Part III

1. Testing Different Linkages: The Leverage of International *Non*-Governmental-Organizations against International Governmental-Organizations

1.1. Introduction: Which Kinds of International Organizations (IOs) Accelerate the Reduction of Child Labor Rates?

This part is a global panel study addressing the question of which kinds of international organizations (IOs) in a country accelerated the reduction of child labor rates from 1960 to 1990. As the previous section shows, international organizational (IO) linkages have a significant effect concerning how fast child labor rates are reduced. This section will investigate if international governmental (IGOs) or non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have the stronger, significant impact on reducing the human rights violation child labor. Since IGOs command many more resources in general, one might surmise that these organizations might be more effective than INGOs. I show that but the reverse is true. This finding addresses several leading theories.

Despite the long and intensive debate about the development and democratization potentials of INGOs in the literature, no study documents the effects of INGOs on upholding human rights beyond scattered case studies. These case studies do not document or explain the sweeping change that has occurred in the area of human rights (the neglect of the overall phenomena is a broader problem in the organizations field, see Scott & Meyer 1983). Country case studies are not appropriate to allow for globally valid conclusions (Meyer & Hannan 1979). The first aim of this chapter is thus a global evaluation of the effectiveness of INGOs versus IGOS.

I analyze the effectiveness of INGOs in contrast to IGOs for the human rights violation *child labor* for two reasons. First, child labor, as defined in the Child Labor Convention (C138) of the International Labor Organization (ILO) of 1973, is an instance of a core labor standard violation and thus a human rights offense. Second, child labor is portrayed as an especially difficult human rights problem to tackle for many Third World countries. Third World countries often argue child labor is not primarily a political but an economic problem. According to this argument, ending child labor thus essentially lies beyond the reach of political will—in contrast to many political or civil human rights, e.g. the freedom of speech. Rather, chiefly economic development is believed to be capable of eradicating it. Examining the net effects of INGOs on the child labor reduction rates in all countries over a time span of 30 years is thus a difficult test of the claims in the development literature about the potential of INGOs.

The second aim of this chapter is to contribute to the world society and social movement literature. As I have shown above, ratifying the convention banning child labor has no significant effect on the reduction rates of working children in a country. Nonetheless, child labor rates drop sharply worldwide. The more international organizations a country belongs to, the stronger this trend is accelerated. This chapter seeks to isolate the organizational linkages responsible for this development.

As argued in part II, international organizations (IOs) are a mechanism of "normative isomorphism" (Powell & DiMaggio 1991a: 67). As shown above, the rights of the child were already internationally proclaimed in 1924 and confirmed in 1959. The right to basic education was already defined as a human right in the Human Rights Declaration of the UN (see part I, section 4.2). Child labor was surmised to displace education. In the 70s, child labor itself, not just its substitution effect, was defined as a violation on an international level that no legitimate nation state should tolerate. World Society Theory argues IOs provide a connection to the international World Society that has de-legitimized child labor. These links provide venues facilitating the isomorphic effects of the world-wide reduction of child labor. Research in the tradi-

tion of the World Society has shown that INGOs are embodiments of "universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, progress, and world citizenship" (Boli & Thomas 1999).

This theory thus implies that Non-Governmental associations and actors, as *indicators* and *proponents* of a universal individualism, should have a strong isomorphic effect. To uphold the concept of an individual with individual rights is an important tool against child labor. Historically and traditionally the child was seen as a part of the family that had to contribute to the family well-being as a whole (e.g. by working) with no individual claims to education or other activities defined as "rights" today. This has also been true for the West. As a State Senator from Delaware County stated in 1891 in opposition to compulsory schooling: "Education is a good thing but we do not want to employ people to go around to penetrate into the sanctity of a man's home and take his child out and compel it to be sent to school" (Speakman 1976). Today parents are not given the right to keep their children at home; in 1980, 80% of the countries world-wide had compulsory mass education (Ramirez 1989). Nonetheless, there is still a prevalent attitude in many Third World countries that "all family members are economic providers and that work prepares children for assuming adult roles" as Salazar (1998: 20) put it for Latin America.

INGOs can put the notion that children are individual right bearers into effect by autonomous, collateral, and penetrative authority (for the distinction see Boli 1999). By espousing that children have the individual *right* to secure their *own* future by going to school instead of contributing to the family income (schooling typically raises future earnings, see Ravallion & Wodon 1999:2), INGOs being present in a country should cause child labor to fall.

Also a different kind of literature, the social movement literature, especially the Political Process Model (PPM), provides a tentative answer why INGOs may cause child labor to drop. In accordance with this social movement literature, I will argue that *INGOs as embodiments of a social movement*—or "the social movement of civil society" as Altvater (1997: 551) refers to NGOs—provide more significant effects for reducing child labor than IGOs. In

the US-American social movement literature, there is an emerging consensus that social movement organizations are valid indicators for social movements (Ferree 1992, McAdam 1982, McCarthy & Zald 1976, 1973) at least in regard to the professional sociopolitical movements of concern here. Taking the density of INGOs as the indicator for the strength of a social movement is thus a feasible and legitimate route.

As outlined above (part I, section 3.2.5.4.2.), the governments of many developing countries argue that enforcing labor standards would hamper both their economic growth and international competitiveness. In multilateral governmental organizations they use their voice to impede the integration of labor standards into the agenda of governmental organizations. For example, in Seattle the developing countries voted against integrating the theme „Social Standards" into the WTO (see also Greven und Scherrer 1998, Liemt 1989, Windfuhr 1996 for attitudes of the Developing Countries on this). Although belonging to IGOs, e.g. the UN, embeds countries in an institutional context that de-legitimizes child labor, IGOs are still required to respect the sovereignty of their member states according to their own charters. INGOs are not. This principle of sovereignty has fostered an institutional mentality of not risking an open confrontation with member states. A UN expert who has worked on several missions on different continents expressed the following view:

During my work in Bosnia and Sri Lanka for various UN and UN mandated international organizations I became convinced that the frequently lenient approach of many UN organizations was not so much a problem of institutional constraints, but one of institutional mentality. The projects of several UN agencies are often no more than glossy PR gags aimed at not stepping on anybody's toes. . . . There might also be a weak generational aspect to the problem, too. Some of the older officials socialized to the system during the cold war, tend to be more markedly passive. (Kristóf Dávid Gosztonyi, Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina , Feb. 1. 02)

INGOs do not have any stipulations stating the need to respect the sovereignty of nations and get involved with internal affairs, i.e. labor standards, and may therefore have another institutional mentality. They also lack governmental representatives of developing countries in their ranks. For these reasons INGOs may be able to provide the "radical flank" (McAdam et al. 1996), as it is termed in the PPM literature, for progressive efforts of both external (the more progressive currents inside the IGOs) and internal (national) actors. INGOs can publicize violations, demonstrate, and "rock the system" more easily than IGOs and thus attain the "success of the unruly" (Gamson 1997a: 95, see also Tronto 1991).

The next discussion focuses on the debate about the effectiveness of INGOs and their international accreditation, the social movement literature, and lastly the problem of "casing" INGOs as a social movement before turning to my hypotheses and results.

1.2. (I)NGOs: Harbinger of Social Progress?

The increasing economic globalization has prompted a renewed interest in finding ways to protect social human rights. NGOs are increasingly portrayed as an important actor to achieve this goal. I will use the term NGO and INGO interchangeably since strictly speaking, as this part will show, most NGOs are actually INGOs, since both largely have ideological or funding bases with international donors (see also Neubert 1994, 1997).

Beginning with the Schneider Report in the middle of the 80s, NGOs were increasingly seen as everything that is desirable in a developmental perspective (Hanish 1994). The Brundtland Report[67] in 1987 further heightened expectations: (I) NGOs were to be the backbone of unbureaucratic help for democratic and sustainable development (Fischer 1993, Bruckmeier 1997, 1994) as well as part of a new base-democratic, global governance (Brand &

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67 The Brundlandt Report had argued: "Immer mehr Probleme von Umwelt und Entwicklung können ohne sie (the NGOs, comment of the author) nicht in Angriff genommen werden" (Translation: More and more environmental and development problems cannot be tackled without them. (WCED 1998: 322, in: Wahl 1 998).

Görg 1998, Altvater et al. 1996, Altvater & Mahnkopf 1996, Commission on Global Governance 1995, Clark 1991). NGOs are praised as the "harbinger" of the "international civil society" (Kößler und Melber 1993) and the "civil coordination and democratization of the world system" (Giddens 1997: 183).

IGOs such as the United Nations Organization (UNO) as well as governmental donor agencies began to see NGOs as potential co-operation partners in the quest to promote development. The Brundtland Report led to a further accreditation of NGOs by the UNO (Wahl 1998). U.S. Aid for International Development (USAID 1995) advocates the involvement of NGOs to support development processes and transitions to democracy. In a similar vein, the German development agency, the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), augmented their focus to include political themes and to promote non-governmental actors and groups (Diaby-Pentzlin 1998).

However, the doubts are growing whether many - or any - of the ten thousands of NGOs worldwide, fulfill these high expectations (Hanisch 1994). Empirical studies of NGOs cast a less favorable light on their work (Freyhold 1998, Wahl 1998, Elwert 1997, Bierschenk et al. 1993: 17, Neubert 1997, 1994), while other authors warn that simply too much is demanded of NGOs (Nohlen & Nuschler 1993). Freyhold (1998) comments on the frequently problematic relationships between different NGOs, especially North- and South-NGOs, while Wahl (1998) notes the undemocratic structures. Elwert (1997) points out the opportunism many allegedly ideologically committed groups display, and Bierschenk et al. (1993: 17) argue that NGOs are likely to accommodate to a corrupted environment by also becoming "buyable."

Neubert's (1994, 1997) study contrasts the socio-romantic visions of NGOs with the reality of existing organizations found in Rwanda and Kenya. He comes to the following conclusions: (1) instead of being civil society's "watchdog", the organizations had an apolitical attitude; (2) instead of instigating change, socio-political influence was negligible; (3) instead of being base-democratic and demand-driven (i.e., by the needs of the local population) idealistic organizations, they were supply-driven (i.e., by donor money) profes-

sional consulting agencies; (4) instead of being supported by the local population, their real base of support was almost exclusively in the First World.

Especially since the 80, due to the attention and funding devoted to NGOs, their numbers have increased dramatically (Boli & Thomas 1999).

