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A Comparison of the Situation of Bosnian Refugees in Berlin and Chicago
Perceptions of the facilitating factors and obstacles affecting their adaptation process

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Abstract

The overall aim of this study was to assess and compare the conditions of refugee reception and incorporation in Berlin and Chicago based on the adaptation and settlement experiences of a sample of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, who sought protection in the early 1990s as a result of the Bosnian war. A comparison of these two cities is relevant since they signify two of the largest metropolitan areas in each respective country that took in Bosnians in need of protection following the war. An estimated 30,000 Bosnians were received in Berlin, while nearly 40,000 Bosnian refugees resettled to Chicago in the 1990s.

The focus was to explore the different refugee reception contexts in the two cities and to analyze the way in which the social and institutional structures in the receiving society constrained and facilitated the interlocutors, based on their own perceptions, in their ability to access resources, adapt in the new contexts, and regain control over their lives. It entails an overview of the facilitating factors and obstacles encountered, as well as a synopsis of the coping strategies the sample applied to achieve their goal to attain *normalcy* after the Bosnian war. Findings underscore the significance of the institutional conditions as a major factor of influence, but not necessarily the most important factor impacting the emotional well-being and adaptation process of the Bosnian refugees.

Abstrakt

Ziel dieser Studie ist in erster Linie, die Anpassungsmöglichkeiten, Erfolgs- und Exklusionsmodalitäten einer Stichprobe von Kriegsflüchtlingen aus Bosnien-Herzegowina, die Schutz in den frühen neunziger Jahren in Berlin und Chicago gesucht haben, zu erfassen und diese anschließend miteinander zu vergleichen. Ein Vergleich dieser beiden Städte ist relevant, da sie den Großteil von Bosniern und Bosnierinnen im Schutz vor dem Krieg aufnahmen. In den 1990er Jahren nahm Berlin ungefähr dreißigtausend bosnische Flüchtlinge auf, während fast Vierzigtausend Bosnier und Bosnierinnen nach Chicago migrierten.

Der Schwerpunkt dieser Studie lag darin, die Aufnahmebedingungen in beiden Städten zu erforschen. Es wurde untersucht, in welcher Weise die sozialen und institutionellen Strukturen der Aufnahmegesellschaften die Gesprächspartner und Gesprächspartnerinnen in ihren Fähigkeiten einschränkten oder unterstützten, sie auf Ressourcen/Hilfsquellen zugriffen, sich ihrer neuen Umgebungen und Rahmenbedingungen anpassten und Kontrolle über ihr Leben zurückgewannen. Die Studie beinhaltet einen Überblick der Faktoren, die ihre Anpassung erleichterten und behinderten, sowie eine vergleichende Übersicht der

Bewältigungs- und Handlungsstrategien der Untersuchungsgruppe(n), um sich nach dem Bosnien-Krieg eine *Alltagsnormalität* zu erschaffen. Die Ergebnisse der Studie unterstreichen die besondere Rolle der institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen als entscheidende Einflussfaktoren auf das emotionale Wohl und den Eingliederungs- und Integrationsprozess der bosnischen Flüchtlinge.

Acknowledgments

My reason for choosing the topic of this study is entrenched in the strength of will the Bosnian refugees exhibited. I was and continue to be impressed by their inner resolve to survive and to pursue the goal of attaining *normalcy* despite the anomalies and *madness* associated with war that my interview participants - and so many other refugees and migrants – have experienced. Framed in a context in which so many are unable to move past life's tragedies, the resilience and creativity that this focus group exhibited in developing and applying practical and protective coping strategies to ease their transition and adaptation in the receiving society contexts, has been powerfully motivating. I chose this topic because it takes much personal strength and resilience to come to a new country as an *outsider* and attempt to *integrate*, regardless of the context.

This is all the more striking considering the reality of those who have attempted this feat as refugees, who are additionally burdened by multiple losses, grief and trauma associated with war and displacement. Conscious of the multitude hardships and challenges my sample of refugees experienced in the attempt to manage their adaptation processes in Berlin and Chicago, I have sought to highlight the positive aspects achieved through human interactions and agency and steer away from the deficit-oriented assessment of refugee integration common in politicized media and public discourses. As such, I wanted not to examine the refugees but to contribute to understanding their plight and to give them a voice in the political system, as they are often unable to speak and be heard.

I was forewarned that if I were to conduct research on flight and resettlement, it would result in my being psychologically and emotionally *burdened* since the "issue of flight implies commitment, empathy and a personal confrontation with human suffering" (Binder/Tošić 2005:608). While there is much truth in this, my research topic inspired me not to give up hope or to give in when the going got rough. My Bosnian interview partners are a symbol of strength and perseverance. I am thankful to have met them when I did and to be inspired by their fighting spirits. I extend my thanks as well to the refugee support workers, government

Terms and Abbreviations

Acknowledgement of hardship cases (Härtefallgewährung)
Asylum Procedure Act (Asylverfahrengesetz)
Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, abbreviated AsylbLG)
Berlin Center for Treatment of Torture Victims (Behandlungszentrum für Folteropfer - BZFO)
Caritas Catholic Charities (Caritas)
Charity of the Protestant Church (Diakonisches Werk - DK)
Churches in Asylum (Kirchen im Asyl)
Citizenship and Nationality Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz)
Collective accommodation facilities (Asylantheimen)
Commissioner of the Berlin Senate for Integration and Migration (Beauftragter des Berliner Senats für Integration und Migration)
Commissioner on Foreigners Affairs (Ausländerbeauftragte)
Compulsory duty to attend school (Schulpflicht)
Conference of the Ministry of Presidents of the federal states (Konferenz der Ministerpräsidenten der Länder)
Eastern European of German origin (Aussiedler)
Federal Agency for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees (Bundesamt für die Anerkennung von ausländischer Flüchtlinge - BAFL)
Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge - BAMF)
Federal Ministry for Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung)
Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales)
Federal Ministry for Family, Seniors and Youth (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend)
Federal Ministry of Health (Bundesministerium für Gesundheit)
Federal Ministry of Interior (Bundesministerium des Inneren)
Federal Training Assistance Act (Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz - BAföG).
Federal Social Welfare Act (Bundessozialhilfegesetz – BSHG)
Federal States (Bundesländer)
Formal limited permit to remain (Aufenthaltserlaubnis)
Formal obligation (Verpflichtungserklärung)
Foreigners Office (Ausländerbehörde)
Foreigners' policy (Ausländerpolitk)
Freedom of Movement Act for citizens within the EU (Freizugigkeitsgesetz/EU).
German Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz – AuslG)
German as a second language classes (Deutsch als Zweitsprache - DAZ)
German "community of fate" (Schicksalgemeinschaft)
Germans from the GDR (Übersiedler)
German Parliament (Bundesrat)
German Red Cross (Deutsches Rotes Kreuz - DRK)
Germany's Basic Law (Grundgesetz - GG)
Guest workers (Gastarbeiter)
Hardship cases (Hartefällen) and Hardship case rule (Härtefallregelung)
Hardship Commission (Härtefallkommission)
Higher education courses (Weiterbildung)

Internal authority's directive (Weisung)

Standing conference of the Interior ministers and senators of the federal states - IMC) (Ständige Konferenz der Innenminister und -senatoren der Länder- IMK)

Interior Senator (Innensenator)

Jesuit Refugee Services (Jesuitischer Flüchtlingsdienst)

Last due date (Stichtag)

Legal Old Case Rule (Gesetzliche Altfallregelung)

Local district authority (Bezirksamt) and Local district authorities (Bezirksämter)

Medical certificate (Ärtzliches Attest)

New Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz)

Obligation to cooperate (Mitwirkungspflicht)

Permanent right to stay (Bleiberecht)

Permission to remain (Aufenthaltsgestattung)

Permit-free residence right (erlaubnisfreien Aufenthalt)

Police medical service (polizeiärztlichen Dienst – PÄD)

Raphael's Work (Raphaels-Werk)

Refugee Council (Flüchtlingsrat)

Regional Authority for Central Social Administrative Duties (Landesamt für Zentrale Soziale Aufgaben – LASOZ)

Required to leave Germany within seven days (Ausreisepflichtig)

Regulation on permanent right to stay (Bleiberechtsregelung)

Resettlers (Aussiedler)

Residency authorization (Aufenthaltsgenehmigung)

Residence obligation restriction (Residenzpflicht)

Resident permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis - § 15 AuslG)

Resident permit status (Aufenthaltsstatus)

Residence restriction/duty (Residenzpflicht)

Resident title (Aufenthaltstitel)

Resident title for exceptional purposes (Aufenthaltsbefugnis - § 30 AuslG)

Resident title for specific purposes (Aufenthaltsbewilligung - § 28 and 29 AuslG)

Resident dispositive (Aufenthaltsdispositive)

Right of unlimited residence (Aufenthaltsberechtigung - § 27 AuslG)

Right to settle permanently (unbefristete Niederlassungserlaubnis)

Rule of mercy (Gnadenrecht)

Senatorial Administration of Interior Affairs (Senatsverwalung für Inneres)

Single case rule (Einzelfallregelung)

Social Welfare Offices (Sozialämter)

Southeast Europe Cultural Club (Südost Europa Kultur e.V.)

Special education schools (Sonderschule)

State Department for Labor, Social Welfare and Women (Senatsverwaltung für Arbeit, Soziales, und Frauen)

Supreme Federal State Authority (Obereste Landesbehörde)

Temporary right of residency (befristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis)

Temporary suspension of deportation (Duldung)

Uninterrupted issuance of the Duldung year after year (Kettenduldung)

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Visa obligations (Visaauflagen)

Volunteer activities (ehrenamtliche Beschäftigungen)

Work Permit (Arbeitserlaubnis)

Work Permit Decree (Arbeitserlaubnisverordnung - AEVO)

Workers Welfare Association (Arbeiterwohlfahrt - AWO)

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1. Introduction - A Human Rights Dilemma

In times of political conflicts of an extended duration, people are often forced out of their home countries due to insecure situations and are thus reliant on protection in other safe countries. Yet, policies and procedures for receiving asylum seekers and displaced persons in safe countries are often inconsistent with the needs of the individuals seeking protection. In cases where there is a need or an interest to remain and to *integrate*, it is the responsibility of the receiving government and society to protect the human rights of asylum seekers and refugees, and to advocate for *long-term durable solutions* for their incorporation (UNHCR 2003).[1] Based on the two principles that emerged following the atrocities that took place during World War II, it was agreed that granting asylum is a human right and humanitarian issue that must be ensured.[2]

Despite this, (Western) governments often make political decisions about refugees and migrants based on security considerations and related social and economic consequences (Joly 1992, 1996). Concerned about having to respond to the needs of asylum seekers, many governments have contributed to creating a *climate of disbelief* to individuals submitting asylum claims. An emerging trend in Europe and North America has been to increase efforts to instill and monitor controls of unskilled and undocumented workers in order to prevent the *non-useful* from entering, while at the same time, recruiting and easing the immigration of skilled and professional workers, deemed useful by the government and employers (Harris 2002). In line with this trend, refugees and asylum seekers are often mistakenly taken for *economic migrants* and thus denied protection. The two principles at issue when it comes to asylum: Article 13(2) of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, have thus been called into question as governments attempt to avoid their responsibility to provide protection to asylum seekers and refugees (Harris 2002). This is evident by claims that individuals flock to certain countries, like the US or Germany, as they represent attractive locations to asylum seekers, an argument that is supported by push/pull theories and "underpinned by the notion of the migrant as a

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[1] When referring to forced migration - encompassing asylum seekers and refugees - an obvious absence of agreement prevails about what is meant with long-term protection, durable solutions, incorporation, and integration policies, as will be shown in this study.

[2] The first principle in Article 13(2) of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights "proclaims the right of all to leave the country in which they live." The second principle in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees acknowledges grounds on which a person may seek asylum in another country and affirms the rights of those in flight not to be returned by force to the country of origin – or from which they are fleeing. This principle also accords permission to those in flight to enter a country, if necessary, without proper documents, provided they report to the authorities as soon as possible with a proper explanation (Harris 2002:36).

rational agent weighing up the pros and cons of the situation in his or her home country and of the country of migration" (Watters 2008:16). Yet, push/pull theories are often criticized and rightly so, for their lack of applicability in situations involving forced migration. These theories rarely reflect the circumstances and potential disadvantages in the destination city that migrants face in situations in which they are forced to leave or are displaced (Castles/Miller 2003). The defining factor of displacement, i.e. fleeing, is the absence of will or consent (UNHCR 2007:164). Yet, discussions on forced migration tend to be closely linked to national-level concerns with border control, national security, and costs of protection (Castles 2003). As such, Western states generally do not give refugees priority to conditions of entry or settlement, evident by the drop in global refugee figures after the mid 1990s.[3]

This raises attention to a complex paradox, namely, that poor individuals in need, albeit with legitimate reasons for fleeing, face greater entry restrictions and a lack of freedom of mobility at a time when the transnational mobility of goods, commodities, and capital as well as of the rich has become more simplified as a result of neo-liberal reform and globalization (Anderson et al. n.d.; Castles 2003). The explanation for this contradiction is embedded in capitalism and economic advantages expected to be gained. The latter approach is deemed valuable and in line with the economic and national interests of the nation-state. The first is interlinked with high costs and fears. Fears abound that "newcomers will simply be too numerous, and aggravate the pockets of persistent unemployment and poverty already found in the midst of the [receiving societies'] prosperity" (Fischer et. al. 2011:9). Governments nonetheless remain morally responsible to shelter and protect asylum applicants fleeing persecution as agreed to following World War II.

Based on current practice Western policy makers tend to rely on policies, allowing for a threshold, to let a certain percent of the population *fall through the cracks*, meaning that policy makers in the name of economic efficiency can choose to deny 40,000 asylum claimants protection due to illegal entry, lack of legal documentation, insufficient evidence of persecution, travel through a third country, or any number of other reasons. Policy makers can even decide that 40,000 refugees are too many, but 5,000 would be acceptable or even economically *optimal* (Mittal et al. 1999). Such restrictive responses are indicative of the (moral) conflict of interests with which governments are currently faced. This trend is clearly

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[3] Between 1975 and 1985, the global refugee population grew from 2.4 million to 10.5 million, and to 14.9 million by 1990. Towards the end of the Cold War a high point was reached in 1993 with a global refugee population of 18.2 million (Castles 2003). The global refugee population had declined by 2000 to 12.1 million (UNCHR 1995, 2000 in: Castles 2003) and these figures only compose those applicants whose claims were recognized.

evident in Europe, and to a somewhat lesser extent in the US, as governments dispute asylum claimants' evidence of persecution and in so doing, accuse applicants of "being 'bogus,' illegal immigrants to be expelled, forcibly returned to the country of their nationality (even if they did not live there)" (Harris 2002:37).

Governments are able to do this based on the human condition "to think in categorical terms" (Massey 2007:10). In our desire for purity, each society has a social structure that divides people into categories based on a combination of achieved and ascribed traits.[4] According to Dominelli (1992), constructions of categories often differentiate along biological features such as skin color, gender, and hair type. Cultural practices, linguistic abilities, religious observances, are among other features, since these are aspects of an individual's or group's identity, which are commonly castigated as *inferior* by a dominant group with the power to enforce its definitions of reality on others. Because ambiguity is a threat, anyone who is not normalized and cannot be categorized becomes the target of either exclusionary or assimilationist practices (Bauman 2001).

Considering the exclusionary potential intrinsic with this, I rely in this study on a definition of racism (cf. Hall 1996, 19971; Marshall 1963; Miles 1993) that embodies a set of contradictory assumptions significant to *third way* governance (cf. Giddens 1998). This is symptomatic of the phenomenon considered detrimental to community building and inclusion. "Crucial to current policy prescriptions is the reconstitution of the subject of racism, such that both the perpetrator and target are viewed through the policy lens of emotional governance." (Kyriakides 2008:592) This implies that policy defines racism according to the needs of the state. Third way politics signify a shift in governing as well as the tension between racist causation and state authority. The potential for marginalization and exclusionary processes must thus also be considered for a balanced and realistic assessment, particularly against the background of globalization and the focus on socioeconomic profits, as the existence of vertical ethnic inequality or vertical ethnic differentiation has the potential of preventing newcomers from fully accessing material resources at the structural level and participating equally in society (Nestvogel 2006).

Theories on *habitus* and capital (Bourdieu 1989, 1990, 2004) and on integration and incorporation (cf. Alba/Nee 2003; Esser 2004; Gesemann 2001; Newland et al. 2007; Penninx 2003; Portes/Rumbaut 1996) are useful for accessing inconsistencies in government responses

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[4] "Achieved characteristics are those acquired in the course of living, whereas ascribed characteristics are set at birth." (Massey 2007:1) The categories of characteristics are defined within a social structure based on intrinsic codes or *schemas* that have been learned and influence all interactions and relationships.

and varying modes of refugee incorporation, i.e. whether newcomers are able to access necessary resources and participate equally in society.

Hartmut Esser (2004) has contributed to this debate by introducing theories on individual assimilation, individual segmentation and multiple inclusion. In an attempt to determine alternatives to assimilation, he differentiated four dimensions deemed integral to social integration (and important for refugees in rebuilding their lives) regardless of the social system in which they occur (Nestvogel 2006). One dimension reflects cultural aspects (*Kulturation*), which refers to the refugees' ability to learn, respond and adapt to new situations, language and cultural norms in the receiving society. How flexible is the refugee in the new context? How willing and open is the refugee to change? The second dimension refers to structural factors (*Platzierung*), covering the refugee's access to rights and ability to negotiate important positions, such as participating in the labor market and other societal activities, accessing the educational system and maintaining an independent financial base in the receiving society.[5] The third dimension, social assimilation (*Interaktion*), incorporates the refugee's social relations and ability to participate and belong in crucial networks, clubs, and organizations. How open is the receiving society toward the refugee? How outgoing must the refugee be to engage people and interact in the new context? The fourth dimension refers to the emotional adaptation (*Identifikation*) of the refugee, encompassing the individuals' sense of loyalty to the receiving society. This last dimension entails a self-assessment on the refugees' identity, religion and worldviews, compatibility with Western values and attitudes, as well as an overall sense of belonging in the receiving society (Esser 2004). All of these dimensions together reflect the realm in which the individual maneuvers in the receiving society context in order to rebuild his/her life and as such can be referred to as cultural, structural, social and emotional assimilation.[6]

This approach, however, focuses mainly on the *refugee's* potential, resources and willingness to integrate *into* the receiving society context (Nestvogel 2006:77). But what happens when institutional constraints curb the potential or will of the newcomer in the integration process? The institutional realm, including the obstacles hindering the refugee's ability to access resources, slips out of focus with this assimilation approach, as it focuses

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[5] Researchers tend to focus attention most on the economic factors influencing adaptation processes, perhaps due to the availability of data collected on immigrant economic circumstances, or perhaps due to the significance of the receiving society's expectation that migrants should be economically self-sufficient. Alba and Nee (2003) argue, rather than speaking of structural assimilation or even socioeconomic assimilation, the better term would be: "minority participation in mainstream socioeconomic institutions" (p.28), as this assesses the migrant's ability to access resources, to participate, and to be *incorporated* into the labor market, as the case may be.
[6] Translated: Kulturelle, strukturelle, sozialer, und emotionale Assimilation.

heavily on the potential and motivation of the refugee. Precisely such an assessment - considering what it takes for an individual to rebuild his/her life, despite the given conditions in the new context – is the main issues to be explored in this study.

I draw from Pierre Bourdieu, who in describing two distinct systems of *social hierarchization* prevalent in modern societies, acknowledges the significance of the institutional realm as an influence on *habitus* and options for full participation. Bourdieu suggests that in the first system of social hierarchization - which is economic - position and power are determined by money and property. Capital determines one's social ranking, which alludes to social capital, another of the fundamental powers and forms that the species of capital assume when perceived and recognized as legitimate (Bourdieu 1989). Social capital, Bourdieu explains, refers to:

> "Die Gesamtheit der aktuellen und potentiellen Ressourcen die mit dem Besitz eines dauerhaften Nutzens von mehr oder weniger institutionisierten Beziehungen gegenseitigen Kennens und Anerkennens verbunden sind; (…)Ressourcen, die auf Zugehörigkeit zu einer Gruppe beruhen." (Bourdieu 1983:191)

The social capital of belonging to a group can thus result in the acknowledgement of societal *Kreditwürdikeit* (Bourdieu 1983).

The second system of social hierarchization is cultural or symbolic; accordingly, the determinants of one's status is based in how much cultural or *symbolic capital* one possesses (Bourdieu 1984). Cultural capital exists in three forms:

> "in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, i.e., in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace of realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the institutionalized state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as we will see in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee." (Bourdieu 1986 in: Ball 2004:17)

Intrinsic with the notion of cultural capital is what Bourdieu calls legitimate knowledge, which incorporates language proficiency and general knowledge as well as flexibility and the ability to adapt to new surroundings and to normalize a situation. But for an individual to have legitimate knowledge, the implication is that the agents' knowledge is perceived and recognized as legitimate in the overall social space (Bourdieu 1989). With this, the focus widens in scope to include both individual as well as institutional dimensions in assessing social integration by including the *expectations* the host society has of the refugee and the

extent to which the individual is able to access resources and be recognized for the capital possessed or further accumulated in the new context.[7]

In accessing what it takes for an individual to rebuild his/her life in a new context it is necessary therefore, to consider the institutional realm as well. Afterall, the openness of the integration definition "reflects the fact that the responsibility for integration rests not with one particular group but rather with many actors - immigrants themselves, the host government, institutions, and communities, to name a few" (Penninx 2003). Depending on the reception responses of these different actors greatly affects newcomers' perceptions of their standing and ability to participate in the political, economic and social processes.

This understanding of integration is important in order to avoid any connotations of one-sided assimilation processes.[8] In contemporary debates, politicians and the media commonly speak about integration but mean assimilation, despite the general and increasingly more popular understanding of integration as a bilateral process in which migrants and refugees as well as the receiving society are expected to be actively involved in achieving integration (Alba/Nee 2003; Portes/Rumbaut 1996; Gesemann 2001; Berliner Integrationsbeauftragter 2005). In so doing, they ignore the multilateral approach of integration, requiring the responsibility and involvement of the receiving society as well as the migrant and refugee, and instead place the burden of integrating on the newcomers alone. For sake of clarity therefore, when referring to integration in this study it is broadly defined as a "dynamic, multidirectional process in which newcomers and the receiving communities intentionally work together, based on a shared commitment to tolerance and justice, to create a secure, welcoming, vibrant, and cohesive society" (Newland et al. 2007).

Moreover, according to various indicators influencing refugee integration, the premise is that refugees and migrants fare emotionally better in pluralistic societies that promote cultural diversity and integration as a national goal (Berry 2007:549) and apply measures to *incorporate* the newcomers. Generally, incorporation policies seek a comprehensive approach, considering the individual dimensions of the individual in focus and relevant to all areas of society and all branches of administration and policymaking. This understanding,

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[7] With this, an attempt is made to move away from the *burdened* understanding of assimilation in light of the *ideological baggage* associated with previous conceptions and one-way integration processes (Kivisto 2003).
[8] Assimilation terminology is often deemed *outdated* and controversial, since it encourages a reconstruction of unequal power balances. Assimilation implies that the responsibility of integration falls solely to the migrant/refugee. Acculturation research, although more holistic than assimilation, also tends to focus more on the process by which immigrants acquire the host society's cultural patterns and develop working relationships according to their new environment (Lakey 2003 in: Augustí-Panareda 2006:410). Integration terminology has also become more contentious in recent debates due to politicized misappropriation of the intended bilateral approach.

however, acknowledges that differences in governing policies - relative to asylum, reception, and diversity laws – create interpretive and instrumental differences that inevitably affect the political and social incorporation of refugees (Bloemraad 2006:4). Afterall, one-sided integration approaches tend to be "deliberately left open due to the varying requirements for acceptance by a receiving society" (Penninx 2003).

This study consequently devotes attention to the individual and institutional characteristics framing the terms of reception and integration for newcomers, while also considering effects of post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) and recovery among refugees. I intend to put names and personal narratives to the voiceless, nameless refugees, who have been castigated as *filth*, *other*, *alien*, *economic migrants*, *fake refugees*, as well as *wasted lives* (Bauman 2004 in: van Houtum/Freerk 2009) in order to emphasize that refugees are humans, worthy of protection with durable solutions, and equal opportunity in destination countries.

1.1 Focus Group and Aims of the Study

The aim of this study is to examine the reception conditions and modes of incorporation impacting a specific sample of Bosnian refugees,[9] consisting of both men and women, who were displaced and sought protection in either Berlin or Chicago in the early 1990s as a result of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia or Bosnia-Herzegovina) between 1992 and 1995.[10] By having the sample evaluate their well-being over a near 15-year time span, I shed light on their perspectives regarding the opportunities, obstacles, key institutions, and actors involved in their adaptation processes in the two contexts.[11] In this regard, it is necessary to examine the individual personalities and socio-demographic characteristics of my sample as factors of influence that shape their narratives and reflect their well-being and assessment of the government responses relative to their reception. The different coping strategies my interlocutors have applied play a key role in understanding how they have been able to orient themselves and regain control over their post-migration lives. The different contexts into which they were received also influence their ability to maneuver and manage their adaptation, as will be shown.

Throughout this study, the terminology used reflects the refugees' adaptation process, though the focus is on the integration options of the Bosnian refugees in the receiving society

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[9] Although my Berlin sample was never granted a recognized refugee status, I interchange the term *refugee* in this study, referring to my samples in both Berlin and Chicago, for purposes of language simplification.
[10] A brief review of the events leading up to the Bosnian war can be found in Appendix J of this study.
[11] I have considered theories on transnationalism and refugee incorporation since transnationalism refers to social processes occurring in space and refugee incorporation refers to processes transpiring over time (cf. Kivisto 2003).

contexts. An attempt has been made to connect isolated research traditions (post-colonial theories, human rights, gender studies, refugee studies) by using approaches found in migration literature and integrating them with an interdisciplinary approach. The study combines theoretical discussion on the role of networks, Diaspora communities, resources, and capital with fieldwork evidence, including interviews with Bosnian refugees and representatives from NGOs, resettlement agencies and government agency representatives. In addition, this study is framed by the scholarly literature on inclusion and exclusion, marginalization and racism, as well as integration and incorporation theories.

I am cautious in using the term *integration* as opposed to incorporation due to the incorrect application of immigrant-management policies and misuse of meaning in public discourses, as *integration* is typically used as a means to conceive the terms and conditions for *successful integration*, while the newcomers expected to integrate are forced into merely responding to these given conditions. Along this line of thinking, the intention in this study is to examine whether a multiplayer integration process has been applied in Berlin and Chicago, allowing for the refugees to contribute in changing the character and nature of the host society contexts to a similar extent as the institutions and mainstream society influence the way the refugees are able to lead their lives (Newland et al. 2007).

1.2 Key Research Questions

Considering the pragmatic, liberal integration approach in the United States compared to the stricter integration approach in Germany, one of the central questions guiding this research addresses the differences in the institutional settings and reception and incorporation conditions influencing the emotional well-being and overall adaptation progress of the sample of Bosnian refugees. A principle behind this study is to not underestimate the relevance and enduring power of the institutional dimension in the two contexts in shaping the samples' responses. This study thus hopes to contribute to debates on long-term durable solutions in response to flight and much needed longitudal data by comparing the modes of refugee incorporation over space and time. In focusing on the concerns of my interlocutors relative to their adaptation experiences, I narrowed the range of interview topics to gather specific data necessary for my theoretical framework (Charmaz 2002:676). A comparison of the outcomes in the two contexts is expected to provide insight into the maneuverability of my respondents within the institutional constraints.

Becoming a refugee implies leaving one's previous life behind. I aim to assess whether becoming a refugee must also mean the diminution of one's future. Considering theories from Foucault (1979, 1994), from Bourdieu (1989, 1990, 2004) on *habitus* and capital, and

borrowing from distinguishing factors identified by Newland, Tanaka and Barker (2007) in influencing refugee and migrant integration in receiving societies, I aim to explore the particular issues that bear uniquely on the Bosnian refugees' experience by examining the following questions: How do the respondents in my sample perceive the structural or institutional factors influencing their ability to obtain economic and political access in the mainstream society? Are they able to achieve economic capital and social mobility, i.e. can they acquire a job, earn a decent living wage, improve their economic status over time and save money to buy coveted material objects such as a car, an apartment or home? Considering their subaltern status, how do they perceive the political factors associated with refugee integration? (Spivak 1988) Are they able to secure a resident status or acquire citizenship in the host society? Do they feel a sense of belonging, or ability to retain linguistic, cultural, or religious ties with the country of origin? Is there a difference in the two contexts regarding their terminology on membership or belonging? Do they speak of a *we* and a *them* or a *we* and an *our*? What impact does this have on notions of nation and notions of equality, as Butler and Spivak (2007) question in their book "Who Sings the Nation-State?" How do the refugees perceive their ability to adapt and be accepted as equal members of the receiving society? (Newland et al. 2007) To what extent are the newcomers encouraged to actively participate in the resources, interactions and activities of the receiving society in a move towards equality? What instruments and activities in the receiving society context – as perceived by the refugees themselves – facilitate or impede their adaptation process and their active participation? To what extent are they able to normalize their situation and accumulate symbolic capital and how does this differ in the two contexts? How do they feel emotionally and psychologically? What individual and/or collective coping strategies are they able to develop to respond in the varying contexts? How do their individual personalities influence their actions? These and other related questions are to be explored in this study relative to my samples' own perception of their adaptation processes in Berlin and Chicago.

1.3 Logic of the Comparison

Based on the state of the art in research, there is not a clear answer whether individual or structural factors are of greater importance with respect to the integration of migrants/refugees (Demel et al. 2003). Much research has been conducted on the role of language proficiency within the hierarchy of integration, labor market incorporation, psychological aspects and the satisfaction of refugees and migrants themselves. Few studies have attempted, however, to cover such a wide scope as this study of, first, assessing both individual and structural factors influencing a refugee group, and, secondly, comparing these results in two different contexts.

Only recently has a greater focus been placed in research on the well-being of refugees/migrants (cf. Migration Policy Group 2011) but even this issue is relatively under examined. A contribution to current integration and asylum debates is expected to be made with this study, as it demonstrates a constant link between internal and external factors in understanding individual and collective dimensions influencing change, action and interaction.

A comparison of the contextual depiction of Berlin and Chicago, reflecting the extent to which my sample is able to accumulate capital over time in the receiving societies or to be recognized for the capital they already possessed, makes sense for a number of reasons. By examining the modes of incorporation in the United States and Germany of a comparable population group - forced Bosnian refugees seeking protection for the same reason around the same time period - new insight into the reception contexts and settlement practices in the two populations can be gathered and compared. This is expected to be particularly relevant considering the widely different socio-political and settlement processes (with Germany's restrictions on gaining legal employment and limiting citizenship, and the United States' expectation of early economic self-sufficiency and ease in citizenship acquisition) impacting the Bosnian refugees differently in the two contexts. An exploration of the situation of Bosnian refugees regarding their abilities to access strategic resources in Berlin and Chicago ought to contribute to the overall debate on reception and settlement practices in the two countries and aid in presenting modalities of inclusion and exclusion needed for ensuring long-term durable solutions. A comparison of the outcomes in the two contexts is expected to provide insight into the maneuverability of my respondents within the institutional constraints and shed light on approaches for fostering refugee resettlement and incorporation. In expounding on the differences in US and German asylum and refugee legislation, I also identify factors that deter refugees from equal participation in society.

Berlin and Chicago were selected as a basis for comparison since they signify two of the largest metropolitan areas in each respective country that took in Bosnians seeking protection following the Bosnian war. An estimated 40,000 Bosnians settled in Chicago (Interview, ORR), while nearly 30,000 Bosnian refugees were received in Berlin in the early 1990s (Interview, JRS). While much research with a psychological perspective dedicated to understanding the transition of Bosnian refugees traumatized by war was released after fighting ended, little to no research has been carried out to better understand the current situation and adaptation process of this focus group. Few studies of a comparative nature have been released that focus on the incorporation and resettlement practices of Bosnian refugees,

and none compare the context of their reception in Berlin with that of Chicago. Moreover, few studies exist that reflect the experiences and perspectives of a certain refugee population relative to their views on adapting and accumulating capital. Likewise, little research exists that reflects the specific everyday life situation of Bosnian refugees' adaptation opportunities (or lack thereof) and their ability to succeed in the destination country.

By considering how important time is as a variable influencing socioeconomic achievement and the likelihood of successful incorporation into a host society, particular attention is directed towards changes in skills, resources, status, and motivation since the Bosnians' arrival in the country of refuge. One intention of the research is to identify the specific needs of this migrant group regarding its incorporation into the different spheres of society, the mechanisms responsible for its social exclusion/inclusion, and its scope of response to varying conditions. After more than 10 years of experience in the host society, the Bosnians' own perceptions on their access and modes of incorporation should provide relevant new research results that could be useful for devising refugee reception and incorporation policies for other new arrivals.

1.4 Research Design and Structure of the Study

The study contains six chapters. To introduce the topic, Chapter one presents brief profiles on the participating focus group and the two contexts of focus, a review of terms and concepts such as integration and incorporation, the accumulation of symbolic capital, as well as the main research questions and logic undergirding the study. It also lays out the general framework of the research approach and design.

Chapter two - in which I position myself – relates my methodological access. It describes the participants, the methods of data collection, and the data analysis employed.

Chapter three relates the historical, sociopolitical and legal access. It touches on the situation in Bosnia leading to the mass exodus of thousands of displaced Bosnians (refer to Appendix J for a more detailed overview of events in Yugoslavia to better understand the focus groups' impetus for migrating. Chapter three also details Germany's and the US' responses to the sample of Bosnians, referring the reader to Appendices K and L for a more detailed contextualization of the two nations' responses to foreigners in general in the 20-30 years preceding the Bosnian conflict. Insight can be gleaned into the differences and similarities of the refugee reception and incorporation policies in the two countries as a result. Chapter four begins the analysis of results, using grounded theory to evaluate and compare my respondents' perception of their actions, interactions, and ability to access the institutional, socio-cultural, and emotional resources in the two contexts. It identifies the facilitating factors

and obstacles that influenced my respondents and examines the extent to which this seems to shape their overall ability to manage their post-migration adaptation. The coping strategies my sample applied in response to the individual and institutional dimensions and the situations in which the refugees feel impeded in their maneuverability are also described. This is followed by a listing of typologies, or structures of generalizations of refugee reception.

Due to its expansive focus, many important findings emerged in this study. Chapter five presents the grounded theory, and suggests that due to the complexity of integration, as multiple processes running across numerous domains, no decisive single cause and effect relation relative to refugee integration could be established. Rather, multiple interrelated cause and effect variables exist, alluding to a tension and confirming the complexity of individuals, integration processes, and welfare and rights regimes. The grounded theory is substantiated in Chapter five by the three main findings influencing adaptation and integration opportunities. The first finding reflects the sociodemographic characteristics of the person migrating, indicating differences in reception processes between males and females, elderly and youth, highly educated and less educated, etc. The second finding considers the mental health and well-being of a newcomer, while the third considers both policies and the context of the receiving society, referred to as institutional denominators. This includes an overall analysis of the two countries' modes of refugee incorporation.

All of this information from the preceding chapters is then brought together in Chapter six, which concludes the study with an analysis of the symbolic capital the focus group was able to accumulate and for which they were recognized in the two contexts, while also addressing the symbolic violence used against them. The study ends with a discussion on the challenges of Western governments to resolve contemporary migration issues while also ensuring protection of fundamental human rights.

2. Methodological Access

As described in Chapter one, the aim of this study is to examine the extent to which members of my sample managed their adaptation processes and perceived their ability to access resources and maneuver in Berlin and Chicago. By considering the facilitating factors and the obstacles in the receiving societies as well as each respondent's individual attributes, I narrowed the range of interview topics to gather specific data necessary for my theoretical framework (Charmaz 2002:676).

2.1 Subjects / Sample

Initially, the selection criteria applied in seeking research participants was based on locating Bosnians, who had resettled to Chicago or Berlin as a result of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and who were still living in one of these two cities at the time of the interviews.[12] Although their reasons for seeking protection were based on similar motives, attributed to the Bosnian war and their forced exodus, their means for entry into the two contexts varied. All of those in the Berlin sample had fled for safety during the course of the war, while the majority of the Chicago sample had applied for resettlement to the US once the war had ended, with some entering the US years later through family reunification schemes. This is an important distinction as it highlights differences in the timing, the conditions for entry, as well as in the agency evident in my samples' migration movements. "The notion of agency centralizes people, conceptualized as social actors who process their own experiences and those of others while acting upon these experiences." (Essed/Ferks/Schrijvers 2004:1). Agency implies a consciousness and ability to engage in specific action. This will be exemplified throughout the study by the decisions and actions of the respondents.

A limit to the study is the uncertainty of the respondents' frame of reference and meanings in contextualizing their positions and experiences. Although it is assumed that they share a common understanding of social reality, particularly since they all came from the same country, differences in meaning may nonetheless result. For instance, due to differences in legal status in the two contexts, being labeled a *refugee* invoked different connotations. My sample in Berlin consisted mainly of applicants with a *tolerated* status, implying temporary and insecure residence rights, while my Chicago sample consisted of mainly *recognized refugees*, many of whom had acquired US citizenship.

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[12] The interviews in Berlin took place from March 2007 to May 2008 and the interviews in Chicago were conducted between April and June 2008.

In total, I conducted 36 semi-structured, problem-oriented interviews (Kühn/Witzel 2000). I chose problem-oriented interviews because they reflect "sowohl den Bezug auf das Subjekt als auch auf die gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen, in denen die Akteure handeln" (Witzel 2001).[13] I interviewed 27 respondents in Chicago and 12 in Berlin, but my sample size of 32 is smaller than the total number of interviews conducted since some of the interviews were categorized as *pretest* interviews and because some of the characteristics of the interview respondents did not meet the specific criteria accorded the focus group. For instance, one interview partner resettled first to New York and then later moved to Chicago and another did not enter Chicago as a refugee, but by means of a student sponsorship program. While I did not deliberately search for a specific number of participants, I nevertheless preferred that my sample be broad enough to capture the experiences of different ethnicities, religions, age groups, and economic and educational backgrounds. As far as possible, I was also conscious of selecting an equal number of adult men and women to participate in my sample.

Applying *purposeful selection* (Maxwell 2005), my refugee sample consists of 19 women and 13 men with varying education levels, ranging from no formal schooling to postgraduate degrees.[14] The youngest respondent was 21 and the oldest was 76 years old. The majority in my sample had been living for a period ranging between nine to 19 years in the receiving society. 27 respondents declared their ethnic identity as Bosnian, three as Croatian, one as Serbian, and one as Roma. Most of these respondents prefer to identify themselves as only Bosnian or Yugoslav. 18 declared their religious identity as Muslim, two as Orthodox, four as Catholic, five answered atheists or no affiliation, and three had mixed religions.[15] Among my sample, one fled Bosnia with a friend, seven fled on their own, and the other 24 respondents escaped Bosnia accompanied by at least one family member; 16 received some form of mental health services in the destination country, 12 did not, and four are unclear cases, meaning they made no mention of it.

In the context of the qualitative paradigm, this sample size proved more than sufficient to obtain reliable and informative results to conceptualize what is going on in the empirical data.

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[13] FQS (Forum Qualitatative Sozialforschung) Homepage.

[14] The Bosnian school system is based on 12 years of education and many, but not the majority, attended college after graduating from high school.

[15] Despite my effort to interview a diverse range of Bosnians, Muslim respondents made up the majority, reflective of the vulnerability of the refugee population. I assume this is related to the fact that the Muslim-Bosnians had no other territory to which to flee and consequently, benefited more likely from resettlement options. While their stories can not be proclaimed as representative of all Bosnian Muslims, their high number is supported by statistics (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2003), in which an estimated 2.2 million of the four million Bosnians forcibly displaced from the Bosnian territory during the war were Muslim-Bosnians (Miscovic 2007).

The results are not meant to be representative, despite the goal to obtain depth. Also, the sample does not attempt to be representative of the adaptation experiences of refugees in the two contexts nor is it representative of the Bosnian refugee population in the two cities or the two countries. Rather they can be viewed as a type of snapshot, caught in time, of how well my informants are doing in the two contexts at the time of the interviews. Despite variances in their personal stories and the conditions greeting them, some similarities are present in their tales of suffering and surviving (Huttunen 2005). The respondents able to speak the host society language and who felt more in control of their situation tended to be more willing to participate in the research and be interviewed. As a consequence, I failed to reach those in jail, or who had been deported, had decided to repatriate to Bosnia, or who were disinterested in interviewing with a translator, among other factors.

2.2 Procedure - Access to and Selection of Research Participants

I established contact with the research participants by means of criterion-based selection in which I selected cases based on specific criteria, i.e. being Bosnian, having fled the war, etc. I also applied *snowball sampling* in which I contacted individuals and staff members at relevant organizations working with Bosnians, such as refugee resettlement organizations or refugee advocacy agencies in both Berlin and Chicago. Relying on means of referrals from personal contacts, the snowball effect led to a chain reaction of identifying cases of interest from people who knew people, who then referred me to individuals they thought would be, first, willing to meet with me, and secondly, who represented information-rich cases. And finally, I applied maximum variation sampling in which I selected interview respondents in an effort to capture and describe central themes that cut across a great deal of participant variation (Patton 1990 in: Draucker et al. 2007).

I contacted these people in writing and by telephone in order to schedule potential interviews. Many readily agreed to an interview. Some respondents, however, declined to be interviewed, usually stating that they were not interested in "thinking about all of that again" or that they lacked the time to devote to the topic. Clearly, the topic caused a sense of inner pain, unease, and sadness. Weaver and Burns note, "Many [refugees] are reluctant or unable to talk about traumatic experiences, others are grateful for the opportunity to share their stories and be believed" (2001:152). Some of the *reluctant respondents* may have felt threatened by my research proposition due to a number of varying factors such as, for instance, a sense of my intruding in their personal experiences, seeking to address topics painful to them, particularly ones many prefer to repress, mistrust of my intentions, fear of retaliation, etc. (Alder/Adler 2007).

Only after reaffirming that my focus was primarily on their experiences in the receiving society and not necessarily the war and life experiences in Bosnia did several of these referrals, which originally refused an interview, agree to speak with me. Their change in attitude may be reflective of a sort of *balanced rapport* (Fontana/Frey 1994:364) that had been established. For certain, at least a minimum level of trust had emerged, which further evolved throughout the interview process.

Prior to each interview, the research participants were informed of the location, duration, aim and context of the interview. They were asked in advance to sign a letter of consent before beginning the interview. Talks were conducted in English, German and Bosnian. Only those interviews conducted in the Bosnian language were accompanied by a translator; otherwise they were conducted on an individual basis with me as researcher.[16] Also as part of this interview process, each research participant was asked to complete a standardized survey questionnaire, providing personal history and general background information, such as age, gender, ethnicity, religious identity, educational and professional background, current professional situation, and legal status in the destination country, which were used as additional variables in the analysis.

The interviews took place in offices, in cafes and restaurants, in my apartment, in the homes of the subjects, or in other private rooms that were quiet and conducive to interviewing techniques. The approach to collect the research data was based on semi-structured, problem-oriented interviews (Kühn/Witzel 2000) and participant observation (Geertz 1984; Glaser/Strauss 1967). The open, in-depth interview questions were pre-tested in the form of pilot interviews with individuals possessing similar characteristics and backgrounds as the research participants. Modifications in the interviews were applied as necessary based on the initial experiences made in the testing phase. Likewise, a constant reflexive approach to the questions and whether they worked for the specific participant were also taken into account (Denzin/Lincoln 1994). The responses were recorded, transcribed and collated in a unified format of interview protocols, which were further accompanied by my own version of an interview protocol, compiled following each interview along with ongoing memos compiled throughout the research process. Time was allotted for sequential or follow-up interviews to gain more depth, detail, resonance, and to follow up on earlier leads (Maxwell 2005).

I was able to interview advocacy workers, government actors, or select experts involved in the reception and integration process of the Bosnian refugees in Berlin and Chicago. They,

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[16] In one interview, the daughter of my interview respondent was involved intermittently during the interview in order to assist occasionally by translating in cases of language difficulties.

too, were contacted in writing and by telephone in order to carry out brief face-to-face explorative interviews, focusing on the existing policies and measures implemented at local and national levels. This proved helpful in acquiring inside information and a better understanding of the structural terms of reception in the two contexts as well as additional developments affecting the sample group in this regard.

2.3 Establishing Rapport and Trust

Because Grounded Theory is a cyclical research strategy, the process of meeting interview respondents numerous times was helpful for the analyses (Strauss/Corbin 1990). This was also conducive for establishing trust and rapport, which often requires more time with cross-cultural interview partners, but is nonetheless necessary for effective intercultural interviewing. "Rapport building is difficult enough between research participants who hail from the same culture; the cross-cultural context adds the complexities and the vicissitudes of relatively enduring research encounters." (Ryen 2007:338)

In addition to committing sufficient time to the interview process, I also considered potentially difficult topics for the interview respondents. Sensitivity and particular care were taken so as not to upset or cause a *re-traumatization* of the research participants during the interviews (Bryant-Davis 2005). Direct questions on the Bosnian war were avoided unless it was made clear in the communication process that the individual was interested in speaking on this topic. Many of the interview respondents most hesitant to conduct an interview with me were surprisingly often the ones most absorbed in reconstructing the details surrounding the war and their displacement. Once a certain level of trust was established and narrations began to unfold, many respondents could not hold back. Some respondents surprised themselves by their need to share details of their personal narrative. One Bosnian Serbian interview respondent, for instance, thanked me profusely for taking the time to hear her story, to listen without judgment, and for being an empathetic listener.

According to psychologist Stevan Weine (1999), speaking in such interviews is similar to testimony psychotherapy, which he applied in his work with Bosnian refugees as a means to help them overcome their PTSD symptoms. "For those survivors of ethnic cleansing whose experiences of atrocity remain so largely unarticulated, any chance to tell and be heard can be a way to get parts of the self back and to discover truths." (Weine 1999:60) Other Bosnian refugees I interviewed shared similar views: Generally, they were grateful for my interest in their life stories and details regarding their displacement, reception conditions, and adaptation processes in the societies receiving them after the Bosnian war. My attempt to convey to my respondents the significance of their giving *voice* in their own accounts appeared helpful in

gaining trust and emitting empathy. My focus on the refugees themselves, with the aim to hear their perspectives and to understand (*verstehen*), served to embolden them to share and reconstruct their life perspectives since the war. "With any sensitive topic, the more researchers can indicate that they share respondents' pain or have experienced similar feelings, the more likely it is that respondents will open up." (Daniels 1983 in: Adler/Adler 2007:530) Many tears were shed during these interviews, suggesting a closer relationship and a minimization of hierarchical status differences between my respondents and me.[17]

2.4 Acknowledging Own Positioning

The underpinnings of this study consider life-stories as communication to other people as well as spaces for self-reflection. The stories of my respondents follow in an endless chronology, composed of texts produced as a result of the interview contexts conducted with me. They reflect that "social life remains ordered and narrated through institutional and inter-subjective mechanisms" (Tavory/Timmermans 2009:251). Knowing that my perspectives and belief system influence how I view and work with the collected data, it is important for purposes of understanding that experiences, feelings, actions and interactions be considered, and the context in which these are located be denoted. "As Stuart Hall (1997a) writes, everybody talks from somewhere: In our identity we all find roots, a position from which we see and comprehend the world." (Miskovic 2007:520) In listening, interpreting, and writing the stories of my research participants, I revisited my own identity and sense of belonging.

Although I am not a *cultural insider* in the Bosnian community, my researcher's voice has also been shaped by the fact that I was born and raised in the US and have been ascribed a *third country migrant status* since living in Germany for 14 years. I have encountered a number of similar experiences to those of my research participants residing in Berlin, such as struggling to learn the German language, dealing with cultural differences, waiting in long lines at the Foreigners Office, being dependent on visa extensions as well as the attitudes and moods of the Foreigners Office authorities. I consequently reflected on the phenomenon of resilience, how some individuals find the strength to carry on, and some do not.

Despite these parallels, I by no means pretend to compare the situation of my research participants with my own, since there are far greater differences than similarities between

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[17] I could not help but wonder whether my interlocutors exhibited more trust (through the release of tears) as a result of my gender. According to Denzin (1989a:116), "gender filters knowledge; that is, the sex of the interviewer does make a difference, as the interview takes place within the cultural boundaries of a paternalistic social system in which masculine identities are differentiated from feminine ones" (in: Fontana/Frey 1994:361).

us.[18] My point in raising this issue is, first, to say that my position may have emboldened a number of research participants in being more open with me as a fellow *foreigner* in Germany; and secondly, it enabled me to be more empathetic to their narratives and challenges, which fostered greater trust, something several of my participants acknowledged and welcomed. Furthermore, my particular position tended to confuse many of my research participants in Chicago, as many assumed I was a German PhD candidate. This led many of my research participants to believe I was a foreigner even in my own country of origin.

I was afforded a degree of social proximity with my research participants in both contexts that may have contributed in lessening their hesitancy in narrating and in diminishing the social divisions between us. This may have also contributed to the perception of mutual similarity between me as the researcher and the *researched*. Perhaps, "those who participated in the interviews and who recommended me to their friends and acquaintances share an Andersonian (cf. Anderson 1991) sense of horizontal comradeship that connects the group of people who belong to different ethnicities, nations, and religions, but express similar sentiments" (Miskovic 2007:521).

This position as a researcher seemed to provide me privileged relations with my focus group, which facilitated my access to the *field*. Likewise, my fluency in German and English helped. Had I been proficient in Bosnian, I suspect that I would have procured further advantages in accessing the focus group through a common familiarity with the language. Anthropologists might criticize my inability to speak Bosnian since language and culture are so narrowly interrelated. Language closely connects the experiences of a community and can greatly influence people as they imagine characteristics of cultural identities. Language influences entire cultural societies and expresses what people think, see, eat, and how they feel, etc. (Brown 2006). The use of language in collecting my data may have had a debilitating influence on the expression and interpretation of the narratives of my respondents. The analysis of secondary literature was also limited to the two languages I understand. Without Bosnian language skills, I was reliant on the services of translators, who conducted the interviews for me, though I was always present.

Despite my inability to speak or understand Bosnian, however, one of my interlocutors commented after our interview that the language differences did not appear to interfere in my understanding. Despite the necessary role of the translator, this respondent observed my body language and facial expressions and sensed that I was empathetic to her tale, which served to

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[18] I came to Germany voluntarily, knowing I could return home any time I chose. In addition, US citizens tend to benefit from a privileged status compared to many other third country nationals (TCNs) living in Germany.

encourage her in narrating particularly difficult experiences. She acknowledged and thanked me for this and commented that although it is always difficult to reflect on her life events it was nice to finally feel understood and to have been *heard*. As such, I may have been successful in my goal as a researcher to avoid objectifying the actions and experiences of my interlocutors. "Man muss die Rolle des Handelnden übernehmen und die Welt von seinem Standpunkt aus sehen." (Wilson 1973:62)

Differences in my participants' responses were observable depending on the contexts of the interviews, i.e. whether in Berlin or Chicago. In Chicago, for instance, I was consistently thanked for my interest in my respondents' personal narratives and also for revealing details on the *collective suffering* and lasting impacts of the Bosnian war. My interlocutors expressed gratitude and appreciation for my effort to explore this topic, implying that a general lack of awareness or consciousness of their plight prevailed in the minds of most US residents. In Berlin, on the other hand, my respondents appeared less forthcoming and more suspicious of my motives. Considering the repetition and emotional burden attached to their having had to previously retell their story and provide details to the Foreigners Office regarding their exodus and gates of entry to Germany – necessary to be eligible for protection - their apprehension to meet with me is understandable. This may also attribute to my smaller sample size in Berlin.

The difference in sample size in the two contexts is worthy of attention here since I sought interview participants for close to 14 months in Berlin and only managed to interview 12 participants. By comparison, I was able to conduct 27 interviews in Chicago in fewer than three months, which may be telling of the differences in their perspectives in relation to their destination contexts. Those respondents willing to be interviewed shared a desire to speak, to be heard, and to amend or alter the narrative that has been publicized about them. They agreed to meet with me possibly to work through their trauma and to be heard by an empathetic listener rather than telling parts of the narrative just to prolong their residency rights or to be eligible for resettlement, as was often the case. Those in Chicago were more willing to meet for an interview likely because they are doing better, i.e. they have positive things to report and are more willing to reflect their *successful* adaptation outcomes.[19] Those in Chicago wanted to call attention to their collective suffering and to document not just the tragedy

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[19] Those who did not emit this positive experience tended to refuse to meet me for an interview. In Berlin, this was less true since representatives from therapeutic settings referred many of my interview respondents to me. Whatever the reason, it proved much more difficult to reach interview partners in Berlin.

associated with the war, but their resilience as well, their ability to persevere despite hardship and to be recognized for this feat.

2.5 Theoretical and Methodological Approach

As much as I attempted to establish a dialogue during the interviews, as the interviewer, I was the one who set the research agenda, guided the conversations in a certain direction, analyzed, interpreted and composed the analysis. In order not to leave the texts to speak for themselves, but rather to apply an interpretive meaning to them (*deuten*) (Denzin/Lincoln 1994), grounded theory was the interpreting processes used (Strauss/Corbin 1990). Applying grounded theory methods made sense considering my aim of comparing varying actions and phenomena in the different contexts of Chicago and Berlin.

> "The grounded theory approach is a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon... Through this methodology, the concepts and relationships among them are not only generated but they are also provisionally tested." (Strauss 1990:24)

It is preferred that the researcher has limited knowledge about the domain in focus prior to the start of investigation. Considering this, the research question according to grounded theory methods is a statement that identifies the phenomenon to be examined. Grounded theory encourages that the research question be formulated as an open question so that new discoveries will not be excluded from the outset (Strauss/Corbin 1990:23).

With an action- and process-oriented approach, my research question was meant to be a guide in the field of investigation. It was intended that the perspectives of the Bosnian refugees, their initial reception experiences in Berlin and Chicago, and their experiences since their arrival in the receiving societies be ascertained. The face-to-face interviews were conducted along a common, semi-structured interview guideline with a process-oriented, explorative focus. This aimed to cover time spans, life situations, and a reconstruction of orientations and actions (Strauss 1998; Kühn/Witzel 2000). The questions aimed to draw a clear picture of the social and legal situations of the Bosnian refugees by grasping key events, their contexts, and the processes that contributed to shaping, easing, or hindering their adaptation processes in the host societies. The analysis leads to four approaches of refugee adaptation responses, illustrating a generalization of structures, and a grounded theory, which confirms the complexity of refugee integration. By examining, through grounded theory lenses, my respondents' actions, interactions, and perception of their ability to access resources and participate equally in the receiving society, the intricate relation of the Bosnian refugees' to the two receiving societies and their refugee reception policies were discovered.

Moreover, the findings elucidate the tension between institutional and individual dimensions impacting migrant and refugee adaptation and integration processes.[20]

Allowing for flexibility in formulating the research question, the research procedure permits a chance for theory building since the research question can be reformulated in relation to the researcher's state of knowledge (Strauss/Corbin 1990:21). In exploring how the Bosnian refugees were able to manage their adjustment processes, my interviews were designed to scrutinize the Bosnian refugees' subjective reflections on their ability to adapt to life in the destination cities, access important resources there, and interact with organizations and individuals who were instrumental in this process. A further consideration was to review how they were able to grow and develop over time and to learn to what extent they were empowered and encouraged within the structures of the host society or were hindered and prevented from attaining their goals. Unable to provide the *truth* (Glaser/Strauss 1967), each method applied served as a means – as a more or less useful tool for learning - rather an end in itself (Charmaz 2002:677).

Against this background, the research methods were essentially divided into two main components: literary research and analysis, necessary for reconstructing the reception contexts; and qualitative data collection and analysis, necessary for understanding how the Bosnian refugees perceived and responded to their situational contexts. Having previously worked at a research institute with a focus on migration issues, I brought with me theoretical knowledge in the research domain of migration, ethnicity and discrimination, which to some extent may have disqualified me from being *free from expectations or knowledge* as is often encouraged with grounded theory methods. Yet, my knowledge of the situation pertaining to the Bosnian refugees was indeed quite limited. As such, a main focus was to accrue theoretical sensitivity, which involved the analysis of additional literature, statistical data, Internet sources and gray literature relevant to the topic, in addition to the many interviews conducted and analyzed.[21] "Theoretical sensitivity refers to the attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity to understand, and capability to separate the

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[20] Institutional factors influence the refugee's ability to obtain economic and political access into mainstream society, while the emotional and psychological factors incorporate the emotional well-being of the refugee, his/her sense of belonging, and ability to retain linguistic, cultural, or religious ties with the country of origin, among other aspects (Newland et al. 2007). The psychological and emotional well-being of an individual, (hence, satisfaction) is further influenced by socio-cultural dimensions, i.e. whether a refugee is able to obtain culturally appropriate skills needed for negotiating or *fitting into* a specific social or cultural milieu (Sam/Berry 2006).

[21] Theoretical sensitivity signifies the personal qualities of the researcher, indicating the researcher's knowledge prior to starting the research process as well as her awareness of subtleties of meaning in the data. This is generally composed of knowledge attained from literature, as well as professional and personal experiences (Strauss 1990).

pertinent from that which isn't." (Strauss 1990:42) Theoretical sensitivity was thus further gleaned during the actual research process based on ongoing interactions with the data (Strauss 1990).

Applying a *triangulation of methods* (Denzin/Lincoln 1994; Maxwell 2005) such as participant observation, grounded theory, content analysis, and interviews with experts working in the field, as well as with the two samples of Bosnian refugees, I aimed to enhance my results by using different methods of data generation. In addition, I applied a triangulation of methods to study the different perspectives of my sample, to recognize their social reality, and to identify and increase the validity of the results. Along the lines of Richard Sennett's (1998) claim that there is value in direct, local observation when discerning human agency and appraising strategies of transformation, I went to resettlement agencies, the German Foreigners Office, Bosnian community centers, a group therapy setting, Bosnian-owned restaurants and bars, Bosnian social gatherings such as a Balkan dance festival, a Bosnian film festival, a Bosnian refugee's birthday party and another's photo exhibition as well as to the homes of various Bosnian refugees. Because participatory and close observation tends to generate different forms of experiential material than is normally attained through written or interview approaches, I used *observation* and participation to better understand the historical, political and social ethical aspects of the Bosnian interview participants.[22]

By applying participant observation, I found myself in a situation of not only being an observer but a participant as well. This required that I maintain an orientation of reflectivity while also guarding against the "more manipulative and artificial attitude that a reflective attitude tends to insert in a social situation and relation" (Peterat 2008). By applying a variety of methods and sources, an attempt was made to reduce the risk of reflecting biases in the findings and in respect to validity threats (Maxwell 2005). This sort of observation, as well as the triangulation of the survey resulted in complementing the generation of data attained through the interviews and desk research. Ongoing *memo writing* also led to conceptual categories as codes were taken apart analytically, and the data was *fractured* (Strauss 1990).

The study of process is significant in this study since the meaning a respondent gives the past is based in the context of the present. According to Alfred Schütz (1951, 1972), an individual's restructuring of a past experience in memory varies according to the interests of the present from which one remembers the past. As such, my respondents' reconstruction of

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[22] Because of the wealth of information, however, I was unable to conduct Chicago-based and Berlin-based research that took both metropolitan areas as systems of units of study, as it would have been too huge an endeavor. Having lived in both cities, however, I incorporated knowledge acquired through personal experience in the analysis.

their past experiences (i.e., their lives in Bosnia, the war and displacement, their resettlement and adaptation process in the receiving society context, etc.) are influenced by their mental and physical state and sense of well-being at the time of the interviews. My analysis of their lived-through-time, individual life-stories is dependent on this account, framed in the time of the interview. This encompasses the most recent reconstitution of meaning (that I am privy to) regarding my interview partners' exodus from Bosnia and resettlement experiences in the receiving society contexts. Despite the potential of a static condition, the structure of temporality in the lived present is the "privileged time frame for the construction of fundamental reality, of action, and of identity" (Muzzetto 2006). Hence, the role of time is important in examining the interdependence of action and structure, since time-space relations are intrinsic in the foundation of all social interactions (Giddens 1979, 1990).

After compiling the interview data, I began by scrutinizing each field note and interview very closely with open coding, line by line, and in some cases even word by word, in an effort to produce concepts that fit the data (Strauss 1987:28). Hundreds of preliminary concepts and categories *emerged* as a result, which led to difficulties in making sense of the expanse of data. Some of the codes emerged as in vivo codes, stemming directly from the interviews. Others emerged from the steady comparison of data instances, leading to *new properties* and *dimensions* (Strauss 2004:174). I experienced *getting lost in the data* and referred to Glaser's list of coding families as a guide to help me re-orientate myself during this theoretical coding phase. Using the coding families, however, did not necessarily aid in making more sense of the data, which according to Kelle (2005) is a common problem since Glaser's list of coding families lack altogether a differentiation between formal and substantial notions.

> "The concept of theoretical coding offers an approach to overcome the inductivism of early Grounded Theory, but its utility for research practice is limited, since it does not clarify, how formal and substantial concepts can be meaningfully linked to each other in order to develop empirically grounded theoretical models." (Kelle 2005:6-7)

To overcome this problem, I relied on Strauss' *coding paradigm*, which is a general approach during *axial coding* of differentiating between conditions, interaction among the actors, strategies and tactics, and consequences, or processes and change over time, as well as variation in types of experiences depending upon the choices the individual makes (Strauss 1990). The goal with grounded theory is to reconstruct *patterns* and subsequent variations in the patterns that emerge in the data. In addition, analyzing the differing conditions under which the variations occur is also of central focus, since an underlying feature of this method focuses on structure and process by reconstructing *Sinnstrukturen* and *latent patterns* that are in constant transition (Strauss 1987).

Contrasting the emerging concepts and categories with one another and breaking them down according to factors of time and content helped in structuring my data and clarifying relations among codes. Theoretical sampling assisted in correcting errors in the theoretical category building process. I also relied on the support of a specialized qualitative data processing system, known as MaxQDA.

> "Systematic contrasting through case comparison aims chiefly at working through main topics in common among cases. Individual cases are compared to one another with respect to their substantive characteristics and features, such as sex, region and occupation, according to the principle of "maximum and minimum contrast" (Gerhardt 1986:69); and similarities and differences are sought." (Witzel 2000)[23]

Hence, the goal of the coding and category formation process distinguished relations among abounding conceptual categories and specifying conditions under which theoretical relationships emerged, changed and were maintained (Strauss/Corbin 1990). In analyzing the data "microscopically, I listened closely to what my interview respondents were saying and how they were saying it" (Strauss 2004:173), and I attempted to understand how my interlocutors perceived and interpreted certain events.

Aware of the fact that there are multiple ways of seeing and representing the same world, I attempted to be objective in the analysis process, to the extent that objectivity can be achieved. "The fact that one's own temporal stream of consciousness never completely coincides with that of another, whose sequence of events and intensity of experience inevitably differs from one's own, places limits on one's understanding of another." (Barber 2002) As such, I was conscious of the fact that as a qualitative researcher I am not the sole authority who elucidates the *way the world is* based on my own interpretation. Rather, there are multiple ways of seeing and depicting the same world, which makes it difficult to answer the two questions that commonly arise in qualitative research: who determines the meaning of peoples' stories and, secondly, whether alternative interpretations are possible (Miskovic 2007:522). Aware of the issue involving the crisis of authority and the crisis of representation, I attempted to analyze and interpret the data *objectively* by means of a process with circular, reiterative and overlapping steps (Denzin/Lincoln 2003). For instance, I joined forces with several other PhD candidates to collectively analyze my interview data. We met regularly to interpret the interviews and to consider the multiple meanings emergent in the data with the aim to organize and integrate the carefully grounded concepts emerging around the core category into hypothesis (Glaser 2004).

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[23] FQS (Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung) Homepage.

By including interactionism, another dimension can be added that contributes to the understanding of how the world functions. With a partial constructionist approach, I generally maintain the position that "the social process is made up of people who construct their identities and selves in the process of interaction with one another" (Abbot 2004:47). "Interactionism says there are circumstances and within those circumstances we have the power to act." (Cisneros-Puebla 2004) Believing that "patterns of action are coded and coerced by the institutions and the intersubjective structures of everyday life in which agents operate," the coded patterns that have emerged act to supply social action with coherence, predictability, and structure… (Tavory/Timmermans 2009:251-252). The function of *theory* in my research thus refers to the patterned ways in which I make sense of the narratives through which my respondents construct their reality and reflect their actions by "taking into account the way institutions bind and shape action" (cf. Adam et al. 2002 in: Tavory/Timmermans 2009:252). The social world of my interlocutors can thus be reduced to the representations they as agents have of it, leading me to produce an *account of the accounts* as they relate them.[24]

My hope with this research is to glean insight into the ways in which my participants manage to overcome hardship and dramatic life experiences to renegotiate meaning and reprioritize a new set of life goals for themselves in their receiving society contexts. Another intention is to contribute toward enhancing an understanding of the challenges involved in the incorporation processes of my samples in Berlin and Chicago, while at the same time, remaining open for multiple interpretations. By discussing what strategies were applied when by whom, in what context, and how this relates to the structural limitations and opportunities in place in the two settings, this study seeks to reveal that an individual's or a group's choice in applying coping strategies and actions is a product of many varying interrelated and complex factors. This is turn should be considered by states devising migration and integration policies and the terms for refugee resettlement and reception in order to foster the multilateral approach to integration and achieve durable solutions for the displaced.

Before presenting the results, however, the next chapter provides a brief historical overview of the Bosnian war as an impetus for the focus group to migrate, and hints at the devastating pre-migration conditions that continue to overshadow the mental well-being of

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[24] Some accounts of my respondents have been quoted in this study. Only in cases in which misunderstandings may have ensued have the quotes been amended for language clarity. My aim, however, is to leave the quotes in their original form, regardless of grammar errors, in order to allow my informants to speak in their own words and to also explicate their host society language skills. Some were more proficient than others. Four communicated through translators.

members of my sample in their adaptation. It then introduces the concept of durable solutions, according to UNHCR, and touches on the solutions offered in Berlin and Chicago to the Bosnians seeking protection in the 1990s. This is accompanied by excerpts from the main immigration policy trends and attitudes prevailing in Germany and the US at the time. The chapter also alludes to the two countries' notions of nation and identity and the consequence of globalization and socioeconomics.

3. Historical, Sociopolitical and Legal Access

3.1 Impacts of Bosnian War Leading to Mass Exodus

In the early 1990s international media attention conveyed gruesome pictures to the world regarding the Yugoslavian conflict, relating details "about the gouging of eyes, the mutilation of genitals, massacres and the expulsion of civilians from their villages" (Ramet 2006:1). A proliferation of conflicting material and portrayals of the varying dynamics and reasons leading to the escalation of animosity and violence in Yugoslavia were publicized and propagated throughout the world. Yugoslavia, and in particular, Bosnia, were portrayed in a new perspective as the wars of Yugoslav succession and events between 1991 and 1995 appeared on the front pages of world newspapers and television screens. Violent images and tales of mass killings, death camps, and the systematic rape of women were transmitted to the world. The term *ethnic cleansing* was also popularized (and misused) in the media (Mertus et al. 1997), giving "the peoples of Yugoslavia, and especially the Serbs, a bad name in the West" (Ramet 2006:1). (Refer to Appendix J for a review of the historical events leading up to the war).

Next to the thousands killed or missing, an estimated 1 to 3 million Bosnian nationals fled their homes, forced to undergo displacement following the start of the war in 1992 (Jones/Kafetsios 2005; Joly 1992:86), resulting in a world-wide refugee diaspora (Huttunen 2010). The high number of internally displaced and refugee populations seemed to confirm the cycle of ethnic hatred, violence and human rights abuses committed during the war in Bosnia as "(…)the conflict in the former Yugoslavia became synonymous with the generation of refugees and displaced persons" (Helton 2002:36).

The exact death toll incurred from the Bosnian war cannot be determined, only estimated, ranging from 102,000 to 250,000.[25] Based on a study released by the Norwegian Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo, these figures have been exaggerated.[26] Considering

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[25] One estimate of the deaths incurred totaled 102,000 (Jones/Kafetsios 2005). The United Nations estimated the figure to be about 110,000. Another estimate of the losses and casualties count 200,000 dead or disappeared (Huttunen 2010:45). Local authorities in Sarajevo made repeated public announcements throughout the war that close to 200,000 people had been killed (Ahmetasevic 2007) and yet another estimate at the end of the war was that more than 250,000 had died and 200,000 had been wounded (Weine et al. 1998).

[26] The project was known as "The Bosnian Book of Dead" and was funded mainly by the Norwegian Government, but additional funders also included the Swedish Helsinki Committee, the US Institute of Peace, the US government, the Dutch government, the United Nations Development Program and the Heinrich Böll Foundation. Apparently, the project did not take into consideration those who died during the war in accidents, through reckless handling of weapons, due to starvation or lack of medication (Ball/Tabeau/Verwimp 2007, Ahmetasevic 2007).

results from the end of June 2007, the number of deaths from the Bosnian war is closer to 97,207 (Ball/Tabeau/Verwimp 2007, Ahmetasevic 2007). Of those who died, about 40 percent were civilians and 60 percent soldiers. The ethnic breakdown of the soldiers who died was: 65 percent Bosnian Muslim, 25 percent Serbian, and between 8-10 percent Croatian; of the civilians, 83 percent were Bosnian Muslim, 10 percent Serb, and more than 5 percent were Croat, followed by a small number of Jews and Roma (Ahmetasevic 2007). The majority of Bosnian refugees endured aerial bombardments, artillery shelling, torture, rape, physical injuries, and some sustained war-related disabilities. Most experienced dismal conditions, extreme scarcity, hunger and intense fear. Many were imprisoned in concentration camps, were forced to separate from their family and loved ones, or were displaced to new regions, losing all their material possessions as a result. Many Bosnian-Croats and Bosnian-Serbs sought protection in the neighboring republics of Croatia and Serbia respectively, yet the Bosnian-Muslims were without a territory they could call their own or to which they could return. As a result, the Bosnian Muslims, deemed the most vulnerable by the UNHCR, were most likely to benefit from protection in third countries.[27]

> "At the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, there were massive expelling in non-Serbian population from Bosnia and Herzegovina and their temporary settlement in Croatia. According to the official statistics from April 1993 (Newsletter No. 12, Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) there were 266,942 registered and an unknown (probably greater) number of unregistered refugees in Croatia. The number of registered refugees and displaced persons in the Zagreb area was 130,106. The great majority of the refugees and displaced were women and children that have experienced rape as well as other war traumas." (Tata Arcel et al. 1995:11)

Having to endure extreme privations and risks in their home country, the prospect of resettlement out of refugee camps to neighboring countries served as an impetus for many Bosnians to leave Yugoslavia. Laura Huttunen (2005) argues that "when one can no longer feel at home in public places in one's country of origins, one is very likely to choose exile, in order to find other, more safe public spaces" (p.179). In search of safety, protection, medical care, employment, and a new life, around 1.2 million Bosnians thus fled to safe countries abroad in the 1990s, mainly to Western Europe and other neighboring countries in Yugoslavia (Franz 2005; International Catholic Migration Commission Homepage). The ramifications of

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[27]According to a refugee advocate I interviewed, the Bosnian Muslims were identified by the US as the ones being persecuted as opposed to the Bosnian Serbs. "They weren't the ones in the refugee camps being resettled." (Interview, World Relief). It was not until 1999 that Serbs began arriving to the US when NATO began bombing Kosovo. As a result, "that was the first time in a long time we had had people from both sides of a conflict" (Interview, World Relief). Usually, the State Department decides which side is being persecuted. Rarely are both sides offered protection.

the Yugoslavian crisis resulted in the receiving countries having to afford the costs of taking in hundreds of thousands of displaced individuals.

3.2 Options for Rebuilding One's Life as the Preferred Durable Solution

The UNHCR eventually assumed the role of organizing resettlement to third countries. The initial UNHCR budget of $US24million, created especially to meet the needs of the Yugoslavian civil war refugees, was quickly exhausted.[28] The cost for responding to the displaced was reported at the end of January 1992 to be $US15million per month, and by February the Croatian Office for Refugees reported that it was spending DM3million per day to attend to the needs of the more than 320,000 displaced people (Joly 1992).

Slovenia and Croatia initially received 10 times more Yugoslavian refugees than their richer European neighbors due to the fact that the industrialized countries began enforcing stricter entrance regulations and denying the war refugees access. According to the Migration Policy Group (Martin 2009), this magnet effect or pull factor caused an increasingly pervasive worry for the host countries as well as for the UNHCR in coming up with viable durable solutions (UNHCR 2007). Solutions were needed, since these refugees were indeed facing a real danger at home, were not just "economic migrants seeking to better their material circumstances," and had a "legitimate moral basis for their demands for entry" (Caren 1997:5).

Traditionally, according to the UNHCR, three options in the realm of durable solutions are available to internally displaced persons (IDPs), including: 1) voluntary repatriation, 2) local integration, and 3) resettlement to third countries. Each third country determines for itself which of the three durable solutions to provide as well as the length of implementation. While refugee resettlement is not the only durable solution for refugees, it serves as a measure of protection, intended to ensure the survival, safety, and dignity of the displaced people affected (Craig et al. 2008). According to standards on achieving durable solutions, the full spectrum of human rights of internally displaced persons is supposed to be protected, and thus the preferred response is for displaced people to be enabled to rebuild their lives (UNHCR 2007). Germany's and the US' responses to the displaced Bosnians in search of protection in the early 1990s as a result of the conflict in Yugoslavia are detailed in the following sections. Their

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[28] A refugee is defined "as an individual owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it" (Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention, UNHCR).

responses are contextualized in light of the two nation's responses toward foreigners in general and refugees in particular. (A more detailed overview of both countries' responses to foreigners in the 20 to 30 years preceding the arrival of the sample of displaced Bosnians can be found in Appendices K and L).

3.2.1 Germany's So-Called Durable Solution for the Bosnians

Compared with other European receiving countries, Germany admitted the highest number of displaced people from the former Yugoslavia, reaching 235,000 by the end of 1992 (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). The highest number of asylum seekers to Germany (438,191) was reached in 1992, largely related to the ethnic conflict and the outbreak of war in the Former Yugoslavia. By the summer of 1993, this number had risen to around 400,000 (Hohlfeld 2008:906).[29] Germany initially lacked the time to develop a thought-out durable solution for the Bosnian refugees. Its initial response was influenced by Germany's tradition of responding generously to asylum seekers. Germany was thus initially quick to offer a *humanitarian* response due to the obvious vulnerability of the refugees fleeing Yugoslavia.

Related services were initially regulated in the July 1990 Aliens Act.[30] Beyond their initial sense of gratitude in being offered immediate protection and welfare benefits, with time, my interlocutors realized, however, that this initial hospitable treatment would gradually transition into a more off-putting approach in accordance with Germany's changing political climate and ensuing legal restrictions. "Am Anfang hatte man irgendwie Verständnis für unsere Lage. Aber nachher war man, was ich auch verstehen kann, war man schon satt von uns. Weil man dachte, das dauert jetzt lange." (Interview, Mirna)

With time, these migration movements to Germany created enormous concern about Germany's capacities to assist and absorb the newly arriving refugees. In addition to the hundreds of thousands of asylum applicants in search of protection from the former Yugoslavia, there were also asylum applicants from Romania, Turkey, and various countries

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[29] 250,000 Bosnian refugees were in Germany with an additional 150,000 refugees from other former Yugoslavian republics (Hohlfeld 2008:906).

[30] The German Aliens Act, implemented in 1965 and revised in 1990, served as the basis for distinguishing the different rights and restrictions that foreigners could appropriate in the Federal Republic (until the new Immigration Act entered into force on January 1, 2005). Under the earlier Aliens Act the resident authorization (*Aufenthaltsgenehmigung*) served as the overriding category and included the following hierarchy of resident titles: 1) residence permit (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis* - § 15 AuslG); 2) right of unlimited residence (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung* - § 27 AuslG); 3) resident title for specific purposes (*Aufenthaltsbewilligung* - § 28 and 29 AuslG); and 4) resident title for exceptional purposes (*Aufenthaltsbefugnis* - § 30 AuslG). Refugees were generally granted a residence permit while recognized asylum seekers were granted a resident title for exceptional purposes. Those granted a resident authorization were initially granted a relatively secure resident status in Germany. With the exception of the right of unlimited residence, all the other categories of resident authorization involved various limitations in residence rights, including limits to the labor market.

in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, as well as more than one million ethnic immigrants from Eastern Europe (*Aussiedler*) or Germans from the GDR (*Übersiedler*) entering German territory at this.[31] With the end of the Cold War, reunification of East and West Germany, and opened German borders, thousands emigrated west to begin new lives as "Germans among Germans" (Fetzer 2000:71). "Tens of thousands" of ex-Soviet Jewish emigrants were allowed the right to settle permanently (Fetzer 2000:71). They acquired German citizenship without delay or difficulty (Geddes 2003; Herbert 2003), signifying a stark contrast to the reception rights granted the refugees. This was followed by a wave of *Spätaussiedler*, consisting of German expatriates who returned to Germany after 1989. Questions of accommodation and general fears of *pull effects* related to reception thus became centrally politicized topics.[32]

As underemployment increased and the economy gradually declined following the fall of the Berlin Wall, ethnic Germans and refugees were increasingly referred to as *economic refugees* or even *bogus refugees* by politicians and the media (Collinson 1993 in: Koser and Black 1999:252). As it became clear that the Bosnian war would last longer, resulting in increased arrivals of displaced people, the general attitude toward asylum seekers became increasingly more hostile. Typical rhetoric emphasized in public discourse at this time referred to *floods of asylum seekers* arriving to Germany with the aim of improving their living standards. "They were generally suspected of misusing the right of asylum and of working illegally, and were therefore regarded as a threat to social welfare and 'German culture.'" (Miera 2009:6) They were clearly perceived to be abusing Germany's generous welfare system.[33]

According to Frauka Miera (2009), Germany's public discourse on nation and the integration of migrants shifted following the breakdown of the Iron Curtain. Until the early 1990s, Germany's national policies on issues pertaining to asylum and refugees were still broadly governed by the principles of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, in addition to a number of other international legislative tools. In line with the 1949 German Basic Law (Article 16 Paragraph 2), Germany allowed individuals seeking protection from political persecution a fixed and enforceable, individual constitutional right to claim political

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[31] More immigrants arrived to Germany between 1989 and 1992 than to the US (Münz 1998).

