehicles.” Kendal Nezan. Turkey’s pivotal role in the international drug trade. Le Monde diplomatique. July 1998.
parliament. Turkey’s rush to satisfy European demands as observed in this case was seen as a sign of Turkey’s consent to European pressure and conditionality, and that Turkey handed over some of national sovereignty to an external actor such as the EU.

The next Accession Council meeting was set to take place on 6 March 1995, by then Turkey was required to produce some visible results. A meeting took place between Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and the Deputy Prime Minister Karayalcin to construct a strategy; taking the recent developments into consideration certain adjustment to Anti-Terror Law would be made to demonstrate respect for freedom of expression and amendment to the constitution would be realized to help flush out European criticism (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2000: 397-9). On 11 December 1994 Prime Minister Ciller rephrased Atatürk’s famous and controversial proverb, “Happy is he who calls himself a Turk” into “Happy is he who calls himself a citizen of Turkey” to hint the initiation of the democratization process. “However, following Ciller’s radical statement the government did not propose any legal changes concerning the Kurdish question” (Uslu, 2010: 94).

A further EU prerequisite, in row, was the amendments to Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, which stated that “no one shall, by any means or with any intention or idea, make written and oral propaganda or hold assemblies, demonstrations and manifestations against the indivisible integrity of the state of the Turkish Republic with its land and nation.” The content of the amendments were of little concern to the EU, what EU wanted to see was progress and reliable results. The definition of the Article was too ambiguous; it was hard to define what constituted “propaganda” and what did not. This ambiguity opened headway in habitual exploitation of the Article in accordance with the Kurdish problem. More than 4,000 people, including members of the parliament, politicians, authors, journalists, writers, doctors and lawyer, were imprisoned in relation to Article 8 citations (Tekeli and Ilkin, 2000: 464-7).

Consequently, the EU pressure produced results on 27 October 1995; Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law was finally amended. New amendments changed various wordings in the law to make it more unambiguous and comprehensible, reduced prison sentences and enabled the courts to defer the implementation of the punishment or to turn it into fines. In addition, on 6 March 1997 the EU demands has led to a reduction of detention periods form 30 to 10 days in the nine provinces under state of emergency, and from 14 to 7 days in the rest of the provinces of Turkey in order to reduce murder and torture under the custody of security forces. The, then, Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller confirmed the belief that amendments to reduce detention periods came as a result of EU pressures by claiming that “from now on, Turkish norms conform with European norms on detention periods.” However, Amnesty International stressed that “there is nothing in this law to support Deputy Prime Minster and Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller’s claim” and “neither European human rights law nor international human rights law, endorse four days’ incommunicado detention.”

92 For further discussion see, European Colloquy of the EALD Documentation. Legislation and Procedures Against Racism in Europe. What experiences? What demands? 8 and 9 November 1997
94 Ibid
IX. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has demonstrated that in pre-Helsinki period push-pull dynamics and cost-benefit analysis of the EU conditionality was clearly evident in the case of Turkey’s EU membership bid. Although, EU’s impact on Turkey was rather limited, since Turkey had not officially been recognized as a candidate state unbalancing the push-pull dynamics, the EU undoubtedly was the most important external actor, reasonably, successfully exerting its influence on Turkey in terms of democratization, human rights and the Kurdish problem. The EU seemed to be more reluctant to accept Turkey’s full membership during this period; the European leaders have thought that by simply forging a Customs Union agreement they would be able to persuade Turkey to undertake a series of reforms which would generate radical changes within the legal, social and political system. However, the Union keeping its leverage in mind would have to settle for less, the Customs Union agreements were approved after some minor amendments were made in the Turkish legal system.

Some scholars argue that the EU conditionality in pre-Helsinki period was too ambiguous and weak to produce radical changes in Turkey; furthermore, they claim that when comparing the conditionality and candidacy processes of the CEECs to that of Turkey a double-standard is evident. EU’s double-standard has various cultural and religious orientations hidden behind economic and human rights concerns (Ugur 2000; Uslu 2010). Nevertheless, these subjective criticisms tend to overlook Turkey’s deteriorating performance in terms of democracy and human rights, and government’s inability and/or unwillingness to finding a peaceful settlement for the Kurdish problem.

Consequently, one should keep a close eye on the power of military in Turkey at this stage. The military possesses immense power in Turkish political and social life; it is often said that “Turkey is not a country with an army but Turkish army with its own country.” Amongst some European, Turkish and international circles military’s secret agenda to scupper Turkey’s EU ambitions are ever so evident. Evidently, the armed forces, which have been actively combating the PKK and various other Kurdish uprisings since the birth of the republic, would have to surrender some of their direct and indirect power to the parliament and loose credibility if Turkish political leadership were to find a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish problem as requested by the EU. By kicking the ball to European court Uslu argues that, “one of the clear indications that EU conditionality was not that strong during the period was the deterioration of democracy in Turkey following the 28 February Process, which increased the military’s influence over politics” (Uslu, 2010: 99).

Finally, Turkey’s poor democratic performance has yet to be decisively measured for this period in question as the EU was unable to introduce a formal monitoring mechanism for Turkey. The bureaucratic (procedural) relations

---

95 As Richard Falk states “much of the democratization pressure felt by Turkey is related to the perceived economic advantages of EC membership.” (Falk et al. 1993:22)


97 Also know as post-modern coup this process led to dismissal of Erbakan’s government after the military memorandum on 28 February 1997.
between the EU and Turkey in terms of EU conditionality and its significance in Turkey’s democratization and human rights processes were explored for pre-Helsinki period in this chapter. Now the main analytical focus of the research will be to demonstrate if these bureaucratic/procedural amendments do in fact lead to substantive results in Turkey. In other words what were the realities of EU conditionality on the ground and did they produce the intended effects in Turkey? In order to operationalize this I will investigate the human (cultural) rights and socio-economic situation of the Kurdish minority with various statistic and numeric examinations in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 7: SUBSTANTIVE COUNTS / ASSESSING REALITIES IN THE PRE-HELSINKI PERIOD

I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND HUMAN (CULTURAL) RIGHTS SITUATION OF THE KURDS IN PRE-HELSINKI PERIOD

As suggested above, the focus of this chapter will be investigating the socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds in the pre-Helsinki period, which will indicate the realities on the ground concerning EU conditionality and its implementation in Turkey. Choosing the Kurdish question as an investigation point has four main motives; firstly, as declared by Whitehead “any systematic analysis of the role of international factors in stimulating democratization…must carefully specify which pressures were most significant; how, when and where they produced their main effect; and in what historical context they were embedded and constrained” (Whitehead, 1994: 46); therefore, a micro-analysis of the Kurdish problem, in accordance, is assumed.

In any area of scholarly inquiry, there are always several way in which the phenomena under study may be sorted and arranged…the observer may choose to focus upon the parts or upon the whole, upon the components or upon the system…Whether he selects the micro- or macro-level of analysis is ostensibly a mere matter of methodological conceptual convince. (Singer, 1961: 77)

Secondly, the EU has repeatedly pressured Turkey to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem, and implied that Turkey’s full membership would be unfeasible if this problem was left unattained. Thirdly, Kurdish problem has extended beyond Turkey’s borders and became a regional and, even, an international concern in a highly militarized region where conflict never seems to cease over ideological differences and/or over the control of natural resources. Kurdish lands in Turkey hold a considerable portion of middle-east’s main water supplies, which is said to be more important than oil, and Kurdish lands in Iraq encompass one of the world’s largest oil reserves. And lastly, in Turkey there are polarizing views on actual definition of the Kurdish problem; some believe that Kurdish problem is merely a matter of economic disparity and a question of underdevelopment, whereas others see it as an ethnic identity and cultural rights issue.98 Nevertheless, these opposing views have one thing in common; the Kurdish problem in its basic form is a matter of good democratic governance and

98 For example Said-i Nursi, a prominent Kurdish scholar known as Bediüzzaman (meaning the wonder of the age) warned the Kurds about the disruptive and destroying nature of underdevelopment for the society as early as 1908. He wrote in the Sark ve Kürdistan Gazetesi (The East and Kurdistan Newspaper) that Kurds had three devastating enemies that threaten the very existence of the Kurdish nation; poverty, illiteracy, and disarray and confrontation. (Sark ve Kürdistan Gazetesi, 4 December 1908)
correlates to realization of comprehensive democratization. Hans Peter Schmitz states that, “research on democratization confirms that underlying socioeconomic conditions affect the long-term sustainability of democratic reforms. The initiation of such reforms, as well as the process they take, can best be understood using an agency-based framework that links domestic and transnational forces” (Schmitz, 2004: 403).

Moreover, examining the socio-economic and cultural rights aspects of the Kurds relates to the concepts of ethnicity and equality. According to Robert Jiobu,

Socioeconomic status refers to the structured inequality found in all societies and is possibly the single most important facet of a society’s organization. It both determines and simultaneously is the fate of individuals as well as entire categories of people, including ethnic groups. To define a group as a minority is to recognize that the group has but little status and not much power, wealth, prestige, comfort, freedom, mobility, or opportunity. To an important extent, then, the study of ethnic relations is the study of inequality.

(Jiobu, 1990:27)

II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The basic definition of socio-economic reads: relating to, or involving both economic and social factors. Economic factors could be summoned up with five main titles: supply and demand, interest rates, inflation, unemployment, and foreign exchange rates. Additionally, “economic factors are linked to political, legal, and cultural issues” (Mathis and Jackson, 2008: 44). Some of the social factors are: economic status, religion, education, ethnicity, culture, political system and locality. In its normative form socio-economics refers to a multidisciplinary approach, incorporating economics, sociology and political science, which examines the effects of economic phenomena on society. This multidisciplinary approach enables an extensive scrutiny of various topics such as health, education and child care, which were previously considered to be exclusivity of sociology, by and through other disciplines such as economics. In other words, socio-economics study macro impacts and consequences of what seems to be micro events; focus is on the society not on individuals (Etzioni, 1990).

Due to its extensive analysis capability, socio-economic research has been gaining more attention from researches of diverse disciplines. Not only individual researchers or institutions are interested in this multidisciplinary approach but also governments and supranational organizations, where diversity of cultures, identities and values emphasize the ever increasing importance of socio-economic factors especially in terms of collective economic and political decision, such as the EU. Ursula Huws state that,

The term ‘socio-economic research’ is in widespread use in the European Commission’s work programmes and elsewhere. In the Fourth Framework Programme, for instance, there was a programme entitled
’Targeted Socio-Economic Research’ (TSER) and in the Fifth Framework Programme there were numerous calls for proposals to carry out socio-economic research related to Information Society Technologies (in the IST Programme) and to other issues of relevance to EU policy

(Huws, 2002: 1).

Furthermore, Huws argue that socio-economic research could be defined under five potential approaches; discipline-based, methodology-based, policy-based, issue-based and hybrid/combined approach (Huws, 2002). For the purpose of this research a combined approach will be assumed to define socio-economic research, which according to Huws is,

…research carried out by people qualified in business studies, industrial relations and management studies, demography and statistics, economic, education, human and economic geography, law, criminology and penology, political science, psychology and related disciplines, sociology, applied social studies and anthropology, or socio-technical studies;

or involving carrying out interviews, whether in person or by telephone or email, with individual informants or groups, observation, including the use of ethnographic methods, survey, secondary analysis of existing data, non-medical experimental research involving human subject, comparative analysis, including cross-cultural research, analytical literature surveys, scoping exercises and content analysis, case studies, action research or evaluations;

that addresses issues of relevance to economic policy, employment policy, social policy, (including equal opportunities policy, social protection policy etc.), environmental policy, health policy, education policy, policy relating to the protection of cultural minorities, immigration policy, trade and development aid policy, policy relating to telecommunications, transport, energy and other infrastructure provisions or information society policy.

(Huws, 2002: 7-8)

In addition, various scholars also attest the importance of socio-economic well-being for the overall quality of life (Abrams, 1973; Schneider 1976; Campbell et al., 1976; Mullis, 1992) as well as for psychological well-being (Dohrenwerd and Dohrenwerd, 1969; Kessler and Cleary, 1980; Morçöl and Gitmez, 1995). The association between socio-economic or income inequality and excess mortality in a given country is also well documented (Shlomo et al. 1996; Kaplan et al., 1996). On the other hand, Wilkinson stresses that equal and compatible distribution of income matters more than income deficiency (Wilkinson, 1992).

In addition, various scholars also attest the importance of socio-economic well-being for the overall quality of life (Abrams, 1973; Schneider 1976; Campbell et al., 1976; Mullis, 1992) as well as for psychological well-being (Dohrenwerd and Dohrenwerd, 1969; Kessler and Cleary, 1980; Morçöl and Gitmez, 1995). The association between socio-economic or income inequality and excess mortality in a given country is also well documented (Shlomo et al. 1996; Kaplan et al., 1996). On the other hand, Wilkinson stresses that equal and compatible distribution of income matters more than income deficiency (Wilkinson, 1992).

Sustainable Governance Index, which is conducted amongst 30 OECD countries with respect to democracy, socioeconomics, economy and employment, social affairs, security and integration, and sustainability, ranks Turkey with the lowest possible ranking with a score of 2.41, Norway scoring 8.71 ranks the first.
A major reason causing Turkey to score poorly in such studies is its inability to provide adequate and comprehensive intra-regional development.

As the ultimate goal of socio-economic study is typically to investigate the affects of socio-economic development, and thus attempt to comprehend inequalities, in terms of advancements in education, employment, GDP and life expectancy, to name a few, a clear definition of socio-economic development is required to systematically conceptualize the research objectives. According to David Jaffee, “socio-economic development…refers to the ability to produce an adequate and growing supply of goods and services productively and efficiently, to accumulate capital, and to distribute the fruits of production in a relatively equitable manner” (Jaffee, 1998: 3). So to say if there is an unequal distribution of capital, goods and services within a given country, it can be assumed that the country is socio-economically less developed or socio-economically underdeveloped.

The scope of socio-economic analysis, as mentioned before, is extensive. Analyzing a vast range of both social and economic variables and their interaction may, thus, be suppressing the purpose and focus of the research. As mentioned before, there is a lack of extensive research conducted to evaluate the socio-economic development at regional levels in Turkey; therefore, comprehensive and comparative assessment of the socio-economic development in pre- and post-Helsinki periods suffer under data variety deficiency. For that reason, this research will adopt the most relevant and significant socio-economic variables, which has already been put to the test by previous researchers, as a comparison tool. Accordingly, the most appropriate and comprehensive research regarding the province-based socio-economic development in Turkey for the assessment of the socio-economic situation of the Kurds in pre- and post-Helsinki periods is conducted by Bülent Dincer, Metin Özaslan and Taner Kavasoglu for the State Panning Organization in 1996 and 2003. Moreover, the research will, on occasion, refer to the data presented by Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) of the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry, and data collected from various reports of the East Anatolian Project (DAP) and Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP) under the State Planning Organization (DPT) of the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry; nevertheless, the main focus will be on the Socio-Economic Development Ranking of the Provinces and Regions in 1996 and 2003.

A major problematic, thus, arises during the processes of necessary data gathering in socio-economic development comparison of the two regions, (East and Southeast) predominantly inhabited by the Kurds, before and after Helsinki Summit periods; the lack of research conducted on an annual basis producing primary data specific to the regional socio-economic development indicators makes the evaluation of pre- and post-Helsinki socio-economic situation of the Kurds rather difficult. However, the relief comes in the form of primary data presented in the previous researches conducted for DTP regional and city specific socio-economic indicators comparison and analysis. Although it pushes the research to rely on a limited data source, the Socio-Economic Development Ranking of the Provinces and Regions provides the most accurate comparison mechanism to assess the situation in pre- and post-Helsinki periods. In addition the unique situation of the Kurds, that they constitute a majority in the cities and regions they inhabit and that these cities and regions are amongst the least socio-economically developed in Turkey, strengthens the data significance and the hypothesis.

As above statement attests, finding socio-economic data specifically addressed to the Kurds is very problematic and a near impossible task; however, a handful of studies exist in relation to the socio-economic development rankings at city levels. This has various reason, perhaps the most overwhelming above all is that the very existence of Kurds were systematically denied by the Turkish government up until 1990s, later Kurds were not considered a different ethnic group or minority, and the state of emergency in Kurdish cities has made the excess rather difficult; unsurprisingly no research has been conducted on the socio-economic well being of the Kurds. Since primary data collection of socio-economic research generally requires on sight participation and examination, attempts from researchers located outside Turkey were rather limited or lacked adequate empirical depth. Nevertheless, the fact that Kurds constitute a majority of the population in the eastern and south-eastern regions provides a considerable contribution to the research in terms of empirical data collection from regional development programs, such as GAP and DAP, and from regional comparative studies conducted by various scholars privately and in association with respective governmental agencies.

Regional disparities in Turkey emerge as a result of various underlying factors; geographic, historic, economic, social and cultural. Geographic factors include: climate, under- and over-ground resources, natural dispositions, transportation and communication facilities. Evidently, due to their diverse geographical characteristics, seven regions in Turkey demonstrate asymmetric development rates; port cities tend to be better-off not only in Turkey but throughout the world. Historic counts indicate that since the birth of the Republic in 1923 western regions developed at a greater pace than the rest of the country. Socio-economically, prevalence of agriculture and agrarian life in the eastern regions of Turkey where low education levels in accordance with failure to modernize the agriculture sector and to turn it into a lucrative commerce severely dropped income levels and augmented unemployment alongside with all its consequences in the region. Culturally, eastern regions are predominantly inhabited by the Kurds with strong traditional and tribal ties.

As stated before, this research will focus on the two primary works conducted by same researchers for the Turkish State Planning Organization to assess the socio-economic situation of the Kurdish dominated provinces and regions in the pre- and post-Helsinki periods.
IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RANKING OF THE PROVINCES AND REGIONS 1996

Initially, it is important to underline the significance of the timeframe of this research for pre-Helsinki assessment; it was conducted in 1996 which coincides approximately to the last quarter of the pre-Helsinki era (1987-1999) and could be considered to produce a fairly accurate stance on the socio-economic developments of the Kurdish cities since Turkey’s formal application for membership in 1987. Furthermore, this study has been conducted for the State Planning Organization of the Turkish Republic (DPT) and thereby carries a certain degree of legitimacy.

The study begins with the statement that, aiming for development parity throughout the geographic spread of a given country is just as important as achieving a high rate of economic development at national level. On the other hand, a need to formulate necessary measurement incentives to determine socio-economic developments of cities and counties in Turkey has emerged since the announcement of the Priority Regions for Development policy in the 3rd Five Year Development Plan (1973-1977). A further important dynamic to consider is that socio-economic development differs in terms of “time” and “space” throughout the world. The terms, “developed”, “developing” and “underdeveloped” are not used exclusively to explain the development conditions of countries compared at an international level but could also be used to define national accounts amongst different regions. Diverse consistency dispersion of social and economic factors, which direct the dynamic development process, throughout a given country, is believed to emerge as the main reason behind regional disparities. Furthermore, since the end of WWII, regional disparities have become a national matter taking its place in society’s economic and political agenda in numerous countries (Dincer et al., 1996).

Regional disparities as they do throughout the world are also evident in Turkey, perhaps even to a greater extend. Various regions fall way beyond the national average; particularly, the Eastern and Southeastern regions and, partially, the mountainous regions of the Black-sea are amongst the least developed in Turkey, whereas the Marmara, Aegean, Mediterranean and Central Anatolian regions score on par with or well above the national average. During the period in question, factors determining the course of development are concentrated in the west of Turkey. The main underlying reasons behind regional disparities were; geographical location, climate, distance to the high-demand internal and external markets, and abundance and dispersion of rural settlement units. While, some of the main problems in the underdeveloped regions were: stagnation and lack of provided services and investments. In the developed regions unemployment, inadequate infrastructure, unlicensed constructions, order and security, and environmental protection stemming from disproportionally high population growth comprised the main problems. Even though there have been various attempts to tackle the issue, regional disparities remain amongst the high-priority problems of Turkey (Dincer et al., 1996).

During the period in question, there have been numerous attempts to balance out the existing regional and provincial disparities. The most noteworthy of these attempts was the establishment of regional development centers, which were successfully put in practice in a range of other countries for the advancement of underdeveloped regions. Primarily, these measures included;
- in the regions, especially the East and Southeast, where the settlements are dispersed selected regional development centers will be prioritized in terms of public investments. These centers will be equipped with the necessary social, physical and technical infrastructure investments, so that they will also be able to provide services to the surrounding lower level settlements.

- to encourage the private sector to invest in the KÖY (Priority Development Regions), and to provide a productive environment for their plants in these regions government assistance will be concentrated in the regional development centers, which would have potential access to appropriate demand threshold.

- devoted to find horizontal and vertical balance in urbanization, to hinder the migration of industrialization, public investments and incentive policies to the metropolitan areas and to discourage industrial accumulation; migration, will be directed towards regional centers instead of metropolitan areas, to the mid-size cities and settlements that have central attributes.

- in order to provide grounds to monitor migration trends, which tends to progressively overburden the metropolitan areas, location determinants of the industry will be redirected. For that reason, the emergence of nationwide development poles will be endorsed. Thus, many services and employment opportunities available in big metropolitans such as Istanbul will be obtainable in these areas.

In the plan large-scale immigration is considered as a top priority issue. Stemming from the regional disparities, large-scale immigration intensifies the existing disparities, and as well creates new ones. The objective of the policies and precautions is not to halt migration but rather to find a consistent dynamic to large-scale immigration problem. This issue is closely related to urban growth regulation, regional development centers, satellite cities, rural-group centers, inter-provincial specializations, infrastructure and sectoral development policies (Dincer et al., 1996).

The scope of this research encompasses indicators gathered between 1990 and 1993. The research includes up to 100 different variables, which are believed to be reflecting socio-economic development levels of 76 provinces of Turkey, obtained from a range of different institutions and organizations. After deliberate considerations, only 58 variables have been scrutinized as appropriate and useful for the research. Social indicators include; demographic, employment, education, health, infrastructure, and other welfare indicators. Economic indicators are composed of; manufacturing industry, construction, agriculture, and financial.

1. Social Indicators

Demographic indicators encompass numerical observation of the population, its growth rate (1985-90) and spatial distribution. In order to explain the development components of demographic indicators, variables such as total population (1994), urbanization rate (1990), fertility rate (1985-90) and average household size (1990) are utilized. Concerning, the demographical setting of the East and Southeast regions it can be said that numerous provinces of these regions produce the highest rates of immigration and emigration owing to the security reason. Data for these variables are obtained from the 1990 General Population Census of Turkey results and form the State Statistics Institute (DIE).
Employment indicators are observed through the following variables: percentage share of people employed in agricultural, industrial, commercial and financial sectors, paid labors, paid female labors and employers in given provinces in total employment percentage. With socio-economic development, employment percentage in agricultural sector proportionally decreases while this percentage in industrial and service sectors experiences a relative increase. Variables composing the employment indicators are acquired from 1990 General Census results.

Education indicators include: literacy rate, women’s literacy rate, rate of university graduates, enrolment rates in primary, secondary and high schools, and various other quantitative factors reflecting the levels of socio-cultural development. There is a close correlation between levels of social and economic development and individuals’ general level of educational in a given society. Literacy and university graduates’ rates are obtained from 1990 General Census results; enrolment rates are obtained from Ministry of National Education’s academic year 1994-1995 statistics.

Health indicators comprise: number of doctors, dentists, pharmacies and hospital beds per ten thousand people in given provinces, and infant mortality rates. Equal and adequate access to health services are considered to be indicators of social development. Furthermore, choices made by health-care personnel and educated/qualified labor force to settle in developed regions are directly related to socio-economic development. Infant mortality rate, on the other hand, is closely related to various socio-economic factors such as; the prevalence of health care services in given provinces, extent of educational and cultural levels, and rise in economic opportunities. Infant mortality rates are obtained from 1990 General Census results, other indicators from the Ministry of Health in 1994.

Infrastructure indicators contain: paved road rates in provinces and rural settlement areas, and ratio of rural population who have adequate access to clean water supply. A consistent infrastructure is not only important in interconnecting the population to modern goods and services but also for the development of other sectors in question. Data for these variables are acquired from the General Directorate of Rural Services and from the General Directorate of Highways in 1994.

Other welfare indicators are: number of private automobiles per ten thousand people, number of motor vehicle and fax subscribers, and amount of cell phone prepaid minutes and electricity consumption per person. Data for variables are obtained from the State Statistics Institute and from the Turkish Telecom in 1994.