Figure 6: Development of Child Labour in Three Decades

Mean of Memberships in International Organisations per Country
1968 - 1995

Do NGOs make a difference concerning the state of labor standards in a country? I will argue that they do. The literature best explaining why they have an effect is the social movement and the world society literature. In the following section, I will briefly discuss the social movement literature to preface the latter hypotheses. Since the world society angle was already elaborated in part II, I will not discuss this literature again in detail.

2. Social movement literature review

The next two sections briefly identify key players and describe influential historical philosophies of social movements theory. The classical writers focused upon include: Weber, Michels, Engels, and Marx, as well as Durkheim and LeBon (section 2.1.) in addition to the modern authors Park, Mühlmann, Parsons, and Smelser (section 2.2.).[68] This discussion is meant to provide a basis for the comparison with the recent social movement theories and conceptualizations discussed in the later sections and should also pave the way for the concluding hypothesis construction.

2.1. The Classical Theorists: Weber, Michels, Engels, Marx, Durkheim, and LeBon

Social movements resemble Weber's concept of charismatic rule.[69] In his discussion of the three types of legitimate rule, Weber describes the progression of such out-of-the-ordinary collective action. The period of pure charismatic rule is characterized by its detachment from the fiscal economy and a revolution of the attitudes and values of the followers: there are no hierarchies, no areas of competency, and economic rationality is abandoned (Weber 1972: 142f). However, in the long run, the need of the charismatic leader to prove himself by providing a material base for his following as well as a successor leads to an adaptation of the charismatic rule to everyday life (Veralltäglichung). The first step is to conform to the fiscal economy, which leads

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68 The grouping is somewhat unorthodox because the term "modern sociologists" most often refers to post World War II authors and would thus exclude Park. However, since Park belongs to a later generation than the "classical authors" and because he is the designated "father" of the contemporary study of collective behavior - as I will explain - the classification of a "modern vs. classical" writers seems most appropriate to me.

69 Weber (1972: 140) defines charisma as follows: " 'Charisma' soll eine als außeralltäglich . . . geltende Qualität einer Persönlichkeit heißen, um derentwillen sie als mit übernatürlichen oder übermenschlichen oder mindestens spezifisch außeralltäglichen, nicht jedem anderen zugänglichen Kräften oder Eigenschaften [begabt] oder als gottgesandt oder als vorbildlich und deshalb als 'Führer' gewertet wird" (emphasis in the original). Weber's (1972) charisma has parallels to Durkheim's concept of mana (Durkheim 1994).

to a creeping bureaucratization (Weber 1972: 144).[70] The original detachment of the charismatic from the ordinary bureaucratic or traditional rule is successively abandoned in favor of a well-functioning hierarchical, specialized bureaucracy, the leadership of which is often legitimized by heredity (Erbcharisma).

Michels (1949) sees the hierarchization of movements as more pronounced than Weber (1972) and has proclaimed the "Iron Law of Oligarchy" according to which all organizations invariably come under the rule of small cliques of bureaucrats who run them selfishly. Examining political parties, Michels (1949: 365) finds the "oligarchical disease" of democratic parties incurable - also in the case of the socialist parties that emerged from the once revolutionary socialist movement with an egalitarian pretension.[71]

Marx and Engels (1968) forecast the course of insurgency differently. In the long run, they forecast the gradual demise of the state. Engels and Marx advocate a class-based, economic approach to explain and predict the types and aims of social protests and the functions of the state. In Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staates, Engels (1968: 266) prophesizes the fall of the state.[72] According to Engels and Marx (1960), history progresses from an ancient form of communism to a classless end-communism through several periods (the slave-holding, feudal, capitalist, and socialist society) via class struggles and the necessary revolutions determined by the contra-

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70 "Mit der Veralltäglichung des Charisma aus dem Motiv der Nachfolgerbeschaffung parallel gehen die Veralltäglichungsinteressen des Verwaltungstabes" because the "Masse der Jünger will ihr Leben auch (auf die Dauer) materiell aus dem 'Beruf' machen" (Weber 1972: 144f, emphasis in the original).

71 The seldom mentioned but almost more interesting prediction of Michels (1949) than the inevitable oligarchization is that in the long run organizations abandon their goals: "from a means, organization becomes an end" (Michels 1949: 373) interested only in its own maintenance. Thus "the hatred of the party is directed, not in the first place against the opponents of its own view of the world order, but against the dreaded rivals in the political field, against those who are competing for the same end - power" (Michels 1949: 375).

72 "Wir nähern uns jetzt mit raschen Schritten einer Entwicklungsstufe der Produktion, auf der das Dasein dieser Klassen nicht nur aufgehört hat, eine Notwendigkeit zu sein, sondern ein positives Hindernis der Produktion wird. Sie werden fallen, ebenso unvermeidlich, wie sie früher entstanden sind. Mit ihnen fällt auch der Staat." (Engels 1968:266)

dictions "the exploited" and "exploiters."[73] The revolution of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is the next step (Marx & Engels 1960). A necessary precondition was that the mass of the proletariat had to transmute from an objective class ("Klasse an sich") to a subjectively felt class ("Klasse für sich") through the guidance of the communist vanguard.[74] Marxism-Leninism does not merely see leaders as tools of the "List der Vernunft," i.e., not as executioners of historical laws as Hegel had, but as organized actors of historical change. According to Marx, the actual revolutionaries belonged to the increasingly impoverished industrial proletariat (theory of the pauperization) which had nothing more to lose than their chains. As Marx suggests in his 1944 Manuscripts (1981), he sees social mass movements as a social solution to individual anguish - that is a justified and in many ways rational quest for a better life.

Durkheim does not see social movement participation limited to a certain deprived class or as a consequence of outdated relations of production or as a sagacious act. Instead, he and scholars in "his tradition," like Parsons and Smelser, interpret movements as general, not class-based, somewhat irrational reactions against excessively rapid, dislocating changes executed by politically strained individuals. Durkheim (1952: 382) argues that the dislocations and social insecurities brought about by the rapid industrialization produce anomie, which "indeed springs from the lack of collective forces at certain points in society." Anomie motivates individuals to join social movements because collective action forges new social connections and serves as an outlet of anxiety. This train of thought can be exemplified by the antidote Durkheim prescribes against suicide: Stopping the increasing rate of egoistic and anomic suicide can be accomplished, in part, by joining compact voluntary associations (Durkheim 1952). Movements are accordingly conceptualized as an

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73 Marx's understanding of social movements has its roots in the enlightenment. Following the German idealist Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Marx sees history as a dialectical progression. In contrast to Hegel, however, Marx does not see the monarchical law-state / nicht constitutional monarchy as the perfect state at the end of this progression.

74 The theory of the vanguard was later embellished by Lenin, the proponent of the main strand of Marxism, into the theory of a "party of a new type."

amalgamation of such "self-help" associations rather than as potent political actors (Barkan 1984). Following Durkheim (1983, 1952), macro-sociological theory traditionally tends to see major sociological events as consequences of underlying social structures and forces, producing psychological strain that needs to be vented through social action. This view of social movements is thus labeled psycho-functional (McAdam 1982).

Besides the more sociological approaches presented above, psychological concepts of collective action have also influenced sociological theory. Gustave LeBon in France, Sigmund Freud[75] in Vienna, and Pasqual Rossi as well as Scipio Sigphele in Italy diagnosed mass action - labeled as "mass psychology," "crowd psychology," "group psychology," or "collective psychology" - as characterized by irrationality and abnormality (Turner & Killian 1993: 6). Of these theories, LeBon's famous "mass psychology"[76] exerted a strong influence on the sociologist Michels (1949)[77]; as well as on the theory of the mass-society associated most prominently with Hanna Arendt (1961)[78], and on the structure-functionalist collective behavior research of the US-Americans Talcott Parsons et al. (1961) and Neil Smelser (1963). The popular press also frequently recurs on LeBonian interpretations; a striking example being the early interpretation of the student protests in the 60s as mass psychosis (Brand 1998). The theoretical tradition emerging from LeBon was labeled as contagion theories by Turner and Killian (1993: 7) because they hold the common

75 These contemporaries, of course, also influenced each other. The influence of Freud, for example, is already noticeable in the terminology (e.g., subconscious). Freud also had a very negative view of crowds, describing them as possessed by a "thousand demons" (Turner & Killian 1993).

76 According to LeBon (1912: 17), "die Hauptmerkmale des in der Masse befindlichen Individuums sind Schwund der bewußten Persönlichkeit, Vorherrschaft der unbewußten Persönlichkeit, Orientierung der Gefühle und Gedanken in der selben Richtung durch Suggestion und Ansteckung, Tendenz zur unverzüglichen Verwirklichung der suggerierten Ideen. Das Individuum ist nicht mehr es selbst, es ist ein willenloser Automat geworden."

77 Michels (1949: 205f) - approvingly citing the same passage of LeBon (1912) - sees the irrationality of the masses as a striking reason why they need leaders although the introduction of leaders in the long run inevitably leads to oligarchization according to Michels (1949) and as described above.

78 For Hannah Arendt the "atomization" and alienation in mass society enabled the totalitarian regimes to mobilize their citizens.

assumption that crowd behavior is characterized by "special psychological mechanisms whereby moods, attitudes, and behavior are communicated rapidly and accepted uncritically".

2.2. The Modern Classics: Park, LeBon, Parsons, Smelser, and Mühlmann

A generation later, Robert Park in the USA founded the field called "collective behavior." Park described the actors of collective behavior as initiators of political change, observing about the Crusades and the French Revolution that "crowd movements played a double role here – they were the forces which dealt the final blow to old, existing institutions, and they introduced the spirit of the new ones" (quoted in: Turner & Killian 1993:6).

In many respects, Parsons stands less in the tradition of Park than of the classical European sociologists. It was perhaps Durkheimian thinking which exerted the strongest influence on Parsons (Habermas 1995). According to Parsons (Parsons et al. 1961:75), the "generalized beliefs" guiding action in social movements have an "irrational" or even "magical" character "organized along the major axes of hope and fear, of 'wishful thinking' and 'anxiety' showing unrealistic trends in both respects." After the Parsonian school of sociology (normative functionalism) gained widespread allegiance in the first two decades following World War II, a person not conforming to the norms of society was labeled as "deviant," and deviance was explained via psychological deficits (Foweraker 1995). The focus of sociology was on the patterns maintaining, rather than transforming society according to Brand (1998), Foweraker (1995), Touraine (1985), and McAdam (1982).

Parsons's colleague Smelser (1963), developed a social-structural explanation derived from Parsons's general theory of social action and was explicitly concerned with The Theory of Collective Behavior, as is titled of one of his books, towards which he had a similarly negative view as Parsons. He (1993) describes, "adherents to such movements exaggerate reality because their action is based on beliefs which are both generalized and short-circuited. .