[32] Another 200,000 people fled as a result of the conflict in Kosovo, the final war contributing to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (Lützel 2006).

[33] This fear extends back to the late 1970s and early 1980s when many economic migrants - in the absence of other legal channels by which to immigrate – relied on the asylum provision as a way to enter Germany. As a consequence, the German government imposed a five-year waiting period before asylum seekers could be permitted to work. While this reduced the number of applicants slightly, it also resulted in fostering the attitude among the German public that "asylum seekers unduly burden the welfare state" (Wickboldt 2003:91).

asylum.[34] The comparatively liberal provisions in Article 16 of the German constitution "recognized the right of the asylum applicant to make a claim rather than the obligation of the state to consider a claim made" (Geddes 2003:87).[35] Different than in any other country, Germany's unique asylum law until 1993 (when the Basic Law was amended) readily granted asylum to individuals seeking political persecution, regardless of the country from which they came.[36] Originating in the times of National Socialism, it was conceived to grant an individual "persecuted on political grounds the absolute entitlement to protection and thus the fundamental right to asylum" (Comune di Roma 2004:55).

As public discontent heightened due to fears that refugees and war expellees would cause exorbitant financial burdens on the receiving society, Germany claimed that it was forced to act due to financial concerns to enforce restrictive policies after 1993. Germany tightened labor market access and reimposed its dispersal policy.[37] Similar to its response toward the guest workers, Germany intended for the refugees eventually to return to their countries of origin and so no attempt was made to administer refugee reception or integration policies. Considering the general public's consent to control the recruitment of guest workers, it was likewise considered acceptable (and even expected) that the increasing number of asylum seekers arriving to Germany at this time also be controlled. (For more detail on earlier migration movements to Germany, including the guest workers, refer to Appendix K). Quick solutions to stem and steer migration were thus sought.

With Germany's pattern of inter-*Länder* burden sharing, it was not just intended to redistribute and share the burden of costs for absorbing the incoming refugees and asylum seekers between the German federal states. Rather uncomfortable reception conditions were meant to deter the arrival of an even greater number of newcomers from entering the territory (Schwarz et al. 2004).[38] Beyond just sharing the financial and administrative responsibility of

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[34] In line with the 1949 Basic Law (Art. 16 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz), assuming their flight was involuntary and based on political factors (i.e. on the grounds of a person's race, religion, membership in a social group, political opinion or national origin), individuals seeking protection from political persecution could be granted protection and enjoy the right to asylum (*Asylrecht*) (Mielast 2006).

[35] Asylum seekers recognized under the GRC were granted a limited resident title for exceptional purposes (*Aufenthaltsbefugnis*) while refugees were generally granted a residence permit (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis*).

[36] This is the only asylum status provided for under German asylum law and is the only constitutional right pertaining solely to foreigners. Before changes with the Immigration Act, all other titles were based on subsidiary protection statuses according to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the German Foreigners Act (Comune di Roma 2004:55).

[37] The German labor administration saw this as an opportunity to begin reducing the employment of Eastern European workers and even tightening up legislation regarding *(Spät-)Aussiedler* immigration (Hönekopp 1995:239).

[38] Based on a quota system relative to population ratios in the federal states, Germany's decentralized system of asylum dispersal began in the 1940s and continued throughout the 1970s. Previously, there had only been one reception point in Zirndorf, Bavaria. Having a single reception point was no longer a viable option, however, due

dealing with incoming refugees and asylum applicants, the dispersal policy further legitimized policies to monitor both the residence and mobility of non-nationals. Once a federal state had reached its standard quota of receiving asylum applicants, it could disperse additional applicants to any of the other federal states still below its quota ceiling. Already effective in practice, it was not until 1982 that this provision became law. "The 1982 legislation was accompanied by measures to lower the social conditions of asylum seekers (Baumüller et al. 1983), and arguably, the provisions on dispersal were as much oriented towards this form of deterrence as they were designed to spread costs." (cf. Wolken 1988:233 in: Boswell 2001:7, Boswell 2003) After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the former East federal states were also included under this provision (Schwarz et al. 2004).

Since the federal states cover the costs for asylum reception and assistance, the federal states have a degree of autonomy in establishing reception standards and in determining dispersal criteria. Under Germany's dispersal system, asylum seekers were received initially in arrival centers, where they stayed while their applications were being processed. Despite the given time limit of an initial three months, asylum applicants typically ended up staying longer in these facilities before they were dispersed to an accommodation facility in one of the assigned federal states. Generally, asylum seekers have no influence regarding the location to which they are dispersed. One exception allows close family members (spouse, and children under 18) to be dispersed together to the same location (Schwarz et al. 2004). Often the locations to which they are dispersed are remote, such as in forests or small towns with little active industry or infrastructure. Once dispersed, according to the *Residenzpflicht*, asylum applicants are not permitted to leave the designated territory until granted special permission from the authorities.

Another response propelled by the Red-Green coalition was to implement measures to address multiculturalism and antiracism, which Schwarz (2002) describes as the third phase of a *type* of policy for foreigners (*Ausländerpolitk*). Responsibility for antiracism and multicultural initiatives was transferred to the Commissioner on Foreigners Affairs in 1991 (Vertovic 1996). Debates on multiculturalism soon followed, resulting in the admission that Germany's multicultural reality represented more of a *side-by-side* (*Nebeneinander*) than *a togetherness* (*Miteinander*), due to a lack of exchange and boundary crossings (Vertovic 1996:389). "What is politically dangerous about this state of affairs is that the lack of political concepts from 'above' combines with frustration and fear from 'below' to form an explosive

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to the high number of applicants and associated costs. In 1974 it was decided at a Federal State Interior Ministers Conference that asylum applicants should be dispersed throughout the federal states (Schwarz et al. 2004).

mixture that led to many outbreaks of violent nativism, ethnocentrism and racism." (cf. Bade 1994:20 in: Heckmann 1995:162)

Following a right-wing attack on a hostel in Rostock, conservative politicians, using political rhetoric to win votes, managed to obtain the support necessary to change Germany's constitution in the summer of 1993.[39] With amendments to the Basic Law, a new legal basis in the Aliens Act was introduced at this time to regulate (and restrict) the terms and conditions for recognizing refugees in Germany. While the basic right to asylum for persons persecuted on political grounds was untouched, Article 16a of the amended Basic Law introduced rules on safe third countries and safe countries of origin, which severely restricted access to the basic right of asylum after 1993 (Comune di Roma 2004:55). The most serious altercation with the asylum compromise was the provision enabling governments to reject applicants seeking asylum already at the borders before even entering the territory, along with a more restrictive handling of asylum altogether (Mielast 2006). Additional aspects of this constitutional change included the airport regulation and fast track adjudication procedure for applications deemed to be *manifestly unfounded* because of, for instance, forged documents.

With the introduction of the *safe country of origin* rule, asylum applicants were suddenly required to prove they were not coming from safe countries of origin. According to this, there was an assumption that based on the general political situation in the country of origin a sufficient guarantee existed that neither political persecution nor inhumane or humiliating punishment or treatment was being carried out. "A person entering Germany from such a country can refute this legal assumption only by producing facts or evidence that he or she is in danger of being politically persecuted in the country of origin, contrary to the general assumption prevailing there." (Comune di Roma 2004:56) If the asylum applicant is unable to refute this, he/she is rejected as manifestly unfounded.[40] A consequence of this constitutional change was that Germany could speed up the asylum process and more effectively weed out cases that were likely to be rejected after 1992, with the lasting consequence of reducing the number of asylum applicants accepted.

Germany (as well as the Netherlands) began compiling *white lists*, which involved an elaborate network of intergovernmental mechanisms to ensure constant liaison on immigration and refugee policies and procedures throughout Europe (Webber 1996:83). A

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[39] Article 16 of the Basic Law was amended following a vote, with a majority exceeding two-thirds of the members of the Second Chamber of the German Parliament.

[40] Since the Bosnian refugees were fleeing from *civil war* and not state persecution and had little evidence to prove otherwise, this rule had little bearing on their legal situation particularly due to the general denial of their asylum applications.

clearinghouse, the Center for Information and Reflection on Asylum (CIREA), fostered the confidential exchange of information by member states on refugees' country of origins.[41] "Having defined refugees out of existence by making use of the white lists and 'manifestly unfounded' procedures, the Bill drives home the racist message by making it a criminal offense for anyone except a bona fide refugee assistance organization to help asylum seekers to get into the country." (Webber 1996:83)

With the implementation of the safe third country rule, the determination process for granting protection to an individual became dependent on which country the individual crossed through to reach the territory in which they were seeking protection. Those who traveled through a safe third country to reach German territory were effectively denied asylum, as were individuals with unconvincing claims of persecution (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). "Die Drittstaatenregelung legt fest, dass wer über die EU oder einen so genannten 'Sicheren Drittstaat' einreist, keinen Anspruch auf Asyl genießt, da der Flüchtling auch dort Schutz vor Verfolgung hätte finden können." (Mielast 2006) All of Germany's neighbors were herewith deemed safe third countries since they endorsed the Geneva Convention for Refugees and the European Human Rights Convention. Along with this, a direct refusal at the German border (without any substantial proof or assessment of the likelihood of being granted asylum) could also be enforced, regardless of the submission of an asylum application (Comune di Roma 2004, Hohlfeld 2008:904).

The reasoning behind this was to determine whether the applicants could be returned to the first safe country through which they passed. This effectively reduced Germany's *burden* in receiving so many asylum applicants. In allowing for the return of asylum seekers to *safe* transit countries without first examining their claims, Germany turned asylum seekers back to the buffer states on the periphery, which in turn returned the applicants to the prior *transit country*, which then returned them to their country of origin (Webber 1997:21). Such *chain deportations* are in violation of the Geneva Convention, as well as the constitutional guarantee of asylum. In addition, just because an individual transited through a safe third country does not assure that this person filed an asylum claim there. In upholding these constitutional changes, Germany withdrew its earlier generous commitment to asylum protection by reducing the right to enter German state territory and by further reducing the amount of social welfare benefits awarded, although the symbolic right to asylum remained.

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[41] Kay Hailbronner (1989) has exposed the dangers of this approach, noting the greatest difficulty in deciding which countries is deemed safe and who should decide which countries to add to the list. Furthermore, political changes and human rights conditions change so rapidly that the list quickly became inaccurate following its completion (Legomsky 1998).

Furthermore, airport regulations regulated the asylum procedure for applicants entering Germany by air and resulted in *extraterritorial* applicants held in collective holding facilities throughout the duration of their asylum application process without access to counseling, translators or legal advice. Cases that were obviously unfounded were denied asylum protection and immediately deported.[42] The burden of providing proof to confirm the existence of persecution based on race, religion or nationality was placed on the applicant, which in many cases caused psychological stress (Mielast 2006). For those denied asylum protection, but were unable to return to their countries of origin due to a general state of emergency such as civil war, poverty or a natural catastrophe, grounds for asylum protection continued to be ruled out. But they were able to remain in Germany if they could obtain subsidiary protection. (This was generally the reality for my sample of Bosnian civil war refugees). Based on grounds of humanitarian reasons, it was recognized that these particular individuals could not be returned to their countries of origin and were thus granted a *Duldung,* or temporary right to leave (Mielast 2006). Germany never intended for these individuals to remain permanently in the country (Koser/Black 1999). The general consensus in Germany at the time was surprise by the duration of the conflict, a sense of burden by the number of displaced, and mounting fear of the rising costs attributed with providing ongoing protection for them. Tolerated refugees in Germany, consequently, became a quickly marginalized population.

Temporary protection was thus granted to the Bosnian refugees after the Act to Amend the German Basic Law was adopted in June 1993, due to the many compelling humanitarian reasons preventing their deportation.[43] "The amendment made to Article 16 by the Asylum Compromise of 1993 brought German law and practices into line with other EU member states and with the Dublin Convention agreed by those states in 1990." (Joppke 1997 in: Geddes 2003:87) With the revamping of the asylum legislation the key aspect of German state sovereignty, namely, that the Constitutional Court possesses the right to determine who is entitled to access state territory, came under scrutiny. According to Koser and Black,

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[42] Obviously unfounded cases commonly refer to cases in which an individual comes from a country deemed *safe*; has entered German territory without a valid passport or other necessary documents; has falsified or provided seemingly inaccurate reasons for seeking asylum; the individual seems to be an economic migrant; or for children whose parents have already been denied asylum protection (Refugee Council Homepage).

[43] Prior to the changes with the *asylum compromise* sec. 51 of the German Aliens Act had provided a legal status for protection beyond just political asylum to individuals based on the 1951 Refugee Convention. The legal wording of Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention delineating protection is repeated in Section 51(1) of the German Aliens Act (Comune di Roma 2004). With a focus on restrictive legal asylum instruments, the scope of the 1951 Geneva Convention was greatly limited through redefinitions of *refugee* (Franz 2005:28-29).

temporary protection - as a policy - is difficult to define, because it has involved a series of different legal and administrative changes in different European countries.

> "Temporary protection is protection granted for a limited, though not necessarily defined, time by the country of refuge, usually in situations of large-scale influx. Temporary refuge is premised on the non-refoulement principle through time and on the enjoyment of basic rights pending a lasting solution." (Comune di Roma 2004:269)

Within the European Union, it generally includes the "suspension or by-passing of normal asylum procedures for applicants from certain countries, and the conferral of temporary residence rights on the grounds of a generalized impossibility of return to that country" (Koser/Black 1999:522-523). According to the Federal Agency for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees, the aim of the new recognition criteria in the asylum compromise was to sort out the *legitimate* refugees from the *economic* refugees (BAMF 2006). Andrew Geddes (2003) suggested this indicates a "'normalization' in the sense that there was a retreat from 'special obligations' with asylum practices becoming similar to those in other European countries, with the developing EU context playing an important role" (p.88). With the implementation of these changes, Germany could adhere to the rights and duties set out in the European Asylum Conventions of Schengen and Dublin that were agreed upon by all the European member states at the time. A goal of the new asylum compromise was to restrict provisions for the thousands of applicants who sought protection within Germany and to dissuade other incoming migrants from abusing Germany's asylum system. Deemed a legitimate means to contain the *problem*, Germany sought to shorten the duration of the legal asylum process and reduce state expenditures spent on economic refugees. In distinguishing between political asylum and so-called economic refugees, Germany legally discriminated against asylum seekers by lowering the welfare allotment awarded asylum applicants and limiting their movements.

Despite this, by the end of 1993, around 30,000 Yugoslavian war refugees were living in Berlin with close to 100 to 150 new arrivals daily (Hohlfeld 2008:905). Because fighting in Bosnia was still in full force in 1993, the main approach in Berlin was to grant the Bosnians (as opposed to other refugees from Yugoslavia) temporary protection with an enforceable obligation to leave the country (*Duldung*). This generally meant only a temporary suspension or deferral of deportation. A *Duldung,* indicating an "Aussetzung der Abschiebung sich nicht rechtmäßig im Lande aufhaltender Ausländer" (Hohlfeld 2008:903), is not a legal title that permits the holder the right of residence or the right to remain in Germany. Rather it is a verification of the recipients' obligation to depart from Germany, but due to legal or economic reasons, deportation has been made factually impossible, and departure is delayed. Extended

to individuals of all ages, whether married or not and regardless of health concerns, the *Duldung*, or temporary suspension of deportation was valid up to six months.

Yet, in the more economically secure regions of Bavaria, North Rhine Westphalia, and Baden-Wurttemberg, the Bosnians were largely granted an authorized residence title for exceptional purposes as well as a work permit. The terms and conditions of refugee reception in Germany thus varied from federal state to federal state, and also depending on the country of origin from which the displaced person stemmed. The number of new intakes also influenced the regional responses to the newcomers.

Berlin ended up taking in the greatest number of war refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, and Hesse (Blaschke and Sabanovic, 2001). With a population of 3.4 million residents and a fourteen percent share of foreigners (Aumüller, 2008:140-141), Berlin, as the capital, is Germany's largest city. Long known for safeguarding conscientious war objectors fleeing the draft, a host to alternative-thinking people, and a variety of immigrants, Berlin had had a long tradition of receiving refugees. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, however, transpired just a few years before the exodus of thousands of Yugoslav refugees to Berlin. As a result, the city was in transition, funding was tight, and local communes had already been squabbling over financial responsibilities to cover the costs related to the fall of the Wall. This tumultuous background greeted the Bosnians upon their arrival to Germany in the early 1990s.

With the *Duldung* as the legal base, there was never any thought given to the Bosnians eventually being permitted the right to stay long-term in Germany (Mihok 2001b). Rather, the *Duldung* was issued to the Bosnian refugees with the aim of ending their protection and associated financial costs once their deportation obstacles ceased to exist. It was intended with the *Duldung* to provide only a minimum of limited protection and the stance was maintained that the Bosnian refugees' entrance and immigration to Germany was of a temporary nature only (Berliner Integrationsbeauftragter 2005:11) to be rescinded once the fighting ended.[44] Among the Yugoslavian refugees seeking protection, only the Bosnian war refugees were still being granted a *Duldung* by March 15, 1994. All other Yugoslavians had been turned away at the border or returned. Germany consequently emerged as the first of the European countries to initiate a trend of exclusionary asylum and refugee policies and procedures, instigating appeals throughout Europe to *share the burden*.

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[44] In cases in which a temporary suspension of deportation (*Duldung*) has been issued for one year, the Foreigners Office was required to give at least a one-month notice of a pending deportation (Schwarz et al. 2004).

Not surprisingly then, as media attention on the war and tragic events in Bosnia waned, another turn in public and political discourse ensued. This has had lasting consequences for the 72,415 asylum applicants from the former Yugoslavia seeking protection in Germany in the first part of 1992 (Hohlfeld 2008). "Man konnte nicht mehr im Fernsehen sehen das dort was passierte; man hat nur gehört, also dort ist kein Krieg mehr. Und dann ging es schon: 'Was wollen sie hier noch? Was suchen sie hier noch?' Dann waren sie nicht mehr nett." (Interview, Mirna)

Mere weeks following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995, marking an official ceasefire in the former Yugoslavia, it was deemed *safe* for the Bosnian refugees to return home. By signing Dayton, Germany had agreed to refer all modalities of return to the UNHCR.

> "Deutschland als Mitglied der Bosnien-Kontaktgruppe habe den Vertrag als Zeuge ("witnessed by") mit unterzeichnet und damit dem Verfahren zugestimmt… Der UNHCR hat am 16.1.96 in Genf einen Rückführungsplan vorgelegt, der eine Rückkehr der Flüchtlinge aus Deutschland in zwei Jahren vorsieht. Der Plan sieht vorrangig die Rückkehr der mindestens 1 Million Flüchtlinge innerhalb Bosniens vor, danach sollen die mindestens 500.000 Flüchtlinge folgen, die in den anderen Staaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawien Zuflucht gefunden haben. Erst danach sieht der UNHCR die Rückkehr der mehr als 700.000 Flüchtlinge vor, die von anderen europäischen Staaten aufgenommen worden sind, von denen sich etwa 400.000 in Deutschland aufhalten." (Classen 1996)

With the specifications of Dayton, the Bosnian refugees were guaranteed the right to return unharmed to their previous residences in Bosnia, where their stolen valuables were to be returned, compensation for damaged goods was to be granted, and their acceptance into the returned community was to be assured (Jäger/Rezo 2000). With the promise of recognizing their *right* to return home, the German authorities thus reversed previous allowances offered the Bosnian refugees, focusing attention instead on repatriation. Within two years, 400,000 Bosnians granted temporary protection in Germany were to be returned.

The focus in the subsequent chapters is to consider whether return can be deemed a genuinely durable solution if the conditions to make it sustainable are absent? According to Stefansson (2006), the understanding of sustainable return includes "access to jobs and livelihoods, social protection and renewed social relationships". He further argues that if there is an intense focus on restitution and a failure to address these other needs, then return is rendered untenable. His assessment of the situation for the many Bosnians was that 'sustainable relocation' was their desired option (Stefansson 2006 in: Haider 2010). The reality, however, was somewhat bleaker.

Changes in the ethnic group jurisdiction of certain territories resulting from the Dayton outcome made a guaranteed safe return nearly impossible. Furthermore, an outcome of the

Dayton Agreement resulted in sparking a new wave of refugee movements to Germany, consisting largely of Muslim-Bosnians. Prior to the war, there were no "pure" ethnic areas within the country, yet with the imposed division enforced through Dayton (creating the Muslim–Croat Federation and the Serb Republic, Republika Srpska), pre-war residence patterns were discounted (Huttunen 2010:45). Close to two-thirds of the Muslim refugees could not return to their homes in Bosnia since these regions had become recognized as Serbian territory under the terms of the Dayton Agreement (University of Köln Homepage).

Despite new arrivals, Germany, with the assistance of the UNHCR, began the preparation and coordination of the repatriation and *voluntary* return of tolerated Bosnian refugees to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In adhering to IOM's definition of voluntary repatriation, German authorities understood the scope of voluntary return to include everything but deportation.

> "Voluntariness exists when the migrant's free will is expressed at least through the absence of refusal to return, e.g. by not resisting boarding transportation or not otherwise manifesting disagreement. From the moment it is clear that physical force will have to be used to effect movement, national law enforcement authorities would handle such situations." (Entenmann 2002)

This in turn led to a rapid decrease in the number of Bosnian refugees remaining in the country.[45] Liz Fekete (1997) describes the atmosphere for migrants and refugees in Germany at this time in critical terms. By the start of 1997, Germany had introduced a residency requirement for children of immigrants who had been born in the country; former guest workers and asylum seekers had become the subject of special repatriation packages; the rights of seasonal and migrant workers were under attack; everywhere the ranks of the *Sans Papiers* (migrants without legal documents) were growing; and new measures provided for the deportation of non-EU students and non-EU workers within the welfare state, including doctors and teachers whose services were no longer required (Fekete 1997:90). Considering that by 1999 14 percent of Germany's population had not been born within the territory (Geddes 2003), raising attention of such statistics to the public tended to fuel anxieties and led to tighter restrictions in legislation. Conservative politicians competed in being *tough* on asylum issues, and as such, their political rhetoric, xenophobic and racist sentiments were both allowed and encouraged in the name of *realism* and financial security (Harris 2002:45).

Not surprisingly, a considerable drop in the number of asylum applicants resulted. At its peak between 1990 and 1993, more than 1.2 million persons claimed asylum in Germany; by 1994 the number had dropped to 323,599 and to fewer than 128,000 by 1995 (Green 2007). The average number of cases recognized on grounds of political persecution or under

protection of the Geneva Convention on Refugees varied between four to six percent (Aumüller/Bretl 2008). The changes in the asylum law, as well the stability of Eastern Europe and other regions, and the ceasefire in the former Yugoslavia led to a decrease in the number of asylum seekers in Germany after 1995. Since then, though with a small increase in 2001, the number of asylum applicants has continuously decreased (BAMF 2006). By the end of January 2000, the number of Bosnian refugees remaining in Berlin had dropped to 10,599 (Jäger/Rezo 2000) and fewer than 10 months later, the number further decreased to 7,454 (Mihok 2001b). Even the response toward the *returned returnees* was to refuse temporary protection upon their return to Germany and to instead order up immediate deportation orders.[46] With this, Germany preferred the so-called durable solution of *voluntary* repatriation.

Not all of the Bosnians were required to return, however. Those remaining were generally individuals deemed particularly vulnerable or who had married German nationals. The particularly vulnerable generally consisted of rejected asylum seekers, who could not be removed due to humanitarian or other reasons; persons with an undetermined nationality; and former war refugees with a confirmed traumatization (Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit und Soziales 2000). In line with this, nuclear family members of a confirmed traumatized individual could also become eligible for an extension of the temporary suspension of deportation for the same duration as the traumatized individual. Special protection was also granted to the Roma.[47] A great many of the Bosnian war refugees in Berlin in January 1996 were Bosnian Roma refugees (Mihok 2001a). "Anfang bis Mitte des Jahres 1998 lag der Anteil bosnischer Roma an der Gesamtheit der bosnischen Flüchtlingen in Berlin demzufolge bei etwa 60 Prozent" (Jäger/Rezo 2000:77). Other Bosnian refugees, who did not fall under these exceptions but still managed to avoid voluntary repatriation and deportation had usually either agreed to speak out as witnesses before the International Tribune in the Hague, or were already 65 years old or older on Dec. 15, 1995, with no relatives in Bosnia to care for them, exempting them from repatriation requirements.[48]

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[45] Legal and practical deterrence measures in the asylum process, such as detection camps and communal living for asylum applicants, had already been enforced prior to the changes in asylum policy (Mihok 2001b).

[46] As a result of the violence and ongoing enmity experienced upon their return in Bosnia, a number of returnees returned to Germany, signifying the term *returned returnees* (Jäger/Rezo 2000). Upon their return to Berlin, these returned returnees spread news about their experiences in Bosnia, discouraging other refugees from returning.

[47] Roma refugees were eligible for special international protection according to the UNHCR and, thus, managed to avoid the more serious repatriation efforts (Jäger/Rezo 2000).

[48] Individuals 65 and over on Dec. 15, 1995 were granted special consideration and permitted temporary leave to remain in Berlin as long as they had no family support in Bosnia and could be assisted by remaining family in Germany (Erdrich 1999). Quite a number of elderly refugees with family in Bosnia did return, where they were eligible to receive their pension (Huttunen 2010).

Other exceptions transpired as well. A Hardship Commission, consisting of representatives of NGOs and local government institutions, and in existence in Berlin since 1990, was created for hardship cases to be brought forward and considered by the Supreme Federal State Authority (Oberste Landesbehörde). This refers to individual cases in which a person can legally be denied protection, the result of which, however, would lead to an inhumanitarian outcome, namely deportation to a region that could be unsafe. Due to principles of Germany's democratic society, such an outcome, however, is not acceptable.

> "In accordance with Section 23a of the German Residence Act a residence permit (Aufenthaltserlaubnis) may be granted in specific humanitarian cases, even if the foreigner concerned is enforceably required to leave the country. To this end, a request must be submitted to the Hardship Commission, which then appeals to the supreme federal state authority to issue a residence permit to the foreigner. Its decisions are discretionary, since there is no claim obliging the Hardship Commission to submit such a request or requiring the competent federal state authority to grant a residence permit." (Federal Interior Ministry 2009)

The assessments of the Hardship Commission were decisive in providing a minimum degree of flexibility in determining grave individual cases, which would otherwise be ignored as a result of Germany's restrictive asylum policy. Grounds for these decisions need not be explained or rationalized, implying a great deal of subjectivity in the decision-making process of each case by the Supreme Federal State Authority. Typically, the decisions are influenced by the so-called *integration* attempts of the individual. According to Martin Stark of the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS), the outcome of hardship-case rule decisions in Berlin are often more generous and in the interests of the individual than in some other federal states. Berlin's acknowledgement of hardship cases and the hardship case rule were thus very important for many of those remaining in the city after deportation orders began.[49] More about this and general reception conditions in Berlin facing the Bosnian war refugees follows in the next chapter. First, comes a review of the US' response to the Bosnian war refugees.

3.2.2 The US' Durable Solution for the Bosnians and the Legal Framework

In contrast to Germany, the US offered the Bosnian refugees permanent resettlement as a durable solution, as did Sweden, the Netherlands, and other countries; the speed of response of these countries and the number of refugees taken in varied greatly from one to another. None ever took in more Bosnians than Germany.

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[49] In Berlin the Interior Senator determines whether humanitarian protection may be warranted. The appeal with the Oberste Landesbehörde is based on the rule of mercy, or *Gnadenrecht*, implying that there are no specified grounds on which the final decision is based.

In 1994, the US government declared Bosnian refugees a *priority* and began their admittance to the United States. The Refugee Act of 1980, incorporating the refugee definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), served as the legal basis for the Bosnian Refugees' Admissions Program to the United States. This was (and still is) administered by the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) of the Department of State in conjunction with the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and offices in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (Refugee Council USA Homepage). By incorporating the UN definition of refugee in the Refugee Act, the resettlement services for all refugees admitted to the US became standardized, with the goal to achieve smooth and quick procedures. Those identified abroad by the UNHCR were assessed by an officer of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service to ensure they met the definition of refugee, were approved for resettlement by the US Department of Homeland Security and streamlined into the US Oversees Refugee Resettlement Program (Office of Refugee Resettlement 1997).

While there was a ceiling for refugee admissions (consultation for which generally takes place between the Executive Branch and Congress, followed by the US President setting a ceiling on the number of refugees to be admitted to the country each year), there was no limit to the number of persons who could be granted protection based on proof of a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of the person's race, religion, membership in a social group, political opinion, or national origin. In cases of refugee emergencies, it is also within the scope of the President's authority to respond beyond this ceiling. The Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA) is to be used in unexpected urgent situations to respond to refugee and migration needs. With this, the US President can distinguish the nationalities and processing priorities indicative of refugee resettlement and US national interests, allowing US flexibility in responding in crisis situations. As a result, Bosnians outside the US, who met the definition of a Convention refugee (as applicable to US law), and were deemed to be of *special humanitarian concern* to the US were granted the status of *refugee*. More than 100,000 Bosnians were resettled to the US as Convention refugees between 1993 and 2000 under the US priority processing system (Franz 2005).

Under US law, an asylum seeker and a refugee are both people who have fled their home country due to a well-founded fear of persecution. The standards for proving a well-founded fear of persecution are virtually the same in both cases with the exception of some technical legal differences. Asylum applicants seek protection from within the US while refugees apply

outside (Interview, World Relief). Despite similarity in reasons for fleeing Bosnia, the protection varied between these two types. Convention refugees were eligible for the full range of federal and state programs upon arrival in the US, whereas asylees were not. My focus is on the situation of refugees since the number of Bosnian asylees was relatively small. "Only a handful came initially as asylees since they would have had to have some means of getting out of their country into the United States." (Interview, World Relief)[50]

With the aim of achieving a durable solution for the Bosnian refugees and fostering their integration, the US Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration provided Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) funds to various international agencies as well as to private US voluntary agencies. The funding provided for refugee processing and prescreening interviews, implementing overseas cultural orientation, and arranging transportation, medical screening, and to otherwise help manage the processing of the Bosnian refugees for their admission into the US (Patrick 2004).[51]

Generally, a first attempt was made to assist the particularly vulnerable groups, including persecuted religious and ethnic minorities deemed to be of special humanitarian concern to the US. This included those who had fled their homes as a result of the genocide and war in Bosnia; those held in concentration camps; and those in interethnic marriages (Office of Refugee Resettlement 1997). The US Embassies gave highest priority for resettlement to Bosnian refugees referred by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Following the prescreening interviews, the Bosnians were required to undergo medical examinations and pass background and security checks before being assigned to either one of the nine national NGOs, the state resettlement agency, or to a sponsor in the destination area.[52] This process took anywhere from two months to two years (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants Homepage).

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[50] Exceptions did exist, however, and some asylees from Bosnia were able to receive protection.

[51] MRA funding was allotted to primary partners: the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Committee of the Red Cross (IRC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), and International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), as well as US based agencies such as Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society and Church World Service, as well as several US embassies to act as Overseas Processing Entities (LIRS 2002). The Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration applies MRA funds to three priority areas: "promoting equal access to effective protection and assistance for refugees and conflict victims [on the basis of geographic region]; maintaining multilaterally coordinated mechanisms for effective and efficient humanitarian response at internationally accepted standards; and supporting voluntary repatriation and sustainable reintegration of refugees in the country of origin" (US Department of State Homepage).

[52] The 10 national resettlement agencies at the time included Church World Service (CWS), Ethiopian Community Development Council (ECDC), Episcopal Migration Ministries (EMM), Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS), US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), US Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), World Relief (WR) and Iowa Department of Human Services (Interview, ORR). More about their roles and direct involvement in receiving and placing the Bosnians are detailed in the subsequent *Domestic Program* description.

Special concern generally applied to "refugees with relatives residing in the US, refugees whose status as refugees has occurred as a result of their association with the US, and refugees who have a close tie to the US due to education here or employment by the US government" (Office of Refugee Resettlement 1997). Family reunification remained a high priority for refugee resettlement. Thousands of Bosnians entered the country by means of family reunification, implying that family members, not the state, paid the costs for receiving their newly arriving relatives. This generous refugee policy was limited, however, to this particular refugee group concerned. Free of costs for family reunification, the US refugee and resettlement program was initially generous in its response to the Bosnians (Franz 2005) and continued to be until policy changes in 2000.

After their approval but prior to their departure to the US, adult Bosnian refugees participated in cultural orientation courses to address central topics relevant for their processing, travel, and resettlement to the US. Particular emphasis was placed on the expectation of the refugee to become economically self-sufficient and socially self-reliant. With the aim of preparing the refugees for life in the US, the orientation courses covered the following topics:

1) Pre-departure processing - entailing a description of the necessary steps for refugees to carry out before departing to the US;
2) Role of the resettlement agency - in order for the refugees to develop realistic expectations about the assistance likely offered them by the resettlement agency. This entails a description of the roles of the case managers and other resettlement agency staff;
3) Housing - entailing information on housing types and costs, ways to find low-cost housing, and housing leases and laws;
4) Employment - covering topics such as the significance of early self-sufficiency, how to find a job, typical job types in the US, what is initially to be expected, how to conduct a job interview, as well as information on salary deductions, employment benefits, and necessary legal documents needed for employment;
5) Transportation - while highlighting laws and information concerning owning and driving a car, this topic also conveyed the different types of transportation likely present in the new community of the refugee;
6) Education - informing refugees about the educational opportunities available in the US for both adults and children. An emphasis was placed on the need for adults to work while studying;
7) Health - providing basic facts about US healthcare, contrasting it with healthcare in the countries of origin, particularly highlighting the differences from socialist traditions, and stressing the importance of health insurance;
8) Money management - introducing the concept and practice of managing a monthly budget while also comprising information about the US banking system and possibilities for saving money;
9) Rights and responsibilities - covering the most significant US laws for newly arriving refugees, which was of particular interest for reasons of family reunification, regulating adjustments in status, understanding legal problems refugees commonly face (such as driving without a license), and being aware of conflicts that may arise with US customs

and laws relating to domestic violence as a result of typical cultural practices from the home country;

10) Travel - explaining each step of the transit process, ranging from pre-departure to arrival in the resettlement community while also addressing in-flight safety, customs and immigration procedures, and security issues; and if time allows, also

11) Cultural adjustment - addressing culture shock, listing community mental health resources, and being aware of potential family role changes (Cultural Orientation Resource Center Homepage).

Adult refugees were provided important written and oral guidance on life in the US as well as necessary steps on how to avoid becoming a *burden* to American society. As such, the incoming refugees were informed of the underlying concept behind the US resettlement program, namely, that government authorities would take active steps to encourage and facilitate their resettlement and to assist them in the initial arrival and reception process, though, only for a limited time period. In the case of the Bosnians this was eight months. Promises were made of "permanent residence and early economic self-sufficiency through employment" for the Bosnians relocated through the refugee resettlement to the US.

Usually the refugees were unable to influence the decision regarding their resettlement placement since the national agencies determined where they would be resettled. However, placing refugees near relatives and same ethnic communities was considered an important factor in their initial placement due to expected advantages that could be gained from the language and cultural support of pre-existing ethnic community networks (Interview, World Relief Chicago). Another consideration identified in their placement was attributed to the skills and knowledge of the local affiliate offices involved in reception processes. Thus, certain aspects were taken into account by the resettlement agencies in determining the refugees' initial placement, such as the availability of services needed, employment, housing, readiness of host community, and various other factors (Mission of US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants Homepage). The former director of the resettlement agency, World Relief Chicago, explained that the decision to take in the Bosnian refugees was influenced by the experiences, knowledge, capacities, and priorities of the national agencies.

> "We had had some experience working with some really difficult populations in the past and so we began working with the Bosnian refugees in 1994. Between 1994 and 1999 World Relief Chicago resettled over 7,000 Bosnians, which to my understanding was the largest number of Bosnians [resettled by] of any of these resettlement agencies in the whole US." (Interview, World Relief Chicago)

Statistics on the number of Bosnians who had been resettled in Chicago as a result of the Bosnian war are inconsistent. Most sources contend that somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 Bosnians came to Chicago between 1993 and 2000. Based on my interview with Dr. Edwin Silverman, bureau chief of Refugee and Immigrant Services, Illinois Department of

Human Services, the total number of Bosnian refugees resettled to Chicago after 1994 was smaller, realistically coming closer to around 35,000, yet, most of the refugees arriving to Illinois between 1994 and 2000 were from Bosnia (Interview, ORR).

Once the refugees arrived to the US they were automatically incorporated into the US domestic resettlement program. (This is further detailed in the next chapter). The durable solution and US response to the Bosnians thus granted recognized refugee protection and supportive services to foster their integration. This marked a contrast to Germany's response, which from the start intended only to offer temporary protection until the war in Yugoslavia subsided, with voluntary repatriation as a follow-up solution.

Another difference was that some of the Bosnian refugees who resettled to Chicago benefited from the fact that they brought previous resettlement experiences as well as financial savings with them, as they commonly lived first in Germany or Croatia before being resettled to Chicago. This sort of capital contributed in easing their transition, though, it was usually depleted quickly.

While the US maintains an image of itself as democratic and tolerant, numerous examples depict its race-based and nationality-based immigration system (Alba/Nee 2003), which is closely interlinked with the labor market needs as well as the skills and educational background of the potential new immigrant. With regard to refugees, entry regulations are also largely influenced by the relationship the US has with the county of origin. Entry rights are also usually easier the more educated an individual is and the better the reputation of the sending country's education system is. The Bosnians' *resettlement potential*, or origins, thus played a contributing factor in the generous response of the US in receiving them. Further evidence of this follows throughout this study.

Yet, a thorough reflection of the historical inconsistencies in US political responses and public attitudes toward migrants and refugees (which is beyond the scope of this chapter; refer instead to Appendix L) shows ethnocentric biases that have come to the fore at pivotal moments but that have also been challenged by the powerful momentum of migration flows and by Americans' "sense of mission as an immigrant nation" (Alba/Nee 2003:168). This is important to keep in mind throughout this study.

The next chapter begins the analysis of results, reflecting the refugee resettlement conditions in Berlin and Chicago, from the perspective of my interlocutors. It highlights the facilitating factors and obstacles that influenced the refugees' in their ability to rebuild and regain control over their lives after their arrival in the receiving society contexts, the coping strategies they applied in response to constraints, their main goal to *normalize* and rebuild

their lives, and their overall approaches of adaptation response. This is followed by a list of typologies for refugee resettlement.

4. Analysis of Results – Factors of Influence

This chapter begins the analysis of results and reflects the factors that influenced my research participants in Berlin and Chicago. Variations in my samples' responses contribute in explaining *how* as well as *how easily* they - as a group and as individuals - adapted in these larger receiving society contexts (cf. Berry et al. 2006). By incorporating the actions and reactions of others, I examine the agency of my respondents and note in what situations their actions may have been modified as a result of their interactions and the conditions of refugee incorporation in the varying contexts. Due to the expanse of data, I emphasize the main findings affecting my respondents in their ability to manage their socio-cultural and psychological adaptation processes with respect to the institutional constraints of the receiving societies. Here, I am cautious of not placing too much emphasis on Marxist philosophy alone, as I do not want to categorize my respondents as helpless victims incapable of applying agency. After all, how can an individual ever get ahead if he/she thinks of oneself as a victim? Because the individual performing social action is not passive, but (potentially) active and reacting, power is shared with interactionism, allowing individuals a degree of control over their circumstances (Dallmayr/McCarthy 1977).

My investigations found many influential factors that have facilitated as well as impeded my interlocutors in achieving their collective goal, which based on the analysis, is to *achieve normalcy*. The overall goal of this chapter is to examine the factors that have influenced my sample in their ability to *normalize* their lives and to identify the coping strategies they applied in an effort to regain control over their post-migration situations. This chapter is structured according to the construction of seven main categories with 38 subcategories that emerged in the analysis of the results.

The first category, *exodus and transit - dislocation and flight-related factors*, comprises three subcategories, including degree of danger and early warning signs preempting evacuation and displacement, surprise or suddenness of the exodus, and whether exiting alone or accompanied by family members. Although the topic on pre-migration life in Bosnia was not intended to be covered in this study, based on the analysis of my respondents' narratives, it became clear that their post-migration experiences could not be separated from their pre-migration experiences and multifold border crossings.

The second category identified refers to the *expectations and motivation (push/pull factors)* of my respondents and includes the degree of agency in their decision to migrate. Additional subcategories related to their reasoning for migrating include preservation or sheer

survival, materialism, self-development, and family loyalty. Their cognizance of agency in deciding to migrate influenced their motivation to adapt in the receiving society context.

The third category, *facilitating factors,* highlights the institutional and socio-cultural conditions in Chicago and Berlin that have been conducive to their incorporation. The ten subcategories here are structured according to the two reception contexts with seven in Chicago and three in Berlin.

The fourth category, *obstacles,* entails the contextual constraints my respondents experienced in the receiving society. Based on the analysis of my respondents' interpretations, three subcategories emerged. The first subcategory refers to the institutional obstacles framing the terms and conditions of reception that have impeded the adaptation experiences of my interlocutors. The second subcategory reflects the socio-cultural obstacles, and the third and last subcategory under the category of obstacles focuses on the emotional and psychosocial obstacles that hindered my interlocutors in their adjustment processes.

The fifth category reflects the *coping strategies* my participants applied in response to the institutional, socio-cultural and emotional obstacles they experienced in the destination contexts. This also led to the construction of three subcategories, namely, non-rewarding (avoidance-oriented), protective (emotion-oriented), and practical (problem-oriented) coping strategies.

The sixth category incorporates the *overall assessment* of my respondents. Here, I introduce the subcategories: well-being, individual goals, distance to and reconstructed meanings of homeland, future locations of space, identity marked by difference, and I end by describing the four general approaches of response my respondents applied in managing their adaptation.

I conclude this chapter with the seventh category on a *structure of generalizations* (cf. Flick 2006). Borrowing from Max Weber (1968b), seven *ideal types* of refugee responses are presented in abstract generalizations for managing refugee resettlement.

4.1 Exodus and Transit - Dislocation and Flight-Related Factors

Based on the analysis of my respondents' narratives, the category *exodus and transit* reflects forced migration, dislocation and flight-related factors. "In making a life-and-death decision every direction matters that takes the threatened migrant away from the danger zone. This is the push-factor: a situation that is perceived as dangerous, threatening or intolerable, and thus pushes the people away from the home." (Demuth 2000:36) As witnesses to the destruction and war in Bosnia, my respondents relate difficult experiences that have been both emotionally and physically taxing. This is relevant since the impact of the refugees'

experiences enroute to their final destination persisted long after their arrival. For the analysis, this includes the degree of danger and early warning signs preempting evacuation and displacement, as well as the surprise or suddenness of exodus and whether exiting alone or accompanied by family members.

According to Alfred Schütz, the temporal structure determines the uniqueness of meaning (Schütz 1951), which in turn influences the relationship between time and experience in the construction of significant lived experiences and identity. Identity reflects a construed label by which an individual classifies him/herself, or is ascribed by others, in this case signifying an ascribed identity. Identity is never static, but always influx, reflecting relational and contextual processes of influence. In acknowledging that the meaning a respondent gives the past is based in the context of the present, my respondents find themselves in a process of renegotiating a relationship with their new countries of settlement as they attempt at the same time to deal with their past experiences and their past identity constructions, as well as the impact this has on their perspectives in the new context. In relating details of their war experiences, my respondents are essentially rationalizing their decisions for fleeing Bosnia. Each of their experiences is their own, unique in its own right. Despite variances in their personal stories, relative to each individualized perspective, similarities abound with specific details regarding the danger, fear, flight, and conditions experienced enroute to their final destinations. Despite these similarities in their narratives, however, they do not necessarily share the same perspectives on the past or the future.

4.1.1 Preempting Evacuation and Displacement

Despite direct confrontations and substantiation of an impending crisis, many of my respondents related difficulties believing the reality of impending doom in Bosnia. In their reconstructions, my interlocutors recalled that relatives or neighbors had refused to leave their homes and possessions, afraid of thieves, or unwilling to believe the severity of the Bosnian conflict. "Everybody was under the impression that the war was just going to be a couple of months." (Interview, Valten) Due to states of disbelief that the war could spread and last as long as it did, many delayed their exodus. Quite often refugees, who do not leave a warring situation prior to the outbreak of violence or close to the outbreak, have been shown to be generally more alike in that they are "less connected, less affluent, and more likely to be fleeing than escaping" (Suárez-Orazco 1987 in: Mosselson 2006:10).

Another reason attributed to the delay in exiting Bosnia, despite increasing evidence of danger, was that many "individual citizens were engaged in personally reaffirming their commitment to multi-ethnic Bosnia, both to themselves and to the people around them"

(Weine 1999:41). This occurred while the Bosnian government conveyed its commitment to multi-ethnic coexistence, criticizing the dangerous propaganda of the nationalist movement. Many Bosnians were thus quite hopeful, resulting in their own self-deception and downplaying the threat of rising nationalism. Many consequently also doubted that previously affable relations with neighbors could, first, be dismantled, and, secondly, so rapidly. A number of respondents described incidents in which relatives, friends, or even they themselves had waited *too long* to escape or, as implied in the following excerpt, regretted having returned.

> "So from the day we left in May 1993- I am sorry, only me and my brother left then- it's very bad experience for me that time. It's very hard on me. The two of us went to Croatia. My parents stayed, thinking in a couple of weeks everything will be okay, so we would come back from Croatia. I am calling my mother a second day and I couldn't reach her by phone. Everything is disconnected. I told my aunt, 'something is wrong. I have to go back.' And I- and I am a girl, you know, I'm, like, 20 years old, 19, 20. My brother was 18 at that time actually." (Interview, Ema)

In many accounts, my respondents implied or hinted at rape and torture experiences, but only a few openly volunteered the details of these traumatic encounters. Cautious of causing a *re-traumatization* and since the focus of my inquiry was not on my respondents' pre-migration war experiences I did not press them to continue their tearful descriptions. Nonetheless, it is important to recall that my respondents are survivors of various forms of violence, provoking their exodus from Bosnia.

Rape is generally recognized as an act of violence and power committed by men against women, but rape during war encompasses additional meaning since women are targeted due to their gender as well as their social positioning within a community (Muftic′/Bouffard 2008). Considered a planned strategy to terrorize a population, soldiers used rape and other forms of sexual violence in the Bosnian war to break women and to shame and humiliate them and their men (Muftic′/Bouffard 2008:210). While men also experienced rape and sexual violence, women were targeted in particular (Mertus et al. 1997:13). According to estimates, anywhere between 20,000 and 50,000 women were raped during the war (Muftic′/Bouffard 2008). In addition to rape, many also endured hardships such as capture and incarceration in *concentration camps*, physical injury and torture, as well as witnessing the torture or killing of family members and neighbors. "Torture is the deliberate, systematic, or wanton infliction of physical or mental suffering acting alone or on the orders of any authority, to force a person to yield information, to make a confession, or for any other

reason." (Gerrity et al. 2001:6 in: Hooberman et al. 2007:109) In this case, it was to suppress and to assert power over the victim.[53]

Persecution and atrocities based on their or their relatives' specific ethnic group membership were also carried out. In trying to reconstruct their hesitancy in leaving Bosnia, many of my interlocutors questioned how their neighbors, friends, sometimes even family members (through mixed ethnic marriages) could suddenly pose such a threat to their safety after having lived peacefully in co-existence for decades.

> "In Sarajevo was fighting and bombing. I lived seven miles from Sarajevo, the occupation by Serbian people. No Bosnian, Serbian people. I lived with Serbian people three years. It was difficult life, so difficult life, believe me, difficult life because I am Muslim. They did not like me and asked: 'Why you not go? Go tomorrow. Tomorrow I'll kill you and take everything.' Always: 'Come on, give me, give me, give me.' Difficult life. So difficult life." (Interview, Beba)

Despite the reality of the atrocities committed, accepting that neighbors, friends and in some cases family, could become so cruel was often only possible after witnessing the transformation themselves. Some experienced torture and deliberate harm designed to psychologically destroy their spirit. "One strategy employed by torture perpetrators is to commit acts that are so horrendous that most people do not want to believe that they occurred" (Weaver/Burns 2001:148).

Stripped of their livelihoods, their networks, and what was safe, familiar and comfortable, my respondents, long remaining in Bosnia, eventually left the region. Some sought shelter with relatives, hiding in abandoned houses, or in forests. Some found temporary protection in refugee camps or emergency centers, often staying for years. In this pre-migration phase, they generally endured grave human rights violations and multiple privations. In most cases this included the breakdown of their family, and social and cultural support infrastructures, the impacts of which have had lasting adverse effects on each individual, which have consequently influenced my informants' ability to adapt in the receiving society context.

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[53] Five distinct categories are used in the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire to assess factors of trauma, which include: torture, persecution (i.e. imprisonment, kidnapping, forced separation), suffocation and loss of consciousness, exposure to violent death, and war exposure (Mollica et al. 1992; American Psychiatric Association 1994; Interview Paul Tegenfeldt). PTSD symptoms are significantly associated with persecution and torture factors (Silove et al. 2002), as well as passive torture (Cunningham/Cunningham 1997). "Techniques are used which deliberately induce a sense of helplessness in conjunction with physical, sexual, psychological violence to paralyze the psyche." (Cunningham/Cunningham 1997:55 in: Weaver/Burns 2001:148) Trauma thus results in "an inescapable stressful event that overwhelms people's existing coping mechanisms" (Kolk et al. 1996 in: Bryant-Davis 2005:3).

4.1.2 Evacuation and Displacement

The context in which the refugees left was rapid, typically with little preparation time, some only having a few hours. This is not to say that they vacated the area quickly, but rather when they decided to act, usually there was little time but to *react*. Many relayed having escaped or been forcibly removed from their homes, evicted or relocated to other places not of their choosing. Many spoke of their luck in catching the "last bus out," risking grave dangers had they waited any longer. Prior to her dislocation, one of my interlocutors recalls the occupation by Serbian troops in her hometown.

> "Sie haben in den ganzen Stadt Blockaden aufgesetzt. Wir konnten nicht raus. Die einzige Möglichkeit raus zu kommen, zu flüchten, war durch die Wälder. Aber wir wussten den Weg nicht. Sie haben es [die Stadt] blockiert und dann sind mit dem Autos durch die Stadt gefahren. Sie haben gesagt: Ihr habt Gewehr, wir möchten sie haben! Und dann jeden Morgen um 6:00 sind sie durch die Stadt gefahren. Sie wollten alles haben was die Bewohner aber eigentlich nicht hatten. Die Männer mussten arbeiten gehen und jeden Tag hatte ich wirklich Angst, dass meinen Mann gar nicht wieder nach Hause kommt. Nach 10 Tage haben sie alle in einem kleinen Dorf getötet und haben alle Häuser verbrannt. Ich habe gesehen, dass es alles stimmte…" (Interview, Irena)

Men were more likely to remain behind either due to imprisonment, labor camps, military duty, or because usually only elderly or wounded men were allowed on humanitarian transports out of the country. "Alle [Männer], die in einem bestimmten Alter waren, die gesund oder fähig waren in einer Army beizutreten, mussten da bleiben. Die haben keine Wahl." (Interview, Dubravka) Having heard that the men were typically collected to join the military, work in refugee camps, be held in concentration camps, or be shot and killed, a number of males sought alternative solutions rather than outright resistance. One of my participants, for instance, described his strategy of hiding in his house for several years to evade having to join military forces before eventually escaping to Germany in search of protection.

> "Ich wollte nicht in den Krieg gehen, das war ein Problem. Als ich diesen Zettel gekriegt habe, dass ich im Krieg gehen musste - ich wollte nicht - ich habe mich einfach im Haus eingeschlossen. Fast ein und halb Jahre war ich im dem Haus eingesperrt. Für mich war die Entscheidung richtig, weil ich gar kein Mörder bin und ich kann auch nicht auf den anderen Leuten schießen." (Interview, Slavo)

With the overriding goal to survive, in the majority of cases my respondents braved risky escapes, unsure whether they would be safe during their journey. Some managed to flee to safety through the forests, hiding in the cold of the night amidst the trees, terrified of being seen by others also in hiding, unsure of the enemy. While some hid in abandoned buildings, some sought shelter through personal contacts or were offered protection in refugee camps or emergency centers.

"Zuerst haben uns die Leute zu sich genommen, meine Mutter und meine Oma und meinen Bruder, aber dann hatte die Frau selbst kein Essen mehr. Dann waren wir in einer Grundschule, wo Flüchtlinge so angelegt wurden und dort haben wir geschlafen. Ich weiß jetzt nicht wie lange wir da waren, 92 vielleicht bis 93. Da waren ganz schlimme Umstände in dieser Schule: Es kamen so Läuse, die Leute wurden krank…" (Interview, Selma)

Deprived of shelter, the Bosnians had entered the *unknown*, leaving all they valued and owned behind, unsure of what they would find. In many cases, women escaped with their children. "We fled, like, my mom and two sisters. We fled because of the fighting but my dad stayed behind." (Interview, Dino) Women and children account for more than 80 percent of the refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Mertus et al. 1997). Rarely did an entire family, including the father, manage to escape together.

In some cases, parents made arrangements for children to be brought to distant relatives, out of immediate harm's way. "My parents stayed, thinking in a couple of weeks everything will be okay, so we could come back from Croatia." (Interview, Ema) For those exiting Bosnia on their own, the lack of family support and the separation from loved ones proved emotionally harrowing. Some studies have shown that family support serves as a "protective factor against developing severe psychological symptoms…" (Hooberman et al. 2007:120-121). In contrast, making an escape with children, worrying about their safety and fearing their having to witness violent acts proved stressful on parents, who worried about their daughters falling victim to ethnic cleansing and rape, and about their sons being imprisoned, killed, taken by military forces to join in the fighting, or held in labor camps. In addition, traveling in greater numbers made it sometimes more difficult to locate food or sleeping options and crying children needed comforting to be silenced (Huttunen 2005). Despite these practical concerns, however, according to my interlocutors, being accompanied by family members and knowing the whereabouts of loved ones tended to provide greater emotional benefits than any practical problems.

A more detailed account of the emotional repercussions of the sample's pre-migration experiences is to come later in the section on *emotional obstacles*. The next section depicts the second category that emerged in the analysis of the data, reflecting the expectations and motivation or push/pull factors of my respondents.

4.2 Expectations and Motivation (Push/Pull Factors)

An emotionally-loaded factor that has influenced my respondents' ability to adjust in the receiving society had much to do with their reasons for emigrating as well as their perceptions of their own ability to act or have agency. Hence, the second category reflects my

respondents' expectations and motivation for migrating. Kosik (2006) argues that beliefs about the self tend to be subject to motivational forces. Motivation in migration is an important consideration in predicting "group identifications, subject well-being, and the economic situation of immigrants, but also in determining the first step of the immigration process: the decision to emigrate" (p.117). In Demuth's (2000) four-phase model of migration, the basic idea in the final analysis determining decisions or actions of an individual is the notion that "migration is the action of a single individual, for it is only the individual person [who] decides to migrate or not" (p.30). While this may, nonetheless, still occur within a group context or in a family dynamic, he believes when migrating "an eventual individual decision is necessary whatever the context" (Demuth 2000:30).

Three needs have been emphasized for migrants choosing to emigrate and include the need for power, affiliation and achievement (Kosic 2006). A higher achievement and power motivation is commonly apparent among those wanting to emigrate, while affiliation motivation is less relevant. This theory associates the goals of high *achievers* interested in emigrating with their aims to attain better opportunities, possessing the will to endure greater challenges to avoid routine. Kosic (2006) argues that "those high in power motivation are more willing to take risks in reaching their goals in order be recognized and to impress others" (p.116-117). This specific set of motivational needs helps in differentiating those fleeing for survival from those actually *choosing* to emigrate.

I have reduced the motivating factors for emigrating that emerged in the data to four subcategories: *preservation* or sheer survival (physical, social and psychological security associated with fleeing), *materialism* (financial well-being, wealth, economic opportunities), *self-development* (personal growth in abilities, knowledge and skills), and *family loyalty* (family reunification options, placing needs of child first, or sending remittances).[54] These subcategories reflect different reasons accompanying my respondents in their decision to emigrate and indicate striking differences of agency applied when resettling.

4.2.1 Extent of Agency in Migration Decision

Referring to previously reviewed push/pull theories the case of the Bosnian refugees exhibits that my respondents *decided* to flee to safe regions due to the devastation, violence and dangers associated with the war and their innate desire to survive. They had enjoyed their lives in Bosnia and (with the exception of one respondent, who was in the process of applying

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[54] The concepts self-preservation, materialism, and self-development were adopted from Tartakovsky and Schwartz (2001) (in: Kosic 2006:117).

to study abroad prior to the outbreak of war) they had never intended to leave, which accounts for their hesitation in escaping.

> "Wir wussten eigentlich, dass wir aus Bosnien fliehen und dass wir vielleicht nicht zurückkommen würden. Ich hatte hier [in Berlin] eine Tante sozusagen und sie hat ein Jahr lang versucht uns zu erklären, wie die Situation in Bosnien ist und dass man fliehen muss. Das wollten wir nicht, aber irgendwann kam das Moment als wir das dann tun mussten als wir die Wohnung in 20 Minuten verlassen haben." (Interview, Mirna)

Despite forced displacement as the core impetus for migrating, my participants nonetheless exhibited agency in leaving, signifying the subcategory *preservation*. Although ambitions were framed in self-preservation, a subtle distinction in meaning emerged between *fleeing* and *escaping*. The subcategory fleeing implies an overwhelming need to react quickly, likable to an impulse, often ill-prepared and poorly thought out. The subcategory escaping often entailed several phases: fleeing immediate danger, and then plotting a more secure plan, thus allowing a bit more time and strategy to consciously weigh options in the constrained setting. Both concepts convey a dangerous, troubling situation, requiring an immediate response to war-related push factors.

Having family members and close friends in Berlin who were willing to initially support and accommodate the refugees proved to be the main impetus and overriding determinant for my interlocutors in deciding where to flee first. "When we came to Germany it was, like, just for survival. I had family in Germany. It was my aunt who was living there, I think for 30 years, and she called me and said, just come, save yourself." (Interview, Behar) Turning to relatives or close friends - whether officially or not - served as my respondents' first contact in Berlin in every instance. One participant confirms that having contacts in Germany served as a main pull factor: "Jeder ist immer da gegangen, wo jemand schon da ist. Sonst wusste man nicht, wo man hin soll." (Interview, Zumra)

Generally, my respondents were practical, heading to locations where they had relatives or personal contacts, to pre-existing networks of support and protection, and taking routes expected to have the least resistance.[55] Despite evident push factors causing my sample to flee, there is evidence that *agency* and deliberation were applied in considering where and when to migrate, and to whom to turn for help. Thus having extended family members already living in Berlin (and later Chicago by means of family reunification) served as an important pull factor for my interlocutors to head to these two destinations; both cities took in thousands of Bosnian refugees.

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[55] Refer to Table 2 in Appendix I: Travel Paths for an overview of the sample's routes of entry to Berlin and Chicago.

Prior to the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence, Yugoslavian citizens were permitted entrance to Germany by means of a tourist visa. Tourists qualified for a permit-free residency, enabling them a three-month residency authorization (Hohlfeld 2008). This implied that Bosnians arriving to Germany as initial tensions in Yugoslavia flared did so with relative ease and based on existing legislation. Following an Internal Authority's Directive (*Weisung Nr. 65*) from the Interior Ministers Conference on Nov. 8, 1991, it was presumed that the collective of Bosnian war refugees arriving to Berlin would in most cases fall under the terms required for an individual to acquire a deportation hindrance on grounds of the ongoing conflict in Bosnia. "There was no 'refugee visa' (and no likelihood that, if one existed, consulates would issue it), so those in flight had to use a tourist, business or student visa or enter clandestinely and then claim refugee status" (Harris 2002:37). One of my participants relays the process she went through to attain legal travel documents to enter Berlin in 1991.

> "Einen Monat lang haben wir irgendwo bei Verwandten, bei Freunden gewohnt und dann haben wir angerufen und gesagt, das Visum brauchen wir jetzt! Meine Tante hat ein Visum für uns beantragt, dass wir hier zum Besuch kommen. Das war wie für die Touristen, und ein solches Visum konnte man damals für drei Monate bekommen. Nach Ablauf sollte man zurückkehren, aber da in Bosnien Krieg war, konnten wir nicht. Dann bekamen wir eine Duldung. Wenn man schon ein Visum für Deutschland hatte, musste man dann auch einen Durchreisevisum für Kroatien besorgen.[56] Na ja und so sind wir hierhergekommen. Aus Bosnien sind nach '91 viele weggeflogen und hier nach Deutschland gekommen." (Interview, Mirna)

After Germany recognized Croatia's claim for independence and international recognition soon followed, different asylum and immigration regulations impacting the Yugoslavian refugees were decreed in the individual federal states of Germany in the form of formal visa obligations, known as a *Verpflichtungserklärung*. All Bosnian citizens were herewith required to have a visa in order to enter Germany after May 1992, a requirement that remained throughout the duration of war (Hohlfeld 2008:901; Blaschke/Sabanovic, 2001).[57] Many became reliant on their relatives already in Berlin to sign this formal obligation. The majority faced difficulties acquiring travel visas to enter into or legally cross neighboring countries, to obtain government-issued passports, or legal means by which to enter destination countries like Germany, especially after fighting broke out in Bosnia. Acquiring visas was made more difficult due to time constraints, lack of money, lack of valid passports, and the breakdown in the Bosnian infrastructure and increasing corruption.

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[56] This refers to the need to attain a visa to travel through a third countries, indicative of the restrictive policy changes to come relative to safe third countries, as such visas were incredibly difficult to get as the war intensified.

In abiding by normal asylum proceedings in Germany, individuals were generally expected to submit their asylum applications to the Foreigners Office *(Ausländerbehörde)* or border police before entering German territory. In reality, however, individuals who arrive legally with a valid visa, often end up applying for asylum from within the country while the applicants who enter Germany illegally, commonly do so by avoiding border controls altogether (Schwarz et al. 2004). The number of Bosnian refugees who evaded border controls and failed to apply for protection is unknown, but it is suspected that this number was not just a few, particularly as news spread among the refugees about the difficulties in acquiring asylum in Germany due to their inability to confirm proof of state persecution. One interlocutor admitted: "I crossed the border illegally." (Interview, Mali) Having waited too long to plot his exit by legal means, a different respondent had to improvise.

> "In der Früh bin ich mit dem Bus nach Belgrad gefahren, natürlich mit falschen Papieren, weil ich mit meinem Namen nirgendwo weg fahren durfte.[58] Wir waren zwei, drei Tage bei einem Freund bevor ich nach Prag gefahren bin. Nach ca. zwei Tage in Prag habe ich meine Cousine angerufen, die in Berlin war. Ich habe ihr gesagt: 'Ich komme jetzt.' Sie hat mich abgeholt und ich war im Kofferraum versteckt." (Interview, Slavo)

Some discovered upon their arrival to Berlin that their contacts could not provide the promised support.[59] As a result, many entered Germany and prolonged their stay "illegally." These examples show that an element of intensity and time - allowing for deliberation - is incorporated in the distinction between fleeing and escaping. Some respondents had strategized approaches to evacuate the area: considering whom they knew in safer regions that could help them, who they could bribe, and how they could arrange the necessary money. Men faced greater challenges escaping. "Most able-bodied men who managed to leave paid large bribes for their escape." (Mertus et al. 1997:40) My respondents commonly signed deeds for their home, signing away all of their possessions in order to acquire assistance across borders or in securing passports. Sometimes, they signed such paper work in exchange for their lives or that of their family members. A frequent strategy of escape was to bribe others as a means out of the region. In some cases, even UN soldiers profited by assisting with escapes, an example of which is depicted in the following excerpt.

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[57] To be eligible for a visa obligation, a private individual or a representative of an institution in Germany needed to sign a formal obligation, guaranteeing responsibility for covering the living and medical costs of the person seeking to enter the country (Paragraph 84 of the Aliens Act). This was then submitted to the authorities.

[58] All of my respondents referred to their ability to identify the ethnicity of a fellow Bosnian depending on their family name. It was, consequently, dangerous to maneuver in certain areas as ID controls were undertaken by opposing ethnic groups.

[59] Many relatives were not in a position to support the newly arriving refugees long-term. Sharing a small apartment with a family of refugees for an unlimited duration and paying their living costs was not feasible for many. Tensions consequently mounted, leading many refugees to move out and have to rely on social welfare and other means of support.

"I paid a UN soldier to take me out from Bosnia. Lucky me, he was half Serbian, half Croatian and he can speak my language. At first checkpoint, they gave me a sign like that I'm a great soldier or whatever, something for UN. And I said, 'man, [when] I'm [at] next checkpoint, wherever it's Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, they [will] take me out because I couldn't speak any different language.' He was 'no, no, no, your jaw is in bad shape, you got operation, you cannot speak.' Then the deal was that he takes me to Hungary. But he kicked me out next to Sarajevo. He was, like, 'from here you've got bus to Belgrade and from over there, you're okay.' And I was, like, 'man, the Serbians will kill me!' He was 'no, no, no, don't worry' and he gave me the phone number of some guy. Then over there, I had a hard time, but I don't want to go into that now. Finally, I was in a bus to Belgrade. In Belgrade, I found that organization that gives interviews and then I came here [to Chicago]." (Interview, Zorak)

In referring to the "organization that gives interviews", this respondent is alluding to the possibility of applying for resettlement to a safe third country.[60] In the case of the Bosnian refugees, resettlement in the US was a desirable option as a way of ensuring a durable solution, alluding to the different experiences of agency applied in migrating to Berlin versus Chicago.

The contested notion of *power* versus *powerlessness* and agent versus victim, typifies the varying degrees of voluntariness in my respondents' decisions to emigrate. This in turn has influenced the individuals' actions as well as their perceptions of agency throughout their adaptation process. Despite being practical, my samples' flight coalesced overwhelmingly out of need rather than a deliberated weighing of advantages and disadvantages associated with the country of origin (cf. Castles/Miller 2003).

Considering the lengthy application and determination process necessary for resettlement in Chicago, a strikingly different degree of voluntariness emerged in the immigration narratives between those in Berlin and Chicago. A distinction between the two samples must be emphasized here due to the greater extent of agency, deliberation and choice evident in the migration decision of my Chicago sample. Removed from immediate threats to self-preservation at the time, motivated foremost by their desire to avoid returning to Bosnia, my Chicago sample acknowledged agency in their decision to emigrate, evident by the anticipated gains they expected to realize in the US. One of my respondents recounts her experiences in applying to be resettled to the US, indicating the time involved in this process:

"In around 1997, we heard about this program for America, you know, and wanted to come. We just thought my husband and me, let's go, let's apply and see how it goes. It's

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[60] Processing posts were in (Zagreb) Croatia, (Frankfurt) Germany, (Moscow) Russia, (Belgrade) Serbia, (Islamabad) Turkey, and the (Former) Soviet Union Republics. There were also processing posts in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Moldova, and Ukraine (LIRS 2002), but these were less relevant for my sample. Priority was given to those in need of resettlement in a third country outside the region from which they had fled.

like a one-year process to get, you know, approval if you are going to go to America or not. We went to Croatia actually to apply and we had to go, like, three, four times. Then, yeah, application and then interview, [orientation] seminars, and it took us, yeah, one year and two months to find out that we were accepted to go to America and, like, 10 days before our flight we found out it's going to be Chicago." (Interview, Sara)

In most cases, the applicants had little influence in the final location of third country resettlement. Nevertheless, they related having certain expectations regarding life in the US, which factored into their initial decision to apply for resettlement.[61] These factors in turn also seemed to influence their willingness and ability to adapt and integrate following their arrival to Chicago.

Many from my Chicago sample, for instance, envisioned the US to be the *land of opportunity and freedom*. Respondents were hopeful that resettlement to the US would enable them and their children a better future. According to Castles and Miller (2003), "people decide to invest in migration, in the same way that they might invest in education or vocational training, because it raises their human capital and brings about potential future gains in earnings" (p.23) One respondent, who had begun his training in Bosnia to become a vascular surgeon applied for resettlement to the US, for instance, in the hopes of being able to continue this career pursuit.

"I went to United Nations and I applied for refugee status. I couldn't go back home, I couldn't go anywhere. That's how they sent me to Chicago. Actually not a choice I had. When I was granted the refugee status, I had choice to apply for immigrant status in the States, Australia, or Canada. I decided to go for States because I didn't know that it's not possible to get back into the medical field afterward.[62] I was definitely hoping that, you know, I would get permission to do what I know how to do. At that time it was just pure survival, you know. I came here with four hundred bucks and didn't speak English, so was pretty much prepared to do any work." (Interview, Arif)

Acknowledging the helplessness of his situation, unwilling to return to Bosnia, this respondent believed he had no other choice but to resettle, but he considered the destination options and chose the US. In many cases, my respondents dealt with their losses from the war by dreaming of a better life with more opportunity abroad. They admitted having expectations of achieving higher living standards in the US, something that seemed impossible for them to

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[61] The type of refugees *recruited* for resettlement to Chicago may also reflect another contextualization aspect influencing the results. The US pre-selection process, resettling individuals likely to achieve economic self-sufficiency may thwart the results, framed in the belief that the focus group in Chicago was more successful due to institutional factors, when in fact, this outcome may be more likely influenced by the individual characteristics and personal ambitions of each respondent in Chicago. Consider the type of person it takes to risk resettling to an unknown country. What does this say about the individual? How might self-esteem and personal ambitions influence this response? Often those achieving successful integration tend to demonstrate a strong will to persevere and achieve their goals, regardless of the circumstances, as in the *stars* always succeed.

[62] This refers to the non-recognition of medical degrees attained outside the United States. This respondent was unable to advance his medical career where he left off in Bosnia, but was forced to requalify himself. He chose a different, less complicated field.

achieve in war-devastated Bosnia. With claims of high unemployment, a destroyed infrastructure and no homes to which to return to in Bosnia, resettlement to a third country often seemed the only viable option for my interlocutors who were hopeful of a better future in the receiving society (*materialism*).

Another motivating factor influencing their decision to resettle to a third country was associated with the expectations they had regarding residency rights and the education system in the US (*self-development*). "Immigrant parents who lack education or vocational skills may hope that their children and grandchildren benefit from the educational and economic opportunities that were never available to them." (Newland et al. 2007) For many, education is imperative for bringing about social change and achieving a better quality of life. Considering education an essential factor for their future and trusting the value of a US degree, this factored into my respondents' decisions to apply for resettlement. One informant described the decision-making process of his family in relocating:

> "My father had visited Chicago before on a business trip. He liked it here and was basically looking for the best place where the three of us [kids] could get an education and basically get permanent residency status. We thought the US was the best place for that." (Interview, Dino)

While children were often too young to be involved in the decision-making process of migrating, many of the younger informants in my sample, who attended university in the US, maintained nonetheless a position of agency in reconstructing their experiences and affirming the prominent reputation of the US higher educational system and the opportunity for achieving a better life. This was expected, with permanent residence rights in the US, to be guaranteed.

Another example of agency that became salient in the process of analyzing my interlocutors' reasons for resettling was the perceived sense of duty towards certain family members, not necessarily the ones abroad but usually the ones within the core family unit (*family loyalties*). Several participants, mostly female, admitted that they only agreed to apply for resettlement to the US because a family member, often the husband, encouraged them to do so. In most cases, the reason attributed for this decision was based on the children's well-being and the potential opportunity for their children to excel in the receiving society. This was complemented by another motivating factor, namely, reuniting with family already located in the receiving society. One of my elderly respondents, who had stayed 10 years at a refugee camp in Serbia, was assisted by her adult-age daughter who undertook a proactive role in arranging for her mother's resettlement to Chicago by means of family reunification. While a perceived sense of duty towards certain family members often aided in uniting

estranged family members, in some cases it also led to greater geographical divisions and a conflict of interests.

> "My plan all along was to go home [to Bosnia], because that's what you want and everything you do is really related to that. When [my brother and his family] went back, well, it was awful. It was really awful and he kept saying: 'Please don't come back, please don't come back.' Because my plan was I wanted to stay just a few more months [in Germany], and go back and I even sent all my stuff with his truck. And in the meantime I get this interview and I have no idea why they gave me a visa to be honest with you, no clue. So I got it probably because I didn't care. And then my brother was seriously concerned if I [were to] go to Bosnia, it's gonna be harder for everybody. And that really made me come [to Chicago], but I didn't really wanna come. I didn't like the idea. I didn't have time to adjust to that, so I didn't like it before I ever even came here." (Interview, Zina)

While my respondents possessed a degree of agency in their decision to migrate, in some situations, a strong sense of family loyalty and perceived pressure served to influence certain individuals from not acting in accordance with their own will, presenting practical and emotional constraints on my respondents' decision-making processes. This, too, had lasting emotional consequences for my respondents during their post-migration adaptation. Overall, both the degree of agency my interlocutors exercised in their decision to immigrate as well as their ability to draw strength from the power to act greatly influenced their post-migration experiences and adaptation processes. The next section addresses other encouraging factors related to the reception and integration policies that facilitated the adaptation process of the sample.

4.3 Facilitating Factors

Due to the bilateral nature of integration, this next section highlights the *facilitating factors* conducive to the incorporation of the Bosnian refugees in Chicago and Berlin. Bilateral integration is understood in terms of the inclusion and participation of migrants and refugees into the different institutional settings of the receiving society (Gesemann 2001:15). It is dependent on the quality of the interactions taking place every day among the individuals, social groups, and institutions in the receiving city, resulting in an interrelation between the newcomers and the receiving society as they both influence each other. This section on facilitating factors and the subsequent section on obstacles are highly significant as they assess *in what* the newcomers are adapting by assessing the efforts of the receiving societies to foster and facilitate the integration of the Bosnian refugees. This section is structured according to the institutional factors, first, in Chicago, followed by Berlin that facilitated the sample in their adaptation process. By highlighting one of the first major differences in Germany's and the United States' responses to the Bosnian refugees, the next section

addresses the facilitating factors entrenched in the United States' overseas and domestic resettlement program.

4.3.1 Facilitating Factors in Chicago

A number of institutional factors positively influenced my Chicago sample, in particular the pre-departure measures and orientation courses as well as the US domestic resettlement program. Not only did the latter facilitate the selection and assessment process of potential refugees abroad but it also clarified the expectations the US had of the newcomers, which was absent in Germany's response to the Bosnians. Here, it is not the courses themselves that served to facilitate the integration opportunities of my Chicago sample, but the standardized refugee recognition processes and their ability to participate fully in the receiving society. Also, enjoying the right to access many institutional resources necessary for maintaining an independent existence, such as housing, employment, education, language classes, among others, proved essential for fostering integration.

4.3.1.1 US Domestic Resettlement Program

In cooperation with the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) at the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was responsible for the longer-term integration programs of the Bosnians, known as domestic refugee assistance. This, not the overseas program, is generally known to absorb the bulk of expenses associated with the US refugee resettlement program, described in the previous chapter (Franz 2005). The ORR offers assistance mainly to refugees resettled through the Department of State's refugee allocation system under the annual ceiling for refugee admissions. As part of this initial package of mandatory core refugee resettlement services, known as Reception and Placement (R&P), the Department of State ensured that a range of initial reception and placement services, including sponsorship, orientation, initial housing, basic costs for food, clothing, counseling and referral would be provided to the newly arriving Bosnian refugees for the first 30 days of their stay (US Department of Health and Human Services 1997).

The Domestic Resettlement Program was run through a program of administrative overhead funding and annual per capita grants, referred to as Cooperative Agreements, which were granted to qualifying national voluntary agencies (VOLAGS) by the PRM Bureau.[63] As

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[63] These agreements are based on a proposal submission and review process. Recipients of R&P grants need to supplement the PRM funds with private cash and in-kind contributions. As such, the domestic orientation process, like the overseas program, is funded by the US Department of State's PRM Bureau and supplemented by self-generated resources (US Department of State Homepage).

recipients of federal funding, the VOLAGS, along with their 450 local affiliates, *assured* the Department of State that it would provide the initial so-called *nesting* services to the Bosnians in order to ease their transition, support them in rebuilding their lives, and foster their long-term adaptation process (US Department of State Homepage). After their admission, the Bosnians were assigned to one of the 10 national US VOLAGS authorized to resettle Bosnian refugees to the United States.[64] Integral to the US refugee resettlement process, the VOLAGS comprised religiously based organizations, private organizations, and ethnic organizations. These agencies were required to provide the refugees an orientation on their housing and personal safety within the first five working days in the US. In addition to initial core services, such as meeting the refugees at the airport and arranging their housing needs the refugees were also offered orientation components, such as assistance applying for food stamps, reporting an emergency, opening a bank account, getting a social security card, going grocery shopping, using public transportation, among other things.

Regulations were established, for instance, to ensure that the apartments were prearranged with furniture, dishes and basic necessities for their initial arrival. Assistance programs were also available for the refugees in financial need both at the start and following the initial eight-month reception period.[65] The Refugee Resettlement program also relied on its model to help cover the cost of refugee reception and placement to link newly arriving refugees with community volunteers and religious organizations.

Following the 30-day initial period, the services available varied depending on the resettlement agency responsible as well as on the individual needs of the refugee. Not all of the 10 voluntary agencies provided services in-house, but each one needed to ensure that the refugees assigned to them be provided a list of specific services as well as case management assistance during the initial R&P period. This was known as Community Orientation and included referrals for the Bosnians to undergo health assessments with physical and mental healthcare providers, to participate in English as a Second Language (ESL) classes as well as job counseling programs. Additional aspects related to this included: general information on refugee services; information on permanent resident alien status and family reunion

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[64] This was list in the previous chapter. VOLAGS work in collaboration with the Department of State's PRM Bureau, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), and their various partner agencies in order to receive and resettle refugees in their new communities (Refugee Council USA Homepage). Nine of the 10 participating agencies were represented in Chicago at the time the Bosnian refugees were received; one of which was a state agency, while the other nine were US private voluntary agencies (Interview, ORR).