2. Economic Indicators

Manufacturing industry indicators include: all public sector businesses and private sector businesses employing ten or more employees. Variables utilized in this content are composed of: number of businesses, average annual number of employees, accumulated turnover capacity, electricity consumption per person, value-added per person, and parcel number in active Organized Industrial Zones. Manufacturing sector indicators are obtained from State Statistics Institute in 1993, parcel numbers of Organized Industrial Zones from the Ministry of Industry and Trade in 1995.

Variables outlining the construction sector indicators are, number of apartments and housing-zone quota per urbanized capita. Apartment numbers
correlates to number of apartments with utilization permit recorded between 1990 and 1994. Housing-zone quota per urbanized capita is obtained by taking the average of the numbers resulting from dividing the square meter of constructions with utilization permit (1990-94) by the urban population of the years in question. Indicators relating to construction sector are gathered from State Statistical Institute.

Agriculture sector variables are: agricultural output quota of provinces per rural capita and per national agricultural output. Agricultural output quota per rural capita reflects income levels and productivity of people employed in agriculture sector. Agricultural output quota per national agricultural output indicates the contributions made by provinces to the agricultural output quota, agricultural potential and actual volume of production. Agricultural production quota consists of crops, animal products, and live stock production levels. Data is acquired from State Statistics Institute in 1993.

Variables of financial indicators include, provincial: income levels, capital accumulation, share of capital turned into investment, public and private sector investment expenditures, local government expenditure, and monetary variables reflecting import and export levels. Source of data and time period for these variables are; the Banks Association of Turkey in 1993, the Ministry of Finance in 1993, the State Planning Organization between 1990-94, the State Statistics Institute in 1992, the Undersecretariat of Treasury between 1991-94, and the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade between 1993-94.

**Map 2: Geographical Regions of Turkey**
A) First-degree Developed Provinces 1996:

Map 3: First-degree Developed Provinces in 1996

(Dincer et al., 1996: 56)

This group consists of five provinces with the highest socio-economic development rankings; respectively, Istanbul, Ankara, Kocaeli and Bursa (see Map). Together they constitute 29.4% of Turkey’s total population and 7% of its surface area. 85.3% of the population in this group lives in urban cities; Turkey averages 73 people per square kilometer whereas this group has 272 people per square kilometer. Provinces of this group absorb the highest number of immigration; population growth rate is rather high with 36.18 in a thousand compared to national average of 21.71 in a thousand. Share of total employment among the sectors are as follows; 18.45% in agricultural, 25.85% in industrial and 55.7% in services. Paid labors constitute 66.94%. Considering the educational levels, 89.02% of the total population and 83.42% of the female population are literate. Rate of university graduates is 7% compared to 4.7% of national average. There are 19 doctors and 30 hospital beds per thousand people for this group exceeding the national average of 11 doctors and 22 beds per thousand people. Production sector value-added rate per capita of these provinces are 2.5 times higher than national average. The group is accountable for 85.1% of Turkey’s imports and 88.9% of its exports. 11% of total agricultural production is made in these five provinces. This group generates 45.5% of GDP. 90% of rural population has access to drinking water in this group, compared to 74.79% of Turkey’s national average. 93.53% of city and state roads are paved with asphalt. There are 829 private automobiles and total number of 1031 motor vehicles per ten thousand people; national average numbers are 472 and 628 respectively. Electricity consumption per capita is 1867 kWh; Turkey’s average per capita consumption is 999 kWh (Dincer et al., 1996).
B) Fifth-degree Developed Provinces 1996:

Map 4: Fifth-degree Developed Provinces in 1996

(Dincer et al., 1996: 67)

Socio-economically least developed provinces in this group are: Adiyaman, Tunceli, Gumushane, Bayburt, Bingol, Mardin, Mus, Batman, Bitlis, Siirt, Sirnak, Hakkari, Van, Agri, Iğdır, Kars and Ardahan (see map). Together these cities constitute 9% of Turkey’s total population and 17% of its surface area. 60% of the population of this group lives in rural areas. There are 40 people per square kilometer (national average is 73). While the population growth rate is half of the national average figures, fertility rate is double the national average. Provinces of this group are spread over a mountainous and rugged terrain with noticeably smaller accessible arable-land compared to the other regions. Though, in the group 75.5% of the total population is employed in the agricultural sector and only 3% find employment in the industrial sector. Considering the population is mainly active in the agricultural sector, share of national agricultural production quota of this group only amount to 9.8%. Industrial and services sectors lag considerably behind in these provinces. There are a total number of 68 medium and large-sized businesses active in manufacturing industry, but most of these facilities are publicly owned. Given that value-added per capita of manufacturing is taken to be 100 throughout Turkey, this value is 6 within this group. Share of GDP is merely 3.5%. Given that the GDP per capita is taken to be 100 throughout Turkey, in the provinces composing this group this number is 39. In view of this, provinces in this group acquire less than half of national average income. 1.2% of total bank deposits and 0.8% of total bank credits belong to this group. Given that the share of national budget per capita, obtained income and corporate taxes, and municipality expenditure amounts to 100 throughout Turkey, provinces of the group score 14, 20 and 34 respectively. Furthermore, migration is another problem facing the provinces of this group negatively affecting the welfare levels. Therefore, it is crucial to close the welfare-gap between this group and rest of the
country; the most important step to tackle such disparities is to prevent migration (Dincer et al., 1996).

C) The Most and the Least Developed Regions of Turkey Compared:

The chart below shows the socio-economic development rankings of geographic regions of Turkey. Marmara is the most developed region followed by Aegean, Central Anatolia, Mediterranean, Black-Sea, Southeastern Anatolia, and the least developed Eastern Anatolia regions.

![Figure 2: Regional Socio-Economic Development Index](Dincer et al., 1996: 72)

i. The Most Developed Region: Marmara

Marmara region is the most developed region of Turkey; there are currently no provinces falling below the national average figures in the region (see the chart below). With a population of 15 million the region accounts for 25% of Turkey's total population (61 million according to 1994 estimates). Marmara region is composed of 10 provinces, 4 of which have more than a million inhabitants; Istanbul 8.5 million, Bursa 1.8 million, Kocaeli 1 million and Balikesir 1 million (Dincer et al., 1996)
Besides containing the highest number of inhabitants, Marmara region is also the most urbanized with 76.26% (national average is 59.01%), has the highest population density with 183, and the highest net migration rate with 0.28% amongst all regions. The region has the lowest fertility rate 2.07, and the lowest infant mortality rate 0.61. Average household size of the region is 4.24. These indicators reflect that the components of modernization process have total control over the social life and that the transition into nuclear family, which is typical in modern societies, is almost complete (Ibid).

In the region employment is mostly concentrated in the industrial (24.34%) and commercial sectors (13.07%). Financial establishments employ 4.32% of the total employment rate. The region encompasses the highest employment percentages of above mentioned sectors in Turkey. Paid-labors constitute 57.17%, paid-female labors 10.35%, and employers 2.96% of the total rate of employment, and are the highest figures in Turkey (Ibid).

Out of a total number of 10,541 manufacturing businesses in Turkey the region houses 5616. The number of annual workforce in manufacturing industry adds up to 490 thousand in the region and, approximately, equals to half the national mean with 979 thousand. Manufacturing industry per capita value-added is 17.7 million Turkish Liras and is approximately 2.5 times that of the national average figures (7.6 million Liras) (Ibid).

Marmara huts one thirds of total banks in Turkey; there are 2157 banks in Marmara and a total of 6242 in Turkey. In addition, the region has 3 times the amount of national per capita imports and exports. As of 1993, region’s contribution to Turkey’s GDP is 36%; during the same period Marmara’s GDP per capita is 49 million Liras (national average is 33 million Liras). General income levels per capita amount to 10 million Liras in the region whereas this number is 4.5 million Liras at national levels. 47% of total bank deposits and 45% of bank credits are made in Marmara region (Ibid).

Besides, other welfare indicators of Marmara region also seem to produce the highest figures in Turkey, and score well above the national average figures. Region’s literacy rate is 88.16% in general and 82.43% amongst women
population, university graduates make up 5.66% of the total number of graduates, enrolment in primary schools is 98.76%, in secondary schools 85.6% and in high schools 60.43%. There are 3.22 dentists, 14.20 doctors and 3.15 pharmacies per thousand people in the region. In Marmara, 86.06% of the population has access to sufficient drinking water and 95.44% of the roads are paved with asphalt (and 34.64% of rural roads). There are 674 private cars, 859 motor vehicles and 27.04 faxes per thousand people in Marmara. Electricity consumption per capita is 16969 kWh, and there are 6233 prepaid credits per person (Ibid).

ii. The Least Developed Region: Eastern Anatolia

Eastern Anatolia is Turkey’s least developed region; with a population of 5.4 million inhabitants it is also the least populated amongst the seven geographical regions of Turkey. Out of the 14 provinces of the region none has a population exceeding one million; Erzurum is the largest city of the East with 826 thousand inhabitants, followed by Malatya with 721 thousand and Van with 500 thousand people.

(Dincer et al., 1996: 94)

Population density of Marmara (183 persons per km²), the highest, is 5 times more than that of Eastern Anatolia, which has the lowest. The rugged and mountainous nature of the region affects its population density; nevertheless, migration also plays an important part. Not only does migration affect demographic indicators but it also affects the overall welfare of the region. Between 1985 and 1990 average annual rate of net migration reached -90.92 per thousand of average population making the East the region with the highest rate of emigration in Turkey. With a fertility rate of 4.2, and the average household size of 7.02 Eastern Anatolia ranks the second nethermost in Turkey following the Southeastern region. According to 1990 figures 74 out of thousand babies born die in the region, which is the highest infant mortality rate in Turkey (Dincer et al., 1996).
Employment is primarily focused on the agriculture sector in Eastern Anatolia (71.93%). Even though the agriculture is the primary source of income, per capita agricultural production of rural population (14.2 million Liras) is well below the national average (18.2 million Liras) and agricultural productivity is comparatively lower. Moreover, the region is responsible for 10% of Turkey’s national agricultural production. The share of employment in the industrial sector is the lowest nationwide (3.98%); similarly, in commerce (3.67%) and financial sector (0.64%) the region lags behind. Additionally, with 2.1% the region also has the lowest amount of women in paid-labor force (Ibid).

Furthermore, large-sized families, high fertility rate, high infant mortality rate, poor education, lacking health services, and minimal input of women in paid-labor force are the common traits of underdeveloped regions. Concerning the educational indicators Eastern Anatolia is the second least-developed before Southeastern Anatolia. Literacy rate in the region is 68.16%, female literacy rate is 54.89%, and 3.33% of total graduates are college graduates. There are 6.31 doctors, 0.69 dentists and 1 pharmacy per thousand people in the region (Ibid).

Per capita income in the region amounts to 935 thousand Liras, income and corporation taxes to 753 thousand. Between 1991 and 1994 amount of per capita investments (with incentive certificate) was 696 thousand Liras placing the region to the last position among 7 regions. The sixth place Black-Sea region almost doubles the amount allocated to the Eastern Anatolia with 1.1 million Liras. The region also ranks the last concerning the per capita import (4.4$) and export (21.9$) rates. Nowhere else in Turkey are there lesser asphalt paved roads than in Eastern Anatolia; the region ranks sixth, out of seven, in relation to other welfare indicators. Eastern Anatolia region also contributes the least in terms of GDP; region’s share of GDP is 4.2% (Ibid).

V. HUMAN (CULTURAL) RIGHTS SITUATION OF THE KURDS IN PRE-HELSINKI PERIOD

Establishing the norms of human rights is one of the most preeminent accomplishments of our civilization. Human rights guarantee and document the basis for human value within the framework of international law under customary laws, jus cogens and treaties. In the literature, it has been generally acknowledged that the significance of human rights and protection of minorities, in a more progressive way, surpassed economic welfare and equal distribution of wealth when debating democracy and democratization. Disused notions such as the right to self-determination were revived during the 1960s, with decolonization, when most African countries declared their independence. Moreover, the third wave of democratization commencing in 1974 with the fall of last authoritarian regime in Europe, strengthen the self-determination claims and underlined the importance of human rights, which were highly neglected during the right-wing authoritarian era. Developments in the New World were also compliant; exasperated from the Vietnam War, the US foreign policy shifted during the Charter era and human rights and democratic expansion became crucial elements of US foreign policy. Evidently, this has also altered the global dynamics and equilibrium; keeping in mind Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, other countries were pulled in and followed the democratic, humanistic global trend.

The most referred and universally renowned text in terms of human, parenthetically cultural, rights is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948 at Palais de Chaillot in Paris and consists of 30 articles. Although not a treaty itself, the Declaration forms part of customary law and is considered as common heritage. Enforcement of the Declaration functions more like a multilateral coercion; moral and diplomatic pressure is applied to countries that violate its articles. In regards cultural rights, Article 22 of the Declaration reads, “everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality”; and Article 27 (1) states, “everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits”. According to Barth granting legal, cultural rights and some sort of exemption to minority groups have “important empirical implications for states because of the variety and complexity of questions raised by the existence of minority groups. Some minority groups suffer from invidious forms of discrimination resulting in poverty, social injustice, and inequality. Other minority groups aspire autonomy, independence or secession from the state, which can lead to ethnic conflict and civil war” (Barth, 2008:3).

In the research, the terms minority rights and cultural rights are used interchangeably and parenthetically to the human rights, since cultural rights are components of human rights and are universal in character guaranteeing all human beings the right to access and exercise their culture. In other words, individuals or groups of individuals could not be denied of their cultural rights simply on the grounds that they do not meet the terms and/or recognized by national or international instruments as, “protecting an individual’s access to culture describes the essence of a cultural rights because it goes to the interiority of personhood…culture is necessary to develop the individual capacity for autonomy” (Barth, 2008: 6-7). Therefore, it can be argued that development of individual capacity for autonomy is essential for the development of group capacity for autonomy, which perhaps was the driving force behind cultural assimilation and repression of the Kurds that reached a peak during the 1980s and 1990s.

Relying on the information presented by Human Rights Watch, Turkey’s human rights violations including freedom of expression, the press, political activity and torture, deteriorated during 1990.

Most torture takes place in the political sections of police headquarters during the initial interrogation of a suspect. Human rights activists and lawyers report, as they have for some years, that over 90 percent of political suspects are tortured, as are over 50 percent of people suspected of ordinary crimes. Turks' right to freedom of expression is violated daily. Freedom of the press is routinely restricted; at present, at least 34 journalists and editors are in prison for what they have written or published. Many are serving absurdly long sentences; one journalist received a sentence of 1,086 years, later reduced on appeal to 700 years. While Turkish citizens are freer to voice their opinions and to criticize the government than they were during the period following the September 1980 military coup, they continue to risk harassment, torture, criminal charges and imprisonment for expressing their views. Human rights monitors fared badly in 1990. At least 23 members of various
branches of the Human Rights Association (HRA) and 17 members of TAYAD (Association of Friends and Relatives of Detainees and Convicted Prisoners) were arrested, interrogated, tried, or sentenced during the year. Political freedom continued to be restricted. Several parties that were banned following the September 1980 coup are still outlawed.


Again according to the same report in comparison with 1990 more people died in detention under suspicious circumstances, and more people were shot and killed by security forces in 1991. There were an increasing number of Kurdish villagers detained, arrested, tortured and, as well, killed by state security forces. During the funeral march of Vedat Aydin, the provincial head of the HEP’s Diyarbakir branch who was found dead two days after he has been taken into custody by the police on 5 July 1991, police fired into a crowd of thousand in Diyarbakir killing seven people. Human rights situation of the Kurdish minority continued to deteriorate in 1991. The highly criticized Anti-Terror Law was also passed during the same year, on 12 April 1991. This law affected the Kurds the most; the law mainly targeted Kurdish intellectuals, politicians, authors, newspapers, and ordinary citizens. Amongst the many controversial articles of the law Article 8, under which most of the Kurdish activities and activists were punished, reads, “Written and oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aimed at damaging the indivisible unit of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation are forbidden, regardless of the methods, intentions, and ideas behind such activities. Those conducting such activities shall be punished with a sentence of between 2 and 5 years imprisonment and with a fine of between 50 million and 100 million Turkish liras”.99 Ambiguous nature of the Article enabled the prosecution of peaceful and non-violent forms of Kurdish expressions alongside with violent forms, limiting the wiggle room for the Kurds to voice out their opinions. The law also legitimized the tying of any form of Kurdish activity to the act of terrorism.

Human Rights Watch’s report published in March 1993, specifically scrutinized the situation of the Kurds in Turkey since Demirel’s coalition government took office. The report began by saying, “Kurds in Turkey have been killed, tortured and disappeared at an appalling rate since the coalition government of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel took office in November 1991” (Human Rights Watch, 1993: 1). Demirel’s government, on coming to power, promised major improvements in Turkey’s abysmal human rights record.

According to HRW, Kurdish ethnic identity continued to be under attack in 1992.100 During 1992, security forces killed 74 people in house raids, 34 in the Southeast. Security forces were also involved in the killings of more than 103 peaceful demonstrators, 100 of which took place in the Southeast during the period in question. The situation, of the Kurds, was not very different elsewhere in Turkey; in August 1992, 24 people, most of whom were Kurdish, in four western cities of Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara, Adana and Antalya) were interviewed by Helsinki Watch all of whom testified on police brutality and torture. All but three of them were detained in connection with political crimes such as writing for a left-wing or pro-Kurdish journal. In addition, 16 people died in suspicious circumstances in 1992 while in police custody 10 of whom were of Kurds in the

100 See, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,,TUR,467fca705f,0.html
Southeast. Police claimed that 6 of them, including 3 children between the ages of 13 and 16, committed suicide. 40 alleged members of the PKK were killed in house raids in western Turkey and 34 were killed in Southeast, according to police claims, during shoot-outs; however, the report states that no police were killed or wounded during these shoot-outs, which strongly suggests that these were deliberate executions (Ibid).

The report states that, approximately 5,000 deaths related to political violence were counted in the Southeast since the PKK commenced armed struggle in 1984, and about 2,000 in 1992. Upon this development, Prime Minister Demirel told reporters on October 4 that, “I no longer see a place for a political solution” (Ibid: 6). Reuters reported on February 26, 1993 that during 1992, 450 people were killed under suspicious circumstances in the Southeast many of them were leaders or in position of responsibility in the Kurdish community, and security forces, who may have been involved in some of those killings, failed to investigate the majority of them. However, the Turkish government has put the total number of mysterious crimes by unknown assailants even higher; Minister of the Interior Ismet Sezgin had stated that in 1992 there had been 881 such crimes in the thirteen provinces under emergency rule in southeast Turkey (Cumhuriyet, 10 February 1992) In August, security forces attacked Sirnak on the grounds that the city had been attacked by the PKK (at first the government claimed there were 1,500 PKK troops; then it reduced the figure to 1,000 and later to 500); out of the 35,000 residents only between 2,000 and 3,000 remained in the city. It was later reported that a small band of PKK fighters attacked a village on the outskirts of Sirnak, but not Sirnak itself (Ibid).

There were further examples such as the Sirnak episode during Demirel’s administration; security forces had apparently decided to punish civilians for attacks against the military. On April 22, following a fatal attack on a police officer in Batman, security forces reportedly detained about 100 people in the Batman Branch of the Human Rights Association, the Batman office of the Yeni Ülke newspaper, the HEP (People’s Labor Party) Provincial Center and many shops. On September 10, following the death of 6 Turkish soldiers in a clash with the PKK in Hamur district of Agri, security forces reportedly opened fire on civilian houses with heavy weapons. On October, following the death of two soldiers at hands of PKK fighters in Kulp district of Diyarbakir, security forces, reportedly, opened fired on civilian houses, shops and vehicles killing 5 and wounding 4. On November 7, a mine apparently laid by the PKK was hit by a panzer tank; security forces then reportedly retaliated by firing heavy artillery on the civilian residential area, killing 9 people including 5 children. Moreover, according to the report 296 villages in the Southeast were destroyed by security forces between March and the end of the year (Ibid).

On the subject of torture, BBC reported on January 14, 1993, that sweeping arrests were continuing to take place in, mainly Southeast, Turkey. The State Security Court in Diyarbakir handled 2,515 cases in 1991 and more than 4,000 cases in 1992; suspects of both ordinary and political crimes were routinely and systematically tortured in police stations in both western and southeastern Turkey. Furthermore, the Turkish government has acknowledged the deteriorating human rights record and problems with torture in a pamphlet entitled, Human Rights in Turkey: A Record of Improvement issued in June 1992. According to the pamphlet, “Human rights organization, national and foreign, have for long insisted that the most serious violation of human rights, torture, was widespread and used systematically in police stations…Whilst not reaching the levels
claimed, this degrading and inadmissible practice has not been totally eliminated” (Ibid: 22).

Moreover, the report stated that Helsinki Watch talked with several government officials including the Interior Minister, Minister of Justice and the head of the Security Directorates about the steps they had taken to prevent torture. Most of the answers were of procedural nature indicating that a Minister of Human Rights had been appointed and many laws had been proposed for amendment including the Criminal Procedure Code, the law on Police Duties and Powers, and the Emergency Laws. In addition, some officials emphasized that there was a lack of technical materials and monetary assistance to reform the organic composition of the security forces that enjoyed extraordinary authority following the 1971 and 1980 coups. Nevertheless, there were no substantial answers provided by the officials given that the United States was estimated to provide Turkey with $575 million in foreign assistance, $450 million in military loans and $125 million in economic support grants for the fiscal year 1993 apart from what Turkey has spent on defense and fight against terrorism. This indicates that the carrot of financial assistance alone fails to generate a more democratic system in substantial terms, there needs to be a push factor, stick of conditionality to make meaning of procedural definitions of a functioning democracy also in substantial terms.

In a further report published in August 1993, freedom of expression, Anti-Terror Law and imprisonments of many left-wing and pro-Kurdish journalists, writers and publishers are raising extreme concerns. In southeast Turkey, one newspaper distributor and a newspaper vendor selling left-wing newspapers were killed in the first seven months of 1993. Anti-Terror Law introduced in 1991 legitimized prosecution based on “separatism”. The report stated that targets of the Law were journalists, politicians, writers, publishers and musicians advocating a separate state for Turkey’s Kurdish minority (Ibid, 1993)

In 1992, twelve journalists were assassinated, making it the highest number of killings of journalists in any country in the world (Committee to Protect Journalists, 1992: 179). All but one of those journalists had written for left-wing or pro-Kurdish Journals. Moreover, three out of four journalists killed in 1993; Kemal Kilic, Ihsan Karakus and Ferhat Tepe were Kurdish. In addition, the report stated that many vendors and distributors of pro-Kurdish newspapers, especially in the southeast, were attacked by unidentified person, and detained, interrogated and threatened by the police (Human Rights Watch, 1993b).

For example Özgür Gündem, a Kurdish-owned newspaper, active since May 1992 had been victimized under governmental press restrictions. Numerous issues of the newspaper were confiscated because they portrayed Turkish citizens as Kurds, which was considered an “act of separatism” under the Constitution. Another pro-Kurdish newspaper, Azadi, had also been a victim of violations of freedom of press in Turkey. Even, foreign journalists were not immune to restrictions; Stefan Waldberg and Andrew Norman were arrested in 1993 on the charges of being couriers for the PKK (Human Rights Watch, 1993b).

Furthermore, the report stated, by referring to arrest of mayor of the Kurdish district of Cizre, Hasim Hasimi, that, “the authorities have taken the ‘making separatist propaganda’ charge so far that supporting peace can become a crime when it is related to the Kurdish issue” (Ibid: 18). Even though the ban on speaking Kurdish in public was lifted in 1991, political communication in Kurdish is still punishable under the new Anti-Terror Law. There are no possibilities for people who do not speak Turkish to express themselves in courts or other official
places since Kurdish is prohibited in the governmental buildings. Moreover, Turkey declined to sign the agreement on protecting and promoting minority and regional languages at the Council of Europe in December 1992.

In October 1994, Human Rights Watch published a report entitled, Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeast Turkey. Since 1993, internal displacement of the Kurds has become a pervasive phenomenon owing, mostly, to the intensified clashes between the government security forces and the PKK fighters. Tansu Ciller’s government followed an identical path with Demirel’s previous government and opted to resolve the Kurdish problem with militaristic means, while the PKK vowed to carry out more attacks and increase its recruitment. Forced evacuation of Kurdish villages intensified during this period in order to deprive the PKK of its logistic base of support; arbitrary detention and torture often accompanied such evictions. The state’s military strategy took a different turn during this period as the number of security forces killed skyrocketed from 715 in 1993 to 1,145 in 1994. On state’s new military strategy against the PKK former Turkish Chief of Staff Dogan Güres stated that, “we have changed the concept. We are now implementing area domination. There is no advancing on terrorists…We now apply ‘let them stay without logistic support – go hungry and surrender strategy’.”