. . This gives collective behavior its clumsy or primitive character" (Smelser 1993: 25, emphasis in original). The school of the psycho-functional perspective in the sociological tradition of Durkheim, Parsons, and Smelser is variously referred to as convergence theory (by Turner & Killian 1987), the hearts and minds approach (by Leites & Wolf 1970), and the breakdown theory (by Tilly 1975).

Mühlmann - to locate him in these rivaling theories - has a somewhat eclectic approach. He positions himself in the tradition of Weber, using Weberian terminology (e.g., charisma), but shares the Marxian assumption that the deprived and humiliated - in his case colonized ethnicities - are the bearers of movements. He also exhibits many parallels to the psycho-functional approach of Durkheim, Parsons, and Smelser, seeing the structural strain and anomie? of beginning industrialism as a "Nährboden für chiliastische[79] Hoffnungen" (fertile ground for chiliastic hopes, translation of the author) and ultimately nativist[80] movements. He does not, however, succumb to the psychological reductionism of LeBon, whose contagion theory he rejects. Mühlmann (1964:363), furthermore, describes the potential actors of these nativist movements as propelled by inferiority complexes and the (psychological) disorientation resulting from the confrontation with a superior culture.[81] The confrontation gives the indigenous person such a plurality of conflicting impressions that his nerves are strained. In this psychological condition, so Mühlmann (1964) believes, the individual has a propensity[82] to join chiliastic movements, which in the later phases become institutions, more specifically sects or churches. In

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79 According to the Duden's dictionary of foreign words, "chiliamus" is the teaching of the 1000-year long rule of Christ prophesied in the Bible. Mühlmann, however, uses the term more generally for end-time fantasies.

80 Mühlmann (1964: V) defines nativism as "kollektiven Aktionsverlauf, der von dem Drang getragen ist, ein durch überlegene Fremdkultur erschüttertes Gruppen-Gefühl wieder herzustellen durch massives Demonstrieren eines eigenen Beitrages."

81 "Der Zusammenstoß mit der überlegenen Zivilisation der Weißen erzeugt Minderwertigkeitsgefühle der 'Müdigkeit' (so vielfach bei den Indianern), die dann kosmologisch projiziert werden, so daß man sagt: die Welt wird alt, die Welt nähert sich dem Ende." Mühlmann (1964: 363)

82 "Propensity" because other factors such as a prophecy must also be present.

an almost Durkheimian way, the reasons for movement participation are more of a psychological self-help nature than of rational calculation.

Touraine (1985: 752) terms the type of activity Mühlmann describes as the "reconstruction of a social, cultural, or political identity" and sees it as only one kind of social movement among others. Indeed, in the decade Mühlmann was writing, "new" types of social movements emerged, triggering a paradigm change.

The proliferation of new social movements in the 60s throughout the Western world led to a paradigm change in the explanation of social action. Many theorists came to the conclusion that "the 'psychological reductionism' of the Durkheimian tradition of collective action did not explain the witnessed mass participation in collective action" (Foweraker 1995:9, see also Offe 1985). Mass mobilization was seen less as a psycho-functional response to strain or a contagious irrationality than increasingly as a legitimate "part of the normal mode of political expression" (Rochon 1990:229). The economic determinism of Marxism also lost credibility because it was not the proletariat fighting for the possession of the means of production (Jaquette 1989), or some other disadvantaged group (Rochon 1990) organizing in the case of the new social movements. The primary focus was on so-called "non-material" goods such as peace or a cleaner environment, as in the case of the peace or environmental movements, or deconstructing and essentializing gender concepts and the right to abortion, as in the case of the second women's movement (Foweraker 1995, Melucci 1989, Offe 1985, Touraine 1985). The primary actors of the new movements were mostly from a middle class background and not from the pauperized masses, as Marx would have proposed (Rucht 1994, Offe 1985, Kitschelt 1985, Brand 1985). This kindled a new interest in resistance movements in the political left, and gave rise to new paradigms in social movement theory: the New Social Movement Theory in Europe as well as the Resource Mobilization Theory and the Political Process Model in the USA (Jaquette 1989).

2.3. New Social Movement Theory (NSMT): Changing Values

New Social Movement Theory (NSMT) is a theory about the aims and ideologies of the new social movements that emerged in the 60s. The term "new social movements" presupposes an "old movement." The point of reference for MSMT-scholars analyzing collective social action is the "old" labor movement. This is especially true for European scholars, since the labor movement in Europe was much stronger and more significant than in the USA in forging social welfare institutions such as unemployment insurance, pension funds, and universal health care. According to Foweraker (1995), the "old social movement," i.e., the labor movement, aimed primarily at raising the material living standard of its constituency (for a criticism of this view see below).

In contrast, the new social movements like the peace, the green (ecology), the second women's, and the anti-nuclear movement in Europe and the second women's, the civil rights, and the anti-war movement in the USA, aimed at transforming the "lifeworld" of modern societies. The rationale for these movements was dissatisfaction with modern life consumerism (Hirschman 1970, 1984) and rationality (Brand 1998, Foweraker 1995, Habermas 1995). The term "lifeworld" (Lebenswelt) was coined by Habermas (1995) in the effort to distinguish it from the "system" (System), which is ruled by rational actors trying to maximize their benefits. According to Habermas (1995), the rationality of the system is increasingly infringing upon the lifeworld. The social movements emerging during the 60s were a defensive measure against what he terms the increasing colonization of this lifeworld.

Hirschman (1970, 1984) echoes Habermas's claim about the increasing dissatisfaction with modern life consumerism and rationality. Arguing that most theories of social movement focus on exogenous factors such as the easing of repression, he examines endogenous reasons for the periodic nature of widespread, iterative collective action. He advocates a cyclical nature of public protest arguing that citizens oscillate between private interest and public

engagement because one is as disappointing[83] as the other over time (Hirschman 1984:18).[84] This argument, despite being intuitively comprehensible, contradicts the assumptions on which neoclassical models build, i.e., that preferences are fixed, in favor of arguing for a cyclical change of preferences and pointing out that there are different types of preferences (see Sen 1977). According to Hirschman (1984), the insurgence in the 60s, occurring after a time of relative wealth, was because people changed their preferences and desired public engagement. Hirschman (1984) maintains that they were disappointed due to (1) the promised - but not attained - satisfaction of consumer goods, especially those with longevity like refrigerators; or/and (2) because, as Kant and Shaw, maintain it is in the "nature" of man never to be satisfied with what he has; or/and (3) out of boredom resulting from the systematic under-engagement by elections. The consumption of services – a phenomenon that is increasingly common in the "post-industrial societies" (Bell 1974) – is even more fraught with disappointments than the acquisition of consumer goods because the range of quality is wide and the consumer is potentially at fault if the service is unsatisfactory, e.g., the therapy is unsuccessful. In such a state of diffuse boredom and unhappiness only a trigger - such as the Vietnam war - is needed to change the level of political activism. Once publicly participating, the engaged activists discover that activism is much more time-consuming than originally supposed, and the goal is more difficult to accomplish than envisioned. Furthermore, they become aware of the increasing marginal opportunity costs, or realize that the movement has developed an undesirable self-dynamic (see Mühlmann 1964 for an account of undesirable self-dynamics) - and again retreat into private life.

In contrast to the tradition of LeBon, Hirschman does not see movement participants as irrational automatons but rather as reasonable, de-

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83 The German word for disappointment (Enttäuschung) is telling because it literally means to be "de-deceived" that is the high hopes - hope being a fundamental principle of action as Bloch (1959) has pointed out -are confronted with the less pleasant reality.

84"Meine Kernthese ist leicht formuliert: Handlungen des Konsums, wie ebenso Handlungen politischer Beteiligungen, die um ihres erwarteten Befriedigungswerts unternommen werden, resultieren auch in Enttäuschung und Frustration" (Hirschman 1984:18).

manding pleasure-seekers. In contrast to Mühlmann, Durkheim, and Marx, the causes of action are not seen in structural strain, suppression, or deprivation, respectively, but, on the contrary, in the over-abundance and resulting boredom in the safe Western societies. Hirschman's thesis draws its plausibility through his assertion that there is a high correlation between political participation and socio-economic status. Many social movement scholars confirm this assertion and see the (new) middle-class as carriers of the social movements (Rucht 1994, Kitschelt 1985, Brand 1985).[85]

A deficit of Hirschman's approach is that to a large extent he simply equates the goals and means of participants, which are the utility and costs of movement members. He does not explain which individuals join or stay active in a movement. The goal (material gain for example) of the movement is portrayed as being only secondary (see especially 1984, 90ff). The assumed primary goal is self-fulfillment through participation. According to Hirschman (1970, 1984), social movements often represent the search for solidarity, values, primary relations, and community rather than the quest for a certain goal.

These non-material objectives are part of a general change of perspective of what constitutes a good life. Ingelhart (1977) first popularized this alleged shift in the population's perspectives from material to post-material values. According to Inglehart (1977, 1989: 136), material values, such as income, lost importance as non-material values, such as the desire for community, self-realization, personal rather than professional satisfaction, and a clean environment, gained sway. The shift has occurred in relative, but not absolute numbers - though some scholars (Foweraker 1995, Roth 1994) have falsely interpreted Inglehart's meaning that an increasing minority has post-materialist values. The economic and technical development; a distinctive cohort experience (absence of total war); the rising level of education; and the expansion of

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85 Recent scholars such as Roth, Hülsberg, Brand et al., and Kriesi however, indicate that the social composition of the new social movements is more diverse than any class based approaches suggest (Steinmetz 1 994), supporting Offe (1985), who saw at least three different carriers of the new social movements. These are the old and new middle class as well as the economically peripheralized (decommodified strata), such as the un- and underemployed as well as housewives and students. This does not seriously questions Hirschman's thesis, though, since these strata also have access to consumer goods in Western society.

mass communications have led to a salience of life-style issues, a decline of class conflict, changes in support for national institutions, and a "rise of elite-challenging issue-oriented groups" (Inglehart 1977:5). The groups constitute the "new" (post-World War II), post-materialist social movements according to Inglehart (ibid.). In his latest book, Inglehart (1997) even argues that in these countries the shift from material to post-material values is part of an even greater shift from modern to postmodern values. The latter values de-emphasize both religious and legal authority, thus leading to a more "permissive" attitude towards abortion, divorce, prostitution, etc. He (1997) only predicts and observes this revolution of values in countries in which the population has a great sense of security, i.e. predominantly Western welfare states.