[65] They were eligible to apply for assistance under the ORR's program of domestic assistance (Office of Refugee Resettlement Homepage) and beyond this they were also eligible for mainstream financial assistance programs after their eight-month transition period to the US.

procedures; the role of the recipient and any other individual or group assisting in sponsorship; as well as public services and facilities; personal and public safety; standards of personal and public hygiene; and "the availability of other publicly supported requirements of each adult refugee to fully repay his or her IOM transportation loan in accordance with the established payment schedule" (LIRS Reception and Placement Program CY 2001:8). Lastly, orientation materials covering these topics needed to be written in the refugee's native language, when possible, and made available to the refugee upon arrival. This greatly facilitated the newcomers' understanding of their new context. Overall, the intention was to assist the refugees in their process of adjusting to life in Chicago, which was deemed an important facilitating factor that influenced their initial adaptation process positively.

4.3.1.2 US Sponsorship

The following experience illustrates the differences in services and legal rights granted an asylum applicant in the US compared with those granted a recognized refugee status. It also alludes to variations in the US reception program[66] and the significance of sponsorship.

With one exception, all of the participants in my sample were granted the status of *refugee* and were resettled with the US sponsored refugee resettlement program.[67] As Convention refugees, they were eligible for the full range of federal and state programs upon arrival in the US, whereas asylees were not. Once the US government determined an asylum seeker qualified for protection, the individual gained the legal status as an asylee. The Bosnians already present in the US or applying for admission at a port of entry could only apply for asylum, which had different implications from those applying for refugee status outside of the country. The experience of the one participant, who did not go through the resettlement process, is significant for this study insofar as it exemplifies an alternative form of protection and route of entry to the US.

This particular participant was a 60-year old retired military sports professor, who arrived to Chicago in January 1992 as tensions in Bosnia were mounting. He had been summoned

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[66] The recognized refugee status is more beneficial than the asylee status due to the wealth of supportive services associated with this.

[67] Under US law, an asylum seeker and a refugee are both people who have fled their home country due to a well-founded fear of persecution. A well-founded fear of persecution needs to be proved on the grounds of the person's race, religion, membership in a social group, political opinion, or national origin. The standards for proving a *well-founded* fear of persecution are virtually the same in both cases with the exception of some technical legal differences. Asylum applicants seek protection from within the US while refugees apply outside (Interview, World Relief). Despite similarity in reasons for fleeing Bosnia, the protection varied between these two types. My focus is on the situation of refugees since the number of Bosnian asylees was relatively small. "Only a handful came initially as asylees since they would have had to have some means of getting out of their country into the United States." (Interview, World Relief) Exceptions did exist, however, and some asylees from Bosnia were able to receive protection. One example follows.

back to active duty in Bosnia to command a *concentration camp*.[68] As a pacifist, he instead *deserted* and went into hiding until he was able to acquire a special visa from the US embassy in Sarajevo to escape to the United States. He was not granted refugee or asylum status at this time, but was able to secure a one-year visa to go to Chicago where he had a contact, who had agreed to be his *petitioning sponsor*. This required the contact to verify - with an affidavit of support - that the *intending immigrant* had adequate means of financial support and would unlikely become a public charge (Bureau of Consular Affairs, US Department of State Homepage). Compliance with the affidavit of support and confirmation of being in possession of adequate finances were requirements stipulated by the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in order for the participant to be approved to enter the US. The consequence of this participant having entered Chicago under sponsorship as opposed to refugee status was that he did not receive any assistance from US authorities or NGO workers, nor did he participate in any orientation programs. Only several years later, through a chance exchange with other Bosnians in a restaurant, did he learn about the possibility of applying for protection, being eligible to receive government assistance, and eventually being able to acquire a permanent resident status. Since he was already in the US he was only eligible to apply for asylum, which enabled him authorization to work in the US regardless of whether he possessed an employment authorization document (EAD).[69]

In addition to individual sponsors, religious ministries and congregants also took on an important role in providing refugee sponsorship and supportive services for the Bosnian refugees. They shared the burden of responsibility the government would have otherwise had to address on its own and with limited means.

> "Wuthnow (1990:8) has observed that religion and giving have been closely linked historically. And although specific expectations about help vary by religious tradition, the religious traditions on American soil embrace teachings about responsibility to fellow human beings, which have been codified in dictums such as the Golden Rule, the Beatitudes, and the parable of the Good Samaritan." (Menjívar 2006:1449)

Religious ministries were engaged in varying levels of *charity* and *altruism*. Congregants could become sponsors, co-sponsors, or support persons for families sponsoring refugees. Congregants could also offer cash or donate supplies, food, furnishings, or other in-kind contributions, and they could offer their time serving as volunteers. Volunteers often assisted

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[68] My sample consistently referred to *concentration camps* in Bosnia, which included reports of squalor, malnutrition, physical violence, and very often killings of the imprisoned male civilians.

[69] EAD authorization is encouraged as it served as "evidence of both identity and employment authorization, [and could] be presented to employers as a List A document of the Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9). The EAD can also serve as evidence of alien registration, which is required by law to be carried by registered aliens at all times" (US Citizenship and Immigration Services Homepage).

newly arriving refugees by providing transportation, assistance with official paperwork, help obtaining a Social Security card, registering children in school, teaching English language classes, serving as teaching assistants or acting as in-home tutors or as mentors, assisting with job skills, providing legal advice,[70] or securing donations.

Signing a sponsorship commitment was not legally binding, but rather clarified the roles and responsibilities of the sponsor, the religious organization, the affiliate office, as well as the refugees' family members already in the US. By engaging a plan to decrease support as the refugees became better able to provide for themselves, an intrinsic aim of the sponsorship program was to assist the refugees in their initial reception process with an emphasis on empowerment, encouraging them to be self-sufficient and independent, while avoiding any lasting dependencies on the family or church congregants. This form of sponsored commitment was intended to be time-limited and variable according to the needs of the refugees. As relationships formed, emotional support often extended beyond the initial sponsorship commitment, however. Sponsorship was not intended to be open-ended - to eliminate any form of dependency (UMCOR Homepage).

Sponsors aimed to create a hospitable environment for the newly arriving refugees, particularly for those arriving on their own, who were unable to unite with family members in the US. By greeting them at the airport, helping them to find affordable housing, maneuvering around the city, offering companionship and support in the initial reception process, sponsoring congregations helped to reduce initial feelings of isolation among the refugees (UMCOR Homepage). My samples' interactions with the sponsors, refugee resettlement agencies and mainstream society institutions were described for the most part as relatively pleasant, especially since the assistance they received was instrumental in easing their initial fears and insecurities. One participant summarized, "Everyone was nice, beginning with our family members, then the agency and our neighbors, everyone was ready to help." (Interview, Behar)

With increasingly more Bosnian refugees arriving for reasons of family reunification, family members already present in Chicago largely assumed responsibility under *sponsorship* programs for the newly arriving people. Families who sponsored refugees received support from the local affiliate office to provide the necessary services to ensure that the refugees

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[70] The US has had a relatively strong system of enabling legal advice provisions to be made accessible to individuals unable to cover the fees, usually including refugees and migrants. Among my participants, this issue of attaining legal advice only emerged for the one asylum applicant, who first entered the US before applying for protection. For my other interlocutors who entered the US as refugees, topics of legal advice only abounded in reference to their divorce cases.

could become self-sufficient as soon as possible. This meant that VOLAGS no longer picked up the refugees from the airport and arranged their initial housing; rather family members did. With the supportive relations through sponsorship and vast institutional support under the US resettlement program, the Bosnian refugees quickly immersed themselves within the mainstream society, proving to be an important facilitating factor towards long-term integration.

4.3.1.3 Socio-Cultural and Ethnic Community Networks in Chicago

The pre-existing Bosnian-American community in Chicago played a significant role by assisting the Bosnian refugees throughout their adaptation process. The configuration of the pre-existing community was composed of four main waves of immigrants from Bosnia to Chicago. The first wave dates back to the beginning of the 20th Century when the first Bosnian-Americans, mostly young and male, helped erect the infrastructure of the city by working in construction jobs and building railroad tracks, roads, tunnels and buildings. In 1906, they established what appears to be the oldest Muslim organization in the US, located on the Near North Side.[71] Chicago's first mosque soon followed, erected on South Wabash Avenue in 1908 (Interview, ORR).

This religious foundation continued to evolve and deepen with the second wave of Bosnians, which took place during the interwar period between 1918 and 1941. The arrival of increasingly more educated and professionally skilled Bosnian immigrants after World War II contributed to the prosperity and prestige of the Bosnian-American community in Chicago. After the 1968 riots[72] the Bosnian American Cultural Association bought land in Northbrook, a Chicago suburb, to build a larger mosque and cultural center, which soon became the symbol of the Bosnian-American community (Interview, ORR). With the wealth of the community and the mosque representing a unifying element, the Bosnian and Herzegovina-American Community Center, a private assistance organization initiated in 1985, proved to be initially very helpful to the newly arriving Bosnian refugees, who mark the last and probably most substantial wave of Bosnians arriving to Chicago as a result of the war in the former Yugoslavia (Puskar 2007). This composes the fourth wave of Bosnian refugees.[73] This final wave was often further divided into two migration groups. The first group consisted of

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[71] This organization was a Bosnian mutual aid and benevolent society known as Muslimansko Potpomagajuce Drustvo Dzemijetul Hajrije of Illinois (Encyclopedia of Chicago Homepage).

[72] Riots ensued between the police and anti-war demonstrators, lasting five days, during the 1968 Chicago convention.

[73] For reasons of clarification, therefore, when referring to the Bosnian-American community or the pre-existing ethnic community in Chicago, I refer to these three waves of immigrants.

severely injured civilians and young soldiers, who had been evacuated in the early years of the Bosnian war to the US as Medevac cases. They were admitted on tourist visas, effectively denied access to benefits available to refugees and were further required to return to Bosnia following their medical treatment in the US.[74]

The other group, encompassed refugees, arriving directly through Croatia, Germany, or some other third country, who had applied for resettlement or came under family reunification schemes. Their arrival occurred mainly between 1995 and 1999. These refugees from Germany or other countries outside of Bosnia brought previous resettlement experience as well as financial savings with them. These refugees were also selected for resettlement based on expectations that they would likely excel in the US. Those arriving later enjoyed another distinction from the refugees arriving before them, as they benefited enormously from the support of Bosnian families already familiar with the way of life in Chicago. These newcomers were able to obtain a wealth of information about life in the US from the existing ethnic community and from recently resettled refugee family members and friends.

The support offered through the Bosnian Refugee Center, founded in 1994 by the Illinois Department of Human Services with the help of public and private agencies, proved to be another source of support for the newly arriving refugees. With the aim of assisting newcomers and addressing the long-term adjustment of the Bosnian refugees, the Office of Refugee Resettlement assisted in developing and transforming the Bosnian Refugee Center into a Mutual Aid Association (MAA).

MAAs are generally organizations initiated by former refugees and immigrants to assist newly arriving refugees in the community by offering community orientation, translation services, employment assistance, transportation and English classes for refugees and immigrants. This is often a gradual process, which takes years to develop. The encouragement by the ORR to quickly develop an MAA for the refugees is more a reflection of US society than a *natural* process inspiring the refugees (cf. Kelly 2004). Such organizations are generally formed and organized to meet a specific need of the community (Salinas et al. 1987 in: Kelly 2004).[75] "The challenge with any community center is maintaining a connection

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[74] Handicapped refugees are eligible for special state programs for the handicapped, but refugee agencies rarely advocate on their behalf due to the long-lasting and intensive time commitment involved in receiving and placing handicapped refugees. The State Department only granted Medivac cases refugee status after relentless lobbying efforts by the Chicago Bosnian community on their behalf (Weiss-Armush 1998).

[75] As was the case with several MAAs, a mentorship process was used at the Bosnian Center, meaning that the center started as a program under the established agency, which was responsible for assisting the development of accounting procedures, of personal policy procedures, etc. and in effect, a staff was trained from which the agency could spin off as an independent entity (Interview, ORR). By 1997 the non-profit Bosnian and Herzegovina American Community Center become an independent entity, staffed by Bosnian refugees from varying ethnic backgrounds.

with the community and having a dedicated leadership and supportive staff able to sustain the effort needed." (Interview, ORR) Some ways in which the Bosnian-American community assisted the newly arriving refugees was by cooperating with the Office of Refugee Resettlement to help with translations, housing arrangements, job placements, and by assisting the new refugees without cars to reach the mosque in Northbrook through carpools (Interviews, World Relief and ORR).[76] Another effort of the Bosnian Center was to develop a youth program to help struggling Bosnian children. The youth program hosted poetry readings, games, celebrations, and dinners, among other things in effort to unite the community. The support and confidence gleaned through same-ethnic exchanges was viewed as empowering and thus promoted by the Chicago reception program. For instance, the refugees were not made to feel ashamed when speaking their mother tongue but were rather encouraged if it facilitated their sense of belonging in Chicago. Many of the refugees took advantage of these services and support offered by the Bosnian-American mutual aid association and ethnic community network in Chicago for as long as it lasted (Chicago Reporter Homepage).

4.3.1.4 Housing and Accommodation in Chicago

The Department of State was responsible for housing the new refugees. This process was made easier for the ORR since a number of Bosnian-Americans, who had been living already for decades in Chicago, owned apartment buildings on the north side, in the Uptown/Edgewater area. A majority of Bosnian refugees were thus settled on Chicago's far north side, which had long been a gateway area for immigrants. The cooperation arranged by the ORR with Bosnian-American networks in the provision of housing for the Bosnian refugees and in finding a workable solution proved to be beneficial for all parties involved (Interview, ORR). The Bosnian refugees not only acquired housing quickly but they also gained immediate contact with other Bosnians in the neighborhood, which proved to be an extremely important source of information and support for the refugees. The US resettlement program benefited from the existing ethnic community since it assumed much of the financial costs as well as the social responsibility that would have otherwise fallen to the VOLAGS and State Department by receiving and assisting the refugees. And the Yugoslavian-owned apartment buildings were sometimes filled entirely with Bosnian refugee families.

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[76] By uniting the Bosnian refugees with the Bosnian-American community, the logistical obstacle for the majority of refugees, who had been resettled on the north side of Chicago, was effectively removed, enabling them to reach the mosque in Northbrook (without their own automobile) through transportation offered by the existing community (Interview, ORR).

"We were living in a building with all other Bosnians. They helped us by showing us places, where we could buy our food, where we could go and swim on the lake. I even knew some of them from our hometown. So yeah, it's just neighbors really. We didn't have anyone else." (Interview, Behar)

Chicago's reception program relied heavily on the informal network of the pre-existing Bosnian community to disseminate information and advice to the newcomers. In addition to enjoying the informal support networks and information exchanges easily accessible to refugees living in the same apartment building, one benefit noted by the participants was the particularly generous response of their landlords.

"I want to mention the landlord at the building where we used to live. All the time from the first day on until we bought our house, he was very welcoming. He took us, like, was it the same week or the second week, he took us shopping. Everything with his money; we didn't pay. He was telling us: 'buy whatever you want. Buy whatever you need,' from food to clothes to pillows, blankets, because we didn't have anything. And all the time this building was full of Bosnian refugees. And it's a four-flight building and maybe, I believe, six to 10 apartments per floor, so it's pretty big building. He helped everyone. He's just kind, I don't know. He just wanted to help. Very nice guy!" (Interview, Ema)[77]

Another advantage of the close-knit Bosnian community was that in addition to living in the same buildings together, many refugees also shared apartments with extended family members (aunts, uncles, cousins, etc.) in order to cover their initial costs and save money. Another trend was for elderly Bosnians to live with their adult-age children, care for the day-to-day household tasks, and assume responsibility for the well-being of their grandchildren. This proved to be particularly important in maintaining a supportive family unit since the adult-age children often worked long shifts and were only home infrequently.

For participants living on their own in Chicago, having the option of moving in with other single Bosnian refugees also proved to be effective in meeting their expenses and contributing to saving money.

"Other friends helped me and we combined together. We were sharing one big apartment, three of us. Each of us had our own room and we shared the only bathroom. A friend in Sarajevo gave me a phone number of his friends who were living in Chicago and that's the link of how we connected." (Interview, Meho)

Moreover, support networks among fellow refugees compensated for "not having anyone else" and played an essential role in their adaptation in Chicago.

Another positive aspect of the support offered by the Bosnian-American community in regard to housing was the opportunity for some residents to take on the extra responsibility of changing inoperable light bulbs, making minor repairs, sweeping and mopping the stairwell,

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[77] Depending on the time of their arrival, this landlord may have been generous or he may have received government funding to furnish the apartments due to the standardization of household items, which were to be found in each flat.

and doing general building maintenance in the Yugoslavian-owned apartment buildings in which they lived. Those willing to take on these tasks were offered a reduced monthly rent. "[In] summer of '95, we all lived in the same apartment and then moved across the hall to a much bigger apartment. Of course my dad was working on the building so our rent was cheaper." (Interview, Valten)

With time, many of the Chicago respondents managed to save money and eventually to invest in purchasing their own property or housing. Many remained on the north side of Chicago, having grown accustomed to the surroundings and the wealth of community support in the area.

4.3.1.5 Formal Language Courses in Chicago

An instrumental strategy of the US reception and integration plan was centered in the goal of the refugees' ability to quickly learn English, so English as a Second Language (ESL) classes were offered to the refugees after their arrival. The formal language classes available to them eased their interactions in the new context and sped up their ability to access the labor market, both of which were vital for normalizing their post-migration situations.

A variety of different classes were offered and hosted by different organizations. Some were offered onsite at the VOLAGS or outsourced to NGOs, public high schools or local colleges, such as Truman Community College and Loyola University. Church volunteers and sponsors also assisted in working with the Bosnian refugees so they could learn English. Different levels of English classes were available, from beginning ESL literacy to high intermediate. Those with no previous English knowledge - making up the majority - started learning basic English skills, deemed necessary for everyday survival in the new community. Only a few of my respondents were able to speak (broken) English upon their arrival to Chicago. These tended to be business professionals who had previously worked abroad, or school age to recently graduated youth who had begun learning the language in Bosnian schools. These ESL language courses were limited in time and rushed, but the emphasis placed on English language proficiency and the free classes were a facilitating factor in the Chicago sample's adjustment process.

4.3.1.6 Labor Market Incorporation in Chicago

In accordance with the Refugee Act of 1980 and the Refugee Assistance amendments enacted in 1982 and 1986, the importance of early employment and economic self-sufficiency was emphasized to the Bosnian refugees prior to their even entering US territory. It is no surprise then upon arrival that the Bosnian refugees were immediately given an I-94 and Employment

Authorization Document (EAD), which served as proof of their legal status in the United States and authorized them to work. The priority of the resettlement agencies was to place the refugees in job positions as quickly as possible since their public assistance eligibility expired within eight months. The faster the refugees could move beyond reception services, the more self-sufficient they became, and the more money the agencies had at their discretion to assist newer incoming refugees.[78]

Many of the Bosnian refugees in Chicago acquired their first jobs as a result of the agencies' initial support. After the Bosnians advanced through the language levels, the agencies offered assistance locating job openings, composing US standardized resumes, and conducting practice job interviews, even rehearsing typical question-and-answer scenarios to ease the communication process in the event of an actual interview. One participant described the help he received from the refugee resettlement agency in finding his first job.

> "[The resettlement agency] would write down your resume and ask what kind of things you know and would look in that direction for work. Amazingly, everybody ended up working in construction. It pays big and it's a basic thing that anybody could learn. That's what I did. I did construction, painting, you know, for a couple of months and during those months I was improving my English and looking for other jobs." (Interview, Kemal)

The jobs the VOLAGS located tended to be typical immigrant-filled positions, especially for those unable to speak English fluently. Women were often placed in service jobs, such as housecleaning, catering, and healthcare; males were often placed in construction jobs, doing installations and repairs, building maintenance, plumbing, or various loading jobs at the airport, for instance.[79] Generally, my sample was mostly thankful for the opportunity to work, regardless of the field in which they were initially placed. They viewed this first job as a starting point for learning the language, gaining work experience in the US labor market, and adjusting to life in Chicago. They were thankful for the initial support offered by the agencies, envisioning the many opportunities of upward mobility that would later open up to them.

4.3.1.7 Educational Immersion in Chicago

Attending school or university was difficult as the war spread throughout Bosnia, and in some areas, impossible. This interruption in schooling, followed by renewed challenges in completing degrees in Chicago due to financial, time, and language constraints, resulted in many Bosnian refugees being unable to complete their first degrees. Many of my Chicago

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[78] Half of the stipend granted the VOLAGs went directly to the refugee, and the other half went towards staffing reception and placement (Interview, Chief of the Illinois Department of Human Service's Bureau of Refugee and Immigrant Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement).
[79] With the increase in Bosnian refugees, eventually a niche in real estate, translation, mental health counseling and social work services opened up, which were often carried out primarily by the female refugees.

interlocutors became common candidates for pursuing second education paths offered at community colleges, which have a proven track record in the US for enabling individuals, unable to succeed in the mainstream education path, to have a second chance. This is significant, as it shows that access to educational institutions in the US was available to anyone interested, although the institutional setting itself and the topic of study determined the esteem accorded the completed degree or qualification.

Because many of the Bosnians were unable to find employment in their previous field of work, were underpaid, or struggling to make ends meet, quite a number of adult Bosnian refugees took advantage of the US conditioned education programs. They pursued some form of continued learning courses or retrained in new fields, not immediately after their arrival in the US but once they had achieved some stability in Chicago and sufficient English language competency. Several took part-time college courses at community colleges or enrolled in university, the fees for which were not minimal, and so they worked on the side to cover the costs. One of my participants, for example, studied part-time and worked two part-time jobs to finance her studies. She barely managed to find the time to complete her homework assignments and struggled to fulfill her responsibilities.[80] Pursuing a master's degree was made easier for the husband of another participant, as he managed to receive financial support from his employer since the degree was related to the tasks of his job in Chicago.

The importance of education was emphasized for the Bosnian children as well. Manifest in the Bosnian participants' motivations for choosing to resettle to the US were high expectations for their children to acquire a quality education and to benefit from the wealth of opportunities anticipated in the US. Parents hoped to gain a chance for upward social mobility and an eventual recovery of the family's prewar socioeconomic status. With a focus on immigrant children being viewed as key agents in the continued upward mobility of their families, it is no surprise that the Bosnian children were also encouraged to excel in school and college. Considering their idealistic impression of the US as the *land of opportunity*, it is also not surprising that many Bosnian parents trusted that their children would be well cared for in American schools and would advance forward. The reality for many Bosnian refugee youth, however, diverged from this aim of achieving the *American dream*, an issue that is addressed again under the obstacles. First, the facilitating factors in Berlin are described.

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[80] Had she also had to contend with family responsibilities, she would not have managed. Alternatively, this overworked schedule may have been a coping strategy to prevent her from reflecting too much on her sense of loneliness as a single woman refugee with no immediate family in the United States.

4.3.2 Facilitating Factors in Berlin

This next section switches focus from Chicago to Berlin by highlighting the factors that facilitated the adaptation process of the Berlin sample, including supportive socio-cultural interactions and financial aid by the state.

4.3.2.1 Socio-Cultural and Ethnic Community Networks in Berlin

Having relatives and friends already living in Berlin proved to be one of the biggest pull factors for my respondents in relocating to Berlin. Similar to Chicago, the pre-existing ethnic community in Berlin provided a major source of support for the Bosnian refugees. The migration movements from the former Yugoslavia to Germany can be divided into three phases: The first phase - the start of which traces back to the 1940s – lasted until 1989 during socialistic Yugoslavia and ran along the pattern of classical economic migration. Milan Mesic (1994:172) describes the first phase as the political emigration to "escape from a closed society," implying a flight from socialism to capitalism. He suggests that this was a direct consequence of the "national war of liberation" and the socialistic revolution during World War II. Around 300,000 people had already fled the country by the end of the war (Bilandzic 1978). Among those were also relatives of the German minority (*Volksdeutsche*) from Vojvodina and Slovenia during the same period. The highpoint of emigration from Yugoslavia began initially in 1955, with around 50,000 emigrants per year (Mesic 1994). With the ensuing systematic recruitment of Yugoslavian workers, known as *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) to Germany, Switzerland and Austria, an economic motive as opposed to a political one became increasingly more transparent. The third phase of migration from Yugoslavia to Germany emerged as a consequence of the collapsed post-socialistic Yugoslavian wars and displacement in the early 1990's resulting in the exodus of thousands of Bosnians from the interethnic conflict. Because the German authorities did not collect data on the ethnicity, national identity, or city of origin of these refugees, however, statistics can only be estimated, accounting for differentiations in the overall numbers (Mihok 2001b).

My sample of Bosnian refugees benefitted from these earlier waves of migration movements to Germany. Having family members and close friends in Berlin who were willing to initially support and accommodate the refugees proved to be an essential facilitating factor for the newcomers. "Ich bin 93 nach Berlin gekommen, ganz normal mit dem Zug, weil ich dieses Visum schon hatte. Und ich wusste auch nur die Adresse von meiner Schweigermutter, die schon vorher nach Berlin gekommen ist, auch als Flüchtlinge. (Interview, Irena) In addition to arranging visas for legal entrance to Berlin and providing initial financial support, the pre-existing ethnic community also assisted in ensuring support

despite illegal entry. They also often assumed an important role for the Bosnian refugees by providing initial accommodation.

> "Als ich nach Berlin kam wurde ich von Verwandten abgeholt, von der Mutter meinem Vater und dann haben wir bei denen einen Monat gelebt, ein paar Wochen, ich weiß nicht. Und wir hatten dann halt auch so einen Bekannten, der dann für uns immer bei Behörden Übersetzer war. Er war schon fünf, sechs, sieben Jahre hier in Deutschland und konnte die Sprache sehr gut sprechen. Er hat uns auch halt die Wohnung besorgt und mit solchen Sachen wie Behördengängen geholfen." (Interview, Adin)

Members of the pre-existing community also escorted the refugees to important appointments, translated, and provided advice and referrals for accessing jobs (whether legal or not), among other things. Many of the incoming refugees benefited from their overview of the system and practical assistance in completing legal formalities, forms and paperwork.

> Ich bin nach Friedrichstr. gekommen und dann war ich zwei Tage bei der Ausländerbehörde. Ich bekam eine Duldung und bin zum Sozialamt geschickt worden. Von denen habe ich Geld bekommen." (Interview, Irena)

Some were able to master the bureaucratic reception system in Berlin rather quickly. They learned where and how to apply for protection, housing support, welfare assistance, and health insurance. "Und dann haben wir Unterkunft gekriegt, vom Sozialamt bezahlt." (Interview, Zumra) Many received support from family members and state-run and non-profit assistance agencies. "Nach und nach habe ich von anderen Leuten erfahren, dass es Organisationen, wie zum Beispiel AWO [Arbeiter Wohlfahrt] gibt, die Hilfe anbieten. Aber die bosnischen Menschen haben mir am Meisten geholfen." (Interview, Irena) Many came upon important information with ease through the informal word-of-mouth exchanges within the ethnic community, especially at the start of the war as information was gathered and passed down. Of particular significance was learning about Germany's legal and political system, as the refugees were advised by others within the ethnic community on what to do and say in order to be able to stay in the county.

> "Da der Bruder von meinem Ex-Mann hier gelebt hat, haben wir mit irgend anderen Menschen Kontakt gehabt und sind erst zu ihnen gefahren und dann zu dem Bruder. Er hat im Heim gelebt. Wir haben dort übernachtet und dann haben sie uns erzählt wie es in Deutschland läuft. Wir haben zwei Tage bei ihnen geschlafen und haben uns versteckt. Die anderen haben uns dann zur Caritas gebracht und gesagt, wo wir uns anmelden sollten. Dann sind wir beim Sozialamt gelandet, haben ein Heim und Geld bekommen." (Interview, Sena)

An unofficial network not only existed, but it served to ease the travel and entry processes of the Bosnian refugees to Germany, helping them to remain in the country. Only after having sought out initial support from relatives and close friends in the first instance did my interlocutors seek out formal support from the Foreigners Office and Social Welfare Office in

the second instance. For those who took advantage of the ethnic community network, a great deal of emotional security could be gleaned. Clearly, having personal contacts on which to rely provided a valuable resource for the newly arriving refugees.

4.3.2.2 Refugee Reception Support in Berlin

The majority of my interlocutors were involved in supportive networks from which they acquired additional support and important information about ensuing political developments. Many non-state-regulated refugee advocacy agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), migrant organizations, as well as state and local government actors assumed responsibility for responding to the needs of the refugees and asylum seekers in Berlin. Yet, these organizations appeared more to *react* to the different state-imposed policies with the services offered, rather than being a part of a coherent, planned out, structured response.

In addition to offering legal and advisory services, language courses counseling and cultural activities, these organizations also offered a variety of psychotherapeutic, supportive and educational services. These included support with translations and particular advocacy in meeting the needs of the traumatized refugees, i.e. lobbying to improve the institutional policy and administrative practices affecting them.

Rapheals-Werk was particularly important in the resettlement process of refugees to third countries while Kirchen im Asyl was helpful in offering low-threshold support to the Bosnians following the war. The Workers Welfare Association *(AWO)*, Caritas, Diakonisches Werk (DK), and Publicata were also identified as important agencies in the resettlement and reception of the Bosnians.

Another important organization that advocated on behalf of the traumatized Bosnian refugees is the Berlin Center for the Treatment of Torture Victims *(bzfo)*, which was founded in 1992 with support from the German Red Cross. Committed to the rehabilitation of torture victims, the bfzo offers help to victims of organized state violence suffering from physical ailments, long-term psychological conditions and psychosomatic disorders (bzfo Homepage). The activities of the bzfo played an integral role in the recognition, diagnosis, and treatment of PTSD and other trauma symptoms. Several of my participants or their family members benefited from the outpatient and day-clinic care provided through the medical, psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatment activities offered by the bzfo. To this day, a large number of Bosnian refugees continue to participate in the bzfo's art therapy, music therapy, physiotherapy, and/or intercultural healing garden. In addition to the transcultural psychotherapy and psychiatry available to the Bosnian refugees, the bzfo also assumed a pivotal role in interpreting and establishing linguistic and cultural conduits for the refugees.

One of the most active organizations in Berlin advocating on behalf of the former Yugoslavian refugees has been the *Südosteuropa Kultur* e.V. (SOEK)*,* founded in 1991 under the direction of Bosiljka Schedlich. With the creation of the *südost Zentrum* in 1992, the SOEK served as a cultural platform and meeting point for the civil war refugees from Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo (Interview, SOEK). With the initial goal of encouraging dialogue among the different ethnic groups, countering nationalistic propaganda and fostering reconciliation, the *südost Zentrum* expanded into one of the most important supportive service agencies for the former Yugoslavian refugees in Berlin. This expansion was attributed to the personal motivation and dedication of its director Bosiljka Schedlich, herself a previous guest worker from the former Yugoslavia (Interview, SOEK). With the aim of encouraging a new life perspective following the devastation of the war, the *südost Zentrum* provided psychosocial counseling and referrals for families, children, and traumatized others. It also established a network and joined efforts with other social service agencies to advocate and lobby on behalf of the former Yugoslavian refugees.

In addition to providing psychological support and advocacy for traumatized refugees, the Südost Zentrum developed and offered - with the support of the European Refugee Fund and the Bosnian Educational Ministry - vocational secondary school courses and specialized higher education courses in varying fields in the Bosnians' first language, so these youth would not be completely abandoned by restrictive structures curbing their growth and development (Hofert n.d.). SOEK was active in developing secondary and vocational schools for the young Bosnians between the ages of 17 and 25, who were unable to speak German and denied access to the regular school system in Berlin (SOEK Homepage). Eventually, the SOEK also offered integration and language courses with partial funding by the Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), as well as special language courses for illiterate migrant and women's courses.

The Berlin Refugee Council has also been active in advocating on behalf of the Bosnian refugees, carrying out lobbying work and political campaigns, particularly in campaigning for the *Bleiberechtsregelung,* or the provision for the right to stay. The Refugee Council is considered an important source for reliable information pertaining to the legal situation of the refugees.

Similarly, the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) has also been active in advocating for better legal changes for the refugees and opposing further policy restrictions fostering deportation. Christian churches often use the church's social teachings to develop their position regarding immigrants' rights. Evidence of this can be seen in the attempt to influence public policy by

lobbying and shaping the consciousness of citizens in regard to Germany's hardship case ruling in Berlin. According to my interview with Martin Stark of JRS, even the EU standards for *Rückführung* would be an improvement to Germany's current operational procedure.[81]

The authorities often determine a hardship case based on the *interests of the German society*, not necessarily on the specific concerns of the individual. Several of these agencies thuds served an important role lobbying on behalf of the refugees by encouraging the hardship case rule and an extension of humanitarian protection. Church representatives, refugee advocates, and liberal politicians appealed for devising a new provision for the right to stay with the Immigration Act (Interviews, Heilig-Kreuz Gemeinde Asylberatung, bzfo, and SOEK).

Suspecting that the lack of clarity regarding the steady chain of issuance of the *Duldung*, known as *Kettenduldungen,* was a fundamental political decision leaning towards the political majority rather than the interests of the tolerated refugees, they argued for alternative solutions and criticized the unclear formulation in the new Immigration Act (Interview, Flüchtlingsrat Berlin). They further criticized that the temporary suspension of deportation status not only limited the refugees' access to the labor market, educational system, and job training programs, but kept the tolerated refugees inert (Interviews, Heilig-Kreuz Gemeinde Asylberatung, bzfo, and SOEK). Until a decision is made permitting an unlimited extension of their *Aufenthaltsstatus*, it was argued, the tolerated refugees would continue to lack a secure status, which they said is inhumane (Interview, Flüchtlingsrat Berlin). In cases of special hardship under the terms of the Foreigners' Act, the Hardship Commission has played a central role for many of the Bosnian refugees in extending their right to remain. In fact the largest group of migrants seeking counseling and consulting services in Berlin regarding the Hardship Commission consisted of individuals from Bosnia (Interview, JRS). Many of the Bosnian refugees who have managed to remain in Berlin to this date are indebted to the support and advocacy of the refugee agencies that assisted them or their family members in acquiring this special protection.

Not until politically endorsed changes in 2006 with provisions for the right to stay, known as the *IMK-Bleiberechtsregelung,* and only after years of advocacy campaigns by NGOs, did new doors open for some individuals with a temporary suspension of deportation and for their children. With this, tolerated refugees were encouraged to seek steady employment, apprenticeships, and practical training placements. This was intended to improve the legal

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[81] Germany has consistently relied on EU regulations to reduce its own services and protection. Federal-wide deportation efforts have been organized that have not yet been regulated in each federal state.

residence and labor market situation of the tolerated refugees and to encourage those with a steady chain of the *Duldung* to access the labor market and become self-sufficient. To eventually qualify for a more permanent right to settle, the sample was finally emboldened to prove they could earn enough money to nourish and care for themselves and their family members.[82]

My respondents turned to all of these organizations for practical and emotional support over the years. In addition, my respondents reported individual cases of support and assistance offered by lawyers, refugee advocates, and personal contacts, which were deemed highly significant and helpful to my interlocutors. "Viele Leute haben mir am Anfang geholfen, aber ich wusste nichts davon. Ich konnte die ersten zwei Jahre kein Deutsch sprechen und meine einzige Kontakt/Umgang während dieser Zeit war mit den Mitarbeitern der Ausländerämter und Behörden." (Interview, Irena) The next facilitating factor emphasizes the significant role Germany's welfare state has had on the adaptation process of the Bosnian refugees.

4.3.2.3 Welfare Support in Berlin

At the time the initial waves of Bosnian refugees arrived to Berlin, the Federal Social Welfare Act (BSGH) regulated the social welfare benefit entitlements for German and foreign recipients (ZDWF 1995). In Berlin, the BSHG applied only to specific groups, but also included the traumatized war refugees from Bosnia. Generally, those refugees issued benefits according to the BSGH were entitled to the same social support as nationals during the first 36 month period (Schwarz et al. 2004). Because the BSHG benefits were determined at the federal state level, variations in provisions and proceedings among the states were common (Comune di Roma 2004). The Bosnian refugees who arrived to Berlin prior to Dec. 15, 1995 generally fell under the financial responsibility of the Senate.

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[82] As long as the terms for the obligation to cooperate were met and the deportation hindrances were applicable without any foreseeable changes, individuals could apply to become eligible for an *Aufenthaltserlaubnis*, qualifying them for a temporary right of residency, usually issued for two to three years. Adults without children needed to have been living uninterrupted in the Federal Republic since Nov. 17, 1998. Adults with minor-age children, composing a family unit, qualified if at least one child was older than three and attended a kindergarten or a school, and one of the parents had been living in the Federal Republic consecutively since Nov. 17, 2000. Additional preconditions for eligibility included: a clean criminal record, independent financial security, regular employment (hereby, excluding elderly, sick or mentally ill applicants who are unable to engage in employment), a high level of integration into German society (demonstrated primarily through German language abilities and contact with host society members), adequate living quarters according to the size of the family, and regular school attendance for the family's children (Leise 2007). Another requirement was that the candidate did not purposely delay his/her deportation orders. Assuming that all prerequisites had been met by the given deadline, then the temporary right of residency (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis*) could be issued in place of the *Kettenduldung*.

Germany's response was perceived by my research participants at this time as having been *Gastfreundlich*, hospitable, as far as meeting their basic needs and providing humanitarian protection.

> "Damals waren die Behörden noch freundlich. Das war noch am Anfang. Wir waren nicht so viele Flüchtlinge da und so weit ich mich erinnern kann waren die [in den Ausländerbehörden] schon recht freundlich zu uns. Schwierigkeiten hat es sich nicht ergeben." (Interview, Mere)

Initially, the need for welfare was generally not only linked to the legal status of the individual but also to the tolerated refugees' inability to obtain a work permit, which in turn was linked to the legal work provisions set out for foreigners. Despite their impending obligation to leave, the Bosnian refugees were initially considered exceptional cases, implying that they could do little about their legal situation and should not be made answerable to the extenuating circumstances mitigating the immobilization of their deportation order (Mihost 2001). All Bosnian refugees authorized a temporary suspension of deportation were thus eligible under the terms of the *Duldung* to receive housing accommodation in Germany, as well as social welfare to cover minimum basic living costs (Comune di Roma 2004). The local Social Welfare Offices responsible for the refugees were required to ensure that all cases of potential homelessness, regardless of nationality, be ensured housing accommodation (Hohlfeld 2008:224-225). My interlocutors were grateful to receive this financial assistance and accommodation. One participant describes her surprise at not only being permitted an option to remain in Berlin, but also amazement at being granted housing and financial assistance upon her arrival.

> "Dass wir ein Zimmer und auch Geld bekommen konnten und dass wir auch so lange bleiben konnten war für mich ein Wunder. Wir mussten uns nicht weiter verstecken. Ich habe nur gedacht, warum sollte mir jemandem Geld geben, nur weil ich da bin? Ich habe lange Zeit gebraucht bis ich es überhaupt verstanden habe warum. Es ist aber schon verständlich." (Interview, Sena)

This sense of wonderment varied from person to person, however, and changed dramatically over time, as policy changes impacted the conditions for eligibility and welfare amounts allotted, which is addressed in more detail under the category obstacles.

Overall, there were more institutional factors in Chicago that facilitated the integration potential of my sample than were evident in Berlin, alluding to Chicago's multiplayer integration and refugee incorporation policies. Yet, the significance of Germany's welfare state as opposed to the limited support provided by the US system is worthy of noting, as it marks a major institutional difference in the two nations' responses to the Bosnians, and a first flaw in the US reception package. Against this light, the next section highlights the obstacles

the refugees encountered, hindering them in their ability to normalize their post-migration situations, but with a longer list of institutional obstacles in Berlin than in Chicago.

4.4 Obstacles

All of my respondents exhibited a willingness to adapt, yet they struggled due to an array of variables that I have broken down into three subcategories: institutional, socio-cultural, and emotional obstacles. The next section provides greater detail (see also Appendices O and P). I begin by revealing the most disempowering, namely, the institutional obstacles my respondents faced.

4.4.1 Institutional Obstacles

The subcategory *institutional obstacles* focuses on the institutional realm framing the terms and conditions of reception and integration that impeded my interlocutors in their adaptation. It is important to acknowledge that governments, states, and civil society have certain expectations, requirements and aspirations for newcomers, which very clearly influence their integration and modes of incorporation. Joseph Carens (2005) elaborates upon this notion, explaining, "an expectation is a norm that is enforced through informal social sanctions rather than legal mechanisms. For example, the public officials or ordinary citizens in the receiving state may have expectations about how immigrants should behave or how they should adapt culturally, and, if these expectations are not met they may be critical of the immigrants even though no formal sanctions follow" (p.31). This often results in the newcomers feeling alienated and excluded, with a diminished sense of belonging. Aspiration is another term that reflects the hopes the receiving society has of the newcomer (ibid). Carens explains that "public authorities or citizens may have hopes about the ways in which immigrants will integrate in the receiving society without thinking that these aspirations are enforceable in any sense, even through informal social sanctions" (Carens 2005:31). A requirement, in contrast, is formal and explicit: when states, for example, "specify conditions that must be met before immigrants obtain certain legal rights or before they become citizens through naturalization" (Ibid). Such requirements evident for my Chicago sample included, for instance, the pre-selection interviews that took place for resettlement to the US, payment reimbursement to IOM for the flight to Chicago, and the enforced participation in orientation and ESL classes. Requirements in Berlin were closely intertwined with the refugees' legal status, *Duldung* extensions, proof of traumatization, and eligibility requirements for a work permit, among other things. In many cases, these requirements, or extenuating external factors, represented for my respondents institutional obstacles or challenges to their adaptation process.

Making decisions, initiating actions, exerting control over self and surroundings are inherent in maintaining the self and its executive function. But in some situations, decisions, actions and the locus of control are determined by outside force, extenuating external factors, such as powerful others or by random luck or fate (Kosic 2006). This reflects the *external* locus of control, which is the opposite of the *internal* locus of control insofar as the internal locus of control is understood as the generalized expectation that outcomes depend exclusively on an individual's own actions (Ibid). Various studies have posited "that an internal locus of control facilitates immigrants' cross-cultural adjustment, whereas an external locus of control is associated with symptoms of psychological distress (Ward/Chang/Lopez-Nerney 1999; Ward/Kennedy 1992)" (in: Kosic 2006:119). This in turn is commonly linked with feeling tired, fatigued, and depressed, which in turn leads to unhealthy mental states.

Based on the analysis of my data, an *external* locus of control emerged in both contexts, but was particularly striking in Berlin, ranging from challenges associated with legal status and restricted labor market access, the nature of the jobs available and structural demotion, downward social mobility and welfare dependency. Restricted access to education and apprenticeship positions, lack of a uniform housing policy, assigned placement in collective accommodation facilities and repeated moves are additional institutional obstacles. By comparison, challenges for my Chicago sample emerged as a result of an *internal* locus of control, causing a string of different issues for my sample relative to making decisions and having too many freedoms. All of these and more are described in the next sections, first in Berlin, followed by Chicago.

4.4.1.1 External Locus of Control in Berlin

Due to the specified legal and structural factors evident in Berlin, my respondents' ability to act, to be autonomous, and to access resources were greatly impaired by an external locus of control. This clearly led to feelings of disempowerment and helplessness and, consequently, had the greatest emotional repercussions on my Berlin respondents. "Es gab immer Probleme in Deutschland! Zuerst wegen der Sprache, dann wegen der Schule, Unterkunft, Arbeit. Das waren die Probleme, die wir hatten." (Interview, Zumra) The limitation in their ability to maneuver freely or access essential resources have resulted in disempowering my respondents, causing them enormous stress and unnecessary turmoil. This has further resulted in exacerbating pre-existing traumatizations incurred from the war, which in turn debilitated the agency of my respondents. This is largely related to the steadily changing policies that

impacted their legal status and efforts to accumulate capital in Berlin.[83] While this is not true of all of my respondents, such as those able to access the educational system, who married Germans, and were able to work and pursue their own goals, many nonetheless felt that they have been excluded from participating fully in German society.

4.4.1.1.1 Challenges Associated with Insecurity of Legal Status in Berlin

One of the core obstacles for my respondents in Berlin was related to the ongoing insecurity of their legal status, which remains still today ambiguous for a number of my interlocutors. The first major obstacle they encountered related to their situation as *civil war refugees*. Because the Bosnian refugees could not confirm proof of state persecution they were not classified as asylum seekers or protected under the 1951 Geneva Convention for Refugees in its strict legal definition.[84] Had they been recognized as asylum seekers, they would have been able to remain in Germany on a semi-permanent basis from the start.[85] The share of applicants who were recognized as refugees on the basis of Article 16a of the Basic Law represents a very small number, with only about a one percent recognition rate; none of whom were located in Berlin (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001).

Despite their inability to acquire asylum protection, many Social Welfare Offices - which are administered at the local level - encouraged the Bosnians to apply for asylum in order to avoid having to cover their costs. By applying for asylum, the responsibility of coverage was effectively transferred to the federal and federal state levels, since asylum applicants automatically entered into the refugee dispersal program, the funding for which came under federal and federal state authorities (Hohlfeld 2008:904).[86]

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[83] The extenuating external foci further impacted the samples' internal locus of control, evident by feelings of blame and guilt for not being more proficient in German, not having more German friends or contacts, and not feeling incorporated socially within German society.

[84] Since the basic right to asylum was enshrined in Germany's Basic Law, anyone persecuted on political grounds was granted the right to asylum (Comune di Roma 2004:55). According to this and as set down in the 1951 Refugee Convention, ratified by Germany in 1953, a refugee is defined as: "a person who, because of well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his/her nationality and is unable or afraid to ask for protection in that country, or not having a country of nationality, is outside the country where he/she usually lived, and is unable or afraid to return to that country" (United Nations Convention 1951).

[85] With the Geneva Refugee Convention (GRC), serving as the basis for international refugee rights, an asylum claim is not automatically granted, rather the GRC regulates the legal status of the asylum applicant, referring therefore primarily to the legal rights of asylum. Article 1 of the GRC only recognizes individuals as refugees who have proven to have a well-founded fear of persecution.

[86] In order to ease its financial burden, Berlin had exerted pressure (to no avail) at the Conference of Minister Presidents of the federal states in December 1993 to implement a dispersal regulation for refugees and a 50 percent co-payment by the federal government (Hohlfeld 2008:905). The intention of the dispersal policy was to balance the financial burden of covering the costs of protecting the refugees equally among the 16 federal states (Schwarz et al. 2004). After another failed attempt in February, the Interior Ministers from the Federal Government and federal states finally agreed by March 1994 to implement an immediate dispersal measure to relieve the cities with an overly high proportion of war refugees (Hohlfeld 2008:907). Newly arriving refugees

As news spread about the Federal Agency for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees rejecting, prematurely closing, and/or simply failing to process the asylum applications submitted by the Bosnian refugees, many rescinded their asylum applications altogether (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). Close to 30 percent of the asylum applications submitted by Bosnians were withdrawn shortly after they had been submitted and a temporary suspension of deportation (*Duldung*) was issued in its place (Hohlfeld 2008:904). The Bosnian refugees made up the largest group awarded a temporary status in Germany after 1992.

As the war in Bosnia lasted longer than anticipated the German government attempted to create a special protective status for the Bosnians.[87] Referred to as the "B-status," this special regulation was proposed to enable the German government the possibility of excluding individuals from the asylum procedure who were coming from war-affected areas or civil war zones (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). The intention was to grant an exceptional resident title throughout the duration an individual was to receive protection on the basis of humanitarian grounds, on grounds of public international law, or in order to safeguard the political interests of the Federal Republic of Germany (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). War refugees and civil war refugees, like quota refugees, were not to undergo an asylum procedure during their stay in Germany, since their stay was viewed as temporary (Comune di Roma 2004). As long as the Bosnian refugee refrained from applying for asylum, the individual could be offered temporary protection by means of a resident title for exceptional purposes (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer 2000). For this to be applicable, however, all 16 of the German federal states needed to unanimously agree to authorize the residency status of a particular group. This, unfortunately, never came to fruition in admitting the Bosnian refugees. Instead this special B-status was issued for the first time in admitting the Kosovo refugees in 1999, since attempts to resolve the conflict among the federal states on covering the burden of costs at the Interior Ministers Conferences (IMC) repeatedly led to ineffective results (Hohlfeld 2008:906).[88] Consequently, due to the lack of consensus on how to share the costs, a different residency dispositive was applied in the varying federal states to determine the legal status of the inflow of Bosnians. Thus the Bosnian refugees were forced to pursue alternative legal possibilities (other than asylum) to acquire protection and support, typically

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from Bosnia to Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin and Hesse (without a visa) were automatically dispersed to other regions. Only a small number of Bosnian refugees were dispersed to Berlin under this quota system (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001), which was largely due to the already high number of individuals already seeking protection in Berlin.

[87] Starting on July 1, 1993, a resident title for exceptional purposes was especially created to protect the masses of refugees fleeing from Bosnia according to sec. 32 and 32a of the Aliens Act (Comune di Roma 2004).

[88] The IMC on Nov. 26, 1993 and Feb. 9, 1994 both failed to meet a common agreement. The plan for repatriating Croatian refugees was extended at this point (Hohlfeld 2008:906).

with more minimal standards of acceptance (cf. Andrees et al. 1996 in: Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001).

Despite the thousands of refugees fleeing in search of protection as tensions in Bosnia continued and became more publicly recognized, Germany's enforced legal changes in 1993 with the Act to Amend the Basic Law (Articles 16 and 18) brought greater restrictions - particularly regarding the travel paths and routes of entry for the Yugoslavian refugees. This made their access to German territory and their application process more emotionally grueling and legally restrictive. In consequence, the Yugoslavian refugees faced greater difficulty securing access to and maintaining ongoing protection in Germany. This was particularly apparent with direct refusals at the German border without any substantial proof or assessment of the likelihood of being granted protection. Additional restrictive measures included the establishment of detention centers, fewer asylum proceedings, placement in central accommodation facilities, employment and education bans and a reduction in reception and service entitlements (Schwarz et al. 2004).

The government also devised regulations to avoid covering the costs associated with Bosnian families - viewed as a *burden*. Those with a *Duldung* were not permitted to invite or host other family members to join them in Germany. Children of an individual with a temporary suspension of deportation, who were born in Germany, were automatically allotted the tolerated status. Couples with this legal status were only able to get married or live together if they had come together to Germany and possessed all the required documentation.[89] Family reunification schemes were thus unavailable, resulting in divisions in family units. The resolutions made at the IMC had the greatest and most immediate impact on the legal situation of the Bosnian refugees (Mihok 2001b). After May 6, 1994, the way in which they were treated evolved from being initially sympathetic and helpful to a more demoralizing and intimidating response. The new message conveyed to the refugees, in particular on visits to the Social Welfare and Foreigners Offices, was that they were to return to Bosnia once the war ended and they should avoid accruing any extra *unnecessary* costs. This soon led to the next obstacle for the Bosnians, namely voluntary repatriation after the signing of Dayton.

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[89] According to the Refugee Council, the Foreigners Office can require all documentation to be submitted for the purposes of marriage as it sees fit (Flüchtlingsbüro 2001). The same was applicable to individuals with a *Duldung* who intended to marry a German citizen, a process that was hindered in a number of ways. This restrictive legislation, especially compared with Chicago's family resettlement program, marks another major difference between the two countries' responses to the Bosnian refugees.

By July 10, 1998 the Senatorial Administration of Interior Affairs decided that there were no longer grounds for protection from deportation in the majority of cases and the deportation of the Bosnian refugees would no longer be deferred. By enabling individuals the option to raise potential hindrances to deportation only in the realm of their asylum proceedings, most of the remaining Bosnian refugees were steered into voluntary repatriation (Hohlfeld 2008:908). Whoever was unwilling to return voluntarily was warned to expect a forced deportation (Mihok 2001b:145). The high representative of UNHCR announced 1998 as "Jahr der Ruckkehr" (Rathfelder 2001:130).[90]

> "Erst nach dem der Krieg vorbei war, dann gab's diese Schwierigkeiten mit dem Aufenthalt und die wollten die Duldung nicht verlängern und dies und jenes. Man wollte uns nur weg haben und das ging bis 98 durch." (Interview, Mere)

This marks a stage in which the legal residency rights of the Bosnian refugees in Berlin deteriorated remarkably, as the German government made explicit its aim to repatriate the refugees to Bosnia. Irrespective of their ethnicity, many were encouraged to return even if they had experienced torture, rape, or had witnessed the murder of friends or family member(s) at the hand of their neighbors. Both practical and subjective problems prevented a smooth return, however (cf. Rathfelder 2001; Huttunen 2005; Stefansson 2004a, 2004b). Many refugees were appalled at the idea of returning to the places of their emotional demise. In addition, some refugee advocates I interviewed criticized the approach of returning the refugees without truly being able to guarantee their safety or enable their future development in Bosnia due to the country's wrecked financial and ruined infrastructure (Interviews, Publicata and JRS).

Despite evident dissent at the time, the German authorities maintained their stance to encourage repatriation and undertook varying strategies to reach this goal. In establishing certain measures to foster an individual's *willingness* to return, the Foreigners Office regulated specific conditions and enforced additional constraints to speed the process of voluntary return. These were carried out through practical support, financial incentives, or through the help of open deportation threats (Mihok 2001b). For my respondents, this was perceived with foreboding and criticism.

> "Ein Aufenthaltsrecht in Berlin während des Kriegs zu bekommen, war kein Problem, aber mit Dayton mussten alle zurück nach Bosnien kehren. Bosnien hat ein Fehler gemacht als der Dayton Vertrag unterschrieben wurde. Mit Dayton war es dann ein Problem für die Bosnier in Berlin." (Interview, Irena)

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[90] Author's translation: the year of return.

This excerpt reveals a perception of the despairing situation for Bosnians with a *Duldung* residing in Berlin after the official ceasefire in Bosnia. Usual extensions of the temporary suspension of deportation or of the authorized resident status issued the Bosnian refugees until then were simply curtailed and swift orders to leave Germany resulted instead. One of my respondents also criticized the absence of cooperation between formal government agencies in communicating the specifics about the supportive services available to the refugees at this time, such as details on psychological support. Considering Germany's aim to return the Bosnians, this is not surprising.

As one of the first German federal states to carry out deportation orders against the Bosnian refugees, Berlin epitomized the restrictive asylum policy changes that were later to spread throughout Europe (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). The largest waves of refugees left Germany in 1997 and 1998 (Ibid). "Nach dem Bericht der Ausländerbeauftragten des Senats über den Stand der freiwilligen Rückkehr von Flüchtlingen aus Bosnien-Herzegowina hielten sich im Mai 1998 noch insgesamt 20.000 bosnische Flüchtlinge in der Stadt auf" (Senatsverwaltung für Arbeit, Soziales und Frauen, Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats von Berlin 1998 in: Jäger/Rezo 2000).[91] By February 1999, just over one year later, only 13,940 Bosnian refugees remained (Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit und Soziales 1999).

For those Bosnian refugees remaining, the November 1999 Conference of Interior Ministers and Senators of the Federal States (IMC) was pivotal in shaping their fate, as it was decided at this conference that permanent residence rights would not be granted in accordance with the *old case rule*. This change in policy had little practical bearing on the Bosnian refugees in Berlin at the time due to the restrictive preconditions required for their permanent right to stay. These included the prerequisite of financial independence and a curtailment of social welfare benefits, plus further proof of employment extending back two years. Achieving these goals to stay in Berlin was nearly impossible for the Bosnian refugees due to high levels of unemployment and limited access to the labor market.[92] As restrictive policies were increasingly enforced, interactions with the Foreigners Office proved to be one of the major challenges for the Bosnian refugees in their adaptation process since voluntary or forced repatriation rather than integration was the immediate goal (cf. Binder/Tošić 2005).

With time, problems attributed to Germany's integration issues began to attract more public attention, forcing politicians to respond. Not until the government coalition of Social

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[91] According to the Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit und Soziales (1998b), 22,221 Bosnian refugees were still in Berlin by the end of January 1998. Hence, the number varies depending on the source.
[92] There was no clausal signifying an exception based on market competition and economic disparity (Interview, Flüchtlingsrat Berlin).

Democrats and Greens – having migrant politicians in their own ranks – openly declared Germany to be an immigration country (after years of German leaders implying the contrary) were measures initiated to begin intentionally structuring Germany's immigration and integration policies.[93] This transpired as recognition gradually settled in at the time that more than seven million foreigners were living in Germany on a long-term basis; one third of whom had been living in Germany for over 30 years and half of whom had been living in Germany for a minimum of 20 years (Geddes 2003). Considering the duration of stay of these foreigners and the reality that their lives centered in Germany, demands were made first for a revision in Germany's citizenship laws.

With the coming into force on Jan. 1, 2000 of Germany's amended Citizenship and Nationality Act, children born in Germany following this date became eligible to attain German citizenship regardless of their parents' nationality, as long as at least one of their parents had been legally residing in Germany for the eight years prior and possessed an unlimited residence right or an unlimited residence permit extending back three years. An individual must choose between the ages of 18 and 23, whether to retain German citizenship or the citizenship of his/her parents. German citizenship is revoked by default to anyone who misses the deadline. In addition, foreigners were additionally offered a shorter mandatory waiting period for naturalization with this (Auswärtiges Amt Homepage). The revision in the Nationality Act was deemed by some as one of the first significant domestic measures passed under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's administration. Yet some critics contended that the revised Citizenship and Nationality Act was inadequate, as most adult migrants still have to decide which citizenship they would prefer rather than allowing the option to maintain both.[94] Moreover, immigrants naturalizing to Germany after eight years of residence are required to give up their original nationality.[95] Another criticism was the failure to come up with any type of durable solution for those with a *Duldung* status.

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[93] Evident in government policy statements and documents extending from the 1970s until the late 1990s, Germany had long refused to acknowledge the diverse demographics of its population, denying the reality of it being an *Einwanderungsland* in official discourse, and failing to implement immigration and integration legislation. In formal terms, the federal government could thus avoid rendering services to foster the integration of migrants and refugees by denying any need. The official stance was merely to recognize the affairs of foreigners, albeit not to encourage integration or permanent residency. The Act to Amend Foreigners and Asylum Provisions (*Gesetz zur Änderung ausländer- und asylverfahrensrechtlicher Vorschriften*) eventually came into force in November 1997.

[94] New dual citizenship legislation went through in 2013, allowing children born in Germany to immigrant parents to hold both nationalities after the age of 23. The nationality renunciation requirement of naturalized immigrants not born in Germany was untouched with this, hereby still limiting dual citizenship to most foreigners in Germany.

[95] Foreigners who have remained in Germany without interruption for at least eight years can naturalize and become German citizens. They merely have to submit an application, pay an extensive fee, take the citizenship test, know German proficiently and also be willing to relinquish their own citizenship.

Despite dissenting ideas on immigrant integration strategies, by Nov. 2005 the grand coalition of the Conservatives and Social Democrats signaled their intention to pursue integration as a top priority. With an aim of providing a legal basis for controlling and limiting immigration in line with Germany's economic, social and political interests, Germany's first ever nationwide integration program was introduced under the auspices of the new Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*), which entered into force on Jan. 1, 2005.[96] This legal change, which "aims to promote social cohesion… and acknowledges its commitment and responsibility to human rights" (Berliner Integrationsbeauftragter 2005:8), represented a shift in Germany's focus to an expected arena of social inclusion with an emphasis on acculturation programs supported by language and integration courses (Dienelt n.d.). This symbolized a new willingness to integrate or include Germany's foreign population.

Yet, the next challenge for the Bosnians came following negotiations on the Immigration Act, as those in Berlin were generally unable to acquire a permanent residence right. The institutional constraints relegating my respondents to mere tolerated statuses served to limit their ability to access citizenship and maneuver in Berlin. As tolerated refugees, they faced greater naturalization restrictions as they are only eligible for German citizenship eight years *after* acquiring a resident title for exceptional purposes and verifying proof of employment in Germany. In addition, Germany expects *proof of integration* as a prerequisite for naturalization or even permanent resident status, meaning in addition to proficient German language knowledge, applicants must also have an understanding of German culture, which is tested in written form, as well as by economic self-sufficiency. This is a result of the social significance that societies give to any legally ascribed differences.

Despite agreement among the political factions about the need to transform conditions of refugees being consistently issued a *Duldung* year after year (Interview, JRS), change has only been gradual. It was expected with the Immigration Act that about 50 percent of those limited by the *Kettenduldung* would be granted a right of residence. The alternative solution was to replace it with the legal *old case rule*, or grandfather clause, for individuals with a temporary suspension of deportation. These optimistic provisions, however, did not translate into reality. The resident titles effective with the Immigration Act were reduced to only two: the temporary right of residency and the right to settle permanently. The scope of

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[96] A new ordinance governing residence rights (*AufenthV*) was implemented to consolidate regulations previously found in the ordinance. This standardized the implementation of the previously imposed Aliens Act (Ausländergesetz vom 9. Juli 1990, BGBl. I S. 1354). Ordinances on monitoring fees, collecting and transmitting data files on foreigners (Dienelt n.d.), and further introduced the Residence Act (AufenthG vom 30. Juli 2004, BGBl. I S. 1950). In addition, the parameters of entry and residence of EU citizens became newly regulated under the general Freedom of Movement Act for citizens within the EU.

determination came under the responsibility of the Foreigners Office, which employed considerable diligence and effort in inspecting individual cases. Despite the priority to alleviate the difficult situation of tolerated refugees' hardship cases, the outcome was that it was near impossible with the new Immigration Act for individuals with a *Kettenduldung* to acquire even a right of residence.

The Federal Interior Ministry maintained its restrictive interpretation of the provision, placing its focus on the Hardship Case Commission as the national instrument to determine the future protection status of individuals, who had been issued renewals of the *Kettenduldung*. Much critique ensued, questioning why the Federal Interior Ministry would maintain its restrictive position when "everyone was conscious of the need to transform the intolerable conditions associated with the *Kettenduldung*." The Bosnian refugees were not necessarily placed in a weaker position than before with this legislation, but rather were positioned in a deadlock. Moreover, their interactions with the Foreigners Office staff and other authorities in Berlin proved to be rather complex as an indirect result of the Federal Interior Ministry's stance.

4.4.1.1.2 Interactions with Foreigners Office, Police and Deportation Authorities in Berlin

Another example confirming the existence of an external locus of control was characteristic of my interlocutors' interactions with host society institutions like the Foreigners Office and the police, encompassing predominately negative accounts that were interlaced with fear and insecurity. My Berlin respondents related emotionally charged accounts of either themselves or other refugees being poorly treated and threatened with deportation. One participant described a situation in which he observed police officers storming the accommodation in which he resided in order to serve the deportation orders to his neighbors who had failed to act on their enforceable obligation to leave.

> "Als ich im Asylantenheim in Lichterfelde gewohnt habe, ist die Polizei so oft nachts gekommen, um da irgendwelche Familien abzuholen und in Abschiebeknast einzusperren. Der Befehl kam von der Auslandbehörde. Der muss da weg und dann kamen sie. Sie haben das Haus gestürmt und geschrien: 'Kommen Sie raus!' Die waren dann ein paar Tage im Knast, dann am Flughafen, dann weg." (Interview, Slavo)

This interlocutor suggested that the German authorities intentionally arrived when the refugees were ill prepared and unsuspecting in order to convey to the others remaining of the immediacy of their own forced return. Yet, some refugee advocates contend that the deportations were carried out in the middle of night so that the inhumane and brutal force

exercised in deporting the refugees could not be observed by mainstream society, for fear of public criticism (Fekete et al. 2010).

The typical procedure following the IMC for the authorities in serving a deportation order was to, first, confiscate the Bosnian's passport and demand his/her declaration of departure.[97] Despite attempts made to guarantee the refugee's cooperation and willingness to leave Germany by a certain deadline (usually within a few weeks), my respondents recall foremost their fears. One participant recalls, "Ich habe die Geschichten über die anderen Abschiebungen gehört und habe immer diese Angst, was wen?" (Interview, Sene) A third interlocutor explained,

> "Ich musste ständig in der Angst leben, dass jemand kommt, um mich nach Bosnien zurück zu schicken. Jeden Tag hatte ich Angst vor der Polizei, vor den Behörden usw. Schon wieder hatte ich keine Sicherheit. Immer Angst. Ich konnte nicht schlafen, nicht leben. Besuche beim Ausländeramt waren für mich wie beim Lager. Das wovor ich befürchtet habe, wurde immer wahr. Meine Angst war groß. Ich hatte auch Angst vor der Polizei, dass ich eine Kriminelle bin. Zehn Jahren waren vergangen und ich lebte weiterhin ständig im Angstzustand." (Interview, Irena)

By relating her experiences in Berlin following Dayton to her experiences in a concentration camp close to Tuzla,[98] the above excerpt highlights the despairing situation for the vulnerable Bosnians who had been issued a *Duldung* and were increasingly threatened with "voluntary" return. Another respondent recounts the nearly routine steps she and others experienced to remain in Berlin as tolerated refugees, including: repeated visits to the Aliens Office, doubt and accusations questioning the legitimacy of their right to stay in Berlin, and the constant fear of being denied another extension.

> "Wir haben eine Duldung in 93 für nur vier Monate gekriegt. Dann geht man dahin [zur Ausländerbehörde]. Sie sagen: 'Sie müssen nach Hause.' Nach Hause! Dann geht man und sucht sich Hilfe. Wir sind zu den Leuten, die unsere Sprache sprechen, gegangen. Man sucht sich Hilfe, dann macht man einen Antrag damit die Duldung verlängert wird. Dann geht man zum Gericht, nimmt sich einen Anwalt, dann geht man hin, kriegt man wieder sechs Monate und dann nach sechs Monaten geht man wieder hin. Und man geht immer mit der Angst, dass man nicht mehr geduldet wird. Am Anfang haben wir überhaupt nicht daran gedacht, dass wir für immer hier bleiben. Nur verlängern, verlängern, verlängern. Ich weiß nicht, es war nicht einfach." (Interview, Zumra)

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[97] Verification of the temporary suspension of deportation (*Duldung*) sufficed as a valid identity document for those under an enforceable obligation to leave, who had arrived to Germany prior to Dec. 15, 1995 (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001).
[98] She describes her experiences in the camp in which she shared a room in an abandoned student apartment complex with several other women. There, she lived under extreme conditions: only allotted one sandwich per day, constantly hungry, and located close to military barracks in which hundreds of men were stationed and who regularly forced the women in the camp to have sex with them. In return, the women sometimes received better treatment, better sleeping arrangements, warmer blankets, and food, etc. Women who refused the sex were moved to even worse housing conditions (Interview, Irena).

The mere description of these details seems to exhaust this particular respondent. The recollection visibly weighs her down.

Another respondent confirms such fears, having witnessed her brother's deportation from Berlin. "Mein Bruder lebt jetzt in Bosnien. Er hat in Brandenburg gelebt und den haben sie abgeschoben. Auch wegen einer ganz blöder Regelung und obwohl er auch die ganze Zeit im Krieg war. Sie haben ihn abgeschoben." (Interview, Selma) Another respondent (a Bosnian-Croatian) recalls how close she came to being deported, despite being Bosnian and in need of protection at the time.

> "[Mein Vater] wohnt in Kroatien, er lebt in Kroatien die ganze Zeit. Er hat das [kroatische Pass] finanziert, er hat das beantragt, wir haben das bekommen. Wir haben uns auch so gefreut. Man ist doch Kroate und dann freut man sich. Es war aber ein Problem, dass wir kroatische Pässe bekommen haben. Irgendwann hat Deutschland entdeckt, dass viele Bosnier kroatische Pässe haben und entschieden uns alle nach Kroatien zu schicken. Dann war es ziemlich kritisch." (Interview, Mirna)

Because her Yugoslavian passport was no longer valid after the dissolution of the state, her father, who fled to Croatia during the war, completed the paperwork necessary for her to acquire a Croatian passport. Bosnians with a Croatian or Yugoslavian passport, however, did not fall under this rule and continued to face deportation threats (Hohlfeld 2008:907). The remaining 16,000 Yugoslavian refugees in Berlin were required to leave Germany within seven days to three months following receipt of their deportation orders (Hohlfeld 2008:907-908). Many were, consequently, denied protection under the principle of non-refoulement.[99] One never knew from day to day how Germany would respond. The following excerpt provides an example why many of my interlocutors feared Foreigners Office authorities.

> "Ich wurde in Handschellen verhaftet. Sie haben mich in einem Zimmer gebracht und reingestopft. Sie haben mich wie die größte Kriminelle behandelt. Im Zimmer haben sie mir ein Blatt [Papier] und einen Kugelschreiber gegeben und sie sagten, dass ich schreiben soll, wann ich Deutschland verlassen werde. Na ja, was sollte ich schreiben? Ich habe da auf dem Sessel gesessen und ca. 6 Stunden später kamen sie wieder und ließen mich frei. Warum?" (Interview, Slavo)

This participant was taken to a room, held for several hours, and was encouraged by the Foreigners Office to promise to leave Germany. When he failed to act accordingly, they agreed to let him go with a two-month extension of his *Duldung*, but only under the condition that he provide proof of his intention to leave Germany by exhibiting, for instance, a plane or train ticket on his next visit to the Foreigners Office.[100] Arresting refugees, holding them for

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[99] Some managed to remain in Berlin under terms of humanitarian protection.
[100] This particular participant managed to avoid forced expulsion since shortly after this exchange, he married a German native, herewith changing his status to a more secure residence permit and liberating him from the intertwined dependency accompanying the status of *Duldung*.

long periods of time, threatening them into composing written statements of promised departure, etc., were *scare tactics* employed by the Foreigners Office staff to intimidate individuals to repatriate to Bosnia.

In cases in which the refugees were not under threat to be deported due to illness or since their *Duldung* status had not yet expired, they were issued either written confirmation that border crossing would soon end *(Grenzübertrittsbescheinigung)*, written confirmation verifying that the individual's passport had been confiscated by the authorities *(Passeinzugsbescheinigung)*, or a written statement insisting the need for the individual to register with the authorities by the specified registration date (*Meldefristbescheinigung*) (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001).

Each visit to the Foreigners Office added to my respondents' stressful situations, making it difficult for them to completely relax or to normalize their lives in Berlin due to the arbitrary responses of the Foreigners Office staff. For instance, by giving only a few members in a particular family temporary suspension of deportation, but handing the others a deportation order, the Foreigners Office assumed a role in dividing and separating families.

> "Das war eine so blöde Situation, dass eine Familie mit einem Kind [zur Ausländerbehörde] kam. Das Kind war drei Monate alt und so kriegte das Kind eine Abschiebung, aber die Familie kriegt die Duldung sechs Monate weiter. Solche Sachen sind passiert. Das was normal bei der Ausländerbehörde. Und jetzt sind so viele Leute weg, weil ihr Leben hier so extrem war. Da waren einmal über 30.000 Flüchtlinge hier aus Bosnien." (Interview, Slavo)

These excerpts illustrate the exasperation my participants typically felt regarding the determination procedures of the Foreigners Office. Many refugees revealed heightened symptoms of anxiety and feelings of dread and foreboding that accompanied them sometimes weeks before an appointment, as well as weeks after a visit to the Foreigners Office as they fretted over the likelihood of their *Duldung* being extended or rejected.

> "Ich musste immer zur Ausländerbehörde gehen und zu dieser Zeit war es hier richtig extrem. Wir waren so viele Flüchtlinge, dass ich schon um drei Uhr in der früh da sein musste, um eine Nummer zu kriegen. Ich konnte aus dem Gebäude nicht weggehen, weil alle meine Papiere da waren und nur so kriegte ich [eine Duldung] mal für drei Monate, mal fünfzehn Tage, manchmal sieben Tage. Warum das?! Es ist nur eine Spielerei mit den Nerven! Tage davor war mir immer schlecht: aufgeregt mit Herzklopfen und Magenschmerzen nur vor Aufregung dass ich die Ausländerbehörde wieder besuchen müsste. Ich dachte, 'Was kriege ich heute oder werde ich ausgewiesen?'" (Interview, Bekr)

Another distinguishing factor that influenced how the refugees were treated by the authorities was dependent on which Foreigners Office the refugees frequented. According to several of my interlocutors, the two Foreigners Offices in Berlin were perceived as maintaining very different approaches in their treatment of the Bosnian refugees. The Foreigners Office at

Friedrich-Kraus-Ufer apparently treated its clients more civilly than the Foreigners Office at *Nöldnerplatz*, a comparison made by several respondents.

> "In der Ausländerbehörde am Nöldnerplatz, da fühlt man sich so- da gibt's keinen Kontakt. Wenn sie nach Kontakt fragen, da gibt's keinen. Man kommt, man kriegt eine Nummer, und dann wartet man. Beim Friedrich-Krausse-Ufer ist es gut. Da wird man schon wie ein Mensch behandelt, aber am Nöldnerplatz, da bedeuten erst mal diese Nummern gar nichts. Wenn sie eine Nummer haben, dann können sie sich auf nichts verlassen. Es sind noch hundert Nummern, hundert Menschen dazwischen. Die Zahlen kommen so durcheinander, so dass man entweder eine Stunde warten kann, oder sogar fünf Stunden. Man weiß es nie. Und wenn man kommt, steht er erst mal in einer Schlange. Da sind so Kabinen: da gibt man seine Unterlagen, kriegt die Nummer und dann wartet im Wartezimmer. Irgendwann wenn die Nummer da ist, bis man die Tasche und die Sachen holt und zur Kabine kommt, da steht schon alles. Der Beamte oder die Beamtin warten und innen ist so eine Glasscheibe. Da fühlt man sich so… Da gibt's kein Kontakt auch wenn man Kontakt sucht, ist kein Kontakt." (Interview, Mirna)

All the respondents speaking on this issue described in detail the visible border at the Nöldnerplatz Foreigners Office building. They commented on the panel of glass that separated the clients from staff members, symbolizing a boundary marker that divides the appropriation of space and power between the refugee and the native German authority figures in question. Another participant summarizes her experiences.

> "Ich dachte ich wäre verrückt als ich immer wieder dahin [zum Nöldnerplatz Ausländerbehörde] gehen musste, weil sie einfach so eklig sind! Also Friedrich-Krause-Ufer ist ganz anders. Da kommt man in so ein Zimmer, ganz normal, bekommt auch so einen Stuhl. Dahinten [im Nöldnerplatz] ist es ganz blöd. Da ist ein Warteraum und da gibt's einen Schalter mit Glas davor. Sie sagen nicht mal guten Morgen. Fast nie! Es gab nur einmal eine Frau, die guten Morgen gesagt hat. Daraufhin habe ich ganz gestaunt gesagt: 'Wow, unglaublich'! Da hat sie gelacht und selbst gesagt: 'Das sagen sie mir alle wenn ich ihnen guten Morgen wünsche.' Sie war nämlich neu da. Sie kam von woanders her. Sonst sind sie so böse. Sie schmeißen auch die Pässe zu einem hin und sind ganz, ganz böse, also wirklich." (Interview, Selma)

The friendliest of the two Foreigners Office staff were perceived to represent more of a service building that catered to the needs of the clients, consisting mainly of accepted refugees and migrants who had been recognized as having *legitimate reasons* to remain in Berlin. The other less friendly office represented the government authority that essentially carried out the internal orders of the government by enforcing scare tactics. The latter of the two typically dealt with the asylum applicants and tolerated refugees likely to be deported, who barley spoke German, and who were likely not considered *useful* to German society. One participant reported that the office staff at Friedrich-Kraus-Ufer used to be friendlier to the clients than the one at Nöldnerplatz, which is likely attributed to internal orders given by superiors.

> "Es ist ein krasser Unterschied zwischen [den Behörden]. Es ist ein und derselben Behörde

aber es ist ein krasser Unterschied so wie verschiedene Arbeit gemacht wird. Man sagt immer bei der Ausländerbehörde gibt es eine interne Anweisung, dass sie zu den Ausländern sehr unfreundlich sein sollten damit die, ja, damit die Leute sich nicht willkommen fühlen, damit sie denken, 'okay, mir geht's hier schlecht. In meiner Heimat geht's mir besser, so gehe ich freiwillig zurück.' Ja, das ist intern; intern wird das so gemacht. Das ist ein krasser Unterschied, also wenn man zu Friedrich-Krause-Ufer geht, da ist man schon fest hier und man hat direkten Kontakt zu der Person, der die Sachen bearbeitet und beim Nöldnerplatz da ist mal eine dran." (Interview, Mere)

Now a lawyer, this participant explains the rationale for the differences in treatment, reducing it to the political, structural motivations of the government. He argues that the employees at the two Foreigners Offices had been advised on how to treat the foreigners, depending on their likelihood of remaining in Berlin, their degree of self-sufficiency and adaptation versus those likely to remain in relationships of dependency to the state if permitted to remain in Germany.

"Ich vermute, weil ich von meiner Arbeitgeberin, die Rechtsanwältin ist, gehört habe, dass die Angestellten bei der Ausländerbehörde interne Anweisungen haben, dass sie sehr unfreundlich zu Ausländern sein sollten. In meinem Fall hatte sie das auch bestätigt. Bei mir stand es schon fest: ich bleibe hier und deswegen war sie auch freundlich zu mir. Bei dem anderen Mann, wollten sie ihm weg haben und deswegen war sie dann auch so unfreundlich. Sie wollte diesen Mann auf jeden Fall zu freiwilligen Rückkehr zwingen. In dem man so unfreundlich zu ihm ist, wurde das wahrscheinlich was bringen, dass er von alleine geht und nicht abgeschoben werden muss. Er ist auch letztendlich alleine gegangen." (Interview, Mere)

Overall, a variety of distinctions were noted relating to the differences in treatment by the Foreigners Office staff toward the Bosnian refugees. This appeared to depend on a number of factors such as the German language proficiency of the refugee, which Foreigners Office was frequented, and the timing of the visit, i.e. whether at the start of the war, following the 1993 legal changes, after the signing of the Dayton Accord, after the adoption of the Immigration Act, or whether applying for extensions under the *Bleiberechtsregelung* after 2006.