Furthermore, during the same year Amnesty International’s annual report stated that the level of human rights violations in Turkey were “so severe and persistent as to warrant the prompt and full attention of the Commission” (AI Report 1994: 3-4). Severity of the situation became more evident when the Turkish government has denied access to Amnesty International to collect information about human rights violations in Turkey as of September 1994. According to the report,

Kurdish villagers have borne the brunt of human rights violations by government forces and by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Villagers who refuse to join the village guard system are subjected to torture, bombings or being burned out of their homes by government forces. According to reports 1,334 villages have been evacuated or destroyed in the past seven years. During 1994 more than 50 people, most of them villagers detained by soldiers in the course of these brutal operations, have “disappeared” while in custody. Women and children have been wounded and killed in mortar and aerial bombing attacks on residential areas, which have often occurred after members of the security forces have been killed in PKK raids…. Many of those now imprisoned or threatened with imprisonment have been convicted solely for the expression of their non-violent opinions under Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law.


Moreover, Human Rights Watch stated that,

In March 1994, the Turkish parliament lifted the parliamentary immunity of eight deputies, six of whom were deputies from the Kurdish-based Democracy Party (DEP). In June, Turkey's Constitutional Court banned the Democracy Party and stripped immunity from the remainder of its deputies, though a new Kurdish-based party, the Peoples' Democracy Party (HADEP), was formed in its place. Eventually eight parliamentarians whose immunity had been removed, seven from DEP and one independent, were charged with treason and separatism, allegedly for collaboration with the banned PKK, a violent guerrilla group. Anti-Terror Law especially Article 8 prohibiting "separatist propaganda" was widely applied to punish debate and expression concerning Turkey's Kurdish minority and the war in the Southeast.

(Human Rights Watch, 1995)

In 1995, various improvements in terms of human rights in Turkey have been observed, including reform on an abusive law, the release of some political prisoners, and reduction in the number of political killings. These improvements are believed to be part of government’s plan to impress the European Union under Prime Minister Tansu Ciller. Even so, violations of freedom of expression, unlawful imprisonments, torture under detention and an abusive counterinsurgency campaign which was utilized to empty Kurdish villages have remained intact,

Although the mainstream press and television were often a lively forum for debate, some efforts by journalists, authors, and intellectuals to discuss the Kurdish issue, human rights abuses by security forces, or the armed conflict in southeastern Turkey were met with severe repression, including censorship, imprisonment and torture of journalists and writers, and the banning of newspapers. In June, legal proceedings were launched to close another pro-Kurdish party, the Democracy and Change Party, headed by the former head of the People's Labor Party (HEP), the party that preceded DEP, because the party “demand[ed] cultural rights for Kurds,” which the prosecutor's office perceived as separatist. The chairman of the Democracy and Change Party, Ibrahim Aksoy, was arrested on his return to Turkey because of charges against him under article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law in October.

(Human Rights Watch, 1996)

The year 1996 marked a further defeat in terms of human rights in Turkey. Efforts to improve the existing human rights violations were rather limited in scope. A major blow to human rights and to the situation of Kurdish minority was the abolishment of the office of State Minster for Human Rights, which was seen as a committed advocate of human rights. Promises made to the Kurds were short lived; for example, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz of ANAP (Motherland Party) has promised to bring an end to the state of emergency in Southeast, and to liberalize policies concerning the linguistic and cultural right of the ethnic Kurds. On March 21, shortly after coming to the post, during his trip to the east Yilmaz claimed to have a new, more humane and daring approach to the Kurdish problem. He visualized about lifting the ban on education in Kurdish. Ultimately, his government was able to accomplish little and collapsed in early June. Yilmaz’s successor was Welfare Party’s Necmettin Erbakan (RP) who became
Prime Minister in July 1996. Erbakan tried a different approach to resolve the Kurdish problem; he assumed that common religious ties between Kurds and Turks will eventually eliminate the differences. Nevertheless, in his speech in October, Erbakan stated that, “we don’t have a Kurdish problem...We have a terrorism problem”, again intermingling the Kurdish issue with terrorism. There was also immense pressure on, pro-Kurdish, political parties. “Forty-one top administrators of HADEP, the pro-Kurdish party that took 4.5 percent of the national vote in December 1995 and came in first or second in many southeastern provinces, were arrested in July on charges of being linked to the PKK.”

Human rights abuses continued in 1998. Illegal formations within the state security forces dominated the agenda. Human Rights Watch states that, “the military, through powers that it was granted in the 1982 constitution, continued to exert influence over politics in a manner largely incompatible with the standards of democratic states.”

National political parties with pro-Islamic, pro-Kurdish, or left-wing tendencies and their local branches were constantly harassed or simply shut down. State of emergency situation remained as a heavy burden for the local population of the East and Southeast regions.

Five provinces in southeastern Turkey remained under the state of emergency. There was little change in six neighboring provinces, provinces that had previously been under emergency rule, because extraordinary measures continued to give state-appointed governors extended and restrictive powers. Despite government promises to compensate villagers, little effort has been made to facilitate the return of displaced persons to their homes in the southeast or to compensate them for the destruction and loss of their property.

In 1999, continuous human rights abuses in Turkey have been reported. The formation of pro-Kurdish political parties and their increasing popularity, especially in the East and Southeast, turned out to be a great concern for the Turkish government. Chief of the General Staff Dogan Gures complained that “terrorists are sitting in parliament” referring to Kurdish members of the parliament. In the eyes of the commanders of the Turkish armed forces Kurdish problem was simply a security problem and a problem of terrorism, ignoring the social, political, cultural or ethnic elements of the dilemma. As a result, Kurds who chose to follow a democratic path towards the solution of the problem became victims of ill-treatment and unjust laws adopted by the state and enforced by the security forces. This led to a wave of party closures imposed upon pro-Kurdish parties or upon the parties that sympathized with the Kurdish cause, “in February, the Democratic Mass Party (DKP), another party with a largely Kurdish membership, was the fifteenth political party to be closed down by the Constitutional Court since Turkey returned to civilian rule in 1983. The party's program (which urged recognition of minority rights within the existing state of Turkey) was deemed to have included separatist propaganda.”

---

CHAPTER 8: EU-TURKEY RELATIONS: THE POST-HELSINKI PERIOD

In this chapter the post-Helsinki period of the political history of EU-Turkish relations would be brought to the table. Many have identified the 1999 Helsinki Summit as a critical turning point in EU-Turkey relations. Turkey has been officially recognized as a member candidate, and Turkish membership seemed plausible if adequate compliance with the Copenhagen criteria was achieved. In addition, at Helsinki a functional monitoring and reporting mechanism was arranged, which was previously rather informal and feeble, to coherently evaluate Turkey’s progress at each stage. At this stage the EU is said to have adjusted its gatekeeper role from passive to active leverage (Uslu, 2010). Uslu identified the years between 1999 and 2005 as, “the time period during which the effectiveness of EU conditionality has been at its greatest” (Uslu, 2010: 100). Moreover, Turkey had the status of ‘not-yet-negotiating candidate’; only after 2005 Turkey became a negotiating country.

The decision at Helsinki was a welcoming one for the Turkish public and the government. The formalities surrounding the Turkish membership were, at last, documented and officialized, which boosted the pull-effect and encouraged the governing elites to carry out various political, social and legal reforms in accordance with the Acquis. Consequently, increasing public support and institutional compliance with the conditionality enabled the EU to utilize the push-effect and exert a real, active leverage between 1999 and 2009, which this chapter will demonstrate in detail.

Nevertheless, EU’s push and active leverage seemed to be limited when compared to the examples observed in the enlargement processes of various CEECs. This may have two reasons; first, the EU may have deliberately kept its direct, active involvement limited, which if applied as in previous enlargement processes would have led to an accelerated and possibly successful integration of Turkey into the Union, to gain some leverage and time for future negotiations while keeping the opposing parties on Turkish membership contented. Secondly, the US invasion of Iraq generated conflicting views within the Union itself and resurfaced the questions, loudly attested by the international civil society, regarding westernization, western-style democracy and coercive democracy. Furthermore, restructuring of the Middle-East and changing dynamics came into question with the invasion of Iraq. Bearing this environment in mind the EU’s political leadership may have, possibly, decided to weather the storm, which perhaps would change geopolitical dynamics of the Middle-East, before coming to a final decision on Turkish membership. Therefore, the EU’s political conditionality for Turkey was clearer, more direct and active compared to the pre-Helsinki period; however, ambiguity surrounding Turkey’s full membership, considering that the country fully complied with the Copenhagen criteria, was still evident, mainly hailing from Turkey’s democratic deficiencies, primarily the Kurdish problem, which is the key to the Turkish democratization.

On the subject of socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurdish population in post-Helsinki period there has been an overwhelming indication directing towards substantial improvements, particularly when compared with the data observed in pre-Helsinki period. Therefore, socio-
economic and cultural situation of the Kurds in post-Helsinki era will be analyzed on the course of this chapter. Regular reports published on Turkey’s progress concerning the compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria, and accession to the EU provide extensive data on the cultural situation of the Kurds, seeing that human rights and protection of minorities have been a stronghold of EU conditionality, precisely in the case of Turkey’s accession. For that reason, cultural situation of the Kurds will, primarily, be assessed based on the data provided by annual progress reports on Turkey from a period between 1998 and 2009. As mentioned before, the remaining socio-economic indicators will be gathered from different regional studies conducted by independent and government agencies, and from the reports made public by Turkish Prime Ministry State Planning Organization.

I –THE HELSINKI SUMMIT

As stated above, Helsinki Summit that took place on 10 December 1999, for the first time, manifested Turkey as a prospect member given that Turkey has fulfilled the EU conditionality and established a monitoring mechanism. The Presidency Conclusion of the Helsinki European Council in this respect states the following:

Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issues of human rights…Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established.

(Council of the European Union, 1999)

Although, the Council’s decisions gathered some negative feedback by a small fraction of the population, most of the Turks and Turkish leadership showed great enthusiasm for the process. This has facilitated adaptation and adoption of various economic and political reforms; hence, a hospitable domestic environment for further democratization was emerging. More importantly, Turkish public and state elite recognized the importance of democratization for compliance with the conditionality and considered further democratization attempts necessary for full membership. On the other hand, by officially recognizing Turkey as a member candidate the EU positioned itself as an active player capable of directly influencing the democratization process of Turkey.

Consequently, Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz became responsible for EU-Turkey relations and presented a reform package to prepare Turkey for EU membership. A historic speech given by Mesut Yılmaz on 16 December 1999, four days after the Helsinki Summit, in Diyarbakir stated that, “the road trough the European Union passes through Diyarbakir”, a city which has deep sentimental value for the Kurds. For the first time in the history of the Turkish republic a high ranking government official openly acknowledged the Kurdish problem and its solution as a prerequisite for Turkey’s EU accession and
democratization. In accordance with the EU conditionality, and the new reform package, Turkey abolished the death penalty and legalized education and broadcasting in Kurdish language on August 3, 2002. The European Commission said that it was “a significant step to…becoming a fully fledge democracy” (BBC, Turkey Agrees Death Penalty Ban 9. Jan. 2004).

II – THE ACCESSION PARTNERSHIP WITH TURKEY

The Accession Partnership with Turkey, adopted on 8 March 2001, was considered to be the centerpiece of the pre-accession strategy and an important step toward its implementation. The main purpose of the Partnership was to provide Turkey with guidance and to facilitate Turkey’s accession process by enabling Turkey to familiarize itself with the EU’s procedures and policies. The main objective of the AP could be summoned in three basic points; first, to identify priorities for reform; second, set guidelines for financial assistance for action in these priority areas; and third, incorporate the principles and conditions governing implementation of the Partnership. The Accession Partnership with Turkey has a dynamic character. The priorities and goals change according to the pace of progress without overstraining the ability to assume the obligations of membership (the Copenhagen political criteria); in the case of Turkey, it has been revised three times in 2003, 2006 and 2008.

The AP identified priorities in two main groups; first, short term priorities were envisaged to contain eight political and 42 structural or legislative changes including: democracy and the rule of law, civilian oversight of military, abolition of State Security Courts, abolition of death penalty, elimination of torture, freedom of expression and freedom of association. Second, medium term priorities were to be composed of eight political and 52 economic and social policy changes such as human rights and fundamental freedoms, ratification of the ICCPR and the ICESC, reviewing constitution and other relevant legislation, revising the role of the National Security Council, ending the state of emergency in the Southeast and to guarantee cultural rights for all citizens.

Regarding the situation of the Kurds, even though the AP did not use the words “Kurdish” or “Kurds” specifically it clearly required Turkey to, “ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural for all citizens irrespective of their origin. Ensure effective access to Radio/TV broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish”, and to remove any legal provisions forbidding this right indicating, indirectly, to the Kurdish language. (Accession Partnership with Turkey, 2003: 11). Additionally, reducing regional disparities and composing a comprehensive approach to improve the situation in the Southeast and to encourage and facilitate the return of IDPs to their original settlements in the East and Southeast were indicated as essential issues in the document; the document stated that, “a significant increase in funding will also allow the EU to support socio-economic development in Turkey, as it relates to the goals of the accession strategy” (Ibid: 2). Moreover, the EU’s assistance to Turkey was conditioned on “the fulfillment of essential elements, and particular on progress towards fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria” and so was utilized as the enforcement mechanism for these priorities (European Commission, 2000: 3)

107 For example, pre-accession financial assistance to Turkey was estimated to be €250 million in 2004, €300 million in 2005, and €500 million in 2006. (AP with Turkey 2003: 3)
III – NATIONAL PROGRAMMES FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE ACQUIS (NPAA)

The NPAA could be considered as an indicator of Turkey’s consent to the EU conditionality. National Programmes were regarded as a critical step in EU-Turkey relations as the Turkish ruling elites, after intense deliberation and dialogue, devised a systematic plan to transform Turkey’s political structure to comply with the conditionality, and were able to present this plan to the EU in a document.

Following a period of deliberations within the parliament between the coalition leaders, the final version of the NPAA was adopted on 19 March 2001. The programme, although fell short of EU expectations in terms of democracy and human rights, aimed to conduct new economic, political and legal reforms to tackle issues retaining Turkey from a potential membership. When, on 26 March 2001, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem officially presented Turkey’s NPAA to Günter Verheugen, he called it as a turning point and the most essential phase in Turkey’s democratization process towards a modern democracy; he, furthermore, added that Turkey needed more concrete reforms especially in terms of human rights and freedoms (Milliyet, 27 March 2001).

The first NPAA encompassed a wide range of political and economic reforms; nevertheless, the document appeared to be rather imprecise as some of the real priorities such as the signing of Protocol 6 of the ECHR and taking progressive steps to guarantee cultural right were not mentioned. The government of Turkey pledged to reassess a variety of provisions of the constitution with respect to human rights, as well as various legal provisions such as Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terror Law and Article 312 of the Penal Code. On the other hand, a variety of important issues, which according to the EU needed special attention, including the state of emergency in the Southeast, abolishment of the death penalty and cultural and minority rights were left unattained and became a political jargon at the hands of the coalition leaders.¹⁰⁸

Once again Turkey gave consent to EU conditionality by adopting a revised NPAA on 24 July 2003 where the government announced its readiness to review the provisions on the freedom of expression in accordance with the ECHR, and on broadcasting and learning of languages other than Turkish utilized by Turkish citizens in daily life.

¹⁰⁸ In the Goteborg Summit (15-16 June 2001) the Union declared that, “in number of areas such as human rights, further progress is needed. Turkey is urged to take concrete measures to implement the priorities if the Accession Partnership which is the cornerstone of the pre-accession strategy (Council of the European Union 2001b: 2)
IV – THE BRUSSELS COUNCIL

The Council meeting on 17 December 2004 was considered as another turning point in EU-Turkey relations. Accession negotiations with Turkey commenced on 3 October 2005 following Council’s positive recommendations, but more importantly a ‘Negotiating Framework’ was drafted.

Nevertheless, prevailing Cyprus issue shed a cover over further negotiations. Turkey was asked to expand the reach of Customs Union so that the span would also comprise the republic of Cyprus. Hence, the Cyprus issue was inserted into the accession negotiation with Turkey. From this point on, the EU used Cyprus as leverage in negotiations, repeatedly reminding Turkey of the absorption capacity of the Union and the open-ended nature of the negotiations.

The direct and active influence of the EU, which augmented after the Helsinki Summit, was also evident considering the decisions taken in the Brussels Council. For example, on 20 September 2005 the EU set up a ‘screening process’ to evaluate Turkey’s progress in terms of compliance with the Acquis. The successful completion of the screening process led to the commencement of substantive negotiations on 12 June 2006.

V – CONDITIONALITY MECHANISM AND THE REGULAR REPORTS ON TURKEY

The period after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 experienced a more systematic approach in terms of conditionality, negotiations and progress of Turkey. The Helsinki Summit itself served as a catalyst, it strengthened EU’s pull-effect and appeal, for Turkey as benefit side of membership became more visible and the process to reach it more achievable. The monitoring mechanism not only facilitated the checks and balances but it also enabled Turkey to recognize various social, political and economic deficiencies. Additionally, progress reports provided an inclusive insight on the cultural and human rights situation of various minorities, above all of the Kurds, albeit the commission seemed to be particularly cautious to not include words such as “Kurds”, “Kurdish issue” or “Kurdish minority” in its literature. Moreover, the reports also scrutinized human (cultural) rights situation and regional socio-economic development incentives with meticulous reference to East and Southeast regions.


The first Progress Report on Turkey was published in 1998. Although, this report was prepared before the Helsinki Summit it is more accurate to discuss its content in the post-Helsinki period due to the fact that progress reports were conducted to assess the progress in candidate states; evidently Turkey has become an official candidate only after the Helsinki Summit in 1999.

The EU, for the first time, actively set a monitoring mechanism, analyzing the economic and political situation in Turkey. The report tried to shed a light on the characteristics of Turkey’s political regime in accordance with the Copenhagen
criteria. One of the major problems discovered by the report was the disturbed civilian military relations and the immense power and influence the army possessed over civilian government and political issues of Turkey:

The existence of [the National Security Council] shows that, despite a basic democratic structure, the Turkish constitution allows the army to play a civil role and to intervene in every area of political life...The army is not subject to civil control and sometimes even appears to act without government’s knowledge when it carries out certain large-scale repressive military operations.

(Progress Report, 1998: 14)

The Report, in addition, criticized various governmental institutions in Turkey mentioning certain deficiencies, which should not be tolerated in a well functioning democratic system. Executive branch of the government, for example, was believed to harbor corruption and favoritism with certain ties between organized crime and state apparatus exposed. State Security Courts were considered undemocratic institutions and cases of extra-judicial executions, torture were frequently recorded. Especially, Anti-Terror Law’s “excessively narrow interpretation” of Articles 7 and 8, Articles 158, 159, 311 and 312 of the Penal Code were heavily denounced, as hindrances of freedom of expression, in the Progress Report.

The central question raised by the Report, in terms of the political criteria, was the Kurdish problem under the Minority Rights and Protection of Minorities clause. According to the report, “the constitution does not recognize Kurds as a national, racial or ethnic minority” (Progress Report, 1998: 19). The Report indicating that Kurds living in the state of emergency areas (East and Southeast) were facing various socio-economic inequalities and resolutely asked Turkey, “to find a political and non-military solution to the problem” (Ibid: 20).

In 1996 Human Rights Committee of the Turkish Parliament visited the region where several villages have been destroyed or evacuated, it is estimated that between 3000 to 4000 Kurdish villages have been destroyed during the conflict109 110 111, and concluded that the government had failed to help these displaced persons. Even though, Mesut Yilmaz’s coalition government stated, in 1997, their intentions to tackle economic and social problems of the region, “no concrete measures have so far materialized” (Ibid: 20). In addition, the report highlighted that in six of the nine provinces in the Southeast the state of emergency, ratified by the Article 122 of the Constitution and in effect since 1987, was still in force.

---

109 According to Norman Paech, “From 184 to late in 1994 a total of 2,500 villages are said to have been destroyed. By now that figure is estimated to have reached 3,000” (Ibrahim and Gürbey, 2000: 167).

110 Moreover, Human Rights Watch states that “by the mid-1990s, more than 3000 villages had been virtually wiped from the map, and, according to official figures, 378,335 Kurdish villagers had been displaced and left homeless” (HRW. “Still Critical” 6. Mar. 2005 http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11822/section/4).

Congressional Record of the House of Representatives states that, “Over 3,400 villages have been destroyed; 37,000 people, mostly Kurds, have been killed; 3 million Kurds have become refugees” Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress, Second Session. April 6, 2000 p. 4827

111 Congressional Record of the House of Representatives states that, “Over 3,400 villages have been destroyed; 37,000 people, mostly Kurds, have been killed; 3 million Kurds have become refugees” Proceedings and Debates of the 106th Congress, Second Session. April 6, 2000 p. 4827
On the subject of economics, acknowledging the considerable potential and great adaptability of Turkish market economy, the commission emphasized the interaction between modernization, economic stability and efficiency, and elimination of regional disparities by stating that, “the wide regional development disparities are a salient factor; closing the gap should be high on the government’s list of priorities. The European Union will do its best to help the backward regions” (Ibid: 29). Moreover, the report also criticized inefficient regional policies concerning the development of the officially designated 49 “disadvantaged” provinces, mostly in East and Southeast, of Turkey by claiming that, “GDP in the disadvantaged areas was only 61% of the national average in 1986. More up-to-date figures based on regional household consumption in 1994 suggest a similar gap. Infrastructure in the disadvantaged regions also continues to lag despite major projects carried out between 1985 and 1990” (Ibid: 50).

In conclusion, the Report recommended Turkey to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue within the democratic framework; “a civil solution could include recognition of certain forms of Kurdish cultural identity and greater tolerance of the ways of expressing that identity, provided it does not advocate separatism or terrorism” (EC Progress Report 1998b: 20). This was an important request in the sense that the EU directly and decisively requested peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish problem from Turkey in the first official progress report, which necessitated an official recognition of Kurdish identity and freedom to practice cultural activities.

2. Progress Report 1999

The EU’s criticisms of Turkey, particularly, in terms of political criteria continued in this second progress report, which was issued on 13 October 1999. Briefly, the above mentioned deficiencies, of the first Progress Report, also made up a large scrap of the script for this report; corruption, human right abuses, State Security Courts, electoral threshold of minimum 10 per cent alongside with the immense power of the military over the government and politics constituted the most serious problems of Turkish democracy (Progress Report 1999). The report stated that:

Recent developments confirm that, although the basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the Copenhagen political criteria. There are serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities…The National Security Council continues to play a major role in political life.

(Progress Report 1999:16)

Moreover, the report urged Turkey to solve its political problems, indicating to the Kurdish conflict in the East and Southeast Anatolia, by political and democratic means with particular respect for human rights and the rule of law, and to also demonstrate that it belongs to the democratic society of the European nations; “in this context it [the EU] welcomes all genuine efforts to separate the fight against terrorism from the search for political solutions and to promote conciliation. In support of this the EU stands ready to contribute, including through continued financial assistance” (Ibid: 6). Financial assistance was also provided for other reasons such as the catastrophic earthquake of 17 August 1999.
Besides sending rescue teams and aid workers the EU immediately supplied €4 million for emergency needs and prepared a package amounting to €30 million for rehabilitation and reconstruction purposes.