Brand (1998:68) likewise argues that the movement discourse changed its focus from "abstract political and economic connection to the subjectivity of every day life." Offe (1985) rightly points out that these issues are not new but have attained a stronger emphasis and urgency within the new social movements. This accent was, in part, due to the popularity of the post-structuralist criticism of society in which the societal order was seen as a subliminal force, which the individual could not escape through revolution but only through subversion (Brand 1998).

The most prominent post-structuralist figure is Foucault (1978-1986, 1982, 1977), who argues that the individual is a social construction and hence has no given human nature that needs to be liberated from repression.[86] An optimistic interpretation of Foucault suggests that although individuals exist with given regimes of power and knowledge, they can still have their own experiences, reasoning, and adaptation of beliefs.

The French sociologist Touraine (1977, 1985) draws on Foucault. According to Touraine (1985: 778), industrial society saw a conflict over distribution, while contemporary post-industrial society spawns cultural conflicts

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86 In Discipline and Punish (Jahreszahl), he examines how power works on the body through external controls via the incorporation into prisons, schools, factories, hospitals, etc. In his History of Sexuality (Jahreszahl), he shows how individuals police themselves by regulating and confessing their thoughts and behavior according to a concept of "normality."

about historicity, i.e., "the capacity to produce an historical experience through cultural patterns, that is a new definition of nature and man". In contrast, up the present the available definitions were "limited by what I call 'metasocial guarantees of social order.' . . . All social movements, at same time as they were defining stakes and enemies, were referring to a metasocial principle which was called the order of things, divine rule, natural law, or historical evolution. . . . . In our times, we feel that our capacity for self-production, self-transformation, and self-destruction is boundless." This boundless historicity is due to the "death of the subject" proclaimed by postmodernists, especially Lyotard (God had already died in Nietzsche's writings). The changing of focus of the new social movements is also prompted by the fact that the working class does not need to seize control to due to the capacity of the production and information structures to impregnate the culture with the viewpoint of the worker (Touraine 1986:24). The goal of the new social movements is thus not to control the state but their own authentic communication, as well as to promote democracy and human rights according to Touraine. The meaning of social movements can hence only be understood through action that is normatively oriented; the central theme of conflict of all new social movements being anti-technocratism (Touraine 1988).

The Italian Melucci (1989, 1985, 1980) also sees the anti-technocratic conflict as the focal point of the new social movements and even further stresses their non-material, ideational component: "Contemporary social movements, more than others in the past, have shifted towards a non-political terrain: the need for self-realization in everyday life." In an effort to combat the increasing informal control and manipulation (described so vividly by Foucault), social movements invent their own cultural codes and life-styles in counter-cultural, submerged networks.

German authors echo their French and Italian colleagues concerning the identity and anti-technocratic focus of the new social movements. Raschke (1985: 420) sees the main theme of the new social movements as a problem of the socio-cultural identity. Offe (1985: 853) argues that social movements "converge on the idea that life itself . . . is threatened by the blind dy-

namic of military, economic, technological, and political rationalization." Offe's argument is reminiscent of Beck's (1986) claim of a risk-society in which no class or nation can flee the potentially life threatening risk of nuclear energy or war. Offe (1985: 849) also argues that the difficulty of reconciling capitalism with mass democracy precipitates a breakdown of traditional mediating systems such as parties and trade unions. The following "crisis of governability" encourages the growth of the social movements.

Organizationally, these new movements are a loose network of autonomous and de-centrally organized, base-democratic groups (Raschke 1985, Brand 1998) - as is typical for awakening groups according to Weber (1972). Further generalizations about the new social movements beyond their identity, their anti-technocratic focus and their lose organizational structures are difficult. The circumstances in the different European countries were highly diverse leading to different patterns and range of influence of social movement development (Kriesi 1995, Rucht 1994, Klandermans et al. 1988).

The new social movement theories impossibly varied to be represented as a single tendency. As shown above, they include at least German (Claus Offe), French (Alain Touraine), and Italian (Albert Melucci) versions. However, according to Brand (1998) all agree that the new social movements arose from the 1960s and reach up to the present (Foweraker 1995). There is also general agreement concerning the fact that the exploitation and emancipation themes have declined, whereas the problems of life-style, ecology, and modernity have gained in importance.

On a critical note, Brand (1998) mentions the degree of abstraction in NSMT that allows scholars to interpret the movements according to their theoretical preferences as progressive-emancipatory or young-conservative defensive movements (Habermas); or as a response to threatened identity (Melucci, Raschke), fear (Luhmann), or hedonism (Bell). The movements are categorized as "anti-technocratic" (Touraine), "postindustrial" (Bell), "de-modernizing" (Berger and others), or "civilization-critical" (Brand) as Rucht (1994: 138) has observed. Furthermore, a sharp distinction between these new

social movements and ethnic and regionalist conflicts, also emerging in the 70s, is very difficult (Brand 1998). These conflicts, however, together with contemporary Third World movements are likely to focus on material and not post-material issues since they do not have the prerequisites Inglehart (1997) sees as necessary for the emergence of new, non-material values.

The vagueness might be one of the reasons Anglo-Saxon scholars never employed the concept of new social movements. Another reason why the concept is alien to US-American researchers, so Ferree and Roth (1998), is that the USA – in contrast to many European countries - has been a "movement-society" since the 19th century. However, I surmise that the construct of "new" social movements is less due to the alleged paucity of European movement history or empirically observable differences than due to the effort - particularly in Germany - to clearly distinguish these movements from the "old," radical, right-wing fascist movements.

The other deficit of the concept of new social movements, besides disallowing differentiation between current movements, is that it falsely over-simplifies the "old" movements. NSMT scholars argue that the movements emerging after World War (WW) II focus on post-material issues like identity concepts, whereas the "old" (pre-WW II) labor movement fought "only" for material improvements, e.g. higher wages for workers. This common simplifi-cation is problematic for several reasons. First, Calhoun (1993) shows how identity also needed to be constructed among workers, thereby negating the al-legation of NSMT that strategic identity construction is something new.

Second, there were other pre-WW II movements besides the labor movement fighting for issues besides money: the suffrage movement, which constituted the so-called first women's movement (Riedmüller 1988), the fas-cist movements (Rammstedt 1978), or religious (revivalist) movements (Mühlmann 1964, Luhmann 1997: 849). The counter-cultural emancipative protest is not a new phenomenon either, but appeared already previously in the early romantic epoch and in artistic-intellectual Bohemian circles in the 19th century (Brand 1998). The "new small bourgeoisie" (Bourdieu 1982) has al-

ways had an affinity for life-style issue - now and in the 19th century (Brand 1998). Movements aiming to change life-styles have had a long historical tradition and span from religious, early socialist, or anarchistic and agrarian-romantic communes to co-operatives in the realm of production and consumption as Brand (1998) argues referring to Conti, Hardy, Krabbe, Linse, and Renn. The ecological movements had their predecessors in the nature-conservation-movements in the 19th century (Sieferle 1984), and the women's and peace movement have had several preceding mobilization waves (Nave-Herz 1982, Schenk 1981). Taking these movements into account, the supposed opposition between the pre-WWII, materially oriented movements and the "new," post-WWII, non-materially focused movements, becomes even less convincing.

Third, feminists criticize that NSMT has a strong "androcentric" bias because the particularities of the women's movement (e.g., building on precedent mobilization efforts), the criticism of patriarchy, and the goal to change gender relations were not adequately incorporated in the new social movement theory (Dackweiler & Schäfer 1998, Ferre & Roth 1998, Clemens 1989, 1988, Kontos 1986).

Fourth, every movement has transcendental goals (Elwert 1983).

Fifth, the implications of the term "post-material" is problematic since issues such as abortion often have material reasons, such as the lacking resources of the would-be-mother.

The use of the concept "new social movements" is thus very limited due to its many imprecisions and false generalizations. Furthermore, according to Inglehart (1997) many Third World countries lack the premises, like a general high living standard and a settled welfare state that are necessary for the broad diffusion of post-material issues – a factor allegedly propelling the new social movements in the West.

Not only may the theory thus be more applicable to Western countries, its German version might also be partly a product of the infamous German Sonderweg. Steinmetz (1994) suggests that the salience of alternative

identity issues, in practice and theory, in Germany is a response to a subjectively experienced deficit that national feelings cannot fulfill because the remembrance of the Holocaust prohibits the development of a positive national identity.

At this point, I would thus like to conclude the discussion with the summary that the new social movements in the West often have aims that are cast as non-material. I argue that this also affects the way the "old " labor movement now frames its claims.

What has in fact taken place is a reframing in the formulation of issues from a more material to more non-material phrasing. The difference is subtle, but nevertheless meaningful. This process has also affected the field of labor rights, which are now conceptualized as human rights. As I have shown (Part I) the core labor standards are not cast in materialistic terms. E.g. the argument is not that women workers too need a stable income and thus should not be discriminated against. The argument is that discrimination violates their human rights.

Child labor has historically been cast as being a material issue in the sense that it is prompted by low family income. It was redefined as a "non-material issue" by portraying it as a human rights violation. In this context, it is noteworthy that child labor is not anymore treated as a labor problem. Nor is there any argument that as a labor problem it should be under the jurisprudence of unions. Rather, as shown in part I, it is defined as a human rights violation that the state is obliged to eradicate.

2.4. Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT)

The new social movement theorists explain the rise of new social movement as a reaction to new grievances - be it the resentment of consumerist values or the fear of the atomic holocaust or the dissatisfaction with increasing environmental pollution. They explain why social actors mobilize but fail to show how they mobilize. Practical political problems such as mobilization, or-

ganization, and strategic decision-making are ignored (Foweraker 1995, Brand 1998).

In contrast, Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) attempts to explain this "how" by analyzing the political environment and the resources that can and are mobilized to nourish a social movement. This theory is associated with the works of Eisinger (1973), McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977), Oberschall (1973, 1994), Jenkins (1981, 1983, 1987), as well as Jenkins and Perrow (1997). Arguing that social discontent is universal but social action is not, these authors all de-emphasize psychological strain and grievances for explaining the development and mobilization of social movements. Instead they examine the political opportunity structure in which movements are embedded and that thus shapes social action. The political opportunity structure is composed of the options or restraints the elite members of the state impose as well as the mobilization structures in civil society. Mobilization structures are the organizations through which insurgents organize and engage in collective action. Movements are to a large extent equated with formal organizations in which rational actors engage, intent on maximizing their utility.