This leads to the next example of imposed external control exerted on my respondents, reflected in their restricted access to the labor market and ability to earn an income and normalize their post-migration situations in Berlin.

4.4.1.1.3 Restrictions to Berlin's Labor Market

The Bosnian refugees were theoretically permitted unrestricted access to the German labor market since a special Work Permit Decree (*Arbeitserlaubnisverordnung* - AEVO), adopted by the Federal Minister for Employment and Social Affairs, went into effect on Oct. 24, 1991. With this, the usual one-year waiting period granted a refugee with a tolerated status could be circumvented. This had to do with the initial arrival of so many Bosnian refugees to Germany. In anticipation that the war would quickly end, the refugees who had been issued an

Aufenthaltsgestattung or a *Duldung* were thus issued exceptional work permits irrespective of specific job descriptions and labor market conditions in connection with the rule on hardship cases (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001).

While Bosnian refugees were able to take advantage of this exception in other federal states, my Berlin respondents encountered a number of complications. For one, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was fierce competition in the labor market, which caused increased competition for jobs. Additionally, quite a number of refugees in Berlin had not attended school past the eighth grade and had thus not completed a degree or trade in Bosnia, which greatly limited their viability on the labor market (Interview, SOEK).

Many, though, had qualifications. But lack of recognition of previous degrees and qualifications caused difficulties for my interlocutors in accessing the labor market. To gain recognition, my interlocutors were required to provide evidence documenting their previous degrees and qualifications, sometimes having to pay translators and notaries for verification. Because of their sudden exodus from Bosnia, however, most were not in possession of the necessary documents and the failed infrastructure in Bosnia made this difficult to acquire. Furthermore a number of variables, such as specific job sectors, whether regulated or non-regulated fields,[101] as well as in which country the qualifications were completed, imposed further complications for the refugees to have their previous qualifications recognized in Germany. The complexity of this process contributed to the inadequate, incorrect, or total failure to recognize the refugees' previous skills, which in turn limited their economic success and social mobility.

Although a few of my interlocutors were eventually able to access the Berlin labor market, there is little evidence connecting their previous skills and education with the positions they attained, with the exception of one photographer who maintained the same type of work in both settings. According to my interviews with experts in the field, highly qualified engineers, for instance, were often only employed as cable layers or construction workers. One refugee, who had previously worked in Bosnia as a doctor, was only able to secure work as a janitor in Berlin during this initial phase when the refugees were granted labor market access (Interview, SOEK). Bosnians with professional backgrounds as doctors, lawyers, teachers,

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[101] Regulated professions refer to jobs in the health sector, school and social sectors, industrial and technical areas, transportation, shipping, forestry, notarization, and include court judges, accountants, tax advisors, food chemists, doctors, apothecaries, nurses, midwives, lawyers, and architects. The process for recognizing regulated professions can take place at a number of agencies such as the German Handworker's Association. In 2011 reforms were underway to make the recognition of regulated professions in Germany easier. Yet, the recognition of non-regulated professions (meaning all other professions, degrees, and academic fields that have not been named) continues to remain obscure (Pfohman 2011a).

electricians, among others, were unable to practice their professions at all without being recertified in accordance with Germany's standards, an expensive and arduous process that seemed impossible for the Bosnians staying only *temporarily* in Berlin.

> "I had a background as a civil engineer, but of course I didn't work as a civil engineer in Germany. I was working at a restaurant, doing cooking and catering. We didn't have a choice really in Germany. I mean it was cleaning or something in the kitchen. Or if you are lucky, you will get something, you know, outside of the kitchen in the restaurant, bartending or something." (Interview, Behar)

Beyond their inability to procure work in their previous fields, complications also arose due to insufficient German language skills and employers' hesitancy to hire individuals with an insecure resident status. The refugees had to present their identification and proof of legal resident status to prospective employers in order for the employer to confirm the legality of their employment relation. For my respondents, this was a tiresome and humiliating experience.

> "Zum Beispiel wenn man sich eine Arbeit sucht, schauten die Arbeitgeber das [Pass und Duldung] an und dann sagten: 'Was ist das denn?!' Es gab ja viele Leute, die überhaupt nicht wussten was das ist. Weil da steht: 'Aussetzung der Abschiebung' auf der ersten Seite, was dann in sechs Monate stattfinden sollte." (Interview, Zumra)

The stamp in the Bosnians' passports made it nearly impossible for them to acquire work and to convince prospective employers they intended to be in Berlin longer than the temporary date printed in their visas.[102] Some respondents, in relating such difficulties in procuring employment, considered whether employers possibly only used this line of argument (i.e. questioning them about the duration of their stay in Berlin and their likelihood of completing a three year job training program or starting a new job, etc.) as an excuse for not hiring them.

In addition, Germany's longstanding custom of applying preferential treatment in hiring people from Germany and the European Union more readily than certain third country nationals, known as the *Vorrangprinzip*,[103] proved to be a further obstacle my interlocutors experienced in their attempt to access the labor market. According to Germany's hierarchical

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[102] The stamp in the respondents' passports further made it difficult to secure an apartment, enroll their children in three-year job training programs, sign up for a mobile telephone, public library card or attain a driver's license.

[103] Native Germans are given priority in hiring practices, followed by EU citizens, then highly qualified professionals and self-employed professionals able to invest in the German economy. Here, citizens of third countries with special bi-national agreements such as the United States, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, and New Zealand are prioritized over other third country nationals from Africa, South America and Asian countries. Only after sufficient proof has been established that no other individual from one of the higher ranking countries of origin is eligible to fill a position, can a third country citizen with a lawful resident status in Germany be considered. Included in the ranking are also contingent refugees (namely, Jewish emigrants from the Commonwealth of Independent States - CIS), ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union (*Spätaussiedler*), recognized refugees on the basis of the Geneva Convention, and family members of foreigners with continuous legal residence in Germany (Aumüller 2007). Usually, a one-year waiting period is applied to tolerated refugees aiming to acquire an exceptional permit.

employment strategy, foreigners interested in engaging in legal employment, first, have to find an employer willing to hire them and then complete all the necessary paperwork required by the Foreigners Office, which then sets an internal procedure into motion with the aim of acquiring approval from the State Job Agency. Before a work permit is issued, the Foreigners Office first assesses availability on the job market. By providing the Foreigners Office evidence of a specific job offer and meeting the conditions required with the *Vorrangprinzip*, a foreigner could be granted a work permit relative to that specific job and an extension of his/her residence rights. One participant explained the complexity of this procedure.

> "Es steht alles im Gesetz also nach dem Paragraph 23a nach dem ich ein Aufenthalt bekommen habe, hat man Anspruch auf eine Arbeit, aber Hauptsache man muss erstmal selber eine Stelle finden, und dann soll man das bei Ausländerbehörde beantragen, dann kontaktieren sie Arbeitsamt und dann überprüfen sie, wenn keine Deutsche, keine EU-Ausländer, keine andere Ausländer, kann auch Bosnier sein, wenn er einen besseren Aufenthalt als ich in Deutschland habe; wenn keiner von denen, also diese Arbeit haben möchte, dann kann ich die kriegen." (Interview, Mirna)

Rather than granting easier access to the labor market, the outcome was that many work permits were actually rescinded as attempts were made to harmonize the policies of the Foreigners Offices to the lowest common standards. As such, the scope for determination of the more generous assessments of some Foreigners Offices became more limited with time (Interview, JRS). Furthermore, access to work was deemed as *secondary* for individuals with a temporary suspension of deportation (*Duldung*).

This set the context for the state-run employment office to grant only a small proportion of refugees work permits to enter into gainful employment (Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit und Soziales 1999). Generally, those able to find employment at this time were frequently in low-skilled, low-wage, and menial labor jobs - often referred to as dangerous, demeaning, and dirty, the three D's.[104] Manual labor jobs, such as construction, catering, cleaning, and hotel work were the most likely, as the refugees typically carried out tasks the average native German preferred to avoid.

Beyond these challenges, unrestricted access to the labor market throughout Germany was short-lived, since by October 1993 only those hardship cases already granted an exceptional work permit were able to receive extensions (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). All others had to undergo a thorough application process (often lasting weeks) to determine their eligibility for a limited work permit. For this, the refugees needed to file an application for a work permit with the Foreigners Office. In determining the parameters to grant a work permit in Berlin,

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[104] I have also read a variety of different references in which the term *demeaning* was substituted with *domestic* or even *dark* work.

the Foreigners Office staff adhered to one administrative precondition, namely, that the applicant was not suspected of having entered Germany with the main aim of claiming benefits, or of having prevented his/her deportation under false stipulations. The authorities needed to determine whether any objections existed regarding the issuance of such a work permit and if there were none, the work permit could be issued for a specific job with a limited duration. With no other regulations guiding them, decisions regarding the issuance of work permits were often made arbitrarily and dependent on the mood or attitude of the specific Foreigners Office worker on the given day. "Erstmal kriegte ich gar keine Arbeitserlaubnis. Überhaupt nicht. Ich hatte gar kein Recht auf die Arbeitserlaubnis." (Interview, Slavo) Another of my interlocutors provides a similar account. "Zu der Zeit als ich nach Deutschland gekommen bin, konnte ich auch keine Arbeitserlaubnis bekommen. Ich hatte keine Zukunft. Meiner Meinung nach sind so viele schöne Jahre vergangen, wo ich keine Chance hatte was mit mir zu machen." (Interview, Irena)

The granting of limited work permits was contingent on developments in the former Yugoslavia as well as on labor market developments in Berlin. As a result of the competitive labor market, the Bosnian refugees in Berlin appeared to be particularly disadvantaged in accessing the labor market and acquiring work permits compared to other German federal states.[105] An implication of the strict compliance rules was that few Bosnians in Berlin were issued a resident title for exceptional purposes along with a work permit under these terms. Only one of my interlocutors was able to acquire a resident title for exceptional purposes and a work permit to pursue his profession as a photographer in Berlin at this time.

> "The first two years I didn't have a work permit but I had a kind of artist status. I had an *Aufenthaltsbefugnis*. It's the lowest permission to stay that exists in Germany. That means you can only stay here as long it says. You have a visa and are not allowed to work, but you can travel and do small things. And they extend it first for half a year, and because I was doing other things [contracted jobs], I got one year more afterward. Then I noticed that they from the Foreigners Office noticed that I was doing different things than the other [refugees]. And they simply trusted me when I asked for a work permit after that because I said if I have a work permit maybe I don't have to take money from Germany, you know? You make small steps all the time." (Interview, Nafiz)

By distinguishing himself from the other refugees as a result of his ability to procure freelance contracted jobs in Berlin, he was able to convince the Foreigners Office administrative staff to

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[105] This was largely due to justifications of disagreements between the federal states on burden sharing remedies and a lack of a standardized, uniform law to regulate the reception process. In general, the Foreigners Office only granted the authorized resident status to individuals who were likely to comply with the terms set in the formal obligation. The few able to acquire a resident title for exceptional purposes, usually did so under the condition that they had already been issued a one-year-long *Duldung* and a work permit, and had been earning a stable income (Landeseinwohneramt Berlin 1995).

grant him the better legal status with the issuance of a work permit. His line of argument with the Foreigners Office worker deciding his case was to adhere to the commonly propagated reasoning in public discourse at the time. He explained that he had been working hard, was able to speak German,[106] and was contributing to German society and culture by providing an important resource with his photography, and as such, it would be in everyone's best interests to let him continue working and earning an income rather than being dependent on welfare. His argument awarded him the privilege to work legally, something few other Bosnian refugees in Berlin were permitted. Proficiency in the German language and acquisition of an unlimited job contract sufficed as proof that an individual is willing to integrate.[107]

In most cases, my adult interlocutors were jobless for years, waiting to see whether they would eventually be permitted the option to access the labor market or contribute to society. Another interlocutor questioned, "Warum darf man sich nicht ein bisschen beschäftigen?!" (Interview, Slavo)

After Dayton, restrictions were even more forthright as a further reduction in the number of approved work permits granted to refugees from the former Yugoslavia ensued (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). All those who had previously been granted an exceptional work permit on the grounds of hardship were converted into general work permits between 1995 and 1996, which led to a five percent drop in the number of working-age former Yugoslavian refugees granted a work permit. 25 percent were granted work permits in 1995, while only 20 percent received permits in 1996 (Senat von Berlin 1995; Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001).

> "Nach Dayton waren alle Sachen ungültig. Alle meiner Zeugnisse habe ich aus meiner Heimat mitgenommen und hier dabei gehabt. Es stand drin alles was ich in Bosnien gemacht habe, was ich für einen Beruf erlernt habe, aber hier war das alles ungültig und ich musste alles noch mal von Vorne machen. Alles noch einmal machen, nach 24 Jahren. So lange, ja, mein Gott, alles habe ich so lange aufgebaut." (Interview, Slavo)

Already denied a work permit and effectively prohibited from accessing the labor market legally, by Dec. 15, 1995, those who had begun vocational training programs were told to end them. It was argued that "stabilization in their resident status was undesirable" (Andrees et al. 1996:55 in: Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). In addition, all those with a *Duldung* who had arrived in Germany after May 15, 1997 were no longer permitted work permits or access to educational measures sponsored by the State Job Agency or ARGE / Jobcenter. "Die Kinder

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[106] When he came to Berlin, he already had a German native contact, whom he had met years earlier on an interactional exchange program. They had even travelled together in the US. As such, he had a friend in Berlin on whom he could rely. He lived with him and in so doing, learned German relative quickly.

[107] The possibility of securing a permanent resident status, which is determined solely by the Foreigners Office, and being entitled the opportunity to strive towards integration is generally contingent upon the legal resident status granted an individual, the specific job description and the extent of labor market competition.

durften zum Beispiel keine Ausbildung machen. Eine richtige Ausbildung kommt nicht in Frage, arbeiten auch nicht." (Interview, Zumra) Labor market access was thus rescinded again for all the asylum seekers and individuals with a *Duldung* at this time (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer 2000).[108]

As a form of encouragement for their pending voluntary return to Bosnia special training and educational projects were offered to young Bosnians with a temporary suspension of deportation between 1997 and 1998. The idea was for them to learn special trades and skills, which would contribute towards their *reintegration* to Bosnia (Senat von Berlin 1995). In line with government encouragement fostering reintegration schemes to Bosnia, many Bosnians decided to either apply for resettlement to third countries or to repatriate voluntarily to Bosnia in hopes of pursuing their previous careers or trades. One participant recalls his brother's situation.

> "Also, er konnte dann nicht zur Schule gehen und hat glaube ich auch keine Lust mehr gehabt. Ich glaube nicht nur weil er die Hoffnung zu kämpfen verloren hat, sondern weil damals 98 ganz viele Bosnier zurückgekehrt sind, freiwillig, und alle seine Kumpels sind auch zurück. Da hatte er keine Lust [gehabt] hier zu bleiben. Er hat sich freiwillig gemeldet und ist zurückgegangen." (Interview, Mere)

By offering training promoting voluntary return and limiting the issuance of guaranteed work permits, the 1997 decree clearly aimed to encourage Bosnian refugees with a *Duldung* to return to Bosnia (Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit und Soziales 1998a).

In response to pressure exerted on politicians by psychologists, refugee agencies, and human rights advocates, the Berlin Department of the Interior finally implemented a specific directive in June 1999, authorizing the issuance of work permits and a more secure resident status to at least the traumatized Bosnian refugees. This effectively exempted those confirmed with a traumatization from the labor market examination based on the premise that employment would serve a therapeutic purpose (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer 2000) One participant recalls, "Ich durfte nur 40 oder 60 Stunden [pro Monat] Arbeit vom Sozialamt kriegen. Na ja, ich war ganz froh, dass ich mindestens das machen konnte." (Interview, Slavo)

Unable to access the labor market resulted in restricting the rights and pursuits of my interlocutors in Berlin, while also compounding their fears and anxiety. This removed them of much needed autonomy negatively influencing them in their ability to regain control over their post-migration lives. It also resulted in costing the German state enormous amounts of money in welfare allotments, an issue that is further addressed in the next section.

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[108] Exceptions were applicable for individual cases as long as they were based on well-founded reasons.

4.4.1.1.4 Welfare Reliance in Berlin

Like the changes related to accessing employment, the social welfare benefit amount awarded a Bosnian tolerated refugee in Berlin had also been altered numerous times, each time leading to less than before. Generally, welfare amounts were reduced in an effort to remove the so-called "pull factors" by deterring individuals from migrating to Germany or of taking advantage of its generous welfare system. To be eligible for welfare benefits, the Bosnian refugees first needed to register and apply for support. While some refugees expressed initial gratefulness, others criticized the extent of bureaucratic complications linked with their benefit allocations. For instance, dispersal according to birth date introduced bureaucratic complexities for refugee families, who lived together and shared resources, but were reliant on different Welfare Offices spread throughout the city due to administrative regulations.

> "Es war auch ein Problem, dass wir drei Erwachsene sind und jede nach seinem Geburtstagdatum zu einem Sozialamt zum anderen Bezirk gehörte. Ich weiß nicht wie es immer noch ist mit denen, die eine Duldung haben. Es kann sein, dass es immer noch so ist, dass es so läuft, dass man von 2-3 Sozialämtern das Geld bezieht." (Interview, Selma)

A different interlocutor recounts the financial and bureaucratic complexities that emerged for her once she turned 18 years of age, as the district authority responsible for her was no longer willing to finance her accommodation if she continued to live with her parents. The cases came under the responsibility of different district authorities, making it impossible to reach a compromise. In the end, the Social Welfare Offices remained unmoving, but the property manager showed compassion by lowering the rent costs to enable my respondent to stay with her parents in the apartment.

Many interlocutors also said the benefit amount awarded was insufficient, especially when awaiting a decision on their application, as this involved extensive waiting periods. In one case, a respondent stretched the initial payment determined to cover her and her baby's expenses to include the additional costs of her mother and brother as well.

> "Sozialhilfe habe ich bekommen, weil ich ein Kind hatte, weil ich eine allein erziehende Mutti war. Und davon, von diesem Geld haben wir uns vier so was zum Essen geschafft und so. Und etwas Geld aus Bosnien haben wir hier gebracht, weil wir in dem Moment dort alles verkauft haben. Ein paar tausend Mark hatten wir schon. Und meine Mutti und mein Bruder, sie haben es geschafft erst nach drei Monate Sozialhilfe zu bekommen." (Interview, Mirna)

Only because this respondent had money from Bosnia was she able to assist her family to survive on her welfare benefits while they awaited the issuance of their first welfare allotment. Having brought savings from Bosnia with them to Berlin proved helpful for many of my interlocutors in covering their costs during this initial period. Also evident from this excerpt is that the duration of the determination process was influenced by a variety of factors

such as whether applying as a single adult or as a parent with one or more children. Under certain circumstances, the responsible authorities could decide to withhold benefits altogether, which resulted in particular hardships.

With the ongoing arrival of Yugoslavian refugees, requests for a more limited asylum policy were made in extensive public debates. This led to the amended provision introduced within the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (*AsylbLG*), which newly regulated the amount of social welfare benefits issued during the initial 12 months of the asylum process following Nov. 1, 1993 (Comune di Roma 2004).[109] Recognized asylum seekers and refugees granted protection under the Geneva Convention continued to be entitled to more extensive benefits based on provisions under the BSHG; asylum seekers and individuals with a temporary suspension of deportation were granted reduced benefits (20 to 30 percent less than recognized refugees and EU citizens receiving social welfare) in accordance with the AsylbLG (Comune di Roma 2004).[110] Another significant distinction was that in both cases the allotment of welfare benefits granted to refugees and asylum seekers was unlimited in time as long as the extenuating circumstances did not alter. These changes in the social benefit amounts granted the refugees is representative of the fact that the AsylbLG benefits could be reduced or stopped anytime the authorities saw fit.

With this, greater financial restrictions were introduced for the Bosnian refugees, evident by reduced social welfare benefits, limited medical treatment, and the distribution of material support by vouchers and chip cards in order to revoke payments in cash (Holfeld 2008:904).[111] The new welfare amount issued the Bosnian refugees under the AsylbLG was not only less than it had previously been, but the distinction in welfare amounts according to

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[109] "Flüchtlinge im Asylverfahren, Kriegs- oder Bürgerkriegsflüchtlinge, Flüchtlinge mit Bleiberecht aufgrund einer Altfallregelung oder einer Duldung aufgrund von Krankheit oder anderen Abschiebehindernissen und Ausländer, die vollziehbar ausreisepflichtig sind, fallen unter das Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (§1 Abs. 1 AsylbLG)." (Groß 2005:9)

[110] The head of a household was generally allotted an amount of DM 360, while DM 310 was awarded for additional household members over eight years of age, and DM 220 was granted for children younger than eight (ZDWF 1995). After January 1994, the additional allowance for each child per household was curtailed for most Bosnian refugees with the exception of those afforded special protection (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). The financial situation changed again for those receiving social welfare entitlements with the implementation of the Social Welfare Law Hartz IV and the 2005 Immigration Act. Now a single asylum applicant is eligible to receive about 200€ per month rather than the sum of 345€ that a welfare recipient could receive according to ALG II (cf. Classen 2000).

[111] Payments for accommodation, furniture, household appliances, food and toiletries are to be paid as allowances in kind. Conflicts emerged whether to pay benefits directly in cash or to distribute non-cash resources like meal packets, grocery store vouchers or chip cards. Ongoing discrepancies continue to be of concern regarding the best form of welfare benefit payments to welfare recipients in the federal states. Thanks to the lobby work of refugee agencies, the chip card has been abolished due to its discriminatory nature and expense. Refugees in Berlin are now paid in cash, a stipend of 41€ per month for an adult.

nationality and status has drawn much critique with claims of institutional discrimination linked to imbalances in welfare amounts.

Following the Dayton Agreement, restrictive resolutions determined at the IMC introduced another reduction in the tolerated refugees' welfare payments and required that recipients undergo the electronic data processing procedure, including fingerprinting (Hohlfeld 2008:907). This was intended to curb the number of duplicate registrations (Sachverstandigenrat 2004:137). Between 1995 and 1999, the social welfare benefits awarded a Bosnian refugee in Berlin had been reduced more than four times in a five-year time span (cf. Senatsverwaltung für Arbeit, Soziales und Frauen, Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats von Berlin 2000; Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001).[112] At this time various types of funding were offered the refugees as an impetus for their return to Bosnia. They were required to withdraw their asylum application or pending claim if they agreed to repatriate on a "voluntary basis." In consideration of work bans and financial constraints in Berlin, many agreed to the terms and financial payments accorded with voluntary repatriation and thus returned to Bosnia.

Although the intention of the AsylbLG was to guarantee the basic minimum living wage necessary for survival (Classen 2000), recipients were confronted with issues of financial scarcity. Balancing the welfare benefits allotted, which were only enough to cover basic necessities, proved to be an ongoing challenge and hardship for the majority of my Berlin interlocutors. Provisory services were restricted to absolute necessities with the option of curtailing pocket money and refusing accommodation, food and/or medical services to individuals with a tolerated refugee status.

The plight of tolerated refugees and their meager financial situation became more public, meaning more contested, leading to the implementation of the *Bleiberechtsregelung*. In response, the Berlin pass was introduced in 2009, enabling Hartz IV and welfare recipients, including seniors and asylum seekers, free access to libraries, sports clubs, youth clubs, and discounted entry to museums, theaters, concerts, open-air events, and sports arenas, as well as a reduced-fare public transport ticket. A well-known phenomenon of children with a *Duldung* and welfare-recipients missing school field trips due to the residence restriction or due to insufficient funds to cover the participation fees has sparked new public debates regarding the implementation of chip cards for children's educational purposes.

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[112] With renewed amendments to the AsylbLG on June 1, 1997, all Bosnians with a Duldung (according to §55 or authorized resident status under §§32 or 32a) were entitled to the social welfare benefits accorded under the AsylbLG (Schwarz et al. 2004) and enforced by the federal state of Berlin, implying yet another deterioration in the legal entitlements of the Bosnian refugees to claim welfare benefits. After receiving AsylbLG for three years, individuals could avoid repatriation based on humanitarian reasons (Comune di Roma 2004:156).

The next section addresses the external control exerted on my respondents, hereby limiting them in choosing their housing and accommodation.

4.4.1.1.5 Housing and Accommodation in Berlin

Berlin authorities implemented and amended a variety of different regulations regarding the reception and accommodation of the Bosnian refugees. These influenced their freedom to choose where to live, i.e. in private housing or collective accommodation facilities, and whether permitted to select the accommodation themselves or be merely assigned placements in the collective housing facilities with no choice in the matter. Not the German federal government, but the federal states were responsible for the accommodation of the Bosnian refugees granted a *Duldung* in Germany. As such, the state of Berlin was solely responsible for covering the costs associated with the initial housing and accommodation of the Bosnian refugees in Berlin, as well as for maintaining the infrastructure and upkeep of the private and state-run housing facilities. Responsibility for determining how to oversee the Bosnian refugees' accommodation, whether in gymnasiums, private quarters, or in varying collective accommodation facilities was further delegated to each district authority in Berlin. As a result, disparate responses in dealing with the need to provide housing to the newly arriving refugees prevailed, not only between the 16 German federal states but also between each district authority within each federal state. Consequently, regulations on the Bosnian refugees' housing were influenced by political pressure and the financial concerns of each district authority (Mihok 2001b). While some district authorities set up emergency sleeping arrangements, for instance, in gymnasiums, as was the case in the neighborhood district of Schöneberg (Hohlfeld 2008:905), other district authorities in Berlin permitted private apartment rentals or encouraged housing with family members, or assigned placements in collective housing facilities. Inconsistencies were frequent.

This and the commonly poor conditions and assigned placement in accommodation facilities with a high propensity of conflict among the residents exacerbated the adjustment process of my respondents. Many also criticized the frequency in which they had to move over the years, which also proved to be a striking obstacle in their adaptation.

> "In 98 sind wir noch mal umgezogen aus dem DRK Heim in Britz-Süd, in Neukölln, weil es drohte sozusagen, dass sie es schließen oder dass sie es runterreißen mussten, weil da sehr viele Familien waren, sehr viele Problemfälle, viel Polizei, und es wurde immer schlimmer. Es wurde ganz viel gemacht und egal was in dem Bezirk passiert war, war das Wohnheim immer schuld. Es war immer in Frage und die wollten es runterreisen. Und irgendwann hieß es, na ja, die machen zu und wir mussten dann alle langsam raus." (Interview, Dubravka)

The most moves tallied among my interlocutors since their arrival in Berlin was eight, with four being the least. Having to move from one apartment to another with little agency in the decision-making process was not only arbitrary and costly, but it also had emotionally debilitating consequences. Whether forced to move to counter the stigmatization in the immediate neighborhood, to respond to building operators' decisions to close down the housing facility altogether due to a change in owners, an alteration in the lease conditions, or a change in legislation, the refugees had to repeatedly contend with a variety of tactics affecting their housing situation in which they had little autonomy over their situation.

> "Ich wohnte erst in Atlas Pension am Ku'damm. Ich hatte dort aber keinen Platz für mich und meine Tochter, die 6 Jahre alt war. Ich wurde in einem Einzelzimmer in einer anderen Wohnung, auch von Atlas Pension besessen, geschickt. Dort hat es 35 DM pro Person pro Tag gekostet. Wir haben dort zwei Jahre gelebt. Im Mai hatte die Sozialarbeiterin gesagt, dass die Wohnung zu teuer sei und dass ich ausziehen sollte." (Interview, Irena)

Another interlocutor relates her family's initial experiences receiving housing accommodation according to the regulations at the time.

> "Es gab welche Regelungen. Eine Wohnung suchen konnten wir damals nicht, sollten wir nicht. Es wurde uns nicht erlaubt. Das war in 93. In diesem Container was es so schlimm, dass wir dachten, da können wir nicht bleiben, sonst sind wir alle fertig. Wir waren alle so depressiv und es war furchtbar. Da im Container haben wir etwas über einen Monat gewohnt. Dann waren wir in einem Hotel. Und dann irgendwann hat man uns gesagt, da können wir nicht mehr bleiben. Wir müssen uns was anderes suchen. Und dann haben wir alle ein Jahr lang in einem Wohnheim gewohnt. Alle in einem Zimmer, mein Bruder, meine Mutti und mein Sohn. Erst nach zwei Jahren, glaube ich, haben wir selber [eine Wohnung] suchen dürfen." (Interview, Mirna)

A gradual shift in refugee reception from mass accommodation to more individualized support was evident at the local level in the early 1990s with a few exceptions. Since apartments, particularly in the eastern part of Berlin were plentiful and inexpensive after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Bosnian refugees assigned to these district authorities were typically able to reside in self-selected private apartments between 1992 and 1993. One participant recounts that he was able to remain in private housing with his companion.

> "It was a good possibility to stay at his apartment in Prenzlauerberg because he had enough space and we didn't have to go to a refugee house. We could stay at his place from the beginning on. And from that perspective, it was much, much nicer, you know. It was a different solution and of course he helped us a lot with the papers, with the bureaucracy, registering, and everything." (Interview, Nafiz)

Despite the ample space to house the refugees in self-selected, private quarters, however, emergency sleeping arrangements and communal accommodation facilities were also arranged, which is characteristic of the general lack of a uniform policy for responding to the housing needs of the Bosnian refugees after their initial arrival.

"Wo wir wohnten war nicht unbedingt eine Wohnung, so ähnlich wie ein Heim; also da waren viele Familien, aber die haben halt jeweils nur ein Zimmer. Bei uns hatten wir keine Toilette und keine Küchenstrich, man musste in einer Gemeinschaftsküche Essen machen oder bzw. in der Toilette gehen." (Interview, Adin)

The operation of the communal accommodation facilities was often decentralized, with both privately-run and state-managed housing facilities. There were large and small accommodation facilities and the conditions varied, depending on the specific location and housing operator in charge. In some cases, the refugees were able to state their preferred housing location by choosing from a list of potential private- and state-run housing facility addresses. The extent to which an individual could attempt to influence the housing location decision, however, was not always obvious or promising. The housing standards and conditions varied remarkably depending on whether the hostels and housing facilities were contracted by the Berlin Senate or privately-run, which often came with inadequate standards.

Housing was often provided for the core family unit, i.e. husband, wife and children, though several families were often forced to share an apartment space together. Generally, they were simply placed into facilities with little say or influence in the matter, which led to a variety of problems for my interlocutors. One participant described the conditions of the privately-run accommodation facility in which she lived with her mother, brother and son before being able to move to a larger apartment within the building and then to a different apartment altogether.

"Es war hier in Berlin am Hermannplatz. Wissen Sie wo Konrad ist am Hermannplatz? Da ist jetzt Hotel Ludwig. Das war einmal ein Wohnheim. Da haben wir gewohnt. Wir haben da erstmal ein kleines Zimmer gehabt. Dann als jemand ausgezogen ist, haben wir das größte Zimmer im Wohnheim, ganz oben, in fünften Stock wo man einen Blick auf die Hasenheide hat, [bekommen]. Es war schön, es war nur ein Problem also, es war nur ein kleines Zimmer. Was aber da gut war, wir hatten unsere [eigene] Toilette und Bad. Und wir hatten in einer Ecke die Spüle und Platz für einen Herd. Es war so, das Zimmer war kleiner als das Zimmer hier, es war glaube ich 24 qm. Wir haben alles in einem Zimmer gemacht, geschlafen, das war Küche und Wohnzimmer und alles in einem. Wir waren da ein Jahrlang und dann haben wir eine Wohnung bekommen." (Interview, Mirna)

In another narrative, my interlocutor highlights the diversity of the residents placed in the state-run housing facility in which she lived, since native Germans "living on the edge of societal norms" were accommodated together with the refugees.

"Ich weiß gar nicht wie lange, ich glaube von 95 bis 2000 haben wir in diesem Heim gelebt und vielleicht die letzten zwei, drei Jahren waren wir wirklich immer zu Dritt in einem Raum. Meine Schwägerin mit zwei Kinder und ihrem Mann, also die Leute haben immer in nur einem Zimmer gelebt, ganz viele Leute. Wir waren halt in diesem Heim wie gesagt, nur bosnische Leute und auch so ganz viele Kroaten, und auch Moslems zusammen, auch nicht Bosnier, aber so Flüchtlinge. Einige sind dann nach Amerika weiter gegangen. Einige haben dann eine Abschiebung bekommen und sind dann

zurückgegangen nach Bosnien. Dann kamen zu diesem Heim auch ganz viele Deutsche, die nämlich nichts hatten- diese so Penner, die du so halt auf der Straße siehst- die haben dann auch dann da gelebt und das war dann halt blöd, dass es eine Toilette gab, die alle benutzt haben." (Interview, Selma)

With time, my interlocutors became more forthright in requesting their move from the accommodation facilities into privately-run housing to evade the tense and often poor standards at the centers.

"Ich bin in eine Einzimmerwohnung in Neukölln gezogen. Beim Umzug hatte ich nur drei blaue Säcke in meinem Besitz. In meiner Wohnung war kein Herd, kein Möbel, nichts. Vom Sozialamt habe ich eine Bescheinigung bekommen, dass ich solche Sachen kaufen durfte, aber nichts Neues, es durfte nur gebrauchte Sachen sein. Fünf Jahrelang haben wir da in der Einzimmerwohnung gelebt. Als meine Tochter großer wurde, habe ich beim Sozialamt nachgefragt, ob ich nicht in eine größere Wohnung einziehen konnte. Das Sozialamt hat zugesagt. Dann bin ich in einer Wohnung an der Land Straße eingezogen, wo ich seit 7 Jahren wohne. Ich fühle mich dort jetzt wohl." (Interview, Irena)

Another interlocutor describes the lesson she learned in finally *asking* the Welfare Office authorities to be moved to a larger apartment so that her daughter may finally have her own bedroom, and to then *ask* again for furniture vouchers to buy necessary kitchen appliances and furniture. She observed that the welfare authorities rarely provided information or distributed material services unless asked directly.

"Um Möbel zu kaufen, hatten wir auch noch das Geld was wir gekriegt haben. Sonst kriegen Leute irgendwelche Gutscheine, wo man die Möbel kauft. Am Meisten war das gebrauchte Möbel, wo es fast wie neu gekostet hat, aber man musste es von da nehmen." (Interview, Zumra)

Once the refugees realized the significance of asking for things, such as furniture vouchers, birth control, psychotherapy, etc., the distribution of these services was rarely denied. The burden of asking was placed on them, however, requiring that they know in advance what materials and services were potentially available, details they could only acquire from other refugees who had clued them in. It took years for them to learn this unspoken policy response and to gain enough confidence to ask.

Regardless of the size of a living space, being able to secure a housing arrangement with a private bathroom seemed to be of utmost importance for my respondents. A few participants expressed their gratitude and sense of fortune or *luck* when reflecting on their ability to influence the situation to acquire their own bathroom.

"Wir hatten Glück, dass wir zwei Zimmer mit einer Toilette nur für uns hatten, nur für uns! Das war mir ganz wichtig, dass die Toilette nicht mit den Anderen zusammen war. Ja, das war das wichtigste! Und die Küche hatten wir auch für uns. Die Wohnung war unter dem Dach deswegen war nur eine Toilette für eine Familie sonst unten haben mehrere Familie eine Toilette benutzt." (Interview, Zumra)

Beyond concerns about sharing kitchen and bathroom spaces, intercultural conflicts among the home residents often emerged. The frequency of conflicts in the housing facility was attributed to a variety of different factors, such as cramped living space, poor and discriminatory conditions, high tensions, symptoms of PTSD, impatience, latent interethnic conflicts and intolerance, differences in hygiene and personality, among other things. Single adults, for example, were usually accommodated with other refugees, often grouping strangers and warring parties or "enemies" in a room together. One of my respondents, a Bosnian Muslim, was accommodated in a 24 square meter room, which he shared with a Croatian, a Serbian and an Albanian refugee.

> "Keiner schlief. Alle guckten mit einem Auge; wenn der andere sich dreht, drehten wir uns alle, weil keiner Vertrauen zu den anderen hat, weil wir nicht wussten, was die anderen machen würden, wie es ist mit solchen Leuten ist, da zusammen zu sein." (Interview, Slavo)

According to several respondents, in general, housing center staff appeared to lack the skills necessary to negotiate lasting solutions to conflicts. The police were called regularly to intervene when the accommodation facility employers were unable to resolve the tensions. One refugee interlocutor said a common response of the staff was to say: "Ihr seid alle ein Volk; ihr musst euch vertragen können." (Interview, Slavo) Forcing war refugees to share compact communal areas with individuals of warring ethnic backgrounds, i.e. the so-called "enemy" depicts a lack of sensitivity and intercultural competence on the part of the authorities in placing the refugees together in the same room within the accommodation facility. Furthermore, such situations evoked traumas associated with the refugees' war experiences and led to situations that forced victims of ethnic cleansing to live together with their perpetrators.

For this reason, many refugee advocates demanded that an exception to the assigned accommodation placement be made for particularly vulnerable Bosnians with certifiable trauma experiences as a result of the war. Individuals with a PTSD diagnosis were in need of special consideration as a result of their trauma and should be permitted to reside in private rental accommodations, refugee advocates argued. Despite efforts urging a special response to the needs of the traumatized refugees, many were nonetheless required to remain in assigned accommodation facilities, which often exacerbated their trauma and created an additionally stressful situation for them.

Such living arrangements proved to be particularly challenging for my interlocutors who shared a living space with Roma families. One participant complained, for instance, about the

lack of hygiene he attributed to his Roma neighbors, which was particularly frustrating for him since they had to share the communal kitchen and bathrooms.

"Ich hatte in Biesdorf in einem riesigen großen Haus mit den 11, 12 Stockwerken und dann 5, 6 Eingänge gewohnt. Da habe ich mit Zigeuner gewohnt, richtig Zigeuner. Na ja, ich bin runter zur Chefin vom Haus gegangen und gefragt: 'Wie können sie mir das antun, dass ich da mit ihnen wohnen muss?' Ja, sie waren alle Bosnier, aber sie [die Zigeuner] haben den ganzen Schrott in die Badewanne gesammelt, alles war voll und ekelhaft." (Interview, Slavo)

Another participant recounted problems her family had with their Roma neighbors. In addition to cultural differences and conflicts that emerged, this participant was further concerned for the security of her daughters.

"Alle Familie auf der ganzen Welt sozusagen, die ganze Welt in einem Haus mit verschiedenen Festen. Aber ja, diese Kultur, den ganzen Tag ist Ruhe, bis ca. halb 12 ist schlafen, schlafen, schlafen und dann Party! Gäste kommen bis zum sehr spät. Sie haben gesagt, die Uhrzeit ist normal. Das war für die normal. Die Kinder sind auch nicht zu Schule gegangen. Ich habe gesagt, dass es für ihre Kinder nicht gesund ist. Das Kind muss schlafen. Das war für die normal und die sind auch nicht zu Schule gegangen, nichts. Von daher war es für die schon normal irgendwie. Die Wände waren auch ziemlich dünn so dass wir wirklich vieles von den Nachbarn gehört haben. Wir wussten auch was bei denen zuhause war. Die ganze Block von den Häusern, es waren drei, vier Häuser nebeneinander, und da war immer ganz viel los. Also, auch ganz viel Polizei und mitten in der Nacht, viele Schüsse, viele Unfälle, ich weiß nicht, da waren ganz viel, so dass wir viel mitgekriegt haben. Wir haben ganz oben auf dem Dachgeschoss gewohnt. Das war ganz gut. Wir kannten aber auch Familien, die unten gewohnt haben und sehr unglücklich waren. Wir waren zwar auch nicht glücklich so, aber wir mussten da durch." (Interview, Dubravka)

Fearful of her neighbors, another respondent depicts the "catastrophic" situation that she and her family were forced to endure in a privately-owned building. The building owner had signed a subleasing agreement with the Foreigners Office to house a certain number of refugees, in addition to the other renters already living there.

"Es war Katastrophe, war so schmutzig, so stinkig, ach Mensch! Da waren Drogensüchtigen in dem Heim. Sie haben immer geraucht, immer geschrieen, die Polizei musste immer kommen, dann Rettungswägen. Einer ist gestorben und hat sich überdoziert. Ach Mensch, katastrophe! Das war schon ein Asylantenheim, aber irgendwie war da Deutsche, aber es war schon, eine private Unterkunft. Irgendwann nach vier Jahren mussten wir das Heim verlassen, weil es irgendwie privat war. Und dann sind wir nach Marzahn umgezogen, da wo nur Asylbewerber wohnten." (Interview, Zumra)

Many refugee accommodation centers were perceived negatively by neighbors and businesses in the vicinity and were commonly associated with crime and poverty. By Feb. 2, 1994, the distribution of accommodation (*Bettenvergabe*) fell under the responsibility of the Regional Authority for Central Social Administrative Duties (*LASOZ*) (Hohlfeld 2008:905).

As word spread among the refugees of the emergent conflicts and poor conditions in the varying accommodation facilities, facilities with a better reputation were inevitably filled more quickly, while the more dilapidated facilities with greater intersocial problems were more likely to have empty spaces. With increasing pressure on the authorities to fill the empty spaces in the communal accommodation facilities, many Bosnian refugees were assigned overpriced and often run-down accommodation facilities with little say in the matter. Rather than train staff in intercultural conflict management or improve the conditions in the buildings or surrounding area, it was easier simply to force the refugees to move and/or to blame them for the poor reputation associated with the often dilapidated housing facilities.

One participant recalls that she and her parents had to share a small but expensive apartment in a privately-run accommodation facility after 1995, in which the owner collected DM 39 per person per night.

> "Man hat auch kein Anspruch auf eine Wohnung. Obwohl es jetzt viel billiger gekostet hätte wenn man das jetzt hochrechnet- 39 Mark für uns, das heißt für uns an jedem Tag über 100 Mark hat sie für uns gekriegt- für uns drei- mal 30 Tage- ist doch- man hätte eine Wohnung in Darlem![113] Ein Haus hätte man da mieten können. Tatsächlich, ich meine was kostet so die Miete für ein Haus eigentlich? 2,000, 3,000 Mark, aber wirklich. Sie haben das zwar gezahlt. Man bekam Sozialhilfe und Unterkunft wurde bezahlt, aber halt diese Schwachsinnige Widerspruche hätte keine Wohnung haben können- dass sie auch- weil sie- da ist auch niemand vorbei gekommen, um zu sehen wie es da war- also dass wir alle in einem Zimmer sind, eine Küche, und ein Herd und was weiß ich sechs, sieben Familie, die in einer Küche zur Recht kommen mussten und ein Bad benutzen mussten." (Interview, Selma)

Though the living arrangements of Bosnians in collective accommodation facilities actually cost the federal state of Berlin more financially, the administrative preference, especially after the signing of the Dayton Accord, was to accommodate refugees with a *Duldung* in collective accommodation facilities. Because of this trend, it was claimed that the larger facilities were more cost-effective than the smaller ones. Either disinterested in the building conditions or simply overwhelmed by the number of new arrivals seeking protection in Germany, few controls were administered by the Foreigners Office to monitor whether a certain accommodation may be inappropriate for the refugees. This was related to the greater pressure exerted by the Berlin authorities to execute expulsion orders or to move the Bosnians into state-run housing complexes.[114]

Discrepancies were common in enforcing individuals with a *Duldung* to live in assigned collective accommodation facilities. After years of being forced to stay in an overpriced

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[113] Darlem is considered a rather noble area in Berlin.
[114] Accommodation benefits for the collective accommodation facilities according to the AsylbLG were relatively limited (see §§ 4 and 6 AsylbLG (Classen 2000).

collective, state-run facility, one respondent recalls how she was requested to move to private housing. "Ich kann mich noch daran erinnern als ich dann 18 wurde, dass mir beim Sozialamt gesagt worden ist: 'Ja, sie können denn die Kosten nicht mehr tragen, ich sollte mir bitte- es gibt doch andere Heime wo es billiger ist.'" (Interview, Selma)

After the amended Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (*AsylbLG*) entered into force in June 1997 all Bosnians with a *Duldung* were required to move into collective accommodation facilities.[115] Because the scope of discretion in enforcing the policy changes was again dependent on the local district authorities, or more specifically, the discretion of the local Social Welfare Offices, variations in the policy enforcement continued. Some local offices required those residing in private rental accommodation to move into state-run collective accommodation facilities immediately, while other welfare offices never enforced the regulation. In districts with a lax enforcement of the policy, complications arose nonetheless for the Bosnian refugees due to difficulties procuring a rental apartment. "Ich hatte immer Angst, weil ich nicht wusste, ob ich in der Wohnung und auch in Deutschland bleiben durfte." (Interview, Irena) Building-owners often refused to take in refugees and several respondents described reactions they encountered in applying for private housing.

> "Wir durften damals nicht in so eine Wohnung, weil wir Ausländer waren; als Ausländer durften wir das nicht und das Sozialamt wollte es auch nicht bezahlen. Es war auch Gang und Gebe, dass man wusste, wenn man vom Sozialamt kommt, viele Hausverwaltungen wollten das einfach nicht. Sie wussten ganz genau, dass wir Ausländer sind, die haben ganz viel Stress gemacht. Genau das was sie uns sozusagen bereitet haben in den ganzen Wohnheims, haben sie teilweise auch durchgezogen in den Wohnungen, also die Leute, die sozusagen Glück hatten und eine Wohnung bekamen bei der Hausverwaltung. Sie haben immer mehrere Gründe angeben müssen und haben wirklich Glück gehabt wenn sie von der Hausverwaltung ganz normale Wohnungen bekamen. Sie haben's immer wieder gehabt und damit kamen viele nicht klar." (Interview, Dubravka)

According to my interview respondents, the housing situation in Berlin became more relaxed only following the voluntary repatriation phase and exodus of so many refugees. With the softening of the reception conditions, the refugees were permitted to move out of the "*Wohnheim Lager*"[116] and to rent their own apartments. Here, they sought better living conditions, i.e. more space, private bathrooms, housing with fewer conflicts, and potentially more permanent housing solutions.

> "Nach diesen 8 Jahren, irgendwann mal, durften wir eine normale Wohnung für uns suchen. Dann haben wir eine gefunden, eine vier Zimmer Wohnung, eine schöne Wohnung. Da wohnen wir immer noch. Wir durften Möbel kaufen und haben es

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[115] This was partly intended as a means by which to monitor the movements of the temporary refugees for purposes of easily locating them in case of repatriation.

[116] This translates as housing facility camp, comparable to a refugee camp, which was the term used by a social worker I interviewed.

gemütlich gemacht." (Interview, Zumra)

As the remaining refugees managed to move into privately-run apartments, the Senate of Berlin contributed to the near eradication of the remaining collective facilities in Berlin by ending the residence principle of assigning refugee placements in purely collective accommodation facilities (Aumüller 2007).

While frequent moves were taxing on my respondents, in some situations a move to a new facility was a relief, depending on previous conditions. One family that had ongoing problems with fellow neighbors was able to appeal to the sympathy of the responsible authority to finally be relocated after months of struggle. This in turn was accelerated through the advocacy and intervention of an NGO advocate, who pleaded on the family's behalf.

> "Nachdem wir dann Nächtelang vieles gehört haben sozusagen und nicht mehr schlafen konnten, weil es dann in der Nacht wirklich geschrieen, gekämpft oder sonst noch irgendetwas gemacht wurde, haben wir noch mal insistiert, dass wir noch mal umziehen mussten." (Interview, Dubravka)

These and similar excerpts highlight, first, how often the participants had to change their housing accommodations. Secondly, they exemplify the external locus of control prevalent in their housing decisions as well as the inconsistencies and steady changes in policy. Third, they exhibit the poor conditions, lack of hygiene, insufficient conflict mediation and intercultural skills of the accommodation owners and staff members, as well as the general inconsistent conditions of the housing facilities. Fourth, they further signify a common experience addressed in my interviews of the respondents having to learn to ask for what they wanted and needed from the German authorities, emphasizing their dependency on external controls. And finally, they depict the array of challenges my interlocutors encountered in regard to receiving housing and accommodation in Berlin. Clearly, the structural housing constraints in Berlin provoked a sense of disempowerment, which is further confirmed by a supportive service agency: "Eine menschenunwürdige Unterbringung in Gemeinschaftsunterkünften, eine eingeschränkte medizinische Versorgung, unsichere Aufenthaltsbedingungen und das Verbot, sich frei zu bewegen sowie ein abweisendes gesellschaftliches Umfeld, auch in staatlichen Behörden, reproduzieren erneut Ohnmachtserfahrungen." (Mobile Beratung 2010a:1)

Another example confirming the existence of an external locus of control was evident in the mobility restrictions imposed upon my interlocutors in Berlin.

4.4.1.1.6 Mobility Restrictions in Berlin

As a rule, my Berlin interlocutors were forbidden to leave the federal state area to which they were assigned by the Foreigners Office. A travel restriction was imposed upon them with the

residency obligation restriction *(Residenzpflicht)*. If caught travelling outside the assigned area without a permit, it was treated as a criminal offense and punishable with a fine and also recorded in the individual's police file. If caught numerous times, it could be used as grounds for deportation based on *criminal* activity.

One participant recalls a situation in which he knowingly crossed the federal state border to see a friend in Frankfurt. "Eigentlich durfte ich nicht aus Berlin raus fahren; man darf keinen Tritt aus Berlin raus, was für mich ein Problem war… Aber was soll ich jetzt machen? Ich wollte meinen guten Freund besuchen und er war in Frankfurt." (Interview, Slavo) Despite the risk of getting caught, having to pay a fine, or being *criminalized*, many participants, particularly on special occasions like a wedding or birthday, risked crossing a German federal state border to reunite with family and friends. One participant recalls the one time she and her family risked leaving the assigned area to go to Bavaria for a celebration.

> "Wir wussten, dass wir nicht durften, aber mal sich mit der Familie, mit Freunden treffen, war ganz wichtig. Aber im Zug haben sie uns erwischt. Das war eine Ordnungswidrigkeit. Wir durften das nicht. Sie haben gleich nach dem Ausweißen gefragt und sie wussten gleich, dass wir Berlin nicht verlassen durften, weil es in unserem Ausweis stand." (Interview, Zumra)

As a consequence, this participant and her family were charged with a misdemeanor and a fine of 35 Euro per person. Because it was the first time they were caught travelling outside of their assigned area of residence, this was a minimal penalty, but the fee was still high for them.

> "Zum ersten Mal ist das nur eine Ordnungswidrigkeit. Sie haben uns gleich gesagt, es ist nicht so schlimm wenn wir zum ersten Mal erwischt werden, aber trotzdem war es ganz schlimm für uns. Weil wir das Feier dann nicht richtig feiern konnten, weil wir Angst hatten, was passieren würde auf dem Weg zurück nach Berlin. Wir haben auch gedacht, wenn die Ausländerbehörde davon erfährt, dann kriegen wir Probleme! Aber es ist nichts passiert, außer dass wir die Buße bezahlen mussten." (Interview Zumra)

To be eligible for special consideration to leave the designated area, my respondents needed to apply for a permit with well-founded grounds. As residents of the metropolitan city of Berlin, my respondents rarely received exceptional permission to leave the assigned area to attend special appointments, i.e., with doctors, administrative authorities, or for court appearances since all the services expected were available locally.[117] The mobility restrictions were not limited to just within Germany. Several participants relayed how they had applied

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[117] Those in Berlin were more likely denied travel exceptions since most of the services they needed were available in Berlin. Bosnian refugees situated in rural areas were granted special permission more often to leave the assigned area in order to realize appointments with specific doctors who would otherwise not be available in the small town.

for permission to leave the designated area in order to attend funerals of close family members in Bosnia, only to be denied permission.[118]

Overall, the participants perceived the *Residenzpflicht*, limiting their ability to travel freely, as unwarranted and a great inconvenience. The potential risk of being caught and the fear of it resulting in deportation served to curb attempts to leave the assigned area. Consequently, many Bosnians missed the opportunity to unite with friends or family both within Germany and elsewhere, often causing emotional regret and a sense of deep loss.

The restricted access to resources for those with a *Duldung* highlights the significant role of exclusionary policies, which so obviously influences my respondents' ability to actively participate and access strategic resources in society. "Ich konnte nicht nach Bosnien, meine Familie konnte nicht hier hin." (Interview, Irena) This had an impact on the motivation of the refugees to integrate and greatly affected their psychological outlook, which is expanded upon in the next section.

4.4.1.1.7 Health Insurance and Mental Health Treatment in Berlin

According to the Ethno-Medizinisches Zentrum e.V. in Berlin, no insured person in Germany should suffer financial hardship due to illness.

> "The general principle in statutory health insurance is solidarity. The insurance premiums are only commensurate with the income, and do not depend on whether one has a family, is female or male, is old already or perhaps is frequently ill. This means that a person with a higher income will pay more into the health insurance than a person with a lower income. In this system, the young support the old, single people support families, and healthy payers support sick ones. Yet, everybody had a right to the same benefits." (Ethno-Medizinisches Zentrum e.V. 2005: 8-9)

Asylum seekers and tolerated refugees (*defacto* refugees), however, are not normally covered by statutory insurance. Not before at least three years have passed (or their legal status has been recognized) are they eligible for statutory insurance. Generally, once they become recognized refugees, they are entitled to regular medical treatment (Comune di Roma 2004). My Berlin interlocutors, however, were never granted a recognized refugee status. Rather, they were covered according to the Asylum Seekers Benefits Law and, consequently, received only limited medical care. This was distinguished between medical treatment apportioned as a right and medical treatment apportioned as a result of the discretion of the relevant authorities

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[118] Or rather they could have returned but there *Duldung* would have been rescinded of they managed to reenter Berlin again after the funeral.

(Mihok 2001b). Restricted provisionary health insurance was granted, but medical benefits for the Bosnian refugees were limited (Classen 2000).[119]

The provision of medical services to the Bosnian refugees varied in the different federal states, similar to the distribution of social welfare benefits. The relevant authorities determined the applicability for medical benefits in cases for securing health or in order to meet special requirements applicable to children. Some federal states enforced a loose interpretation of the regulations and provided medical care generously, while others, including Berlin, practiced a restrictive interpretation and only offered medical services in critical situations. Treatment of chronic diseases that worsened gradually over time was excluded from emergency coverage. In addition, medical services could be curtailed anytime the authorities saw fit (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001). According to JRS, three criteria of interpretation exist for assuring secure health imperatives referred to in law:

> "(1) when a medical specialist has certified at length and in detail that the medical treatment in question is really necessary; (2) the patient has been provided by the authorities with a residence permit allowing her/him to stay long enough for the treatment to have real positive effect; and (3) there are no cheaper methods of treatment" (Weernink et al. 2007:28).

Considering Germany's intention of reducing the costs of caring for so many Yugoslavian refugees, these three cases emphasize the German government's concern to reduce costs incurred by individuals without recognized residence rights and to avoid the high costs of treatment and administrative procedure incurred by tolerated refugees and asylum seekers. Hence, the Bosnian refugees with a *Duldung* were only eligible to receive medical and dental care in cases of emergency or *acute* pain and illness and only after proof of a need for urgent care had been confirmed.[120] Therapeutic costs were thus covered for those recognized to be suffering with PTSD. In cases of real emergency, though, my respondents said adhering to bureaucratic requirements was difficult. Many consequently refrained initially from or were deterred from seeking medical care.

Under these terms, symptoms of depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) often went undetected, undiagnosed, and untreated. The recognition of psychological ailments among the Bosnian refugees occurred gradually. It often began when perceived physical

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[119] My respondents' right to healthcare was regulated according to the AsylbLG, Articles 4 and 6. This also dictated terms of treatment for children as well as emergency coverage.

[120] Once the Bosnian refugees were able to receive Social Welfare (*Sozialhilfe - SGB XII*) according to § 2 AsylbLG, various limitations in medical treatment were no longer applicable according to §§ 4 and 6 AsylbLG. For acute illnesses and pains, medical and dental treatment incorporates medical supplies, dressing material, and other benefits necessary for convalescence, recovery of illnesses, and latent symptoms (Weernink/Eitzinger/Schöpf 2007).

ailments, such as heart problems or immobility, could not be diagnosed as legitimate physical ailments by medical staff, but were eventually recognized as psychological disorders connected to symptoms of stress related to war traumas. In such cases, psychological stress led to actual or imagined physical ailments. One of my interlocutors, for example, was believed to have heart problems, but after various tests, was eventually diagnosed with depression and PTSD.

> "Dann ging es mir schlecht. Plötzlich steht man auf und hat keine Lust. Das war dann, dass man festgestellt hat, dass bei mir das nicht körperlich ist. Weil ich dachte, mit meinem Herz stimmt was nicht. Man hat festgestellt, dass ich gesund bin. Ja, dann habe ich eine Psychologin gefunden, die meine Muttersprache spricht, weil es so schlimm war. Also in der Muttersprache kann man nicht erklären, was mit dir los ist. Man hat keine Lust mit dem eigenen Sohn zu spielen und für gar nichts. Ich habe monatelang nicht geschlafen, weder nachts, noch am Tag." (Interview, Mirna)

Symptoms of PTSD were sometimes so severe that they caused individuals to become immobile, which is what occurred to the mother of this same interlocutor. Considered one of the leading causes of disability, psychosomatic stress resulted in my respondents' having difficulties concentrating, frequent headaches, stomachaches, and other pains and health problems.

The many language and intercultural barriers that transpired among the medical staff and the patients further negatively impacted the refugees' healthcare treatment. According to Dr. Gün (2009, 2010), in the majority of clinics and hospitals in Germany, with a few exceptions, the somatic, psychiatric and rehabilitation departments were not prepared to address the healthcare needs of patients with *other* cultural and language needs. Language and cultural barriers often impeded the medical case history, diagnosis, therapy and rehabilitation of non-German patients, with the consequences of misdiagnosis, repeated healthcare screenings, renewed hospitalization, and chronic illnesses (Gün 2010:26). In response, some healthcare workers tended to prescribe anti-depressants or other medications rather than address the source of the trauma.

In addition to language barriers, misinterpretations in cultural and gender behaviors, and improper diagnosis of medical conditions hindering my respondents from accessing necessary medical and psychotherapeutic treatment, there was also an insufficient dissemination of information regarding the services available. Critical of the lack of cooperation and communication exchange between the social welfare office and medical support available, the following respondent voiced her frustration.

> "Als die Frau B. diese Gutachten anfertigte und erfahren hat was meinen Vater und meine Mutter und ich erlebt hatten und nie Hilfe bekommen haben, das konnte sie einfach nicht glauben. Man ärgert sich über viele Sachen. Ich habe mich geärgert, zum Beispiel warum

wir die Möglichkeit nicht gehabt haben, zum Beispiel, dass die Sozialämter, die Sozialhilfe geben, dass sie nichts davon wussten von dieser Hilfe für die Leute halt. Wenn eine Zusammenarbeit stattgefunden hätte, dann glaube ich, dass vieles anderes gelaufen wäre." (Interview, Selma)

It is unclear, however, whether it was intentional that the social welfare office worker failed to communicate necessary information regarding healthcare treatment options. This may have been an exceptional case or perhaps purposeful in the effort to reduce the costs of services and mental healthcare treatment, particularly following Dayton.

The medical situation of the traumatized refugees and their history of psychiatric treatment were generally reevaluated by the Foreigners Office as a necessity for the renewal of their *Duldung*. Obtaining expert assessments was nonetheless challenging (Lützel 2006; Interview bzfo). To comply with deportation exemptions, a medical certificate was needed from both a psychiatric professional and a medical doctor, the latter of whom needed to be employed by the authorities in order to provide an official *second opinion*, confirming the evidence of the trauma diagnosis. This certifiable confirmation was necessary as a prerequisite for legitimizing a deportation halt.

In certain cases, effort was made to bring in translators to prevent the children from having to hear and translate the traumatic and often disturbing details of their parents' war experiences (the admission of which eventually became necessary for extended protection in Germany). Specific questions relating to rape, imprisonment, and other traumatic experiences were referred to external psychological professionals, arranged by the Foreigners Office or by doctors conducting the mental health assessments. Translators needed to know, for instance, both German and Bosnian fluently in order to relay symbols and reflect the inner frame of the patient. "Sie muss Sprachbilder aus beiden Kulturkreisen kennen und sinngemäß übersetzen können" (Mobile Beratung 2010c:6). The skills of the translators and ability to gain the patients' trust were deemed essential for both the diagnosis as well as for ongoing therapeutic treatment. Unfortunately, there was often a lack of funding, too many cases, and too little time to meet the needs of all the Bosnian refugees adequately.

Participation in psychosocial therapy was advantageous for my respondents as it helped them to deal emotionally with the day-to-day challenges of adapting. Female and elderly refugees were most likely to seek out mental healthcare treatment. They in turn were most likely to remain in Berlin as a result of their diagnosis of PTSD, since extensions to their *Duldung* were generally granted to those refugees with confirmed psychological ailments due

to the lack of adequate psychological therapy in Bosnia.[121] As long as they could verify that they had been receiving medical treatment for a serious psychiatric illness prior to Jan. 31, 1998, confirmed traumatized refugees in Berlin were generally issued a six-month extension of their *Duldung*. By the spring of 2000, a practice arose to exempt certain more vulnerable Bosnians from immediate repatriation due to reasons of special concern. "Wo man vorher eine Therapie gemacht hat, konnte man nicht nach Bosnien zurückgeschickt werden." (Interview, Irena)

But refugee advocates often criticized the medical screening standards used to assess asylum seekers and refugees as being insufficient. They argued that there was not an adequate reliable and continuous monitoring of the health of asylum seekers living in hostels and assigned accommodation facilities, which tended to exacerbate pre-existing emotional strains (Interviews, bzfo and SOEK). The second opinion procedure, necessary for *Duldung* extensions, was enforced by the State Department for Labor, Social Welfare and Women until May 1998. Thereafter, the Senatorial Administration of Interior Affairs shifted responsibility to the Police Medical Services (PÄD), which was known for its rigid interview and medical examination process. Often the PÄD rejected the first medical assessment that had been made by the more impartial medical professionals. Critics of this process argued that there was a lack of qualified psychiatrists and doctors, recognized by the authorities, who could conduct the assessments, and who had the interests of the refugees at the forefront. Another difficulty was related to gaining the trust of the refugees during these brief assessments and easing their hesitancy to come forth with sufficient details for a proper diagnosis. Additional criticism revolved around the state's interest to deport the Bosnians and the application of the mental health determination procedure as an instrument to sort out the *truly traumatized* from those seemingly misusing the supportive services. Despite the intentions of Eckhardt Werthebach, the Berlin Senator for the Interior, to repatriate all the remaining Bosnian refugees in 1999, this could not be completely carried out (Jäger/Rezo 2000).

Not until the Bosnian refugees were required by the Foreigners Office to undergo the second opinion assessment did one of my participants manage to reveal the details of her trauma and finally be referred to psychotherapy. It is unclear, however, whether she was finally able to open up to the psychotherapist and reveal the details of her war trauma because the psychotherapist was a female or because she was a recognized representative for the Foreigners Office with the power to influence the duration of the refugees' residency rights.

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[121] Despite the flaws, at least there was psychological therapy in Berlin, as opposed to Bosnia. According to § 53, Abs. 6 of the Aliens Act (AuslG) (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer 2000).

Communicating about emotionally laden topics and providing enough details that could lead to a deportation halt was difficult. Knowing that the psychologist could determine her ability to remain in Berlin may have caused my respondent to be more forthright in disclosing the details of her war traumas. The frequency of PTSD symptoms observed among my respondents was particularly important as the difficulties related to their displacement from Bosnia and the adjustment process in Berlin tended to exacerbate PTSD symptoms (Molina et al. 2001; Tata Arcel et al. 1995; Lopez Cardozo et al. 2000).

The next section addresses the challenges related to educational access.

4.4.1.1.8 Educational Immersion in Berlin

Because education falls under the authority of the federal states and each federal state in turn is responsible for determining standards of quality for education, discrepancies in school programming and access prevail(ed) throughout Germany. Regulations on accessing school vary from federal state to federal state, and secondly, the resident status of an individual greatly influences his/her ability to access schooling or vocational training. This is attributed to the specific laws affecting the rights of migrants and refugees as far as entering the German public school system. Although school in Berlin is theoretically compulsory for children and youth up to the tenth grade (in accordance with the compulsory duty to attend school (*Schulpflicht*),[122] those with an uncertain resident status tend to encounter greater complications in accessing the regular school system.

As newcomers to Germany, the Bosnian children eligible to enter school were expected to learn the German language as fast as possible. Initial assistance in the form of special German language courses was available in all subjects to help those eligible to access the school system. Children were able to access the educational system, job training programs, and language assistance courses as part of the school preparation as long as they were under the age of 16 at the time. One of my participants explains:

> "Ich kenne auch ganz viele Leute, die zum Beispiel mit 18 oder 19 hierher gekommen sind und für die ist es blöd gelaufen, weil sie halt diese Duldung hatten und überhaupt in keine Schule gehen konnten, und keine Ausbildung machen konnten. Ich kenne jemand, der erst jetzt eine Aufenthaltserlaubnis bekommen hat, obwohl er seit 1994 in Berlin lebt. Und jetzt ist er 30 Jahre alt und das ist so blöd, weil er jetzt keine Ausbildung hat. In Bosnien hat er keine Schule zu Ende machen können und hier keine Schule besuchen dürfen. Also, was soll er jetzt machen?!" (Interview, Selma, Interview was in 2003)

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[122] Compulsory duty to attend school (Art. 7 Abs. 1 & 2 GG); Schulgesetz für das Land Berlin (Schulgesetz – SchulG (§42 Berliner SchulG)) vom 26. Januar 2004 (GVBl. S. 26), zuletzt geändert durch Artikel I des Gesetzes vom 2. März 2009 (GVBl. S. 62) (Senatsverwaltung für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung Homepage).

Essentially, those younger than age 16 were allowed access in accordance with the *Schulpflicht*; those older, however, were denied access. Hence, the Bosnian refugees' ability to access the school system depended largely on their age upon arrival in Berlin. One participant recalls how this policy affected him and his older brother disproportionately due to a mere three-year age difference between the two.

> "Mein Bruder war schon 16 glaube ich als wir nach Deutschland gekommen sind und der fiel nicht mehr unter die Schulpflicht und der wollte zur Schule gehen, aber man hat gesagt: 'Nee, man darf nur zur Schule gehen wenn man unter 16 ist.' Und man hat ihm den Schulzugang verwehrt. Der konnte hier nicht zur Schule gehen. Später hatte er, 97 glaube ich, so eine schulische Weiterbildung für Tischler gemacht und so ganz normale Kurse, aber jetzt irgendwie die keine besondere Anerkennung haben. Das hat er ein Jahr gemacht und dann 98 als diese ganze Abschieberei begann, so richtig, und keine Verlängerung der Duldung, da ist er freiwillig zurückgekehrt." (Interview, Mere)

While my interlocutor completed his schooling and went on to study law in Berlin, his three-year-older brother was denied access to school and German language classes and further prevented from pursuing a higher education. Such hurdles in accessing the educational system proved to have long-term effects on the goals of the young Bosnian refugees denied access. It further increased German language deficiencies through the denial to access formalized German classes.

Accessing education in regular schools was also mired for the Bosnian refugees suffering from physical and psychological issues related to their experiences in the war and resettlement. Because the regular German schools generally did not have special personnel to manage *extraordinary* cases, a frequent alternative was for Bosnian children to attend special courses at various social institutions or to attend classes at *special* schools, the latter of which usually aimed to meet the needs of children with obvious learning deficiencies. In this case, the psychological challenges of the Bosnian youth were deemed *extraordinary*, excusing the structural discrimination they experienced through lack of formalized psychological support as well as reducing their educational opportunities by placing them far beneath their intellectual capabilities.

Another problem affecting their ability to access education is related to segregated residency areas. In the areas in which a high percentage of foreigners live, the reputation and quality of teaching standards in the grammar schools have often been criticized as being poorer in comparison to schools in which fewer or no migrants are placed. With the implementation of new measures to combat these structural differences, the previously known *more troubled* schools have improved remarkably, yet the negative associations and stigmatization continue to linger.

Germany's hierarchical educational sorting process often steered tolerated refugees in the lowest of the school paths. As they become more knowledgeable of their legal rights, my respondents also became more forthright in making demands, particularly when teachers conveyed that due to their tolerated refugee status they were unlikely candidates for higher education. Attending a university in Germany with the *Duldung* status was theoretically possible as long as the standard requirements were met, which included proficient German knowledge, acceptance at one of the universities, health insurance and sufficient financial resources to cover the expense of living and studying. This meant, however, that individuals receiving social welfare benefits were unable to attend university, which effectively excluded all newly arriving refugees from pursuing university studies during this initial reception phase.

Once their legal status changed from a *Duldung* to an *Aufenthaltserlaubnis*, the refugees were finally able to participate in vocational training programs, apprenticeship posts, and in special job-creation or qualification measures, targeting individuals who previously had a *Duldung*.[123] With legal changes allowing for temporary residence permits, my interlocutors commented on the new freedoms associated with this. "Es ist ganz wichtig, dass die Kinder jetzt Ausbildungen machen können. Bis jetzt war das nicht der Fall. Man kann jetzt arbeiten. Alles [ist jetzt] komplett anderes." (Interview, Zumra) With the *Bleiberechtsregelung*, access to education became dependent on securing a more permanent residential status and the issuance of the *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* signified permission to pursue training programs. Hence, with time, the educational immersion of the Bosnian refugees became somewhat more accessible.

Yet, the costs attributed with pursuing a higher education marked an additional challenge, as there were no subsidies available for learning materials or travel costs. Young Bosnians with a tolerated resident status were ineligible to receive federally regulated student loans based on the Federal Training Assistance Act (*Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz - BAföG*). Since eligibility for BAföG had long been dependent on the income of the children's parents, the children of tolerated refugees, who were unable to access the labor market and hence were lacking a viable income on which to measure the student loan eligibility, were effectively denied this assisted funding.

> "Das Geld reicht nicht. Die zwei Kinder, die immer noch zu Schule gehen, kriegen gar nichts vom Staat. Das müssen wir selber zahlen. Wir haben die Aufenthaltserlaubnis nach den Paragraphen 23 gekriegt. In September ist es zu einer neuen Regelung gekommen,

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[123] One such measure was the program devised to train women with a migrant background to become *city district mothers*.

oder neu Gesetzt weiß ich nicht, dass die Jugendliche, die eine schulische Ausbildung machen und Aufenthaltserlaubnis nach den Paragraph 23 haben, gar nichts vom Staat kriegen. Gar nichts. Nicht mal BAföG, nicht mal vom Jobcenter. Nur Kindergeld von der Familienkasse. Sie werden Kindergeld in Wert von 150 Euro kriegen." (Interview Zumra)

According to the rules of BAföG, parents were required by law to fund their children's education, but parents of low-income families (or those denied access to the labor market) could not meet such obligations. Only in the last few years have changes in BAföG regulations been made that have softened these regulations, making it easier for children with temporary suspension of deportation to be eligible to take advantage of these loans (Federal Ministry for Education and Research Homepage).

In practice, acquiring permission and access to higher education was granted more readily when an applicant had a resident title for exceptional purposes (*Aufenthaltsbefugnis)*. The decision was generally left to the discretion of the Foreigners Office and the particular mindset and capabilities of the specific Foreigners Office worker assigned to determine an individual's case.

"Ich kenne zum Beispiel auch eine junge Frau, die 'schwarz' - also was heißt 'schwarz'? - studiert hat. An der Uni haben sie keinen Ausweis verlangt. Ganz komisch. Sie ließ sich anmelden und zwar durch den Sachbearbeiter, der es wahrscheinlich irgendwie verpatzt hat. Und so meinte sie, sie versucht es einfach mit der Duldung und mal gucken was er mir sagt. Da ging sie zum Ausländeramt und der hat gar nicht gefragt! Da waren ihre Unterlagen und sie wurde angenommen. Sie hatte studiert. Sie hatte so vier, fünf Jahre glaube ich Wirtschaft, ich weiß nicht was, studiert und dann hat sie also hinterher die Aufenthaltserlaubnis bekommen und alles ist so gelaufen." (Interview, Selma)

Whether the Foreigners Office worker purposely avoided asking for this woman's ID is unclear. A contrast is presented in the subsequent excerpt, which highlights potentially different outcomes depending on which Foreigners Office authority handled the case.

"Bei mir hat das nicht geklappt. Ich durfte nicht studieren, weil ich eine so genannte Duldung hatte obwohl ich die Voraussetzungen dafür erfüllt hatte. In dieser Duldung steht drin, dass man nicht arbeiten kann und auch nicht studieren darf. Da ich an der Uni angenommen worden bin, habe ich immer wieder Anträge gestellt, und war tausendmal bei dieser Ausländerbehörde. Es war so schlimm! Ich habe immer gebeten und gesagt: 'Bitte, bitte die sollen mir das nur streichen. Ich möchte keine Aufenthaltserlaubnis haben, nur dass sie mir aus dieser Duldung streichen, so dass ich studieren darf. Ich werde auch arbeiten, ich werde um mich selbst sorgen, nicht vom Staat leben, sie brauchen gar nichts für mich zu tun!' Sie haben es mir aber immer abgelehnt und mir wurde auch mal gesagt: 'Ja, in Sarajevo kann man auch studieren.' Als ich immer wieder bei der Ausländerbehörde war, um zu bitten, dass sie mir das [mit dem Studiumverbot] einfach aus der Duldung streichen ärgertete ich mich so, weil das ist ja so krank wenn jemand zu Schule gehen will, aber nicht darf. Hier sollte die Demokratie so wichtig sein und so schön dargestellt." (Interview, Selma)

While one Bosnian refugee is permitted access to the university with no questions asked, another one, desperate to study, is denied access with no explanations or consistency in the

ruling. For the person denied access to the higher education system, her sense of injustice is great. These variances in experiences exemplify the paradoxical regulations and restrictions applied by the Foreigners Office to those with a *Duldung* status. This is further evident in the final outcome, determined by yet another Foreigners Office staff member, in regard to my interlocutor's goal of studying in Berlin.

> "Ich musste dort hingehen [zum Ausländerbehörde], um mein Pass abzuholen und da meinte die Sachbearbeiterin: 'Warum studieren Sie nicht?' Und dann habe ich zu ihr gesagt: 'Ja, weil ich nicht darf.' Und dann meinte sie so: 'Sie haben aber schon Ihren Abi.' Und ich meinte: 'Ja, ja, ich habe Abi, ich bin auch schon an einer Universität angenommen worden, aber ich darf nicht studieren.' Und dann meinte sie: 'Aber wer sagt Ihnen so was bitte?' Und ich meinte: 'So, ja, Ihre Kollegin.' Das konnte sie selbst nicht begreifen. Das war krank. Ich weiß nicht, was anders fehlt mir nicht ein. Es war krank." (Interview, Selma)

My participant continues by describing how integral this second administrative worker was in assisting her to alter her status in order to attend university in Berlin and hence to complete all the necessary bureaucratic steps so that she could promptly start her studies in the forthcoming semester.[124] This highlights that not all of the Foreigners Office employees were keen on *mistreating* or causing hardship to the Bosnian refugees but rather, some were even helpful and kind. This is an important distinction in contrast with the many examples of rude treatment and interrogation-like scare tactics employed by the Foreigners Office staff. Despite this positive example, the overwhelming response among my interview respondents was that interactions with the Foreigners Office were difficult.

Issues surrounding educational immersion became quite contested as well at the time German authorities began enforcing *voluntary* repatriation. Generally, those over 16 years of age, unable to attend schooling in Berlin, and whose schooling in Bosnia was interrupted as a result of the war, were generally targeted for repatriation. After much criticism from refugee advocates, the Berlin Senate announced its intention in 1995 to improve the educational opportunities available to Bosnian refugees in Berlin. This came following the court ruling regarding Ismail Kosan - in which young Bosnian refugees were granted eligibility to participate in vocational training programs as long as they could verify that they had been offered an apprenticeship or trainee position.[125] Their enrollment in training programs saved a number of Bosnian refugees from immediate repatriation. In cases in which family members received deportation orders, young Bosnians were permitted to remain in Berlin until they

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[124] Here, it was unclear whether the two employees were based at the different Foreigners Offices or if they just had different approaches to treating the Foreigners in need of their services. Either way, this excerpt clearly depicts the inconsistent responses of the Foreigners Office employees.
[125] cf. Kl. Anfrage Nr. 7174 Ismail Kosan on Oct. 18, 1995 (Blaschke/Sabanovic 2001).

completed their job training as long as they adhered to the following conditions: they had to have been in their final or second to last year of training prior to January 1996; and they needed to be financially independent, i.e. they were not permitted to claim social welfare benefits (cf. Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer 2000).[126]

The next obstacle is reflected in the lack of formal language learning in Berlin.

4.4.1.1.9 Lack of Formal Language Learning in Berlin

Among my sample, only one interlocutor had learned a bit of German prior to her arrival in Berlin. Due to the general premise that the Bosnian refugees would not remain long in Germany, only temporarily, few encouraging efforts promoting their long-term integration were enforced initially by the state. Consequently, there were no instrumental state-run strategies carried out as part of the initial reception conditions to foster the adult-age Bosnians' German language proficiency.

German language classes were available, however, to school-age refugee children as a prerequisite for attending primary school.[127] Special language classes were offered, usually lasting up to two years, which is not to be confused with the special education schools. Consideration of this two-year time estimate for German language courses in addition to age were calculated in the determination and placement process of the young refugees in the regular school system. Several of the younger participants admitted that learning German had been relatively easy for them due to the structured, intensive language classes offered as part of their school curriculum. "Ich hab's [die deutsche Sprache] sehr schnell gelernt. Ich glaube in vier Monaten konnte ich schon sehr gut deutsch sprechen und dann gewöhnt man sich langsam dran." (Interview, Adin)

The youth who were able to participate in the German school system revealed that it served greatly in easing their transition in German society, as it not only enabled their access to the educational system, but it also taught them the unspoken rules of how to *behave* and interact within the host society. Teachers played a key role in molding the pupils, which became particularly significant for younger refugees living in Berlin, unaccompanied by their parents.