Concerning the human rights issues and protection of minorities the Report made references to the Kurdish population indicating the laws forbidding broadcasting in Kurdish language, and more significantly the existence of state of emergency and martial law in the six Kurdish provinces of East and Southeast Anatolia. Moreover, the 10 per cent electoral threshold for entry into the parliament severely affected the political participation of the Kurdish population creating an unequal representation prospect in the government. The report stated that,

The “Committee on the Honoring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe” indicated in its January 1999 report that “the essential point is that any such group [Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin] should have the opportunity and material resources to use and sustain its natural languages and cultural traditions in circumstances and under conditions now clearly and reasonably defined by two important Council of Europe Conventions: the Framework Convention on Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, as well as by Assembly Recommendation 1201 (1993) on an additional protocol on the right of national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights”

(Progress Report 1999: 14)

Even though, six provinces of southeast remained under the state of emergency legislation, the report indicated that various developments were taking place, which may have positive impact on the situation. First of these optimistic developments was the adoption of the Repentance Law (No. 4450) by the Parliament in August 1999, which granted amnesty to PKK members if they surrendered, given that they have not partaken in any armed incursions. Second, important development was the ceasefire declaration of the PKK with, its leader, Öcalan calling upon the members to end the armed struggle as of 1st September 1999. And lastly, the meeting that took place between President Demirel and representatives of pro-Kurdish HADEP party, facing a closure, to discuss the problems of Southeast.  (Ibid)

Economic incentives to develop the East and Southeast regions in order to eliminate regional disparities were also discussed during this period; the commission found Turkey’s incentives to eliminate regional disparities to be rather centralized with little attention paid to the regional dimension. Under the assessment in terms of Copenhagen criteria title the report stated that,

Regional disparities between urban and rural areas and East and West are very large, leading to considerable internal migration flows. Despite government’s attempts, like the Güney Anadolu Projesi, to promote economic development in underdeveloped areas, the present disparities pose a potential threat to Turkey’s social and economic stability.

(Progress Report 1999: 25)
The uneven distribution of income and the huge regional disparities impede sound economic development. Attention should be paid to education as an element of an overall socio-economic development. (Ibid: 26)

Following such assessments and the authorization of Turkey’s candidate status, “in March 1999, PM Ecevit announced that the Government will support socio-economic development of the south-east Anatolia region with an additional USD 100m over the next two years” (Ibid: 14)


The third regular report on Turkey’s progress, alongside with the Strategy Paper, was announced on 8 November 2000. This Report was considered to be Turkey’s first exam since it was the first report conducted after the Helsinki Summit with Turkey as an official candidate. An important element of this report, perhaps, was that it contained a section titled “Recent developments” where Turkey’s performance in relation to compliance with Copenhagen criteria with previous report and overall situation in the country were compared.

Conceivably, one of the most direct and significant influence exerted by the EU has been the EC pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey adopted in July 2000. A considerable amount of financial aid, referred to as the “community aid”, has been granted to Turkey in order to facilitate country’s accession process and integrate it into the EU.

During the period 1996-1999, Turkey received € 376 million, which equals an annual average over € 90 million. From 2000 onwards the yearly allocation to Turkey has been set at 15% of the MEDA bilateral envelope, in addition to the € 50 million annual average allocation foreseen in the framework of the two ‘European strategy/pre-accession strategy’ regulations. The first regulation adopted in April 2000 foresees € 5 million per year for 3 years; the second regulation is at present in the process of being adopted. It will provide € 45 million per year for 3 years. Overall the annual allocation to Turkey in 2000 will therefore amount to € 177 million

(Progress Report 2000: 8)

Half of this sum was to be allocated for structural and sector reforms and the other half for various measures to promote Turkey’s harmonization into the EU including investment support and regional/rural development.

According to the report developments in the Turkey signaled a democratic initiative and were “welcomed as a signal of strengthening the democratization process” (Ibid: 10). Some of these developments were; the Presidential elections on May 5th, replacement of two State Ministers one of whom were the State Minister in charge of human rights and creation of a new post of Deputy Prime Minister and State Minister in charge of EU affairs in July.

More importantly, however, the period following the Helsinki Summit awakened the public interest and initiated an extensive debate concerning the content of EU democratic conditionality and Turkey’s compliance with the Acquis. Accordingly, various initiatives took place in Turkey, mainly in terms of
human rights and harmonization with the EU, which gathered positive feedback from the European Commission. Some of these initiatives were; signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in August 2000, publishing nine reports on torture and ill-treatment by the TBMM Human Rights Committee following inspections carried out in 1998 and 2000 in a range of prisons and police stations, and the work of the Supreme Board of Co-ordination for Human Rights,

On 21st September, the Government made a press statement in which it declared that “the papers prepared on human rights, democracy and the rule of law [by the above mentioned Board] were evaluated and subsequently adopted as reference and working documents”. The same statement indicated that the government had set a number of priority objectives such as the adoption of new legislation on “working rights”, freedom of association and “demonstration marches”, the development of freedom of thought and expression, the improvement of the functioning of the judicial system, the establishment of a Human Rights Department under the Prime Minister\textsuperscript{112}, the elimination of regional disparities in East and Southeast Anatolia, and the training of staff on matters related to EC legislation…Finally the Council of Ministers decided to continuously follow developments in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and to evaluate periodically the efforts made in adapting to EU standards.

(Progress Report 2000: 11)

On the subject of human rights and protection of minorities the report highlighted the progress made by Turkey by giving the example of signing of two, above mentioned, international instruments in the field of human rights. “Human rights education”, for example, “has been incorporated in the curricula of police academies since the beginning of the 1999-2000 academic year” (Ibid: 16). Nonetheless, the report also indicated that Turkey has yet to accede to Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights on the abolition of death penalty, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the Statute of the International Criminal Court has also not been signed by Turkey. Likewise, the government did not recognize minorities except for those defined by the treaty of Lausanne and expression of pro-Kurdish views were still considered, by the State, to be an assault on the indivisibility of the republic (Ibid).

The report drew attention to the importance of cultural rights, which would compose a great part of the settlement incentives in the Southeast region since the security issue has been, for the most part, enhanced and socio-economic development programs well underway,

Since the last Regular Report, large scale armed violence in the Southeast seems to have stopped…According to the estimates of the Press Office of the Chief of Staff, PKK activities continued to decrease in 1999 at a rate of 26%, compared to 42% in 1998…The state of emergency has been lifted in two provinces, Siirt (in November 1999)

\textsuperscript{112} The department has been established on 5 October 2000
and Van (in June 2000), but remains in force in four provinces, along with the village guard system. On the socio-economic side, the Turkish authorities have begun to step up efforts in order to improve the level of development of the region. Further substantial efforts are required for example with respect to education, health and water supplies. The authorities have also shown the will to allow a partial return of the population in villages and hamlets evacuated in the past for security reasons.

(Progress Report 2000: 19-20)

As regards cultural rights, with a judgment passed on 31 March 2000 by the Supreme Court of Appeals parents were granted the freedom to name their children with any name they pleased, including the Kurdish ones. Use of Kurdish language in broadcasting and education was still problematic and limited to a small segment; in some cases use of Kurdish was tolerated.

On the subject of regional disparities and development incentives, the commission criticized the absence of regional statistics for an improved assessment mechanism. The commission also asked Turkey to propose a NUTS classification for the implementation of structural policies. Although the State Planning Organization has initiated various regional development programs such as; Eastern Black Sea region (8 provinces), Eastern Anatolia (16 provinces), Yesil Irmak development basin (5 provinces) and Marmara region (5 provinces) none had reached an operational phase. In addition, the report stated that, “high priority needs to be given to reinforcement and modernization of a regional policy which is in compliance with Community standards, addressing the major gaps of the regions lagging behind” (Progress Report 2000: 60)

A range of interrelated criticisms, in accordance with the previous reports, were voiced including, the military control (mainly exerted by the National Security Council) over politics and government, the necessity for the regime to be more “civilized”, and inconsistency of State Security Courts with European norms. The report stated that, “Turkish courts continue to restrict the expression of views with which the State disagrees, notably when it concerns the situation of the population of Kurdish origin” (Ibid: 16). Furthermore, the case of Akin Birdal, former Chairman of the Human Rights Association, who was imprisoned for a second time in March 2000, raised concerns in the EU. The report declared that, “the renewed detention of Mr. Birdal…is not in accordance with the spirit of the Helsinki conclusion” (Ibid: 17). Upon EU’s criticisms and concerns over this case, Mr. Birdal was released from prison on 23 September 2000. In addition, the report also criticized the administrative structure for being over-centralized.

The fourth progress report on Turkey and the Strategy Paper were published on 13 November 2001. This report was rather different in scope although the content in general correlated with those of pervious reports. Amendments adopted in September 2001 and the National Programme introduced by Turkey were scrutinized for the first time in this report.

The community aid continued to be an important contributor for Turkish accession process as well mentioned in this report, Turkey will continue to receive a significant allocation from the new EIB mandate for the Mediterranean countries (the EuroMed II Lending Mandate). This amounts to a total of €6.425 billion for the period January 2000-January 2007. Moreover, Turkey was accepted by the EIB as eligible to benefit from the EIB pre-accession facility, which amounts in total to €8.5 billion for the 13 candidate countries. The EIB also approved the Special Action Mandate for Turkey (€450m) and the Turkey Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Assistance Facility (TERRA; €600m) is also available. The EIB has also adopted a new “Mediterranean Partnership Facility” of €1billion, covering the region, from which Turkey may also benefit.

(Progress Report 2001: 11)

Keeping the National Programme in mind, the report underlined the importance of constitutional amendments for a successful and effective democratization process,

The package of thirty-four amendments to the 1982 Constitution was adopted on 3 October 2001, introducing new provisions on issues such as freedom of thought and expression, the prevention of torture, the strengthening of civilian authority, freedom of association, and gender equality. Several amendments are related to the Copenhagen political criteria, the Accession Partnership and the NPAA.

(Progress Report 2001: 14)

The positive nature of recent constitutional amendments, though not entirely complying with the Copenhagen political criteria, were signified as, “a significant step towards strengthening guarantees in the filed of human rights and fundamental freedoms and limiting capital punishment” by the Commission. (Ibid: 19). More importantly, the Commission stressed on the practical application of these amendments not just the institutional.

Considering the human rights and protection of minorities the report implied that recent constitutional amendments were a crucial step to resolve issues stemming from human rights abuses and unfair treatment of minorities. For example, Articles 13 and 14 have been amended to clear the path for procedural application of fundamental rights and freedoms.113 Enforcement mechanism of

---

113 Article 13 now reads: "Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only on the basis of specific reasons listed in the relevant articles of the Constitution without prejudice to the values defined therein and only by law. These restrictions shall not conflict with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the democratic social order and the secular republic and the principle of proportionality". Article 14 now reads "None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State
human rights were, as well, established in Turkey (law of 5 October 2000) such as; the Human Rights Presidency, the High Human Rights Board, the Human Rights Consultation Boards and the Investigation Boards. Moreover, with a circular issued on 26 September 2001 the Minister of the Interior called upon the regional authorities to deepen efforts to stop human rights abuses. In addition, proposals to change Articles 159 and 312 of the Penal Code and Articles 7 and 8 of the Anti-Terrorist Law have been submitted; nevertheless, the report stated that Articles 7 and 8 were still widely in effect and utilized by public prosecutors to restrict freedoms of expression. (Ibid)

On the subject of civil and political rights the report revealed that serious deficiencies, such as torture and ill-treatment of detainees under police and security forces’ custody, remained within the Turkish system. This was exemplified by the statement made by the Turkish authorities, “during the period 2000-2001, 1472 proceedings for charges of ill treatment and 159 proceedings of torture were opened against security forces members. As a result, 36 persons were given prison sentences while another 50 were expelled from service” (Progress Report 2001: 22).

The conditions of prisons were also evaluated in this report. Several laws had passed to improve the conditions of prisons and rehabilitation of the prisoners; some examples were: Law amending Article 15 of the Anti-terrorist law (5 May 2001), Law on the Institution of the Judge of Enforcement (16 May 2001), and Law on the Establishment of Monitoring Boards for Punishment Enforcement Institutions and Detention Houses (21 June 2001). Furthermore, 30,000 prisoners have been released as a result of Amnesty Law issued on 8 December 2000, “by 1 May 2001, there were 59,215 detainees in Turkish prisons, a decrease of 23% from the previous year” (Ibid: 24).

In accordance with previous reports, this report restated some of the rooted issues in Turkish democracy and system such as: the State Security Courts, military control with the National Security Council, freedom of expression and the Anti-Terror Laws (specifically Articles 7 and 8). Considering the protection of minorities and continuous deteriorating situation of the Kurds the Commission stated that Turkey should sing the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

The commission, once again, clearly stated that, “the issue of respect for cultural rights is particularly important for improving the situation in the Southeast” (Ibid: 29). Kurdish New Year (Newroz) celebrations that took place on 21 March 2001 in Diyarbakir, for the first time in a long while, witnessed no clashes between the security forces and people taking part in the festivities; an estimated half a million people gathered to celebrate Newroz. Since the Regular Report 2000, however, the state of emergency, for the purposes of security, in Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Sırnak and Tunceli were extended three times: on 27 October 2000, on 27 March 2001 and on 29 June 2001 for four months periods (Ibid). Moreover, pro-Kurdish HADEP party remained as a target for prosecution and police investigations.

with its territory and nation, or for activities undertaken with the aim of destroying the democratic and secular Republic based on human rights. No provision of this Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that grants the State or individuals the right of destroying the fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution, and of staging an activity with the aim of restricting rights and freedoms more extensively than is stated in the Constitution. Sanctions for persons undertaking activities in conflict with these provisions shall be defined by law.” European Commission Report 2001: 19
On the economic front, upon EU’s criticism that regional disparities are “considerable and widening”, Turkey established East and Southeast Action Plan initiated by the National Security Council to develop the regions affected by violent conflict between the state security forces and PKK members.

The plan reputedly includes 107 measures related to public administration, economy, health and education…As part of this plan, the “return to village programme” consists of a resettlement scheme for those who have been displaced by the events in the region. According to Emergency Rule Governor, up to 26,000 people have as of July 2001, returned to their villages. 2800 households have been officially resettled. However, 34,000 applications for return are still pending. In several instances village guards, armed and paid by the state to defend evacuated or abandoned villages, have occupied the houses of departed villagers and refuse to return them to the legitimate owners. There are between 45,000 and 90,000 village guards in the region.

The government reports that 10 private bank branches were opened and infrastructure projects increased by 14% in the region.

(Progress Report 2001: 30)

In conclusion, the Commission acknowledged and welcomed various reforms and progress made by the Turkish government to comply with the Acquis, but assessed that these efforts were inadequate, compared with European standards, and needed more dedication and improvement. The National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) and the Accession Partnership were also analyzed in this report. Turkey was asked to produce more lucid and manageable timetables, priorities and deadlines.

The present NPAA makes it insufficiently clear how Turkey will address a number of priorities in the Accession Partnership such as those on cultural rights. The NPAA falls considerably short of the Accession Partnership priority of guaranteeing cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of origin. Furthermore, the priority on the removal of all legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting is to be included.

(Progress Report 2001: 103)

Under the regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments, the commission came to the conclusion that no progress had been reported in terms of preparing for the implementation of structural policies, adoption for the legislative framework, institutional structures, programming, monitoring and evaluation, financial management and control, and in the development of regional statistics. Concerning the development incentives and implementation, the government relied heavily on a centralized system controlled entirely by Ankara, with the exception of the Authority for the development of the South Eastern Anatolia Project (Ibid: 77)
5. Progress Report 2002

This was the fifth progress report on Turkey. The EU’s wave of criticism concerning Turkey’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and overall democratic performance continued, and to some extent expanded, in the report. Section on the political criteria swelled up to 32 pages making it 12 more than that of the previous report. Nevertheless, progress has been recorded in various fields.

The reform package adopted by Parliament in August 2002 was particularly far reaching. Among the amendments adopted are the lifting of the death penalty in peace time, the possibility for Radio and TV broadcasting in Kurdish, the widening of freedom of expression and greater freedom for non-Moslem religious minorities.

(Progress Report 2002: 17-18)

On the subject of community assistance, the report stated that a financial assistance over €200 million will be contracted to Turkey by the end of 2002, and that the Commission’s objective was to double the level of financial assistance previously enjoyed by Turkey in the period 1993-1999. Total national allocation for Turkey in 2002 was set to be €149 million, which would be utilized for priority areas identified by the commission such as; the political criteria to promote good governance, freedom of expression, fight against discrimination, prevention of torture and improved access to justice; the economic criteria to help Turkey overcome the economic crisis; and technical assistance and investment to meet the obligation of the Acquis (Progress Report, 2002). Turkey, also, continued to benefit from loans granted by the EIB and various other institutions of the EU.114

On the regional front, the report claimed that social and economic disparities had widened owing to the constantly elevated inflation and economic instability, and that limited progress had been achieved in the elimination of regional disparities.115 However, assessing the actual regional impact proved to be highly problematic due to the fact that the State Institute of Statistics had only began producing monthly and quarterly data in 2002; therefore, the content of regional statistics and the quality of monitoring mechanisms lacked a certain degree of comprehensiveness. Even though, the progress on regional development had been slim and inadequate, it was not entirely absent. Defining a provisional map for regional development purposes according to the NUTS 2 classification had been completed by the Turkish government to specify the targeted areas and planned guidelines. (Ibid)

Concerning the judicial system of Turkey the report underlined the absence of progress to establish intermediate courts of appeal alongside with a verity of inconsistencies in the system. Although some efforts were made to establish civilian control over the military, the military courts remained influential and even tried civilians. The National Security Council, on the other hand, kept its long

114 “In total Turkey has received loan financing worth €1020 million from 1992 to 2000” EC Progress Report 2002: 14
115 According to the report, “regional disparities in Turkey should be a major objective…long-term strategy should be made to strengthen internal socio-economic cohesion…the provisional NUTS map should be used for regional development purposes, in particular at NUTS 2 level” EC Progress Report 2002: 109
established power, even though the number of civilian members was increased by the constitutional amendments, and enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy in drafting the defense budget. The Commission suggested that the State Security Courts needed to be on a par with EU’s standards. Moreover, concerns regarding the situation of the juvenile courts, such as the average duration of proceedings being 755 days compared to 406 days in general criminal courts and 241 days in general civil courts, and independence of judiciary were voiced by the Commission (Ibid: 21). Torture and ill-treatment of the detainees and general condition of F-type prisons were some of the other points made by the Commission.

With specific reference made to the human rights issues, the report indicated that Turkey has made some considerable progress; for instance, ratification of the 1969 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by the Parliament in April. In addition, European Agreement Relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the ECHR was likewise signed by Turkey. Nonetheless, other instruments such as the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the UN international Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights remained untouched. Detention periods in police custody, for example, have been reduced from ten days to four days and in emergency rule areas (composed of various Kurdish provinces of East and Southeast Anatolia) an additional three days to a possible seven days maximum. Although not fully operational, “there are currently Human Rights Boards in 81 provinces and 831 sub-provinces…Between October 2001 and June 2002, 1192 applications were filed” (Progress Report, 2002: 27). Moreover, according to the report,

Between 1 October 2001 and 30 June 2002, 1874 applications regarding Turkey were made to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of these, the majority (1125) were related to Article 6 of the ECHR (“right to a fair trial”). Three hundred and four were concerned with Article 5 (“the right to liberty and security”), and 246 applications were made under Article 3 (“prohibition of torture”). One hundred and four pertained to Article 11 (“freedom of assembly and association”), and 95 to freedom of expression (Article 10).

(Progress Report 2002: 26)

On the subject of freedoms, the report paid particular attention to the emergence of new restrictions in the Civil Code alongside with the new RTÜRK (Supreme Audio Visual Board) Law which dammed the freedom of expression. Broadcasting in Kurdish and Kurdish music cassettes, especially in areas under emergency rule, were still subjects to prosecution. However, the report also called attention upon the improving situation of the Southeast Turkey in terms of security and cultural rights by giving the examples of a Syriac photographic exhibition in Diyarbakır and European Film Festival, which was previously banned. (European Commission 2002: 42) Additionally, a substantial increase in the active role of civil society organizations has been reported, “in June, the Civil Society Platform, which is made up of 175 civil society organizations, issued a

---

116 For example, in February, Nevzat Bingöl owner of the Gün TV, a local TV station in Diyarbakır was charged with Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (“disseminating separatist propaganda”) for having broadcast a Kurdish song. (see EC Progress Report 2002: 34)
notice urging politicians to commit themselves and ‘take brave steps’ on the way to EU membership” (Ibid: 36).

According to the report, although some insufficiencies remained there has been considerable improvement in the fields of protection of minorities and human rights issues. Pending ratification of several international human rights conventions and partial compliance with the ECHR’s decisions, particularly in the case of former DEP deputies, raised great concerns. The Commission urged Turkey to sign the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Ibid).

Internally displaced persons, who according to the UN Secretary General Representative for Displaced Person’s Report amount to a figure between 378,000 and one million, have been returning to their settlements. Since the implementation of the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project some 37,000 persons have returned particularly in the provinces of Bingöl, Diyarbakir, Van, as well as in the other areas of the East and Southeast. Newly constructed “central villages” housed over 4000 displaced people. The report also indicated that exact figures and numbers were hard to determine and the process was rather of slower pace. Moreover the majority of the displaced rural population from the East and Southeast lived in urban centers such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Antalya in harsh socio-economic conditions with inadequate nutrition, hygiene, health care and drinking water. This situation, according to the report, “has adverse consequences for the children whose education and literacy levels are unsatisfactory” (Ibid: 43).

Following a recommendation by the National Security Council made in June 2002, Turkish Parliament lifted the state of emergency in Hakkari and Tunceli provinces in effect as of 30 July 2002, even though the military was not pulled back entirely. Consequently, the report indicated that normalization and relaxation in daily life has been reported in Hakkari and Tunceli. For example, for the first time without facing any bans performers could sing in Kurdish during the Tunceli Culture and Nature Festival, which took place between August 1st and 4th. Hakkari province, which has been the center of most vicious clashes between the government forces and the PKK, also witnessed positive developments. The report stated that, “the security forces’ practices in the region have also changed. In the province military influence is still felt, but the atmosphere is reportedly much less tense…the food quota has been lifted” (Progress Report, 2002: 42). In addition, various newspapers and journals, that were previously banned, could now be distributed and purchased legally at newsagents.

Concerning the state of emergency in the East and Southeast of Turkey the report stated that,

The National Security Council recommended on 30 May 2002 that the state of emergency in two provinces of the Southeast be lifted. The Turkish Parliament endorsed this recommendation and this measure entered into force on 30 July 2002. The National Security Council also recommended the lifting of the state of emergency in the two remaining provinces by the end of the year.

(Progress Report, 2002: 18)
Accordingly, the Council’s later recommendation would be endorsed and implemented by the Turkish parliament in 2003 as affirmed in the next progress report.\footnote{117}


This was the sixth progress report on Turkey, which marked the point of the initial assessment of the Turkish political system since the announcement of the second National Programme by Turkey. National Programmes were set to facilitate and steer the domestic dynamics towards the adoption of the Acquis.\footnote{118}

As an important incentive tool to address the Copenhagen political criteria, approximation to the Acquis, strengthening public administration, and economic and social cohesion community assistance in terms of financial aid was, continuously, made available at Turkey’s disposal,

For the years 2000-2003 financial assistance to Turkey amounts to an annual average of around € 177 million. In 2003 the pre-accession financial assistance national programme totals € 144 million.

(Progress Report 2003: 9)

As regards regional policy, the definition of a provisional map for regional development purposes according to NUTS classification criteria has been completed and approved by EUROSTAT. However, the use of this classification for planning, and regional policies has not yet started. No effective regional policy strategy in line with the EU standards has been developed. Overall, alignment with the Acquis remained limited (Progress Report, 2003: 59-60)

Considering the political component, the report announced that various changes and reforms have been taking place in Turkey in accordance with the Acquis; the commission asked Turkey to accelerate the pace and the flow of such reforms. As a result, this would lead the new AKP (Justice and Development Party) government to implement further major political reforms in terms of cultural rights, freedom of expression, civilian control over military demilitarization and freedom of demonstration, to name a few. In addition, the EU’s influence seemed to produce some visible results in Turkey’s domestic political system as the parliament established a reform monitoring group to ensure effective implementation of the reform packages. Furthermore, the state of emergency in the remaining provinces of the Southeast was lifted on 30 November 2002, and a “zero tolerance” policy towards torture was also adopted. The one aspect that worked against Turkey’s favor, as mentioned in the report, was that, “implementation has been slow and uneven” (Ibid: 16).

This led to the commission’s conclusion that Turkey was not ready to commence accession negotiations due to the fact that it did not fully comply with the necessary criteria. The commission exemplified various non-democratic

\footnote{117 However, according to Human Rights Watch, the government faces longstanding opposition from the army and the security forces in implementing key measures and reforms. HRW Annual Report 2002: 356

\footnote{118 During the period in question, according to Human Rights Watch, “at last European Union (E.U.) pressure for Turkey to meet its political and human rights criteria for membership began to produce substantial results” HRW Annual Report 2003: 365}
practices still in effect in Turkey, first of which was the 10 per cent national threshold for parliamentary representation, freedom of expression remained as a major case under the Penal Code and the judicial system was not fully independent, the defense budget was still drafted by the armed forces, which also enjoyed an influential say in the way the republic has governed.