Using this economical perspective, RMT attempts to account for differences between rivaling organizations in recruitment success and between individuals in their proclivity to join a movement (Steinmetz 1994). The extent to which rationalistic, economical models are used depends on the particular authors, but there is a common Clausewitzian notion that social movement activity is the continuation of orderly politics by other (disorderly) means.

In his study of public protest, Eisinger (1973: 25) defines the political opportunity structure as "a function to the degree to which groups are likely to be able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system." He demonstrates a curvi-linear relationship between mobilization and access chances, maximum mobilization occurring at a medium degree of political opportunities. Kitschelt (1986: 62) is more precise. He differentiates the political opportunity structure, which he defines as the openness of the state, into four indicators: The openness rises with the (1) number of political parties, fac-

tions, and groups that effectively articulate their demands in electoral politics; (2) capacity of legislature to develop and control policies independent of the executive; (3) "pluralist and fluid" links that provide access to centers of political decision-making; (4) mechanisms that aggregate demands. Both Eisinger's and Kitschelt's concepts maintain that political opportunities are central to the emergence and development of social movements. These opportunities are primarily structured by a state's repression of its populous, the organizations congregating demand and providing connections to the political power, the cohesion and alignments among political elites, and the structure, ideology, and composition of political parties.

Drawing on Eisinger (1973), Mueller (1987) as well as Jenkins and Perrow (1997) argue that in order for a movement to be a success, support from a group within the political establishment - a party and/or elite support - is needed. Jenkins and Perrow (1997: 40) observe in their study of farm workers' movements that support from the political or economic elites enhances the mobilization capacity of social movements and hence enables insurgency. The authors argue "discontent is ever present in deprived groups, but collective action is rarely a viable option because of the lack of resources and the threat of repression. When deprived groups do mobilize, it is due to the injection of external resources." Carthy and Zald (1973: 21-22) also illustrate the positive effects of elite support.

However, elite support can also be detrimental to movement success. Jenkins (1981) and McAdam (1982) point out that support from a group within the political establishment can lead to the takeover of the movement and its organizations, which in turn leads to a decline in movement membership and, in the long run, to "participation without power" - that is movement failure. The danger is that social movement organizations co-opted in such a way are no longer forces for effective change but rather sponsoring organizations. "Given the instability of the resources supporting such organizations and their high level of dependence on economic and political elites, such organizations are virtually chameleons, changing tactics and programs to suit the whims of their sponsors and, in many cases, functioning as a control mechanism for

siphoning movement leadership into more moderate, less disruptive forms" (Jenkins 1981: 131). Rather than strengthening their position, cooperation with the elites or government may lead to abandonment of an NGO's effective tactic: unruly disruptiveness.

Gamson (1997a: 95) first pointed out the "success of the unruly," meaning that, contrary to common wisdom, "unruly groups, those that use violence, strikes, and other constraints, have better than average success." As Tronto (1991), referring to a number of empirical studies, argues, "a radical fringe is essential for more mainstream accomplishments, rather than being a nuisance or embarrassment." McAdam, et al. (1996) have labeled this the "radical flank effect." According to McAdam (1982) another unwelcome scenario of elite support is that it may simply lead to the demise of social movement participation because the supporters see the movement as being commandeered and its original goals corrupted.

The linkage between the movement organizations and the elites is thus a trade-off between costs and benefits. The costs are the efforts of balancing the interests of the constituency against the diverging interests of the elites. By modifying organization operations to make them more attractive to benefactors, the organization risks movement-external control. The benefits are the additional resources that elite support provides.

Apart from the dissent about success factors, there is also imprecision among Resource Mobilization theorists concerning the term "political opportunity structure." The term is often misused in the literature to capture effects of the "societal context structure" that are not "political" in the stricter sense. Factors of the societal context structure that are positively correlated with mobilization are material prosperity and organizational density (McCarthy & Zald1973, Oberschall 1973, 1976, Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982, Jenkins & Perrow 1997).

The RMT was mainly applied to an intra-national context. Some studies describe the transnational networks and channels that the movement of one country exerts on that of another but only within a Western context. E.g.

Rucht (1994) stresses *trans-national diffusion effects* of feminist discourses or achievements from the USA to Germany.

I would like to argue, though, that in this increasingly international world, these dynamics are not restricted to the internal developments of a nation state (see Tsutsui 1998) or only to Western nations as a group. Multi-and bilateral governmental organizations provide the funds (e.g. development aid) and the political opportunity structure (e.g. the UN can grant NGOs a consultancy status and therefore a platform) for groups to express their grievances and siphon resources. International organizations such as the UN represent a supra-national "elite structure" in the terminology of the RMT.

Associating with this supra-national system also contains the benefit of gaining elite and state resources but not having to conform to the wishes of their *own* state to acquire funding. Donor monies to Third World INGOs often come from Western governments. Thus INGOs can risk confrontation if their interests clash with the interests of the state (see also below for a further development of the "radical flank argument"). This clash is likely to occur in the case of child labor since this is the one core labor standard convention that, if implemented, would reduce the competitive viability of the national economy (see above).

The RMT suggests how INGOs could use the international system to combat child labor. It does not explain why they would want to do so. Neglecting the process of grievance interpretation and hence goal generation is a basic weakness of the RMT. (McAdam 1982). Furthermore ". . . what is at issue is not merely the presence or absence of grievances, but the manner in which grievances are interpreted and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations" (Snow et al. 1997: 236). The Political Process Model supplements RMT by addressing these issues.

2.5. The Political Process Model (PPM): Injustice Frameworks

Whereas RMT only examines how the *objective* political and societal structures enable a movement to mobilize, the Political Process Model (PPM) examines how the *subjective* interpretation of events decisively influences mobilization. I argue that the linkages that IOs in general and INGOs in particular provide to the international system is decisive for the interpretation of child labor as a social injustice. This injustice frame both shapes the perception of the actors as well as enabling them to use it as a legitimate justification for their efforts to decrease child labor. The PPM is associated with Snow et al. (1997), Gamson (1997b), McAdam (1992, 1988a,b, 1986, 1982), Klandermans (1992, 1986), Melucci (1989, 1985), Moore (1978), Tarrow (1983), and Tilly (1992, 1978, 1975).

Snow et al. (1997), Snow and Benford (1988) as well as Gamson (1997a,b, 1992) - drawing on Moore (1978) and Goffman (1974) - argue that rebellion is partly contingent on the generation of an "injustice frame." The term "frame" was coined by Goffman (1974:21) to describe the "schemata of interpretations" that enable individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" events as meaningful. Goffman stands in the tradition of Mead (1938, 1934), on whom Symbolic Interactionism draws, which in turn inspired the PPM.

Symbolic Interactionism is closely associated with Blumer (1993:51) whose central thesis is "social problems are fundamentally products of a process of collective definition instead of existing independently as a set of objective social arrangements with an intrinsic make-up." Taking up this line of argument for social movements, McAdam (1986) argues that grievances need to be defined and legitimized because actors are often confused about what is going on and *need a framework in which to interpret issues to perceive*

them as change worthy.[87] Snow and Benford (1988) as well as Gamson (1992) differentiate between three necessary "subframes" for mobilization:

- *diagnostic frames* providing the "identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality" (Snow & Benford 1988);[88]

- *identity frames* are essential in "the process of defining this 'we', typically in opposition to some 'they' who have different interests or values" (Gamson 1992: 84);

- *agency frames* (Gamson 1992: 59) or *motivational frames* "are necessary to identify strategies, tactics, or targets" (Snow & Benford 1988: 201). Out of tactical motives, not due to the irrationality of the actors as Smelser (1963) suggested, these frames often have a very optimistic bias according to Snow and Benford (1988).

Moreover, to change a situation, not just a frame but also a *network of friends and acquaintances* is needed. Gamson (1997a,b), McAdam (1986, 1982), Klandermans (1986), Costain (1992), Evans (1980), and Tilly (1978, 1975) assert that personal networks are a critical part of the mobilization process because the recruitment into a movement follows preexisting social relations. Tilly (1978, 1975) documents the critical role of grass-roots settings, especially with respect to work and neighborhood, in structuring and aiding insurgency. Evans (1980) locates the origins of the women's movement within the ties of friendship forged by female activists in the civil rights movement. McAdam (1982)illustrates the critical part of local black institutions, churches and colleges, in particular, in the emergence of the American civil rights movement. . These authors also document that being part of a personal network pressures individuals to participate in collective action instead of "free-riding" - in Olson's (1965) terms - due to the fear of being ostracized. "Action participa-

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87 The relationship to the "Framing-Ansatz" by the Germans Kreisl and Sack (1998) is unclear since the authors do not clearly differentiate this approach from the PPM.

88 In a similar vein, Melucci (1989, 1985) argues that the misfortune once seen as personal must be interpreted as a collective grievance that is unjust and therefore warrants collective action. Melucci is also often grouped with New Social Movement scholars - a good example of how difficult a precise location of the more ambitious theorists is, who modify their theories and have several theoretical dimensions.

tion," to use the term of Klandermans and Oegma (1997), is thus fostered by personal ties.

PPM authors thus commonly dissent from RMT's simple equation of social movements with formal organizations, in favor of including informal networks of friendships and acquaintances. This heightens the validity of social movement research but also makes the definition and operationalization much more difficult and maybe also less reliable since there is a higher variance among the units of research if friendships or even acquaintances are included.

The PPM also builds on the collective behavior tradition of Smelser (1963) and others, which RMT had sought to supplant, thus again assigning ideas and sentiments a prominent place. Although not exclusively featured by the self-defined PPM theorists, the social-psychological deprivation theory - claiming that not only the objective deprivation but also the subjectively felt deprivation is necessary for insurgency - represented by Gurr (1970) and others also seem to have influenced the PPM.

Both theories - the RMT, and the PPM - exhibit a Western bias because crucial aspects for Third World mobilization, contacts to and funding by foreign donors, are not taken into account regarding their *opportunity structures* (the area of focus of RMT), or their *frames* and informal *networks* (the turf of the PPM).

In the development literature, Neubert (1994) discusses the effects that First World funding has on Third World mobilization goals and patterns for Kenya and Rwanda. However there is no global study documenting that IOs have a significant impact on alleviating human rights abuses. Furthermore, it is not clear, which type of IOs, INGOs or IGOs, are more decisive.

I will argue that INGOs are more influential in conveying the *diagnostic frames* by identifying child labor as a problem – even if such an identification goes against the interest of their own governments. Through their cooperation with their donor an *agency frame* is established of how to combat child labor – potentially over the heads of their own Third World governments since they draw their funds form other (mostly Western) governments.