> "Ich hatte gute Lehrer gehabt. Die haben gute Ratschläge erteilt. Das war gut. Also, sie kannten alle meine Situation, woher ich komme, sie wussten alle Bescheid und die haben mich so mit erzogen, weil ich hier ohne meine Mutter war. Sie kam 94 erst nach Berlin

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[126] The older brother of one of my participants benefited from this. Having been denied access to the normal school system, he was eventually permitted access to a carpentry-training program in Berlin in 1997. One year later he decided to return to Bosnia voluntarily in pursuit of better career options there.
[127] This was applicable for children younger than 16 years old. Those older were deemed *too old* to attend.

und deswegen also. Ich hatte ziemliches Glück…" (Interview, Mere)

Because the children learned the language faster than the adult refugees, children proficient in German inadvertently became translators for their parents or their parents' friends. One participant admitted, "Ich muss alles übersetzen, weil meine Eltern deutsch leider nicht sprechen. Also mein Vater ist ganz schlimm, bei meiner Mutter geht's nur einigermaßen." (Interview, Selma) Since their arrival in Berlin, the refugee children were relied upon to communicate on behalf of adult relatives, particularly at important appointments with local authorities, for instance, at the Foreigners Office, Social Welfare Office or at doctor appointments.

> "Das war schwierig mal zum Arzt zu gehen. Ohne Deutsch ging das gar nicht. Man musste immer jemanden mitnehmen, beten ob er mitkommt, und immer so… Mein Onkel hatte zwei größere Söhne und weil sie neun oder acht Monate vor uns hier gekommen sind, konnten die Kinder schon ein bisschen Deutsch, sie gingen hier auch zur Schule. Sie sind nur zwei oder dreimal freiwillig mit mir gegangen, und dann reichte es ihnen." (Interview, Zumra)

Translating for their parents or others unable to speak German was deemed by all my young interlocutors as a given, as a task considered to be part of their upbringing as war refugees in Berlin. Though many would have preferred to play or do other things with their time, they typically acquiesced to their parents' or other relatives' pleas for help. Accepting this responsibility was "ganz normal. Es gehört dazu halt." (Interview, Mere) As such, every time their parents or adult family friends required German communication - whether at the Social Welfare or Foreigners Office, grocery shopping or riding the bus - the school-age children were automatically positioned as translators.

> "Wenn wir zur Behörden gehen mussten und meine Mutter oder mein Vater was nicht verstanden haben, habe ich's gehört und ihnen dann gesagt. Das war jetzt nicht so, dass meine Mutter gesagt hat, übersetzt für uns. Das war eher durch Zufall dass ich das gehört habe und dass denen erklärt habe. Oder als wir im Laden waren oder wo wir was einkaufen waren oder sonst was, da war ich halt derjenige der es verstanden hat." (Interview, Adin)

German language proficiency was necessary for everyday survival in Berlin, as one social worker I interviewed confirmed, "in einer Deutschen Behörde wird deutsch gesprochen." (Interview, Publicata) Although my informants recognized the significance of learning and speaking German in order to interact with members of the host society and to fit in, few adult-age refugees had been encouraged to learn German in formalized classes and thus struggled in learning the language.

> "Er [my brother] war auch in Deutschland, auch in Berlin. Jedes Problem was ich hatte, als ich die Wohnung suchte oder mit den Kindern in die Schule ginge, war mein Bruder meinen Dolmetscher. Und dann einmal hat er gesagt: 'Ich gehe nicht mehr. Jetzt musst du

Deutsch lernen.' Wieso weiß ich nicht. Er hat gesagt: 'Du hast alles vergessen. Du musst jetzt alleine hin, deine Kinder sprechen kein Deutsch, deinen Mann spricht kein Deutsch, also, musst Du." (Interview, Dubravka)

Initially, there were not any formalized language classes offered by the authorities to the adult-age refugees in Berlin. Changes in policy with the new Immigration Act, however, introduced formalized German language courses in 2005, around ten years after the Bosnians' arrived to Germany. Yet, tolerated refugees were not awarded the right to take part for free in the newly developed integration or language classes. This is due to the fact that recipients of unemployment benefits (ALG II) were no longer eligible for a permanent residency authorization due to Germany's stance that "Wer in Deutschland leben darf muss auch für seinen Lebensunterhalt sorgen können."[128] As a result, persons with a *Duldung* were required to finance the German language courses and travel costs to these courses themselves. Several refugee advocacy agencies, such as the Südost Europa Kultur e.V. (SOEK) managed to circumvent such costs for the tolerated refugees by becoming a supporting organization, recognized and partly funded by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) to implement German integrations courses.[129] According to a social worker I interviewed (Interview, Publicata), women in particular tended to pursue German language classes offered by organizations or through other informal structures. Despite this assistance, speaking and understanding German remained an ongoing challenge for many. Generally, the elderly only managed to learn phrases and expressions, communicating largely in broken German.

Nevertheless, the above excerpt alludes to the uncomfortable position the Bosnian refugees encountered in Berlin. They were expected to complete tasks essential for their transition, yet they lacked the language skills necessary to carry out tasks on their own. One participant explained how difficult her transition was as a result. "[Es war] schlecht, ganz schlecht am Anfang. Wenn man kommt, man kennt keinen, man kann nicht selbst einkaufen gehen, man kann kein Wort Deutsch, die Kinder müssen eingeschult werden. Katastrophe!" (Interview, Zumra)

Generally this created a state of dependency and caused a sense of disempowerment as a result of their scarce German language skills. As the political situation became more restrictive, their language deficiencies became politicized in public debates, especially as it became increasingly clear that a number of refugees, based on exceptional humanitarian grounds, would not be returned immediately to Bosnia. The Bosnian refugees were criticized

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[128] Translation: Whoever lives in Germany needs to be financially self-sufficient.
[129] Anyone with an *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* was permitted access to participate in the integration courses offered at the SOEK. Those receiving social welfare (SGB XII - Sozialhilfe) and unemployment benefits (SGB II - Arbeitslosengeld II) were permitted to participate for free.

for not having made more of an effort to integrate in Berlin, i.e. for failing to have learned German. One refugee advocate I interviewed admitted, "The most many were able to achieve was only learning the first level of German and doing little more beyond this" (Interview, Südost Europa Zentrum). Language issues, including proficiency and use, arise in conjunction with intercultural living. "Which languages are learned, and which are used in which kinds of interactions, are all decisions that are made daily, particularly by those in immigrant groups." (Berry et al. 2006:11) In this regard, it is important to consider the contradiction in expecting the Bosnian refugees to speak German despite failing to provide standardized language classes for them to learn the language. The impacts of this are discussed later in this study as it led to the sample distancing themselves from the mainstream society.

The following section switches focus from the external locus of control in Berlin, resulting in a sense of disempowerment for my sample, to the more pervasive internal locus of control evident in Chicago, which created challenges for my sample in making decisions and having to deal with so much freedom.

4.4.1.2 Internal Locus of Control in Chicago

Evidence of an external locus of control was less abrasive for my Chicago sample than for those in Berlin since the institutional constraints and governing policies in Chicago allowed more individual freedoms. That is not to say that there was no external locus of control in Chicago, but my interlocutors struggled more with the many freedoms afforded them.

My Chicago interlocutors were frequently confronted with difficulties related to an internal locus of control and freedom in *decision-making*. A refugee worker I interviewed recalled an example she had experienced with a Bosnian, challenged by the unaccustomed freedom of making decisions.

> "I remember when a refugee wanted to know who he had to bribe to get a job and he got mad at me because I wouldn't tell him. Because he thought maybe he needed to bribe me first so I would tell him whom he needed to bribe for a job. I was trying to explain to him it doesn't work that way. Here, you have to go get the job. He thought I was lying, you know. There are just some people who are like 'wow, I get to be whatever I want? Are you kidding, this is amazing!'" (Interview, World Relief Chicago)

This excerpt emphasizes the internal locus of control expected of newcomers in the US. For some refugees, having the freedom to choose their field of work and actively seek a position could be intimidating, especially when there were many options from which to choose. Others interpreted this as an *amazing opportunity* that not every country offers refugees. "Freedom means no government official or anyone else interfering, telling me which job to take or where to live." (Morre Pappé 1999:139) If personal freedom entails the ability to design a

satisfying life for oneself and one's family, real opportunities must be available then to achieve satisfying jobs that pay enough to support one's family, housing, affordable medical care, and so forth (cf. Morre Pappé 1999). Many from my Chicago sample had - before their arrival – high expectations of the US relative to the *opportunities* available. With a base of economic freedom, individuals are expected to think independently, thus making economic security indispensable to freedom. The next section addresses the obstacles my Chicago sample encountered in regard to their internal locus of control relative to the inner city school system, language acquisition, health insurance payments, mental healthcare treatment, as well as money, credit, debt and welfare.

4.4.1.2.1 Educational Immersion in Chicago

While access to education was unlimited in Chicago, other obstacles emerged in the inner city educational system that made the adaptation of the Bosnian youth particularly difficult, which was reflective of both an internal and external locus of control. Despite the educational opportunities available in the US, especially for children and youth, various issues arose in the interviews that highlighted the challenges accompanied with participating in the public school system. First, the student body at low-performing US schools tends to be particularly diverse, resulting in the Bosnian youths' culture shock and apprehension adjusting to the diversity and levels of violence in the inner-city schools. According to a National Public Radio (NPR) report, all of the students at Shoop Elementary School at the time of the broadcast were black and more than 90 percent of them were low income and qualified for free or reduced-price meals (Schaper 2007). At Senn High School, the student body consisted of kids from 78 nations, while Roosevelt High School had kids from 35 to 40 nations (Interview, ORR). Amundson High School is considered a troubled urban school, on probation under the No Child Left Behind Act, and attended by mostly Hispanic and some African-American students. The Chicago public schools enabled many Bosnians the first chance to interact with African-Americans, which added to their sense of *culture shock*. Racist notions or *white flight* were sometimes the outcome.

Beyond differences in ethnicities, the schools caused the refugees further distress due to metal detectors located at the school entrances (intended to prevent students from bringing guns, knives and weapons to the classes). Drugs, gangs, violence and criminality were common. Some participants mentioned fearing for their lives in the Chicago school setting. One participant said, "Getting caught up with a bad crowd was easy, avoiding trouble at the schools proved to be more difficult." (Interview, Valten) This indicates challenges with an

internal locus of control, as well as a failure of the schools to create democratic classrooms and teach the youth how to intervene and challenge unjust conditions.

From the point of view of policies, there was a lack of support, structure, and resources made available to the Bosnians for their integration into the school system. Despite student caps, many schools were confronted with rising enrollments, overcrowding, classrooms bursting with students, cramped quarters, and classes conducted in the auditorium. Public school staff members were commonly expected not only to teach the kids, but to also be part disciplinarian, social worker, procurement officer, nurse, human resources officer, cafeteria manager, and registrar (Allee 2006). All of this made the school experience more challenging and caused the children's education to suffer (Interview, Dr. Weine).

With the provisions of the No Child Left Behind Act, passed under the Bush Administration in January of 2002, the operations of Chicago Public Schools changed significantly.[130] Parents of children attending low-performing schools were offered the option to transfer their children to better-performing schools. With the intention of promoting *educational choice* and providing *quality options* for all students regardless of ethnicity and economic background, parents became emboldened to participate in their children's education options (NCLB Homepage). By enabling children to be bused to better-performing schools outside their neighborhood, many low-performing schools were shut down or became even more troubled as the higher achiever students left. *Voluntary* choice was offered in Chicago to all students and roughly a third transferred to non-neighborhood schools, including magnet schools and gifted centers (NCLB Homepage). While the Bush Administration anticipated that schools be made more accountable with the provisions of the NCLB to improve student achievement, the law inadvertently resulted in overcrowding in some schools, and even lower-performance in the already *low-performing* schools.

Many schools, like Shoop Elementary and Amundson High School have been on academic probation for years for not meeting the adequate yearly progress under the federal

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[130] The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act is a good example of neoliberal education policy. The proliferation of standardized examinations led already underfunded schools, teachers and youth, especially those of color and from the working class and migrants families to failure. Schools unable to achieve high enough marks on these one-size-fits-all assessment strategies were confronted with reduction in governmental funding and often became open to private firms or other school-choice, corporate-driven initiatives, such as vouchers and charter schools. This forced many desperate school districts to turn to corporate sponsors for resources with the implication of influencing everything from lunch programs, classroom curricula, to the building of schools. It cemented the values of the market within K–12 education (Porfilio 2007). This is deemed specifically neoliberal because it preaches the discourse of free-market supremacy, yet adheres to practices of big government intervention in favor of big business, which also affects the teacher-education programs (Ibid).

No Child Left Behind Act.[131] Greater pressures were placed on teachers accompanied by fewer resources and funding. Student behavioral problems, violence, gang and drug activity emerged in many of the 641 schools in Chicago's system (Schaper 2007). As a consequence, the Bosnian youth were confronted with the challenge of having to decide to excel in school despite structural problems or to become negatively influenced by these surroundings as a result. Decisions needed to be made to apply oneself, participate in ESL classes and learn the English language or not.

In addition, the Bosnian youth in Chicago were confronted with identity conflicts, adaptation challenges particularly attributed to the inner-city high school they attended, as well as doubts with regard to family loyalties. "In each of these cases, adolescents are faced with decisions as to the extent to which they retain the values and behaviors of their family and community and adopt those of the larger society." (Berry et al. 2006:9) The Bosnian youth were consequently faced with some tough choices, particularly as difficulties mounted in their school adjustment.

> "Adolescents acquire within the family the adaptive patterns of behaviour, personal characteristics, values, and social responses expected of them in their heritage culture. Once the family has migrated, parents cannot rely on the new society to assist in the cultural transmission of their own groups' values. Rather, adolescents are increasingly exposed to the values of their new society through peers and schooling." (Ibid)

Through his work with the Bosnian community, and in particular, based on his ethnographic research conducted at Amundson High School, where a majority of Bosnian children were placed, one researcher, who wishes to remain anonymous, observed grave deficiencies at many of the Chicago public schools, despite the good intentions of all involved. Seeing an "opportunity to bring in some smart, white kids" to this school, large numbers of Bosnian children were placed at Amundson following their arrival to Chicago. By the time a crisis erupted, the children were often too entrenched in bad habits to break out of that mold. "They became Americanized very quickly, in the worst possible way, and their parents were oblivious to what was going on." (Interview, anonymous) As a result, many Bosnian youth ended up going to jail or being deported.[132] The refugees, balancing precariously on the edge of society's standard for success often fell into the pit of *failure*. Those in the middle and the ones on the bottom typically drifted further downward. The lack of teachers, educational support, and guidance, in addition to the general lack of understanding regarding what the

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[131] When a school is on academic probation, the instructional school leader is responsible for raising its school test scores by 10 percentage points across the board, or face increased sanctions under the provisions of the NCLB, usually meaning further reductions in funding and resources.
[132] None of the youth I interviewed in my sample went to jail or were deported, yet, this topic surfaced in most of my interviews as this phenomenon impacted the siblings, friends or children of my interview participants.

Bosnian families and their children needed emotionally and otherwise for their integration into the Chicago public school system, contributed to the misguided paths of many Bosnian youth. According to one researcher, this marks one main default in the Chicago refugee reception program as it adversely affected the Bosnian youth's future perspectives. There was little option or leeway for the schools to offer the newly arriving refugee kids a positive experience. In the end, this situation effectively resulted in the Bosnian youth deciding between two paths: those who succeeded - referred to as the *stars* - and those who got *lost* along the way.

The *stars* were those who pushed themselves, worked hard to be exemplary students, made vast effort to stay out of trouble, and commonly sought out a mentor or an adult contact person or other networks of support. Those who excelled in high school tended to acquire partial scholarships or financial grants covering or partially covering their university tuition fees.[133] One of my interlocutors, for instance, even received a full scholarship to pursue his PhD. The second group, in contrast, became *lost* and strayed from the model behavior exhibited by the *stars*. This group often got caught up in criminal activity, *deviant* behavior, and got mixed up with gangs and drugs, which typically led to greater family tensions. In seeking acceptance from their peers, they became more American than the Americans (Interview, ORR). Implications on their adaptation process were evident by the choices they made. This also influenced their English language acquisition in Chicago. An example of this is covered in the next section.

4.4.1.2.2 Challenges with Language Acquisition in Chicago

Refugees in Chicago were encouraged to move quickly through the different language levels in order for them to secure and maintain employment. Assuming they were not taking language classes within the formal school setting, many as a result, went part-days to ESL classes and worked the other half of the day. One of my respondents was critical of the resettlement agency and its accelerated process of teaching adult-age ESL classes since she was rushed through several language levels despite her inability to formulate an English sentence. She explained how the refugees were given multiple-choice tests to assess their English knowledge. With this, they could choose an answer from four possibilities. An individual could score high by guessing well, which is what happened to her. She had scored a 98 percent on her placement test, though she had never learned or spoken English before,

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[133] Neoliberal policies and practices are further evident in the US higher education system with the creation of hyper-corporate universities that are characterized by grants, business partnerships, profit, and learning outcomes (Porfilio 2007).

and advanced to the fourth level ESL class despite her inability to communicate. Not until much later did she come to understand the contentious situation for the resettlement agencies in providing ESL classes and assisting refugees in job placements.

The government funding distribution, used to cover the costs of the refugee agency, was contingent on the refugees' participation and successful completion of both the English courses and employment counseling. Quickly moving refugees through ESL classes was a necessity before being placed in a job, and both steps needed to take place within the initial welcoming phase of eight months.

> "All this language pushing, well, there are certain funds that are paid out to an agency. For example, every person that they find a job for or report that they did, they [the resettlement agency] get[s] a certain amount of money [from the government]. Now they cannot look for a job for anybody until you reach fourth or fifth [ESL] level and that's probably why they very speedily moved you through the system. And you know it makes sense. Everything makes sense now because I know what funds resettlement agencies have. Not much, you know? So now in order to help somebody else, they helped you speed it up. That's how it is." (Interview, Zina)

For newly arriving refugees, this process was stressful, but it was a necessary procedure for the refugee resettlement agencies to cover the costs of the funding allotment. For this participant, it was easier to forgive the pressure the reception agency workers exerted on her once she understood the pressures under which they were forced to work due to the limited government funding granted the agencies for each new refugee. She made the best of her situation and learned English. Not all of my respondents were in a position to consciously *decide* to learn the receiving society language, however. Many were limited due to age, literacy or mental health challenges.

4.4.1.2.3 Mental Health Insurance and Treatment in Chicago

Two main issues on the topic of insurance and healthcare support emerged as obstacles for my Chicago sample. One issue was related to the government authorities' response to the Bosnians' mental healthcare needs, particularly related to PTSD and trauma-related symptoms. The second issue revolved around the health insurance benefits and concern among the Bosnians of becoming sick and penniless.

One obstacle that emerged was the mental needs related to the brutal and very immediate violence encountered during the war and the authorities' response to the Bosnians' high levels of posttraumatic stress disorder. The mental health workers in Chicago struggled with the challenge of response: first, in comprehending how rape and genocide were used as tactics during the Bosnian war; and secondly, in knowing how best to respond and provide appropriate mental healthcare interventions and services to this particular refugee group

(Interviews, World Relief Chicago and Dr. Weine). For the agencies active in providing mental health services to refugees, this was seen as an opportunity for developing innovative new programs to deal with the refugees in serious need of mental health services.

Having recognized the gap between the PTSD approach to Bosnian refugees and the lived experiences of their refugee families, Dr. Stevan Weine and other American and Bosnian mental health researchers in Chicago established a service intervention in 1998 called CAFES (Coffee and Family Education and Support). The aim was to establish an approach for assisting Bosnian refugees to treat family-oriented behaviors and cultures rather than clinical trauma mental health approaches were apt to do. Through their work, they observed that family members tended to perceive the consequences of violence through the lens of the family (Weine et al. 1997), which they argued was not surprising considering that family life signifies the core of Bosnian culture (Weine 1999). Researchers believed that family life marked the most important remaining social institution for the Bosnian refugees following all the losses accompanied with the war (Weine et al. 2004).

As a result of this need, the refugee mental health program in Chicago quadrupled in order to respond to the Bosnians' experiences with atrocities endured as a result of the war and ethnic genocide. According to the chief of the Illinois Department of Human Service's Bureau of Refugee and Immigrant Services, Illinois was fortunate to have had resources to remodel the mental health program in response to the Bosnians' mental health needs. This marked the high point of Illinois funding for refugee mental health, reaching about $1.3 million at the time (Interview, ORR).[134] The sum for refugee mental health has since decreased to about $600,000, in part because the Bosnian population is now beyond eligibility for refugee specific services (Interview, ORR). All the refugees were limited to a five-year eligibility period in which they were able to access mental health treatment immediately after their arrival in the US. Initially, the majority of Bosnian refugees were too busy adjusting (learning English, finding work, completing school, having previous degrees recognized, etc.) during the first five years of their residency to take advantage of these mental health services. Often only those with obvious symptoms of PTSD, or who were elderly and unable to procure employment were transferred to disability income, and those having grave difficulties coping with the adjustment process, sought out these services (Interviews, World Relief Chicago and

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[134] The mental health funding for refugees from Rwanda and Darfur was not raised to the extent it was for the Bosnian population. When confronted with this inconsistency, State Department Refugee Resettlement Coordinator, Dr. Silverman admitted that there was a difference in policy in this matter. He said, [this is] "complicated by the fact that there is no African cultural experience with the provision of mental health service." Another expert raised the same point about the Bosnian refugees (see World Relief interview) as far as the Bosnians not having a tradition of western style therapeutic situations.

Dr. Weine). After the five-year eligibility period, anyone interested in receiving mental health treatment had to cover the expenses themselves, which like medical care treatment also tends to be exorbitant.

This leads to the next point, namely that health insurance was not a certainty for my Chicago respondents. During the initial eight months, healthcare was part of the package of support, which continued for those receiving disability or welfare support. Those individuals who entered the labor market and were working, however, were either offered health insurance packages through their employer, which are rare in low wage positions, or they could have voluntarily insured themselves, the prices for which are known to be costly. This reflects again the burden that decisions have consequences.

4.4.1.2.4 Physical Health Insurance in Chicago

The unevenness of the US healthcare system created a variety of different reactions among my participants. For those without health insurance, anxiety regarding the consequences of becoming ill was a common concern. For those with health insurance, a fear of potentially losing it was also common. In both scenarios, with or without insurance, my interlocutors expressed fear of becoming sick due to high medical costs and co-payment fees. This led to yet another fear, namely, if an individual becomes sick, she/he may lose a job, and thus, health insurance. For those without health insurance, fear of becoming ill and not being able to cover the medical costs, causing them to go into debt, and possibly becoming homeless as a result, represented the worst-case scenario of my respondents' fears on this matter.[135] One participant summarized,

> "I never felt so insecure in my life as here. Basically everybody is more or less a pay check or two away from homelessness. That's how it is with the whole business of health insurance. And this is something I never thought about my whole life in Europe, where it's different: you're like born with it, it belongs to you, it's nothing you think about, it's just the way it is. And then [here] you find out, well, it isn't [the way you thought]. And there is all this fear because you don't know what's gonna happen. So God forbid if you get sick because you know if you lose your job, you'll lose insurance and you'll lose everything." (Interview, Zina)

Although this participant was insured through her job at the time of my interview, she nonetheless worried about the possibility of losing her job and with it her medical coverage and housing. Having witnessed this happen to a single, elderly American woman, she was particularly terrified of becoming herself destitute and suffering a similar fate since she too

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[135] These interviews were conducted in April/May 2008, just before the financial crisis erupted.

was alone in Chicago without family or support. Another respondent offered a similar view on the healthcare system.

> "[The medical situation] is another reason why I hate America; I mean insurance, it's crazy! It's a business here. It's a business about human life. Because it's so expensive, so expensive! Insurance is really expensive, but I have to do it. I pay monthly $450 just to have basic insurance. I thank God that I and nobody from my family ever saw doctor in the last two, three years. It's a total difference from other countries, say in Europe, and a lot of things here it's just about the money. If you don't have money, you are a dead man. I mean maybe it's not like that for everything, but most everything. These things make me really sad." (Interview, Suzanna)

These excerpts depict a common critique among my respondents regarding the US healthcare system and an overriding sense of doom related to becoming ill. This also led to the emergence of cultural challenges in the Bosnians' assimilation process as their expectations of healthcare coverage stemmed from a different cultural and economic context than the one facing them in Chicago, causing some to feel vulnerable, out of place and unprotected.

With the issuance of the Welfare Reform Act in 1996, the burden of financial support shifted, proving this fear about healthcare to be a truly legitimate concern for my respondents and not just an overemotional anxiety. Responsibility for the provision of safety net services was shifted from the federal government to immigrant families. Following broad restrictions on their access to benefits and coupled with new support obligations for immigrant sponsors, the family members of immigrants had to absorb the health and other costs of incoming immigrants, regardless of whether these "costs were high and unpredictable, such as those arising when future immigrants become disabled after they enter[ed] the country" (Fix/Tumlin 1997). Those without family members were free from having to cover these costs, but it also meant that no one would cover their own costs if needed. This leads to the challenges related to the debt, credit and welfare concerns of my interlocutors in Chicago.

4.4.1.2.5 Debt, Credit and Welfare Concerns in Chicago

Before even their arrival to the US, my respondents were indoctrinated in some basic American values, stressing work and self-sufficiency. Implicit with this was the belief that the refugees not only absorb these values but also act upon them to become economically self-sufficient and socially self-reliant, emphasizing self-initiative. One participant recalls the process he was encouraged to pursue in his resettlement to Chicago, reaffirming this notion of self-sufficiency:

> "Well, the good thing is that they had all the paperwork, so you were travelling quite legally and they had the papers and it was paid for. They gave us loans, which we would pay off later. They had programs waiting for us; we had somewhere to go, to report to. They gave us certain structures, how to get basic information, how to get from somewhere

to somewhere. We had food stamps. We were given cash. It was Public Aid. And from day one, actually, you realize that they took care of you, but you also knew that you had to go and look for a job." (Interview, Kemal)

In addition to the well-planned and implemented structures of the resettlement program, this excerpt alludes as well to the funding schemes in place to assist the Bosnians in covering their flight costs to the United States. IOM helped arrange the Bosnians' travel, enabling them to repay the costs of their flights in installments following their relocation to the US.[136] To be eligible for this, the refugees had to sign promissory notes in which they bound themselves to repay the loan within three years. Shortly after their arrival to Chicago, the Bosnians received monthly bills from the resettlement agency, reminding them to begin paying off their debt. Without fully realizing the significance of this, the Bosnian refugees were inadvertently building up their history of credit in the US; whether they took this initial debt seriously had potentially lasting impacts on their *financial success* in the United States. The Bosnians encountered firsthand a cultural value emblematic of the US capitalist system, vital for maintaining *financial success*, which was surmised by many of my respondents as a main cultural difference affecting their adaptation in Chicago.

Having flexibility in consuming and buying on credit proved financially dangerous for some of my interlocutors, who *overspent* and lived off credit. Having the freedom to spend based on one's credit limit created a practical burden as several interlocutors lived beyond their means. For some, the autonomy and freedom expected of them to make decisions in the US has not necessarily fostered greater agency and self-awareness. Those with a poor credit history were severely limited. For instance, most property owners perform credit checks before they allow anyone to rent a house or an apartment in the US.[137] Having a good credit history was essential for my respondents, as they quickly learned. The significance of having both a credit history as well as good credit was considered (and continues to be) a key element to financial success in the US, an expectation that was laid out repeatedly upon my respondents. Having a high credit rating enabled them to not only apply for low interest credit cards but also to obtain an equity line of credit, finance a car, or even buy a house with a low interest mortgage. According to the US Immigration Support Homepage, "good credit history in the US can make one's life a lot more convenient and economical." In emphasizing the

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[136] In borrowing money from the IOM for their flights to Chicago to resettle, the US government not only managed to avoid having to cover the costs of resettling the refugees, but it also emphasized to the refugees the importance of economic self-sufficiency.

[137] Renting a flat in Chicago during my field research proved difficult for me, a US citizen, since I had not been *building up* my credit history, meaning using US credit cards to purchase things within the last five years. This was due to the fact that I've lived outside the US for more than 12 years. Consequently, in order to be considered eligible to rent an apartment in Chicago, a family member with a strong credit history had to *vouch* for me.

benefits of a strong credit history, the US government fosters the image of being able to achieve the American dream, of working hard, saving, being industrious and buying whatever one may desire, with credit, of course.

Several of my respondents were confronted with the conflict of enjoying the freedom of consumerism versus buying beyond their means and then having to face the consequences. In reflecting on the double bind of having to make decisions and then bear the consequences of these decisions, one respondent compared his previous experiences as a refugee in Austria to his experiences in Chicago:

> "Sometimes I think maybe you have too much freedom here. Yeah, because nobody's yelling at me. There's none of this telling you what to do and not to do. It's kind of like getting loose, a kind of way of living. Sometimes it's not good. All right that's what I think, but I could be wrong. We can bring them on because we do things that we don't think about and then later on, like, okay, I've gotta change, but in that order. And it's hard. It's like a credit card, you keep using it and not paying enough back, you know, spending on 'bad girls,' so that kind of thing. But I'm trying not to go too deep into debt. Sometimes you have to." (Interview, Mali)

Although they were introduced to principles of credit and consumption in their orientation courses, a number of my interlocutors expected additional external control to help monitor some of the decisions with which they were confronted. The coping strategies, supportive network, and individual personality dimensions of each refugee further influenced this. For those who managed to save money and maintain a good credit history, the internal locus of control was deemed positively.

> "In the US it's like, hey, we'll let you come here, we're not going to provide you long-term services; you'll get a short amount of support and then you can do whatever you want. You can't become the president, but you can do just about anything else. And to some refugees that's been amazing to be able to do that." (Interview, World Relief Chicago)

Those who enjoyed the freedom to act in Chicago were successful in achieving progress or nearing their personal goals, which highlights a main difference from those in Berlin. The next section continues discussing money and finances by addressing the limitations of Chicago's welfare system.

4.4.1.2.6 Welfare Restrictions in Chicago

Despite the emphasis on economic self-sufficiency many Bosnian refugees were dependent on welfare benefits in Chicago. Those in need were eligible for mainstream social programs, like Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and loans for higher education on largely the same terms as citizens.[138] Because the federal programs were

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[138] For the first seven years, they were eligible for Social Security Income (SSI), and Medicaid and for the first five years, for TANF, Food Stamps, and state and local public benefits (Fix/Tumlin 1997).

typically time-limited, the State of Illinois made state-level funds available to supplement the federal programs and the refugee agencies (Interview, ORR). With the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, however, their eligibility for mainstream support became dependent on the date of their arrival to Chicago, as this influenced whether they were eligible to apply for Social Security Income (SSI), Food Stamps, Medicaid, Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or its successor program Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), in addition to state and local public benefits.

At the Bosnians' initial arrival, AFDC was the main federal cash assistance program for poor, single-parent families. Administered by the US Department of Health and Human Services, this program assisted children whose families had low or no income. About $20.4 billion per year was being allotted to help immigrant families in need by 1996; a year in which the State of Illinois spent $833 million on AFDC benefits (US Department of Health and Human Services Homepage). Reliable, but not generous, payments were characteristic of the AFDC program. On average, in 1994, a single mother with two children and no income received $366 per month (Larner et al. 1997). Refugee families on welfare received food stamps and Medicaid coverage, but the combined value of AFDC and food stamps reduced families to living below the federal poverty level (ibid).

With the federal food stamp program, food assistance is provided to low-income people in the US. According to a study conducted by the Institute for Research on Poverty, refugees are more likely than other immigrants to use food stamps during their initial reception phase in the US (Economic Research Service, Institute for Research on Poverty Homepage). The amount available for food stamps differs according to family size and income.

> "When we came here, we rented a studio apartment. We applied for and got SSI right away and usually here in Illinois when you apply for SSI, they give you a medical card. We got the medical card, food stamps and that's how we live. Before I used to have coupons [food stamps] and usually when I bought something, they give me change that I could use to pay for laundry detergent and other things." (Interview, Kata)

According to the Illinois Department of Human Service's Bureau of Refugee and Immigrant Services, the cash break for a single adult in 1994 amounted to $197 a month (Interview, ORR). The food stamps were dispensed in the form of a plastic card that could only be used to purchase food. Products such as shampoo and soap were not included, but needed to be covered from the cash amount left over after paying rent, which proved to be very challenging for my respondents receiving aid.

With changes to immigration policy in 1965, naturalized citizens were allowed to sponsor the immigration of parents without quota restrictions. 30 years later, however, a growing perception emerged that elderly immigrants were *abusing the system*. Suspicion persisted that

adult-age immigrant children were pledging to support their elderly parents to only then enroll them in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and food stamp programs. Consequently, by August 1996, immigrants and refugees were thrust into the center of the nation's long-running debate over welfare reform with the passing of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).

President Bill Clinton was able to pass the PRWORA following negotiations with the Republican-controlled Congress, replacing AFDC, AFDC administration, the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program, and the Emergency Assistance (EA) program with a cash welfare block grant called the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program (Fix/Tumlin 1997). With this, the federal guarantee of assistance to all eligible families ceased and a lifetime limit of five years (or 60 months) was imposed as the amount of time an individual could receive federally-funded benefits.[139] With the aim of preventing elderly immigrants on sponsorship programs from arriving and entering the welfare program, a five-year waiting restriction for Medicaid and TANF was also imposed, as were additional restrictions on SSI and food stamp eligibility for adults.[140] Refugees, however, were granted an exemption from the federal eligibility restrictions that applied to other legal immigrants.[141] The restrictions were expected to account for $23 billion, which was nearly half the federal savings that welfare reform was expected to generate (Fix/Tumlin 1997).

This Act generated public outrage, particularly between refugee and immigrant advocates, prompting the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. This restored "SSI and derivative Medicaid benefits to all elderly and disabled immigrants who had been receiving SSI at the time PRWORA was enacted and to all legal immigrants in the US on the date of enactment, who

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[139] Other key elements with this included an increase in states' work participation rate requirements, and broad state flexibility on program design. TANF block grant spending was capped at $16.5 billion per year, slightly higher than fiscal year (FY) 1995 federal expenditures for the four component programs. States also were required to meet a *maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement*, meaning they needed to spend at least 75 percent of the amount of state funds used in FY 1994 on programs for needy families, and 80 percent if they failed the work participation rate requirements. In its initial passing, PRWORA also restricted immigrant access to benefits, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and food stamps (US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Homepage).

[140] One participant worked the required 40 quarters and then retired. Since then, he receives retirement benefits, but the amount awarded was based on his overall employment earnings in the US and as a building cleaner his income was not particularly high. The federally regulated retirement benefits amounted to more than the amount he accrued based on his 10 years of work experience in the US. Having worked and paid into the system, he felt cheated as a result of the little amount accrued.

[141] The scope of services was greatly reduced for immigrants who were not yet naturalized by 1996 or who entered the country after August 1996 as they became ineligible for federal benefits. Although the federal government remained responsible for setting the parameters of the AFDC program, authority was transferred to state governments, and so states determined eligibility and benefit levels and had the option of providing immigrants who entered the country after August 1996 cash assistance or Medicaid benefits (Larner et al. 1997, Fix/Tumlin 1997, Economic Research Service, Institute for Research on Poverty Homepage).

become disabled in the future" (Fix/Tumlin 1997:1). Hence, qualified refugees became *re-eligible* for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), including Social Security Disability Income (SSDI), which is a federal cash assistance program for people who are blind, disabled or over age 65. Like the other government programs this one, too, had strict time limits and funding caps, reducing the scope of services and accessibility for refugees to just seven years (Fix/Tumlin 1997).[142]

In addition to restoring further refugee benefits, the group of immigrants treated as refugees was also broadened with the implementation of the Balanced Budget Act. Yet, despite this reinstatement of benefits, the Act was ineffective in changing the PRWORA's extensive restrictions on immigrants, the nation's immigrant policy, or the new role shared by state and local governments in shaping the policies that govern immigrant integration (ibid). States were able to design their own welfare programs within broad federal guidelines as a result, recasting welfare as only a temporary support for needy families and requiring that single parents leave home to work (Larner et al. 1997).

A parallel program called Targeted Assistance and Cash, Medical, Administrative (CMA) assistance was available to the Bosnians determined *ineligible* for TANF and Medicaid. CMA targeted mainly single and married refugees without dependent children (US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement Homepage). Through the CMA program, as part of the Division of Refugee Assistance, the State of Illinois was reimbursed 100 percent for the refugee services available under the Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA), Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA), and Unaccompanied Refugee Minors programs.[143] This reimbursement also covered the administrative costs related to carrying out the refugee assistance programs (US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement Homepage).

What this meant for the Bosnians was that they were eligible not only to receive RCA benefits, which was a mirror of the mainstream cash assistance program targeting individuals having difficulty locating jobs (Interview, ORR). They were eligible to receive RMA and Medicaid, which are both government programs to assist working-age people with low incomes to cover some of their medical care costs. Both the cash assistance and medical assistance support programs, however, were restricted to a maximum of eight months starting

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[142] The scope of services and accessibility was greatly reduced for other types of immigrants arriving after Aug. 23, 1996, but no distinction was made for the refugees in regard to their entry date.
[143] Through local public health clinics, medical screening costs were also reimbursed through CMA, which aimed to contribute to reducing contagious diseases and medical conditions among the refugees (Office of Refugee Resettlement Homepage).

with the month of entry into the US or the date of the final grant of asylum for asylees (US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement Homepage). If the refugees obtained employment within the initial eight months, earning more than the income/asset limits determined by Temporary Family Aid (TFA), or acquired medical insurance coverage through their employer, they were automatically made ineligible to collect the payments and health benefits. With the American value of working and being self-sufficient repeatedly emphasized, managing to establish an independent financial base for themselves was considered a positive outcome for the majority of Bosnians, as it symbolized their independence and beginning *integration success*. They quickly surmised that economic security is indispensable for their freedom.

Some (typically, the elderly, traumatized or disabled refugees), however, were unable to work or become economically self-sufficient due to their war-related trauma, age, or insufficient English proficiency. This leads to the next main adaptation obstacle, namely poverty and downward social mobility.

4.4.1.3 Entering a Culture of Poverty and Enduring Structural Demotion

My interlocutors able to engage in employment were initially steered into typical *newcomer, immigrant* jobs, often in cleaning and construction in which they were underpaid and overworked. Their *market potential*, meaning their professional skills, educational profile, language competencies, legal access, and health varied, affecting their ability to find gainful employment and benefit from social mobility and economic gain. In both contexts my samples entered a culture of poverty, at least initially.

Coming from a former socialist country, many were caught off guard by the capitalistic approach of the US and the notion of self-sufficiency expected of them in Chicago. They had been accustomed to working and fending for themselves while in Bosnia, but if they were unable to work for whatever reason, i.e. an illness, a disability, etc., they had typically turned to their family, friends or the government for support.

> "If anything happened in Bosnia, you knew everybody would give you a hand until you got on your feet. In my country, I don't think you can be homeless even if you want, you know, there's no way. I think it's all cultural. People are closer there, families are tighter and it's just different." (Interview, Zina)

To some degree, sources of support were similar in Chicago, but the outcome varied greatly, introducing many Bosnians to a new experience of living in poverty despite being in a so-called *wealthy* country and despite promises of the government *taking care of you*.

Despite the supportive services available in Chicago, several of my respondents were taken aback by the reality of their new circumstances and the misguided expectations they had

about the reception process in the US. While they had been forewarned of what to expect in the US, most asserted, however, that no orientation program could have prepared them with what they would be confronted. "After three months [of English class and orientation] you were on your own and once you go, you do whatever you want to do." (Interview, Kemal)

Another participant described her experiences in Chicago as being very different from the promised conditions presented during her overseas orientation course. Her perception of the US, based on her orientation was that she would be supported long enough by the US government for her to learn English, go through the job-training program, and find a job with an income on which she could live and support herself. While this was partly true, she soon realized, however, that her adjustment would not be as simple as was made out to be during the orientation course, nor would the financial assistance granted her by the government last until she was able to find a *decent* job. Rather, the duration of the financial assistance was limited to just eight months.[144]

> "The 'being-taken-care-of-part' meant that they took you to the Public Aid Office, where they gave you food stamps, a couple hundred dollars and health insurance. And so now it's up to you how you are going to live, how you're going to pay rent. But you certainly cannot pay your rent with $200. And after eight months they simply cut you off. It's up to you how you are going to live, how you're going to pay rent, and I only know if I didn't have my own money to survive, I would have been homeless, Now, you see, it's a big misrepresentation, it's an impression given of something totally else from what's really happening, but when you analyze word for word, well, you know." (Interview, Zina)

Thus, some of the Bosnians were staggered by the conditions they faced after their arrival in the United States.

Despite the assistance granted in the realm of the Domestic Resettlement Program and the general optimism of both the refugee agency staff and my interlocutors, many refugees encountered initial challenges in accessing jobs in Chicago. Some described difficulties that arose due to employers being unfamiliar with the I-94 and their unwillingness to hire a refugee based on the supposed complications involved. Legally, there should not have been any complications as anti-discriminatory hiring policies were in place. Yet some employers were concerned about unnecessary bureaucratic complications and in response restricted the refugees' access.

Time constraints and financial pressures placed on the resettlement agencies also led to limitations in helping the Bosnians locate jobs in their previous fields or interests. Since unskilled jobs were easier to acquire than skilled positions, those with higher human-cultural

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[144] The amount awarded a single adult refugee upon his/her arrival was $212 per month, which was barely enough to scrape by.

capital, i.e. better job qualifications, tended to struggle more with finding positions comparable to the type of work they had done in Bosnia. Many with professional backgrounds, such as lawyers and doctors, were not able to practice in the US without being certified, a process that typically took years to complete and thousands of dollars for university certification. Another limited profession was engineering. Several participants from my Chicago sample had backgrounds in engineering, but were unable to work in this field in Chicago without being re-qualified. The refugees, however, could not commit the time and cost necessary to pursue recertification courses or additional education in their previous fields during the initial eight-month period of refugee assistance.[145]

Resettlement agencies also had little leeway in the job options available for placing refugees. Hence, many Bosnians - particularly urbanites and professionals - were unable to work in the same professional roles they had previously had in Bosnia. Consequently, some found it difficult emotionally to deal with this type of *structural demotion* in their careers, particularly as some *foreign degrees* were rated as less worthy.[146] An additional tendency depended on the field of the foreign degree. For instance, several in my sample completed engineering degrees in Bosnia. While this did not permit their access to engineering jobs in Chicago, these individuals nonetheless seemed more likely to be hired for better paying positions than other respondents with degrees deemed less reputable by employers. The same was true for the respondent who had trained to become a vascular surgeon. While unable to proceed in this career, he was able to prove his flexibility and ambitions by working as a translator and case manager before pursuing further qualifications in psychology.[147] Another interlocutor, hoping to work in a semi-skilled position in Chicago, was referred by the refugee resettlement agency to become a cleaning woman at a local hospital. Feeling frustrated by the lack of positive recognition attributed to her previous knowledge and field of work as a nurse in Bosnia, she eventually refused the agency's assistance in finding her a job altogether.[148]

> "They said to me, 'Well, you're a lucky one, we found you a job in your profession.' You know what the job was? A cleaning lady in a hospital! I was, well, I don't get it. What does this have to do with my profession, the fact that it's a hospital?! I was kind of fed up with the whole process and I just thought, okay, I am done with you guys! Don't call me, don't come here, and that's it." (Interview, Zina)

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[145] With time, however, some of my Chicago interlocutors did pursue recertification courses. One participant, for instance, worked two part-time jobs and was enrolled in university classes on the side.

[146] Based on a recent study published by the Migration Policy Institute, legal immigrants able to acquire a college degree in America were "three times more likely to work in high-skilled jobs than those with a foreign degree" (Batalova/Fix 2008:2).

[147] This respondent – and others like him in Chicago – pursued future career paths that integrated his *refugee* experiences in his work.

[148] The completion of a nursing degree in the US entails university courses, including math and science, in the curriculum and it spans more credit hours than nursing studies in Bosnia or Germany.

The approach of the agency in this account seems typical of many initial job placements found by the VOLAGS for the refugees. The goal of the VOLAGS was labor market insertion as quickly as possible. Language competencies, salary, and job type were secondary considerations. The personality characteristics and responses of my respondents to these suggestions for job insertions greatly influenced the outcome, as is evident by the above excerpt.

In contrast with Berlin, therefore, the Bosnians in Chicago appeared more likely to benefit from the reputable status that comes with having engineering, medical or law degrees, implying that certain professional backgrounds were better received than others in the US. While these interlocutors may not have been able to work in their previous fields, generally refugees with degrees and previous qualifications were more readily hired. "Erfolgreiche Etablierung in der Aufnahmegesellschaft ist wesentlich bildungsabhängig. Grundsätzlich gilt: je höher das Bildungsniveau und je urbaner die Herkunftsregion, desto leichter und besser gelingt dies." (Woellert et al. 2009) They also tended to experience alternative advantages in accessing the labor market and earning higher wages.[149]

Moreover, the more astounded the refugees were about conditions in the US, the greater difficulties they seemed to face in achieving self-sufficiency, i.e. the goal expected of them. Despite the seemingly positive outcome that many from my Chicago sample experienced - working, saving and investing in property or housing - many believed nonetheless to be faring worse financially in Chicago – at least initially - than they had been accustomed to prior to the war in Bosnia.

One reason they may have felt this way was that an adult's income in Chicago was rarely sufficient to cover the family's costs of living. With the minimum wage in 1996 set at $4.75 per hour, being raised to $5.15 in 1997 (Larner et al. 1997), many parents had to work numerous jobs to make ends meet. Women, who had previously remained at home with their children in Bosnia, were expected to enter into the workforce to help ensure the family's financial survival. It seemed to be understood that both parents would have to work to cover living expenses in line with the *American way of life* - work hard to achieve success.

This is referred to in the German context as the development of a new low class (*Unterschichtung*), resulting in the emergence of enlarged social inequality as a result of asylum and migration. Friedrich Heckmann (1995) refers to this as the ethnic

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[149] Authors of the Migration Policy Institute publication further contend that highly skilled immigrants (with at least a bachelor's degree) from European or Asian origin tended to enjoy higher rates of job utilization than, say, immigrants from Latin America (Batalova/Fix 2008).

heterogenization of the social structure, accompanied by the phenomenon of ethnic stratification. "Ethnic stratification, firstly, means that there is inequality among the different ethnic groups in a society; secondly, it means that status acquisition of individuals is also determined by ethnic identity, in addition to education, income, and professional status." (Heckmann 1995:159) Recognition of such stratifications in the US has long been acknowledged.

Doug Bandow (1996) identifies three forms of poverty: material poverty, situational poverty, and dependency – or, as Ruby Payne (1996) suggests, generational poverty. The state of poverty today increasingly extends beyond just material deprivation, particularly since many *poor* people are, despite their status as government welfare recipients, still able to meet their basic needs. Granted, they may do so with difficulty and may live impoverished lifestyles compared to their wealthier neighbors, Bandow argues that material deprivation today – at least in the US - is relative. Payne (1996:10) upholds the same point, arguing, "If everyone around you has similar circumstances, the notion of poverty and wealth is vague. Poverty or wealth only exists in relationship to known quantities or expectations."

Since my interlocutors in Berlin were generally all reliant on welfare, the comparison among the refugees was not as crushing. Issues pertaining to wealth and poverty were highlighted in the interviews, particularly for the refugees who had been accustomed to more comfortable lifestyles in Bosnia, where they worked as professionals, owned homes, cars, or other valuable objects. This explains why those accustomed to possessing more money in Bosnia struggled more emotionally in their adjustment. After the 1993 legislation, when the tolerated refugees received less than others on welfare, the contrast became more glaring. Receiving only enough welfare benefits to avoid *starving or dying* was deemed unsatisfying.

> "Es hängt davon ab, was man unter einem normalen Leben meint. Wenn man sich keine normalen Sachen leisten kann, wie ins Theater zu gehen, das kann man sich hier vom Jobcenter ehrlich zu sagen nicht leisten. Und viele Bosnier, sie leben so an dieser Existenzgrenze, also, da ist genau berechnet, so viel Geld, dass man genug hat, um nicht zu hungern oder zu sterben, aber nicht genug für was anderes." (Interview, Mirna)

For younger respondents who had not yet been accustomed to working and being self-sufficient in Bosnia, managing the allocated welfare benefits in Berlin appeared somewhat easier. "Ich konnte normal mit dem Geld vom Sozialamt leben. Ich konnte Kleidung, Essen, kleine Dinge für mich kaufen. Ich konnte nicht Extravagantes kaufen, aber es hat für mich gereicht, um zu leben." (Interview, Irena, 23 years old upon arrival in Berlin) Reliance on the goodwill of others such as family, friends, NGOs and charity organizations also helped in easing my respondents' sense of destitution and helplessness. Essentially, those accustomed to having little experienced less of a damaged self-esteem in encountering structural demotion in

the receiving society context and managed to come to terms more easily with their limited finances. "Wenn man halt nicht so viel hat, kann man auch nicht so- weiß ich nicht- also manche Sachen nicht machen. Ich lebe auch nicht irgendwie- nicht luxuriös oder so." (Interview, Selma, university student)

For many, however, the minimum existence was clearly too little, especially for families with children. Dimension of poverty and destitution affected the autonomy and well-being of my respondents, including the children. In Berlin, for instance, children often had to miss class outings due to the high costs. In Chicago, the children's well-being was hampered as parents tried to succeed in the low-wage labor market, but this was a reality that affected many Americans and was not linked just to refugee status. Both settings caused new challenges for governments in trying to respond with strategies designed to protect the children. External factors, such as inflation and economic decline also influenced my respondents' perception of their own standing in Chicago.

> "It's hard today. That's another thing what I don't agree with in America. I mean before it was easier. It was easy to find a new job, to find three jobs at the same time, but now it's hard to keep the job you already have. So a lot of things are different. I remember when we came here one gallon of gas was $1.24 and now it's almost $4.20 and a gallon of milk was $0.97 and now it's $3.50. So the dollar is going down and prices are going up. It's not comfortable, you know, and it makes our lives difficult, more difficult than before." (Interview, Suzanne)

Many felt shame and disappointment as a result of their downward social mobility and loss in status in the receiving society, regardless whether in Berlin or Chicago. Individuals generally feel let down or disappointed when they fall below beneath their own expectations, ideals, or standards (cf. Weernink et al. 2007). This results in a drop in their self-esteem, coupled with a sense of failure and embarrassment. One of my interview respondents, who had worked as a sports professor at a military academy in Bosnia (even having served as a judge for the Winter Olympics in Sarajevo), was only able to find work as a janitor in Chicago. This was typical of most of my interlocutors whose limited English knowledge resulted in the devaluation of their cultural capital. Though ashamed of only being a janitor, he was the only one among the elderly refugee respondents in my sample who managed to find work in Chicago and he learned Polish from his colleagues. (For the elderly unable to procure employment, the social services offered by the various care providers and refugee agencies served as a minimum base of financial support). Overall, the lack of control over assets and the loss of access to income of their own labor (economic capital and labor market dimension) greatly impaired the emotional well-being of my respondents in both contexts.

This concludes the overview of the main institutional obstacles my respondents encountered during their adaptation. This range of obstacles highlights the varying types of challenges my respondents had to deal with in the two different contexts, illustrating that neither situation was perfect. The following section focuses on the socio-cultural obstacles my respondents encountered in Berlin and Chicago.

4.4.2 Socio-Cultural Obstacles

The subcategory, *socio-cultural obstacles,* reflects the social and cultural variables that have hindered my participants in their adaptation processes. This subcategory overlaps with the two subcategories institutional and emotional obstacles, as it is triggered by external, extenuating circumstances staged in the institutional realm, while also encompassing the emotional concerns of my respondents. This subcategory is also characteristic of both externally influenced factors as well as internal, individual obstacles that have emerged as a result of the co-dependent relationship between each respondent and others, like with the Bosnian community, family members, refugee agency staff, social workers, language teachers, religious organizations, MAAs, Foreigners Office and Social Welfare Office staff, or other representatives in the receiving society context. In each context, the respondents were expected to cope, adopt the new language, adjust to the new social roles, new community structures, new familial relationships, and to deal with the many pre-existing as well as newly emerging obstacles of adaptation. Individual personalities and skill sets, as well as interactions with others greatly influenced this process. The following section provides an account of the most frequently emerging socio-cultural obstacles that affected my respondents' ability to adapt, starting with physical safety and fear.

4.4.2.1 Physical Safety and Fear

Survivors of traumatic events such as war and violence often feel a loss of safety. Lasting mental traumas were sustained from my respondents' war experiences, which in turn influenced each person's sense of ease in the receiving society, despite being removed from the immediate dangers in Bosnia and enroute to safety. In both contexts, my respondents described feelings of anxiety of the unknown, unfamiliarity with the host society language, surroundings, institutions, resources, and uncertainty of their legal rights. This resulted in exacerbating the samples' feelings of vulnerability. Consequently, few, if any felt safe following the outbreak of the war in Bosnia.

> "Safety is a sense of protection, well-being, and security. It is the feeling people experience when they are not in danger. During times of safety, one is not worried about harm to the body, heart, mind, or spirit. If people are safe, they feel comfortable

expressing themselves, their dreams, thoughts and feelings. Feeling safe means there is an absence of anxiety and tension. Times when a person feels safe are times of feeling a sense of relaxation and ease." (Bryant-Davis 2005:14)

This contributed to feelings of dread and helplessness. This is a natural response following a traumatic event, as survivors are commonly known to feel apprehension and fear after experiencing emotional and physical danger. Mental anxieties relating to legal restrictions emerged as a particularly important finding for my Berlin sample.

"Wenn ich so nachdenke ist eigentlich gar nichts so Großes in allen diesen Jahren passiert... Man hat jahrelang mit der Angst hier gelebt, genauso wie dort im Krieg. Weil man wusste nicht wirklich, wenn man eine Abschiebung bekommt, wenn man jetzt aus dem Flugzeug an Sarajevos Flughafen aussteigt, wo soll man hin? Und das ist eine Angst, dass man nicht beschreiben kann." (Interview, Mirna)

While fear related to insecure residence rights was widespread in Berlin, in Chicago physical safety and security were a focus of concern, particularly at the outset. In contrast, members of my Berlin sample did not touch on the issue of physical safety at all during interviews (apart from the rough treatment sometimes by authorities enforcing deportation), implying that Berlin's city streets were less threatening than Chicago's.[150] One participant even says as much in comparing Germany and Chicago.

"Actually, I like Germany. I just think it's so much safer, you know, than here [Chicago], like, when I visited my friend a few times I would take the train back to where we lived at midnight or something like that. I would never take the train at midnight [in Chicago]. That's something maybe that I miss, you know, that type of, like, safety." (Interview, Anita)

Chicago exemplifies one of many cities in which the transition from a mainly agrarian to a predominantly industrial economy has led to economic polarization, spatial dislocation, power inequalities, and a lack of public authority at the metropolitan level (Livezey 2000:5). At the time of arrival in the mid-1990s, Chicago's Edgewater/Uptown area was a low-income, racially segregated, and relatively insecure inner-city neighborhood, with streets marking invisible but well-known borders among the different ethnic populations, income levels, and degrees of security. The north side was considered a point of entry for poor whites and immigrants from around the world, incorporating diverse backgrounds and spanning 40 different languages. Little Vietnam, on Argyle Street, was one of the more prosperous streets with many Asian restaurants and shops catering to people from the five nearest states. The

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[150] Despite guidance on using public transportation, several participants described an initial insecurity in maneuvering through Chicago's vast public transportation system for reasons of safety. They related nervousness, due to fears of criminality. The distances were also much greater; trips took longer than they had been used to, and difficulties arose due to language insufficiencies. Overwhelmingly, the magnitude of Chicago's city limits proved to be rather daunting for them at first.

work of the Vietnamese Association (an MAA) contributed greatly to development, especially considering that Argyle Street was a ghost town in 1975, with only about three viable businesses on the street: a bar, a laundry mat and a currency exchange.[151] Just a few blocks away, close to the reputably dangerous Wilson Street El Stop, was Truman College, the community college where many Bosnian refugees took their ESL classes and pursued additional courses.[152] The area was flanked by corner bars and currency exchanges, a day labor exchange with a diverse crowd of hopefuls waiting for an opportunity to earn a day's wage, as well as beat cops, who patrolled the streets. Assigning police officers was an attempt by city officials to take back Chicago's neighborhoods from gang-bangers and drug dealers (Chicago Uptown Commission Homepage). With certain pockets concentrated in poverty, hopelessness and homelessness, taxi drivers often avoided making stops in this neighborhood.

The ethnic diversity so visibly apparent in Chicago caused initial unease among many of my respondents and issues of safety were a key focus of concern. One participant related how his father, who worked all day, forbade him and his sister (both in their early teens at the time) to leave the apartment during their first summer in the city in order to ensure their safety. The Uptown neighborhood suffered poverty and marginalization, both of which nourish crime (cf. Zinn 2001). In schools, the youth were confronted with gangs, drugs and violence. Metal detectors were frequently installed at the school entrances to prevent students from bringing in weapons. On the streets, respondents were confronted with diversity and homelessness with which my respondents previously had little experience. Many described their first ever interactions with a *black* person. The newness of this experience also exacerbated fears. The longer my respondents lived in Chicago, the more accustomed they became to the inner city setting and the more readily their sense of fear and safety concerns abated.[153] This adjustment was further influenced by changes in city planning measures.

With extensive development and wealthy residents vying for housing prosperity near the lake, the residents of Edgewater/Uptown began feeling the pressure of gentrification from

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[151] When the Southeast Asians began arriving to Chicago, Uptown had a vacancy rate of close to 30 percent, enabling the purchases and renovations of available low-income rental properties (Interview, ORR).

[152] The author lived in Edgewater and worked in Uptown around the corner from Truman College as a social worker, providing supportive housing to formerly homeless and mentally ill individuals at Lakefront S.R.O. from 1994-97. She observed the most recent effects of gentrification in the Uptown area during her field research, so it seems significant to describe the transition the Bosnians experienced as residents in these neighborhoods, especially in Uptown.

[153] With the falling housing market and recession in the US, it would be interesting to assess how the interview participants have fared, and to examine whether they have been able to make payments on their property mortgages. If they have had to forfeit their housing loans, this would link problems in the US of accepting low credit for payment. Considering the personalities of the interview respondents, however, I would be surprised if they had to face foreclosure on their homes.

neighborhoods on all sides. The neighborhoods of Andersonville and Edgewater began slowly pushing low-income residents out. Alderwoman Helen Schiller's strategy is to develop the ward without causing displacement, but according to data, the white population jumped nearly 10 percent in the last five years, while the number of blacks declined to nearly 12 percent (Konkol/Golab 2006). Alderwoman Schiller has been fighting against gentrification in the 46th Ward for years, but the more she strives to improve city services for those residents living in the area, meaning *those without clout*, the more enticing her ward is for wealthy investors and residents. With the renovation of historically renowned music halls such as the Riviera, the Aragon Ballroom and the Green Mill jazz club, plus the moving in of chains like Starbucks coffee shops, Borders Books, and expensive restaurants, the Uptown neighborhood is becoming more and more exclusive and homogenized.

In response, several Mutual Aid Associations (MAAs), such as the Cambodian Association or the former Lakefront S.R.O., have been active in trying to develop affordable housing in the Uptown/Edgewater area. By the time new legislation was passed with the goal of forcing big (immigrant) families rooming together in small spaces out of the neighborhood by increasing the rent prices in Uptown, many of my respondents had already purchased their own apartments, condos, or homes and thus, were likely not directly impacted by this. According to Dr. Silverman, these MAAs have even had some success in combating housing displacement and, surprisingly, some landlords have also been unwilling to increase rent prices (Interview, ORR).

For the Bosnians, the development of more shops and services in their neighborhoods has contributed to an increased sense of security and belonging in Chicago. Several participants commented on feeling comfortable and much safer now after having lived in the same district for more than 10 years. My respondents could not decide, however, whether this transition was due to their simply adapting to life in Chicago or whether it was because the image of their neighborhood was changing. Does wealth automatically inspire a sense of safety? Or do living and sanitary conditions generally improve in neighborhoods with residents who have money? Could this be related to institutional discrimination and classism? Whatever the reason, feelings of safety tended to embolden my respondents in their actions and heightened their sense of belonging in the neighborhood over time. Interactions with certain members of the mainstream who had ignorant suppositions about the Bosnians had a contrasting impact, as is described in the next section.

4.4.2.2 Misconceptions and the *Luxury of Ignorance*

Both samples emphasized and criticized the intercultural differences implicit in their interactions with members of the host society. Some respondents purposely avoided certain people, disassociating from the ignorance they otherwise commonly experienced in their interactions. Despite the friendliness of the Chicagoans, several respondents felt *lost*, overwhelmed, caught up in extreme culture shock and dismayed at the host society's level of ignorance in regard to their new neighbors from Bosnia. My Chicago sample observed that the curiosity of the mainstream society was often reduced to just a superficial level of interest, which they related to as a general lack of knowledge on the whole. "They don't even know that Bosnia exists. I will never forget my neighbor asked me in 2003 where we had gone on vacation, so I said we went to Bosnia. She said, 'Oh, I like Boston very much.' She doesn't know." (Interview, Ema)

The neighbor, thinking in narrow terms, misunderstood and left my respondent feeling annoyed and isolated. Nearly all of my participants could relate similar anecdotes in which their contact with members of the host society left a sense of frustration and loneliness. Most often their examples of *ignorance* reflected assumptions and prejudices the receiving society had about refugees, Muslims, Bosnians, and issues revolving around the ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia.

> "They didn't even know where Bosnia was located. They thought it was like a jungle or something. Those who didn't know tried to teach us how to open an umbrella, for example. A lady asked, 'Do you guys know how to use this'? I swear she took the umbrella and pushed that little button and opened it and tucked her head under the umbrella and showed us the procedure. And we were saying, 'Oh, okay, I see. That's how it goes.' That's probably the most extreme example how people assumed we had no clue." (Interview, Kemal)

A specific idea of what a refugee was *supposed* to be existed among the general population before the arrival of my respondents. Refugees represented poverty, underdeveloped origins, and lack of modern amenities. The mainstream response to the Bosnian refugees contained surprise that a war can transpire in modern, developed societies and result in such *cultivated* refugees who are accustomed to using telephones, TVs and refrigerators. Comments often ranged from explanations on how to flush a toilet or open an umbrella to presumptions about their religious and ethnic identities. Many interactions with mainstream Chicago society thus provoked my sample to feel unwelcome as a result of the mainstream's general ignorance.

> "I always try to explain as best as I can and if they have any questions, I'm not offended by it and I'd rather have them know from me just to explain what the issue is than have them be offended. I mean you get a lot of stupid questions, anywhere from where Bosnia is to whether you had a TV growing up or do you know what a TV is, so it's just you get used

to it anyway." (Interview, Melisa)

In recalling the general kindness of the mainstream society, however, one interlocutor defended the ignorance of the receiving society. He rationalized that while such ignorance is annoying, it is not intentionally spiteful. "Not that it's a bad thing. Honestly, they have fewer things to worry about. Ignorance is bliss, as long as you don't harm other people [with it]." (Interview, Dino) This participant explained his ignorance is bliss theory, which is linked with a luxury of *not needing to know*. In trying to make sense of the ignorance of many Americans for not knowing anything about Bosnia, including its location, or details about the war, several participants attributed this deficiency to the poor elementary and high school level educational system in the United States.

> "Maybe it's because of the school system they have here. I told my son, there is no way I could use calculators in the school during a test. Here, there's nothing without a calculator. We had learned so much about the United States, but our school was maybe too much for us, you know? But maybe it's because of the school system that the lady didn't know that Bosnia exists." (Interview, Ema)

Unaware of symbolic violence, this respondent unknowingly provides evidence of Bourdieu's theory that cultural arbitration does not just happen. Rather it is based in pedagogic action, whether transposed through family education, formally institutionalized education, or the diffuse education of peers and everyday life (Jenkins 2004). In such situations, my interlocutors indicated their disdain and questioned how US residents could be so self-focused and generally ignorant of so many things just because it is not related to their immediate realities. Unaware of the obscured hierarchy and pedagogic authority influencing the mainstream US society, such behaviors were legitimized through the reproduction of ignorance as part of the social and cultural norm. Several of my respondents reduced the general lack of knowledge among the average US citizens (in regard to Bosnia) to a prevailing self-absorption and lack of knowledge of other countries. A multitude of such egocentric incidents led many from my Chicago sample to feel that mainstream society lacked the interest in getting to know them, in taking the time to hear their stories or learning about their experiences as refugees. As a result, this led to a sense of disenchantment and impacted my Chicago samples' willingness to interact on a deeper level with most host society members. Interactions were polite and friendly but largely superficial.

My Berlin respondents described a different response, since mainstream society members generally knew of the plight of the Bosnian refugees and were generally aware of Bosnia's modern infrastructure and lifestyle. Many Germans had even vacationed in the former Yugoslavia during peaceful times. This, perhaps, helps explain Germany's initial friendly response towards the Bosnians and understanding of the Bosnian way of life. My Berlin

sample encountered fewer ignorant comments about their identity but felt nonetheless often stigmatized. This was related less to their national or religious identity but more so to their status as tolerated refugees.

Average Germans were unaware of Berlin's immigration and refugee policies, the legal restrictions associated with the *Duldung,* still in force over a decade later and the impact this has on lives. One of my interlocutors in Berlin applied the *ignorance is bliss* concept in referring to the general population's lack of knowledge on refugee law or the impacts of the *Duldung* status.

> "Die Deutsche die hier sind, sie verstehen das nicht und wissen gar nichts davon. Das ist wirklich interessant, dass die Bürger von Berlin überhaupt keine Ahnung haben [von dem Ausländergesetz] und wenn ich das an der Uni erzähle, die glauben das einfach nicht. Sie können sich das nicht vorstellen, wenn sie meinen Studentenvisum sehen, dass ich jetzt nach dem Studium nur ein Jahr Zeit habe, um ein Job zu finden. Wenn ich keinen Job finde, dann muss ich halt weg gehen. Und ich denke dann so drüber nach warum dass alles so ist und dann ärgert mich das. Das schiebe ich alles zurück auf dem Krieg zurück und dann in dem Moment ist es besonders schwer." (Interview, Selma)

This participant draws attention to the privileged status of ignorant individuals, as they are sheltered from needing to know about refugee law and regulations that do not affect German citizens.[154] Reflective of Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence, this signifies one way by which the Bosnians were "harmed or held back, not by force of arms but by the force of (mis)understanding" (Calhoun 2003:285). The reality that some people are completely free of even noticing immigration laws was difficult for my respondents to grasp, especially since these very laws govern the refugees' ability to remain in Berlin, to work, to go to university, or to travel outside of the city district. The message spread over time by German politicians and present in media discourses associated the Bosnian war with *floods* of refugees, resulting in an increase in taxes and welfare allocations needed to cover the costs of humanitarian protection. My respondents were consequently reminded that their stay in Berlin was a costly inconvenience for Germany. What this might imply about the Bosnian refugees is that the rise of cultural differences did indeed influence my respondents in their perceptions of their actions, interactions, and positions as refugees from which they viewed the world.

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[154] Rather than identify the real root of this distinction, this respondent instead complained, had the war not broken out, she would not have had to flee and had she remained in Bosnia she could be the one ignorant of such differences in status due to migration experiences, something she would have preferred. This implies the power element intrinsic in their relations and interactions. The reality of power as an influence is evident as well in reflecting the disdain several of my interlocutors exhibited in regard to the Roma with whom they lived in the accommodation facilities or the fear of interacting with *Black* people. In exchanges with the host society, my respondents felt less privileged, but they took on a privileged role in their interactions with Roma or with other less privileged groups.

The luxury of not needing to know about the rights (and lack thereof) afforded refugees abounded in both reception contexts. Furthermore, both samples commented on their particular positions as refugees and the insensitivity of the receiving society in relation to this. This led some of my respondents to distance themselves from the mainstream receiving society. For instance, my Berlin samples' general assessment of German social workers, welfare office workers, and housing facility staff was rather critical. Many refugees perceived them to be cool and distant. One of my Berlin interlocutors, for instance, observed that the social workers tended to complete their required number of hours, carrying out their *duty*, but left work punctually, never staying past six p.m. This was viewed negatively by some of my respondents, who appear to have felt *dehumanized* as a result. Some felt as if they were being observed by the social workers as *objects of need*, generating *work* for the social workers, who in turn tended to them only during work hours and not on a personal, human level. What does this say about the degree of professionalism among German social workers? On the other hand, can generalizations be made?

Beyond problems relating to marginalization tendencies, intercultural differences, and critique of the professionalism of social workers, other discouraging exchanges were generally related in regard to the formal interactions with institutions such as the Foreigners Office and Social Welfare Office staff members. Despite their distant and limited contact with individual *native* Germans, social interactions with the German population cannot be characterized as indifferent, since my respondents provided many examples of *very positive* as well as *very negative* interactions with members of the host society during their adaptation process. This was dependent on single actors. My respondents felt an unequal power balance between themselves and the Germans. For example, one respondent depicted an interaction with neighbors in which she felt generally alienated as a result of typical characteristics that she and others attribute as *Yugoslavian*.

> "Es war immer so, dass man durch seine typisch Deutsch alles so perfekt sein muss und hier ist es schon ein bisschen- man kann auch in Neukölln sich besser finden, durch die Wohnung laufen und die anderen sind nicht so gut und da müsst du auch nicht sein, aber auch nicht übertreiben, einfach freier." (Interview, Sena)

For her, living in Germany required nothing less than perfection. She needed to learn the language, fit in culturally, and adopt the norms and attitudes. Only in Neukölln, a district with a high percentage of immigrants did she feel she could relax and be herself. Some respondents admitted feeling out of place and unwelcome in Berlin due to differences in loudness and emotional expression.

"Wir sind zum Beispiel nicht daran gewohnt wenn der Besuch kommt und wenn der

> Besuch von zu Hause geht, wir verabschieden uns nicht in der Wohnung, sondern draußen vor dem Haus. Und dann wenn es spät ist, dann stört es natürlich hier die Leute, aber uns nicht." (Interview, Zumra)

In addition to being louder than the Germans, several of my interlocutors perceived additional cultural characteristics, such as differences in time orientation, gender roles, expression, religious conviction, family orientations, among other aspects that served to distinguish the Bosnian refugees from members of the host society. Such incidents caused several of my respondents to intermittently feel a sense of frustration, loneliness, and exclusion in their interactions with German natives, which in turn affected their willingness and interest to learn German and interact with mainstream actors.

Intercultural differences were evident in both contexts: in Chicago relative to a general ignorance and lack of interest in knowing the Bosnian refugees, and in Berlin due to mainstream expectations of the refugees to assimilate into German cultural and social norms. Contributing also was a lack of knowledge or concern with the legal restrictions impeding the refugees in accessing necessary resources to achieve normalcy. Much criticism was thus related to the ignorance and in some cases unconscious discrimination of the mainstream societies and their institutions. The next two sections address the ethnic and religious divisions that emerged both among the Bosnians and the receiving society.

4.4.2.3 Ethnic and Religious Divisions

The lives of my participants in socialist Yugoslavia were marked by secularism, a post-socialist transition toward multiparty democracy, and a market economy. Growing up with Muslims, Serbs and Croats, the Bosnians intermingled on friendly terms with one another and so there was little need to have a strong sense of nationality or of religion. Prior to the war, there was an interconnectedness of religion and ethnicity in the lives of my sample touching on the almost social role of religion in socialist Yugoslavia. "For many, religion was less a matter of ritual practice and more detectable in the trace it leaves upon the spirit, in cultural values, and in a special feeling of familiarity and connectedness with others." (Weine 1999:24) Connections to family members, food, special religious holidays, and traditional celebrations tend to play the most significant role for my interlocutors in their religious expression.

> "My mother comes from, not a conservative Catholic family, but from a Catholic family that went to church on Sundays. Although my father never really went to church, though his mother is very religious, we of course celebrate Christmas and Easter - by the Catholic rules. But religion to me was never really- I mean I see myself as an atheist. I don't believe in a higher power. On my dad's side his sister and her husband are Orthodox Christian, so they'd celebrate Christmas Saturdays after we do, and Easter whenever they get around to

it. I don't know how the Orthodox calendar works exactly, but, you know, at the same time, I have an aunt who was married to one of my dad's cousins who's a Muslim, and sometimes I'd go over there for Ramadan and Bairam when they had cake. I guess the way religion unites me is through food because whenever there's a holiday my mom spends the whole day making cookies, which I'm grateful for." (Interview, Valten)

Enjoying Catholic festivities with one part of his family, Orthodox traditions with another side, and Muslim festivities with still another, this respondent supports evidence that the politicization of religion and ethnicity had been suppressed under Tito's reign. This allowed families with multiple religions and ethnicities to interact peacefully. "Before ethnic cleansing, intermarriage was not considered 'mixed' because the people were not considered to be 'other.'" (Weine 1999:19)

With the arrival of the renegade or paramilitary forces that began looting Bosnian towns, however, the distinction emerged that religion - in its interweaving with ethnicity - created complexity in identity as was evident by the Bosnian war. While categories of nation, ethnicity, and citizenship may be symbols - completely irrelevant aspects of an individual's identity - once these attributes were ascribed externally on my respondents, it became difficult for many to evade further categorization (cf. Lister 2003). Thus as neighbors began to kill each other in the name of ethnic purification, and as ethnic and religious sentiments became increasingly conflated and contested during the Bosnian war, the meanings my sample attributed to these characteristics also became more complex. Their lived and experienced identity constructions unvaryingly incorporated narratives of ideologies, ethnization, and mistrust. My informants continue to perceive the Bosnian war as a turning point in their lives as it served to shift their regional, Yugoslav identities to a broader, globalized identity as refugees, as survivors, and for some, more strongly as Muslims, Croats, Serbs, or even Yugoslavians (an effort to dispel ethnic and religious categorization).

The ethnocultural and religious variables, characterizing the identity of my respondents, were further impacted by their ethnic identity construction as first generation Bosnian refugees living in the metropolitan areas of Berlin and Chicago. One participant, for instance, recalls sitting in his favorite restaurant where he enjoyed easily meeting other migrants from the former Yugoslavia, when he became engaged in a heated conversation with men who had migrated to Chicago following World War II.

"I was thinking that it's a really nice place to reach out and meet other people from my country, but there were different ethnicities and I got into some problems later on because some of them were thinking that I wasn't loyal to my country and they were very hostile. They greeted me with a Hitler wave and [said] 'Chetnick!' They were accusing me of maybe having collaborated with the Serbians and especially because I was in the Yugoslav military army. That was different later on when they split the military, you know? And of course, I got very unpleasant. I was mad and was not very etiquette." (Interview, Meho)

In addition to the historical tensions that emerged between the different ethnicities, issues of ethnicity and religion were relevant for the Bosnians in terms of their re-creating transnational communities and reconstructing identities in the present as well. For some of my participants the issue of ethnicity was also relevant for their labor market integration and other practical resettlement issues, not just because of the way the host society treated them, but also because of the role *connections* and networking within the ethnic community have played on their own well-being.

The Bosnian Center aimed to serve all refugees by providing community services that included educational and family programs, counseling, and cultural activities. Yet, an interethnic battle arose between the staff and the Center leaders. Divisions within refugee groups arriving en masse are not uncommon and are framed in differences in class, religion, ethnicity and politics (Salinas et al. 1987 in: Kelly 2004). While the Bosnian-American community offered initial resettlement support to the new arrivals in 1994, as resettlement continued, the initial efforts of the mainstream Bosnian-American community "sort of disappeared" with time (Interview, ORR). This was attributed to the fact that the Bosnian refugees tended to be more secular than the more conservative and more piously Muslim-Bosnian-American community. This led to conflicting notions of religious practice, emerging tensions and cultural differences among the different groups. Many conflicts occurred within the Bosnian Center.

Based on federal and state law, discrimination is not permissible based on national origin, but it was suggested that antagonism among the different ethnic and religious affiliations of the staff members operating the Center led to tensions, deficiencies in the services offered the clientele and power struggles among the staff.[155] This culminated in the Center's loss of

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[155] Various actors familiar with the circumstances surrounding this conflict explained to me that a possible complication regarding the conflict at the Bosnian Community Center and its eventual closing was attributed to the fact that the executive director was from an interethnic marriage (Serb and Bosnian). While ethnic tensions did contribute to problems at the Bosnian Center, the main reason the Center was closed, however, was attributed to power dynamics between the main leaders and board of directors. According to the chief of the Illinois Department of Human Service's Bureau of Refugee and Immigrant Services, the original board of directors of the Bosnian Center was gradually phased out, but tensions rose when a number of new people replaced those leaving the board. One very strong-minded woman, in particular, was elected president of the board, who soon had a personality conflict with the executive director of the Bosnian Center. This woman apparently had done an incredible job generating community interests and sustaining funding to provide services, and generally, as long as an agency is providing services that people need they are going to remain viable. Despite this, the new president and the executive director did not get along well and soon the executive director was fired. Once the agency entered a phase without an executive director, funding complications ensued because of the general rule that foundations will not fund an agency that does not have an executive director. Hence, certain foundations that had been supporting the Bosnian Center were no longer willing to provide support and within a year and a half, its funding had completely eroded. In one case, there was a grant directly from the federal government for $200,000 that the interim leadership failed to apply for. It also came down to a situation in which most of the members of the board of directors were not Bosnian refugees, they were struggling with the future vision, and only one staff member remained. As a result, the Center was closed and those few individuals

funding. With the closing of the Bosnian Center, the earlier unifying activities as well as the youth program ceased (Interview, ORR). The majority of refugees taken in under the US resettlement program were Muslim-Bosnians, yet some Croatian-Bosnians and Serbian-Bosnians were received as well. With the war, my respondents' perception of their own religious affiliation and identity was called into question. Though my respondents professed bearing no grudges, many nonetheless continued to feel disappointment, mistrust and in some cases, even hostility, toward the different groups in opposition to each other during the Bosnian conflict.