On the subject of protection of minorities and human rights, the report stressed on the fact that Turkey had not signed the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the Revised European Social Charter or the Statute of the International Criminal Court. In addition, Turkey was yet to establish administrative and legislative provisions against discrimination, and did not entirely comply with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Various laws have also been adopted in regards minorities in order to promote peaceful settlement of the situation in the conflict regions of East and Southeast. “Social reinsertion” was one such law that entered into force on 6 August 2003, according to which people involved in illegal organizations would be granted amnesty and sentence reductions given that they have not partaken in criminal activities; “according to official figures of September 2003, of 2067 applications 524 prisoners have been released...about two hundred militants from illegal organizations have surrendered.” Furthermore, lifting the state of emergency rule in the remaining provinces of Diyarbakir and Sirnak, on 30 November 2002, and “putting an end to almost 15 years of emergency rule in the East and Southeast of Turkey” have, to a great extent, contributed to the normalization process in the region. (Ibid: 39)

Accordingly, the most important and noteworthy, and yet rather controversial, development in Turkey has perhaps been the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by the parliament. These two Covenants have entered into force in 1976 and have been presented for Turkey’s approval; however, up until the ratification on 4 June 2003 they were considered to embrace elements posing potential threats to the nation state by consecutive governments, and as a result they have been turned down for 37 years. In general, these Covenants endorsed self-determination of all peoples and their right to freely dispose natural wealth and resources without prejudice.\textsuperscript{119} Ratification of these agreements reminded various circles in Turkey of the issues relating to the socio-economically deprived East and Southeast regions where most of the natural resources and wealth were used in and transported to the rest of the country such as the oil and electricity generated by the numerous hydroelectric power plants in the region, to name a few. Hence, an atmosphere of intense criticism and disputes directed towards the current government was evoked; the opposition and critics accused the government of surrendering the national sovereignty over domestic issues to external powers and stressed on the possibility that such treaties may lead to country’s partition due to the fact that they authorized rights for “all peoples”. Nonetheless, the government had stood its ground and ratified the Covenants as an incentive to expand social, economic and political rights in accordance with democratization and EU conditionality.

Official figures of the Return to Village Project have indicated that between January 2000 and January 2003, 82000 people were given authorization to make

their returns. Nevertheless, the report also criticizes the lack of transparency and adequacy of consultation in the development of this project. Issues surrounding around 58,551 village guards, who according to official reports remained on duty, remained untouched; complaints concerning rape, torture and abuse of governmental power by village guards have been reported. Furthermore, the Parliamentary Investigation Committee on Human Rights was send over to investigate the overall situation of several provinces in the Southeast after the lifting of emergency rule. Upon their field visits in six cities, between 17 and 20 January 2003, the Committee concluded that, “the lifting of emergency has led to a relative improvement in the general condition in the area” (Progress Report 2003: 40). Additionally, “there has been greater tolerance for cultural events” but, “serious efforts are needed to address the problems of the internally displaced persons and the socio-economic development of the region in a comprehensive fashion and of cultural rights in general” (Ibid: 133).

Pertaining to general evaluation of recent developments in Turkey, the report stated that,

Overall, in the past 12 months Turkey has made further impressive legislative efforts which constitute significant progress towards achieving compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. Turkey should address the outstanding issues highlighted in this report, with particular attention to the strengthening of the independence and the functioning of the judiciary, the overall framework for the exercise of fundamental freedoms (association, expression and religion), further alignment of civil-military relations with European practice, the situation in the Southeast and cultural rights. Turkey should ensure full and effective implementation of reforms to ensure that Turkish citizens can enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms in line with European standards.


7. Progress Report 2004

The major significance of this report was that even though the EU did not openly and officially utilized the pull-effect for Turkish accession in pre-Helsinki period, by defining the Turkish accession as an “open-ended process”, the decisions made in the Brussels European Council meeting in June 2004 reassured that the Union, now, seemed to have a systematic agenda and employed its pull-effect more precisely for the Turkish case. Evidently, this also altered the cost-benefit dynamics for Turkey regarding its accession to the EU; there has been a noteworthy shift towards benefit pan of the scale. The Brussels European Council meeting endorsed the decision of the Copenhagen Council that, “on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria; the EU will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay” (Council of the European Union 2004: 5).

There have been some remarkable developments, as stated in this report, in favor of Turkey in view of accession to the EU. As Turkey was pushing more towards the compliance with the conditionality through various reforms\textsuperscript{120}, the

\textsuperscript{120} “Since 1999 Turkey adopted two constitutional reforms and eight legislative reform packages” EC Progress Report 2004a: 29
EU was, simultaneously, pulling Turkey more towards its harbors. One such example was the announcement of the so called, Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress toward Accession, which concluded that, “Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and [the Commission] recommends that accession negotiations be opened” (Progress Report 2004: 3). Moreover, the report also underlined the progress made by Turkey in compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria (Ibid: 53-55). In addition, regularly increasing community’s financial assistance, which could be regarded as a good incentive of pull or carrot approach, continued to be allocated to Turkey to assist Turkey’s accession process and to pull Turkey more towards the EC.

Turkey, on the other hand, seemed to be responding rather positively and enthusiastically to EU’s accession conditionality. This positive attitude became evident when analyzing the recent amendments and developments put forth by Turkey for compliance with Acquis. For example, recent data indicated that for the first time in its history education spending surpassed the amount allocated for defense spending in Turkey; “the 2004 budget figures indicate that, while defence spending is US$5.6 billion, or 2.59% of GNP, education spending is US$6.7 billion, or 3.06% of GNP” (Ibid: 23).

On the subject of human rights and the protection of minorities the report underlined the establishment of a constitutional amendment, which acknowledged the preeminence of international agreements, especially in terms of human rights and fundamental freedoms, over domestic legislation. Accordingly, the death penalty was abolished on January 9, 2004 with Protocol No. 13 of the ECHR. Nonetheless, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities or the Revised European Social Charter was left unsigned. The report acknowledged that, “turkey has made progress since 1999 in relation to the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), particularly over the last year”; re-trail of Kurdish politician Leyla Zana and other DEP deputies came as a result of this approach. (Progress Report 2004: 30).

Not only did Turkey recognize the supremacy of international agreements over internal legislation, but it also set up bodies to promote and enforce human rights. Since 1999 various bodies such as; the Human Rights Presidency, the Reform Monitoring Group, the provincial and sub-provincial Human Rights Boards, Human Rights Advisory Committee and various investigation boards were established to promote, monitor and implement human rights in Turkey.

With regard to freedoms, one of the most significant in relation to the situation facing the Kurdish population has, perhaps, been the reforms made by Turkey

121 “Between 1995 and 2003, €1098 million was committed to various programmes in Turkey. The 2004 Programme for Turkey consists of an allocation of €235.6 million for the National Programme” which was approximately €91 million more than the sum allocated in 2003. EC Progress Report 2004: 8

122 Some of these international agreements signed by Turkey since 1999 were; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (15 August 2000) and the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (with reservations 15 August 2000); Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) on the abolition of the death penalty (15 January 2003); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (16 September 2002); the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights and the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. EC Progress Report 2004a: 29

123 According to EC’s Progress Report 2004, the number of provincial and sub-provincial Human Rights Boards increased from 859 to 931. p. 32
between 2001 and 2003 on Articles 159, 169 and 312 of the Penal Code and Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law, given that people convicted under these laws were, overwhelmingly, of Kurdish background. Additionally, the notorious Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, which made “propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state” a crime, was revoked and people who had received prison sentences under this law had been released. The report stated that, “according to the official figures, as of April 2004, 2,004 persons have been acquitted as a result of the implementation of the amended provisions by the State Security Courts. As of May 2004, there were 5,808 persons detained for terrorist-related crimes, as compared to 8,657 in 2000, 8,298 in 2001, 7,745 in 2002 and 6,137 in 2003” (Ibid: 37).

There, also, seemed to be an alleviated attitude towards the use of the so-called “unknown languages” in the public as well as in the media; consequently, “the Constitution was amended to lift the ban on the use of the Kurdish language” (EC Progress Report 2004a: 16), and “radio and television broadcasting in languages and dialects other than Turkish, including Kurdish, has begun” (Ibid: 37). In spite of various constitutional amendments and efforts to open the doors for broadcasting in other languages RTÜK (High Audio Visual Board) laws continued to impose heavy penalties and targeted some Kurdish TV and radio stations. A Diyarbakır based television channel, ART TV for example, faced with a 30 days closure penalty from the RTÜK in March 2004, “on the grounds that it had violated “the principle of the indivisible unity of the state” when, in August 2003, it broadcast two Kurdish love songs” (Progress Report, 2004: 40).

Pull-push dynamics of the EU and its conditionality seemed to be evidently present in the Commission’s stand towards the human rights and protection of minorities. As argued by some, the EU would generally enhance its demands and exert more influence over the candidates once the candidacy status was granted and negotiation talks opened; in other words at some point the EU may begin to demand more than what it supplies. This was clear in the seventh progress report on Turkey as the Commission’s criticisms became harsher and more wide-ranging considering the protection of minorities and human rights (Uslu, 2010). Amongst the most important aspects that needed considerable improvements were; limited freedom of expression, the large number of prosecutions stemming from non-violent expressions of opinion, ill-treatment and torture, situation of Alevi minority, use of the Kurdish language, critical situation of internally displaced persons, and the 10 per cent threshold which has made fair representation for minorities very difficult. The report, as well, reminded that Turkey had not signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities or the Revised European Social Charter, and that Additional Protocol No. 12 to the ECHR had yet to be ratified.

Considering the Kurds and the situation in the Southeast the report stated that, “the normalization of the situation in the Southeast should be pursued through the return of displaced persons, a strategy for socio-economic development and the establishment of conditions for the full enjoyment of right and freedoms by the

\[124\] Article 159 – “insulting the state and the state institutions”; Article 169 – “adding and abetting terrorist organizations”; Article 312 – “incitement to racial, ethnic or religious enmity”

\[125\] Article 7 – “propaganda in connection with the (terrorist) organization in a way that encourages the resort to violence or other terrorist means”

\[126\] For example the regulation published in January 2004 enabled broadcasting in languages other than Turkish however, broadcasting in other languages could not exceed four hours per week, not exceeding 45 minutes per day for television, five hours per week, not exceeding 60 minutes per day for radio. See, EC Progress Report 2004a: 39
Kurds” (Ibid: 55). Moreover, the report emphasized on the fact that, “the impact of the reforms had not been uniform throughout the country” (Ibid: 37) indicating the existence of various disparities within Turkey.

Nevertheless, positive comments and acknowledgment on Turkey’s progress and compliance with the Copenhagen criteria were followed by, yet, another wave of criticisms, especially in terms of human rights, protection of minorities, the rule of law and perpetuation of democracy. The so called “informal mechanisms” were highlighted by the Commission considering the Turkish army’s influential position over the government, which seemed to be fading away slowly since the implementation of the latest reform packages. Moreover, the Commission also stressed upon the fact that formal adoptions of various laws and reform packages in relation to increase the civilian control over the armed forces might not, necessarily, lead to democratic control over the Turkish army. In addition, concerns over the insufficient degree of supervision by the public prosecutors over gendarmerie and police forces during the investigation periods alongside with overall shortage of independence of the judiciary.

Indicating on the progress made by Turkey over the years, the report concluded that;

Over the past year the Turkish government has shown great determination in accelerating the pace of reforms, which have brought far-reaching changes to the political and legal system. It has also taken important steps to ensure their effective implementation, in order to allow Turkish citizens to enjoy fundamental freedoms and human rights in line with European standards. Four major packages of political reform have been adopted, introducing changes to different areas of legislation. Some of the reforms carry great political significance as they impinge upon sensitive issues in the Turkish context, such as freedom of expression, freedom of demonstration, cultural rights and civilian control of the military. Many priorities under the political criteria in the revised Accession Partnership have been addressed.

(Progress Report 2004: 11-12)

In addition, on the situation of the Kurdish population the report read,

Overall the situation in the East and Southeast of the country, where people of Kurdish origin mostly live, has continued to improve gradually since 1999, both in terms of security and the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms. The emergency rule has been lifted and the return of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) has continued. Nevertheless, the situation of IDPs remains critical.

(Ibid: 50)
8. Progress Report 2005

This was the eighth report on Turkey’s progress and the first since the initiation of accession negotiation on 3 October 2005. The report, conducted on 9 November 2005, acknowledged that sufficient progress has been made by Turkey to start negotiation talks and to advance Turkey’s EU bid.

As it was the case in previous reports the commission did not fall short of noticing Turkey’s setbacks in relation with its ability to assume the obligations of membership. The report reiterated that the Union would take an absolute uncompromising stand on certain issues such as the performance of democracy and human rights. Civilian and democratic control over the military forces was amongst the most emphasized criticisms alongside with freedoms, human rights and protection of minorities (Progress Report, 2005).

Ambiguous definition of national security provided by the National Security Council, according to the report, contributed to the intensification of militarism and unnecessary augmentation of military’s role. Furthermore, the untouched Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law was seen as a leeway for the military which, as a result, would enable and make military’s involvement in domestic politics more likely. In general, concerning the civilian military relations the reports advised Turkey to,

Continue to align civilian control of the military with practice in EU Member States…Establish full parliamentary oversight of military and defense policy and all related expenditure, including by external audit…Abolish any remaining competence of military courts to try civilians.

(Commission of the European Communities 2005: 6)

As for the human rights and protection of the minorities issues, the commission stated the fact that Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and has not ratified Additional Protocol No 12 to the ECHR on the general prohibition of discrimination by public authorities (Progress Report, 2005: 36). Furthermore, the Commission also advised Turkey to accede to the Statue of the International Criminal Court and to submit its first reports to the ICCPR and the International Convention for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Additionally, the report pointed to the need for improvements in prevention of torture and ill treatment, freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly, freedom of religion, and women’s rights.

The report stated that although some significant progress has been observed in Turkey in relation to the use of Kurdish language and expression of Kurdish culture, tension rose in early 2005, owing to the intensified clashes between the armed forces and PKK militants in the Southeast.

According to the report, “the judiciary’s role in guaranteeing the right to use Kurdish is mixes” (Progress Report, 2005: 38). While on the one hand, the Court of Cassation revoked a

127 “In November 2004, a father and his 12-year-old son were killed by Special Forces during operations in the Kiziltepe district of Mardin. The Parliamentary Human Rights Investigation Committee sent a delegation to Kiziltepe and concluded that the security forces had used excessive force. Following the incident the Deputy Security Director and 3 members of the special forces were suspended from duty” EC Progress Report 2005: 24
decision to ban the use of Kurdish music in election campaigns in May, Diyarbakir Criminal Court issued confiscation of various music albums in January and February 2005.

On the subject of regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, the report depicted the progress made in the field of statistics and that the database for regional statistics was expanding according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) classifications. The report stated that,

There has been some progress in establishing the legislative framework for the decentralisation of Turkey’s public administration, and this should help to promote a participatory approach to regional policy…Considerable efforts are required to develop sufficient administrative capacity at both central and regional level. Turkey may consider delegating responsibility for sectoral strategy, implementation and monitoring to the sectoral ministries and to regional structures.

(Progress Report, 2005: 103)

According to the report progress in the East and Southeast Turkey, where the Kurdish population forms the majority, has been slow and uneven; however, promising development has been that the issue, for the first time, was acknowledged by a prominent government official as a political/ethnic/social one rather than merely an issue of security or economic development:

In some cases, the situation has even deteriorated. While no comprehensive policy has yet been established to address the socioeconomic and political problems in this region, it is notable that in August 2005 Prime Minister Erdogan met with several Kurdish intellectuals, visited Diyarbakir and emphasised the need to resolve through democratic means, what he described as “the Kurdish issue”.


Furthermore, it seems that gradually improving security situation of the region, since the Helsinki Summit in 1999, suffers a serious blow and falls into uncertainty every time armed clashes between the armed forces and PKK militants reignite. This intuition has been under the scrutiny of various intellectuals and organizations in Turkey, claiming that concealed key players and/or the so called “deep (or profound) state”, who in order to maintain their dominant positions owing to the prolongation of this conflict, deliberately reignite the conflict situation and obstruct the normalization and/or democratization process which necessitates the elimination of conflict situation.

128 NUTS is the name of the statistical region classifications used in the EU
129 on this issue Human Rights Watch stated that, “Turkey’s human rights record continued to improve during 2004, albeit slowly and unevenly, as the country attempted to recover from the legacy of gross violations committed by state forces and armed opposition groups fighting in the countryside and cities in the early 1990s. The reduction in political violence since 1999 has encouraged reform” HRW Annual Report 2005: 429
130 Former President of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel defines deep state as, “deep state is the state itself. Deep state is military. Soldiers who have constructed the republic constantly dread to see its demise…they are not a separate entity but become the ´deep state´ once they seize the control of the government”, Radikal Newspaper, 18. April, 2005. Available at: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=149990
Authors publishing articles and publications on the Kurdish and Armenian issues continued to face prosecution under Article 302 of the Penal Code. (For example in August 2005 Orhan Pamuk, the first Turkish citizen to be awarded for a Nobel Prize in Literature in 2006, was trialed under Article 301 due to the comments on the killings of Armenians and Kurds in Turkey. In October 2005, Hrant Dink was convicted under Article 301 due to his remarks on the Armenian diaspora. Ragip Zarakolu was convicted under the same Article due to his publications on the Kurdish and Armenian issues EC Progress Report 2005: 25). The report declared that the progress concerning the liberalization of broadcasting was inadequate. Broadcasting Kurdish music continued to form the grounds for heavy penalties imposed to TV and Radio stations. Adana based Radio Dünya was closed down for 30 days, in March 2005, by RTÜK on the grounds of broadcasting Kurdish music. (Progress Report, 2005: 27). This, nevertheless, has led to an amendment to Article 133 adopted by Parliament in June 2005, which enabled the political parties in parliament to elect members of RTÜK.

Although inadequate and unsatisfactory, Turkish government started to give compensation under the Law on Compensation of Loses Resulting from Terrorist Acts approved in 2004. Approximately 173,208 applications have been filed, 2200 decisions have been made, and 22 people have received their shares from the total of 212,000 YTL as of March 2005 (Progress Report, 2005).

There, also, has been a slight decrease in the number of active village guards as observed in 2005 report, “official figures state that 57,601 village guards are still on duty (as opposed to 58 551 last year)” (Ibid: 39); according to the previous reports of the commission village guards, to a certain extent, have been committing human rights crimes in the region and are a serious factor in the prolongation of the conflict.

Reports concerning torture, ill-treatment and extra-judicial killings in the East and Southeast continued to pour into the databases of the NGOs; nevertheless, the report also acknowledged that there has been a slight decrease in the number of complaints, a total of 331 in 2005, received by the Human Rights Association. The report, on the other hand, urged Turkish authorities to impose more effective sanctions on individuals committing such crimes. 132

In conclusion, concerning the overall assessment on Turkey the 2005 Progress Report, states:

With regard to the priorities concerning the enhanced political dialogue and the political criteria, further legislative progress has been achieved, in particular in those areas identified as priorities in last year’s report. As regards implementation, although progress was achieved in some areas, this remains uneven. As such, it is clear that political reform needs to be further consolidated and broadened.

(Progress Report, 2005: 137)

132 For example, “In 2004, of the 1 831 cases concluded, 99 led to imprisonment, 85 to fines and 1 631 to acquittals” EC Progress Report 2005: 108

In this report two simple observations could be made considering Turkey’s progress. Firstly, there has been a decline or standstill in the pace of progress process in Turkey, reflected as lesser content of the report. Secondly, on a positive note, given that Turkey has been complying with the Copenhagen criteria criticisms directed towards Turkey, at times quite extensive and harsh-toned, in the previous reports saw a certain degree of decline as well.133

Nevertheless, the EU continued to exert its influence on Turkish transition and maintained its assistance and monitoring mechanism.134 Political criteria, once more, formed the center of the discussion in terms of Turkey’s ability to assume the obligations of membership. Compendiously, the report criticized Turkey, especially, in regards democracy, the rule of law, decentralization issues, 10% participation threshold, civil-military relations, Anti-Terror Laws, Cyprus issue and the Kurdish problem.

At a parliamentary level, the report accredited the significant role played by the EU Harmonisation Committee and the Human Rights Committee “in addressing issues arising under the Copenhagen criteria” (Progress Report, 2006: 5). In addition, a new reform package was submitted by the government in June for the, partial, purpose of compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. As it was the case observed in the previous reports the escalating conflict situation between the military and the PKK, yet again, generated an immediate response by the government under the national security clause, which in many ways stalled democratization process and caused a retraction effect on the already accomplished progress.135 Under the recently amended Anti-Terror Law, as of June 2006, the list of definitions constituting terrorist acts was extended and the ambiguity surrounding the definition of terrorism maintained (Progress Report, 2006).

Turkey’s civil-military relations continued to generate criticism. Excessive role enjoyed by the military on domestic and foreign policy issues regarding secularism, the situation in Cyprus and the Kurdish problem were mentioned among the stern problems facing Turkey. Broad definitions of national security under the Article 2a of the National Security Council Law, as brought to attention in last year’s report, remained unchanged. The report underlined that even though the government initiated the implementation of reforms in defense expenditures, extra-budgetary funds financing most procurement projects stayed under the radar of parliamentary scrutiny. Hence, the report concluded that, “overall, limited progress has been made in aligning civil-military relation with EU practices” (Ibid: 8).

On the subject of human rights, Turkey has ratified a number of important international instrument such as; Protocol No 13 of the ECHR in February 2006, the Second Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on the abolishment of death penalty in March 2006, the revised European Social Charter in September 2006, Protocol No 14 of the ECHR entered

133 On the issue Human Rights Watch stated that, “Human rights developments in Turkey were mixed during 2005. The government shows some commitment to reform, but is clearly inhibited by antireform elements within the judiciary, police, and army” HRW Annual Report 2006: 405
134 On the financial side alone, “The 2006 EC pre-accession financial assistance amounts to € 500 million. EIB lending in Turkey stands at some € 4.3 billion” EC Progress Report: 5
135 For example “The law introduces legal restrictions on freedom of expression, the press and the media...the new anti-terror law reduces procedural safeguards for suspects of terrorist offences” EC Report 2006: 6
into force in May 2006, and the UN Convention against corruption entered into force in June 2006. Moreover, the Human Rights Presidency and the 931 District Human Rights Boards continued to promote and enforce human rights, for example; by processing some 778 application received between January and June 2996. However, on the down side, various other Protocols remained to be ratified such as; Protocol No 12 on the general prohibition of discrimination by public authorities, the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, and the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT) (Ibid).

Considering the number of cases submitted to the ECtHR, out of the 196 final judgments the court found that Turkey had violated at least one article of the ECHR, and in 5 cases no violations had been detected. Approximately, 1500 cases relating to the possibility to return to village (in the Southeast) under the Law on Compensation and Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts have been declared inadmissible by the ECtHR since no hindrance that kept individuals from returning to their villages was found to be present. In sum, the commission declared that in relation to the execution of the ECtHR’s judgments, Turkey has produced some positive result; however, cases pending against Turkey still constituted 14.4% of the total cases pending before the Committee of Ministers (Ibid).

The situation in the Southeast also raised concerns in relation with the recent events and demonstrations turned violent in several cities in March and April. According to the report, “over 550 people were detained as a result of these events, including over 200 children. The Diyarbakir Bar Association submitted more than 70 complaints of ill-treatment to the authorities” (Ibid: 13). Additionally, Kurdish associations in the area also became a subject of condemnation such as the closure of a Kurdish association by a Court based in Diyarbakir on the grounds that its activities would be carried out in Kurdish and would lean out to establish a Kurdish archive, museum and library.

In respect to broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, two local TV channels in Diyarbakir and one radio station in Urfa were granted to broadcast in Kurdish on the grounds that they respect time restrictions and put Turkish subtitles to all broadcasts, except for songs. However the report underlined that, “educational programmes teaching the Kurdish languages are not allowed” (Progress Report, 2006: 21). Broadcasting in languages other than Turkish remained at a local level since no broadcasters at national level seemed interested in this opportunity. (EC Progress Report 2006)

The report identified the utilization of mother tongue (other than Turkish) as another area of particular concern. Turkish laws forbid teaching in languages other than Turkish in public schooling system, leaving the private sector for the continued existence of such languages. Nevertheless, concerning Kurdish all private courses teaching Kurdish language were closed down in 2004; therefore, “there are no possibilities to learn Kurdish today in the public or private schooling system” (Ibid: 21).