3. Definitions

3.1.(I) NGOs

There has been a "world-wide proliferation of NGOs" (Hanish 1994:7, see also Boli 1999). What kinds of organizations hide behind the "catch all-term" (Brunnengräber 1998) NGO? Ideal typically, NGOs are private voluntary associations, which are not profit orientated and depend on external funding (Beck 1997). Organizationally they range from non-hierarchical "grass-roots moments to bureaucratic interest organizations" and ideologically from "a radical rural peasant organization to a conservative cultural women's movement" (Bertnstein 1994: 59).

Some authors try to differentiate NGOs. Kirsch (1994), for example, divides them into the following categories: BINGOs (Big NGOs), DENGOs (Development NGOs), DONGOS (Donor NGOs), INGOs (International NGOs), QUANGOs (Quasi NGOs, i.e., only formally independent but actually dependent on government promotion), etc. Bruckmeier (1997) adds GRINGOs (government inspired NGOs, i.e., initiated by government politicians to push their political or commercial interests).[89]

However, currently there is no standard classification. Furthermore, in the Third World most NGOs are to some extent "international" donor NGOs because they receive most of their funding, and hence often their agenda, from First World donations – often from government sources (Abu Sharkh 1999, Neubert 1994, field research observations of the author in the West Bank, India and South Africa). In this context, the irony of the classification *non*-governmental also becomes apparent. A more precise term might be non*national*-governmental organizations. When the term NGO is used in this paper it draws on the classification as found in the Union of International Associations.

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89 The also the typology of Honey and Bonbright (1993) and Bernstein (1985).

I take the numbers of NGOs as an indicator for the strength of a social movement of a country. But is that a valid operationalization? It depends on the definition of a social movement.

3.2. Social Movement

Are social movements merely an "artificial academic production" (Roth 1994: 16)? Defining the sociologically amorphous concept " social movement" is an ambitious task: From epidemically spreading ghost-dance euphoria to professionally planned, single-issue demonstrations, everything can be and often is labeled a movement. In fact, not only is the label "movement" used for a broad variety of phenomena depending on the theoretical slant of the author and the historical time period, but - worse - the *same* phenomena (movements) is often termed differently. Mühlmann (1964), for example, points out that historically movements were often (falsely) given a different name: sects. Generally one can conclude that *different theoretical approaches define social movements in line with their general assumptions*. This is the reason why I chose to first give a brief overview of the different movement theories and then attempt to define the phenomena.

Lorenz von Stein first coined the term movement in the effort to describe "die That um den Widerspruch zwischen Arbeit und Kapital zu überwinden" (Translation of the author: The act to overcome the contradiction between labor and capital.) (quoted in Rammstedt 1978: 27). The modern classical, but vague, definition of social movement advanced by Blumer (1969a, 1969b) is a collective enterprise to bring about social change.

A currently wide-spread definition of "social movement" in the USA is "a collectivity acting with some degree of *organization and continuity* outside of institutional channels for the purposes of promoting or resisting change in the group, society, or world order of which it is part" (McAdam &

Snow 1997: xviii, Snow & Oliver 1995: 571, Benford 1992: 1880, Turner & Killian 1987: 223, Wilson 1973: 9, emphasis added).[90]

In light of the vast array of phenomena that can be studied under the heading "social movement," further differentiation of the research subjects is needed. Offe (1985) offers a helpful distinction by contrasting socio*political* - characterized by non-institutional "political action" - and socio*cultural* movements (e.g., sects) propagating certain life-styles or traditions (see table 7). *Political action* is defined by the claim of the actor that "the *means* of action can be recognized as *legitimate* and the *ends* of action can become *binding for the wider community*." According to Offe (1985) both sociocultural and sociopolitical movements employ legitimate means and actors, but while the former do not aim to have their values acknowledged as binding for the wider community, sociopolitical movements do.

Table 5: Schema of Forms of Noninstitutional Action (Offe 1985)

Ends / Means/actor	*Not* binding for wider community if accomplished	Binding for wider community if accomplished
Not recognized by political community as legitimate	"private crime"	"terrorism"
Recognized as legitimate	"sociocultural movements"	"sociopolitical movements"

Offe's differentiation has its followers. Neidhardt and Rucht (1993) also distinguish between political change movements and personal change movements. While this is a useful analytical distinction, it has several drawbacks. First, Offe's examples of sociocultural movements (e.g., sects) are questionable. Religious sects often feel that they have the "holy obligation" to spread their doctrine and hence want their life-styles or religious laws to be binding for a wider community.

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90 The difference between movements and any collectivity, such as an array of organizations, is unclear. Melucci (1989: 24) critiques such all encompassing definitions with the fitting, sarcastic comment: "Contemporary American authors seem to call every form of non-institutional political action a social movement, to the extent that the word 'movement' is in danger of becoming synonymous with everything in motion in society. Also, a certain quantity of activists should be incorporated in the definition of a social movement because three opponents could hardly qualify as a movement.

Second, authors like Touraine (1977: 373) emphasize that every movement has the dimension of broad social change by de-masking the "rational" order because "the action of a social movement consists in transforming the given into a product. The force of a project is the capacity to overthrow the social order, to unmask the power concealed by values and the exercise of authority, to discover behind the 'natural order' the cultural model and class interest." This cognitive revolution can also be accomplished by sociocultural movements, as an effect "de-binding" or de-restraining the wider community in its own way.

Third, Gamson (1997a,b), in contrast to Offe, argues that interest groups and social movement organizations are members of the same species, only holding different positions towards the state: interest groups are accepted by the state, whereas *social movement organizations are not seen as legitimate*.

Still, Offe's differentiation is a useful *ideal-typical* distinction to differentiate between the ghost-dance movements Mühlmann describes and the kind of professional, *sociopolitical* internationally linked movement that is conceptualized in this paper. For this study, the collective action of interest is limited to sociopolitical movements.

Taking these different dimensions of social movements together and - admittedly - with a RMT and PPM slant, I define social movements as a *network* of *formal organizations* and *informal networks* engaged in a *struggle* for *change* as do Buechler (1990), McCarthy and Zald (1977), Morris and Mueller (1992), Morris (1984), and Staggenborg (1988). Further specifications for a social movement definition resulting from the previous discussion are that the envisioned *change* is binding for a wider community, the *motive*[91] of action being the instigation of or hindrance to such a change; and that *organizations and personal networks* provide the needed coherence and longevity. A social movement is coordinated both through organizational (McAdam 1982, Mess-

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91 Motive, according to Weber (1972: 2), is "ein Sinnzusammenhang, welcher dem Handelnden selbst oder dem Beobachtenden als sinnenhafter 'Grund' eines Verhaltens erscheint."

inger 1955) and personal networks (Gamson 1997b, Melucci 1989, McAdam 1986, Klandermans 1986).

However, due to data limitations, I can only operationalize the social movement strength of a country by their organizational density as found in the Union of International Associations (1960-1995). This leads to a bias towards formal organizations. Nonetheless, an operationalization in resting on organizational characteristics is valid. A nominal definition taking organizational characteristics into account helps to differentiate movements from sporadic bursts of rage in a crowd. As pointed out above, an adequate definition of social movements requires the incorporation of a certain *duration and continuity,* and this is best arranged in a *social movement organization* according to Staggenborg (1988).

4. Operationalizing a Social Movement

Nominal definitions cannot be right or wrong (Kromrey 1991: 106). In the preceding chapter, I hope to have shown that the definition advanced above was not arbitrarily chosen. In this section, I discuss how studying a social movement can be operationalized (section 4.1.) and show that such a definition raises serious epistemological issues / questions (section 4.2.).

4.1 Internally Correlative Indicators of a Social Movement: Organizations as Statutory Manifestations of a Social Movement

Ever since the writings of political activists like Lenin (1970) and sociologists like Michels (1949), the organizational aspects of social movements have been discussed. To conceptualize organizations, pre-dominantly non-governmental ones, as accessible representatives of social movements also has a long history and is increasingly widespread.

Already Messinger (1955) had argued that social movements manifest themselves, in part, through a wide range of organizations. However, only recently with the formulation of RMT by McCarthy and Zald (1977, 1973) has

the organizational dimension of social movements taken center stage. Currently, movement organizations are the focal unit of analysis (McAdam & Snow 1997). While also discussing the role of collective consciousness in their book, McAdam and Snow (1997) point to the centrality of NGOs: "We also think it is difficult to understand the operations and dynamics of social movements, including most movement-related collective action, without reference to organizations and organizational characteristics" (McAdam & Snow 1997). They list a number of movement organizations such as the National Organization for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in which movement organizations represent the interests of their constituency. Taylor (1989), Staggenborg (1988), and Rochford (1985) likewise highlight the importance of taking organizational characteristics into account to understand the goals, characters, and careers of social movements.

On the one hand, it is possible to argue a critical note that this emphasis, particularly of RMT, that (statutory) organization is a pragmatic move since all social movement researchers are confronted with "the difficulty of capturing these action systems, 'in action' " as Melucci (1989: 32) has put it. Choosing organizations as indicators allows for an *easier* operationalization (i.e., taking the mission statements of NGOs) than the – maybe just as valid – movement characterizations of famous older movement scholars like Mühlmann would have. Mühlmann argues that the organizational manifestation, for example in form of a sect, is a sign that the movement has stopped moving and thus is no longer a "movement" (Mühlmann 1964: 10). This argument may be valid in the context of "religious mass-hysteria" described by him such as the Ghostdance- or Shaker movements that do not have concrete, external goals, their aim being to demonstrate an "identity" by portraying certain – also irrational – elements of their culture.

On the other hand, this emphasis may also reflect a *type* of socio-political movement. McCarthy and Zald (1976, 1973) as well as McAdam et al. (1988) and Luhmann (1997) have argued that many current movements consist of a small *cadre of professionals* while most participants are only ephemerally

involved. According to McCarthy and Zald (1976, 1973) as well as McAdam et al. (1988), these professionals work in social movement organizations. Employees of the respective movement organizations should therefore constitute the best-informed activists since they are the heart and mind of the movement. Furthermore, they are the most accessible movement participants because their organizations are likely to be registered.

Defining social movements through *formal organizations*, so McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996: 4), might be less a theory about social movements in general than "an attempt to describe and map a new social movement form - professional social movements - that they (RMT theorists, comment by Abu Sharkh) saw as increasingly dominant" in the USA. These professional movements are rational, in Weber's sense of *zweck-rational,* rather than *affective* or purely expressive and can therefore be characterized by their organizational structures erected to promote specific changes rather than by disruptive, spontaneous protest behavior. In a similar vein Roth (1994: 13) advanced the thesis of "movements as institutions[92]."