> "Right now I am working with the Commission on Human Relations in Chicago. They just got a new Commissioner and he's trying to do new stuff. We wanted to try and get a dialogue going because of the social events. Well, one thing is they have a soccer league and most of the teams are Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian from the Balkans and every time you go there, there's a fight and screaming and it's not a good situation and then you have young kids who go to these games too and they're watching their dads, how they behave and scream." (Interview, Melisa)

Because children mimic their parents, the continuation of tensions generated from the war spread with the refugees in Chicago. This participant works to counter the varying ethnic problems emerging as a result. Hence, a continuation of the tensions in Bosnia resumed in the receiving community, though on a much lower scale.

4.4.2.4 The Role of Religious Constructions

Religion and religious constructions played a significant role in the lives and identities of my interlocutors. Religion or faith also resulted in some cases in either strengthening or weakening my interlocutors' notions of belonging in the receiving society contexts. Prior to the war, it does not appear as if many of my respondents spent much time reflecting on their religious identity, what they believed, or how secular they were. While religion was officially sanctioned and unaccepted under Communism, it was at the same time tolerated unofficially (Miskovic 2007:518). This in turn influenced my participants' religious identity, mostly as far as it contributed to underplaying the role of religion in their lives. "Religious affiliation is a part of one's cultural identity, regardless of one's attitudes toward religion." (Miskovic 2007:518) Precisely because of Bosnia's intricate past with Communism and conflicts propagated on the basis of religious and ethnic identity, however, notions of religion and ethnicity took on significant new meanings for my interlocutors after the war. In particular, this became more convoluted in the countries of destination as my respondents reflected on their values, beliefs, and identity formation following their displacement. One of my Muslim

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still committed to the effort, cooperated with the State Department to try and figure out how to maintain services to the Bosnian refugees (Interview, ORR).

interlocutors explained, "Just the other day somebody asked me: 'Are you still a Muslim'? That's a very tricky question. It tells you a lot about what I have learned. I didn't answer it the way that maybe I would have answered it before." (Interview, Kemal) Having encountered questions, assumptions, ignorance and blatant discrimination related to religious ethnic identity both in Bosnia and in the receiving society contexts, my respondents learned to be cautious in discussing such topics.

> "We moved first to Germany and then here [Chicago], and we don't even look like the typical Muslims, so if we actually admit what religion we are, we get that weird: 'Oh really? Well, you don't look like one.' And then for Muslims from other countries we're never Muslim enough: 'Well, you do this and the way you dress and this and that.' It's part of my identity and something I was reading on and I know a lot about it, but religion doesn't drive my life, I'd say." (Interview, Melisa)

This excerpt addresses the common problem many of my Muslim respondents encountered in their interactions with members of the host society. Expectations regarding what and who a Muslim is often varied from the image and lifestyle of the Bosnian Muslim in Chicago, causing them to have to explain themselves as well as to answer to questions regarding Islam in general.

This was further influenced by the intricacy of global events (war on terror) in relation to the local contexts (meaning-making occurring during the interviews) (cf. Huttunen 2005). In the politicized context following the attacks on the World Trade Center Twin Towers and rising Islamophobia, the label *Muslim* became more common, regardless of any affiliation to Islam. Hence, it is presumed that the focus in Chicago on Muslim identities rather than Orthodox Serbs or Catholic Croats emerged as a result of the contested relations with Islam and *Muslimness*. When Muslims admitted their faith in public in Chicago, my respondents were commonly confronted with questions regarding Islam and stereotypical associations of Muslim identity, which became more contentious following the World Trade Center attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, since the events of this date provided the "rationale for the erosion of civil liberties in anti-terrorism legislation and increased demonizing of Muslims" (Briskman/Cemylin 2005:716). This often induced conflicting emotions and defensive stances as a result.

> "You need to understand when a Bosnian guy says he's Muslim this doesn't have to mean anything. We are not even close to the Muslims from, say, Saudi Arabia. We are like totally opposite. I sat in one Polish bar and I see a dark skinned guy who asks, 'where you come from'? I go, 'from Bosnia.' [He says] 'Oh then you are my brother.' I said 'but you are not mine.' Because I hate people like this! I like open-minded [people] and never do compare them: like, Catholics from Rome, Italy, it's not saying, like, Catholic from South America from, let me say, from Colombia. You cannot compare those guys. Like Orthodox from Moscow and Orthodox from Serbia they are not the same. Muslims from

Bosnia are not the same as Muslims, say, from Afghanistan. We are totally opposite!" (Interview, Zorak)

By questioning not only the existence of universal traits distinguishing religious Muslims from one another, but all religions from one another, my respondent understands that differences in loyalties to ethnic or religious groups, countries of origin, and brotherhood shape different narratives about Muslims, or any religious group for that matter. In distinguishing the different practices of religion according to different national settings, this respondent rejects the notion of universal traits to distinguish religious groups in connection with nationality. His clear refusal of *brotherhood* with someone just because of a supposedly shared religious association is telling of the complexity and skepticism he relates to religion and religious association.

Having been accustomed to ascriptions relating to ethnicity and religion enforced by others during the war in Bosnia, my respondents were fully aware of the interlinking of religion and suppressive thinking and actions. Reveling in *sameness* is a consequence of the differentiations ascribed to religion and ethnicity during the war. For many, religion is consequently something to be suspicious and wary of. Against this background, another respondent admitted his suspicions and misgivings in regard to religious activities in Chicago, suspecting that religion is used to achieve an ulterior motive.

> "We had English classes in a church-owned facility but I don't remember that they had any other agenda than talking English to you. I don't consider that to be missionary work and the reason I'm saying that is because we are different religions and maybe, you know, people would say, well, that's why they wanted to do that, so they can do their own agenda and maybe do missionary work or something." (Interview, Kemal)

Traditionally, religion can serve a fundamental category of identity and association in society. Through it immigrants find a place for themselves in American life (Menjívar 2006). "Religion is also often at the center of an immigrant's sense of identity and religious institutions regularly serve as focal points for gatherings and celebrations, as well as for obtaining assistance for practical everyday life issues." (Menjívar 2006:1449) This is evident by the following excerpts. One interlocutor explained that when he was in high school in Chicago he became active in a Catholic parish regardless of any religious convictions. He simply wanted to play ball.

> "My closest experience with the church here in America is that in sixth or seventh grade, my buddies at the school, some of whom, you know, some of the boys from my class would go play basketball at a church that was three doors down from our school. We'd play basketball for an hour and a half and then Pastor Bob, as he was called, would tell us about some part of the bible, but it was kind of like commercials that you watch during a film. It's like, okay, fine, just hurry up and let me play some basketball!" (Interview, Valten)

Another participant, who describes himself as Muslim, also became active in playing basketball at a local Catholic parish. Initially, only interested in making use of the church's basketball court, he relates how his affiliation with the church organization offered him a platform as a young adult to develop his own character and identity. Eventually, he received more than he had bargained for, however, since one of the requirements for his participation was to engage in an hour-long religious dialogue with the parish priest and other youth before every game. He says his initial motivation was to seek "a source of positive energy."

> "But then when I got into the community and when I saw all this self-conviction, meeting people who were running the show, I realized I was not looking for that. So faith became kind of negative, but more because of the people driving it. I'm not going to put this much effort into it because I just don't think that it's helping. So it's just me. Do your own thing and that's it." (Interview, Dino)

The sports program began as a community activity and opportunity to learn about a Christian religion in the US, but soon evolved into a stronger focus on missionary activities. Eventually, this participant ceased pursuing this sport outlet because he claims, "there were too many politics" involved. Church-sponsored activities such as these are prevalent throughout the US and tend to target youth or individuals in need. The aim is to provide a supportive network with mentorship and identity formation activities.

> "The institutions of urban religion are made up of people whose frames of reference have been shaken by some combination of structural and cultural change. In response, these churches, temples, synagogues, and mosques produce the cultural material that enables their members and adherents to locate themselves with respect to the places and time in which they currently live, to identify with others, to find their moral bearings, and to achieve some measure of efficacy with respect to their own needs and aspirations. Mainly through worship, education and social activities, these congregations appropriate symbols and generate new ones... to make sense of changing circumstances" (Livezey 2000:21).

According to Miskovic (2007), religious institutions play an important role in the process of ethnic formation for immigrants in the US, as they "exercise leadership and serve as a gathering force in structuring immigrants' lives in the host society" (Kurien 2004 in: Miskovic 2007:519). Interaction with religious organizations contributed in providing an alternative to the gangs and trouble that commonly befell the refugee youth in Chicago.

This is consistent with the generally accepted attitude in American society with regard to religion and its expression, which is heavily intermixed in many different spheres of social space. Religion has incorporated a role as a "cultural system that appropriates symbols, generates new ones, claims and revises traditions, defends and bridges social boundaries, articulating and inventing meanings and values by which to make sense of changing circumstances" (Livezey 2000). This has become a source of strength for individuals in need, particularly as religious involvement transcends class boundaries. This sort of supportive

"missionary" work, however, sometimes deterred several of my interlocutors from becoming more involved, as they were particularly sensitive and mistrustful of the role religion sometimes plays.

The majority of my respondents believed these interactions and comments were not intentionally disrespectful, but were rather representative of the general ignorance of mainstream American society about people from other countries.

> "People normally don't think that we're from Europe, especially us Muslims. I've heard many comments. Sometimes I would stay quiet and then if I knew the person, then I would explain and be nice, you know? Give them a clue, but if someone's views were too over the top, then no. From time to time, you always run into people who put that at the forefront, but I try to disassociate myself from those kinds of people." (Interview, Dino)

Perhaps because the perpetrators in the war were people my respondents knew, people they may have trusted, they were more likely later to doubt the wisdom of trusting others. Essentially, the war led to a breakdown in my respondents' trust of others, which influenced them in their adaptation processes. They generally reacted sensitively and often emotionally when the topic of religion was raised due to the ascribed religious ethnization they experienced during the war. "Survivors tend to experience intense emotions in response to stimuli even when the stimuli may appear to others as mild or innocuous. Survivors may be more sensitive or may emotionally shut down and disconnect." (Bryant-Davis 2005:45) The following excerpt reflects an attempt made by one of my respondents to explain the complexity of nationality classification when others ascribe politicized religious labels.

> "Religion is something private, it's something intimate. I don't think it belongs en masse to the people and especially not with politics. If you mix politics and religion, then it can be very dangerous and history showed me this before. It would always be like this because people, they never learn through history. They always do the same. States and history are somehow repeating and this is sad, you know?" (Interview, Nafiz)

This mistrust is telling of the negative experiences my respondents had with religious identity constructs, a characteristic that influenced each of them, regardless of their faith. Several acknowledged the constant interplay between ascribed and performed ethnicity and the role of societal and historical mediators influencing the agency of their identities (cf. Miskovic 2007).

This contention is precisely what many of my Muslim respondents complained of in their exchanges with host society members, whose understanding of a Muslim identity varied greatly from the individual identity and *Muslimness* perceived by my respondents. In posing difficult questions in an attempt to distinguish for themselves what role religion and spirituality should have in their lives, some of my respondents, consequently, negated religion

altogether, refuting any religious ties or associations, even distancing themselves from religious symbols involving mosques, synagogues, or churches.

> "I'm not religious at all and my wife, she's not religious. I grew up in socialism and we learned in school that god doesn't exist. I respect that; just do not force me to believe in something that I don't. I was lucky when I met my wife. We are same age, same country, everything's same and we don't have those problems now. Because from 100 Bosnians maybe five to 10 believe and the rest of them don't. I mean, I believe in something, but I am not a guy who goes to the mosque and prays over there. That's not me." (Interview, Zorak)

Consequently, some moved to the extreme of mistrusting anything to do with religion, while others simply rejected the role of religion in their lives. Assumptions made by the receiving society about the Bosnians' religious and ethnic identities served as an impetus for them to distance themselves from the host society or to avoid discussing the topic altogether. One participant stated: "I'm just, you know, not really religious" (Interview, Anita) and left it at that, not feeling the need to clarify or elaborate. Another participant admitted that religion is not really important to him. In his experiences in the US he is rarely asked about his religion and what it means to him, something he considers "fine by me, because I wouldn't know the answer." (Interview, Mali)[156] Whether a lack of interest in religion is a result of my interlocutors' war experiences or whether their indifference toward religion existed already before the war was difficult to determine in a number of cases.

What is striking by these excerpts on religion is the openness of my Chicago sample, whereas members of my Berlin sample rarely referred to their faith, its meaning, their practices, or mainstream society's response. Overall, my informants in Berlin did not place the same degree of focus on religious stereotyping as those in Chicago. One reason for this may be attributed to the privacy of religion in Germany and the fact that one's religious beliefs tend to be discussed only in intimate circles. Secondly, Berlin residents seemed to know more about Bosnian Muslims and their secularity and thus possibly disassociated from religious associations. Lack of contact to the mainstream society may be another factor. Fourth, the Bosnian refugees in Berlin may have been spared racist and religious *othering*, since the Turkish and Arab migrant communities received greater negative attention from civil society

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[156] This respondent's point in not knowing what he would to say, how to explain his beliefs, or how to connect religion with his identity or with some greater meaning in life is interesting. He was the only respondent in my Chicago sample with such an emotionally-distanced and seemingly unreflective attitude. Whether this may be a form of self-protection to avoid confrontation or self-definition, or whether religion really is so irrelevant to this individual, is unknown. Alternatively, perhaps, he just did not trust me enough to delve into this complicated issue with me. Compared to the other interlocutors in his age category, he also seemed to have fewer interactions with mainstream society, which may explain why he had fewer interactions in Chicago with people questioning him about religion.

than the Bosnians.[157] Lastly, my sample may have simply avoided speaking to me on this topic.

It seems certain that members of my Chicago sample were accustomed to having to answer to others about what they believe, how they position themselves, what being Muslim means to them, etc. This is likely why they went into expansive detail on the topic. Whether this is a result of the openness of the American population to discuss religion or whether this can be attributed to racialized undertones and fear of Muslims could not be determined. Considering, however, that religion for my Croatian and Serbian respondents was less of an issue, I suspect that this outcome is closely related to the heightened Islamophobia in the US following Sept. 11th.

4.4.2.5 Role Reversals and Challenges for Youth and Adolescents

Another socio-cultural obstacle that emerged in the data was reflected in the role reversals and transitions in family dynamics. As was already highlighted, children were often forced to assume parental roles. This was largely attributed to the fact that the youth learned the language of the host society more rapidly than the adults. The youth were - regardless of the context - generally expected to explain the customs of the receiving society to their parents, grandparents, and adult-age friends and relatives. As such, the children assumed adult roles in the majority of situations, being the family spokesperson and discussing issues of significant importance for the family's well-being. They filled out visa forms and answered asylum and entry interview questions, they negotiated at the Welfare Office and Foreigners Office, they assumed roles as accountant, translator, and legal advocate, mediating with lawyers, and translating at parent/teacher conferences and at doctors' appointments. An entire family's ability to remain in Berlin, for instance, was often contingent on these exchanges and carried enormous weight.

In Chicago, the responsibility of communicating also fell to the children due to the adult refugees' basic need to understand and to be understood, at least initially. This arrangement did not appear to be openly discussed. Rather it was understood, framed in the simple reality of the children's language proficiency and the adults' lack thereof, contextualized in a state of dependency for the adult refugees in both contexts. Consequently, the refugee youth undertook adult responsibilities, tending to possess more social competence than their parents in the receiving society context. According to Binder and Tošić, "this shift in competence destroys traditional family structures. Parents are viewed as not competent and sometimes

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[157] No statistics have been gathered to confirm such a presupposition.

even as failing" (2005:622). Due to the different rates of adaptation that the youth and parents undergo intergenerational differences often result (cf. Berry et al. 2006). "For example, the acculturation attitudes of adolescents generally favor integration whereas their parents may favor separation (Berry/Sam 1997), resulting in dissonant acculturation (Portes 1997)." (in: Berry et al. 2006:9) Although this created stress for the children and youth, they typically acknowledged the helplessness and pressure on their parents and did their best to assist them.

"The adolescent refugee is in the peculiar position, typically, of not having participated wholly in the translocation decision, and her experiences of migration may remain relatively obscured by that of her parents." (Garcia Coll/Manguson 2000 in: Mosselson 2006:xxii) Despite their lack of agency to decide to migrate, the youth were greatly affected by displacement and relocation. For instance, because of their parents' insufficient host language knowledge and/or inability to attain work, the well-being of many Bosnian youth was also threatened by poverty and hardship. In Chicago, this was most evident during the initial reception phase as parents attempted to learn English and acquire jobs that paid more than the minimum wage. The consequence was that parents in Chicago were rarely home and the youth often lacked parental guidance. In cases, where parents or grandparents were more present and available to the youth, healthier behavioral responses were evident.

> "By socializing within the family and the community, adolescents learn values, traditions, and practices of their culture. In many immigrant families, these values typically emphasize interdependence among family members (Fuligni 1998b; Phinney/Ong/Madden 2000), including the expectation of mutual support within the family. With increased age, there are countervailing pressures for greater autonomy; peers from other groups provide models of alternative ways of interacting with parents and others. A strong sense of obligation to the family may benefit immigrant youth by providing clear roles and a sense of direction." (Fuligni 1998 in: Berry et al. 2006:8)

The youth in both contexts benefited from the presence and guidance of their parents. It was nonetheless difficult for some of the youth to have to observe their parents' states of depression and sense of powerlessness. This was more evident among my Berlin respondents. Due to the many structural limitations inhibiting the Bosnian adults to be more active in pursuing their goals in Berlin, many – especially the traumatized and/or elderly - tended instead to direct their attention on the goals and experiences of their children or grandchildren. Parents in Berlin revealed feeling helpless as they were forced to sit by and watch their children struggle as a result of residence, work and education restrictions. As the situation for some refugee youth improved over time parents were generally much happier.

Those in Berlin, able to attend school, learned German and hoped to remain in Germany to work and to *contribute to society*. Those unable to access Germany's educational system, since they were over 16 years of age, suffered from boredom, inertia, and a phase of de-

qualification. Critics of Germany's education system argue that pupils are weeded out from pursuing higher education based on their legal status, psychological state, German language skills and educational performance, which places certain migrant and refugee groups at a disadvantage.[158] Unable to work, attend school or learn a trade, many of the Bosnian refugee youth were known to have caused trouble, the consequence for which resulted in their deportation. Confronted with deportation as a punishment, many remained on their best behavior.

> "In diesem Jahr ist auch was Schönes passiert. Am Ende des Schuljahrs ist mein Sohn an die Schule angenommen worden. Es hat mir eine große Freude gemacht. Das hat mir eine recht große Freude gemacht. Er macht jetzt Gastronomie. Und kurz danach haben wir die Aufenthaltserlaubnis gekriegt. Ach Mensch!" (Interview, Zumra)

Overall, the concern for youth delinquency was less of a concern among my Berlin sample than my Chicago sample, perhaps because those who *got lost* in Berlin were merely deported. Another reason for this may be related to the fact that "the Bosnian children in Berlin have always been in the forefront" (Interview, Publicata) and because parents were not working and had more time for their children. Alternatively, it may have been due to many parents in Berlin internalizing the successes of their children or grandchildren and this pride possibly encouraged their children to succeed.

> "Immigrant adolescents develop an identity as a member of their own group (Phinney 1990) and, to varying degrees, as a member of the larger society (Phinney/Devich/Navarro 1997). The extent to which they develop a preference for either the ethnic or national group or combine them into a bicultural identity has implications on their psychological adjustment." (Berry et al. 2006:8)

The youth in my Chicago sample, by contrast, acknowledged that their parents' lack of guidance was interlaced in their parents' feelings of being overwhelmed due to the many challenges in the new context. They faced pressures to be self-sufficient, lacked time to process their war traumas, and had to pay the costs of the family. This sometimes resulted in youth interpreting their parents as being detached or angry. Depressed mothers tended to be more irritable, more critical, and they exhibited a higher degree of hostility and aggression towards their children (cf. Meffert/Marmar 2009). The combination of mourning parents disassociated from their children as well as adolescents striving for more autonomy is known to stir greater interfamilial conflicts (Berry et al. 2006).

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[158] (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung im Auftrag der Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung 2010). Although recent scores in the PISA study showed general improvement among migrants, it is unclear whether this is due to improvements made by the migrants themselves or based on concerted integration measures targeting migrants. Perhaps, this is a combination of the two.

Despite efforts of the Bosnian Center to prevent Bosnian youth from becoming involved in gangs, some community activists argued that this sort of assistance often came too late. Consequently, quite a number of Bosnian youth in Chicago became involved in criminal activity, gang involvement, were imprisoned and even deported (Interviews, Drs. Kennedy and Weine). It thus seems that the insufficient services and resources of the Chicago public school system, in addition to the lack of guidance on the part of their parents - who often worked two jobs, in addition to dealing with their own sense of loss and insecurity - tended to lead to a breakdown in many of the teenagers' development. This in turn exacerbated the integration challenges of the Bosnian refugee youth in Chicago.

This concludes the description of socio-cultural obstacles my interlocutors faced collectively. Starting with war-related traumas, PTSD, pressure to integrate, fear, insecurity, and more, the next section lists the emotional obstacles my samples encountered, which overlaps somewhat with the previous obstacles described, again indicating their interrelationship.

4.4.3 Emotional Obstacles

The subcategory, *emotional obstacles,* is characteristic of the internal, individual emotional hurdles my participants experienced in connection to both their pre- and post-migration adaptation processes. Many of the emotional obstacles that influenced my informants in adapting in the receiving society were reflective of the war and displacement, as previously described: Some experienced rape, torture, incarceration in concentration camps, physical injuries, and war-related disabilities. Some witnessed the violent death, torture, and/or injury of loved ones (cf. Macksoud et al. 1993; Weine et al. 1998). Many were forced to separate from their family and loved ones, or were displaced to new regions, losing all their material possessions as a result. These unhappy and frightening experiences contributed to the complex nature of stressful events experienced in the receiving society context. The emergence of new obstacles in the receiving society context also had a tendency of heightening the stressors connected to pre-existing war traumas. This in turn influenced my respondents' ability to act, to interact, to maneuver, and to access essential resources in the two reception arenas. Thus, the pre-migration experiences of the Bosnian refugees clearly influenced their post-migration adjustment and adaptation processes. In the following section, more detail is provided on a range of the most consistent emotional obstacles identified in both samples.

4.4.3.1 Survival and Guilt

Accompanying the refugees' exodus was the notion of diaspora, a feeling of being dispersed throughout the world, victims of war, maimed and psychologically damaged, helpless victims of ethnic cleansing, but survivors nonetheless. Intrinsic with this is the ongoing struggle for survival, both psychologically (overcoming traumatic experiences) and physically (dealing with loss of food, clothing, housing, possessions, health, safety, security, etc.). As a result, characteristics of being a survivor and carrying the memory of personal and collective calamity were interwoven into my respondents' narratives. "It is safe to assume that most newcomers hold a personal and collective history of hardship, struggle and a remarkable capacity for survival at the heart of their life experiences." (Sam/Berry 2006:11) Tarta Arcel et al. (1995:23) suggest that this common core experience of being a survivor makes civil war refugees effectively equal in their fundamental humanity. "They have all experienced the worst dislocation stress for a human being – dislocation because of war and devastation of the homeland. They have faced death and have survived."

Despite the elation associated with this realization, it often inspires simultaneously a wave of guilt at having survived while others close to the survivor died. This common experience of surviving, of having come into close contact with death, either through others, such as family members, or personally, often has the effect of "aligning individuals, particularly civil war refugees, in their basic humanity" (Noorfarah 2007). Survivor guilt commonly abounds among war refugees and relates to their having "endured circumstances where significant others perished" (Ibid). As both witnesses and survivors to the devastation of war, my interlocutors found themselves in a, for them, new position, one that is, however, common to many survivors of war, having survived extreme physical, sexual, verbal and emotional violations. Events are traumatic not because of their rarity, but because of their impact of overwhelming an individual's internal resources (Bryant-Davis 2005).

4.4.3.2 Trust and Mistrust

By experiencing firsthand the atrocities carried out by neighbors with whom they previously had been on friendly terms, my respondents observed - or sometimes even took part in - the harm humans can inflict on each other. This resulted in their loss of trust in others, which was intensified if they themselves had caused harm to others. This heightened their sense of mistrust, often leading to a *loss of faith in humanity*. It became a central issue for my participants, framed around the task of making sense out of life, finding meaning again after the tragedies experienced firsthand during the Bosnian conflict, which shook them to the core. "After a trauma, the survivor may feel that by opening up, relying on, trusting another person,

he becomes vulnerable. He may believe that the way to prevent trauma in the future is to trust no one." (Roth/Batson 1997 in: Bryant-Davis 2005:45)

In Berlin, mistrust was most prominent in the interactions with the Foreigners Office staff as my interlocutors perceived a stark ambiguity and inconsistency in the treatment they received by the authorities. The uncertainty of their situation was particularly stressful for the traumatized refugees, who tended consequently to feel heightened displays of mistrust. In Chicago, evidence of mistrust abounded most frequently in the narratives of my respondents regarding divisions in ethnic and religious constructs of others and in relation to their own worldviews.

Having trust requires faith in a person to act toward you with compassion. "It is the expectation that a person will be dependable." (Bryant-Davis 2005:44) Those in my sample, who were able to establish trusting relationships with other individuals, who felt "protected" by God, or who felt confident or resilient, tended to benefit from relationships that felt safe and secure. "When survivors trust themselves, they have a special sense of peace and confidence in their capabilities and self-worth." (Bryant-Davis 2005:44)

4.4.3.3 Shame and Self-blame

An additional connection appeared linking my interlocutors' loss of faith in humanity to feelings of *shame* and s*elf-blame*. "Shame is a feeling of an internalized "badness" and general negative self-concept that the survivor has. It is not simply guilt over doing something wrong. Instead, it is the belief and feeling at the survivor's core that something is wrong. Shame creates feelings of embarrassment and causes the survivor to feel the need to hide." (Bryant-Davis 2005:61) Self-blame is attributed to my respondents' feelings of responsibility, even when they were in fact victims of war atrocities. According to Bratton (1999), "self-blame fosters guilt, minimization, and denial" (in: Bryant-Davis 2005:62). The emergence of self-blame had the potential of impeding my respondents in their recovery. In moments of self-blame they felt they were to blame for their current situation due to their being *evil*. Several of my respondents even felt shame regarding their *illegal means of entry* to a third country. Shame and self-blame have the tendency of keeping survivors *stuck* and as such, some of my respondents have been unable to move from surviving to thriving. Feelings of blame and self-blame may be partly attributed to their standstill, as some of these respondents continue to hold themselves accountable for the actions of others and the eruption of war in Bosnia.

4.4.3.4 Multiple Losses

In reconstructing meanings related to their experiences and the obstacles they faced in embracing life since Bosnia, my respondents consistently referred to the multiple losses and destruction related to the war and their displacement, which is why *losses* has its own subcategory. This included: loss of home and possessions, employment, status, security and financial means, loss of family and loved ones, relationships, marriage, loss of normalcy, fulfillment, safety, joy, trust in others, belief in one's self, sense of certainty, peace of mind, loss of previous life, loss of control over one's body and health, loss of a sense of power, self-determination, self-esteem, loss of independence, social mobility, as well as loss of will, energy, and lightness. For those who resettled more than once, this further involved having to start life anew, i.e. having to undergo numerous life transitions and further losses, sometimes including loss in identity and loss of a sense of belonging.

Despite how wide-ranging the refugee experiences have been, leaving behind family members or loved ones, who have disappeared or died, emerged as a pervasive ongoing post-migration obstacle for the interlocutors.

> "For a victim of war, a death encounter presents a violent intrusion or threat for life or end of life for the loved ones. All scales that assess stressful life events rank death of family members as one of the most stressful events. The death of a spouse or a child, or the loss of parents for young children and adolescents is the biggest crisis for most people, creating unparalleled stress." (Tarta Arcel et al. 1995:23)

Nearly each one of my respondents suffered personally from death encounters, resulting in severe emotional stress. Separated from family and loved ones, uncertain whether their husbands, wives, sons, daughters, fathers, mothers, brothers or sisters may still be alive, some have spent years waiting and hoping for the eventual return of loved ones. One respondent reflects her family's turmoil due to her father's disappearance and their difficulties admitting his death.

> "My father was taken from our home in May 92 and we never heard anything about him like for years. We had hoped but you know it's been 16 years now. You lose hope. So he's dead, but I keep saying that he's missing. Because we never found anything, so it's difficult to say you know he's dead. We always had hoped." (Interview, Anita)

Because mourning is not a one-time event, my respondents grieved each time memories of their losses reemerged, which seemed to occur simultaneous with each new overwhelming obstacle encountered in the host society. Unrelated stressors resulted in exacerbating the emotional states of my respondents. The painful losses and grief associated with the deaths of parents or siblings living in Bosnia were worsened by my interlocutors' inability to leave Berlin to participate in the mourning ceremonies in Bosnia.

> "Mein Vater ist in 1997 gestorben und meine Mutter ist an Silvester 2000 gestorben. Beide Male dürfte ich nicht runter fahren. Beim ersten Mal, als mein Vater verstorben ist, habe ich sie bei der Ausländerbehörde gebeten, mir die Erlaubnis zu geben nur wegen der Beerdigung runter zu fahren. Sie haben gesagt: 'Nein, wenn Sie jetzt so runter fahren, können Sie unten bleiben. Ich bin deswegen nicht runter gefahren.' Das war nicht richtig von den Mitarbeitern von der Ausländerbehörde. Das war alles so komisch und schwieriger durch die Ausländerbehörde gemacht worden." (Interview, Slavo)

Due to the mobility restrictions enforced with the *Duldung*, restrictions in my respondents' movements contributed to their sense of dependency and defeat and further led to feelings of resentment and shame for not having returned to Bosnia to pay their last respects and attain closure. This seemed to intensify feelings of loss and grief. Accepting and coming to terms with the multiple losses has been an ongoing process for my respondents, the impacts of which cannot be underestimated. Symptoms of depression and PTSD often emerged among my sample in response to these emotional stressors.

> "Because survivors of genocide suffer from a magnitude of losses including family members, other loved ones, property, work, and the sense of belonging to the multiethnic society, the term complicated grief, describes more clearly this experience of intense loss" (Craig et al. 2008:104). "Complicated grief involves an individual being frozen or stuck in a state of chronic mourning in which much of their mental anguish stems from their psychological protest against reality of the loss and general reluctance to make adaptations to life in the absence of a loved one." (Zhang et al. 2006 in: Craig et al. 2008:104)

Feeling stuck, helpless, and depressed were common descriptions of feeling in the interviews. "Posttraumatic experiences, in addition to continuous stress regarding cultural shock, adaptation, and integration into the new society, make refugee populations especially susceptible to mental health problems." (Spasojevic´ et al. 2000 in: Craig et al. 2008:104) Mertus et al. (1997) summarize in their writings on refugees, "Time for refugees spells danger; it forces them to remember, and at the same time it threatens to take them far from themselves, stripping them of who they once were and what they once desired" (p.16). In their struggle to come to terms with the many losses and hardship experienced with the war, in addition to the loss of loved ones, each new stressful situation in the receiving society heightened the impact of my interlocutors' interpersonal trauma as a result of their fragility. Some managed to cope with the emotional obstacles better than others.

This ends the overview of emotional obstacles. The next section highlights the actions and coping strategies my interlocutors applied, whether purposeful or not, in response to the obstacles they encountered in their post-migration *lifeworld* (Thiersch 1992).

4.5 Coping Strategies

To Alfred Schütz, the lifeworld represents an intersubjective terrain in which people both create their social realities and are simultaneously constrained by these social and cultural

structures in place (Ryan 2004). Although many similar elements were common to the Bosnian refugees, each nonetheless had his/her own individual lifeworld and commonsense reality. People tend to function with what Schütz refers to as *natural attitude,* or to what Bourdieu calls *habitus;* people rely unconsciously on learned behaviors and responses. This is the notion that objective structures never work in the abstract but exert themselves in the habitual dispositions of individuals (Bourdieu 1990).[159] People take the world around them for granted, acting unconsciously, until such a severe problem arises that their lifeworld shatters as they knew it. "It is only then that they cease to rely on 'recipes' for handling routine situations and must develop creative ways of handling the problems they encounter." (Ryan 2004)

One main characteristic of lifeworld, according to Schütz, is that individuals act with the aim of causing something to happen by virtue of that action. Action may be overt or covert, purposeful or unintended. Schütz (1951) defines action as an ongoing process of human conduct, which is devised in advance by the actor, based upon a preconceived project.

> "The term 'act' shall designate the outcome of this ongoing process, that is, the accomplished action… In order to transform the forethought into an aim and the project into a purpose, the intention to carry out a project, to bring about the projected state of affairs, must supervene." (Schütz 1951:161)

This differs from Bourdieu, who argues that *strategies* do not imply deliberation or motivation but, rather, are rooted in less-than-conscious *practical logic* (or *practical sense*), which emerge in encounters between habitus and field (Jenkens 2004).[160] Unless habitus becomes conscious, previously unconscious actions, tastes, styles, dispositions, sensibilities, thinking schemes, etc., which became internalized, must be unlearned so that new coping strategies may be applied in their place.

Coping strategies can be patterns that have been learned from family and friends, from role models, teachers, and therapists, through reading, observing the media, or acquired

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[159] Habitus are "schemes of perception, thought, and action, and on the other hand, social structures," which Bourdieu refers to as fields and groups (what others tend to deem as social classes) (Bourdieu 1974, 1980 in: Lemert 1993:482). "In habits, subjective consciousness meets objective reality in practical human action that is both enduring and unique." (Bourdieu 1984:14) Bourdieu argues that objective structures exist within the social world itself and not only within symbolic systems (language, myths, etc.), "independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations" (Bourdieu 1984:14). "Objects of knowledge are constructed, not passively recorded… and the principle of this construction is the system of structured, structuring dispositions, the habitus, which is constituted in practice and is always oriented towards practical functions." (Bourdieu 1974, 1980 in: Lemert 1993:479) This in turn influences the actions and coping strategies of the actors.

[160] Examples of fields - as systems of power relations – could include the political domain, the foreigners' office, and immigration systems, formal education, kinship relations, neighborhoods, and even the world of art. These fields are the site and the medium of interaction between the collective – institutions - and individual agents in which symbolic violence transpires, where domination is achieved indirectly, rather than forcefully coerced (Bourdieu 1990).

through practice. Coping strategies are cognitions and behaviors applied to manage and reduce stress (Lazarus/Folkman 1984 in: Kosic 2006). They may be either healthy or unhealthy (Bryant-Davis 2005). According to Ruby K. Payne,

> "Coping strategies are the ways in which one copes with daily living: the disappointments, the tragedies, the triumphs. Coping strategies are ways to think about things, attitudes, self-talk, strategies for resolving conflicts, problem-solving techniques, and the avoidance of needless conflicts. Coping strategies are also ways of approaching tasks, settings priorities, and determining what one can live with and what one can live without." (Payne 1996:90)

Coping strategies are often the actions and protective measures individuals are accustomed to using, particularly those that have brought positive outcomes in the past. Coping strategies are also commonly distinguished between problem-oriented strategies and emotion-oriented strategies (Lazarus/Folkman 1984 in: Kosic 2006).

> "Problem-oriented strategies are directed towards the management of the problem (doing something to alter the source of stress, trying to solve the problem), whereas emotion-oriented strategies are directed at reducing the level of emotional distress associated with the stressful situation (focus on the expression of tensions and frustrations, ventilate the feelings, self-controlling, etc.)." (Kosic 2006:117)

Coping strategies often incorporate a degree of purposeful action. When an individual plots an action to be realized in the future, the *in-order-to motive* of an individual's action can be established, which allows the individual to consider the information and resources available, as well as the time allotted for a decision to act to be made (Schütz 1951:161).

Traumatic events and the outbreak of war, however, disrupt the habitus and are known to overwhelm existing coping strategies, calling into doubt whether in-order-to motives still apply. Refraining from a projected action, however, may in itself also be an action, since purposefully refraining from acting is also considered a performance (Schütz 1951:161). This is what some authors call *non-rewarding strategies* or *avoidance-oriented coping*, referring to distraction, passivity (Kosik 2006) and possibly also denial or suppression.

In response to the different obstacles and heightened stress levels that emerged throughout the course of my samples' adaptation in Berlin and Chicago my interlocutors applied many and varying strategies to manage their responses to their situations. Although constructed as members of the same group, the Bosnian refugees did not all adopt the same coping strategies or exhibit identical emotional and psychological displays. Their *in-order-to motive*, however, was generally reflective of their shared goal to manage their adaptation process and normalize their lives. The *actions* they applied are reflective of the coping strategies they applied during this process and their *lifeworld* thus incorporates the social actions and interactions that

transpire in the shared world of communication and social action while intersecting with the overarching timeline of society (Ryan 2004).

I have broken down the analysis of the results according to three main categories of coping strategies exemplified by my respondents' actions. These include: non-rewarding (avoidance-oriented) coping strategies, protective (emotion-oriented) coping strategies, and practical (problem-oriented) coping strategies. The combination of these three strategies emerged as key concepts that contributed in the adjustment and adaptation processes of my interlocutors. Because many of the coping strategies applied were related to the resources available in the host society context, distinctions are made in these cases according to the two contexts (please see also Appendices O and P).

4.5.1 Non-Rewarding (Avoidance-Oriented) Coping Strategies

Non-rewarding coping strategies refer to the tactics my participants applied as a way of compensating for the emotional stressors that appeared too difficult for them, leading them to find alternative strategies upon which to act to avoid stressors altogether. Many of my respondents, for instance, were forced to suspend their natural mourning rituals and grieving processes during their displacement due to conditions of extreme turmoil. Had they stopped to grieve, for instance, in the middle of their exodus, they would likely not have managed their escape. In an emergency situation, adrenaline and dulled emotional reactions are deemed valuable protective responses (even required of doctors and nurses to do their jobs), but once an emergency situation passes and the danger is alleviated, it is important to process the experience. Those who fail to do so apply avoidance-oriented coping strategies. "Unhealthy coping strategies compromise the survivor's safety, health, functioning, and well-being." (Bryant-Davis 2005:146) Coping strategies harming the health and safety of others (i.e. abuse) are likewise unhealthy. Often this response is referred to as *destructive strategies*, applied in order to numb or distract from emotional pain.

In applying non-rewarding coping strategies, my interlocutors were responding to particular circumstances that seemed especially emotionally challenging for them. Usually relying on an internal response to stress situations, they often acted without devising a conscious strategy or plotting a certain form of action to take. "Repression, disassociation and denial are phenomena of social as well as individual consciousness." (Herman 1997:9) The non-rewarding strategies tended to be unconscious reactions, which often resulted unintentionally in maladaptive outcomes, rather than consciously hoped for positive outcomes (cf. Kosic 2006). Some of the various behavioral responses identified among my participants included, for instance, denial; escapism; distraction (keeping busy); avoidance; isolation;

compulsive behavior; self-medication with alcohol and other addictive substances; mental or physical abuse of others; failure to learn host society language; relying on children as translators, forcing them to assume adult roles; downplaying or minimizing traumatic experiences; and dissociation (disconnection from self and surroundings). An example of this is evident in the following statement, "I was trying not to think about the past, just put it somewhere else. I don't like talking very much about that. It was a bad time, with bad memories and I can't say anything good about it." (Interview, Rada) Many individuals learn to suppress their sadness, often out of fear of getting *stuck in the sorrow*. Many of my respondents disassociated from their war experiences, knowing intellectually that they happened, but disconnecting from the feelings and emotions related to these events as an essential means to function.

> "While dissociation may have been helpful during the crisis in that it allowed the survivor to physically and emotionally disconnect from the horrors being enacted upon them (Bratton 1999), it can become uncontrolled, unhealthy, and a predisposing factor in the development of post-traumatic stress disorder." (Herman 1998, McFarlane/Yehuda 1996 in: Bryant-Davis 2005:147)

Some of my respondents fared better than others, but many suffered from mental health disorders and were diagnosed with PTSD, particularly those in Berlin. My respondents' war experiences commonly led to symptoms of PTSD, which made it difficult for them to deal with the day-to-day problems that existed in Berlin.

Consistent with many trauma survivors, there is often an inclination to minimize the cruelty associated with their traumatic experiences. As Leo Eitinger, a psychiatrist who studied Nazi concentration camp survivors, said, "War and victims are something the community wants to forget; a veil of oblivion is drawn over everything painful and unpleasant" (Eitinger 1961, 1964, 1969). This applies both to society's response to the victims, as well as the victim's attempt to repress memories, referred to as episodic amnesia. "A refugee's memory may be impaired by trauma, or repressing memories may be an adaptive mechanism." (Beiser/Hyman 1997 in: Weaver/Burns 2001:152) In some cases, as a response to suppress the painful memories, individuals may not even recall traumatic experiences (Eitinger 1961, 1964, 1969). "Having experienced torture or other extreme trauma may prevent refugees from functioning in routine social and psychological roles and therefore they may have difficulty describing past experiences." (Vesti/Kastrup 1995 in: Weaver/Burns 2001:152) This protective response is deemed a non-rewarding coping strategy, since the intended goal for survivors is "to move from unhealthy to healthy coping strategies." (Bryant-Davis 2005:146)

In the subsequent section examples are provided of strategies that emerged in my research. A more expansive list of the non-rewarding coping strategies my respondents applied in the different destination contexts can be found in Appendices O and P.

4.5.1.1 Avoiding Therapy

Despite options to participate in psychological treatment or healing groups, there was often a tendency in my sample to avoid therapeutic support altogether. Many Bosnian refugees were hesitant to reveal the events causing their nightmares and anxiety. They struggled in the *retelling* of events they experienced, as they were afraid they would not be believed.

> "Zu erklären [was passiert ist] war in Gründe immer schwer. Es ist nicht so leicht Sachen zu erklären, die man unten erlebt hat. Es ist ja nicht so leicht, dass man vom einem zum anderen geht und sagt: ich habe das und das erlebt. Und die Leute sagen: da unten [im Dorf] war kein Krieg…" (Interview, Zumra)

In addition, some also felt a sense of shame in relating the specific details of their experiences. Speaking about traumatic incidents, such as rape was a topic many of my participants preferred to avoid altogether and when necessary, women preferred to disclose details only to other women.

> "Mit einem Mann kann man nicht so viel reden, nein… Ich habe am Ende Medikamente genommen. Der Arzt wusste, dass da was passiert ist, dass wir schon was erlebt hatten, aber das war alles was er wusste. Ich habe nur Tabletten von ihm bekommen und kurz gesagt, wie es mir geht und so. Die Gespräche haben nicht lange gedauert." (Interview, Zumra)

In addition to hesitancy in revealing details related to rape, torture and other traumatizing war experiences, having to describe disturbing events to strangers, and through translators, reliving it in the narrative, was extremely difficult for my respondents.

> "Ich habe zum ersten Mal damit angefangen meine Erlebnisse zu erklären als ich mal zu einer Begutachtung von der Gemeinärztin von der Ausländerbehörde war. In '99 musste ich zu einer Begutachtung und da habe ich zum ersten Mal erklärt bei der Frau, erst als ich bei der Frau war, die Begutachterin. Sie hat mir gleich danach eine Psychotherapie empfohlen. Dann habe ich bei AWO angefangen, wo ich heute immer noch hingehe, da wo ich mehr erzählen konnte." (Interview, Zumra)

Many refugees were further unwilling to exhibit signs of weakness or to bring on shame to themselves or their community by disclosing what had transpired. Males in particular often abstained from seeking out psychological assistance, applying instead denial and avoidance strategies rather than admit or address any lasting impacts their war traumas may have caused. One participant attempted to explain that it was part of the Bosnian mentality to refuse mental health treatment. If psychology or professional therapeutic assistance was mentioned, the typical response was: "Ich bin nicht verrückt!" (Interview, Bekr)

For many men, revealing the details surrounding their disempowerment during the war was too painful to speak of or to recount. This may reflect one reason why some were unwilling to pursue therapy. "Manhood is often associated with independence and showing minimal emotional display to others." (Bryant-Davis 2005:49) The fear of breaking down in front of others likely also kept many away. Implicit with the notion of therapy is mourning in the presence of others, which requires the capacity to communicate one's feelings, to trust, and to establish a connection, which was a particular challenge considering the general mistrust of my respondents following the atrocities witnessed during the war. Consequently, several of my respondents faced trust issues when considering counseling. Perhaps as a result of notions of patriarchal gender roles, many Bosnian men viewed emotional traumatization as a sign of vulnerability. Breaking down, showing weakness might after all be perceived as an attack on their conceptions of *manliness*, which appeared synonymous with images of provider, protector, and fearless leader. This, too, resulted in improper recognition of symptoms and diagnosis.

Gender bias in diagnosis and treatment also served as a barrier in building trust with mental health professionals (Bryant-Davis 2005:49). Many doctors merely prescribed medication to help the refugees sleep, relax, or dull the symptoms related to the trauma, addressing only the symptoms superficially, rather than healing the causes. As a result, clear symptoms of depression remained in many cases in which there was a quick distribution of medication unaccompanied by therapeutic guidance. A general tendency prevailed that regardless of the medicine prescribed, forgetting was impossible.

> "I know that some of my colleagues stayed [in Bosnia], some left, and now some have problems. It's different from person to person. In those three weeks when I was there during the war, it was enough. I had some bad experiences and I still have it somewhere, you know, in my head." (Interview, Nafiz)

The youth in my sample refrained from seeking counseling and speaking with professionals about their dramatic life events. Some may not have realized that mental health treatment was an option and that they might benefit. Some likely were too busy or their parents were too busy (or emotionally strained) to address this need. In Chicago, one reason for failing to participate in therapeutic recovery was due to time constraints. The impact of trauma is not lessened due to financial or family obligations. "Whether the survivor allows time and space to grieve now or later, the grieving has to be done for her complete wholeness. Some people put it off awhile, but eventually the survivor will come face-to-face with the impact the trauma has had on her life." (Bryant-Davis 2005:96) The failure of some of my respondents to seek support and to deal with their emotional traumas had a lasting impact on their long-term

well-being. This became further complicated in Chicago by the five-year limitation on free healthcare access coverage. Now after more than 10 years, recurring trauma and mental disorders are surfacing, causing renewed hardship and adaptation obstacles among several of my Chicago respondents.

Those unable to approach their recovery and self-care in healthy ways, developing strengths emotionally, cognitively, socially, and spiritually, had the tendency of exhibiting erratic behavior or suffering more emotionally in each stressful situation. Many suffered from lapses in their recovery, exhibiting greater difficulties in regaining control over their post-migration living situation, which in turn exacerbated a variety of symptoms, ranging from anxiety and nervousness to substance abuse to depression to PTSD. This appeared to be an outcome of their avoidance-oriented coping strategies. According to diagnostic criteria specifying symptoms of PTSD, war experiences accounted for a large variance. This is due to the fact that "PTSD symptoms correspond to the people exposed in situations of war and repression (i.e. high levels of violence) and to the reactions of overwhelming fear and helplessness that such events elicit." (Durakovic´-Bello et al. 2003 in: Craig et al. 2008:104) Rather than incur stigmatization by admitting vulnerabilities, many instead chose not to pursue psychiatric treatment or engage in therapy. This is linked to unrewarding coping strategies, such as denial and avoidance.

4.5.1.2 Denial, Avoidance, and Self-Isolation

Rather than addressing the symptoms head on, many of my respondents preferred a strategy of avoidance.

> "I don't like to talk about [the war in Bosnia]. That's not really a happy subject, you know? There's nothing good about that or anything I say about it. The only thing you can learn from the war is how to cry. It makes you. I still cry. That's why I don't wanna- I don't know, I don't need to talk about it still." (Interview, Mali)

In accordance with Bosnian cultural traditions of stoicism, many of my interlocutors managed to simply carry on and function in the receiving society.[161] The following excerpt depicts one participant's reflections on the matter.

> "Als sie erfahren haben, dass ich alles übersetzen musste und auch was ich selbst erlebt habe, dann meinte sie, sie würde mir empfehlen mal selbst Hilfe in Anspruch zu nehmen. Ich habe es nie geschafft, aber ich denke ich schiebe das immer so irgendwie so vor mich hin, aber ich frage mich ob ich damit zu Recht komme. Wenn ich nicht darüber- also ich merke jetzt, dass es schwer ist so weil irgendwie- je älter man wird. Weil man dann halt so andere Sorgen hat und nicht- Verwirrung hangt immer was damit zusammen- also zum

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[161] Some personality traits exist across cultures (cf. Berry et al. 2002) and some cultural factors influence the development of traits and behavioral displays, which is an implication of associations with Bosnian stoicism and patriarchal traditions.

Beispiel, da hätte ich schon längst mit dem Studium wirklich fertig werden können, weil ich jetzt 27 bin. Das ärgert mich dann auch und dann ist es auch alles wegen des Krieges oder tausend andere Kleinigkeiten, die so passieren. Wenn ich mein Vater sehe, das wird dann so schlimm, wenn ich ihn halt sehe wie er halt ist und seine Auge tränt immer oder meine Mutter halt- sie hat so schlimme Sachen erlebt und so halt die Trennung von meinem Bruder und seine Frau- da sind alle so Geschichten mit einem dann schon nah gehen und dann merkt man erst wie tief es so sitz. Ja, ich weiß nicht ob, so wenn ich nicht darüber rede- dann geht es ja noch." (Interview, Selma)

There was a pervasive understanding that exchanging stories about the war was a taboo for both men and women alike, since it recalled the disempowerment they experienced during the war, an experience they preferred to suppress.

Seeking out contact with others outside the refugee community would normally not be deemed a non-rewarding coping strategy. But some participants purposely avoided contacts with Bosnian refugees, which had the unintended result of self-isolation. The main reason for this was due to the desire to avoid painful memories of the past and to dispel the sense of loss by avoiding situations where the topic would arise. In all interactions with Bosnian refugees this common experience abounded, whether the topic was discussed or not. One participant explained that it was too straining to interact with the Bosnian refugees in Berlin as the topics tended to include war experiences, memories of life in Bosnia, topics of inheritances stemming from the deaths of loved ones in Bosnia, and problems adjusting to life in the receiving society context, among other things. All of these issues drained this woman of her energy and strength, so she chose to avoid such interactions altogether. Others, acting like her, often ended up isolating themselves due to their limited interactions with mainstream Germans.

4.5.1.3 Self-Medicating and Avoiding Taboo Topics

Instead of addressing their traumas, some managed to suppress their memories through excessive alcohol and/or drug consumption, which was an unconscious strategy to help them forget, or a form of *self-medication* to help them deal with the ongoing stressors of life. Possibly they imbibed just for fun. Whatever the reason, these same respondents typically failed to take advantage of psychotherapy. Many simply carried on despite their sadness, fears, and isolation. Despite considerations that therapy might be beneficial to them, many could not muster the courage to take the first step.

"Many refugee clients come from cultural traditions that encourage them to be stoic and suppress trauma rather than discuss it openly. The strength that is found within these cultural traditions may serve as a protective factor. Additionally, some asylum seekers may be reluctant to discuss trauma and torture because it is socially stigmatizing. This may be particularly true in cases of rape." (Weaver/Burns 2001:152)

Many seemed to feel it would be better to avoid the taboo topic of war and their displacement, as if once they began talking about it they would be overwhelmed by the sadness and pain. Failure to talk about the past or to seek out professional assistance was a protective stratagem for many. Yet according to psychologists, neither the pain nor the loss disappears; only in working through the emotions related to the past can long-term health strategies be learned and applied. While some overcame their hesitancy in disclosing the details surrounding their traumas and sought treatment, many others applied avoidance strategies instead as a way to deal with their traumatic experiences and *function* in the receiving society context. On a more positive note, the next section addresses the protective coping strategies my respondents generally applied.

4.5.2 Protective (Emotion-Oriented) Coping Strategies

Protective coping strategies reflect the coping strategies my samples applied to deal mainly with the emotional obstacles they encountered. Because my respondents' past war experiences and memories of life in Bosnia continue to accompany and influence them in the processes of negotiating and constructing meanings in the receiving society contexts, attention must be devoted to this issue. While some common personality traits exist among my respondents, which can be partly attributed to their upbringing in Bosnia (*habitus*), and their experiences with the war and dislocation, many differences in their individual behavioral responses and personalities were apparent in the receiving society context. The Bosnian refugees, as a group, have differential size, power, rights and resources. As individuals (or as a group), these factors bear on how well my interlocutors managed their adaptation processes as their attitudes, motives, values, and abilities are distinctive of each individual (Sam/Berry 2006). I have assessed the extent to which my respondents' individual personalities influenced the risk and protective strategies they applied in pursuing (or not) their individual goals in their adaptation process (cf. Kosic 2006 in: Sam/Berry 2006). For this I distinguish between self-orientations and other-orientations.

> "Self-orientation refers to the experience of reflexive consciousness by which an individual is aware of the self, his/her personality and identity. Without this capacity, selfhood would be absent or meaningless: the self could not take the perspective of others, exercise self-control, and produce creative accomplishments, or experience pride, self-esteem, anxiety, and locus of control." (Kosic 2006:115)

This self-orientation is reflective in my respondents' reconstructions of their individual characteristics, responses, fears, hopes, and expectations.

> "Others-orientation includes skills and attributes that assist in the development and maintenance of relationships and effective communication in a foreign country (e.g.

extraversion, sociability, and coping strategies)." (Kosic 2006:115) As an example, knowledge and possession of intercultural competencies were deemed helpful as they serve to facilitate awareness of differences, which can be minimized in interactions. The variety of interactions with others assumed significance in my respondents' narratives. Because each interaction in the host society had the potential of either raising or reducing my respondents' self-esteem, each interaction could potentially hinder or facilitate my participants' willingness or perceived ability to act. Some interactions were specific to the receiving society context, but many were not, rather they were most connected to the individual.

Based on the analysis of my research, a number of variables emerged that have helped safeguard and positively influence the mental health of my respondents. Overall, their ability to overcome hardship, set new goals, and thrive in the receiving society context were deemed important protective coping strategies. A few examples follow starting with support of psychotherapy.

4.5.2.1 Thriving, Resilience and Psychotherapy

My respondents realized that they could not achieve normalcy in the receiving society context unless they came to terms with the reasons and the events that forced them to flee Bosnia. They needed to find ways to mourn their losses, overcome their fears and depression, and learn how to "thrive in the wake of traumatic experiences" (Bryant-Davis 2005:1). A number of Bosnian refugees benefited from participating in a spectrum of psychotherapies, ranging from family therapy, client-centered therapy, psychodynamic therapy, behavior therapy, Gestalt therapy, group therapy, and psychosocial supportive resource-oriented therapies offered by different organizations, such as the bzfo in Berlin or Heartland Alliance in Chicago. "Mit der Therapie lerne ich wie ich damit umgehe. Ich habe einen Schutzsystem: wenn es mir nicht gut geht, wenn ich es nicht mehr ertrage, dann schlafe ich nur." (Interview, Irena) Another participant said that only after her family began to participate in therapeutic services in Berlin did she and her parents begin speaking of their past experiences in Bosnia.

> "Wahrscheinlich weil wir uns dann auch zu sehr lange mit diesen Erlebnissen beschäftigt haben, ist mir dann aufgefallen, dass wir am Anfang nie darüber in der Familie oder so unter einander gesprochen haben, weil alle wussten was wir da erlebt haben. Nur wen jemand da war, der sich wirklich, wirklich dafür interessiert hat, dass mal nur ganz kurz so gesagt hat: Ja, so und so." (Interview, Selma)

Hence, many refugees learned the significance of applying varying coping strategies to help them focus again on the present when memories from their past abounded. Taking advantage of therapeutic support was deemed instrumental for those diagnosed with PTSD as they learned and applied a variety of helpful coping strategies.

"I first visited a psychologist. Since then I have been treated. They asked what kind of symptoms manifested during the time. I said fears. I don't know exactly if fears of everything, probably just my background and the life what I had and finally when I settled here, I had a lot of fears. I had a lot of sleeping problems and all my thoughts and memories from the past just came out. I have medications that help me for a short time, but sometimes my fears come again. But it's pretty stable now with the medicine and with the control. I also attend a therapy group. I have been in therapy for years. I meet them twice a week to be with people, talk with them, and laugh with them." (Interview, Rada)

Many at the time of the interview were still participating in therapy in order to practice healthy coping strategies and stress management. "Ich gehe regelmäßig zu Psychotherapie von AWO. Am Anfang, 1997, 1998 bin ich einmal in der Woche gewesen. Ich gehe immer noch. Jetzt gehe ich seltener, nicht so oft, aber schon mit der Organisation, mit der Therapie, mit Treffen usw." (Interview, Zumra) Respondents in my sample described improvement in those who pursued therapy, as they generally acquired more patience, became more engaged and more accepting of their current situation as a result of their past war experiences. Many participants mentioned the significance of the psychosocial therapy they participated in, indicating that this contributed in developing coping strategies. One participant describes some goals she learned from her group therapy.

"Durch die Gruppentherapien haben wir Distanz auch gelernt. Beispielsweise mit 15 Frauen und jeder Termin, jede zweite Wochen hat irgendeine Frau irgendwelche Probleme, die sie belastet, die auch verbunden ist mit allem was sie erlebt hat. Und dann haben wir so, ich glaube ich bin schon fast 8-9 Jahre dabei, wenn ich jedes Mal heulen würde was die auch fühlen, dann würde ich bis August hier sitzen. Und unsere Therapeutin hat uns auch gelehrt, dass wir nicht alles so ernst nehmen." (Interview, Sena)

Beyond offering a sounding board to deal with loss, displacement, and past war traumas, the therapy also provided a platform to deal with concrete concerns or current problems of the group members. Some common topics revolved around current problems the refugees were experiencing with bureaucratic administrations, Foreigners Office authorities, or language concerns. Another topic related to the future of their children and how to develop strategies for providing them guidance and support in the receiving society. "In der letzten Zeit kommen Probleme mit Kindern. Da viele der Kinder kommen in der Pubertät, kommt es irgendwann, dass die entweder kriminell oder schlecht in der Schule oder auch ganz früh heiraten werden." (Interview, Sena) In this regard, my participants discussed issues about their roles as parents, how to support their children and deal with the German school system, considering options for their children to pursue further qualifications or similar opportunities. In many cases, group members learned personal strategies to help them overcome the many obstacles and deal with life choices and stressors encountered in their day-to-day adaptation experiences. They learned, for instance, the significance of taking the time to grieve; to find meaning in

life again; apply positive interpretation, positive, procedural self-talk or relaxation exercises; they learned to trust themselves and increase individual self-worth; to trust others; make a decision to start anew; trust that all will work out; and feel grateful for those individuals who helped them; among other coping strategies.

While the following respondent admits the importance of feeling thankful, she nonetheless appears to have to remind herself of this, which is referred to as positive and procedural self-talk. "Ja, man soll froh sein, dass nichts Schlimmeres passiert ist, aber es ist schon schwer. Also wie gesagt, wenn man so ein bisschen nachdenkt, also man darf nicht darüber nachdenken." (Interview, Mirna) This kind of thinking helps in making sense of the world, and at the same time aids in protecting and reaffirming self-esteem (Bryant-Davis 2005).

Another significant strategy learned in therapy was *mourning their losses*, taking the time to grieve, and to process their sadness. Recognizing and allowing themselves to feel the impact of these losses not only appeared to be an important step in their process toward recovery, but it also eased my respondents' adaptation process as it helped them cope with their anxiety, tension, despondency, and general nervousness.

> "In erste Linie war für mich sehr wichtig, dass ich Psychiater hatte und Psychotherapie ansonsten glaube ich, wenn ich das nicht gehabt hätte, wäre ich schon längst tot. Wer weiß wo. Und wenn man durch das Ganze jemanden hat und plötzlich muss man auf den Ort kommen wo man noch nicht damit fertig ist, das konnte ich mir überhaupt nicht vorstellen. Und nach elf Jahren bin ich das erste Mal nach Bosnien gefahren. Schlimm." (Interview, Sena)

Those who took advantage of psychotherapy perceived it as essential. It helped them in addressing their psychological disorders and feelings of anger, sadness, depression and anxiety. After participating in therapy and consciously mourning their losses, my respondents were generally less easily provoked, less high strung, and better able to concentrate. Several respondents even commented on improvements they observed in the general well-being of other individuals and family members who had undergone therapy, as therapy enabled them a channel to deal with a wide range of emotions.

> "Durch die Arbeit mit dem Herrn R. geht es meinem Vater viel, viel besser. Bevor er mit Herrn R. in Kontakt war, hatte mein Vater nie darüber gesprochen oder wenn, nur ganz, ganz wenig. Er sagt nie was von der Geschichte als er in dem Konzentrationslager war oder was passierte bevor er halt mit Herrn R. zusammen gearbeitet hat. Und ich muss sagen, dass der Herr R. eine tolle Arbeit also gemacht hat." (Interview, Selma)

By experiencing their grief and recognizing their losses, many respondents managed to apply healthy emotion-oriented coping strategies. Therapy also proved to be a helpful instrument in counteracting feelings of mistrust, shame and self-blame, and in processing feelings related to

survival guilt and increasing self-trust, necessary for thriving. Thriving refers to post-trauma growth and implies that a survivor is able to make healthy choices during recovery.

> "Some survivors approach their recovery and self-care in such a healthy way that they begin to develop strengths emotionally, cognitively, socially, and spiritually. Areas of growth may include increased self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-awareness, coping skills, support system, knowledge, spiritual practices, sense of empowerment, activism, and purpose. Beyond a cessation of symptoms, the goal of thriving is to live an abundant life that is one of purpose, self-esteem, and empowerment. Another component of thriving is the acknowledgement that the survivor may have periods of distress and setbacks, but that he or she now has the skills to cope with these periods. As Bratton (1999:263) notes, thriving takes times; 'healing is a process not an event.'" (Bryant-Davis 2005:162)

The survivor's hard work during the recovery process reflects the source of growth not the trauma itself (Bryant-Davis 2005). Thus, an initial first step after arriving in the receiving society was to begin the process of accepting that they would never again be able to carry on with the lives they lived before the war and to take strides toward thriving. As such, they needed to learn to come to terms with their war traumas, their displacement, and all they had left behind. This proved to be an essential first strategy toward integration and long-term recovery. In this regard, achieving normalcy was closely connected with overcoming the emotional burdens wrought with war and in regard to their memories of *home* and life in Bosnia.

4.5.2.2 Relying on Inner Strength and Survival Instincts

While a variety of different factors or attributes were identified, which provided my participants with hope to carry on, many were unable to pinpoint or identify exactly how they managed to survive or find the strength to carry on. One participant said: "Wenn ich jetzt daran zurück denke, frage ich mich, wie ich das alles geschafft habe." (Interview, Irena) Another participant amazed herself in her ability to survive and did not know where her inner strength came from. "Das kann ich Ihnen selber nicht erklären…" (Interview, Dubravka) A different respondent admitted: "Wenn ich ehrlich bin, weiß ich es nicht wirklich." (Interview, Selma) She admits her surprise at having survived and managed all of the hurdles thus far, including remaining in Bosnia throughout the war before being displaced to Berlin, separated from her family as a teenager and later reunited, only to then hear the horrific account of her father's experiences in a Serbian concentration camp and, likewise, her mother's survival story, in addition to dealing with the adaptation challenges and legal restrictions placed on her in Berlin. In retrospect, this respondent is uncertain how she has been able to cope all these years. Upon reflection, this proved to be a common theme among my respondents. In considering their own resilience in their adaptation processes, my interlocutors commonly

responded that they had little other choice - they carried on because they had to. Essentially, there was nothing else they could do: carry on or give up. Because giving up in some cases was synonymous with dying, my respondents made a mostly unconscious, but sometimes even conscious choice to live.

> "Meine Mutter und meine Schwester haben [in Bosnien] sehr gelitten. Mein Vater ist auch in der Zwischenzeit gestorben, in 95. Ihn habe ich nie wieder gesehen. Ach ja, so tragisch. Das ist so, dass man einfach durch muss. Was passiert ist passiert. Man ist dadurch erwachsener geworden, stärker. Die schmerzlichen Sachen von unten möchte ich nicht unbedingt wiederholen und wiederholen, einfach sagen wir leben ein neues Leben." (Interview, Sena)

Despite not knowing for certain how they managed to find the strength to carry on, several identified varying factors they found helpful, serving as a source of strength, which ranged from relishing the unexpected kind acts of certain individuals; giving back to others in need; persevering; accepting one's fate; thinking positively; trusting a higher power, i.e. believing in fate or a sense of purpose; and living/hoping for their children. While the trauma they endured did not make them stronger, knowing that they could endure extreme hardship and still carry on often afforded renewed courage and strength. The next example highlights the benefits of positive thinking and consciously being thankful.

4.5.2.3 Positive Interpretation, Sense of Luck, Gratefulness and Thankfulness

Research has shown that immigrants and refugees adopt various strategies in order to "achieve a positive self-concept and/or to preserve their self-esteem" (Kosic 2006:116). Some of my participants (particularly those in Berlin who were stuck in menial jobs, uncertain legal status, etc.) used what psychologists refer to as *re-interpretation* to reconstruct their situations. In highlighting the positive strategies applied in the face of harsh losses, displacement, and challenging reception and adjustment conditions, some of my interlocutors acquired renewed strength. They learned protective coping strategies to protect and enhance their self-esteem. Many of my respondents, for instance, conveyed a strong *sense of luck*, which is an important coping strategy in focusing on positive aspects. In reflecting on the many challenges faced in escaping Bosnia, one of my respondents acknowledges her luck in having survived.

> "Wir haben im Wald geschlafen. Das war Ende April und es war sehr kalt. Es war so schrecklich. Die Serben sind in den Wald gegangen und haben alle getötet, die sie dort gefunden haben. Ich habe Glück gehabt, dass ich schon vorher gegangen bin. Ich bin wieder nach Hause gegangen, habe wieder eine halbe Stunde auf dem Bus gewartet und habe gehofft, dass ich raus fahren konnte. Dann sind die Serbien gekommen. Sie haben die Autos angehalten, die Leute rausgeholt und aufgehalten. In den Bussen war es genauso. Sie haben die Menschen in den Bussen aufgefördert aus den Bussen raus zukommen und dann haben sie die Leute aufgeteilt, klassifiziert. Die Frauen wurden von den Männern

getrennt. Die wurden kategorisiert und von einander getrennt. Viele wurden getötet. Ich habe schon wieder Glück gehabt, dass ich nicht in dem Bus war." (Interview, Irena)

Many accounts similar to this were described in my interviews. This sense of luck often translated into a sense of *gratefulness*. When comparing their fate with those who lost their lives, limbs or families, my respondents felt lucky to have some or all of their nuclear family still intact and together.

"Ich bin froh dass alles noch so gut gelaufen ist. Ich kenne auch Leute, die ganz schlimmes erlebt haben und ich bin froh vor allem, dass mein Vater trotz allem das überlebt hat- echt das grenzt an einer Wunder- und ich auch und meine Mama auch und meinen Brüder auch. In unserer Familie ist niemandem so umgekommen, obwohl ein paar verletzt waren. Aber ja, es gibt halt Familien, die Schlimmeres erlebt haben und daher sage ich dann: ja, man soll halt froh sein, dass nichts Schlimmeres passiert ist." (Interview, Selma)

Another respondent describes his gratefulness for having survived the shelling in Bosnia, a fact that comforted him throughout his struggle of adapting and resettling in Austria as well as in Chicago. "I was so lucky- anytime a fight broke out, I was at home. So lucky…" (Interview, Mali) Through random luck, this respondent managed to be at the right place at the right time, and on numerous occasions, making him feel like he personally was *saved*. In some cases this led to ideas of a renewed sense of purpose in life.

Precisely because they had come close to death, my respondents were generally grateful to be alive. They were also thankful to have been received in a third country, provided protection, and welfare support. They gleaned much emotional support in this reflection. My respondents also relayed accounts of specific individuals, including host-nationals and co-nationals, having assisted them in some form or another that left them feeling a lasting indebtedness and thankfulness. These specific interactions and individual acts of kindness typically resulted in giving my respondents renewed strength and hope, particularly for those respondents who were conscious of and thankful for these relationships.

Thankful for the help they received, several of my interlocutors, particularly in Chicago, were intent on *giving back to others*. In their goal to help, a number of Bosnians moved into *helping professions*, becoming social workers, counselors, psychiatrists, or assisting in refugee reception. This type of work served to inspire them in finding new meaning in life. In this realm and as part of their professional training, they also learned the significance of balancing sympathy/support and the necessity of establishing a healthy degree of distance between themselves and their clients. This further led to healthy coping strategies, including mourning and participating in therapy.

Additional factors for which to feel thankful and lucky about in Chicago included the opportunity to start anew, work, save money, achieve social mobility, buy a home, provide for

the family, send the children to American colleges, and acquire American citizenship. Many expressed feelings of *thankfulness* for the opportunity to come to the US and live the *American dream*. Whether this development was an intentional coping strategy or simply an outcome associated with being a survivor is unclear. Even those who did not attend therapy and learn positive protective strategies to deal with the everyday stressors tended to acknowledge this sense of luck in having the opportunity to work towards achieving their goal of the American dream. They were motivated by promises of opportunity, of becoming a *success*. Some calculated that had the war not broken out and forced them to flee, they would not be enjoying the advantages accompanying their current life situation in Chicago. As such, some of my interlocutors (all of whom were male) even took pride in focusing on this perceived *advantage* that came as a result of the tragedy and loss associated with their war experiences.

While the extent of this gratefulness was not evident among my sample members in Berlin, most were relieved and thankful for being taken in and were thrilled when they were finally granted access to the labor market after so many years of waiting. Particularly for those refugees who had already begun professional careers in Bosnia, which were interrupted by the war and put on hold all of these years, gratefulness was a distinguishing characteristic that described their response to legal changes that came with the *Bleiberechtsregelung*.

> "Dann sagte sie, 'ja ich habe gestern was von einer Einrichtung bekommen und Sie können doch ziemlich gut Deutsch. Sie brauchen jemanden, der bosnisch spricht.' Und da wurde ich hingeschickt und jetzt arbeite ich dort immer noch. Das war das Schönste was mir hier passiert ist. Ein großes Glück war das. Im richtigen Moment am richtigen Platz. Das sind schon fast fünf Jahre her, Februar 2003." (Interview, Mirna)

My respondents were highly eager to start working again after being inactive for years. They were thankful for the *humanitarian response* of the German authorities in enabling them new opportunities to pursue a practical skill and finally to work. Some managed to procure the positions they had previously worked illegally.

> "Wissen Sie wie froh ich war als ich meine Arbeit bei der Deutschen Bundesbank angefangen habe? Als ich zuerst da war, musste ich meinen Pass vorzeigen. Was für eine Erleichterung wenn man dahin geht und man weißt, dass nichts passieren kann. Sonst wenn man Schwarzarbeitet, man guckt immer so ob die Kontrolle kommt, ob sie die Papiere suchen. Ich weiß, wenn ich Schwarzarbeite, dass man selbst schuldig ist. Aber jetzt wenn ich dahin gehe und mein Pass zeige und die gucken dahin und ich weiß, dass ich da arbeiten darf, dann ist es überhaupt nicht schwer! Man fühlt sich erleichtert. Ich kann mich überall bewegen wo immer ich will. Und wenn sie die Papiere ankucken, ich weiß, dass ich sauber bin. Ja, ich war so froh." (Interview, Zumra)

Knowing that she is now permitted to work legally, this participant refers to herself as being *clean*, essentially being liberated from illegal activity. Transitions from illegal to legal

working status resulted in the regulation of my respondents' working conditions and salary, freeing them from criminalization, and also contributing to a renewed sense of normalcy. Staying active, contributing to society, earning a wage, and developing oneself were closely interwoven into working. The issuance of a temporary resident permit thus emboldened many of my respondents to engage in more regular work activities without fear of consequences.

With the implementation of the issuance of an *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* my Berlin respondents appeared to relax somewhat as this status rendered changes in their legal rights and thus, their emotional well-being. "Mit der Aufenthaltserlaubnis, habe ich mich endlich sicherer gefühlt. Ich hatte bis dahin ständig das Gefühl gehabt, dass ich Deutschland plötzlich verlassen werden musste." (Interview, Irena) This legal alteration represents a measure of stability and security that the refugees had long been seeking, since this also marks an end to the Foreigners Office visits every few months. Many feel a reprieve from worrying and wondering if and when they may be deported as a result. Another respondent explains further:

> "Es ist ganz wichtig wenn man weißt, dass man bleiben kann. Eine Ruhe kehrt ein. Es ist irgendwie eine Befreiung. Man kann Pläne machen, man erwartet nicht mehr jeden Tag abgeschoben zu werden. Es ist ganz wichtig! Man denkt nicht mehr, was wenn ich zurück muss, was dann, und wie dann? Ich denke nicht mehr daran. Ich weiß, dass ich nicht mehr zurückgehen muss. Ich freue mich. Und jetzt mache ich mir Pläne." (Interview, Zumra)

Though their legal residence in Berlin was still limited and contestable, the difference between the issuance of a three-month *Duldung* and a two year residence permit left a definite impression on my respondents in addition to inspiring new found hope.[162] For some who had given up hope in year's prior, this legal alteration enabled new freedoms and with it, an impetus to begin making plans for themselves and their children, something for which they were deeply thankful. The notion pervaded among those directly impacted that *life could begin again*. This marks the intricate relationship between individual well-being and the extent of temporariness versus permanency of one's legal resident status. It also highlights the significance that work has on individual's well-being. According to research by Fineman (1983), occupational identity and the centrality of work is extremely important in the lives of most adults, which he supports with two reasons:

> "(1) the identity based on one's job may be a key resource for generating positive reflected appraisals and favorable social comparisons, both inside and outside the workplace, and (2) action in the workplace may be crucial for creating and sustaining feelings of self-efficacy through self-perceptions of competence. To lose one's job, then, is not only to potentially suffer damage to the selfconcept but also to lose access to the resources with which it was made and held together." (Garrett-Peters 2009:548)

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[162] If they managed to find steady paying jobs by the end of 2011, they could remain in Berlin.

Generally, people want to work, to keep busy, to have a purpose, to earn an income, and to feel as if they are contributing to society in some form or another. Max Weber (1930, 1992) referred to this as the *spirit of modern capitalism*, where capital and monetary supplies are produced as a means to an end.

The next section signifies the protective approach my respondents applied by placing their faith in the existence of a higher power, God, Allah, or some universal source of energy.

4.5.2.4 Faith in Higher Power

Faith or belief in a higher power resulted in taking the burden of responsibility off survivors, as they became smaller figures in the bigger constellation. The survivor's experiences became relativized. "When the survivor has trust in a higher power, he has faith that he is being cared for and loved." (Bryant-Davis 2005:44) In these cases, my participants' faith provided additional strength and hope in overcoming the challenges of resettlement and adaptation. This sense of faith helped many to forgive themselves, since they trusted that a higher power would forgive them.

> "My religion is Muslim. I go to the mosque very often. I believe in God. I believe, I pray. But I prayed before the war too, I'm the same. I know how American people are. I have a woman friend from Guatemala. I go with her very often in her church too. There's one God, I pray. Yeah, it's the same, oh yeah." (Interview, Beba)

Evident in this excerpt is my respondents' impulse to associate the Bosnian war with her declaration of faith. The implication of her war reference is the assumption that she should no longer have the same religious convictions following the war. The contested identities resulting from ascribed ethnicity during the war resulted in discouraging many of my respondents from having any form of religious ties after the war. What is different about this respondent, however, is her continued faith despite all that happened. Perhaps even in defiance, she affirms that she is still the *same*. While so many of my respondents became torn by the war – dislocated in time – she, a 65-year old woman, claims to be the same, though, she also acknowledges the significance the war has had on her life.

For another respondent, her religion symbolizes a link home to Bosnia and a connection to her past, which she did not recognize until after she went through a gradual process in Chicago of deciding what approach to take for the religious upbringing of her son. While identifying as a Muslim, she also admits that she was never devout, "My parents never took me to the mosque, you know. We never went, why should I lie?" When her mother-in-law suggested that her seven-year-old son attend Saturday school at the mosque located in Northbrook, a Chicago suburb about a 15-minute drive away, she initially balked at the idea. Cautious of coming into conflict with her mother-in-law, however, this participant agreed to

send her son to the mosque the next year on a trial basis. Five years later, she summarizes her perception of the benefits that came from her son attending the Saturday school at the mosque.

> "When he started he was eight, now he is 13 and I'm so happy he's there. I'm so happy. It's not religion only, but he's with Bosnian kids. They were all born here. They all go to other public schools, give a presentation to same-age children and get their awards; they are all very good students at the public school. And I am so proud that he is there. I don't care how much he's going to learn from the Koran to be honest. For me, it's knowing that he's there with his good friends and that I know who his friends are. Now they're all going together to malls and to the movies together once a month. They are very, very nice children and I told my husband that I would regret now had I not listened to my mother-in-law. So I think I will be proud if my son, as a grown up, goes to church or somewhere and gives a presentation about the country, you know, where his parents are from." (Interview, Ema)

She is not concerned whether her son learns the teachings of Islam. Rather she is pleased the mosque provides her son an important foundation and supportive peer group accompanying him in his early developmental years in Chicago. Knowing that he can meet on a weekly basis with other Bosnian children, whose parents fled their homeland for similar reasons as she herself did, where he can learn about *her* homeland, culture, native language, values and past prove to be very significant to her. Her son's participation at the mosque is in accordance with her expectations for his development and understanding of self. She views this as a source providing him a deeper understanding of his own family's history, which she believes gives him a sense of belonging in knowing where *she* came from, since he was too young to remember much of Bosnia himself. For others like her, their involvement in religious activities in Chicago served an important outlet for reconnecting to their past, their homeland, their faith, and their identity. While this was painful for some (as previously described), it was inspiring to others, resulting in reaffirming and grounding certain participants in their identity and sense of self.