Compensation of losses resulting from terrorist acts began to be processed under the Damage Assessment Commission that had received around 215,981 applications out of which 33,299 had been processed as of September 2006. While progress had been made in certain areas, resumption of violence by the PKK deteriorated the situation in the Southeast, “during the period between November 2005 and June 2006, there were 774 terrorist attacks reported, which led to 44 military, 5 police and 13 civilian casualties” (EC Progress Report 2006: 22). A further controversial incident reported in the region was the November
2005 Semdinli bombing, which killed one person and injured others. The incident revealed the existence of a secretive unit referred to as JITEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight against Terrorism) when the two officers were captured carrying their gendarmerie identification cards and, ultimately, were sent of to prison by a court in Van.

Concerning the general situation in the Southeast, the report stated that,

Overall socio-economic situation in the Southeast remains difficult and there is no comprehensive plan to address this issue. The positive statement of Prime Minister Erdogan in 2005 stressing the need to resolve through democratic means what he called “the Kurdish issue” was not followed up.

(Ibid: 22)


This was the tenth report assessing Turkey’s progress; the report was issued on 6. November 2007. Commission’s criticisms continued to follow a similar path with the previous reports; these were civil-military relation, Cyprus and Kurdish issues, 10% threshold, the NSC to name a few. Nevertheless, the report indicated that there has been a rising consensus in terms of the need for effective and dedicative efforts towards democratization. For instance, parliamentary elections held on 22 July 2007 were judged by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and by a delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) to be pluralist, transparent and professional. The EU continued to grant financial assistance to facilitate Turkey’s accession process and to assist Turkey to generate more compatible results in terms of compliance (Progress Report, 2007).

Progress has, also, been observed in terms of human rights and the protection of minorities. Turkey ratified Protocol No 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in October 2006, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was signed in March 2007 and in February 2007 the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), signed in 2004, entered into force. This Protocol enabled the UN Human Rights Committee to receive and pass judgments on human rights violations filed by individuals. On the other hand, some Protocols such as the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT) remained to be ratified by Turkey. In addition, the report indicated that past reforms have had positive effects on the execution of ECtHR judgments, even though the number of new application to the court was observed to be higher than the same period last year; consequently, several cases stemming from the Article 8 (freedom of

---

136 See for example Cem Ersever ve Jitem Gereçgi by Cetin Agase. Istanbul: Truva Yayinlari. 2007 or JITEM Türkiye’nin Faili Mechul Tarihi by Ecevit Kilic. Istanbul: Timas Yayinlari 2009

137 In addition the report stated that, “the newly-elected parliament is now more representative of the country’s political diversity” p. 6

138 “some € 500 million have been earmarked for Turkey form the new Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) in 2007...Two financial agreements were signed in 2007, releasing some € 370 million for EU funded project under the 2006 National Programme (NP) for Turkey. € 21.5 million from the 2006 NP will support civil society dialogue between the EU and Turkey...The European Commission allocated € 62 million in 2007 to co-finance Turkey’s participation in Community Programmes and Agencies” p.5
expression) of the Anti-Terror Law and others on the dissolution of political
damnas were closed (Ibid).

In a similar vein, the commission reported that number of prosecutions and
convictions for the expression of non-violent opinions almost doubled in 2006
compared to 2005 figures and further increase was observed in 2007; “more than
half of these charges were brought under the Criminal Code, and in particular
under article 301, which penalizes insulting “Turkishness”, the Republic and the
organs and institutions of the state…article 301 needs to be brought in line with
the relevant EU standards” (EC Progress Report 2007: 14-15). Similar drawbacks
were reported with other legal provisions, “Articles 215, 216 and 220 of the
Turkish Penal Code criminalizing offences against public order have been applied
to Kurdish issues. Comments by journalists, human rights defenders and lawyers
on court decisions have also led to prosecution under Article 288 (attempt to
influence a fair trial)” (Ibid: 15).

Increasing number of such prosecutions does not necessary indicate a
deterioration of the situation but rather a serious glitch in the system. They could
also be an indicator of democratization and/or relaxation of previous government
restrictions with a regained confidence by the public to exercise freedom of
thought and speech knowing that expression of their views would be subject to
legal punishment, under the questionable laws of the 1982 constitution, but would
seldom lead to ill-practices such as torture and disappearances, a frequent
occurrence during the 1980s and 1990s, at present. The problem, however, was
not the execution of such existing laws, and hence doubling the incarceration rates
stemming from charges on free expression of thought, but the outdated and non-
democratic core of the constitution itself, which was drafted by the generals of the
1980 coups who guaranteed themselves an influential place in political affairs by
establishing and legitimizing the National Security Council, and who with
Provisional Article 15 further guaranteed themselves immunity from prosecution.
There have been various amendments since the coup, most notably with the
referendum passed on 12 September 2010, but these efforts seem to just pinch the
capillaries without going into the arteries to cure the core of the state apparatus
form anti-democratic cells.139

Concerning cultural rights various TV stations and radio channels were
allowed to broadcast in languages other than Turkish.140 Various restrictions,
however, remained in relation to subtitling or translating the content of broadcasts
in Turkish and not allowing educational programmes teaching the Kurdish
language. Teaching in Kurdish is only possible in private language courses, due to
the fact that all such courses were closed down in 2004 learning Kurdish is merely
impossible in the private or public schooling system (Progress Report, 2007).

The report further criticized Turkey for not preparing a comprehensive
strategy to accomplish socio-economic development in the Southeast, and for the
lack of opportunities provided by the government for Kurds to fully enjoy their
rights and freedoms. On a positive note, nonetheless, the legislative elections in
July provided increased representation for Southeast when compared to the level

---

139 Human Rights Watch stated that, “the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
failed during 2006 to implement key reforms necessary to consolidate the human rights progress
of the past years. Entrenched state forces, including the military, continued to resist reform. Illegal
armed groups, as well as rogue elements of the security forces, conducted violent attacks that
threaten the reform process, although clashes decreased after the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
declared a ceasefire in October.” HRW Annual Report 2007: 425

140 With Cagri FM, a radio station in Diyarbakir which received authorization in March 2007,
there are now four TV and radio stations broadcasting in Kurdish. p.21
of representation in the previous Parliament. Deteriorating security situation in the region, on the other hand, drove the government to take tougher measures such as establishment of three security zones along the Iraqi border and Parliament’s authorization, on 17 October 2007, allowing the military intervention in autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq. The EU Presidency issued a press release on 22 October to condemn the terrorist attacks of the PKK urging the Government of Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Government to target issues arising under such conditions through dialogue and collaboration.

Further progress had been reported with respect to internally displaced persons. The process of compensation continued,

By 24 May 2007, 269,759 persons had applied to the Damage Assessment Commissions for compensation under the Law on the Compensation of Losses due to Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism. 57,071 applications have been examined, of which 37,309 have obtained a favourable response.

(Ibid: 23)

A new study conducted by Hacettepe University’s Institute of Population Studies estimated the number of internally displaced persons to be between 950,000 and 1,200,000, significantly higher than previous estimates. The deadline for compensation application was extended until 30 May 2008, and the number of Damage Assessment Commissions was raised to 106. Nevertheless, the report pointed out that the Turkish government lacks a comprehensive national strategy to tackle this issue (Ibid).

On the subject of regional policy and coordination of structural instruments the commission found Turkey’s alignment with the Acquis to be limited. The report noted some progress regarding the institutional framework such as appointment of the Undersecretary of the State Planning Organization as the strategic coordinator who would ensure coordination between programmes (Transport, Environment, Regional Competitiveness and Human Resources Development) and would prepare Strategic Coherence Framework. Progress in establishing regional offices responsible for gathering and examining the statistical data for NUTS II and III regions have also been made. On the downside, administrative capacity was centralized and rather weak at regional level; no progress was noted in monitoring and evaluation processes (Progress Report, 2007).

Additionally, the commission noted some progress on the judiciary (particularly on efficiency); limited progress in the area of anti-corruption; limited legislative and in practice progress regarding fundamental rights; little progress on corruption; limited progress on migration; no progress on judicial cooperation in criminal matters; limited progress on police cooperation; progress was registered in the fight against organized crime and in combating trafficking in human beings; progress was also made in fight against terrorism; good progress on education, training and youth; some progress in the field of consumer protection; moderate progress on public health etc. (Ibid).

141 According to the report “several hundred terrorist attacks have been recorded since the beginning of the year causing multiple casualties. On 22 May a suicide bombing in Ankara claimed the lives of 9 people. There was an increase of terrorist attacks targeting civilians throughout the whole country” 2007: 23

The report was released on 5 November 2008; in terms of the content it has followed a similar path with the previous reports. Since 2005 the reports included lesser content; while the annual report of 2005 was composed of 146 pages, annual reports of 2006 and 2007 had 82 pages respectively, and 2008 report produced 91 pages in total. As discussed before, this could either be an optimistic indication on Turkey’s progress or, possibly, a pessimistic one. Declining page numbers could not necessarily be considered as a performance indicator without the scrutiny of the content. However, lesser volume did not translate into lesser financial assistance; in accordance with the Instrument for Pre-accession Turkey continually received financial support which came to € 540 million in 2008 (Progress Report, 2008).

On the subject of democracy and the rule of law there have been some setbacks such as the Chief Public Prosecutor’s application on 14 March 2008 demanding the ban of AK party’s members including the President and the Prime Minister of Turkey. Additionally, the Prosecutor also targeted pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) for closure and members to be banned from political activity. In February 2008, the Parliament amended Article 10 and 42 of the Constitution in order to lift the ban on students wearing headscarf in universities; however, an appeal by the opposition parties led to the invalidation of the amendments by the Constitutional Court claiming that they were against the secular nature of the State. On a positive note, however, an investigation was launched to disintegrate Ergenekon, an alleged criminal network including military officials, politicians, police forces and former members of terrorist organizations, which led to the arrest of a number of people some of whom were retired Army generals.

The government, on the other hand, articulated its dedication to the EU accession process, and its intention to carry on with political reforms. Subsequently, a draft National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis was announced on 1 September 2008, and various circles such as the opposition parties and civil society were asked to contribute with their expertise. Moreover, the government also engaged in a project aiming to reinforce the mandate of local government and adopted a Law in July to increase their revenue. The report highlighted that even though positive developments and reforms have been recorded these lacked a considerable amount of consistency and comprehensiveness on political and constitutional levels.

Bearing in mind the civilian control of the military, the commission stressed on the fact that the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law and the Law on the National Security Council remained to be changed. Furthermore, the influence of the armed forces, “via formal and informal mechanisms”, on politics had not lost any ground and intensity, rather “senior members of the armed forces have expressed their opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues going beyond their merit, including on Cyprus, the South East, secularism, political parties and other non-military developments” (Progress Report, 2008: 9). In addition, the 1997 EMASYA secret protocol on security, public order and assistance units, which

---

142 EMASYA protocol will be annulled on 4 February 2010. Chief of the General Staff, Ilker Basbug, in an interview stated that, “there is no need for this protocol as it is already stipulated in the law…article 11 of law no. 5442 of the Special Provincial Administration clarifies the issue…the governor is superior to all general an local law enforcement officers” indicating the
allows military personnel, under certain conditions, to perform operations surrounding domestic security risk situations without parliamentary/civilian request, remained in effect. In conclusion, the commission stated that “no progress has been made in ensuring full civilian supervisory function over the military and parliamentary oversight of defence expenditure” (Ibid: 10).

Concerning, the human rights the report indicated that various human rights instruments were yet to be ratified, such as the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT), the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the additional Protocols No. 4, 7 and 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights, and that no progress was recorded in this matter. Moreover, the number of applications to the ECtHR followed a similar path with last year’s accounts and continued to increase. However, on the whole progress had been recorded on the execution of the ECtHR judgments.

Certain legal provisions continued to constraint civil and political rights. Highly debated Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code was amended in April to guarantee freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the report argued that although the wording of the Article had been changed the content remained intact. On the other hand, expression of non-violent opinions, particularly on Kurdish issues, being criminalized under Article 215, 126 and 217 and Anti-Terror Law remained a cause of concern:

Turkish judges and prosecutors apply a wide interpretation of the provision on “incitement to violence” or “public interest”, in particular as concerns Kurdish-related issues. This is not in line with the ECtHR case law on freedom of expression and implies in particular a lack of differentiation between violent and non-violent opinions.

(Progress Report, 2008: 16)

The report also called attention to violence against demonstrators who have gathered to celebrate the Kurdish Spring festival of Newroz on March 21 in several provinces of the East and Southeast mainly in Hakkari, Yüksekova, and in Van where three citizens have lost their lives (Ibid).

On the subject of minority rights, there exists a major paradox in regards the Kurdish population. The Turkish government reasons what it considers as a minority, and hence justified its approach to minority rights, with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. According to the Lausanne minorities in Turkey consist exclusively of non-Muslim religious communities such as Greeks, Jews and Armenians; Kurds being predominantly Muslim do not fall into the minority category.

The amended article 301 reads as follows:

1. A person who publicly degrades the Turkish nation, the State of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the judicial bodies of the State, shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to two years
2. A person who publicly degrades the military or security organisations of the State shall be sentenced to a penalty in accordance with the first section
3. The expression of an opinion for the purpose of criticism does not constitute an offence.
4. The conduct of investigation for such offence shall be subject to the permission of the Minister of Justice.


143 According to a definition prepared in 1985 for the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities by Jules Deschênes minorities are, “a group of...
before the law and the constitution. Consequently, the international instruments signed by the Turkish government in respect minority issues do not necessarily and specifically apply to the Kurdish population; therefore, Kurds like the rest of the citizenry benefit from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as well as basic rights of citizens declared in the Constitution. Turkish Government claims all citizens are equal before the law. Nevertheless, the commission state that this should not prevent Turkey, in accordance with the European standards, from granting rights to “neglected” individuals or groups. Moreover, Turkey is yet to sign the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities or the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Ibid).

As regards Kurdish language and broadcasting in Kurdish, restrictions remained intact especially for educational programmes teaching in Kurdish and subtitle obligations for all programmes except for music were in effect. The report stated that, “the police and the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) apply a policy of strict monitoring of broadcasts in Kurdish” (EC Progress Report 2008: 24). Court cases were pending against the Gun TV, the only remaining TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish. Additionally, no noticeable opportunities were made available to learn Kurdish in public or private schooling systems. Problems surrounding the facilitation of access to public services by non-Turkish speakers continued to exist and in some cases municipalities aiming to resolve the issue by adopting bilingual services were subjected to criminal charges.

On a positive development, nevertheless, progress was made in regards amending the Law on broadcasting in languages other than Turkish in June 2008. The law authorized the use of foreign languages in broadcasting for and extended period of 24 hours a day, which had, since 2004, only been possible for half a day. Accordingly, Mus FM a local radio channel was allowed to broadcast in Kurdish. This was regarded, especially by the Kurdish community, as a conciliatory incentive by the government to make up for the mistakes of the past, and to improve its relations with the Kurdish minority. Overall, the commission reported limited progress on cultural rights and the use of languages other than Turkish (Progress Report, 2008).

Considering, the situation in the East and Southeast, the government announced in May that it planned to increase the allocation of capital for the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP) to develop the region under four pillars; economic development, social development, infrastructure development and institutional strengthening. An estimated €14 billion was pledged to be spent between 2008 and 2012 to complete the GAP, which was €10.2 billion more than initially planned. However, the report stated that, “most investment will concentrate on the energy and agriculture sectors” (Ibid: 27). Tension in the region continued in regards the security situation, PKK continued its terrorist
citizens of a state, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that state, endowed with ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law” UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, para. 181. Also see Francesco Capotorti, Study of the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities. United Nations: New York 1991, para. 568. Note that there is no specific definition of minority in the UN Declaration or in the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of 1994

145 In June 2007, for example, the Council of the State dissolved the Municipal Council of Sur Municipality of Diyarbakir and dismissed the mayor for providing municipal services in both Turkish and Kurdish language.
attacks and the “temporary security zones” (Sirnak, Siirt and Hakkari) established in June 2007 remained operational.

Turkey continued to make progress with respect to the compensation of losses due to terrorism and the fight against terrorism; “by may 2008, 313 829 cases had been filed…Some 40% of these, i.e. 126 945 cases have been finalized, out of which 82 893 obtained a favourable response” (Ibid: 27-28). Nevertheless, uneven and inequitable calculations were reported and the deteriorating situation of the Internally Displaced Persons in urban centers such as poor and limited access to social, educational and health services, and unemployment caused concern. In addition, various social factors including the security issues in the region, fear of militants, security forces and village guards, lack of services, infrastructure and employment opportunities created a serious barrier for the IDPs on the way to return home. Overall, while the commission welcomed the efforts to complete the GAP project for socio-economic development of the region, it underlined that, “further efforts are needed to create the conditions for the predominantly Kurdish population to enjoy full rights and freedoms” (Ibid: 28).

Overall, the commission had found that Turkey progresses to sufficiently fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria although progress on reforms was limited. Pledging to increase spending on the GAP project was a welcoming development in addressing the socio-economic difficulties of the Southeast. Reforms needed to have a stable and comprehensive basis especially as regards the reform of the constitution and the judiciary. Progress has, also, been recorded in Turkey’s ability to take on the obligations of membership (Progress Report, 2008).


This report was issued on 14 October 2009. The EU continued to assist Turkey with financial aid to facilitate the transition process and to pull Turkey towards European shores; in 2009 financial assistance raised €27 million, compared to last years numbers, and totaled €567 million. This sum has been allocated to priority areas as well as to the development of civil society.

At institutional levels, Turkey showed commitment to regain civilian control over the military and to bring the suspects of the Ergenekon criminal network to justice; for the first time the military was also not exempt form civil justice\textsuperscript{146}, Ergenekon suspects who were changed with attempting to overthrow the government and instigating armed riots included 19 retired military officers, among those were five former generals, and five serving officers (“an investigation into extra-judicial executions in the South-East in the 1990’s led to the arrest of a Gendarmerie serving colonel, along with six other people” Progress Report, 2009: 10). As regards the current constitution, a growing majority consensus had been observed amongst the political and societal circles that the 1982 Constitution drafted by the coup generals needed to be amended to open the gates for further democratization endeavors. The government, on the other hand, expressed its dedication to political reforms and to the EU accession process, by adopting the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) as required by the Accession Partnership in December 2008. In addition, in January

\textsuperscript{146} With a legislation passed in June 2009 civilian courts were given the authority to try military personnel in peacetime under article 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; furthermore, military courts were stripped of their power to try civilians.
2009 the government, for the first time since the commencement of accession negotiations, appointed a State Minister as full-time EU Chief Negotiator. Furthermore, electorate’s trust in the electoral process was evident in elections of municipal, special provincial administration on 29 March 2009 with over 85% of voter turn-out. Nevertheless, the commission criticized Turkey for not making any progress concerning the devolution of power to local governments and on establishing of city councils, which are seen as the a very important element of improving public participation and democratic governance mechanisms (Ibid).

On the other hand, the influence exerted by the armed forces has continued to show its signs in politics, on politicians and judges, and on a range of other institutions. Senior officers have continued to express their opinions on domestic and foreign non-military matters through media channels, especially on such issues as Southeast, ethnicity, Israel, Cyprus, secularism and political parties. A press briefing held in April where the Chief of General Staff expressed his concerns and opposing views on the Ergenekon case was believed to put the judiciary under pressure. The report also noted no observable change to the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law or to the Law on the National Security Council, and that the 1997 EMASYA secret protocol remained in force. Furthermore, no progress has been observed on reinforcing parliamentary scrutiny of the military budget and expenditure and of the Defence Industry Support Fund (SSDF), which finances most procurement projects. More importantly, however, the report stated that, “parliament has no mandate to develop security and defence policies” (Ibid: 10).

The state owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) launched TRT-6 on 1 January 2009, country’s first national Kurdish language television station broadcasting in the Kurmanji, Sorani and Zaza dialects of the Kurdish language 24 hours a day. Moreover, at the inauguration ceremony of TRT-6, for the first time in the history of the republic, the Prime Minister spoke a few words in Kurdish and said “TRT Ses bê xerbe” (May TRT-6 be beneficial). This was a giant step considering that the use of Kurdish language was banned in Turkey up until 1991. Additionally, various steps have been taken to integrate Kurdish language into higher education bodies; Artuklu University’s (Mardin) application in September to establish a “Living Languages Institute” which would give post graduate education in Kurdish and other spoken languages of Anatolia was approved by the Higher Education Board. In regards the use of Kurdish language in public services, several governorships in the Southeast have started utilizing Kurdish. These new developments not only provided more freedom for the Kurdish language but also for other languages; in March 2009, for example, the public radio network commenced broadcasting in Armenian, which was considered a highly controversial and sensitive subject previously (Progress Report, 2009).

Conversely, some restrictions in relation to the use of Kurdish language remained, such as the pending criminal charges against the members of pro-Kurdish DTP for using Kurdish in political life. Consequently, the Deputy Chief

---

147 1982 Constitution Law no. 2392, Art. 3: “The native language of Turkish citizens is Turkish. It is forbidden: a) to use as a native language a language other than Turkish and to participate in any activity aiming to diffuse these languages” was lifted on 25 February 1991. See also “On 3 March 1924, for example, a decree banned all Kurdish schools, organizations, and publications, as well as religious fraternities and madrasas (Islamic religious schools), which were the last source of education for most Kurds” Michael M. Gunter in Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden eds. Nationalism and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish issue. Oxon: Routledge 2011 p.85
Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation opted for the removal of parliamentary immunity of several DTP members in July. The mayor of Sur (Diyarbakir) who had been charged for providing municipal services in Kurdish was re-elected after the dismissal in 2007. Educational programmes teaching Kurdish remained unauthorized. Turkey had been found in violation of students’ right to education by the ECtHR regarding the suspension of 18 students from Afyon Kocatepe University due to their petition to have elective Kurdish courses. Non-speakers of Turkish, particularly those with Kurdish as mother-tongue, continued to face difficulties regarding easy access to public services. Overall, the commission observed some progress on cultural rights, especially in regards the Kurdish-language; however, the use of Kurdish language was not guaranteed in the constitution and some restrictions remained intact (Ibid).

Regarding the situation in the East and Southeast, even though there seemed to be a relative drop of violence since the end of 2008 clashes between the armed forces and the PKK members continued to occur, resulting in fatalities. Regarding, regional socio-economic development government initiated a slender decentralization loom where the GAP Administration’s headquarters were moved from the capital to the Southeastern city of Urfa and a monitoring, evaluation and reporting mechanism specific to the GAP was announced to be established. Additionally, supplementary resources were allocated to the Project; “the GAP’s share in total public investments increased to 12% in 2008 (7.2 in 2007). Investments on irrigation, road transport and education were given priority” (Ibid: 30). The Kurdish spring celebrations (Newroz), contrary to previous years, were authorized by governorates and passed by peacefully. Nevertheless, ambiguous anti-terror legislation remained in effect and was utilized to punish non-violent opinions, particularly in the region on the Kurdish issue. The report stated that,

Since April 2009 the police arrested several hundreds DTP members and executives for alleged membership of the terrorist structure KCK [tied to PKK]. A similar anti-terror operation was carried out against members of trade unions KESK and Egitimsen for alleged membership of PKK; 22 of them remain in pre-trial detention. In February, a criminal court in Diyarbakir sentenced a DTP Member of Parliament to 18 months in prison for several speeches.

(Progress Report, 2009: 30)

No progress, nevertheless, was reported on the subject of the abolishment of village guard system, which was known to cause human rights violations in the region for the duration of the combat against terrorism. In sum, the report concluded that, “despite continuing terrorist violence, the government has opened a wide-ranging public debate -covering cultural, political and economic matters- on the Kurdish issue. It is crucial that this debate be followed by concrete measures” (Ibid: 31).

Continuous progress has been observed in the situation of Internally Displaced Persons. The government continued the process of compensation of losses as a result of terrorism and the fight against terrorism, “so far, about 50 of the total number of received applications (361 000) have been processed and completed. Of these, about two thirds have been accepted” (Ibid: 31). However, the situation of IDPs in urban centers remained a concern where most of them lived in poverty with a lack of social, educational and health services. IDPs, who moved from the country side into the urban centers such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Adana
and Mersin faced isolation and alienation; consequently, their group perception and association intensified and socially, politically and economically deprived slums emerged.