Altvater (1997: 551) even suggests that NGOs and movements are equivalent to an extent that one can substitute one term for the other and thus refers to NGOs as "the social movement of civil society". This also hints at the interesting fact that the same phenomenon – the efforts of actors outside the government to instigate or hinder change - is discussed under different headings in the USA and Germany. Judging from my experience of studying at a renowned US-American university, Altvater's observation is only true for Germany; in the USA these non-governmental efforts are predominantly conceptualized as social movements.

In summary, there is an emerging consensus that social movement organizations are valid indicators for social movements (Altvater 1997, Ferree 1992, McAdam 1982, McCarthy and Zald 1976, 1973) at least in regard to the professional sociopolitical movements of concern here. Taking the density of

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92 The minimal requirements for an institution according to Roth (1994) are steadfastness, duration, repeatability, internalization, steady codes of conduct, and meaning-orientation - all the typical characteristics of a statutory organization.

INGOs as the indicator for the strength of a social movement is thus a feasible and legitimate route.

However, it should not be forgotten that the relationship between social movements and organizations is multifaceted and dialectical. Organizations can both predate and outlive a movement: they can provide the organizational grid for a movement to mobilize (McAdam 1 982) or can remain intact after the movement has ceased to exist (Messinger 1 955). Furthermore, different organizational structures and participants motivate different movement tactics, strategies, goals, and activities. Piven and Cloward (1979, 1978), for example, suggest that large formal organizations lead to a diffusion of protest. Another reason to remain skeptical about equating movements with organizations is that the former are also constituted by personal networks, as PPM scholars have pointed out.

Nevertheless, an expanding body of literature confirms the causal importance of organizations and organizational ties for movement recruitment, maintenance, co-ordination, and definition of aims and strategies (Gould 199, Fernadez & McAdam 1988, McAdam 1986, Walsh & Warland 1983, Curtis & Zurcer 1973, Orum 1972). *Taking the existence of NGOs as an indicator for a social movement is thus, in spite of certain conceptual problems, a valid operationalization.*

4.2 Excursion: Indicators and the Problems of Casing

Let me embark on an epistemological excursion. Despite organizational aspects having taken center stage in the social movement literature, there has been very little thought about establishing criteria that decide if an (I)NGO really constitutes a social movement organization. Is the self-definition of the organization or the view of other members of the movement crucial?

Especially in Third World countries the question which organizations are valid indicators of a social movement is very problematic because some organizations claim to be part of an idealistic grass-roots movement, when, in reality, their goal is to elicit donor-money from First World organiza-

tions. The lacking reflectivity of scholars may be an indicator of a Western bias since, in contrast to fund-receiving Third World NGOs, their Western counterparts might have less incentives to falsely pretend being part of a grass-roots movement.

Who decides which empirical phenomenon provides a case study for which theory? The researcher? Or the self-definition of the researched subjects? As I will show in the following paragraphs, the problem of "casing" is not only a problem when defining INGOs as a case of a social movement organization but lies at the heart of the discipline of sociology. I will therefore discuss this problem in the following paragraphs.

The definition of a *case* is of crucial importance in sociology because a case study in sociology always entails the claim that this study is an example of a whole family of phenomena, as Walton (1992) points out. Individual cases are studied in order to refute or support theoretical assumptions about a family of cases or to make generalizations about the family on the basis of this case study. In fact: "Sociologically defined, a case has no significance unless referred to a precise, coherent theory or method" (Wieviorka 1992: 163).[93]

Harper (1992), referring to Blumer, points out that the definition of the case depends on the conceptualization of the social world, or more succinctly: the relationship the researcher sees between science and the object of scientific inquiry. This relationship has been under especially intensive scrutiny since Kuhn's (1962) book *The Structure of Scientific Revolution.* In his history of the natural sciences, Kuhn sharply contradicts the rational, cumulative, progression of natural science propagated by Popper and Carnap, the leading theorists of science at the time.[94] Kuhn claims that there is *no sharp distinction*

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93 There are, however, conflicting ideas regarding this approach. As Wieviorka (1992: 169) argues "opposed to this model was the less prevalent idea, which I shall call historicism, that any collective, historical experience was absolutely original." In anthropology, a similar debate exists between universalists, e.g., the structuralist Claude Levi-Strauss and cultural relativists (e.g., Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict) (Kohl 1993).

94 Despite their differences Popper and Carnap had both claimed that (1) there is a clear distinction between theory and observation in science; (2) that science progresses cumulatively;

between theory and observation; that science *is not cumulative*; that living science *neither has a very deductive structure nor operates with very precise definitions*; and that science is in its nature something historic – even physics, the crown jewel of rationality. Although not a self-defined post-modernist, Kuhn's (1962) criticism of the history of science as linear and evolutionary is, incidentally, also one of the main criticisms of the postmodernists regarding the claims of modernity (Nicholson 1990). Kuhn's observations had caused an avalanche of distrust in the alleged rationality of science by questioning the rational picture scientists had of themselves and their discipline.

The landslide Kuhn caused can be dissected into two parts (Hacking 1996). The first area around which heretic questions abound is the so-called *rationality problem*: What constitutes scientific support for a theory? Or is the talk about rationality only a masquerade for technocrats? The post-modernist critique of science argues that the much-vaunted objectivity is an instrumentalistic illusion: "Science, according to the ideological argument, serves the interest of dominant groups (males, whites, Westerners), thereby subverting those of oppressed groups (females, ethnicities, Third-World peoples)" (Spiro 1996). The second area surrounds *scientific realism*: How is the world? Are research objects, i.e., cases, something real, or are they only constructs to structure research? (Hacking 1996).[95]

Vaughan (1992) points out that the rationality as well as the realism problem cumulate in the *logical tangle of defining a case* after closer scrutiny: "the organizational form we thought was example of X is not an example of X at all but of something very different." In this "case" (pun not intended) the questions of *which* definition for X is appropriate and *which* theory X could

and (3) exhibits a deductive structure – this was supposedly especially true for physics (Hacking 1996, Popper 1971).

95 In the recent sociological literature, Ragin (1992) and others (see Ragin and Becker 1992) have discussed the rationality problem. Ragin (1992) emphasizes the problematic relationship between ideas and evidence. Can the observed really be taken as evidence to support or refute a theory? Harper (1992) points out that the problem of causality in sociology goes back at least to the debate between "erklaeren" versus Weber's "verstehen" approach.

then be used, .for instance can I draw on the social movement theory, are linked. The question of "casing" and theory testing are thus interdependent.

Depending on the discipline, the aim, and the school of thought of the scientists, there are important differences in what social scientists assume to be a case. Ragin (1992) argues that there are four ideal types of views about cases: cases are found, cases are made, cases are objects, and cases are conventions. As Vaughan (1992) points out, the research object is a case of something different at different stages of the work. Ragin (1992) criticizes this approach and demands to first exactly define the case study and then to research because in the past the lack of a working definition had led to the simple aggregation of individual level data without an appropriate theoretical concept of the object on the macro-level.

While this is a valid criticism, Wievieorka's (1992) work shows just how difficult it may be to uphold an *a priori* definition once the case is examined closer. Working in a team directed by Alain Touraine studying social conflicts, Wievieorka set out to research social movements and wound up interviewing terrorists. The terrorists defined themselves as a social movement while the population did not see them as such at all. Which "casing" is true, the terrorists' self-definition, or the definition of the population? Ideally both, but in reality these dimensions contradicted each other.[96] As the Italian social movement researcher Melucci (1989: 13) succinctly states, "identical things can be given different names, and each name conveys a different meaning."

If the organizational co-operation structures were very fragmented, would the INGOs still fit the criteria of a *network*, by which social movements are defined in chapter three? Or is the constant *lip-service* of being part of an

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96 Incidentally, Wieviorka (1992) sees the difficulty to forecast historic events as part of sociology's casing problem. In contrast, Lieberson (1992) sees only small N-studies as having difficulties evaluating probabilistic theories. Wievieorka (1992) also points out an additional problem confronting sociologists in particular. In other sciences the problem of scientific realism has been "solved" by coming to the agreement that a theory doesn't need to be true, just as long as it makes accurate predictions; according to that criteria, sociological theories would not be worth much, so Wieviorka (1992).

interlinked human rights movement *community[97]enough*, e.g. as stated in the mission statement, since all communities larger than the village community are *imagined[98]* (Anderson 1988), including the movement activist community?

Should INGOs simply be conceptualized as organizations instead of part of a larger construct like social movement? I have argued above that INGOs can be taken as a case of a social movement organization according to the RMT and PPM. One should be aware of the epistemological problems with this construction – and many other constructions in science.

5. Hypothesis: The Success of the Unruly

Links to international organizations help to re-conceptualize the perception of child labor as a human rights violation that all members of society including the state should work to eradicate. As Tsutsui (1998:2) argues "the promulgation of human right norms created an international context in which poor human rights records can undermine a country's legitimacy in global society."

Concerning child labor, already the Declaration of Human Rights pronounced that children have a right to basic education. This basic education can only be attained if the child is not a full-time member of the labor force. The ILO Minimum Age Convention (1973) was the first convention on an international level that declared child labor in *itself* (not only due to its substitutions effects regarding education) as illegitimate. Most bi- and international donors subsequently followed suit (see part I and II for further details).

But will INGOs or IGOs be more effective in reducing child labor? As argued in the discussion of the social movement literature, a defining characteristic of INGOs is that they stand outside the immediate interest structure

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97 Community being defined as "unabhängig von realer Ungleichheit und Ausbeutung, als kameradschaftlicher Verbund von Gleichen" (Anderson 1988: 17).

98 Anderson (1988: 16) argues that "Gemeinschaften sollten nicht durch ihre Authentizität von einander unterschieden werden, sondern durch die Art und Weise, in der sie vorgestellt werden" (Anderson 1988: 17).

of the state from which they originate . In many third world countries, but especially in Asia, state representatives argue for the need of child labor in order to stay competitive (see part I, section 3.2.5.4.2.). INGOs fighting for human rights may take a stronger stance against these interests than IGOs, which have to respect the sovereignty of their member states (see above).

A characteristic of movement actions is also that demands are stated in an "unruly way". Contrary to common wisdom, this makes claimants *more* effective as the PPM argued. Easier than the IGOs, INGOs may be able to build an "injustice frame", that casts child labor not as a traditional way of life but as violating the child's rights.