> "I tried to pull out values from various schools and actually merge them together in my personality. That's what I've done. I believe that there's a common god for all the people in the world. There's definitely a common ground and all the differences shouldn't be paid much attention. I am Bosnian and I am American and I am everything that came to my experience. That's who I am." (Interview, Kemal)

Incorporating his life experience into his perception of religion and God as well as interlinking both his pre- and post-migration experiences, this participant is conscious of including the potential for destruction and conflict often associated with religious ideology in his reflections on the role religion has on his life now. His identity is thus interlinked with his religious beliefs, since his constructs of meaning are framed in his personal experiences. Aware of the potential danger of religious ideology, he encourages the value of accentuating a

common ground rather than emphasizing the differences in religion, as this is necessary for harmony.

Some of my respondents attempted to find an ulterior form of practicing their faith or belief. Some reaffirmed their existing religious beliefs with renewed conviction, stressing a loving God, accepting of all people and all religions. For certain, the majority of my sample questioned to what extent their notions of religion, ethnicity, and identity had been reconstructed since the war and their displacement. Considering their experiences in Bosnia and that Chicago provides the setting for a "complex interaction among religion, urban structure, and social change" (Livezey 2000:5), it is not surprising that religion took on different forms of meaning for my respondents, inspiring new deliberations and understandings.

4.5.2.5 Self-Esteem and Self-Orientations

My respondents' ability to apply coping strategies was closely linked to their own personalities and self-orientations. According to Ankica Kosic (2006:115), each individual has certain views about his/her personal characteristics. These may either remain *neglected and overlooked* or they may become *salient and central*. Nurturing favorable notions of self may be conducive in developing or applying favorable resources for coping in stressful situations. Negative views, on the other hand, may exacerbate stressful situations as this often leads to maladjustment, depression and other problems.

Considering this, it is important to acknowledge the role of self-esteem as an influence on the reactions and actions of my respondents. Kosic (2006) argues that self-esteem is not only implicated in advantageous and positive outcomes in adaptation processes of immigrants but it further helps individuals to better cope in stressful situations. High self-esteem can be perceived as a resource in assisting an individual when experiencing defeat or in response to challenges. For this reason, self-esteem has long been considered a strong predicator of adaptation among refugees. "Maintaining good self-esteem is a constant effort in a foreign country, and this is important because the more one values oneself, the more likely one is to make an extra effort to adapt." (Kosic 2006:115) All of the obstacles my respondents encountered in the receiving society contexts - the institutional, socio-cultural, and emotional obstacles - contributed to threatening and reducing their self-esteem. The most repeated example that emerged as a threat to self-esteem was related to insecurities and requirements to learn the host society language. Another example related to interactions with the host society, the latter of which is elaborated upon further in the subsequent section.

4.5.2.6 Self-Monitoring and Intercultural Differences

My respondents' ability to *monitor* their own actions and self-presentation in social situations is indicative of self-monitoring concepts. The premise is that individuals skilled in self-monitoring are generally likely to achieve greater integration. The concept of self-monitoring incorporates two dimensions: *getting-ahead* and *getting-along* (Lennox/Wolfe 1984 in: Kosic 2006:120). Essentially, those skilled in appropriate responses to social cues are more likely to get-ahead, as they possess high self-monitoring, easily learning and modifying their responses in relation to the *feedback* they receive in interactions. This in turn fosters their ability to establish and negotiate social relationships. "The tendency of getting-along is guided instead by the desire to avoid social disapproval, a characteristic related to social anxiety, shyness and low self-esteem." (Kosic 2006:119) Based on early research by Kosic (2002, 2004), in which she examined the relationship between getting-ahead and getting-along as self-monitoring styles in the choice of acculturation strategies and immigrant adaptation, getting-ahead was found to be positively related to one's relationship with the host group, whereas getting-along was negatively related to relations (Kosic 2006:119).

> "It seems that the positive social relationships which immigrants high on getting-ahead manage to achieve with the host group go a long way in making them feel more accepted in the new society. They therefore are psychologically and socio-culturally well adapted. On the other hand, high cultural maintenance was positively correlated with both styles of self-monitoring: getting-ahead and getting-along." (Kosic 2006:120)

Considering the orientation courses, the ESL classes, the job placement assistance, and refugee agency services available to the refugees in Chicago, clear effort was made by government institutions to establish *positive social relationships* with the refugees. But it is unclear whether this or the pressure exerted on my Chicago sample to *get ahead*, i.e. to be economically self-sufficient within the first eight months, is what steered them in this category of *getting ahead*. This outcome may also be a consequence of the pre-selection process that took place in accepting these particular refugees (in consideration of their integration potential) to the resettlement program. Kosic believes her findings confirm:

> "…that a motivation for self-presentation in socially desirable ways to obtain social acceptance underlies the personality of people high on getting-along. This attitude appears to be directed first and foremost to people with whom immigrants are familiar in terms of values and culture. This induces less social anxiety than when interacting with a non-familiar group and culture." (Kosic 2006:120)

Along these lines, their commonalities were repeatedly emphasized and as such, the Bosnian refugees were expected to excel in Chicago.

Many were able to come up with strategies on how to deal with condescending and ignorant generalizations made by the mainstream society. Some assumed responsibility to

clarify the misinformed; some grew to expect ignorant and exclusionary comments; some excused the behavior, realizing that a lack of awareness is common. Those conscious of an unintentional ignorance attempted to apply intercultural understanding and empathy, whether consciously or not. Many felt that they were expected to adapt to existing norms and customs, and as such attempted to conform and get along.

> "Witkin and Berry (1975) found that those individuals who were highly differentiated were able to maintain the self in the face of change and thereby suffered less stress, while those who were less differentiated were more embedded in cultural changes and thereby suffered greater stress." (Kosic 2006:119)

Others recalled their degree of agency during times of stress or hardship in the receiving society, resulting in strengthening their resolve and empowering themselves. Being cognizant of having actually made a decision to resettle in the US served as both a practical and protective coping strategy for my interlocutors, as it influenced their motivation to integrate in the receiving society context. In recalling their motivation for migrating, i.e. focusing on their expectations regarding the host society and the positive factors, influencing their decision to migrate helped them accept their fate, the intercultural differences, and acknowledge their own agency in positioning themselves in the post-migration context. Drawing on this brought them renewed strength in their adaptation process as they recalled that they are not just victims. Regardless of whatever self-monitoring strategies they attempted to apply, my Berlin sample was less likely to get along or to get ahead due to the institutional constraints related to their insecure and temporary resident status.

4.5.2.7 Extraversion

Extraversion also proved to be an important individual dimension relevant within others-orientations. Extraversion has received much attention in cross-cultural studies, as it refers to individual self-expression, i.e. how individuals express themselves. In connection with immigrant adaptation, researchers have found positive, negative and non-significant relationships linked with extraversion. For some researchers, "extraversion includes the ability one has to establish interpersonal relationships with others, including host nationals. Establishing friendships with host nationals consequently facilitates social learning of cultural-specific skills, easing cross-cultural adjustment." (Kosic 2006:121) While some dominant cultures favor introverted qualities, based on some comments made by my interlocutors, however, I suspect that extraversion was a common form of expression in Bosnia. Several of my interlocutors even criticized the tendency of Germans to be reserved, quiet and controlled, difficult to meet and engage with initially. The refugees in Chicago appeared to come into contact much more quickly with Americans. But when it comes to

generalizing about the ease of establishing relationships with host nationals, it is difficult to make a collective assessment about how well the respondents fared relative to their interactions in the receiving society context. Due to the institutional differences in the two contexts, it appears as if my Chicago sample at least interacted more frequently with mainstream members due mainly to their labor market incorporation.

4.5.2.8 Being Alone Versus Relying on Support of Family

Obtaining social support from families and like-minded communities has been one of the most essential coping strategies for my respondents. Prior to the war, Yugoslavians were associated with maintaining robust family ties. After the war, relying on family connections continued to be perceived as an invaluable asset, foremost evident in the practical and emotional assistance gleaned from supportive family constructs. Enchautegui and Sparrow's (1997) assertion that immigrants often foster strong family structures by maintaining intact marriages and extended families seemed to be only partly accurate for my Berlin and Chicago respondents. Several of my interlocutors perceived family reunification to be a necessary obligation. But for others, making sacrifices to reunite with family served as a form of healing. The following respondent implied that resettling her family served to redeem her sense of humanity.

> "My husband has a big family, so we started bringing everybody over. There were so many people in the building that were all related to us! We would go to the airport and welcome everyone. The apartment and the furniture was nothing expensive, but everything was brand new that we bought for them. We would save money, knowing when they were coming, because we didn't want them to have an experience like ours. And even today everybody's talking, you know, how thankful they are. When you have somebody at the airport waiting for you, with flowers, and a smile, it's totally different than what we had, sitting at the airport, waiting for somebody, who was late, and then taking us somewhere where there is nothing in the apartment, no furniture or anything." (Interview, Ema)

Although family reunification in Chicago was an initial financial strain for my respondents, the anticipated emotional benefits to be gleaned by reuniting with family members generally outweighed any financial burdens associated with resettlement costs. Retrieving extended family members from the airport and creating a cheerful environment upon arrival contributed in reaffirming the self-worth of several of my respondents. One, for instance, beamed proudly as she recalled the recognition and appreciation expressed by those she assisted who were thankful for her generosity. By presenting newly arriving family members better terms of reception than she had received she strove to *give back*. As previously mentioned, this signifies a key coping strategy that brought my respondents strength and encouragement, as it served to assist in restoring their faith in themselves and in humanity.

In her reflections on the significance of family support, one respondent highlighted the significance of receiving support.

"Being alone without family is really hard. No one is there to help you when you are sick, when you have an emergency and need to borrow money or something like this. I realized it's very hard when you don't have, like, mother, stepmother or mother-in-law to help you out. I mean I had friends, of course. Everyone can help you a couple of hours, but you know to have someone [regularly], it's very hard. What happens without this support?" (Interview, Behar)

This concern seemed all the more relevant in Chicago, where economic self-sufficiency was expected of the sample. Support of family members had the tendency of influencing individual well-being and psychological adaptation. The emotional impact caused by forced separation from family and loved ones rendered the adaptation process all the more challenging for respondents on their own, as is touched on by the next respondent.

"Ich hatte mein erstes Kind in Bosnien und das war ein ganz großer Unterschied, dass man auch eine Familie dabei hat oder Freunde kommen konnten, und das ganze Prozess mit der Geburt und sonstiges war richtig schön. [In Berlin] war ich natürlich allein, wie gesagt, alleine auf der Welt. Die ganze Familie, Freunde sind dort - außer mir ist gar keiner geflüchtet aus der Familie." (Interview, Sena)

Refugees on their own were not only confronted with greater emotional challenges due to a lack of family support, but also greater financial challenges. Apprehension surfaced resultantly among the Chicago respondents at the possibility of being forced out of their apartments due to looming economic pressures and/or physical ailments. Anxieties linking health and economic insecurity were also problematic for my respondents on their own, who were unable to rely on family to support them in an emergency. After admitting the reality of added difficulties for single individuals in adapting and fulfilling their goals, one respondent (on his own) stoically soldiers on, contending, "Everybody manages somehow."

"It's much harder for a single guy, you know, for one guy to make it through, but everybody does it. But everything depends on you. There's no, like, if you have to share a home or an apartment, you don't have anybody to share anything with, so everything, all expenses are on you. That's pretty big. Plus, somehow you just don't have a choice. Yeah, it is harder." (Interview, Mali)

In presenting practical matters, such as financial concerns, this respondent hints at the burden of being strong. Because he is alone and needs to earn his salary to pay his rent and cover his costs, he cannot afford to be weak, to break down, to grieve and to burrow into his sorrow. He alone is responsible for his financial well-being in Chicago. Those on their own have to function and fend for themselves. A protective mechanism is evident by his stoic interpretation, namely, that there is no time for self-indulgence or self-pity. Instead the challenge is to persevere and to function and hope that all works out.

Although therapy or mental health treatment would likely help ease the isolation of those respondents on their own, few exhibited interest in opening themselves up to others as would be necessary for a therapeutic setting. Instead some seemed to seek to dull their senses by drinking alcohol or taking drugs. Some managed to apply a protective coping strategy by reaching out to fellow Bosnians, who were aware of the additional challenges of being a refugee separated from family. While these friends provided emotional support and comfort, few were able to relieve the fears pervasive among the Chicago sample relating to finances and healthcare insurance coverage.

4.5.2.9 Relying on Ethnic Community Network

Having been accustomed to a strong social support network in Bosnia, the refugees reproduced a similar social network in the receiving society contexts. They frequently turned to other newly arrived Bosnian refugees or like-minded communities for assistance and emotional support. Furthermore, having friends or relatives on whom they could rely was repeatedly identified as a pull factor in my respondents' escape from Bosnia as well as a main facilitating factor in their adaptation process.

> "Diese Migrationsbewegungen, diese neuen Konfiguration von Migration, wurden zuerst einmal entlang von sozialen Netewerken früherer Emigranten organisiert. Flüchtlinge versuchten, mit Familien zusammengeführt zu werden, die in Westeuropa als jugoslawische 'Gastarbeiter' lebten." (Blaschke 2001:13)

In Berlin, respondents relied on each other in response to the stressful adaptation process and as a result of interactions with the authorities. Many of my respondents admitted that their self-esteem, resulting from loss of steady, well-paying employment and coinciding with the loss of financial security, has been eased somewhat by the presence of a strong social network. The majority found relief in exchanges with individuals who had undergone similar experiences. In some instances residents of the same Bosnian town reconnected, sometimes even being placed together in the same refugee reception center (Berlin) or in the same neighborhood (Chicago).

Since many of the Bosnian refugees were accommodated together in state-run collective housing facilities (such as one on Sigrid Street or the facility on Hohenschönhausen) establishing connections within the refugee community was uncomplicated. There was a tendency for many to interact mainly just with one another, communicating only in their mother tongue.

> "Ich hatte den Onkel hier, der auch Flüchtling war. Und da waren auch welche Bekannten, die ich von unten noch kannte. Es waren schon viele Leute aus meiner Stadt hier. Da waren ganz viele Leute vom Anfang an aus Bosnien, aus Jugoslawien. Man trifft sie überall. Wo immer man hin geht, hört man unsere Sprache. Man freut sich dann. Und

wenn man sich nicht kennt, lauscht man immer. Es waren schon viele Leute mit denen wir Kontakt gehabt haben, die wir auch hier getroffen haben. Man findet sich. Ja, natürlich. Mir hat es einfach geholfen, dass ich sie einfach kannte, dass wir uns einfach mal trafen, besuchten und so und in unsere Muttersprache sprechen konnten." (Interview, Zumra)

Despite the many hardships associated with their housing accommodation, i.e. the fact that the refugees were placed together in the accommodation facilities regardless of ethnicity, age, gender, marital status, and also placed together with *Aussiedler* families, sometimes these collective housing facilities presented a type of *Zufluchtsort*, meaning a place of refuge for the Bosnians, especially for the children (Interview, Publicata). A variety of informal activities took place there, such as collective celebratory gatherings on shared Muslim holidays, arts and crafts activities for the children, as well as impromptu German language classes for the adult women. Despite this, in the reconstruction of my respondents' narratives related to accommodation, my respondents emphasized more readily the obstacles than any benefits.

The many hurdles in Berlin and Chicago often resulted in uniting the Bosnian refugees. With few other distractions, many turned to one another for comfort and entertainment.

"Bevor ich die Qualifizierung als Stadtteilmutter gemacht habe, habe ich vorher nie gearbeitet. Ich habe meinen Tag verbracht in dem ich meine Tochter in die Schule gebracht habe, gekocht und geputzt habe, bürokratische Dinge erledigt habe und mich mit Freunden getroffen habe." (Interview, Irena)

Establishing connections to other people and resources and creating a support network to which one could turn for temporary relief from emotional and mental strains proved to be an important source of strength, relevant in both contexts. This in turn aided in inspiring my respondents in their personal ambitions and pursuit toward normalcy.

This concludes the description of protective coping strategies that contributed to my respondents' emotional well-being. The next section discusses practical coping strategies refugees applied to solve problems, mostly at the institutional level.

4.5.3 Practical (Problem-Oriented) Coping Strategies

Practical coping strategies reflect the actions and coping strategies my interlocutors applied in response to the institutional, contextual constraints and situational stressors encountered in their adaptation processes. In terms of practical, everyday problems, there were many parallels in the accounts of my respondents in the two contexts. Some problem-oriented coping strategies my interlocutors applied in both contexts included, for instance, learning how and where to access social and structural support; gathering information in regard to visas, resident status, welfare advice and overall practical guidance in surviving as a refugee in an unfamiliar context; learning to whom to turn to gather information and know-how or assistance in attaining housing, employment, or help with translations; establishing

connections to other people and resources and creating a support network to which one could turn for temporary relief from financial and/or time constraints. My respondents applied many additional practical coping strategies, which contributed in aiding them to carry out certain tasks and to follow through on achieving specific goals.

4.5.3.1 Staying Abreast of Ongoing Legal Changes and Knowing Your Rights

Several of my interlocutors in Berlin attempted to deal with the dependent relationship they had in regard to the asylum laws and decisions made by the German government by staying abreast of the ongoing legal changes. One participant, for instance, attempted to keep abreast of the political situation by reading the newspaper, watching television, and staying informed of the outcome of the Ministers Conferences, among other things, that dictated her fate through the residence rights.

> "Es war immer sehr schwierig mit den Ausländerbehörden, mit allen… Es war immer eine schwierige Zeit. Bis ich mein erstes zwei Jahresvisum erhalten habe, waren es zehn Jahren wo es immer nur einen Kampf war wie man hier bleiben könnte. Ich habe Zeitungen gelesen, Nachrichten gehört, nach dieser Konferenz aufgepasst wie sich über die Flüchtlinge entschieden haben." (Interview, Sena)

Staying updated on the political climate was conducive to knowing their legal rights and options to remain in Germany.

> "Wir haben die kleinste Möglichkeit gesucht, dass man irgendwie in dem Moment eine Verlängerung bekommt, aber natürlich [suchten wir] normale, legalen Sachen. Eine Möglichkeit war, dass man einen anderen z.B. einen deutschen Mann oder eine deutsche Frau heiratet so dass man länger bleiben könnte. Aber zum Glück war es so, dass wir total normal durch den Gesetzt bleiben konnten, aber es war überhaupt nicht einfach." (Interview, Irena)

Despite the political option of remaining through marriage, none of my female respondents chose this route. Instead the majority of women refugees was recognized through their own or their parents' trauma diagnoses. While three male respondents did marry native Germans, they did so *for love*. Besides being able to remain through marriage and to access the labor market, marriage to a native German also fostered the likelihood of my respondents intermixing in different social groups and aided in their German language proficiency.

In addition to staying informed, my Berlin sample sought additional practical approaches of response. Being conscious of the restrictive policies regulating employment, for instance, saved my sample from unnecessarily seeking jobs they would not have been able to procure. Knowing the legal conditions also helped my interlocutors to accept the reasons for being refused jobs. While much of the legislation made little sense to them, they could at least understand that Germany imposed specific regulations that explained its hierarchal hiring

preferences, known as the *Vorrangprinzip*.[163] While terminology such as *discrimination* and *exclusion* was avoided in their reconstructions, my respondents, nonetheless, related situations in which they or their children had felt severely disadvantaged in accessing the labor market due to their *Duldung* status and structural constraints. Staying informed of the legal changes regarding their legal residence rights thus proved a helpful coping strategy. This in turn shaped and influenced their actions. For instance, some purposely sought means by which to remain longer.

4.5.3.2 Seeking Legal Redress

Seeking legal redress became an important method to counter deportation threats or other restrictions, essentially serving to secure many of my respondents' ability to remain in Berlin. Case managers and lawyers proved integral in assisting my respondents in negotiating their legal status and in improving their situation.

> "In 98 haben sie mir und meine Mutter, die später in 1995 nach Deutschland, nachdem der Krieg vorbei war, gekommen ist, haben sie uns eine Duldung für 7-8 Monate gegeben, weil ich noch die 10. Klasse besucht habe. Und dann in diesem Zeitraum hatte ich keine Problem, aber nachdem gab's wieder Probleme. Dann hieß es wieder Abschiebung und dies und jenes und dann haben wir dagegen geklagt und erst mal Widerspruch erhoben und es ging auch zum Gericht. 2001 haben wir ein Aufenthaltsbefugnis bekommen." (Interview, Mere)

Although they were expected to pay from their own savings for any legal assistance they received from lawyers or solicitors themselves, which was often very difficult, legal support was sometimes offered for free by certain agencies and private law practices. The following respondent also sought legal redress to counter restrictions that would have prevented him from attending university.

> "Für das Studium braucht man mindestens eine Aufenthaltsbefugnis. Als ich mich angemeldet habe, hatte ich aber noch eine Duldung. Und meine Rechtsanwältin wusste Bescheid und hat versucht auf den Richter einzuwirken, dass er sich schnell entscheidet. Da hat sie einmal mit ihm telefoniert, hatte ihm gesagt: 'Ja, der Junge will Jura studieren und dass ist Ihr künftige Kollege und machen Sie mal da was,' und dies und jenes. Und da hat der Richter gesagt: 'Ich kann mich nicht vorher entscheiden. Ich muss der Reihe nach entschieden. Wenn der Fall an der Reihe ist, dann werde ich mich entscheiden.' Der hat dann gesagt, das einzige was er machen könnte wäre der Ausländerbehörde zu schreiben, dass sie selbst die Aufenthaltsbefugnis geben soll bevor er die Entscheidung bekannt machen wird. Das hat er dann auch wirklich gemacht, hat er geschrieben, an die Ausländerbehörde, eine Woche später kam einen Brief von der Ausländerbehörde." (Interview, Mere)

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[163] This procedure – hiring a foreigner over a naturalized or long-term resident - incurred higher administrative cost for employers as they had to verify work rights and compare competencies with Germans and EU residents.

In the letter from the Foreigners' Office was a notice for his permission (*Zulassung*) to study. Without the advice and counseling from his legal advocate, who effectively pressured the judge to make a speedy decision, my respondent would not have been permitted access to the university by the start of the semester, if at all. This illustrates again the inconsistency in the regulations and treatment of the refugees by the authorities and underscores the significance of having important contacts advocating on one's behalf. The next section reflects the strategies my respondents applied to deal with inconsistencies in policy responses.

4.5.3.3 Excusing Inconsistencies

One way of dealing with the institutional obstacles was to acknowledge the inconsistencies. Several participants in Berlin excused the inconsistencies and maltreatment exercised by the Foreigners' Office staff, reflecting that they were merely doing their job, i.e. carrying out orders from above. "Die Leute, die da arbeiten, sie entscheiden das nicht, muss man sagen. Die entscheiden nicht, wie lange ich hier bleibe oder so. Nee, das entscheiden die großen Leute. Die Anderen tun nur ihre Arbeit." (Interview, Zumra)

Based on this participant's observations, the *große Leute*, or big people, seem to represent the ones holding the power to decide the fate of all the clients who come to the Foreigners' Office, as they determine who is permitted an extension to remain in Berlin and who is deported. The *big people* are the ones who make and transmit the decisions; politicians are possibly meant. The implication for this respondent is that the Foreigners' Office staff members are nearly as powerless as the clients themselves and that everyone involved in refugee reception policies is reduced to being a mere pawn in the legal and political system. Hence, some refugees excused the inconsistencies and ambiguities of the Foreigners Office staff. Some further explained that covering the high cost of receiving so many refugees, whether temporary or not, served as ample reason for the unfriendly treatment of the Foreigners' Offices in Berlin.

> "Na, ich glaube die in Berlin waren auch ziemlich überfordert. Es läuft in den anderen Bundesländern anders. Es ist in Berlin so besonders blöd gelaufen oder die kamen nicht zu Recht damit. Zum Beispiel in anderen Bundesländern, also jetzt am Beispiel Niedersachsen, da haben bosnische Flüchtlinge die dann nach Niedersachsen gegangen sind- also ich kenne da eine Familie, die in Braunschweig lebt und die haben von Anfang an- sie wurden in so einem Verein halt darauf hingewiesen, dass es so ein Verein gibt und da gab's gleich Psychologinnen, die haben gleich ein Gutachten gestellt und dann dürften sie- haben gleich ein Aufenthaltserlaubnis bekommen und haben überhaupt nicht solche Probleme- haben gleich eine Wohnung haben können und ganz anders. Aber nicht in Berlin, wahrscheinlich weil so viele Flüchtlinge aus Bosnien in Berlin lebten, deswegen wahrscheinlich [waren die Behörden überfördert]." (Interview, Selma)

Acknowledging that Berlin was overwhelmed after the fall of the Wall and the arrival of thousands of Yugoslavian refugees, as well as the high costs of protecting the refugees, this interlocutor and others excused the Berlin authorities for their inconsistencies in treatment and policy enforcement. Such a response is an indication of the internalization of normalization processes with an emphasis on economic returns.

4.5.3.4 Remaining Active

In both contexts, working a job served as an essential coping strategy in so far as it kept my participants busy and deterred them from reminiscing about the past, their war experiences, and dislocation. It also served a practical goal to earn an income, necessary for acquiring material possessions. Working, depending on the position, additionally contributed in raising the self-esteem of my respondents and fostering their sense of belonging in the receiving society context. Yet, this depended on the context in which they were received, how quickly they were able to access the labor market, if at all, the types of work acquired, whether taking on one or more positions, the income associated with the job, as well as the options for achieving social mobility. As already stated, those in Chicago were expected to enter the workforce within eight months after their arrival, sometimes taking on two or more minimum wage jobs to pay their bills. Those in Berlin, in contrast, were effectively denied legal access to the labor market. While the Berlin sample felt bored and would have preferred working, the Chicago sample tended to be so active, due to pressures to work, that they wished to have more time for themselves, their families, and their mental healthcare needs. This lack in time resulted in many being too busy to seek psychological healthcare treatment.[164] Cognizant of this need at the time of the interview, many realized that they had given up their option to take advantage of state-funded healthcare services.

Remaining active was deemed essential in Berlin precisely because of the refugees' underemployment. In an effort to restore their damaged feelings of worth, many of my respondents applied the coping strategy of remaining active in order to deal with having too much undirected time. Eager to work and contribute to their own financial independence, a common strategy in Berlin led many down the path of illegal employment. One participant admits, "Ich habe versucht was zu finden oder auch ein bisschen Schwarz zu verdienen." (Interview, Slavo) Another respondent attributes her reasoning for working illegally as a necessity to cover the costs of her family as well as keeping busy. "Ich habe als Lehrerin [in Bosnien] gearbeitet. Dann sind wir hier gekommen und ich habe nichts außer Schwarzarbeit

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[164] In both contexts, many encountered further obstacles due to age and health concerns.

gemacht - putzen. Jetzt arbeite ich immer noch als Putzkraft." (Interview, Zumra) This resulted in working over-proportionately in dirty, dangerous, demeaning jobs with less job security, social insurance benefits, and lower earnings.[165]

Some, too hesitant to work illegally, preferred instead to volunteer rather than "sit around waiting for something to happen." One interlocutor favored working as a street cleaner in winter rather than simply washing the floor in a kindergarten for hours, or worse, doing nothing. For her remaining active implied not just physical but also mental activity.

> "Ich musste jeden Monat gemeinnützige Arbeit machen, 40 Stunden, und wurde in einen Kindergarten geschickt, um zu putzen. Zehn Tage habe ich ausgehalten. Es war so langweilig. Ich meine beim Putzen muss man vielleicht auch manchmal nachdenken, jetzt mache ich erst mal das, dann mache ich das. Das sollte ich gar nicht, da sollte ich jeden Tag vier Stunden nur Wasser im Eimer wechseln und den Boden wischen. Und als ich wieder zum Sozialamt gegangen bin, dann fragte sie, ob ich wieder dorthin will? Dann habe ich gesagt, lieber draußen. Es war Februar, es war ständig minus zehn Grad draußen, lieber so was fegen im Park als dort." (Interview, Mirna)

Others spent their time learning German. "Dann gab es so ziemlich günstige Kurse für die Frauen, und da ich nichts anderes zu tun hatte, habe ich einen Deutschkurs besucht." (Interview, Mirna) My interlocutors attempted to keep busy to fill time in ways that created an impression of accomplishment. It is plausible to suppose that staying busy was also a way for at least some to generate good will that affirmed conceptions of themselves as still capable despite their structural demotion (cf. Garrett-Peters 2009:562).

4.5.3.5 Saving Money

While the Bosnians' initial financial situation in Chicago was typically quite meager, when left on their own means, with time, hard work, and concerted efforts to cut costs, many of the self-sustaining Bosnians managed to save money. This was generally channeled into three main outlets: first, sending remittances to family members back in Bosnia; second, applying for family reunification to have relatives join them in Chicago; and third, being able to afford better apartments, sometimes even splurging to buy their own places.

Descriptions of the US being the *land of opportunity* evoked in both my respondents as well as their extended families the notion of wealth and luxury. Many of my Chicago respondents related pressures exerted on them by family members, who remained in Bosnia or had been displaced elsewhere throughout the world, who expected remittances to be sent back home.

> "My husband had to work two or three jobs to get us on our feet. We didn't even have a

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[165] Berlin is known to have a thriving informal labor market, playing a significant role in integrating refugees into the black labor market (cf. Aumüller 2007).

spoon when we came here so we had to do something. After his brother died over there, he left his wife and two kids with nothing, they didn't have any income, so we had to think about them. They didn't even have a place to live, so we had to send money and think what to buy them. All the money we could save, we had to send it over there and see that they are ok. And my family too, you know, they were working but never enough money. So we had to help them over there and deal with that loss. Then after a while his mom had an accident with his sister and after seven days his mom died. Same thing again: we had to help his sister and it was really hard for three, four years. After, he got a better job and moved to another place to work. [He] has just one shift. I mean he worked normal hours and had enough money so that we can, you know, live." (Interview, Sara)

Factoring in the costs of remittances, family reunification and expectations for financial self-reliance, my Chicago sample generally needed to devise strategies to save money. Some families shared small spaces in order to reduce the monthly costs of rent. Others worked several jobs to save money. Many aging parents reunited with their adult-age children, who have become naturalized American citizens.

Although my Chicago respondents generally expressed gratitude over family reunification schemes, this nonetheless caused additional financial burdens, as least initially, for a number of my interlocutors, as this implied that the family members, not the state, paid the costs for receiving their newly arriving relatives. With time, economic success in Chicago was often expressed in the form of family resettlement. The more family members retrieved from Bosnia, the more evidence of the family's economic success.

While budgeting was a necessity for survival due to the minimal welfare benefits, building savings was not as realistic an option for my Berlin sample compared with my Chicago sample. In Berlin fewer opportunities were related as far as actually *saving* money. Many of my Berlin respondents lived from welfare check to welfare check. There were few or no expectations for the Berlin sample to send money back home due to their inability to freely access the labor market.[166] There were even a number of cases in which my Berlin respondents received money from family members dispersed throughout the world, who had managed to save enough to send remittances to the tolerated refugees in Berlin. In one case, the sister of one of my respondents sent him money occasionally from Sweden (Interview, Slavo). In another situation, my respondent's older brother in Bosnia assisted her financially while she studied in Berlin.

> "Er hat jetzt unten eine kleine Firma gegründet und er unterstützt mich, also jetzt in der letzten Zeit nicht mehr so viel. Aber eine ganz lustige Geschichte ist, dass er mal in der Balkan war um Geld zu überweisen und die Bankangestellte sagte: 'Mein Gott, unglaublich! Dass es noch Leute gibt, die aus Bosnien Geld nach Deutschland schicken.'" (Interview, Selma)

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[166] Likewise, financial constraints would have made it difficult to pay for family reunification had this been an option for them. In Berlin, however, tolerated refugees were ineligible for family reunification.

They were creative in devising strategies in which they could save money. One of my respondents was told by the authorities that she could only buy used furniture and appliances for her apartment, so she crossed the border to Poland as a means of saving money, where she bought cheaper products. "Ich bin mit meiner Freundin nach Osten gefahren, wo ich gebrauchte Möbel gefunden habe. Dies haben wir zur Zweit nach Berlin geschleppt." (Interview, Irena) Although she does not mention it, considering the rules of the limited residency regulation, she crossed the border illegally in an effort to save money. Overall, the Berlin sample encountered greater challenges to save money by legal means than those in Chicago. As a consequence, the Chicago respondents enjoyed having the financial means to reunite with family members or even to purchase material possessions such as a home with their income.

4.5.3.6 Buying a Home

Several interlocutors prioritized their goals: after having settled a bit, found work, saved money, helped relatives still in Bosnia to resettle, they finally considered making plans for themselves, which usually revolved around the decision of residency. With time, the question of whether to remain in Chicago arose, but also whether to invest in a home or continue renting an apartment. One respondent explains her experiences.

> "We agreed to move a little bit out of Chicago, to a suburb. So we were searching the houses and prices and saving money. We can adjust to anything, to good things, to bad things, to whatever. After what we went through nothing can surprise us, so if you want your better future, then you have to have your limits. Those first four, five years, we did not go anywhere, no vacations, no traveling, nothing. But after that, then yes, step by step. My husband changed jobs. He's working for Lufthansa for 10 years now. Very good salary, thank God, insurance from the first day and my father-in-law too. My husband got that job first, because he's younger. He picked up English faster, so he got that job then. He took with him his dad, but he's a maintenance man today, he's making $20 per hour, which is very good and with insurance and everything. So when we wanted to buy the house, as I told you, we had saved some money for that down payment." (Interview, Ema)

After deciding to remain in Chicago, the money they saved was often transferred into home ownership. Owning one's own apartment, condo or home in Chicago was identified as one of the main characteristics, contributing to my interlocutors' sense of belonging in Chicago and the opportunity to regain normalcy. Owning a home – or at least making a down payment on a home – confirmed their ability to achieve the American dream, to adapt successfully in the receiving society. It symbolized compensation for all they had lost as well as a reward for all their efforts. To come to America with nothing, move through the initial stages of poverty, work hard and save enough money to buy property, seemed to mark the absolute achievement and sense of accomplishment for my Chicago interlocutors. One refugee worker reflected on

the resilience and determination evident by certain refugees in restarting their lives and achieving specific goals. "I see refugees buying houses and I'm still renting! How are they managing to do this? It's mind-boggling!" (Interview, World Relief Chicago)[167]

While home ownership contributed in raising self-esteem, for a few respondents it also raised a new fear of one day possibly losing everything yet again. It is unclear whether this lasting financial insecurity was triggered by the trauma associated with leaving everything behind in Bosnia or the respondents' sense of insecurity due to the volatile US social system, misuse of credit, and/or the lack of health insurance. It is certain, however, that past traumas and fear of potential losses tended to remain with my respondents throughout their adaptation processes, regardless of how *successful* they appeared to be in the receiving society. This was exacerbated when negative consequences ensued due to poor financial decisions and reliance on credit cards.

4.5.3.7 Activism

Another practical coping strategy my respondents applied was activism. Where there is power, there is also resistance (Foucault 1979). The knowledge my respondents accumulated through both formal and everyday practices, as well as through their particular situations as Bosnian war refugees and as war survivors, brought with it varying degrees of power. For instance, the knowledge they gained from each other after the war and during the initial months of resettlement aided them in their adaptation process. Besides such practical knowledge, they also acquired power-knowledge experiences as Bosnian refugee war survivors that inspired some of them to become refugee advocates, Roma activists, or political activists with varying modes of expression.

> "Regarding activism, while oppression has the power to enforce a particular worldview, to deny equal access, and to physically, emotionally, and mentally harm, the survivor has the power 'to risk, to resist, to love, and live, with a fierceness of integrity and dignity despite and (unfortunately) at great costs.'" (Pelligrini 1992:54 in: Bryant-Davis 2005:148)

Working for change in both the receiving society and in Bosnia proved to be a very important coping strategy for many of my respondents. In many cases, a type of activism emerged in the jobs my respondents took. In Chicago, for instance, some of my interlocutors pursued career paths working as refugee advocates or community organizers.

> "I am currently working with the Commission on Human Relations in Chicago. Some of the stuff that we do here, just the way the system is set up, you get the money and you do the work, whereas in Germany, it would be work that's done by the government and paid by the government, that's sure." (Interview, Melisa)

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[167] The interviews took place shortly before the housing market crashed in the US. My respondents may have been victim to credit schemes which may have later been impossible to pay.

Several respondents in both contexts were engaged in social work activities and had experience volunteering as translators to ease the adjustment of other newcomers. One respondent in Berlin went a step further by providing refugees' legal advice on a voluntary basis. Intent on improving the situation for tolerated refugees in Berlin, this respondent incorporated his personal experiences into his career path and then offered his skills back to the refugee community. Another respondent actively campaigned to improve the situation of Roma in Berlin and in the world to make the plight of Roma better known. (In fact, this respondent spoke of little else throughout our interview).

A different interlocutor used his art and music as a form of critical expression, while another relied on his photography to be his voice. The activism prevalent among my sample appeared to serve the function of *helping* or *giving back to others*. In Berlin, it also encompassed critical expression of the social political issues, particularly focusing on limitations with the *Duldung* and ways to process normalized identity ascriptions. According to one social worker I interviewed, a development that emerged from the female refugees' lack of recognition in German society was to form a dance group and to host Balkan festivals regularly. In celebrating a part of their own culture and arranging a platform on which to be *seen* by mainstream German society, many attempted to gain recognition beyond just being *helpless refugee victims* or the *invisible foreigner*. A similar approach was taken and supported by mainstream actors in Chicago, evident by the annual Bosnian film festival, Bosnian cultural events, book readings by Bosnian authors and other activities that recognized and raised attention of the issues of the Bosnian ethnic community in Chicago. Generally, activism in Chicago was linked more with cultural activities, while in Berlin much was related to changing the legal predicament of the tolerated refugees. The next section addresses the practical responses of my interlocutors in seeking supportive social services.

4.5.3.8 Seeking Social Service Support

Although those who fled the collapsed Socialist Yugoslavia and the earlier guest workers represented the initial support network to which the Bosnian refugees fled, this support network widened rather quickly to include NGOs, refugee agencies, advocates, charities, religious organizations, social workers, lawyers, as well as individuals well-rehearsed in the requirements of the refugee resettlement program. This sort of contact proved helpful both practically and emotionally, which further seemed to influence positively the mental health of my respondents. "Under ordinary circumstances, social support is a determinant of health that is as important as the physical environment or genetics (Tarlov 1996). During stressful life transitions such as forced migration, it may play a critical role in protecting health and well-

being." (Ahearn 2000; Beiser 1999 in: Simich et al. 2003:872) Relying on social services was an important practical coping strategy that also often incorporated an emotional element, resulting in fostering refugees' well-being and ability to regain control over their lives. Social services providers and other supportive actors increasingly served as intermediaries in negating the array of challenges that accompanied my respondents' reception in both contexts. According to Michael Bommes (2011), the core institutions of the welfare state include family, education, unemployment, illness, accidents, and retirement.

> "[They] are structured in a way that implies the expectation that individuals are equipped and wiling to prepare themselves for a biographically-ordered sequence of inclusions in different social realms and organisations, especially the education system and labour market. The institutionalisation of the life course and variations in different welfare states can be taken to be the result of the specific historical formation of the relation between each state and its citizens." (Bommes 2011:239)

This relation between state and citizen is conceptualized as a lifelong relationship/partner. Relying on assistance from certain individuals was significant in both contexts for a number of reasons. For one, the assistance of certain people proved helpful in acquiring material resources (baby clothes, gifts, jobs, better housing, food and healthcare). But it also proved to be an emotion-oriented coping strategy. Opening up and trusting others were often rewarded with kind acts, which bestowed new energy, inspiration, thankfulness, gratitude, etc. Several spoke on the significance of these small gestures, which inspired my interlocutors to keep carrying on. Relying on the institutions of the welfare state also contributed in forming the beginning relationship with the receiving society, a much forgotten factor in Germany considering the lack of integration policies applied to the Bosnians.

Several of my respondents continue to rely on different NGO's psychosocial therapeutic support, attending women's support groups, and German language classes. AWO, Publicata, and the SOEK were regularly named by the Berlin respondents as still offering valuable support. The explicit help of AWO contacts, for instance, facilitated the transition into better-rate housing for some of my respondents. One respondent explains that if it were not for this help, she would have needed much longer to be in a position to alter her family's housing situation. "Über unseren Dolmetscher, der bei dem Sozialamt gearbeitet hat, haben wir eine gute Verhältnisse geschaffen und haben über ihn Glück gehabt, in einem etwas normaleren Wohnheim zu kommen." (Interview, Dubravka)

Another respondent spoke of the difficulties she faced in assisting her sick mother to acquire a proper diagnosis linking her physical with her mental conditions. Only after my interlocutor pleaded her mother's case to the Social Welfare Office and managed to confirm her mother's PTSD diagnosis with a number of medical certificates, attained through the

support of refugee agencies, was she able to move her mother to another apartment with greater accessibility for her immobility. In this case, my interlocutor's mother not only lacked proficient German language capability, but she was also in no mental condition to plead her case herself. Rather, she was dependent on the support of her daughter and others to battle her case, to advocate on her behalf, and to deal with all the bureaucratic requirements necessary for receiving medical care. When it came to securing appropriate healthcare – whether physical or psychological – advocacy from third parties was often necessary.

> "Inzwischen hatte meine Mutti viele gesundheitliche Probleme. Na ja, gesundheitlich, das sind posttraumatische Belastungsstörungen. Sie kann kaum noch laufen, sonst körperlich ist sie ganz gesund. Also, ihr tut alles weh, aber laufen kann sie nicht. Man konnte nicht feststellen warum und dann stellte man fest, dass es also posttraumatische Belastungsstörungen waren." (Interview, Mirna)

Social service organizations were important for the refugees in confirming mental health disorders and enabling the means by which to extend their legal status in Berlin. Due to restrictions for tolerated refugees to attain medical support unless in urgent cases, the degree of *urgency* seemed to be contested in certain situations.

Another respondent related her gratefulness for the referrals her father received from a SOEK worker to seek services from a lawyer specialized in foreigners' law. Because her father spoke out as a witness in The Hague about the war crimes committed in Bosnia, he should have automatically been granted humanitarian protection and been freed of deportation threats. Without the lawyer's advocacy, however, this automatic protection would have been denied due to the inconsistency of practices in Germany. My respondent attributes this help to be of paramount importance for her family's ongoing stay in Berlin.

> "Der hat gesehen, dass mein Vater obwohl er in den Haag geholfen hat, eine Abschiebung bekommen hat. Da er eine Abschiebung bekommen hat, hat [der Anwalt] gesagt, dass er eine ganz gute Psychologin kennt, die dann diese Stellungnahme, dieses Gutachten erstellt hat, weil es dann auch ganz schwer war, Termine bei diesen bestimmten anerkannten Psychologinnen, die auf dieser Liste waren, zu bekommen. Er hat es geschafft, dass wir bei ihr einen Termin bekamen. Dann hat sie dieses Gutachten erstellt und mit Hilfe dieses Gutachtens haben wir es geschafft. Also, ohne sie glaube ich wäre er schon längst abgeschoben." (Interview, Selma)

The political campaign undertaken by several Berlin NGOs to encourage the protection of the civil war refugees led to greater public awareness of the desperate situation of the refugees, which contributed in their acquiring humanitarian protection and in many cases, the right to remain longer in Berlin.

Another respondent reflects on the act of an unknown person (to her), who agreed to pay her salary at a Berlin NGO providing support to refugees, where she had worked on a volunteer basis. Without this support she may still be unemployed.

"Als ich den Aufenthalt bekommen habe, da ich jahrelang ehrenamtlich gearbeitet habe in einer Einrichtung, hat mein Chef versucht mich irgendwie einzustellen und da hat er mehrere Male einen Antrag an der Ausländerbehörde geschrieben, wo er versprochen hat, dass er eine Stelle für mich hat, wenn sie mir nur ein Arbeitserlaubnis aushändigen würden. Dann hat mein Chef so geschrieben, dass keine andere die Stelle kriegt, dass ein Spender, also jemand wird das Geld monatlich spenden, um mir diese Stelle zu bezahlen. In dem Fall, dass jemand anderes die Arbeit macht, kommt es nicht in Frage." (Interview, Mirna)

My Berlin interlocutors generally relied on the goodwill of others during their initial settlement process, including networks of family and friends, charity organizations, and NGO-based assistance.

In the US, many of the refugee-led agencies played a key role in understanding the particular needs of the Bosnian refugees, which was particularly evident in devising a special response to their mental healthcare needs and the challenges of responding to trauma sustained from ethnic cleansing. Over time, the refugee agencies began realizing that many individuals from the Bosnian population, not just seniors, were going to need much more than temporary services for a much longer period of time. This became apparent in the Bosnians' long-term mental health needs as well as job development. As a result, the refugee agencies began re-conceptualizing their work more holistically than they had previously been doing in order to meet the specific needs of these refugees.

The organizations not only encouraged English class participation but they also developed ethnic entrepreneurial projects. World Relief Chicago, one of the 10 VOLAGS, for instance, began a kind of business incubator project to help refugees who wanted to start their own businesses. With the help of World Relief, many refugees learned how to write a business plan and were advised on where to go for grant funding. Some Bosnians were thus able to start their own insurance agencies, some were licensed to offer childcare or to become beauticians; a community magazine was started as were about 40 Balkan restaurants (Interview, World Relief Chicago). In addition, special language courses targeting seniors and projects such as the intercultural garden were eventually established to foster the long-term integration process of elderly Bosnians as well.[168] Hence, despite the challenges of finding

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[168] World Relief DuPage also offers a program called Refugee Senior Services (RSS), which aims to address the emotional and physical needs of their elderly refugee clientele. In cooperation with CLESE (Coalition of Limited English Speaking Elderly), World Relief still (despite the five year time limit) works with elderly Bosnian refugees on their English skills by "incorporating contextual and experiential learning in and outside of the classroom" in order to enhance their socialization, and address the practical issues they are confronted with in Chicago, like helping them apply for citizenship and complete the written English test. Participation in these group activities enabled the seniors an excuse to regularly leave their housing accommodation, meet with other Bosnian refugees who have experienced similar stress situations, and simply interact and visit with other people. This contributed in reducing their isolation and symptoms of depression. The social worker who facilitated the

work fitting for those in more precarious situations, the refugee resettlement agencies were instrumental in assisting the majority of employable refugees in accessing the labor market and in finding alternative solutions for those unfit to work. In some cases, these agencies have also attempted to play a mediating role not only in interactions with the host society but also among the different ethnic groups within the refugee population. The Bosnian refugees were offered an array of resources through governmental support that did not generally exist for other immigrants in Chicago.

Religious agency also played a role in addressing social justice issues related to refugee reception in Chicago. Whether carried out in the form of volunteering - donating time, money or material possessions - providing social services, offering protection and support to the refugees and economically marginalized, social ministry assumed an important form of religious engagement. Sponsorship was intended to be time-limited and variable according to the needs of the refugees. Relationships formed, however, and emotional support often extended beyond the initial sponsorship commitment. "Congregations of all major faiths are collectively engaged in good deeds to benefit the 'disadvantaged other,' continuing the long-standing tradition known in Christianity as social ministry." (Livezey 2000:20) This long-standing expectation of religion expressed as part of a trend toward the privatization of services in the 1990s was evident in the involvement of religious agency in responding to the influx of Bosnian refugees in Chicago. According to Doug Bandow (1996), several reasons speak for a shift in responsibility from political to civil society, the most significant of which reflects the impetus behind giving and donating, namely the desire to fulfill one's faith commitment. He explained:

> "…traditional charity was always a complex community exercise involving mutual responsibilities. Givers fulfilled their obligations — to God and the community — by simultaneously helping the poor and ensuring that the latter lived up to their responsibilities, while the recipients were expected to do what they could to avoid or escape poverty and had to give in return for their benefits. This model helped create a tightly knit community centered around real compassion — a willingness to 'suffer with' those in need — in which both parties benefited." (Bandow 1996)

According to the chief of the Illinois Department of Human Service's Bureau of Refugee and Immigrant Services, the reliance on charity, donations, and church sponsors has become a necessity due to the simple lack of government funding to cover the needs of the refugee program. "Without the church's sponsorship and involvement, the US resettlement program would have likely collapsed years ago." (Interview, ORR) It was confirmed in my interviews

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Bright Ideas class and Group Cultural Adjustment Counseling served as my translator in several of the interviews I conducted with elderly Bosnians (Interview, World Relief DuPage).

with experts working in the field that government-allocated funds could not suffice to meet the needs of all the refugees. Hence, the involvement of religious institutions and volunteers played an important role in the reception process of the Bosnian refugees in Chicago. "Family service agencies, private and faith-based, are among the organizations that help immigrants the most by providing emergency clothing, shelter, legal assistance, work, family support, educational opportunities, and counselling when needed." (Glicken 2007:263) The Catholic Relief Services Midwest Office also provided advocacy and services to the Bosnian community.

In addition to these supportive services, individual actors were deemed of particular significance in aiding the refugees in both contexts. In Chicago, one person in particular, Tom Robb, executive director of Care for Real, was identified by many of my interview respondents working in refugee reception as a key player in supporting the Bosnian refugees. He not only sponsored the refugees, through his engagement, he encouraged the members of his church to aid in protecting thousands of Bosnian refugees. Fadila Campara was another individual actively involved in advocating on behalf of the refugees in the greater Chicago area. As a key player in the Chinese Mutual Aid Association, she had been closely involved in the activities of the Bosnian refugee and immigrant services program.

My respondents also enjoyed many helpful acts, reaping positive energy and self-worth as they were empowered in numerous situations to regain control over their lives. My sample relayed a number of situations in which they relied on support, such as the elderly relying on language courses and interactive group activities, kind acts of landlords generously supplying them with essential material resources, job training assistance, among other examples. Such supportive activities contributed in shaping their relationship to the host society, which essentially enabled them to exercise agency, empowering them to be proactive.

4.5.3.9 Keeping Expectations in Check

The relationship between the refugee and the state was not always positive. Because the situation in Berlin was interlaced with steady restrictions in autonomy and agency, my Berlin sample was acutely conscious of situations in which they received assistance, i.e. when actors, especially from German institutions, went out of their way to help them. Rather than assuming their *natural right* to polite and helpful treatment, my sample quickly learned not to expect kind gestures and helpful acts, as they seemed rare. They learned to keep their expectations in check, as a result. Instead, they expressed surprise and felt grateful when they were treated warmly. While thankful for the help, my respondents also felt traces of sadness by their reliance on this type of assistance, as many would have preferred independence.

Furthermore, their response of surprise to helpful acts in Berlin also seemed to raise feelings of regret, since any rare act of kindness from the Berlin authorities called attention to how debilitating their situation actually was.

The range of strategies my respondents applied to overcome their post-migration obstacles proved essential for managing their adaptation in the different contexts. The protective and practical coping strategies were especially important, as they both contributed in healing emotional wounds and managing the socio-cultural and institutional obstacles. This concludes the overview of coping strategies my respondents applied. The next section summarizes my interlocutors' overall assessment of their adaptation experiences and analyzes whether they managed to achieve their individual goals.

4.6 Overall Assessment – A Choice of Four Action Responses

It is important in order to analyze the overall assessment of my respondents' adaptation processes and perspectives to first try and understand how each respondent sees himself/herself and to understand what she/he wants and determines as a main goal. How they see themselves fundamentally is how they set goals by which to act. This in turn is influenced by their general well-being. In assessing my respondents' individual goals, I avoid the ethnocentric notion of determining their individuality and identity by asserting my own goals upon them. As such, in the section below, I provide an overview of my respondents' general well-being, followed by a summary of their individual goals, an overview of their meanings of *home* and their future locations of space. Thereafter, I comment on their identity and then describe four common responses my interlocutors took to manage their adaptation processes.

4.6.1 General Well-Being – Dislocated in Time

My respondents' sense of belonging in the receiving society was contingent on the meaning they ascribed to the Bosnian war, the receiving society context, their identity, and shifts in perception over time. Considering how important time is as a variable influencing a shift in attitude, this highlights the process and transformation in my respondents' construction of meaning at the time of the interview as opposed to before (or thereafter). All of my participants perceived their uprooting to Berlin and Chicago as a result of the war to be a major life event. Consequently, the category *dislocated in time* emerged as a finding as it reflects two main realities my respondents constructed in order to carry on in the new context: life before the war and life after the war.

Their reconstructions of life before the war - complete with family celebrations, weddings, births, and happy times - were described very positively, in terms of harmony, security, and

comfort; respondents were happy and the world was *good and safe*. For my respondents, their life before the war represented *normalcy*. Life since the war, on the other hand, is difficult, painful, uncertain, and often tragically discouraging. In addition to the loss and destruction, the war and resulting displacement symbolize a partition in time, essentially dividing their lives into two worlds.

> "Das schlimmste und das wichtigste [was in meinem Leben passiert ist] war was unten passiert ist. Das sind die Ereignisse, die ich unten erlebte habe, die mein Leben verändert haben. Früher vor dem Krieg war ich glücklich verheiratet. Ich habe die drei Kinder. Wir haben beide gearbeitet, haben so gut gelebt, kann man sagen. Es ist ganz wichtig wenn man eine Arbeit hat- finde ich- dass man sich einen Urlaub planen kann, das ist ja was ganz anderes was man erlebt hat- vor und nach dem Krieg. Das sind zwei ganz unterschiedliche Welten. Das war eine Welt und nach dem Krieg ist jetzt eine zweite Welt. Nicht nach dem Krieg, sondern von dem Zeitpunkt wo der Krieg angefangen hat. Da sind zwei unterschiedliche Welten. Seitdem Anfang des Kriegs, durch den Krieg hat sich mein ganzes Leben verändert." (Interview, Zumra)

Memories of the past acquire new meaning as my respondents recall life in Bosnia where they were employed, worked fewer hours, had more financial, political and physical security, health insurance, and more time to interact with family and friends. Often cited in their memories of life in the past was their sense of having greater financial means to take vacations, celebrate holidays, and go to the theater, among other things. My Chicago sample also recalled previously enjoying more leisure time and a slower pace of life in Bosnia. Their relationships to friends and family were nearly always described in purely positive terms, and certainly, knowing the language, the inhabitants, the surroundings all served as contributing factors fostering their sense of belonging in Bosnia.

With the outbreak of war, the opposite became true. The war changed the way the Bosnian respondents reconstructed memories of home, community, their sense of identity and the positions from which they perceive the world. Since the war and their displacement, my respondents reconstructed meanings in relation to their life and identities in the past, present and future, which in turn have affected their processing and coping strategies throughout their post-migration transition. Dilemmas related to memories of Bosnia have influenced their individual goals and their overall sense of post-migration well-being. This has also affected the choices they made and continue to make, particularly regarding their future place of location, as well as in applying coping strategies and setting personal goals.

4.6.2 Individual Goals

Because the Bosnian war *robbed* my respondents of so many areas they considered *good and positive* about life, hoping to feel normal again was the common goal each of my respondents shared - in both receiving society contexts. By *striving towards normalcy*, they either

consciously or unconsciously aspired to mend the division in their lives caused by the war and their resulting displacement. They typically associated normalcy with *normal* life events such as: falling in love, getting married, having babies, going to weddings, working, going to school or college, graduating, going on holiday, making decisions and having autonomy, saving money, owning a home, being surrounded by family and friends, attaining host society language proficiency, planning for the future, sleeping soundly, not feeling depressed, among other aspects that characterized their lives before the war. They generally maintained normative goals, a description of which follows.

The goals of one respondent in Berlin are, "dass ich normal arbeite, Deutsch übe, einen normalen Mann finde, dass meine Tochter gesund bleibt, und dass ich im Leben keine große schreckliche Lebensänderungen mehr erleben muss." (Interview, Irena) She further attempts to explain what she means with *normal*, whether describing work or a potential future husband.

> "Normale Arbeit bedeutet, dass man gut genug verdient für das Leben, dass man Rechnungen bezahlen kann, dass man einmal im Jahr in Urlaub fahren kann. Es muss nicht luxuriös sein. Ein normaler Mann bedeutet, dass er nicht arrogant ist, dass er Verständnis für mich hat, dass er eine gute Seele hat. Materielle Sachen sind für mich nicht wichtig, weil ich sowieso alles in einem Moment verloren habe. Alles Materielles und auch Freunde, Familie, Nachbarn usw., alles was wichtig für mich war, hat sich verändert. Jetzt ist nur das menschliche Leben das wichtigste für mich. Dieser Mann wonach ich suche, sollte nicht die Fassade anschauen, sondern die innere Werte haben. Ich habe Hoffnung." (Interview, Irena)

In describing her goal, this respondent also acknowledges that the war has changed her values, which was true for the majority of my respondents. An increasing consciousness of the significance of interpersonal relationships emerged as a result. In addition to the general goal of *achieving normalcy*, my respondents also related individual goals and future aspirations pertaining to each of their unique situations and personality characteristics. Those able to realize their fundamental identity, the core of their self, tended to be closer to meeting their intended goals, which was inherently linked to their self-understanding and personal identity.

The main goal for most of my Berlin respondents was simple: to acquire a secure resident status with unlimited access to the labor market. It was believed, once they could achieve this then they could earn a decent salary, secure their right to remain in Berlin permanently, and finally relax after their near decade-long battle to stay in Germany. Another respondent yearned to go on holiday again or to earn enough money to go to the theater. One respondent hoped to finish his legal clerkship and eventually start his own law firm. Another deliberated whether to become a doctor or a lawyer. One sought one day to possess a German passport.

Another considered returning to Bosnia to die since her husband recently passed away and she felt torn about where she belongs. Another interlocutor imagined working for UNESCO or for other organizations that help refugees in war zones. A few respondents commented on the goal of reuniting with their children whose relations and contacts had become estranged due to the war, dislocation and interfamily and marital problems. Only a few from my Berlin sample considered the option of returning to Bosnia to live or retire as a plausible goal. The majority instead strived to remain in Berlin. "Ja, ich stelle mir so vor für immer hier zu bleiben, aber nur in Berlin, nicht woanders. Nein. Die Kinder bleiben bestimmt hier. Sie denken nicht mal dran irgendwo anders zu leben. Und ich bleibe dann da wo die Kinder sind." (Interview, Zumra) The well-being of the children was a consistent priority in the Berlin group. Generally, the goal of my Berlin sample was to secure their resident status, find a job, and earn a decent enough salary. If possible, many hoped to earn enough to afford vacations and to enjoy local activities or events.

The goals of my Chicago sample varied from those in Berlin due to their already possessing a secure resident status and, in the majority of cases, also already working. Removed of these two concerns, my Chicago sample developed different goals, though, that also seem to relate to the institutional conditions framing their adaptation. One respondent admitted her goal was "just to be healthy, that would be enough for me." (Interview, Nina) Remaining healthy was a main goal for many of my Chicago respondents, perhaps, because many did not have medical insurance and in some cases, even when they did have insurance, the medical costs and co-payment fees were still so high that remaining healthy seemed the best option. One respondent said, "For me, it's health really, to be healthy, and to be happy, to keep our jobs." (Interview, Behar) Another participant hoped to stay healthy long enough to earn and save enough money to be able to retire in comfort with his wife in Bosnia.

The overriding goal of another respondent - alone in Chicago without family - was to complete her college education in order to earn enough money to support her parents and brother to join her under the terms of family reunification. In fact, acquiring the means by which to resettle their family members to Chicago was also a main priority for several of my interlocutors; many, however, had already achieved this goal. The goal of one respondent was to support her son through college and to keep her job, while another elderly informant hoped to secure housing for her son before she dies. Another respondent hoped to stay in the profession in which she currently works: "I really like what I am doing. I work on a lot of social issues in the community, doing outreach work. It's something I probably want to stay in and eventually I want to go to law school too." (Interview, Melisa) The main goal of another

respondent was to support her adult-age daughter and grandchildren to the best of her ability without causing additional strain or tension for her family throughout her remaining years. For several respondents, it was important to overcome the past and all they endured, to move forward and to improve their situations, especially for their children. Another interlocutor thought of going back to school since the war interrupted her life plan. The main goal of one male participant in his early 30s was to "find his princess, get married and live happily ever after" (Interview, Mali). Another respondent wanted to have at least three children since family is important to her; beyond that, she hoped to be happy. Another respondent said, "I hope that my children are going to get a really good education here, they are going to succeed, and have a normal life. I like my life right now and I wouldn't like it to change for anything. I want it to stay as it is and for my children to enjoy their lives here too." (Interview, Sara) A different respondent hoped to never have to resettle and start over again, even though she "does not love Chicago." Another respondent said, "Well, I hope to, you know, continue developing myself and what I do in my career." (Interview, Dino) A different informant hoped to get his doctorate, become a professor, and teach Slavic literature. Another respondent hoped to live to see his great grandchildren in Bosnia. For many respondents, owning property in Chicago became a main goal toward which they aspired. An additional goal, often generated by external pressure, was to send remittances to family members in Bosnia. Ultimately, however, focusing on family and loved ones was the main priority.

Clearly, a merging of the adaptation approaches was made easier once my respondents could begin to start a new life in the receiving society, i.e. could access necessary resources that contributed to their sense of *normalcy*. For those in Chicago, achieving normalcy - according to this understanding - was far easier than for those in Berlin due to the structural constraints imposed on them with the *Duldung*.[169] Hence, the reception contexts have undoubtedly framed and influenced my samples' experiences and actions throughout their adaptation process (more on this in section 5.3).

Nevertheless, my two samples exhibited much resourcefulness in attaining and setting their goals despite setbacks. Each of my respondents' adaptation situations is distinct of their personalities, identities, and experiences, evident by the variety of their personal ambitions. While some in my sample suffered under professional demotion and became demoralized and disempowered, many developed alternative strategies or pursued steps to reach new goals.

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[169] Nonetheless, a number of socio-cultural and emotional constraints imposed on my Chicago respondents, such as fear of poverty, geographical distance to Bosnia, pressures to work and be self-sufficient, also contributed in hindering their adaptation process. Establishing procedures that increase self-esteem, foster *normalcy* and contextualize trauma effects is extremely important.

Each setback was influenced by their skills and ability to communicate, to act, or interact. Some were forced to lower their expectations as a result of the institutional constraints in the receiving society context. This often resulted in their *doubting* themselves, becoming static and struggling to strive towards the intended goal. Some went so far as to give up their own goals and to instead live for their children or other family members. Many behaved in accordance with their identity perceptions, i.e. how they perceive themselves. This was also shaped by meanings they attributed to their *home* and experiences in the receiving society.

4.6.3 Distance to and Reconstructed Meanings of Homeland

Memories of the past and war experiences frame the adaptation experiences of my respondents. This has largely influenced their current understanding of home life, both in Bosnia as well as in the receiving society, as well as their identities. The memories of my respondents reflect their ability to recall events from the past, ranging from childhood through adulthood, encompassing both positive and negative occurrences. "Memory refers both to the act of recalling episodes and personal events as well as to the capacity of using acquired information which has no personal or temporal connotations." (Dalla Barba 2002:2) This implies an ambiguity connected to the meanings used for expressing memories due to the substantial differences of each individual. Depending on the particular person, memories of home tend to revolve around life prior to the war, which was generally positive, or to life during the war, which inspired many of my respondents to wish never to return home.

Accounts told by others who had returned to Bosnia shortly after peace was declared tended to support their instinct of not wanting to return. Returnees commonly described a sense of shock and disassociation upon their arrival in Bosnia, given dismal conditions. Bleak accounts of the destroyed infrastructure and renewed violence in Bosnia were rampant. Returnees described a general lack of future opportunity in Bosnia, few job options, inadequate schooling, and a collapsed economy. Homes and apartments had been destroyed or taken over, the ethnic composition of the population had changed, and little other than animosity and deteriorated living conditions remained. The sense of *no longer belonging* was often worsened by the ethnic tensions still present in the region, as well as the animosity of those who had stayed behind. The *stayers* treated the returnees as *traitors* for having failed to defend their country or to fight to protect their land during the war (Interview, SOEK). Those who remained in Bosnia during the conflict sought an outlet for their aggression and took it out on those returning. Accounts of *returnees* being confronted with hostility, shootings,

deaths, landmines, etc. upon their return in Bosnia were widespread. Returning children, in particular, were criticized at school as *Kinder der Geflohene*.[170]

Those who returned also struggled since their identity process had altered through their experiences in the war and in fleeing. Consequently, many faced severe challenges. According to Anders Stefansson (2004b), "There was a widespread assumption among repatriates that if people in Sarajevo had realized how long the war would be waged, almost everybody would have left at the start, thus giving credence to the returnees' claim that the stayees remained not because of patriotism but because of their naïveté and conservatism" (p.60). Some returnees were even shot dead by neighbors upon their return (Interview, bzfo). My respondents described the palpable hostility still present after many years as difficult to fathom and disheartening. A consequence of having heard these descriptions was that many civil war refugees expressed little interest in returning to Bosnia, whether just for a visit or permanently. This instinct was in turn connected to the traumatic experiences they had endured there during the conflict. "Ich kann mir überhaupt nicht vorstellen, dass ich dort irgendwann zurück kehre, dass ich für immer da lebe." (Interview, Sena)

At the time of the interviews, a few respondents had still not returned to visit Bosnia. On the surface, this seemed to be attributed to reasons of limited economic means, geographical distance, or mobility restrictions (in Berlin). Yet, in many cases the reasons for not returning home for a visit was attributed to my respondents' traumatic experiences, deep sense of loss, and disassociation with Bosnia. Many wanted simply to forget what they had gone through in Bosnia. A return home was out of the question for them, as it would compound their traumas. In contrast, some from Chicago returned voluntarily on vacation since a return home signified a reunion with family and friends from the past. Some of my respondents admitted having changed, no longer fitting in upon their return to Bosnia. "They realize that the multiethnic society in which they used to live no longer exists." (Mertus et al. 1997:17)

Many meanwhile prefer the anonymity of living in the large metropolitan, diversified immigrant receiving society. This is most apparent among the younger respondents, several of whom lived in Bosnia for a shorter duration than they have lived in the receiving society. One, for instance, referred to Berlin as *home*, where he felt more comfortable than in Bosnia, and where he *belongs*.

Despite feeling settled in the receiving society context, some in Chicago described their annual return home to Bosnia as the highlight each year. They revel in reuniting with family and friends. Some in my sample were not only eager to return home to be reunited with loved

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[170] Author's translation: as children of parents who had fled.

ones but sometimes they also planned trips to Bosnia in order to take advantage of the more economical medical and dental services there, among other things. For instance, some from my Chicago sample without health insurance have calculated the costs of seeing a doctor in Chicago versus purchasing a roundtrip ticket to Bosnia, buying gifts for the entire family, and being treated by Bosnian doctors. Since the price is essentially the same, several respondents have chosen the second option, combining their holidays with doctors' appointments and family reunions. For these *transnational migrants*, traveling between locations and crossing familiar borders to return *home* has become routinized and has lost its initial frightful and daunting significance.

Visits to Bosnia took on different meaning for the older respondents, who tended to experience greater difficulties adapting to life in the receiving societies due to language deficits and isolation. Bosnia for them represented their youth, the prime of their lives. In speaking of Bosnia they often exhibited sorrow and nostalgia. As Benedict Anderson (1983) describes Jamaican immigrants relating an *imagined community*, the elderly Bosnians in particular tended to construct a utopian Bosnia; they imagined a fantasy life in Bosnia incompatible with the current reality. This coincides with Zygmunt Bauman's critique of the term community. While it may "sound sweet", full of positive associations and feelings, what the term "truly evokes is everything we miss and what we lack to be secure, confident and trusting" (Bauman 2001a:3). The notion of community, contrived and imagined by an individual, may reflect a multitude of coveted and romanticized prospects that have either dissipated or not yet been attained. Bauman asserts that community conveys the kind of world that is not available to us, a type of paradise lost that we seek to re-inhabit, one to which we would preferably return or, yet, find. Bauman argues that this community, this paradise, is not one we know from our own experiences, but from our unbridled imagination (Ibid).

> "It is not just the 'harsh reality,' the admittedly 'non-communal,' or even the explicitly community-hostile reality, that differs from the imagined community with a 'warm feel.' That difference, if anything, only spurs our imagination to run faster and makes the imagined community even more alluring. On this difference, the imagined (postulated, dreamed off) community feeds and thrives." (Bauman 2001a:3-4)

Bauman questions whether an individual is able to distinguish between the "community of their dreams" and the "really existing community" – or, to be more accurate for this particular case, "the community that really existed" (Ibid). In support of this, in the rare occasions that my respondents could afford a return trip to Bosnia, their sense of belonging in some cases was destroyed due to the harsh reality they found, rather than their imagined homecoming. In some cases, however, the *sweetness* and the positive associations of returning home were intensified due to their knowing the residents, the language, culture, and surroundings.

Particularly for the elderly, born and raised in Bosnia, with most of their life reality based there, Bosnia as *home* took on more significant meaning. For them, their notions of Bosnia were not just imagined; rather their sense of homecoming and belonging was reaffirmed. Generally, the meanings the respondents attributed to home influenced their intention on where to settle, i.e. impacting decisions on their future locations.

4.6.4 Future Locations of Space

My respondents described varying meanings of home, depending largely on the individual experiences and personalities of each person. Yet, my respondents' reconstruction of *home* was also influenced by their interactions in the receiving society, i.e. whether they felt well-received and with a strong sense of belonging. This likewise influenced their decisions on where to settle long-term. While some continued to perceive Bosnia as *home*, some incorporated both Bosnia and the receiving society context in their depictions of home, and some focused only on their receiving society experiences. The more time distancing my respondents from the war, the easier it became for them to imagine eventually returning, retiring, and dying in Bosnia. Yet, this does not necessarily mean they all expected or pursued this outcome.

Most of my respondents still question where they would be happiest. The answer seems to change on a daily basis depending on their emotional well-being. Parents prefer to live where their children choose to live, which in Chicago, varied depending on the individual youth in focus. The youth in Berlin usually hope to remain in Berlin. Many in Berlin (adults included) seemed desperate to remain in Berlin, even though their sense of belonging and emotional well-being was not strongly intact.

> "Mein Sohn kommt hier gut zurecht. Sein Leben ist hier. Dann hofft man, dass irgendwann durch sein Leben, meins auch schöner wird. Ich kann mich jetzt nicht beklagen, die Tage sind eigentlich schön. Zu Hause ist es harmonisch, auf der Arbeit ist es schön. Meine Tage sind echt schön. Erst wenn was ist, wenn was ernstes ist, im Sommer war meine Mutti im Krankenhaus, erst in solchen Momenten merkt man, wie weit er von allem, die er lieb hat, ist, wie die Familie fehlt, die alten Freunde, die man seit Jahren kennt, wie sie fehlen, und wie man hier doch allein ist. Aber sonst…" (Interview, Mirna)

The general attitude among my Berlin sample was that Berlin's geographical proximity to Bosnia makes it easy to return *home* on visits, but they do not necessarily wish to move back there permanently. One young respondent, desperate to study, nearly left Berlin in order to pursue this goal, but instead found a way to remain in Berlin to study and remain close to her parents. Another respondent whose husband recently died played with the idea of returning to Bosnia, but as long as her children remain in Berlin, she imagines doing the same. Thus,

despite feelings of homesickness and loneliness, my respondents in Berlin generally hope to remain in Berlin.

In fact, most from my sample wanted nothing more than to remain in Berlin and to attain a more secure resident status, despite Germany's exclusionary treatment (or perhaps as a result of it). Perhaps, this wish is a common response of individuals to want what they do not have, or possibly this relates to their war-related traumas and fear of return. Or perhaps this is because of the struggle involved with remaining in Berlin, after having overcome the challenges of staying and fearing the loss associated with this acquired recognized status? Unable to provide definitive answers, I can only highlight trends and the clear trend among members of my Berlin sample was their strong desire to remain permanently in Berlin. Realizing that they are being collectively singled out and that their poor treatment affects all tolerated refugees in Berlin likely also eases their discomfort, as they can rationalize that Germany promotes restrictive and discriminatory policies that target all foreigners, in particular tolerated refugees. Yet another reason may be attributed to the general quality of life in Berlin despite restrictive reception policies. Although the welfare payments allotted are low, the sample has meanwhile grown accustomed to living simply and/or has devised coping strategies to survive and earn additional money; they also find support from within their own networks and have managed to negotiate their survival in Berlin for more than a decade.

By contrast, a greater number from my Chicago sample considered the idea of returning to Bosnia. It is unclear whether this is related to the vast geographical distance to Bosnia, the US social system, the intercultural differences causing my sample to distance themselves and feel a limited sense of belonging, or because they have US citizenship and can come and go as they please. One respondent commented: "There are, you know, very successful families, like, 80 percent of the Bosnians are successful. I mean successful like they have houses, they have good lives. But somehow, I don't know, this is not the country for me. Really it's not." (Interview, Behar, Chicago) The number who wished to return to Bosnia was greater in Chicago than in Berlin, which surprised me considering how well integrated the Chicago sample appeared to be. Many studies have shown that refugee group exile often turns into long-term conditions, resulting commonly in refugees developing attachments in the receiving country and unable to imagine returning home to live (cf. Stefansson 2004). My presumption was that those with homes, jobs, friends, language proficiency, etc. would more likely wish to remain in the receiving society, where they have enjoyed full participation. This was indeed the case for a handful of respondents who formed attachments in Chicago, an outcome more pronounced among the younger refugees.

Many of the older respondents in Chicago hoped nevertheless to return to Bosnia.[171] Their reasoning was attributed to a combination of institutional, socio-cultural, and emotional factors. Some of the emotional reasons included: inflated and idealized memories of home, cultural differences and ignorance of the mainstream, disjointed sense of identity/belonging, distance to home and family, homesickness, missing the slower pace of live in Bosnia, the desire to return a *success* and enter early retirement. Some of the institutional reasons included: inadequate health insurance, (expensive premiums, tendency of doctors to prescribe medications rather than treat the problem, lack of health insurance altogether for some respondents), fear of becoming homeless, savings accumulated in Chicago are not enough to survive in Chicago but accompanied with Bosnian retirement pension would enable a comfortable retirement abroad, vast mobility as US citizens, and freedom to return if dissatisfied with Bosnia.

Overall, descriptions of return trips to Bosnia and feelings of belonging highlight the convoluted relationships my respondents in both contexts have with the country of origin and the receiving society and offers insight into differing approaches my respondents used to negotiate their identities and sense of belonging in relation to *home*. This leads to the next section, reflecting changes in their identity formation marked by difference.

4.6.5 Identity Marked by Difference

As the Bosnian refugees reconstructed their identities in the receiving society contexts they instinctively conceptualized similarities and differences between themselves and the receiving society as well as with other population groups (such as the Roma in Berlin). They did this not just in effort to be well received but also as a result of the ethnic differentiation they experienced during the war in Bosnia. Hence the identity of most of my respondents became marked by differences, as was already highlighted in section 4.4.2.3 in connection to the ethnic and religious divisions. As is often the case, history influences this process (cf. Woodward 1997:12). Being ascribed the status as refugee or a mere tolerated refugee in the receiving society had negative impacts on their identity formation. When weighing an identity against the other, it acts to devalue the one identity, which is further exacerbated by history, the media, and the politicized situation in which differences are emphasized (cf. Woodward 1997:12). This in turn influenced their individual goals and coping strategies. Each individual personality and self-perception influenced whether one took on the victim role or devised

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[171] The youth were least likely to envision living long-term in Bosnia, but endeavor to spend some time there to get to know it.

other practical and protective coping strategies.[172] This leads to the next section, addressing the four approaches of response my interlocutors took to manage their adaptation process.

4.6.6 Four Approaches of Response

In examining the adaptation and integration processes, my instinct was to determine whether my interlocutors have managed to interconnect the diverging *life approaches* over time. An analysis of each respondent's perspective regarding his/her adaptation process and related maneuverability has resulted in a choice of four action responses. The results show that my respondents' ability to overcome depression and stagnation, related to their past experiences and losses, is linked and influenced by the resources and opportunities they managed to enjoy in the receiving society context.

First, some made a conscious decision to choose to improve their situation in order to meet their own standards. Despite hardship, they managed to find a way of dealing with their losses and pain to carry on with life. In making a conscious decision to focus *on the here and now*, meaning their present post-migration situation, this group set the goal to start anew in the receiving society. They decided *what chair to sit on*, an in vivo code used by several respondents. In so doing, they made a concerted effort to forget their painful past, to start anew in the receiving society, and to set future goals for themselves. "When I came to the United States I felt like I was reborn." (Interview, Kata) This group relied on existing strategies and developed new ones to help them remain focused on realizing their aims. Generally, those successful in focusing their energy on the present and future, not always being absorbed by past losses, tended to be more successful in mastering their adaptation processes. "I have a new life here. I became a new person when I moved." (Interview, Rada)

The second approach that emerged since the war was evident among those who had endured hardship but were unable to move out of that pain and loss to set new goals and be hopeful about their own future. The impulse to start anew, to start living again, proved to be too exhausting for this group of respondents. Symptoms of depression were exacerbated by situations in which they saw no future for themselves. Little energy existed to strive toward any other goal than just functioning. For those stuck in a situation of *non-life*, they related difficulties finding the strength from within to change their mental, emotional and even physical state. One respondent admits her defeat: "Ich war eine große Kämpferin, aber jetzt

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[172] Some have applied healthy coping strategies, i.e. attempting to focus on taking pride in their previous positions and wealth in Bosnia, consciously choosing to draw on past successes in order to raise their self-esteem. Others feel that precisely because of these past successes they have been cheated due to institutional constraints preventing them from making something of themselves.

habe ich keine Kraft mehr." (Interview, Dubravka) Their deep sense of loss was usually heightened by feelings of anger and resentment that the war had *robbed them of their lives*. Comparisons of the past keep them inert. Those, who felt victimized, forced to migrate, against their will, displaced by the war and bitter about the *inconvenience* - thus seemingly powerless - tended to struggle more in their adaptation processes. This also tends to produce a more negative appraisal of their situation, as they constantly compare their situations to previous standards and ideals. These are the respondents who live in the past, recalling Bosnia as a perfect utopia, feeling frustrated as a result of their social and economic demotion and stagnation in the receiving society context. Nostalgic for their lives in Bosnia prior to the war, these interlocutors struggled in their adaptation in the receiving society and with notions of belonging. The self-esteem of this group of respondents tends to be fraught, and PTSD is often a contributing factor keeping them fixed in the past. Until they are able to learn and apply healthy coping strategies, their memories will likely be fixed in time, focused more on past events rather than on current or future events. The subcategory depicting this group was: *too little to live, too much to die*, another in vivo code, and apparent in the following quote.