In conclusion, the report confirmed that Turkey continued to show signs of progress and improvements, though at times uneven, concerning its ability to take on the obligations of membership in most areas.
CHAPTER 9: SUBSTANTIVE COUNTS / ASSESSING REALITIES IN THE POST-HELSINKI PERIOD


As previously stated, the main source of data collection and assessment for regional socio-economic research in the post-Helsinki era is the research conducted by Bülent Dincer, Metin Özaslan and Taner Kavasoglu entitled Socio-Economic Development Rankings of the Provinces and Regions 2003 prepared for the State Panning Organization (DPT).

II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RANKINGS OF THE PROVINCES AND REGIONS 2003

Regional development incentives play an important role in Turkey’s geostrategic and public policies; therefore, regional development is a key for Turkey in order to become an influential actor in the global arena, to become an EU member, to become a prominent regional hub of Eurasia, to become a true information society, to have a competitive, high-tech, foreign market orientated, international standards approved production system, and to raise the welfare, education and health standards of the citizenry. Evidently, the European Union also puts great emphasis on the regional development incentives of the candidate countries, providing extensive financial assistance to facilitate the process of managing regional disparities in order to realize social and economic equilibrium between regions. Therefore, regional statistics becomes crucial in determining the direction of funds needed for the intended results.

The study encompasses 58 variables selected from; social (demographic, employment, education, health, infrastructure, and other welfare indicators) and economic (manufacturing, construction, agricultural and financial sectors) indicators analyzed in 81 provinces of Turkey. Variables used in this study are identical to those of 1996 study (Dincer et al., 2003).

1. Social Indicators

Demographic indicators comprise of the same variables used in the 1996 study: population figures obtained from 2000 General Population Census of Turkey, population growth rate (1990-2000), urbanization rate (2000), fertility rate (1990-2000), and average household size (2000). All the data for these variables are obtained from the 2000 General Population Census results and from the State Statistics Institute. Variables composing the employment indicators are acquired form 2000 General Census results. Education indicators: literacy and
university graduate rates are obtained from 2000 General Census results; enrolment rates are acquired from the Ministry of National Education’s academic year 1999-2000 statistics. Health indicators: infant mortality rates are obtained from 2000 General Census results and other indicators from the Ministry of Health in 2000. Data for infrastructure variables are acquired from the General Directorate of Rural Services and from the General Directorate of Highways in 2000. Data for variables on other welfare indicators are obtained from the State Statistics Institute and from the Turkish Telecom in 2000 (Dincer et al., 2003).

2. Economic Indicators


A) First-degree Developed Regions 2003:

Map 5: First-degree Developed Provinces in 2003

(Dincer et al., 2003: 58)

As it was the case in 1996 socio-economically most developed provinces in 2003 were: Istanbul, Ankara, Kocaeli and Bursa (see Map 5). Together these provinces constitute 30.57% of Turkey’s population and 7.25% of its surface area. 85.45% of the population in this group lives in urban cities. There are approximately 88 people per square kilometer in Turkey and 371 in this group. Provinces of this group attract most of the immigration, and have the lowest fertility rate throughout Turkey. Population growth rate is rather high, 28.15 per
thousand compared to 18.29 per thousand of national average. Share of employment rate amongst various sectors are as follows: 18% in agricultural, 26% in industrial and 56% in services. Paid labors make up 69% and 17% of women are paid labors. Considering the educational levels, 93% of the total population and 89% of the female population are literate. Rate of university graduates is 12% compared to 8% of national average. There are 22 doctors and 32 hospital beds per thousand people in this group well over the national average of 13 doctors and 23 beds. Provinces of this group are accountable for 76% of national imports and 77% of national exports. 12% of total agricultural production is made in the five provinces composing this group. This group generates about 46% of GDP. 92% of rural population has access to drinking water compared to 85% in rest of Turkey. 97% of city and state roads are paved with asphalt. There are 1077 private automobiles and 1452 motor vehicles per ten thousand people; national average figures are 652 and 1056 respectively. Electricity consumption per capita is 2076 kWh compared to Turkey’s average of 1433 kWh per capita consumption (Dincer et al., 2003).

B) Fifth-degree Developed Provinces 2003:

Map 6: Fifth-degree Developed Provinces in 2003

When compared to the results of 1996 study, Adiyaman and Tunceli provinces exceeded this group while Urfa became a new addition. Socio-economically least developed provinces are: Urfa, Mardin, Gumushane, Bayburt, Bingol, Mus, Batman, Bitlis, Siirt, Sirmak, Hakkari, Van, Agri, Igdir, Kars and Ardahan (see Map 6). Together these cities constitute 10.1% of Turkey’s population and 18% of its surface area. In this group there are 51 people per square kilometer (national average is 88). Population growth rate is 21.4 per thousand and is well above the national average of 18.3 per thousand. Agriculture employs 69.3% of the group’s total population and the industrial sector employs only 3.9%. Considering the agricultural sector is the main source of employment for the inhabitants of this group, share of national agricultural production quota only amounts to 9.8% (same as 1996). Industrial and services sectors fall below the national average...
figures. There are a total of 94 medium and large-sized businesses in manufacturing industry sector. Given that the value-added per capita of manufacturing is taken to be 100 throughout Turkey, this value is 5 for this group. Share of GDP is merely 3.8%. Given that the GDP per capita is taken to be 100 throughout Turkey, it is 38 for the cities forming this group. In view of this, provinces in this group acquire less than half of national average income, 1.2% of total bank deposits and 0.8% of total bank credits. Given that the share of national budget per capita, obtained income and corporate taxes, and municipality expenditure amounts to 100 throughout Turkey, provinces of the group score 10, 12 and 37 respectively. Furthermore, migration continues to be a huge obstacle for the development of general welfare for this group (Dincer et al., 2003).

**Map 7: Cities and Provinces According to Development Index**

![Map of Turkey showing development index](image)

(Dincer et al., 2003: 72)
C) The Most and the Least Developed Regions of Turkey Compared:

The chart below shows the socio-economic development rankings of geographic regions of Turkey. Marmara is the most developed region followed by Aegean, Central Anatolia, Mediterranean, Black-Sea, Southeastern Anatolia, and the least developed Eastern Anatolia regions.

![Figure 5: Regional Socio-Economic Development Index](image)

(Dincer et al., 2003: 75)

i. The Most Developed Region: Marmara

Marmara region remains to be the most developed geographical region of Turkey since the 1996 study. There are currently no provinces falling below the national average figures in the region (see Figure 6). With a population of 17 million the region accounts for, approximately, 25% of Turkey’s total population (68 million according to 2000 General Census). Marmara region is composed of 10 provinces, 4 of which have more than a million inhabitants; Istanbul 10 million, Bursa 2.2 million, Kocaeli 1.2 million and Balikesir 1.1 million (Dincer et al., 2003)
With 79.07%, Marmara region also has the highest urbanization rate in Turkey (national average is 64.9%) and the highest population density (241). The region has the best indicators in terms of fertility rate (1.91) and average household size (3.85). Besides having the lowest fertility rate in Turkey, the region also has the lowest infant mortality rate of 39 per thousand (Ibid).

In Marmara, majority of the population work in the industrial (25.67%) and commercial (14.28%) sectors. Finance sector consists of 5.39% of the total workforce and agricultural sector of 25.33%. Paid-labors constitute 62.23%, paid-female-labors 14.68% and employers 4.29% if the total rate of employment, and are the best figures in Turkey (Ibid).

Out of a total number of 11,118 manufacturing businesses in Turkey, Marmara houses 5608. The number of annual workforce in manufacturing industry totals to 585 thousand in the region and equals to half the national mean (1.1 million). Manufacturing per capita value-added is 756 million Liras in the region, which approximately is 2 times the national mean of 350 million Liras (Ibid).

Marmara houses one thirds of total number of banks in Turkey; there are 3080 banks in the region and 7786 throughout Turkey. Furthermore, the region has 3 times the amount of national per capita imports and exports. Marmara’s contribution to Turkey’s GDP is 37%; during the period in question region’s GDP per capita is 2.7 billion Liras (Turkey averages 1.8 billion Liras) (Ibid).

Other welfare indicators of the region follow a similar path with the above mentioned indicators and score well above national average. Marmara’s literacy rate is 92.4% and 88.14% of women are literate in the region. University graduates make up 9.95% of the total number of graduates; enrolment in primary schools is 115.65%, in high schools 41.05%, and in vocational technical high schools 29.39%. There are 3.6 dentists, 16.43 doctors and 3.8 pharmacies per thousand people in Marmara. 91.39% of Marmara’s population has access to sufficient drinking water and 95.99% of the roads are paved with asphalt (74.82% of rural roads). There are 876 private cars and 1234 motor vehicles per thousand people in the region. Marmara’s electricity consumption per capita is 2.2 kWh (Ibid).
ii. The least Developed Region: Eastern Anatolia

Eastern Anatolia remains to be the least developed geographical region of Turkey since 1996 study. With a population of 6.1 million inhabitants the region is also the least populated amongst Turkey’s seven geographical regions. There are 14 provinces in Eastern Anatolia; largest provinces are as follows: Erzurum with 937 thousand inhabitants, Van with 877 thousand inhabitants and Malatya with 853 thousand inhabitants (Dincer et al., 2003).

Marmara’s population density of 240 persons per km², the highest, is 6 times more than that of Eastern Anatolia’s, which has the lowest. Migration and rugged mountainous geographic setting of the region affect its population density to a great extent. With a fertility rate of 3.92 and the average household size of 6.27 the region ranks second nethermost in Turkey, just above the Southeastern Anatolia. According to the estimates, 53 out of a thousand births die in Eastern Anatolia, which is the highest infant mortality rate in Turkey (Ibid).

Agriculture is the main source of employment for the inhabitants of the region (66.41%). Even though the agriculture sector is the primary source of income per capita agricultural production of the rural population, with 884 million Liras, is well below the nation average figures, of 1.1 billion Liras, and agricultural productivity is comparatively lower in the region. Furthermore, with 9-5% Eastern Anatolia’s contribution to national agricultural production lags way behind. In addition, the shares of employment in industrial (3.26%), commercial (4.4%) and financial (1.05%) sectors are the lowest nationwide (Ibid).

Eastern Anatolia is the second least-developed region in Turkey, ranking just above Southeastern Anatolia, in terms of educational development. Literacy rate in the region is 77.71% (national average is 87.30%), female literacy rate is 65.9% (national average 80.62%), and the rate of faculty or collage graduates is
6.13% (national average 8.42%). There are 7.54 doctors, 0.61 dentists and 1.21 pharmacies per thousand people in the region (Ibid).

There are a total number of 322 banks in the Eastern Anatolia region. Per capita income in the region amounts to 57 million Liras, income and corporation taxes to 30 million Liras. Between 1995 and 2000 amount of per capita investments (with incentive certificate) was 611 million Liras. Eastern Anatolia was the third largest recipient of per capita public investments during the same period. The region ranks the last concerning per capita import ($83) and export rates ($81). The region ranks the last in terms of asphalt paved roads and ranks sixth concerning other welfare indicators, above Southeast Anatolia. With 4.14% (it was 4.2% in 1996) the Eastern Anatolia contributes the least in terms of GDP (Ibid).

III. COMPARING 1996 AND 2003 RESULTS

As the Figure 8 (below) illustrates slight changes have been observed in the socio-economic development of the geographical regions of Turkey; while Marmara, Central-Anatolia, Black-Sea and Southeastern-Anatolia regions progressed, Aegean, Mediterranean and Eastern-Anatolia regions regressed in 2003 when compared to 1996 results.

While the development index value difference between the most developed Marmara region and the least developed Eastern Anatolia region in 1996 was 2.83149, this value has further increased in 2003 to 2.86447. Between 1996 and 2003, Marmara region’s socio-economic development index value has risen 0.00775 points (from 1.69436 to 1.70211). On the other hand, Eastern Anatolia’s index value has declined -0.02523 points from -1.13713 to -1.13713 (Dincer et al., 2003)

According to the results obtained from 1996 and 2003 studies other progressed regions are: Central-Anatolia increased 0.02093 points from 0.46045 to 0.48138, Black-Sea increased 0.03009 points from -0.54364 to -0.51355, and Southeastern Anatolia increased 0.02508 points from -1.03631 to -1.01123. Besides Eastern Anatolia Region other regions regressed between 1996 and 2003 are: Aegean Region decreased -0.01777 points from 0.50073 to 0.48296, and Mediterranean Region decreased -0.0485 points from 0.06154 to 0.02069 (Ibid).
Figure 8: Development Index Values of 1996 and 2003 Studies

(Dincer et al., 2003: 78)

Figure 9: Socio-Economic Development Indices of Provinces

(Dincer et al., 2003: 54)
## Table 2: 1996-2003 Comparison of Socio-Economic Development of Provinces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES</th>
<th>1996 - STUDY</th>
<th>2002 - STUDY</th>
<th>2003 - STUDY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RANK</td>
<td>INDEX</td>
<td>RANK</td>
<td>INDEX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROY</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.14716</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5.69352</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYVAZ</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.23527</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAZIANTEP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.19653</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIRSEHIR</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.45495</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DERBENT</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.56477</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAKARYA</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.15176</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATH</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.04724</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIRSEHIR</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.55447</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARI</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.46602</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAYBURT</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.78954</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARDEKA</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>-0.05151</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYVAN</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-0.12259</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANKARA</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-0.18956</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAYSERI</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.15253</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAYSERI</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>-1.99872</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARI</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.12346</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTRAC</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.95251</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYAHO</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.82060</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GURU</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.53936</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARTIN</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.42219</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARI</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.55605</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOKAYMA</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.75285</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTANBUL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.87966</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANKARA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.32447</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZMIR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.76790</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOKAYMA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.73906</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURSA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.54580</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTRAH</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.61564</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURSA</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.25646</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURSA</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.16040</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEVESIR</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.06599</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAKUL</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.73407</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAYSERI</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.85490</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURSA</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.97865</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAUSA</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1.24487</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAKARYA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.02090</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALIKESIR</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.55650</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IZMIR</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.36227</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KONYA</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.37607</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HATAY</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.18856</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIRIKALE</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.14696</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELAZIG</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.02459</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALATYA</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.16930</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAYSERI</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.22111</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UZUNSU</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.46312</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIVAS</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.40602</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANAKKALE</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.56092</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUYSUM</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.81448</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIRIKALE</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.83439</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARDIN</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.91368</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASJI</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1.11343</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTLAYA</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0.97602</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANISA</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.36547</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRABZON</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.03230</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKSEHIR</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.44924</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÇANLI</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.32059</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÝANANTU</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1.05650</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAYDE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.56469</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANAKKALE</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.54143</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MÜSİD</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.59430</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELÇUKAN</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.72338</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.95145</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.97212</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAYSERI</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.76593</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOKAYMA</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.31193</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAKI</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.48233</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAYSERI</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.08133</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEPA</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.32425</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ÇANLI</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.44815</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARDIN</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.60056</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAYSERI</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.85503</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTALYA</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.96540</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AYDIN</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.57212</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Provinces of East and Southeast Anatolia Regions

(Dincer et al., 2003: 56)
As previously argued, underdevelopment of the Eastern and, particularly, Southeastern regions were linked to rugged and mountainous structure of the region accompanied by the imminent threat of terrorism and conflict situation. Amongst the two regions in question, Southeastern Anatolia is known to be more mountainous and more conflict infested; heated clashes between the PKK and security forces, particularly since 90s, is concentrated in the bordering provinces of Southeastern Anatolia to Iran and Iraq. However, as evidence presented in the 2003 research suggests Southeastern Anatolia has socio-economically progressed since 1996 while Eastern Anatolia regressed. Therefore, the hypothesis claiming that there is a close and causal relation between underdevelopment and geographical setting and security factors has been, significantly, negated.

Progress observed in the socio-economic development of Southeast region could be linked to government’s eminent interest to finalize the GAP project; the main objective, however, was argued to be the control over the water-flow in Tigris and Euphrates rivers and its by-product, which was the considerable increase observed in socio-economic development index. In fact, judging by the results compared between 1996 and 2003 studies, Southeast Anatolia region was the second most progressed in terms of socio-economic development following the Black-Sea region (even though both these regions scored below national average) in 2003. It is important to note that EU’s financial assistance under the GAP Region Development Programme has seriously facilitated the implementation and the course of the project. As detailed below, the Programme was launched on 1 May 2002 and the EU allocated €45 million in total.

The Eastern Anatolia remains the least developed region for various underlying factors such as; insufficient public services provided by the state to the region negatively affect the basic socio-economic dynamics including education, employment and health care. Consequently, the region has high birth rates as well as elevated infant mortality rates. State’s assimilation and denial policies have a partial role in region’s deviant population growth; it has been noted that amongst a sizable number of people in the Kurdish community, having as many children as possible, besides seen as a helping-hand in the fields, means a way to stop the Kurds from being eradicated. This belief is popular mainly amongst the rural population that have witnessed the painful and dreadful years of 1980s and 1990s. Minimal industrialization in the region leads to high unemployment and to an absence of middle/working class population.

IV. EU-FUNDED PROGRAMMES / SUCCESS STORIES IN TURKEY

According to the Delegation of the EU to Turkey, thousands of projects in Turkey are annually financed by the EU. The main objective behind the EU-funded projects is to prepare Turkey for EU membership by supporting civil society dialogue between the EU and Turkey, the performance of the market economy and increased competitiveness, the adoption, implementation and enforcement of EU legislation and the preparation for managing the Structural Funds.

EU funds mainly focus on supporting reforms and development in key sectors. For example, as of 2009: €412.4 million (22.8% of the total funds) has been allocated for the Improvement of the Administrative Capacity & STD; €395.1
million (21.8%) for Economic & Social Coherence; €339.8 million (18.8%) for Social Policy; €291.5 million (16.1%) for the Infrastructure, Energy, Telecom, Transportation and Environment sector; €208.9 million (11.6%) for Internal Market, Customs Union & Agriculture; €128.4 million (7.1%) for Justice Freedom and Security; and €32.7 million (1.8%) for Other projects (EU Delegation to Turkey).

EU funded projects that specifically generated positive affects on the socio-economic development, regional disparities and human (cultural) rights situation of the Eastern and Southeastern regions could be listed as follows:

1) European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) – Support to Human Rights and Democracy Actions on Torture and Other Forms of Ill-Treatment launched on 19 August 2009 with a budget of €20 million;

2) Support to Human Resources Development through Vocational Education and Training (IKMEP) was characterized as a success story by the EU Delegation. The project was launched on 2 June 2008 for 24 months, with a €16 million budget (€12.9 million EU contribution and €3.1 million from Turkey). Sub-objective of the Project was to encourage human resources development in the selected 8 provinces of Malatya, Van, Gaziantep, Diyarbakir, Sanliurfa, Elazig, Erzurum and Kahramanmaras;

3) Strengthening Civil Society in the Pre-Accession Process: NGO Grant Facility launched on 11 July 2006 for 24 months, with €10.5 million. One of the sub-projects of the Programme aims to enhance interest of people of Turkey in the diversity of EU multi-cultural identity;

4) Better Access to Justice in Turkey programme launched on 13 June 2006 for 24 months, with a budget of €4.4 million;

5) Preparation for the Implementation of Common Agriculture Policy launched on 28 April 2006 for 24 months with a budget of €2.07 million;

6) Agri, Malatya, Konya, Kayseri Nuts II Regional Development Programme (was marked as a success story) was launched on 18 April 2006. The programme lasted 24 months and was co-financed with a total budget of €90.67 million. EU allocated €70 million and Turkey €20.67 million. The Programme covers 5 provinces of Central-Anatolia (Konya, Karaman, Kayseri, Sivas and Yozgat) and 8 provinces of Eastern-Anatolia (Malatya, Elazig, Bingol, Agri, Kars, Igdir and Ardahan) regions. The aim of the Programme is to stimulate economic and entrepreneurial activity in the regions through support to rural development and to SMEs;

7) Eastern Anatolia Development Programme (another success story) was launched on 1 December 2004 for a 36 month period, with a budget of €45 million. Main objective of the Programme was to support the national and EU objectives of reducing regional disparities, “to develop local skills levels and capacities, whilst ensuring that results are sustained once the programme is completed and that income levels are boosted” (EU Turkey Review 2006: 10) in the targeted provinces of Van, Hakkari, Bitlis and Mus, one of the poorest regions of Turkey;
8) European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights was launched on 1 December 2003 for 18 months, and programme’s budget was €515,000;

9) Support to Basic Education programme (a success story) was launched on 9 September 2002 for 72 months with a total budget of €100 million. The Project aims to increase the quality of basic and non-formal education and improve access to education, especially for females. The programme is being implemented in 24 provinces under three categories: “pilot”, “disadvantaged” and “recipient of highest level of immigration”. Pilot provinces are: Ankara, Bolu, Diyarbakir, Hatay, Izmir, Istanbul, Kocaeli, Samsun and Van. Disadvantaged provinces are: Adiyaman, Agri, Ardahan, Bayburt, Bingol, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Kars, Mus, Sakarya, Sanliurfa and Siirt. Urban provinces with the highest rate of immigration are: Adana, Antalya, Bursa, Istanbul and Mersin (EU Delegation to Turkey, 2009);

10) EU Loan for Small Businesses (a success story) was launched on 1 July 2002 for 78 months and with €20 million allocation;

11) GAP Regional Development Programme (success story) was launched on 1 May 2002 for 60 months with a total of €47 million. “The programme objectives are closely linked to national priorities such as the improvement of the economic and social status of people living in the GAP region; the contribution to economic growth; the mitigation of regional development disparities and the enhancement of the production and employment capacity of the region. To do so, the GAP Regional Development Programme focuses on three components; development of cultural heritage, rural development and support to SMEs” (EU Turkey Review 2006: 10). Within the framework, Cultural Heritage Development Programme of the GAP Region (March 2003-May 2007 has a budget of €17 million; it is implemented in nine provinces: Adiyaman, Diyarbakir, Batman, Siirt, Sirnak, Mardin, Sanliurfa, Gaziantep and Kilis;

12) Sanliurfa Drinking Water Project (another success story) was launched on 2 January 2001 for duration of 72 months, and €21.3 million allocation. “The project ensures uninterrupted access to clean drinking water in Sanliurfa 24 hours a day. As such, the project has made a significant contribution to the quality of life of Sanliurfa citizens” (EU Delegation to Turkey);

13) Active Labor Market Strategy (October 2008-April 2010) was another co-financed success story; EU allocated €16 million and Turkey provided €4 million for the project. The project, listed as a success story, targets mainly unemployed women and youth and leads to decrease in unemployment through 101 sub-projects carried out in 25 different cities (8 of which are located in the Eastern and Southeastern regions) including; Ankara, Bursa, Manisa, Ordu, Konya, Istanbul, Samsun, Antalya, Corum, Nigde, Hatay, Kocaeli, Kilis, Tokat, Balikesir, Kayseri, Sanliurfa, Malatya, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Agri, Igdır, Mus and Siirt;

14) Small Enterprise Loan Programme 2nd Phase (SELP II), another success story, was launched on 29 December 2006 (and will last until 30 November 2012) for companies with at most 50 employees and less than €1 million as assets. A total of €90.6 million was allocated to the Programme, “All the 49 provinces in the
Middle, East and Southeast Anatolia covered by the “Law on Encouragement of Investments and Employment No: 5084” were all included in the programme. Moreover, the budget of SELP-II includes a special fund to be used only in the regions covered by the “Eastern Anatolia Development Programme” (Hakkari, Mus, Bitlis, and Van). In this way, alongside increasing the competitiveness of small businesses, supporting employment and strengthening the financial sector, the programme also creates a considerable added value by contributing to the reduction of regional disparities” (EU Delegation to Turkey)

Map 8: SELP I and SELP II Provinces of Turkey

15) SKE NUTS II Regional Development Programme-Beytahti Project (a success story) was funded by EU (€1.07 million) and Turkey (€119,894) collectively. The Project started in May 2006 and ended in November 2007. According to the EU Delegation to Turkey, the Project has enabled Erzincan Municipality to renew 1/6 of its drinking water network and with the completion of the EU-funded Cansuyu Project, initiated directly after the Beytahti Project, Erzincan will not face water problems in the next 50 years (EU Delegation to Turkey);

16) Empowerment of Women and Women’s NGOs in the Least Developed Regions of Turkey is another EU financed project (€5 million) commencing in May 2010 for 31 months. The Project, which was characterized as a success story by the EU Delegation, aims to upgrade women’s social, political and economic status in the least developed 30 cities of Turkey in Southeastern Anatolia, Eastern Anatolia and Eastern Black-Sea regions (see Map 9),
17) Increasing Public Awareness on Energy Efficiency in Buildings (a success story) was another co-financed project; EU allocated €1.07 million and Turkey €30,000. The Project aims to reduce energy consumption in buildings by informing the public on ways of saving energy. According to the EU Delegation energy efficiency will result in a 25% saving in energy consumption and contribution of 7.5 billion TL a year to the national economy (EU Delegation to Turkey).