This "injustice frame" spurs a recursive process. For the INGOs, the injustice frame enables them to *perceive* and *argue* that the elimination of child labor is a legitimate quest. The definition of child labor as a violation of human rights meriting international efforts also enables these INGOs to garner resources (from Western donors/governments) by stating that they work on the elimination of child labor.

On the other side, the international standing of the topic forced on the world societal level (e.g. being endorsed by UN agencies) governments to attend to the accusations and demands these groups made inside their country and propagated beyond their borders. Thus the "collateral" and "penetrative" authority of INGOs was expand (Boli 1999).[99] This gain in influence, funding, and attention leads to emergence of new INGOs devoted to this topic.

As shown in part I, a large number of INGO initiatives with a focus on child labor have sprung up. As Neubert (1994) and others have pointed out, (I)NGOs are very versatile professional consultant organizations. They are in tune with international agendas and willing to quickly change their quests to attain funding.

The importance of resources, e.g. funding, for successful mobilization constitutes an early observation of RMT scholars. As the RMT points out,

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99 See also Tsutsui (1998) for a very similar line of argument regarding the global rise of ethnic social movements.

resources are essential for a successful social movement. The original argument of Carthy and Zald (1973) elaborated above was that deprived groups mobilize themselves if resources are injected. My argument has a different slant. In many Third World countries groups mobilize *for* the deprived. Hanish (1994: 22) sarcastically observes that on the protests and rallies of deprived groups, e.g. peasant protests, the deprived groups *themselves* do not show-up. They are too busy working for their living.[100] Poverty is often not only income but also *time* and *knowledge poverty* impeding aggrieved groups from mobilizing (Abu Sharkh 1999).

Due to the rampant poverty, the claim of Jenkins and Perrow (1997) – that mobilization occurs only with the injection of external resources - is likely to be especially accurate in the Third World context regarding the input of non-governmental organizations funded by Western donors. Funding is a prerequisite for the emergence of a successful movement. Much funding for (I)NGOs comes from Western donors as the discussion of (I)NGOs above showed. Donors will only fund a "mission" if it targets a "problem" – as defined on the global level by conventions. With the unruly social movements tactics and authority derived by drawing on an internationally recognized injustice frame, INGOs may prove to be powerful actors in reducing child labor.

Hypothesis 12: As the social movement literature thus suggests (I)NGOs will have a more significant positive impact on the reduction rates of child labor than IGOs.

Since this third part only tests which international linkages count holding constant everything else in the models introduced in parts II and III, I will not restate the hypotheses concerning the independent and control variables that I elaborated in part I.

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100 " 'Bauerndemonstration' . . . entpuppen sich nicht selten als Aktionen von (urbanen) Bauernfunktionären und Verbandsmitarbeitern, ihren Kooperationspartnern in anderen NRO und Sympathisanten aus dem universitären Milieu. Wirklich praktizierende Landwirtschaftler sind in einer größeren derartigen Veranstaltung selten beteiligt. Sie müssen sich nämlich auf der Scholle um ihren Lebensunterhalt sorgen (es sei denn, man fährt sie, gegen Bezahlung, zum Demonstrationsort)" Hanish (1994: 22)

6. Sample and Data Analysis: Subjecting Nations to an Event History and Panel Analysis

Since this part uses the same data as part II, please refer to that section for a more detailed discussion. To analyze if the number of (I)NGOs or IGOs has the larger impact concerning child labor rates dropping, I conduct a cross-country panel analysis. Due to the small N, I will again employ an OLS regression with robust standard errors. The time period analyzed is 1960 - 1990. I thus analyze if higher numbers of IGO or (I)NGOs in a country have the more decisive impact on reducing child labor, when possibly confounding variables have been controlled.

My dependent variable is again the reduction (in percent, not percentage points) of children working between the ages 10 to 14. To facilitate the interpretation of the results the reduction is calculated so that a high reduction is a large positive number. So if Ghana reduced its child labor rates by 4% between 1960 and 1970, it would have the value +4, not –4. The calculations were performed drawing on data available from the World Development Indicators data base of the World Bank for the years 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990. The child labor rates and the child labor reduction rates vary widely, e.g. in 1960 the child labor rate ranges from 0 to 70%.

For the control variables, I draw on a data bank on economic data made available by the World Bank as well as social and political data available through the international politics center at the Hoover Institute and the Sociology Department at Stanford University (composed of different data files such as polity3 etc.).

7. Results and Discussion: David against Goliath

As hypothesized, INGOs indeed have very large and significant effect on the reduction of child labor. In the 60s, INGOs are the most significant and influential factor reducing child labor. One additional NGO reduces child labor by .044% holding the influence of the other variables constant. The unstandardized coefficients are small due to the range of the variable so the standardized coefficients are also shown.

The standardized coefficients display the very large impact INGOs have relative to all other variables. INGOs still play a significant, positive role in reducing child labor throughout the 70s. In the 80s, however, they are ineffectual. The problems of decreasing sample size and floor effects that could have caused this effect were already elaborated in the part II. Future research should attend to which types of INGOs produce these effects. Trade associations are likely to have some other impact than human rights associations.

Surprisingly, IGOs are significant but in the opposite direction. The more IGOs a country belonged to the less child labor decreased. The results should also be viewed with some caution because they are not substantiated by the findings in later decades. In the following decades IOs have no significant impact on the child labor reduction rates. When data availability allows, their effects in the 90s should be examined in future research.

Table 6: Regression with Robust Standard Errors: Child labor (1970-1990): What Types of International Linkage Matters?

		1960-70	1970-80	1980-90
Formal adoption of international norms	Ratification of the ILO Child Labor Convention 138 (lagged 2 years)		**3.81 (.01)** .03	**.145 (4.7)** .001
	Ratification of the ILO Child Labor Convention 138 (lagged 12 years)			**-12.7 (7.14)** -.095
Linkages				
Normative	INGO	**.044 (.01)** .68***	**.023 (.01)** .23**	**.001 (.01)** .0007
	IGO	**-.313 (.12)** -.33***	**-.153 (.16)** -.08	**-.08 (.29)** -.03
Coercive	Aid per capita (current US$)	**.239 (.09)** .14***	**-.097 (.19)** -.03	**-.06 (.04)** -.13
Economic	Trade (% of GDP)	**.078 (.06)** .23	**.080 (.07)** .08	**.080 (.04)** .12**
Development indicators				
Progress	GDP per capita growth	**.012 (.01)** .05	**.018 (.01)** .11**	**.172 (.08)** .21**
Level of development	GDP per capita	**-.015 (.01)** -.38**	**.013 (.002)** .39***	**.006 (.001)** .33***
Strength of the state	General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)	**-.219 (.19)** -.06	**-.045 (.38)** -.01	**.421 (.34)** .08
Substitution effect of child and female labor	Labor force, female (% of total labor force)	**7.42e-08 (7.29e-08)** .15	**.331 (.30)** .11	**-.270 (.29)** -.08
Quality of schools	Pupil-teacher ratio, primary	**-.325 (.17)** -.19**	**-.18 (.27)** -.06	**.481 (.22)** .16**
Control for initial state	Labor force, children 10-14 (% of age group)	**-.429 (.16)** -.42**	**-.505 (.21)** -0.20*	**-.644 (.26)** -.32**
Regional/ "cultural" effects				
	Africa	**-5.62 (6.1)** -.14	**-12.7 (8.60)** -.16	**-25.9 (12.7)** -.38**
	Asia	**-9.27 (4.3)** -.17**	**-5.7 (8.68)** -.05	**-27.3 (9.2)** -.29***
	South or Central America	**-5.76 (4.2)** -.12	**-3.8 (9.29)** -.04	**-23.4 (9.8)** -.29**
	Middle East & Upper Saharan Africa	**-12.29 (3.8)** -.21***	**3.75 (9.06)** .03	**1.04 (13.3)** .01
	F-test vs. nested model without (linkage variable)	**N = 120** **R² = 0.58** sig = 0.00	**N = 134** **R² = 0.72** sig = 0.00	**N = 109** **R² = 0.69** sig = 0.00

*p <.1   **p<.05   ***p<.01

Another research agenda would comprise investigating what IN-GOs are an indicator for. In the World Society Theory they comprise an indicator for linkages to world norms. Conceivably, however, they also present an indicator for the possibility of an opposition like the civil society argument in the social movement literature suggests. One would thus have to test if INGOs have an effect beyond democratization and corporatization.

A final research question would attend to INGOs as possible indicators of political stability. Vibrant INGOs could be taken as a sign of a lawful, stable political climate as they serve as an access road to influence political decision-making in a peaceful way. To investigate these questions, future models should incorporate political system and stability variables as well as variables reflecting a typology of INGOs.

8. Conclusion: The Radical Flank Effect

The findings of this investigation are a confirmation for the World Society Theory and the PPM. World Society scholars had shown how international links spur countries to make formal commitments pledging to adhere to World norms, e.g. by signing environmental treaties (Frank 1999) or establishing women's ministries (e.g. Berkovitch 1999). In this dissertation, I have shown that links to the world society both through IGOs and INGOs increase the likelihood of nations to ratify the Minimum Age Convention of the ILO.

Beyond that, I have shown that the number of INGOs is highly significant in accelerating the reduction of child labor over 20 years (1960-1980). It is all the more astounding that this linkage effect was true for child labor, because, as a "social problem", the development of child labor rates is most often linked purely to to the socio-economic development and not conceptualized as something heavily contigent upon purely normative world societal influences. Another surprising finding, from an economic persepctive, is that it was not the number of IGO memberships but rather of INGO memberships that had this accelerating effect even though IGOs command over large labor budgets. The extent to which the organizational memberships links national *societies* to the world society (memberships in INGOs) has the greater effect than nation *states* ties to the world society (memberships in IGOs).[101] I have argued that, as the PPM suggests, INGOs as potentially unruly civil society members have more leeway to establish an injustice framework that portrays child labor as a human rights violation that must be tackled. In fact the INGOs that are most outspoken, e.g. Amnesty and the Helsinki Committee, frequently have relatively few resources.[102] Not the amount of funds but the outspoken representation of world societal, universal, individualistic norms makes the difference concerning the reduction rate of child labor. This assertion demands further research.

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[101] I want to thank David John Frank for this idea that he convayed in an email correspondence Sun, 10 Feb 2002 (email: frankdj@wjh.harvard.edu).

[102] Interview with the UN expert Kristóf Dávid Gosztonyi, Feb. 1, 2002.