18) Strengthening the Vocational Education and Training System in Turkey (a success story) was launched in 2002 (to 2007) with a budget of €58.2 million (with the EU contributing €51 million, and Turkey contributing €7.2 million). The programme aims to reinforce Turkish VET system in line with the socio-economic need and lifelong learning principles in a total of 145 pilot institutions in 30 provinces. The project includes Eastern and Southeastern provinces of Gaziantep, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Mardin, Sanliurfa, Malatya, Mus, Erzurum, Van and Kars.

19) Eradicating the Worst Forms of Child Labor (a success story) initiated in November 2005 for a two year period with €5.3 millions. The project was implemented in 7 pilot provinces: Sinop, Ordu, Kastamonu, Cankiri, Van, Erzurum and Elazig;

20) Support to the Turkish Authorities in Charge of Legislative Alignment to the Acquis in the Veterinary Sector launched in October 2002 for 3 years total budget was €17.1 million and EC contributed €13.4 million. The project beneficiary will be the Ministry of Agriculture;

21) Support to Turkey’s Alignment to the EU Acquis in the Phytosanitary Sector launched in October 2002 for 3 year period. Total budget of the project was €5.4 million and EC contributed €4.3 million. The beneficiary is the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs.
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS

Democracy as a social concept harbors complex dynamics; as Abraham Lincoln, appropriately, attests, it is a “government of, by and for the people”. Nevertheless, defining democracy is a rather difficult endeavor. In the literature two major stances prevail; substantive definitions emphasize the importance of functional and participatory democracy in terms of political liberties and socio-economic implications upon the populace, whereas procedural definitions pay more attention to the political and institutional dynamics of the system such as the election procedure and legislative assembly. In the light of these definitions, this study presumed a substantive definition of democracy and explored democratization through a structuralist approach indicating the importance of social requisites such as economic and social development for the survival of democracy and success of democratization process. The emphasis is given to the results generated by the political process rather than the procedure itself to identify the exact influences of external factors on the process of democratization; a comprehensive democratization process encompasses an enhanced form of democracy at both institutional and social structures. Procedural and substantive definitions, both, share a common trait that democracy is an ongoing process; as Archibald MacLeish states, “democracy is never a thing done. Democracy is always something that a nation must be doing”. This ongoing process is described by leading scholars, such as Huntington, in “waves of democratization”. This study, therefore, assumes democratization as a process of regime change directed towards social and economic development to increase and promote popular participation and to establish an enhanced form of democratic governance which is more stable, substantive and comprehensive.

According to Huntington democratization, throughout history, came in waves and withdrew in reverse waves. First, long wave of democratization originated in the American and French revolutions and lasted from 1828 to 1926. The first reverse wave marks the point of shifting away from democracy back to authoritarianism and totalitarianism; it began in 1922 with Mussolini’s March on Rome, subsequently military coups mushroomed in other countries. The second wave of democratization (1943-1963) started in WWII; it was initiated by inauguration of democratic institutions promoted by the Allies in occupied territories. Turkey moved toward democracy during this era, in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. Second reverse wave (1958-1976), a further shift toward authoritarianism, came in with widespread military take-overs throughout the world, most dramatically in Latin America. And finally, the third wave of democratization began in 1974 when the Portuguese dictatorship fell and democratic regimes began to replace authoritarian ones. Huntington suggest that the third wave of democratization is still ongoing, as democracy itself is an ongoing process, and as pathology suggests the process may possibly end up in a third reverse wave. Furthermore, Huntington states that Turkey is an exceptional case in the Islamic world where democracy, even though has not been an unmitigated success, more or less found a holding ground through secularist, modernist and western-oriented nation building approaches (Huntington, 1991).

The process of democratization has three major phases; first, initiation phase is ignited by the elites who seek to introduce new rules by eliminating the old
ones through introducing civic rights. At this phase democratization is almost exclusively a domestic product where external actors merely play a direct and active role and external factors guide but do not determine the course of the process. Second, transition phase marks the point of the collapse of the old regime and the official establishment of the new government. The role of external f/actors, given that there is a certain degree of consent and that the external actor itself is an enhanced democracy, should be more active and conductive since democracy takes its formal constitutional and legitimate character during this phase. Third, consolidation phase refers to a branching-out, maturing period where democracy takes on specific national characteristics. Since democratization is an ongoing process, consolidation phase, thus, is open-ended; democracy never ceases to continue maturing during this phase. Again, competent external f/actors should be more direct and active in this phase to create a new form of or transform the existing democratic political culture to facilitate the process of democratization and modernization. Due to its limitless duration, influence and pressure exerted by the external f/actors are felt the most during the consolidation phase. External actors make two major mistakes in terms of their involvement in the democratization or domestic democratic transition processes. Firstly, they tend to be unanimously confident about the superiority of their way of governance and attempt to implement this through social, economic and political channels (contagion), and hence initiate democratization processes elsewhere (diffusion), and later prematurely abandon the process before the imperative transition and consolidation phases take root. Secondly, in some cases external actors make the catastrophic mistake of assuming the role of domestic elites, eliminating the old rules and introducing the new ones in coercion without taking the consent of the populace into consideration; for example, the US involvement in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Panama, Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq.

Establishing institutions and appointing electives should not be the ultimate goal of democracy. Democratization goes through a consolidation phase, once the initiation and transition phases are completed, where democracy extends beyond its formal aspects, becomes more durable and crisis-resilient. Democracy faces the ultimate test in the consolidation phase since the enhancement process of democracy leaves the elite-hut and reaches the masses in a more direct and comprehensive way. A vital aspect in the consolidation phase where the establishment, institutionalization and legitimization of the new political regime takes place is to build the initial regime upon the principles of justice, equality and liberty to ensure the durability of the democracy within the institutions of the state apparatus. As the principles adopted during this phase are legitimized under a written constitution, their populace support, correct interpretation and consequences become even more imperative since later modificational or correctional attempts would possibly be considered unconstitutional and unlawful. Specifically at this point, the significance of external f/actors not only becomes principal but also inevitable in correcting certain flows and residues of authoritarian practices inherited from the past. Accordingly, in order to examine the path of democratic transition, internal/external dynamics and implications for democratic consolidation, it is necessary to focus on the transition itself. Therefore, I have examined Turkish transition from the birth of the republic until the conditionality induced consolidation to assess the role of external f/actors.

The role and the significance of external f/actors is taken as the independent variable of the study, and the socio-economic and human (cultural) rights of the Kurdish population before and after the Helsinki summit in 1999 as the dependent
variable. In this research the EU is taken as the primary and the most influential external actor, EU conditionality as the most apparent external factor, and Turkey in the consolidation phase of its democratization process. By outlining a causal relationship between EU conditionality, Turkey’s accession to EU and the socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds, I demonstrated that external actors play a much more decisive role in the consolidation phase of Turkey’s third wave democratization and that their absence in the transition phase produced complex dynamics and structures within the state organs and provided elite-centered, Kemalistic and militaristic notions with enough room to maneuver within the body of politics. This has, eventually, led to an uneven modernization process in Turkey with a developed west and an underdeveloped east, an identity and rights crisis between the Kurds and the Turks, an incomplete democratization process in the sense that Turkey could not attain democratic consolidation in an efficient, comprehensive and factual manner on its own, and eventually to a hybrid democratic regime with all the procedural attributes of a functioning democracy but with little substantive output. In other words, this study argues that the more influence the EU exerts on Turkey, in terms of democratic consolidation, the better the welfare of the Kurds become, and, consequently, the more comprehensive Turkey’s democratization process becomes. Furthermore, Turkey’s formal application for EU membership in 1987 signifies Turkey’s consent on EU conditionality and willingness to hand over sovereignty, concerning the democratization process, to the EU so that Turkey would fulfill the requirements of the Copenhagen political criteria and reach the European levels of functioning democracy, which is a membership prerequisite. Therefore, the EU is the most eminent and influential external actor on Turkish consolidation and democratization process.

For that reason, it is accurate to assume that a conditionality-consent-reward based involvement of the external actors in democratization process would guarantee an enhanced form of democracy, where group or elite domination and determination is minimized, the rule of law is independent, socio-economic development is comprehensive, human (cultural) rights are respected, minorities are protected, and disparities reduced to smallest possible levels. Without the involvement of external actors or with partial involvement; elite domination remains intact, concealed authoritarian practices resurface, modernization and socio-economic development are dispersed, and democratization process is incomplete, as observed in Turkey.

As finding a definition for democracy is problematic so is to conduct a generalization of democratic transition/democratization processes in specific cases around the world since the very understanding and conceptualization of democracy and democratization entail social, cultural and historic elements that vary significantly between the circumstances, nations and peoples around the world. Nevertheless, conducting an organized and comprehensive study on a specific case serves as a step towards finding a cohesive definition and understanding of the concept, and as a stepping stone for further research in the fields of democracy and democratization studies. Examples of democratic transitions share various similarities and differences; hence, scrutinizing the differences are equally, if not more, important for the intellectual, comprehensive scrutiny as it is to observe the similarities. In that light, even though the Turkish democratization carries certain similarities with CEECs due to the involvement of the same, primary external actor, Turkey is a case of its own.
As mentioned before, democracy and the procedure countries go through to enhance it is an ongoing process, in other words transition from an autocratic to a democratic regime is not sufficient enough; popular participation in public affairs to establish an enhanced form of democratic governance is crucial. Even though democratization of Turkey was initiated in 1923 owing to the global political/ideological order with the birth of the new republic and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, transition did not take place until the early 1950s with the end of single party rule. Each phases of democratization has to be successfully completed in order to progress to the next stage, by doing so country’s not only avoid future crisis but also indoctrinate a democratic political culture within the society. The primary tool for change in the initiation phase is the introduction of extensive civic rights to overcome crisis of legitimacy with the autocratic system. In order to successfully complete the initiation phase a country has to grant more political rights and opportunities for political maneuvers to individuals and groups and abolish residual authoritarian practices. Forced assimilation and denial policies of the Kurds since the early years of the republic meant that this was not the case in Turkey; polarization and alienation within the society continued on to the consolidation phase.

Democratization and development are components of Modernization. Therefore, it could be presumed that a comprehensive and effective modernization process, where socio-economic and human rights disparities in a given country are reduced to a possible minimum level, would equally generate positive results for democratization process. The ultimate test of Turkish democracy lies with the compliance of EU conditionality and Copenhagen political criteria; as suggested by the European Commission Turkey’s democracy is not up to par with the European standards and needs further enhancement. This research indicates that Turkey’s democratic deficiency is ultimately rooted in the conception and prolongation of the Kurdish problem since the birth of the republic, and equally in the inability and deliberate disregard of the ruling-elite to find a peaceful and democratic solution to the problem. On the other hand, equally important, Turkey’s democratic deficiency is also rooted in the ambiguity and indecisiveness of the EU in its policies towards the Kurdish problem, democratization process, and possible membership of Turkey.

The ruling-elite have commenced consolidation without fully completing the transition phase of democratization. In order to speed up the transition phase the founding fathers of the republic adopted, and bequeathed, a system of forced assimilation and repression policies directed towards anyone who did not considered themselves ethnic Turks; the Kurds who have opposed this imposition with uprisings and revolts, and who have eventually formed opposition through political movements have been the main target of such policies. Instead of trying to find a solution to the problem by acknowledging the Kurdish existence and culture, the ruling elite opted to make culture with politics, denied the Kurdish existence and left the transition phase incomplete, carrying on with concealed authoritarian practices. Evidently, modernization process in the East and Southeast regions, where Kurds constitute the majority, has not been comprehensive and complete, which has led to the incompletion of the democratization process in Turkey in terms of implementation of different phases, with the very existence of the Kurdish problem at its core.

The republic of Turkey was established upon the notions of Kemalism, parenthetically Turkish nationalism. Kemalism incorporated elements of French-style civic nationalism with emphasis on the principle of citizenship and a
German-style ethnic nationalism based on territoriality principle. The course of modernization in Turkey was, hence, drawn by Kemalism. Kemalist ideology imagined a nation culturally assimilated, politically obedient and economically dependent on the state, and gave the decision making duty to the state elite, because of the perceptions that the nation lacked necessary maturity to decide on its own. For the Kemalist ideology modernization meant westernization and required a homogenous national identity with the will to (Western) civilization; however, raising opposition by the Kurds jeopardized the societal homogeneity and the completion of the process of modernization itself. National identity was shaped by the elite to facilitate and cope with the process of modernization rather than molding a process according to the demographic characteristics and needs of the nation. In order to speed-up the transition phase and to not put the process of modernization in jeopardy, the state adopted denial and forced assimilation policies towards the Kurds. Official doctrine, in a way, made modernization exclusive for the Turks; thus, Kurds were not able to benefit from modernization process in an equitable manner. As a result, East and Southeast regions where Kurds form the majority are socio-economically least developed regions of Turkey.

Incomplete modernization process opened the flood-gates for the incomplete democratization process. Furthermore, concealed authoritarianism obtained from the melange of Kemalism and Militarism, lack of democratic political culture, fear of change, socio-economic disparities and the Kurdish problem facilitated and prolonged the duration of incompletion of the democratization process. It has been previously argued that compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is considered to be the ultimate test of Turkey’s democracy; therefore, this research presumes the EU as the most important and effective external actor and EU conditionality as the most preeminent external factor for Turkish democratization. Furthermore, Turkey’s official application for membership in 1987 and consent to comply with the conditionality strengthens the hypothesis.

Conditionality is considered as one of the most prominent forms of linkage through which the external actors exert their influence and impact. Effectiveness of conditionality also depends on various factors, which shape the nature of conditionality. First and foremost, there has to be consent to acknowledge the importance of democratic pressures and conditionality, then definition of conditionality has to be unambiguous, and the reward has to be realistically attainable only after pre-conditions are successfully complied with. Conditionality is considered ineffective if its calculated costs exceed its calculated benefits for the hosting country. Throughout the history of the EU the process of candidacy has served as an important factor to promote consolidation of democracy in candidate countries. EU conditionality, which was considered to be crucial for membership, for example, has spurred significant political reforms in CEECs. When applying this theoretical framework to the case of Turkey, the analysis has two basic and correlated dimensions; firstly, the process of democratization in Turkey, and secondly, socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds. As discussed in detail, Turkey’s democratic regime has not completed transition and has not been adequately consolidated. As O’Donnell attests progression of Turkish democracy from a democratic government to a truly democratic regime in its 60 years history has not factually happened (O’Donnell, 1992: 18). Hence, the main problem with the Turkish democracy is the country’s inability to resolve its Kurdish problem. This is evident through the examination of substantive counts of Turkish democracy. Moreover, the empirical data has
shown that there is a positive correlation between the EU’s pressure on Turkey and improvements in the socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds as observed in the pre- and post-Helsinki periods.

In the pre-Helsinki period, EU’s influence was limited to the constitutional and legal dimensions of consolidation; EU was not involved directly and actively in the democratization process of Turkey and its leverage remained limited and modest in scope. Nevertheless, pressures exerted by the EU and the European Parliament generated some direct procedural impacts such as the legal amendments made to the Article 8 of the Turkish Penal Code. Evidently, substantive outcomes of such procedural levers only emerged in the post-Helsinki period, as observed through the socio-economic and cultural situation of the Kurds, where the EU exercised direct and active leverage in the Turkish democratization. Implemented reforms during the pre-Helsinki period were, thus, unmonitored. The EU did not have a specific conditionality mechanism prepared for Turkey; ambiguity of conditionality intermingled the carrot-stick and consent-reward dynamics boosted by the open-ended nature of the accession process. Therefore, it can be attested that EU conditionality lacked a certain degree of effectiveness during the pre-Helsinki period; hence, indicating that EU has been less effective during the period in question. Socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds were also inferior in the pre-Helsinki period and followed a similar path with degree of influence exerted by the EU.

Following the end of Cold War, EU’s priorities have changed so did the geostrategic importance of Turkey for the EU accordingly, owing to the major shifts in international politics. Newly independent East European states were prioritized and Turkey lost its traditional role in the eyes of the EU, and the EU-Turkey relations hit a pause. The Helsinki Summit, where Turkey officially became a candidate, was the turning point for EU-Turkey relations. From this point on, under the umbrella of pre-accession mechanism the EU was able to exert its active and direct leverage in Turkish politics. Amongst the most eminent political changes the EU asked Turkey to implement above all were minorities and Kurdish issues, which in particular generated heated opposition and discussions within the Turkish body of politics. Nevertheless, with the help of the EU and pro-EU elites, anti-EU groups and the Euro-skeptical sentiments were marginalized.

In the post-Helsinki era, EU conditionality has been more effective due to the fact that conditionality, foremost, gained procedural implementation mechanism. The EU closely monitored and assessed Turkey’s progress through the publication of annual progress reports where it voiced out the necessary reforms Turkey had to implement to satisfy political conditionality. In accordance, Turkey’s consent was rising and became evident when it declared the NPAA as the basis of its National Programme. Revolutionary political changes took place in Turkey since the recognition of the country as a member candidate in 1999; one of such changes was that the state, for the first time, officially recognized that some Muslim groups possessed a mother tongue other than Turkish and granted them the rights to broadcast in their mother tongues. In addition, languages other than Turkish, Kurdish for example, was allowed to be thought in private schools. These revolutionary steps were realized by a three-party coalition, of which ultra-nationalist MHP was also a part. Furthermore, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation established TRT 6 in 2009; its 24 hours a week broadcast is entirely in Kurdish. In accordance, socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation
of the Kurds were also superior in the post-Helsinki period, when compared to pre-Helsinki results.

Concerning the substantive outcomes of EU conditionality in Turkish democratization process, socio-economic and human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds in pre- and post-Helsinki period were scrutinized in this research. It is necessary and crucial to assess the realities on the ground once the institutional and procedural aspects of democratization are implemented. It has been noted that effectiveness of EU conditionality has been at its greatest since 1999 with the official recognition of Turkey as a member candidate. As attested before, Helsinki summit was a turning point in EU-Turkey relations since the formalities surrounding the Turkish membership were, at last, documented and systematized. This was a welcoming development in Turkey, increasing public support, and institutional compliance with the conditionality enabled the EU to utilize its active leverage in a more direct and effectual manner between 1999 and 2009. Even though the invasion of Iraq in 2003 scrambled the existing dynamics in the region, Turkey’s accession to the EU has always been linked to its sincerity and devotion to resolve the Kurdish problem in the light of socio-economic and cultural elements. This, to a great extent, was the reason behind Turkey’s prolonged and bumpy journey into the harbors of Europe.

In the light of empirical data gathered for this study, it can be said that developments observed in human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds produced short- and medium-term results, while the socio-economic indicators are expected to generate, mainly, long-term affects. Substantively, human (cultural) rights situation of the Kurds improved at a more rapid pace since the Helsinki summit in 1999 compared to the socio-economic development. Lack of studies conducted in socio-economic development at regional levels and insufficient data suggests that examining the socio-economic situation of the Kurds is a long-term endeavor; it may stretch as far as to Turkey’s full membership era and even further. Therefore, it is too soon to evaluate the real socio-economic impacts of EU conditionality on the Kurdish population. However, lack of regional socio-economic development programmes in pre-Helsinki period and a rapid increase of such programmes in the post-Helsinki period indicate that regional development has not been a priority incentive in Turkey until the Helsinki summit, and with EU induced and funded programmes and reforms discussed in detail in this study and signified as success stories. Therefore, it is argued that external f/actors due to various embedded and existing internal realities, such as exceeding to the consolidation phase of democratization without completing the transition phase foremost, concealed authoritarian practices, maintenance of and insistence on militarism, incomprehensive modernization and industrialization and consequently, incomplete democratization processes, are unable to considerably influence socio-economic development in short- or medium-terms in the countries of third wave democratization, going through consolidation phase. Nevertheless, procedural outcomes of EU conditionality have produced, almost immediate, short-term results, since prerequisites of candidacy required immediate procedural reforms.

In conclusion, it can be argued that external f/actors, in fact, play a more significant role in the democratization process than internal f/actors, precisely, in the consolidation phase of a multiethnic country where various underlying social, economic and ethnic issues remain systematized as a result of incomplete and incomprehensive transition phase, and democratization and modernization processes, as it was the case in Turkey. External f/actors exert their influence and
help generate substantive results more on the human (cultural) rights situation in the given case than they do on the socio-economic development.

Having said that, the EU and Turkey have a mutual responsibility to find a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish problem. The EU has to further monitor Turkey’s efforts to resolve the Kurdish issue and demand open, robust and substantive outcomes alongside procedural amendments. Moreover, Europe also has a historical responsibility towards the Kurds. While drawing the map of the Middle East, European powers disregarded the demographic and ethnic dynamics of the region and, after all, contributed to the creation of the current situation in the Kurdish regions. Europe has seen the Kurds of Turkey and the Kurds of Iraq in miscellaneous ways. The Kurds of Turkey were mainly seen through the eyes of Ankara as rebels or terrorists in a democratic/democratizing country; on the other hand, the Kurds of Iraq were sympathized as their interests mingled with those of the West in their opposition to the Baathist regime. One of the major failures of the EU to induce a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue is the inability or reluctance of the Union to address the issue as a separate subject matter with case specific analysis. Instead the EU seems to, also, use the Kurdish issue as a leverage instrument in the accession process of Turkey. As argued before, the EU is reluctant to have Turkey with its growing population as a member that would have a considerable amount of influence in the European Parliament. The EU is also reluctant to have its boarders stretch towards the Middle-East, primarily towards Iran, Iraq and Syria, a highly militarized and unstable region, a possibility Europe has to take in hand with the full membership of Turkey. This intense climate may lead the European powers to seek different solutions, including the utilization of a buffer-zone to overcome the dilemma in the foreseeable future. This dilemma has created conflicting and opposing views amongst the European institutions in regards Kurdish problem in Turkey. While the European Commission, Europe’s leading political organ, prefers to not mention the words, “Kurd”, “Kurdish” or “Kurdistan” and fudges the Kurdish issue, the European Parliament directly addresses the issue by urging Turkey to find “a comprehensive solution for the aspirations and problems of the Kurdish population including Constitutional provisions on cultural rights.”\footnote{Europarl, News Report, “Turkey: yes to negotiations but no guarantee of membership Brussels”, 20 November 2004} The Council of Europe, lesser bound by political constrains than the EC, also freely and openly refers to the “Kurdish question” and allocates an entire section on the issue in a report published in 2004.\footnote{Council of Europe (COE), Parliamentary Assembly, “Turkey: Explanatory Memorandum by the Co-rapporteurs, Mrs. Mandy Delvaux-Stehres and Mr. Luc Van den Brande”, March 2004, pp38-46} Regardless of the outcome of Turkey’s EU membership and EU’s role in Turkish democratization process and in enhancing the situation of the Kurds, it is evident that with their growing population, distinct ethnic origin, resource rich lands, especially in terms of water and oil supplies, and geostrategic position Kurds are starting to become the ultimate alternative choice and go-to actors of the Middle-East, under the inquisitive eyes of many power players, in the foreseeable future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


EU Delegation to Turkey, “EU Funding in Turkey”, Available at: http://www.avrupa.info.tr/AB_Mali_Destegi/AB_Program_Bilgileri,Abprojeleri.html?pageindex=3

--------. (1994a) “The Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession”, COM (94) 320 final.


--------. (1994c) “Follow up to Commission Communication on the Europe Agreements and Beyond: A Strategy to Prepare the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Accession”, COM (94) 361 final.


--------. (1994a) “Resolution on the Trial of Members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly”, B4-O111, 0145 and 0154/94.

--------. (1994b) “Resolution on the Trial of Turkish Members of Kurdish Origin of the Turkish Grand National Assembly”, B4-0515.


216


Lerner, D. (1964) The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle


University Press.