"Ehrlich zu sagen gibt es keine [wichtigen Erlebnisse], man vegetiert da. Also, so wie ich hier lebe… Ich denke manchmal, ich habe mein Leben wieder im Griff, oder ich lebe ein normales Leben – ist es aber nicht. Da ich einen Sohn habe, dann hat das Leben einen Sinn, aber sonst…" (Interview, Mirna)

The third approach overlaps with the second approach but adds a new dimension, namely, age as a variable. This reflects those who have made a conscious decision not to pursue their own goals, but rather to focus their energy on the goals of their children and grandchildren. Due to their age, they have reduced their standards and ideals to conform to their actual situation as elderly refugees with *too little time to start over* in the receiving society context. Rather than living for themselves and striving for their own potential achievements, they find meaning through the lives of their children or grandchildren. When speaking of the well-being of her family, one respondent said: "If they are happy, I will also be happy." (Interview, Rada)

A final approach, which was only evident by one of my respondents but was touched on in both contexts as a common response of the refugees in general, is the category: *qualifying for sympathy*. This term was coined by a care worker I interviewed in Chicago, which was later repeated by one of my interlocutors. Based on his years of experience working with underprivileged refugees, this care provider observed a select group of welfare recipients in the US who commonly vocalize and exaggerate their experiences of loss and suffering in effort to *qualify for greater sympathy* and thus greater financial and supportive services. He noticed the same response emerge over time among some Bosnian refugees, particularly

among certain elderly or (physically or mentally) disabled refugees, who were reliant on the system for support.

> "The most fascinating thing was with the wounded who came, because after the wounded got here, then all the Bosnians I met after that felt that it was their obligation to compare themselves and their story to make it worse than the wounded who I was helping. And it became a competition of who had a harder life, you know? My neighbor three doors down died. That makes me more qualified from grief of loss of my neighbor, but that guy lost his leg... And the concept was if we can get the sympathy, then we get everything. But it really was sort of sad. You wanted to give them dignity and in giving them dignity, you sometimes, didn't. You kind of had to be mean to them. The sadness is that these are people who had great pride and personal integrity I think in their life and all of a sudden they reduce themselves to being constant beggars. I think that's the sadness, because they have what they need." (Interview, Chicago care provider, anonymous)

Hopeful to acquire free or low cost materials and services from the government or assisting agencies, some refugees competed with one another in *working the system* and vying for sympathy and recognition. One of my interlocutors acknowledged the phenomenon of refugees vying for sympathy and questioned what instigated this process. She wondered if this behavior was in response to becoming a social welfare recipient in a rich country like the US, or whether these individuals who vied for sympathy had always behaved so and would have done the same in Bosnia prior to the war.

> "It's so different from what I knew about people when I looked at [this behavior] and it's a real headache and I don't know how or why, I don't know when, I just know that's the way it is, you know? When somebody says people don't change maybe they don't and if there's a normality, which if it wasn't normal, it was very well hidden. Or did it just start here? What I don't like is when people feel that they're entitled to whatever they think they're entitled to. I mean nobody's entitled to anything. You know how that is [when they think] it's truly like a birthright or something? That's how they present it and you know it beats me why, but honestly, it's a big majority that thinks that way and I don't know if this is after that war experience. I mean at least I'd like to think that, although I have doubts myself. But what you know is this, people lost, you know, lifelong achievements. Actually it's not [just] lifelong achievements; my family was very well-off, not because I did something certainly, but it was my great grandfather, then my grandfather and then my father, you know, and everything is being left to you and that accumulates, you know how that is? I don't know is this all their lives and everything they lost accompanied with all the trauma? But I don't really know how to express that. It's weird and it's ugly actually. It's really ugly as far I'm concerned." (Interview, Zina)

Rather passionate in her reflection on this phenomenon, this participant raises an important ethical issue regarding the government's distribution of care and welfare recipients' consumption of it and the reification of suffering. The focus revolves around needs versus wants and the government's role in deciding this. Interestingly, governments often criticize refugees for relying on welfare support, but in offering this support, does it not actually

contribute to this phenomenon of *vying for sympathy*, fostering competition to be the worst off and the most victimized?

As in Chicago, a similar tendency emerged in Berlin largely as a result of the total denial of tolerated refugees' cultural and economic capital over the years. According to my interview with a Berlin-based care provider, some of those who have been able to remain in Germany have learned to take advantage of the welfare benefits available to them. While they do not consume any of the riches available in Berlin (not going to museums, to cultural activities, etc.), but they do receive a warm apartment and basic necessities (some even work illegally, earning an additional couple hundred euros a month). Doctors *write them sick*, label them traumatized and excuse them from participating in society. They are given medications and refrain from working and doing other essential daily activities. One social worker argues that with time, they become lazy and the idleness is what makes them ill (Interview, SOEK). They even refer to their social welfare benefits as *Rennte* (retirement pension). The care provider's theory is that they will never seek a full-time position in Germany as long as they can receive *Rennte*. They have learned to be content with this minimalist lifestyle. When they compare their situation and finances with their relatives in the former Yugoslavia and consider their lifestyle in Berlin, they believe they live better, more comfortably in Berlin. He further argued that the job centers are the only institutions in Germany that currently cause difficulty or stress for them. Those unable to speak German are expected to attend integration classes, but they commonly skip the appointments claiming illness, or that their children are sick and they need to stay home to care for their kids, among other excuses. It seems, according to the care provider, that these actors have become quite adept at manipulating the system to their advantage and doing the minimum to maintain the financial security awarded them by the German social welfare office. Essentially, he argues that they have learned that positioning themselves as *sick* or *helpless* enables them freedom to negotiate a comfortable future for themselves in Germany without needing to fulfill many duties.

These scenarios raise the question whether the asylum and refugee policies implemented, especially as regards temporary status, in effect create this response? Is this an expected outcome in Berlin due to the steady restrictions in the refugees' right to participate in society or to access essential resources? Or is this reflective of their *giving up* due to limitations in reaching their aim to accumulate cultural and economic capital? Or is this a result of individual personality attributes, as may be the case in the Chicago example? Alternatively, can this sort of mentality be acquired based on the receiving society's expectations of the refugee? These questions are difficult to answer. They mirror common politicized debates by

governments in regard to welfare support and fears of creating environments of dependency. Caution is used to avoid simplifying answers to complex questions, as multiple variables influence the outcome.

The next section, presented as a *structure of generalizations* (cf. Flick 2006), provides further evidence of the complexities of refugee incorporation by considering the extent to which societal structures have enabled situations for refugees and migrants in general to act and to interact (respond).

4.7 Structures of Generalizations

Despite the unique experiences of each of my interview respondents, many generalizations can be drawn from this study that may be applicable to other refugee and migrant populations. In an effort to understand the phenomenon of refugee incorporation, I describe and interpret the actions of my refugee respondents by abstracting and highlighting certain elements common to most of the cases and to wider examinations of refugee resettlement. According to Max Weber (1968a), "theoretical differentiation (*Kasuistik*) is possible in sociology only in terms of ideal or pure types." (Dallmayr/McCarthy 1977:51) Weber (1968a) oriented social action in at least four ways: instrumentally rational (*Zweckrational*), value-rational (*Wertrational*), affectual (especially emotional), and traditional, which is determined by ingrained habituation (Weber 1968a in: Dallmayr/McCarthy 1977:53). In identifying these four orientations, Weber in no way meant to exhaust the possibilities for discerning additional modes of action. "When reference is made to 'typical' cases, the term should always be understood, unless otherwise stated, as meaning 'ideal' types, which may in turn be rational or irrational as the case may be…" (Weber 1968a in: Dallmayr/McCarthy 1977:51) The next section thus elaborates abstract generalizations from my respondents' realities (as they were revealed to me). These are not descriptions of specific individuals but an abstraction of multiple accounts, in an attempt to give more precise meaning and understanding to common trends in refugee integration. The question guiding these descriptions is: what ideal type of social action or coping mechanisms abound in the adaptation processes of refugees? This varies, of course, depending on a number of variables including, among others, individual personalities, culture, race/ethnicity, gender, age, and the contexts in which refugees are acting and interacting, as was previously exhibited.

4.7.1 Ideal Type: Traumatized Woman

A war widow arrives to a new city with her child, unaccompanied by any other family members. She is uncertain how she has been able to cope all these years. Having married

young, she never went to college and lacked any formal qualifications or skills. She was a young wife and mother, who focused her energy in her home country primarily on building a strong family and home life. When the war broke out, her husband joined the military and was separated from her. Her daughter is her only family near her now.

Enroute to safety, she experienced horrific atrocities, of which she rarely speaks. She knows firsthand about rape and survival stories and has heard about the men's experiences in concentration camps. She has still not heard from her husband, who has gone "missing." She assumes he was killed. She suppresses the pain associated with memories of home and the past in order to move forward. She still has ongoing nightmares, is fatigued, and suffers from PTSD. She has avoided voluntary return and deportation as a result of her traumatization. She has been taking antidepressants for years and has participated in group therapy sessions offered by a local NGO. She breaks down in tears at inappropriate moments, struggles to get out of bed certain days, is quick to break into outbursts of rage, and otherwise feels generally numb. She learns in her therapy to focus on the positive. She attempts to deal with her emotional losses of being torn from her homeland as well as separated from her husband by envisioning a reunion one day with her husband and extended family. She surrounds herself by other women refugee survivors. Despite this support, she experiences bouts of loneliness and depression. She cannot fathom how people can talk about mundane and superficial things; especially after all she has been through. She distances herself as a result.

She is not fluent in the host society language and is hesitant to befriend natives. She is unable to get a decent paying job. Relying on welfare benefits, she spends her days going to therapy, caring for her daughter, cooking and taking care of the household, drinking coffee with fellow refugee women, and trying to learn the host society language. Unaccustomed to luxury, she is able to budget her welfare supplements. She works illegally as a cleaner a few hours a week at a big company. She is terrified of being caught and deported. But she is dependent on the income. She has begun a training initiative offered by the unemployment office in order to remain in the host country. Eventually, she may be placed in a new position with more hours depending on her mental health assessment. She tries to be strong for her daughter. She is thankful that they are both alive. She hopes to secure another extension of her residence permit to remain in the future. She has nothing and no one in her country of origin to go back to and dreads the idea of being deported.

4.7.2 Ideal Type: Youthful *Star*

A 15-year old refugee boy arrives in the receiving country accompanied by his neighbor and her children. He is able to go to school in the receiving society. Without his parents, he relies

on the extra attention some of his teachers give him. Knowing he is a war refugee unaccompanied by any family members and struggling to adapt, one teacher in particular reaches out to him. His ambition to please her motivates him to excel in school. With her support, he eventually learns the host society language and progresses through school. He has no problems accessing university and studying business. His father eventually reunites with him in the receiving society. He is fragile as a result of the torture and atrocities carried out on him in the camps. The boy's mother was killed during the war in his home country.

Having to start over and learn the language of the receiving society proves difficult for his father. Having enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle in Bosnia, the transition as a refugee is difficult for them both. The father's previous prestigious identity makes the loss associated with the war and displacement even harder to bear in the receiving society. The father is completely reliant on his son, who is responsible for translating, taking care of bureaucratic paperwork, shopping, paying the bills, cooking, and caring for his father. Despite this burden, out of sympathy and loyalty to his father, the boy does his best to excel in school, work, and adapting. He knows he has no other option. He dreams of recapturing the comfortable lifestyle they had enjoyed prior to the war. His father, overcome by PTSD and feelings of loss, barely acknowledges his son's efforts.

The boy attributes his success to the fact that he fled the war at a young enough age to enter the normal school system in the host society, where he learned the language and progressed through the educational system, reaching the same standards as a native citizen. The additional care and support he received along the way from specific actors encouraged him and motivated him to keep trying. He feels comfortable and at home in the host country. He can not imagine living anywhere else. Despite his integration success, he has never dealt with the death of his mother and the deterioration of his once healthy father. The war took his parents from him and has forced him in a position of caring for an ailing, traumatized shell of a man, what remains of his father. He does his best to be successful, to be a "star," knowing that he must persevere.

4.7.3 Ideal Type: Male Marrying for Love

Unable to work in the receiving society, this male refugee does not speak the host society language, has little financial means, and is constantly reminded of his painful memories of torture, prison camp experiences, and war-related atrocities. He avoids therapy, viewing mental health treatment as a sign of weakness and attached with stigmas. He feels uncontrolled outbursts of rage though, linked to his humiliation and let-down. Having lost everything, he feels useless and powerless to change his situation. He perceives himself to be

superior to the Roma people or drug-dependent natives with whom he is forced to share an accommodation facility in the receiving context. This sense is exacerbated when recalling his loss in status and wealth, leading to his sense of powerlessness and causing him to feel resentful for all that has been taken from him. He wants nothing more than to work and to regain all he has lost, but he is denied access to the labor market. His previous qualifications are ignored and discounted in the new contexts. He has been sitting idly for years, waiting to get some construction and building jobs irregularly. He has been exploited and not paid for his work on several occasions. Helpless, he is often angry.

That is, until he meets a native woman and falls in love. His vulnerability is attractive to her. He learns to rely on her for support. Contrary to others who married to improve their residence rights, he insists he marries only for love. He and his fiancée undergo a grueling questioning process with the Foreigners Office authorities. He likens it to an "inquisition" they have to undergo in order to prove the validity of their love, the seriousness of their relationship, and the legitimacy of their being together. Placed in separate rooms at the Foreigners Office, each is asked nearly 300 questions about their relationship. Vague answers are not permitted. Questions are asked like: "what is the first thing you see when you get out of bed in the morning? Are there tiles in the kitchen and what color are they? Do you have a coffee machine, and if so, what color is it?" His fiancé has to answer questions regarding his shaving and hygiene routine, among other things. Months after the *interrogation* and examination of his paperwork, he is finally granted permission to marry.

In marrying a native, his legal status changes to a more secure limited residence permit, which is extended to a three-year permit. This permits him to work, attend university, and travel freely. Because he is already over 50, attending university does not seem a likely option. He enjoys nevertheless the other freedoms that come with his new status. He is able to work legally in his trade again, but he lacks the necessary paperwork to complete the process. He hopes (with assistance from his wife) to have his degree from abroad recognized in order to start his own business in the receiving context. He begins the process to become an entrepreneur, working as a carpenter and freelance construction worker. He earns less than other carpenters whose degrees have been recognized. He is still angry a lot and feels as if he were being blamed and punished for the war in his country of origin. But he didn't start the war nor did he want to flee. He does not understand why the authorities of the host government hate him. Despite this sense of not belonging and being resented, he envisions remaining with his wife in the receiving country until he dies. One day, he hopes to return

home for a visit though in order to reconnect with his adult-age children from his first marriage.

4.7.4 Ideal Type: Family and Household Composition

A women refugee seeks to reconstruct a familiar lifestyle in the resettlement context to what she had been accustomed to in her country of origin. She continues to be responsible for tasks associated with her earlier role as a young mother, responsible for cooking, cleaning, mending, caring for the needs of the children, husband and household. She never worked outside of her home in her home country. In the resettlement context, she must work full-time in order to help ensure her family's survival. When she first arrived in the new context, she participated in the state-sponsored language classes and worked hard to learn the host society language. She was placed in a low-wage job, cleaning schools. The first years passed quickly, as she worked and continued taking host language classes in the evening after work. As she became more fluent, she gained confidence to apply for other jobs more aligned with her previous educational background. She did her best to care for her children, but there was little time to be nurturing. She was forced to adjust quickly and had to postpone grieving or dwelling on the reasons that had brought her to the resettlement context. Eventually, she manages to get a better job, albeit not in her previous field, but working as a translator and counselor in a mental health clinic. This provides healthcare coverage for her and her family. The transition from a single-income to dual-income family culminates in a variety of changes within her marital and family relationships. Her husband feels torn initially, in part, feeling threatened and thus contributing to increased intermarriage tension and interfamily conflicts. Yet, he also acknowledges that her job is linked to the family's health insurance and their survival in the new context. Her job is thus important for the well-being of the whole family. Fortunately for her, her husband eventually recognizes the value of her working to contribute to his earnings. His salary alone would not have sufficed to cover the family's costs of living. The fact that she earns less than him due to the type of job she has and due to only gradual transitions in gender-based salaries,[173] has aided in deescalating her husband's sense of unease over her full-time position and protected her from his abuse. With time and strict budgeting, the couple is able to save money. Eventually, they relocate their remaining family members from abroad to join them in the host country through family resettlement schemes. Her parents join them first. Her father becomes the handy man, making household repairs and

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[173] Despite the passage of equal opportunity statutes imposed to guarantee women the same legal, political, educational, and occupational rights as their male counterparts, the weakening in patriarchal traditions has only been gradual in most contexts.

home improvements. Her mother assumes the traditional caring role (cooking, cleaning, etc.) for the whole family, which saves the younger mother time and energy. Focusing their attention on the well-being of the grandchildren, the grandparents provide a significant contribution to the family dynamic, helping the younger couple in their efforts to work, save money, and get ahead in the host society. Their presence also eases the interfamily tensions that were the result of stress, sleep deprivation and repressed trauma. Knowing their children are in good hands with their grandparents makes it easier for the younger couple to pursue financial security, trusting that their children are safe. This leads to a subtle transformation in the parental and gender roles as the younger mother balances the responsibility (and burden) with her husband of earning and covering the family's costs of living. She relies heavily on her mother to assume her earlier household duties and as such, the women are both agents of change as well as sources of continuity and tradition (Martin 2004:13 in: Muftic′/Bouffard 2008).

Despite empowering aspects embedded with this transition, the young mother continues to criticize the quick pace of life in the new context, the constant pressure to perform, to work, to get ahead. She rarely has any energy or time to relax or to meet with extended family or friends or to deal with her personal needs. She still has occasional nightmares from the war, but has missed the opportunity to apply for mental healthcare treatment. She marvels at how well integrated her children are in the new context. For their sake, she and her husband have decided to remain in the country of resettlement and to only return home for vacations. She misses home, her friends, the slower pace of life, and the weather, but she also realizes it is no longer the same; it has changed dramatically from her memories. Each time she visits she is reminded of this. To compensate for remaining in the destination country, her personal strategy is to invest in creating a new home and in making her dream of buying a house a reality. She and her husband are saving money with the goal to make a down payment on a small house in the destination country. Meanwhile, she considers going back to school. She wants to finish her degree and be a strong role model for her children. She wants them to be proud of her, as her children are the catalyst behind all she does.

4.7.5 Ideal Type: Integration Exhibited Through the Agency of the Children
A young refugee reflects how her integration has taken precedence over that of her parents, since she has had greater potential to take advantage of what the host society has had to offer. She quickly learned the host society language, made friends across ethnic group lines with little to no problems and excelled in school. As she grew older, she experienced increasing pressures: extended family members and friends of her parents encouraged her to get married

within the same ethnic community and to do so at a much younger age than was average in the receiving society context. She was torn between her identity and responsibilities.

Her parents were working two jobs, learning the host society language, adapting to the new environment, and often left her on her own. Her parents were too busy to enforce restrictions or limit her social contacts. Because they trusted the destination country's school system, they presumed all was well. She enjoyed much autonomy, more than was common for a girl her age. She observed one of her friends, also a refugee, get into trouble, experimenting with drugs and befriending the *wrong crowd* - a typical inner city youth problem. After this friend was jailed and threatened with deportation, she realized she would need to make a decision for herself whether to remain in this troubled phase of experimenting with alcohol and drug consumption or making a decision to make something of herself despite her lack of parental guidance. She made an important decision about her identity, who she is and who she hopes to be in the future as she transitioned from childhood to adulthood. She decided to *straighten up*, to cut ties with the members of the *wrong crowd* and to focus on her schoolwork.

With time, her parents save enough money to move into a better apartment. She is pleased because the new apartment is bigger than any they have ever had before. She even has her own room, where she can better concentrate on her schoolwork. Eventually, she graduates from high school and receives a small scholarship to attend college. Her parents continue working to help pay her tuition fees. She still lives at home and feels pressure from the surrounding community to get married. Yet, she focuses more on her future career, unsure what field she wants to pursue, but certain that she is not ready to get married now. She is surprised her parents accept this decision so well and attributes it to the new context. She hopes to travel after she graduates from college and aspires to return to her country of origin. She has only returned once and it was terribly difficult for her. She ponders where she will live for the rest of her life, what she will do, what she will aspire towards. Her success in the receiving context has been undergirded by her family's decision to move forward; they have all learned to be flexible and know they can adapt to anything, as proven by their displacement and multiple resettlements. After having lived in three different countries and survived, and having entered in with the *wrong crowd* in high school, and maneuvered out of harm's way, she has become more conscious of her own actions and agency in surviving. With this knowledge, she has become more confident and comfortable with her life situation. Compared with other natives her age she feels wiser and more knowledgeable about the human condition, distinguishing her from her peers.

4.7.6 Ideal Type: Living for Grandchildren

The next ideal type is a tearful war widow, whose husband died in the war, and who resettled under the family reunification scheme. She moved into an apartment with her adult-age daughter, son-in-law, and grandchildren, where she primarily cares for her grandchildren. She cooks, cleans, and does her best to help the family. They are kind to her; she tries to be the same. She does not speak the host society language, though she tries. She attends language classes for seniors offered by a refugee agency. Some days she remembers the foreign words better than other days. Some days, she closes herself off in her room and cries. She feels much shame and self-blame linked to her ethnic identity and the atrocities of the war that took place in her homeland. She is unaccustomed to receiving empathy from others. She lost her house, her possessions, and much more. She tries to hide the fact that she cries from her family. She does not want her daughter to worry about her. She wants to make her grandchildren happy, to make them smile. When she feels bad she pretends that all is well. Her antidepressants are helpful but they don't remove all of her *bad emotions*. Everything she does, she does for her family. She has nothing else. She misses her home culture and sometimes finds herself fantasizing about returning. Then she wakes from her reverie, realizing that home no longer exists the way she envisions it in her daydreams. She does not have another 30 years to invest, to start anew, and to create new goals for herself in the destination country. Consequently, she feels as if her life belongs to the past. She contents herself with this thought: If her family is well, then she is well. If they are happy, then she is happy. She does her best to care for her family, stay positive, and accept her fate. Her involvement in the activities and group therapy for other elderly refugee survivors is important to her. This intermittent activity with others like her is the only thing that eases her sense of isolation and gives her strength to be strong for her family. Her identity has been reformulated in the destination context: she is now a war survivor, a widow, a traumatized refugee, unable to speak the language of the receiving society, too old to work or start over. She waits to die and in the meantime seeks to ease the lives of her children and grandchildren as a main priority.

4.7.7 Ideal Type: Vying for Sympathy

An elderly war refugee lived in a refugee camp for close to 10 years before being resettled with her adult-age son with a learning disability. She comes from an agricultural area and is illiterate. She lost track of her three sons after the start of the war. She does not mention her husband. The refugee camp helped her locate the two surviving sons, one of whom had since been resettled. Through him, she manages to apply for resettlement, but has very little contact with him after she arrives in the new context. He helped her procure welfare support and as a

traumatized elderly refugee she is also eligible for government-funded housing. Her son with the learning disability is not eligible for this, but a special allowance is made by the social workers for him to share her single-occupancy apartment. Although it is against the rules to have her son sharing her apartment, they have no other options. Her son sleeps on the couch in the kitchen, she sleeps in the bedroom. Neither speaks the host society language despite the imposed language classes after arrival. Both have given up trying to learn. She has had many health problems and it is difficult for her to walk or leave her apartment. She often misses her doctor's appointments because she can't walk to the bus stop, can't afford a taxi, and doesn't like waiting for senior services medical transport to be arranged for her by care providers. This not only costs her money, but it costs her much time. She often fails to follow through. Meanwhile, the social workers in the building have become reluctant to arrange these special services for her any more as she is often unreliable.

Having her adult-age son living with her is helpful, because he can do the physical work, cleaning, cooking, shopping, etc. She can not trust him to do the more complex bureaucratic things, as this is too difficult for him, but he is a good helper and friendly. Although he is close to 40 years old, his mental level is much younger, like a child. She is very worried about what will happen to him when she dies. He will be evicted from the seniors'-only housing. She has applied for other housing, but they do not qualify. She expects assistance from others. In some regards, she is not very willing to help herself. Following through on doctor's appointments, for instance, would help relieve her pain and increase her mobility, but she is unwilling to follow through. Learning the host society language would help her and her son integrate and qualify for other services, but they don't follow through. Securing other housing would help them both, but the waiting list is too long. She is content to wait for someone else to solve her problems and meanwhile does her best to *qualify for sympathy* as a way of gaining support. This after all, she hopes, may speed her placement in the housing waiting list. Beyond this, she exhibits little aspiration or personal incentive to change her situation.

4.7.8 Final Assessment of Ideal Types

As has previously been shown, there is no single standardized action response, rather multiple conditions and causations interplay with varying outcomes. These ideal types reflect an array of factors that influence an individual's coping strategies and ability to manage his/her adaptation in a new setting, including personality, relationships, interactions, culture, ethnicity/race, gender, age, contexts, causal processes and systems, among others. The next chapter elaborates on this by confirming that due to the complex nature of integration, no

decisive tangible cause and effect relations could be determined. Instead, an interrelation of multiple variables and actors across different domains influence integration outcomes.

5. Interwoven Causalities – Grounded Theory and Main Findings

Due to its expansive focus, many important findings emerged in this study. Both individual and institutional denominators - and their interrelation - emerged as significant factors of influence in the post-migration adaptation of my sample in the two contexts. While some of these factors are innate (e.g. gender and age), some are representative of the respondents' accumulated cultural and economic capital (e.g. language acquisition, previous education, and labor orientation); some are further influenced by the policies and context in which they are received (e.g. institutional constraints, education and work bans, social services, inclusion policies), and some are influenced by the individuals' emotional well-being (e.g. motivation to integrate, physical and mental health, therapeutic treatment, etc.). These individual and institutional dimensions are clearly interrelated, most evident, for instance, by the impact the institutional dimensions has had on the extent and manner in which the individual actions and perceptions of my sample appear to be determined by external social forces.

Multiple examples of this interrelation emerged with different outcomes depending on the context, individual personalities and self-esteem levels of my interlocutors. These descriptions help in clarifying why some participants were more likely to achieve their goal towards *normalcy* than others. Depending on how they perceived and interpreted the situational stressors (often referred to by psychologists as primary appraisal) and how they relied on strategic resources to respond to these stressors (secondary appraisal) greatly influenced their overall perception and sense of well-being in the receiving society. This also influenced their ability to act and take advantage of the resources available. "Empirical findings presented by Schmitz (1992a) point to the relevance of these cognitive appraisal processes as central intervening variables in immigrants' acculturation." (Kosic 2006:117)

It is not possible to make a definitive statement about which of the two denominators - individual or institutional - is of greater importance as a factor of influence on the Bosnians' overall adaptation. The respondents' socio-demographics and cultural capital clearly affected their ability to draw on coping strategies, interact with others, and maneuver in the receiving society (finding 1). The individual personalities and psychological state of each respondent likewise influenced the extent of resilience and ability to take advantage of the institutional resources available, particularly evident by those severely impaired by PTSD and other mental health disorders (finding 2). This also influenced whether my respondents were the type to see the glass half full versus half empty. Finally, the legal scope and institutional

conditions greeting the refugees also shaped the mode of refugee incorporation and their ability to access entitlements and rights (finding 3).

This study thus confirms that multiple interrelated cause and effect variables exist, with varying tangible outcomes for different individuals in different contexts dependent on the series of interrelated institutional and individual dimensions. Consequently, no decisive cause and effect relation relative to refugee integration could be established. The grounded theory emerging from this study suggests that this outcome is transversal to all newcomers in terms of measuring *integration success*, evident by the structure of generalizations listed at the end of the previous chapter. Considering the complexity of integration - with its multiple processes, actors, and domains – this grounded theory confirms the impossibility of determining a single, tangible cause and effect relation between government responses (rights regimes) and successful integration outcomes, according to common indicators.[174] This is because there are simply far too many interrelated factors of influence when it comes to monitoring integration. Further elaboration to substantiate this grounded theory follows in the following descriptions of findings.

5.1 Finding 1: Sociodemographic Characteristics as a Key Factor of Influence

The first finding entails the respondents' socio-demographic characteristics and cultural capital – thus individual denominators - that appeared to have the greatest influence on the likelihood of my respondents being able to rebuild their lives within the receiving society contexts. It includes age-related aspects, gender-specific characteristics, family and household roles, and the educational background of my samples.

5.1.1 Age-Related Aspects

The age at which the refugees arrived to the receiving country was a critical determinant for how they fared after arrival. At the time of the interviews, the ages of the refugees in my sample varied between 21 and 76, with only one respondent in the first age category (18-24). This was to be expected considering my intention to engage interlocutors who would be old enough to remember their pre-migration experiences. The second age category (25-34) was composed of eight respondents; 11 were in the third age category (35-44), six were in the

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[174] The European Commission, together with EU Ministers responsible for immigrant integration, were called upon with the Zaragoza Declaration, adopted in April 2010 and approved at the Justice and Home Affairs Council two months later, to "examine proposals for common integration indicators and to report on the availability and quality of the data from agreed harmonised sources necessary for the calculation of these indicators". The indicators examined in the resulting report apply to four policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship (Eurostat, 2011).

fourth (45-54) and six also made up the fifth age category (55+). Striking differences emerged on the whole in the narratives of my respondents. Many similarities along age lines and likelihood of attaining economic self-sufficiency emerged in the two contexts. I distinguish between three simple age categories: the elderly, the youth/adolescents, and the adult-age refugees. Unless otherwise specified, this study essentially described the situation of the adult-age refugees, which is why the ensuing description highlights the other two age categories, the youth and adolescents, and the elderly.

In Berlin, those under 16 years of age, generally fared well as they entered the mainstream educational system, learned German proficiently, and advanced to higher degrees. Similarly in the US, the younger refugees also entered the school system, but different from Berlin. This was not always an advantage in Chicago due to the choices the youth were forced to make in the inner-city high schools, i.e. to excel and become a *star* or wind up involved in *deviant* activity. For those who chose the first option, they tended to enjoy enhanced labor market opportunities and integration *success*. The latter group sometimes faced jail time or deportation. This was a similar outcome for many in Berlin unable to access the education establishments. The older the refugee adolescents at the time of arrival, the more likely they returned to Bosnia, either voluntarily or due to deportation. Since much attention has already been devoted to the particular situation of the youth in both contexts, the subsequent section focuses in more detail on the situation of the elderly refugees.

The resettlement agencies in Chicago faced a particular obstacle in regard to placing the elderly Bosnian refugees in the workforce. Many seniors lacked the physical endurance and skill set necessary to work full-time. Additionally, many of the elderly Bosnian refugees, having come from rural farming villages, often had lower educational levels, had little job experience other than farming and agriculture or housekeeping. Some were illiterate, leading to difficulties in their acquiring host society language proficiency. Another distinction between the elderly in the two contexts was the role of family reunification in Chicago. Many elderly united with family, who cared for their well-being and covered their expenses. While in Berlin, many elderly were returned or had been deported to Bosnia.

A particular challenge for the elderly in Chicago was related to the emphasis on employment. Refugees of all ages were expected to join the workforce. A 62 year old Bosnian senior I interviewed, who spoke no English at the time of her arrival, was told she needed to find a job to support herself. Since she had not yet reached the age of retirement (65 years old) she was automatically denied retirement benefits and told to work. Aware of the challenges associated with placing elderly refugees in the labor market and conscious of the

anxiety levels related to this pressure, case workers were often able to arrange alternative solutions by referring the seniors to mental health screenings, where a doctor might diagnose them with symptoms of PTSD. This solution was implemented for many Bosnian seniors who struggled in accessing the labor market as this diagnosis enabled refugees to come under a government assistance program for needy people with disabilities.[175] This outcome is thus not remarkably different from that in Berlin, as the Bosnian refugees in both contexts were classified as disabled and traumatized, and thus deemed worthy of institutional support.[176]

Overall, elderly female refugees were most likely to have been referred by case workers to seek treatment after evidencing signs of stress and anxiety, and unable to cope with the expectations related to their adjustment process. Cut off from social connections, struggling with the receiving society language, unable to drive, many of these elderly refugees were often isolated. In addition, some had values that sometimes conflicted with the mainstream culture as well as with those of their increasingly *assimilated* grandchildren. Essentially, the elderly Bosnians needed greater support and benefited as a result of their eligibility for mainstream therapeutic services.

5.1.2 Gender-Specific Characteristics

Gender was also an important variable influencing adaptation. Based on the analysis of my results, gender relations and gender-specific role models were newly arranged and renegotiated, particularly in Chicago. This led to a gradual dissolving of traditional patriarchal gender and family roles that had been practiced in Yugoslavia.[177]

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[175] Being diagnosed with PTSD allowed my participants to receive benefits and to participate in individual and group setting case management. As a result, this participant was very active in numerous social activities offered by the refugee voluntary agency. Throughout the years, she participated in numerous ESL courses. In contrast to the other seniors I interviewed, she was one of the only ones able to conduct the interview with me in English without a translator. Despite this development, she was still reliant on medication to help her sleep at night and suppress the memories associated with her war experiences. Refugees like other US citizens aged 65 or over were eligible to draw on the federally funded Medicare program, which also covers a part of any medical prescription costs.

[176] The residence rights of the elderly in Berlin were mainly connected to their traumatizations.

[177] Several authors confirm that Bosnian women were encouraged to enter the workforce under Tito's Communist regime, yet none was *emancipated* from *traditional* roles within the family (Muftic′/Bouffard 2008:175, Franz 2004, Simic 1999). While a record number of women entered the Yugoslavian workforce, they were not granted greater recognition; rather their subordinate position within society was merely reinforced as they were expected to work outside the home in addition to carrying out the tasks within the home (Muftic′/Bouffard 2008). In addition to being expected to clean, cook, and serve meals to extended family members, many Bosnian women also suffered under patriarchal traditions with regular beatings from their husbands or fathers, as well as a double standard of sexual morality (Franz 2004, Muftic′/Bouffard 2008:175, Interview, Dr. Weine). "There continued to be a stress on women as wives and mothers, ahead of their roles as workers, and on the home as their primary locus of identity and responsibility". (Massey et al. 1995:375) The type of employment in which the women engaged was *gender differentiated* with women working in *female appropriate* sectors, such as nursing, education, and services (Muftic′/Bouffard 2008:175). The social positioning of women in Tito's Yugoslavia was less than ideal, referred to by Franz (2004) as *peculiar*.

For each of my participants, the process of uprooting and resettling in a different country encompassed a variety of practical and emotional issues. The particular plight of my female respondents as women in situations of conflict and in places of refuge and adaptation deserves special attention. "Women have their own stories to tell – both as victims of a particular group and as women." (Mertus et al. 1997:14) Forced to leave their homes because of brutality and persecution, the women found themselves in extremely difficult and vulnerable positions, in part also due to the atrocities committed against them during the war.[178] Many Bosnian families had been forced to split apart. The men went off to war, become imprisoned, or possibly even killed. Due to an overall deterioration in economic and social resources, made worse by the absence of men, the women were forced into situations of overwhelming insecurity. Many encountered difficulties, particularly as they felt pressure to provide financially for their children and/or elderly parents.[179]

The socioeconomic situation of all of my respondents became immediately uncertain with the outbreak of war. As hostilities increased, the infrastructure collapsed. Respondents reported no longer being able to access their money from the banks as a result. One participant describes how her mother, who had relied heavily on her husband in Bosnia to take care of the family, the finances, and to make all the decisions, was forced to modify her parental role in Chicago after her husband went missing.

> "In Bosnia she didn't have so much, like she had her own job and everything but she didn't have much responsibility. Like my father he took care of paying all the bills and grocery shopping and this and that. She would just buy like clothes for herself and for us, so that was about it. She didn't even know, like if you asked her how much the bread costs, she might not know." (Interview, Anita)

For this participant and her family, the mother's reliance on her husband led to her family's inability to access the years of savings at the bank where her parents had an account. The signature of her father was needed to release the funds. His absence, consequently, left them penniless. My respondents' mother, in response, was not only overwhelmed by the war and her displacement, but also with her new role as guardian to her mother.

In addition to the many other functions ascribed to their identities, many acquired new roles, namely, that of survivor, war victim and war widow (International Committee of the Red Cross 1999).[180] Many of my female respondents struggled in balancing their own

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[178] In addition to the mass rapes, Bosnian women had also been targeted for genocide and trafficking, as well as domestic violence (Brittain 2003 in: Muftic′/Bouffard 2008).

[179] Often this pressure was shared with their husbands as well, resulting in both working long shifts.

[180] The Bosnian war marks a special situation in which more women than men sought asylum (Binder/Tošić 2005). It is difficult to determine statistically the number of war dead by gender, but the presumption is that the around 80 percent of those killed during the war was men of *combat* or *military* age (International Committee of

grieving processes with their roles as mother, wife or widow. Some women fared better than others. Some had to first learn how to fend for themselves and how to be more proactive.

Despite existing patriarchal societal structures and expectations that women would be more vulnerable than men (Hillmann 1996), most of my female participants, however, showed the opposite was true. They were able to position themselves anew in the receiving society context, evident especially in Chicago, where refugees of all ages and gender were, for instance, propelled into the workforce due to the emphasis on employment. The opportunities available to the female refugees were not necessarily in greater imbalance with those available to the male refugees, though the female refugees may have earned less than their male counterparts.[181] One of my participants disclosed to me a common strategy undertaken: "Actually, what a lot of people do here: the man gets the good paying job and the woman takes whatever job she can get with insurance to cover insurance for the family." (Interview, Zorak) Since many of the women's jobs were commonly linked to the families' insurance coverage in Chicago, the female respondents assumed a particularly important responsibility in ensuring the well-being of the family. Many of the jobs the women acquired in Chicago were in typical female-oriented positions, but the significance of attaining health insurance for the entire family through their work was deemed more vital.

Gender also seemed to play a role when it came to overcoming feelings of shame and self-blame. "Girls and women are often discouraged from having or expressing feelings of anger. This results in the anger being turned inside as self-blame, shame and depression." (Bryant-Davis 2005:110) This in turn had the tendency of exacerbating emotional disorders and heightening symptoms of depression, diagnosed in particular among female respondents. Based on refugee research studies, "women report higher scores on anxiety, depression, and intrusion scales (Plante et al. 2002), and one study found that women develop PTSD twice as often as men" (Rosner et al. 2003 in: Craig et al. 2008:104). This may be attributed to the particularly high vulnerability related to gender-based violence targeting refugee and internally displaced women. This may also be attributed to differences in gender roles and learned traditions of emotional expression. Women, for instance, are known to mourn more than men, an outcome that may be linked to accepted social roles and differences accorded gender (Bryant-Davis 2005). Certainly, a correlation can be made to the situations in Chicago

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the Red Cross 1999). Based on the age of these young married men who have fallen, a high proportion of survivors consisted of young war widows.

[181] Typical of the mainstream patriarchal patterns, the male refugees tended to earn a somewhat higher income than the female refugees in both contexts.

and Berlin, since the female respondents were more likely than the male respondents to seek out therapy or be diagnosed with PTSD – or to discuss the topic with me.

5.1.3 Family and Household Characteristics

An additional variable found to be important in influencing the respondents' adaptation was family composition. This addresses whether the person is single without responsibility of children to worry about, whether in a large extended family household, whether alone or supported by family, or whether interfamily conflict or spousal abuse emerged.

One finding among the sample was that the psychological functioning of those refugees arriving on their own separated from their families was negatively affected. Being alone without family in the receiving society context caused particular challenges, such as loneliness, isolation, financial strains, and related problems that led to greater obstacles for my single respondents to manage their adaptation process. "The disruption of extended family and peer networks that end up scattered around the world adds to the inability to express one's grief in the cultural context that is needed." (Craig et al. 2008:112) Respondents managed nevertheless to carry on by disguising depression, distracting themselves from loneliness and keeping busy, sometimes through working long shifts, volunteering, or even just watching a lot of television.

One clear finding was that the support gleaned from family members and like-communities served as essential facilitating factors that positively influenced the refugees in managing their post-migration adaptation processes. For instance, respondents in Berlin turned commonly to family as an emotional strategy for dealing with the arbitrary behavior of the Foreigners' Office staff. One interlocutor, for instance, relied on her parents throughout her entire resettlement process as they provided a source of strength for her.

> "Sehr wichtig! Wirklich sehr, sehr wichtig wahrscheinlich, weil wir das so zusammen erlebt und so schlimm erlebt haben, und von der bosnischen Mentalität her. Du wirst es wahrscheinlich erleben, dass so ehemalige Jugoslawien Familie wirklich sehr schätzen. Also, ich hänge sehr an meinem Vater." (Interview, Selma)

Because her parents have shared a similar fate, having experienced the war and dislocation, they could commiserate with her and understand her deep sorrow and steady sense of loss since living in Berlin. They understood the mood swings and depressive states that sometimes arose. Participants relied on their family for support and understanding particularly when feeling disadvantaged or disappointed. Having relied on the support of her mother and brother for years, another participant recalled her thought process in determining whether to move out on her own.

> "Wir dachten, wenn wir schon so lange zusammen in dieser Wohnung gewohnt haben und

es ausgehalten haben ohne uns zu streiten und Stress zu haben, nervös zu sein - es war ziemlich harmonisch, hat alles ganz gut geklappt - dachten wir, wir warten, bis hier im Haus eine Wohnung leer ist. Seit über fünf Jahren wohnt [meine Mutter] im ersten Stock mit meinem Bruder." (Interview, Mirna)

Regardless of the context, being surrounded by family and loved ones was perceived in overwhelmingly positive terms by most of my respondents. Support through family interactions sometimes contributed in curbing the negative impact of perceived cultural differences between the respondents and receiving society members.

In some cases, however, participants were unable to benefit from the family's mutual experiences and war-related traumas. This was attributed to stress-related factors. In some cases, individuals were suffering too deeply to be mindful and empathetic toward surrounding family members and in some cases, changes in family and gender roles sometimes resulted in creating additional stress within family units. Conflicts sometimes emerged.

Here, family conflict can be divided along several lines: marital conflict, parent-child conflict or general interfamily conflicts. They are often interrelated. Marital conflict was only touched on in passing, never directly addressed, making it difficult to ascertain whether this was really a contributing factor in the adaptation of my respondents. I raise the issue here, however, since reference was made a number of times in the interviews to family dynamic stressors that impacted already unstable mental health conditions and increased the potential for violence. Depression in one or both marital partners, for instance, has been associated with increased marital conflict and the absence of positive conflict resolution strategies (Du Rocher Schudlich et al. 2004 in: Meffert/Marmar 2009:1837). A study of Bosnian refugee couples found that the marital satisfaction of wives was directly related to the PTSD of husbands and the PTSD of the wives themselves (Spasojevic et al. 2000). "Trust and connection for refugees and immigrants, including marital intimacy and satisfaction, are greatly shaped by the trauma experiences and their ability to cope." (Bryant-Davis 2005:49) Some experts suggest that intermarital conflicts were heightened by stagnation and economic decline in the receiving society context as well, as this resulted in feelings of inadequacy. A decrease in self-worth is presumed to occur more consistently among male refugees, perhaps, attributed to the Bosnian male identity being associated in activities and jobs outside of the home (Mertus et al. 1997:101). This and the transformation from single-income to dual-income families evident in Chicago culminated in a variety of changes within the marital and household composition, which in some cases also created additional stressors.

While there is little literature on Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) and refugee status, Beutz et al. (2004) suspect that Bosnian refugees may be at increased risk for IPV. According to

Martin (2004), female refugees may be in a position of increased risk since many refugee men are unable to accept their new (and often diminished) social role and are hence prone to greater risks for depression, alcoholism, and violence (Muftic′/Bouffard 2008). Because social norms sometime discourage male survivors from grieving or exhibiting vulnerabilities, men are known to sometimes express anger physically instead of verbally. "Sometimes displaced anger results in male survivors being abusive toward those they love." (Bryant-Davis 2005:110) Because there was a tendency among the men in particular to suppress their sadness, likely out of fear of *getting stuck in their sorrow*, fighting among the couples may have been common since repressed pain tends to result in emotional battles. A strategy to combat this was learning nonviolent ways of communication in order to break the potential of encouraging the cycle of violence (Bryant-Davis 2005).

A lack of information on the legal system and supportive services for refugee women to leave their abusive husbands, in addition to the challenges they faced adapting to a new culture with different norms, values, and laws, may have been contributing factors keeping them in these roles (Muftic′/Bouffard 2008). "Many women are socialized not to trust themselves. Growing up, the survivor may have had her thoughts and feelings discounted and questioned. As a result, she may have always felt uncomfortable about speaking her mind or making decisions for herself. The traumatic event may have further challenged the survivor's trust of herself" (Bryant-Davis 2005:48), which in turn influences her self-esteem and ability to cope in such situations. In addition, some were embarrassed to admit the abuse and/or lacked the knowledge to seek support and protection in cases of IPV. Some also lacked the strength to act on it or to protect themselves. The intensity and consistency of interfamily conflict varied remarkably among my respondents; some not being impacted by it all, some refusing to speak about it, and some in search of help to cope with it.

In addition, an increase in alcohol use and spousal abuse accompanied by inner-family conflicts often resulted in the younger generation of refugees feeling torn between identities and responsibilities. Intercultural conflicts emerged and the youth sometimes became caught up with gangs and criminal activity (Interviews, ORR, World Relief Chicago and Dr. Weine). According to Dr. Silverman, the State of Illinois attempted to be proactive in its response to mental healthcare needs and protective activities for the youth. It had a network of 34 agencies providing interpretation and translation in 41 languages. But as the need for continued mental healthcare among the Bosnian population remains steady, the institutional problems in Chicago became more obvious. Responding to the need for interpreting services in both the division of alcohol and substance abuse and the division of mental health

outstripped the resources available. The result is having only substance abuse counseling without skilled interpreters (Interview, ORR). This illustrates a few features of family and household characteristics, which influenced the respondents in their ability to manage their reception and adaptation processes. The next section addresses the cultural capital variable linked to education.

5.1.4 Educational Background

The educational background of migrants and refugee is known to have a large influence on their flexibility and ability to adapt in the receiving society context. Entry level host society language proficiency and school histories in the country of origin are known to affect school adjustment and academic performance post-migration. War and civil unrest causes long-term interruption to the schooling of large numbers of refugee children, many of whom are displaced in refugee camps for years. Those who have experienced school interruption at early stages of the learning process do not have the opportunity to acquire basic literacy skills and verbal comprehension skills in their own native language, further impairing host society language acquisition. By the time the displaced youth reenter the school system, assuming this is possible in the receiving society, many often have to first overcome these barriers. It is generally understood, however, that their educational profile or that of their parents, functions as a significant factor for their successful integration, as educational background plays a role in newcomers' ability to access the labor market and also develop creative coping strategies to deal with labor market restrictions.

The refugees in my sample vary between having very high or low levels of education, which is indicative of the bifurcated educational attainment in Bosnia. Generally, the elderly refugees, who had lived in the countryside with an agrarian background, had little to no education. Those living in urban settings in Bosnia tended to have pursued higher than a high school education, some went on to complete university education in Bosnia. Some were interrupted in their studies as a result of the war and their displacement. Once in the receiving society, some pursued further education, some were denied access, and some fought for their right to study.

In Berlin, where labor market access was more restrictive and recognition of previous degrees and qualifications rather complex, the educational background of my respondents played a role in their ability to access the labor market mainly as it helped them develop creative coping strategies to deal with labor market restrictions. This alludes to the different estimations of the receiving society regarding the respondents' socio-demographic variables and cultural capital and the likelihood of this being recognized as *valuable* (more on this in

Chapter six). The next section describes the second main finding and illuminates the significance of a newcomer's mental health as a key factor of influence in managing the adaptation process.

5.2 Finding 2: Mental Health and Well-Being as Factors of Influence

The second main finding suggests that an individual's mental health, well-being and individual personality influence his/her ability to pick up the pieces again following hardship and trauma. My respondents' ability to maneuver in the receiving society was clearly influenced by the degree of autonomy they perceived in their decision to migrate, the flight-related factors and exodus from Bosnia, their ability to cope with their grief, multiple losses, and survivor's guilt, as well as the anticipated gains and expectations they had in regard to their post-migration resettlement. Unresolved historical trauma with links to present trauma and discrimination-related stress contributed to various physical and psychological conditions, such as PTSD and depression.

5.2.1 Interpersonal Trauma Relived With Each New Stressful Situation

Because a number of variables were identified that adversely affected my respondents, resulting in restimulating the original war trauma, creating increased anxiety, and slowing the respondent's post-migration recovery process, the mental health and well-being of my respondents were very influential on their ability to manage their adaptation and normalize their post-migration lives. Those grieving and crying all day, for instance, or dreaming of better times, living in the past, feeling constantly numb and depressed, among other things, struggled in reaching their goal of normalcy.

Healthy individuals usually rely on internal resources that enable them a sense of control, connection, and meaning (Herman 1997 in: Bryant-Davis 2005:3). Yet after experiencing a traumatic event, perpetuated by another person or group of people, feelings of intense fear, powerlessness, hopelessness and horror are often the outcome. Overwhelming psychosomatic problems and interpersonal trauma emerged as a consistent finding in the data as my interlocutors relayed pained details of their physical and psychological struggles to survive the war and dislocation. According to Tarta Arcel et al. (1995), "Traumatic experiences may result in traumatic syndrome where the individual is plagued by unresolved conflicts, grief, death, anxiety, survivor's guilt, psychological deadness, anger, and suspicion of all kinds of help offered" (p.23). This often led to psychiatric disorders, especially depression, which is "associated with physical impairment, social role impairment, and loss of productivity" (Mollica et al. 1999 in: Craig et al. 2008:104). In relaying details of their trauma experiences,

my interlocutors depicted experiences directly from the war (interrogations, abuse, harassment, brutal beatings, suppression and ethnic cleansing, as well as bearing witness to murders that happened to those around them). Such incidents, calling up past traumatic memories, inexorably led to feelings of anxiety, which often had lasting debilitating effects, sometimes causing individuals to feel too overwhelmed to carry on with everyday tasks. "Wir wussten nicht, dass wir psychische Probleme hatten. Nach und nach haben wir nur gewusst, dass etwas mit uns nicht stimmt." (Interview, Irena) Firecrackers on New Year's Eve, for example, reminded participants of the shelling and blasting that took place in Bosnia. In general, any loud noises similar to shelling, shooting or bombing tended to cause my respondents momentary panic.

> "Ich erinnere mich ganz gut am Anfang als wir vom Krieg hierher gekommen sind und dann hörten plötzlich Geschoße. Ich dachte ich träume. Dann habe ich meinen Mann gerufen: 'Hörst du das?' Dann sagt er: 'Ja, Ja, was könnt es denn sein?' Man kriegt gleich Panic. Man kann es nicht glauben, aber es kommt von irgendwo. Und wir wüssten nicht, dass in der Nähe Amerikanische Soldaten da waren, die geübt hatten. Wir hatten keine Ahnung, aber wir kriegten gleich Panic." (Interview, Zumra)

Other common triggers were related to certain smells, noises, and even weather conditions, which typically caught my interlocutors off guard, placing them back in past situations, calling up war memories or earlier memories of life in Bosnia. "You can't forget some things you see, especially if you took a picture of it. It would stay longer in your head and you'd dream about it." (Interview, Nafiz) Recurring nightmares, panic attacks, and reactive responses in stressful situations were common symptoms of trauma that emerged throughout the narratives of my interlocutors. One participant described a situation that took place after her arrival in Berlin that left her drenched in sweat and terrified.

> "Heute habe ich immer noch Trauma. Mit irgendwelchem Ereignis wird es provoziert. Zum Beispiel wenn es hier regnet, kommt es gleich wieder hoch. Wenn es regnet, denke ich an die Lager.[182] Es ist wie da. Auch an Silvester mit den ganzen Knallern, denke ich am Krieg mit den Bomben usw. Es gibt auch vielen anderen Beispielen." (Interview, Irena)

Some common symptoms diagnosed in patients suffering from PTSD include: intrusive memories, recurrent dreams, flashbacks, depression, reduced interest in previously enjoyed activities, emotional detachment from others, reduced capacity for pleasure, expectations of a curtailed future, survivor's guilt, avoidance, including numbing tactics in which participants sometimes evade thoughts, feelings, people, or places that are reminiscent of the trauma. Some other symptoms are known to have an arousing effect and include insomnia, irritability,

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[182] The *Lager* refers to the camp she stayed in prior to fleeing to Berlin, where the sexual advances of the guards unceasingly threatened her, as a young attractive woman.

impatience, distraction, inability to concentrate, or hyper vigilance (Eitinger 1961, 1964, 1969). In such situations, the response of the refugee was often to become unexpectedly emotional, angry at inappropriate moments, overreacting to harmless misunderstandings, and sometimes even becoming violent. Some resorted to drinking alcohol and taking drugs as a reaction to their feeling out of control. Interpersonal trauma, associated with the physical, sexual, verbal and emotional violations encompass a sense of disempowerment.

Another finding that emerged is the positive association between internalized discrimination and increased alcohol consumption, lower self-esteem, symptoms of depression and/or chronic health problems. For the majority, this brought with it further negative associations, negatively impacting their self-esteem and ability to regain control over their post-migration situations. Research findings also show higher rates of psychological stress among individuals who report experiences of rape or sexual assault (Hooberman et al. 2007).

> "Van der Kolk and McFarlane (1996:9) note that 'because of the timeless and unintegrated nature of traumatic memories, victims remain embedded in the trauma as a contemporary experience.' These vivid memories are often accompanied by feelings of extreme loss, anger, betrayal, and powerlessness." (Bryant-Davis 2005:78)

Trauma is known to impact relationships, trust, and intimacy. It often results in relational effects and difficulties in regulating emotions (Ibid, p.45). Even when survivors prefer to dissociate the events associated with the war, memories of their trauma come to the fore regardless, since trauma can affect memory through intrusive thoughts. "Traumatische Erlebnisse brechen über sie herein und werden erneut durchlebt." (Mobile Beratung 2010b:4) Memories associated with my respondents' trauma appeared in the form of nightmares and flashbacks when awake and in the unwanted mental replay of the horrific event(s) experienced.

5.2.2 Emergence of the *Bosnisches Syndrom*

My respondents' interpersonal trauma did not just cease once they were removed from the immediate physical danger endured in Bosnia or enroute to safety. Rather, their traumas were heightened by conditions in the receiving society. In addition to intrusive thoughts about already lived trauma, a clear finding in the data was the sense of disempowerment evoked among my informants in each new stressful situation in the receiving society, intensifying their existing sense of powerlessness. Several of my female respondents referred to a phenomenon they termed the *bosnisches Syndrom*,[183] a common behavioral response of

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[183] Author's translation: Bosnian syndrome.

Bosnian refugees with regard to their war traumas and difficulties adjusting to life in Berlin. This syndrome encapsulates their war experiences including rape, ethnic cleansing, deaths of family members, as well as the many difficulties they face(d) in Berlin, in acclimating to a new city, learning a new language, and having to deal with the many adjustment challenges and restrictions in their self-determination. The Bosnian syndrome made itself most apparent when my interlocutors reflect on painful topics, which *bring them down*, causing them to recognize their automatic response of feeling depressed and helpless. One respondent relates her experiences both *unten* in Bosnia as well as in Berlin as being implicit causes for her apathy and sorrow.

> "Das ist mit Krankheit verbunden. Das ist schon Existenzangst. Mit dem kann man nicht klar kommen. Nur in dem Moment wo man gesund wird, aber nicht lange, nur in fünf Minuten und dann kommt die ganze Spannung was man schon vorher gehabt hat, dann bekommt man physische Schmerzen, Magenschmerzen, Kopfschmerzen und paar Tage danach. Man muss einfach durch, ob das gut oder schlimm, oder ganz schlecht ist, man muss einfach durch. Aber am liebsten wurde ich nur Kopfkissen über meinen Kopf werfen und nur an diesen Tagen verschlafen. Und ich denke nicht so dass ich kämpfen muss. Ich habe auch die ganze Zeit nur gekämpft. Und jetzt war es mir mehr oder weniger egal. Jede kleinste Möglichkeit habe ich immer gesucht und hielten immer die Ohren und Augen geöffnet, dass ich nicht etwas verpasse, irgendwelche Papiere nicht habe, alles muss richtig laufen und das ist schon krank. Es hat auch Gründe warum. Das ist auch mit der Angst verbunden." (Interview, Sena)

In relaying her experiences in the receiving society, another respondent links her war traumas with the challenges of adapting in Berlin. "Nur schlechtes… Nur schlechtes unten, hier. Es passiert gar nichts Gutes Jahrelang. Und dann ist ja kein Wunder, dass man so traurig aussieht…" (Interview, Zumra) While trauma has been proven to maintain a continuing influence on depression, anger, anxiety, nervousness, among other feelings, the key role in maintaining symptoms of depression is actually attributed to individual and socio-environmental factors (Miller et al. 2002 in: Craig et al. 2008:104). The more disempowered my respondents felt in the new context, the more likely they were to become overwhelmed by feelings of grief and a sense of danger. This in turn affected my respondents in managing their adaptation processes in the receiving society contexts, making it contingent on their ability to cope with their sense of disempowerment and interpersonal traumas.

"In refugee populations, attachment and behavioral theories of depression can explain depressive disorders resulting from separation and loss, and lack of recurrent, pleasurable interactions and activities due to weakened social networks." (Miller et al. 2002 in: Craig et al. 2008:104) This in turn negatively affects refugees' well-being and mental health in the receiving society. An increasing number of studies suggest that factors characterizing previous conditions such as emotional functioning, temperament, developmental level, and

cultural and social context greatly affect an individual's potential to develop PTSD (Blake et al. 1992 in: Craig et al. 2008:111).

According to some experts (Lützel 2006, Mobile Beratung 2010), having to deal with the economic, social, and cultural marginalization associated with the status of being a displaced refugee - powerless to influence external decisions affecting their residency and adaptation rights - tends to provoke *re-traumatizations* in refugees. Psychologist Stefan Weine, however, is wary of such terminology, denying the presence of new traumas. Instead, he argues that war traumas are compacted as a result of the stressful situations in the receiving society (Interview, Dr. Weine). Cautious of encouraging constructions of *re-traumatization*, Weine asserts that trauma in the specific case of the Bosnian refugees, stems from their war and exodus experiences. Each stress factor thereafter becomes more difficult for the individual to deal with due to the original trauma. "Each new obstacle in the reception context evokes a renewed sense of powerlessness intrinsic in the events that caused the original trauma." (Interview, Dr. Weine) One respondent confirms this notion in her narrative, describing a second layer of trauma incurred from her interactions with the Foreigners Office staff members.

> "Ich glaube aus diesen Angst heraus bekommt man einen zweiten Stress und Angst und das war ihnen egal. Wenn ich jetzt dort mit irgendjemand irgendwas erledigen musste, das ist dann poow, immer das gleiche, diese Nervosität. Ein Paar Mal nach dem [ich beim Ausländeramt war] konnte ich überhaupt nicht schlafen." (Interview, Sena)

The institutional responses in the two receiving society contexts clearly play a role in exacerbating or minimalizing pre-existing trauma. This is apparent by the examples of institutional obstacles previously described by the ambiguity in many of the policies that negatively impacted my interlocutors, causing stress and anxiety.

5.2.3 Need for Cognitive Closure (NCC)

My findings show a link between the need for cognitive closure (NCC) and adaptation stress and anxiety. "NCC has been defined as the desire for a firm answer to a question, and an aversion towards ambiguity." (Kruglanski/Webster 1996:264 in: Kosic 2006:118) NCC is also "expressed as the dispositional need for order, predictability and mental closure…" (Kosic 2006:118). For my respondents, NCC emerged as the intolerance of ambiguity, ranging from high NCC to the opposite - a need to avoid closure altogether. Individuals exhibiting a higher need for NCC, on the other hand, tend to suffer from demanding and situational stress factors, which can be further exacerbated by fatigue and other examples of organismic states. Kosic's research (2002a) "found that immigrants with high NCC suffered from greater stress,

expressed as emotional disorder and psychosomatic symptoms, although no causal links between the two variables could be established" (Kosic 2006:118).

Greater stress relative to NCC was observed in this study, for instance, in my participants' *waiting*. The reasons identified with waiting are multifold: Some waited until the last minute before finally leaving their homes, possessions, and hometown. Some waited on the issuance of visas and passports to move to safer locations, waiting on determination decisions regarding their resettlement process. Many waited to return home to Bosnia and to visit gravesites of family members who had died since they left. Some continue to wait for missing husbands and fathers, who have likely been killed. Some await reunification with long-separated family members. Many anticipate a better life, waiting for more opportunity and greater success for their children. Some are simply waiting to die.

In Chicago some are waiting to save enough money to buy a home. Others wait to retire in Bosnia. Some wait until the last minute to see doctors or dentists, aware of high premium insurance payments. In Berlin, in contrast, some await permission to travel outside the assigned residence zones, to access the labor market and educational system, and to secure better living accommodation. Some wait in fear of getting caught working illegally. Many are still waiting on the outcome determining the security of their legal right to remain, several of whom said that their entire adaptation process has been a *waiting period*, when their lives have been *put on hold*. For many, this sort of waiting and uncertainty heightened the impact of my samples' pre-existing trauma and grief and led to greater emotional obstacles, aggravating PTSD symptoms and intensifying feelings of disempowerment. These examples of waiting, while not complete, incorporate some basic elements of human life my respondents sought to control and manage. To varying degrees, some gave into their feelings of powerlessness, meaning they admitted feeling constricted in their ability to act. This inspired notions of *complicated grief*, of *being stuck*, depressed, helpless, and stagnant in their positions of waiting. This in turn exacerbated interpersonal traumas, heightened stress and led to greater emotional obstacles. While different degrees of NCC influenced coping levels, ambiguous situations generally served to exacerbate pre-existing traumas. It thus appears that an even greater distinguishing factor than participation in therapy has been the institutional denominators impeding my respondents from acting autonomously.

Traumatized refugees in particular often lacked the necessary coping skills to deal with these additional stressors in the receiving society. One participant in referring to her interactions with the Berlin Foreigners Office summarized, "Das war das größte Problem. Das ist ein Alptraum." (Interview, Zumra) Each visit to the Foreigners Office left a lasting

impression on my respondents, often disturbing their sleep and leading to heightened nervousness. Many were severely disempowered as far as making choices, acting autonomously, participating fully in society, or being mobile, for instance, due to restrictions linked with their temporary refugee status. Coming to terms with the challenges of being a tolerated refugee in Berlin under ambiguous circumstances, with limited rights and restricted access to resources caused a highly stressful situation for my interlocutors. This saddened and angered most of my respondents as they felt *robbed* of the ability to regain control over their lives and begin anew.

The external locus of control in Berlin not only limited my respondents' agency in achieving normalcy and regaining control over their lives, it also signifies varying degrees of institutional discrimination. In their research, Williams and Williams-Morris (2000) found that the effects of prejudice and racism on mental health could be divided into three categories:

> "1) the direct consequences of institutional racism, resulting in unequal access to mental healthcare (which may be mediated by socioeconomic status); 2) racist experiences that 'induce physiological and psychological reactions that can lead to adverse changes in mental health status' (p.243); and 3) internalization of stereotypes that lower one's positive self-evaluation and psychological well-being." (Bryant-Davis 2005:112)

There is an evident connection between various kinds of discriminatory experiences and unequal treatment related to my respondents' status as refugees or tolerated refugees, which increased psychological distress and depressive symptoms.

5.2.4 Participation in Therapy

The intensity of these feelings could be influenced by the coping strategies the respondents applied, such as focusing on the positive, being grateful, participating in therapy, among others. One psychologist and trauma expert I interviewed expected participation in therapy to be the main variable signifying the likelihood of my respondents' ability to adapt *successfully* in both contexts. The presumption was that the refugees would not likely be able to manage the stressors of their adaptation in addition to their war traumas if they did not participate in psychotherapeutic treatment and learn healthy coping strategies. This depends perhaps on the degree of violence and atrocities they experienced in Bosnia, as well as the emotional support they received as a follow-up and the varying exclusionary processes experienced in the reception context. I am cautious of making any definitive statements related to my respondents' participation in therapeutic services or making any corollaries between their potential positive adaptation assessments, since I do not have a background in psychology. Yet, a general finding revealed that taking the time and space to accept and mourn their war-

related losses was vital, particularly as this related to my respondents' long-term well-being and integration success. This was likewise contingent on the quality and duration of mental health care services available and dependent on the two countries' welfare systems and health insurance schemes.

While some respondents were more successful than others in overcoming their traumas and participation in therapy was indeed significant, their success and general happiness did not seem to be reflective of having participated in therapy alone. While everyone who took part in therapy, in one form or another, professed how important it has been for them in their transition, contributing to their healthy recovery and adaptation. Many others nonetheless appeared to thrive in the wake of trauma, although they refrained from therapy (or refrained from speaking about it to me).

In Chicago, for instance, mental healthcare coverage was limited to the first five years after the Bosnian refugees' reception, alluding to the institutional dimension. During this time, however, many of the Bosnian refugees were too busy in their adjustment process, i.e. learning English, finding work, completing school, and having previous degrees recognized to take advantage of the mental healthcare services available. Adult male and female refugees alike tended to face time constraints and financial pressures, so that many failed to take the time to process or consider their emotional healthcare needs. Typically, only those with very obvious symptoms of PTSD (or an absence of pressure to work) pursued healthcare treatment services in Chicago.

With time, the need for mental healthcare services among the Bosnian population in Chicago - who had initially been too busy adapting and thus skipped therapy - became more apparent as related topics of concern emerged. These included intercultural conflicts, isolation among the elderly, lack of guidance among the youth, and concern for members of the younger generation. Some respondents were partly overburdened with parental responsibilities, while their children exhibited behavioral problems related to torn identities, sometimes getting caught up with gangs, drugs, and criminal activity. Another concern focused on an increase in alcohol consumption among the adult refugees, as well as spousal abuse accompanied by interfamily conflicts. As these problems emerged within the community of Bosnian refugees, the structural problems related to the five-year mental healthcare limitation became more obvious. According to one of the psychologists I interviewed, "a wealth of behavioral problems emerged as the five-year time limit for healthcare coverage was coming to an end, which were rooted in traumas and war-related stressors that had not been previously acknowledged or dealt with." (Interview, anonymous)

Following the five-year time limit, however, anyone who needed psychotherapy had to cover the costs themselves. This is viewed as a flaw in the US refugee reception program. The funding was too little to make changes to meet this need. Consequently, many in Chicago have discovered too late that they are in need of mental health treatment, but no longer qualify for state-sponsored services. One interlocutor expressed critique of the neo-liberal health insurance system in Chicago, which she perceives to be discriminatory.

> "In Europe, I like the fact that when you go see a doctor, no services will be kept from you because the doctor knows that the type of insurance you have doesn't cover certain things. There, it really doesn't matter what you do, if you are a waitress somewhere, are a cleaning lady or have 10 PhDs, you know? You get the same care. It's that one insurance and you have little preventative or non-preventative things available to you. It doesn't matter what you have and who you are. That's important, you know? Maybe it's [become] more important because I know more about those certain hidden things here. To me this is not really human, you know? You don't want to treat people like that. That shouldn't really matter and I understand it's expensive, but in the whole world, no system works perfectly, but you know how they [in Europe] make it work. Why can't it work here?" (Interview, Zina)

Evidence in this study thus shows that trauma and hardship negatively affect an individual's ability to manage post-migration adaptation. Moreover, depending on the healthcare treatment available and its duration further influences a newcomer's chance of rebuilding his/her life in the receiving society context. Those respondents who participated in therapy learned, for instance, that periods of distress and setbacks were part of their post-migration adaptation and recovery processes. They also acquired the skills to cope with such setbacks, which proved reassuring to them and gave them the courage to persevere.

The next section describes the third main finding, incorporating institutional denominators. This variable confirms that a refugees' ability to manage the adaptation processes is clearly impacted by the pervading structures of exclusion versus inclusion in the context of settlement.

5.3 Finding 3: Institutional Variables as a Key Factor of Influence

The third main finding reflects the emerging institutional variables that greatly influenced my interlocutors' incorporation into the receiving society context. Joel Fetzer (2000) identifies three reasons for countries to oppose new immigrant arrivals: first, marginality (especially cultural forms, but also economic and gender-based factors (among others). This is deemed a significant factor in shaping public opinion; second, economic self-interest (both labor market and use-of-services); and three, contact (both individual-level and aggregate). The thinking behind this is that "cultural and ethnic ties to immigrants promote pro-immigrant attitudes and support for a more open immigration policy" (Fetzer 2000:3).

The subsequent section presents the different institutional variables that impacted the members of my samples' autonomy, agency and maneuverability in the receiving societies. These include: the country of origin, ethnicity and/or *race* of a newcomer, resettlement and predeparture measures, family reunification schemes, the welfare state system and economic self-sufficiency, labor market needs, early employment and job retention, host society language proficiency, educational access, permanence of legal status, length of residence in the receiving country, and naturalization options and citizenship rights.[184] I end this section with an analysis of the modes of refugee incorporation the two nations applied in responses to the Bosnians, followed by an assessment of the influential nature of the nation-state building process on a nations' refugee and migration policies. This suggests the extent by which the institutional variables influenced the receiving societies' expectations and requirements of the newcomers, and their interrelation on influencing newcomers' aspirations to integrate in the destination context. I start by considering the significance of a newcomer's country of origin, ethnicity and race.

5.3.1 Country of Origin, Ethnicity and 'Race'

Multiple research studies confirm the significance country of origin has when it comes to receiving and incorporating certain migrant or refugee groups. This is generally linked to cultural similarities and differences between migrants and the receiving society. Despite the fact that assimilation terminology is deemed *outdated*, since it encourages a reconstruction of unequal power balances, an expectation nonetheless prevails that newcomers adopt the norms and cultural values of the host society. The likelihood of this is often linked with the reputation of the country of origin as well as its political and economic relationship with the receiving society. The country of origin of asylum applicants, for instance, influences the likelihood that their cases are considered or deemed unfounded from the start. This also influences distinctions in rights. For example, country of origin plays a role in the European Union relative to differential visas and work permits granted EU passport holders versus non-EU migrants, or third country nationals.

According to a study conducted by the Berlin Institut für Bewolkerung und Entwicklung,[185] the country of origin of a migrant has a centrally determining factor in measuring the individual's integration success. Alba and Nee (2003), Portes and Rumbaut (1996), Hönekopp (2010) and many other researchers provide similar findings, confirming the

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[184] Some additional institutional factors, including educational access, health insurance, and social service support, including charities, churches, refugee agency, and host society language courses were also highly significant. Most have been addressed elsewhere.

influential dimension of country of origin and ethnicity when assessing migrant integration. The results confirm that some groups tend to fare much better than others. Relative to the German context, for example, migrants coming from the EU-25 countries, with the exclusion of southern Europe, comprise individuals who achieve the greatest number of *integration points* in Germany. "Sie gehören zumeist zu der europaweiten Wanderungselite, die leicht Beschäftigung findet und sehr gut gebildet ist – sogar besser als der Durchschnitt der einheimischen Bevölkerung." (Woellert et al. 2009) These same migrants also enjoy greater freedom to work, access resources, and benefit from one collective welfare system. They also experience fewer structural restrictions, allowing them viable options for integration. In contrast, the migrant groups with the largest integration deficits in Germany are identified as individuals from the former Yugoslavia, Africa, and Turkey (ibid). Based on integration indicators and criteria for equal opportunity, these individuals face the greatest challenges in Germany largely due to the difficult reception conditions they have encountered (ibid).

In the case of the Bosnians seeking protection in Berlin, it would seem that their country of origin and ethnic background resulted in raising first empathy and pity among the German mainstream only later to become more hostile, as legislation changes emphasized the high costs associated with their protection. In contract, the US provided clear recognition to the Bosnian refugees, favoring them over other refugee populations seeking protection. The Integration and Naturalization Services (INS), a US institution with the power to foster or impede equality, viewed the Bosnians' relatively high educational profile and European background as contributing factors expected to facilitate their integration into US society. Expectations of individuals being highly skilled and ambitious result in easier entry rights and labor market access for newcomers in most countries. Receiving society governments often *select* those educated newcomers with skills deemed valuable to the receiving society and who are more likely to adopt the norms and cultural values to integrate *successfully*.

Like many European countries, the US shows a tendency to pick and choose which refugee groups to accept and which to exclude. Economic factors, public discourse and international attention further play a role in influencing government policy responses and expectations of newcomers. According to my interview with a refugee advocate, who wishes to remain anonymous, the US accepted the Bosnians for the following reasons:

> "The US felt a special sense of ownership of the Bosnians because they were white, because they were European, because it was more tragic that this was happening to Europeans than it was to other ethnicities, like Africans or Afghanis. At the time I think there were three of four million Afghani refugees in Pakistan. So that's probably my more

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[185] Entitled "Ungenutzte Potenziale: Zur Lage der Integration in Deutschland."

cynical view of things. I think there was probably realistically some guilt because we hadn't gotten involved earlier. I was working in the State Department in '94 during the genocide in Rwanda and that was right after everything had fallen apart in Somalia. Our soldiers had been killed and the Clinton Administration thought 'that's it; we're not getting involved in anymore African countries.' And you know, I had to take the calls from the NGOs and advocacy groups about why we weren't getting involved in Rwanda and then later Bosnia was falling apart and there was a lot of pressure on them to try and fix their mistakes. So I think that was part of it. That we didn't get involved earlier. So maybe if we had, it would have turned out differently. I also think with the Bosnians that there wouldn't necessarily have been a good place for them, so we needed to bring large numbers of them here to keep them safe." (Interview, refugee advocate, anonymous)

Due to feelings of guilt, a moral sense of duty to help at least one refugee population and a preference for European over African refugees were the main reasons for the generous response of the US toward the Bosnian refugees in the 1990s.[186] The US provided clear recognition to the Bosnian refugees, favoring them over other refugee populations seeking protection. This becomes all the more obvious when comparing the US response to the Haitians, who were denied protection around the same time the Bosnians were generously received in the US. Just a few years prior to the arrival of the Bosnians, the Rwandans were largely left on their own. (Refer to Appendix L for more detail). Years later, the Kosovar-Albanians also encountered tight restrictions, limiting any protection options. Refugee reception conditions often serve to legitimize the denial of protecting certain groups in need and any inconsistencies in government responses to the different refugee populations (Fetzer 2000). Hence, the country of origin, ethnicity and 'race' of the refugee and the governments' self-interests clearly come into play in determining which groups of migrants and refugees can access the territory. This is further evident in the resettlement and predeparture measures applied.

5.3.2 Resettlement and Predeparture Measures

Another institutional variable that influences the integration options of my respondents relates to their selection process, resettlement options and orientation courses. Prior to their arrival to the US, the Bosnians were required to participate in pre-arrival orientation courses, which were required for resettlement to the US. These courses help in clarifying the receiving society's expectations of the newcomers, namely, confirming the socioeconomic duties

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[186] At the time, US refugee reception was still based on the model applied for the Southeast Asians, in which the US brought in large numbers of people from one particular ethnic group. Arguments in the State Department about refugees tend to increasingly focus on the consequences of removing refugees from a specific community. It is argued, "If you take them out of the community, then the 'bad guys' win because they are getting what they want by removing that population from the area." (Interview, World Relief) The consequence of not removing them call into mind the delayed response of the US in World War II in offering protection to Jewish refugees and the guilt resulting from this.

required of them. To qualify for resettlement applicants needed to undergo a selection and recognition process. Going through the multitude of questioning and determination interviews as part of the pre-selection processes reinforced the respondents' pride in being selected. The sample understood the special position they had over other applicants denied resettlement to third countries, as they were guaranteed a durable solution with permanent resident status and naturalization options due to their recognized refugee status.[187]

Expectations to work and be self-sufficient were clearly imparted on my respondents during their pre-departure orientation courses and in the initial reception period in Chicago. My sample learned that socioeconomic achievement in the US is key to successful integration. Linked to neoliberalism and capitalistic profit gains, the conveyance of this message is worthy of special attention, as it emphasizes the meritocracy of the US reception system.

In the competitive environment of the US, the message conveyed is that there are *winners* and *losers* and the incoming refugees are encouraged to be *winners*, i.e. by being financially independent and self-sufficient. The transparency of the receiving societies' aspirations actually helped my respondents in prioritizing the steps to take to achieve *successful* integration after their arrival. As such, the courses targeted the refugees, emphasized the US expectations of them, and included information about differences in cultural values and lifestyles in Yugoslavia and the US, in an effort to ease the culture shock and transition period.

Such courses were unthinkable for my Berlin sample considering the suddenness of their exodus from Bosnia at the time and the lack of any standardized reception procedure. In an attempt to standardize the involvement of countries of origin in resettlement programs, discussions in Germany and at the EU level have moved away from integration as a two-way process to encompass a *triple-win solution* (6th Integration Forum, 2011). Predeparture measures have been gaining more attention in discussions on integration (cf. Scholten 2011), but there are rarely distinctions made between refugees and migrants. The measures often entail language training and cultural tests to equip the newcomer to be proficient to interact in the country of destination. Such measures, however, often take several months and are not free of costs for the participant. In the case of refugees fleeing their country in search of protection from war, dictatorships, etc., such predeparture measures in the country of origin

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[187] This generally enabled them social, legal and labor market incorporation in Chicago, allowing the sample to quickly shed their *refugeenness* (more on this in Chapter six), albeit only as long as they managed to attain economic self-sufficiency.

seem absurd. For the Bosnians in need of immediate protection, this form of predeparture orientation would have been unthinkable, at least in the way it is currently being discussed at the EU level. Much could be learned from the US pre-departure methods, including the particularities of the application process in safe neighboring countries, the right to non-discrimination in fostering equal accessibility to everyone, the subject matter of the pre-departure courses, as well as the language and civic courses being offered post-arrival, not pre-arrival.

5.3.3 Family Reunification Schemes

Another influential institutional denominator revolves around family reunification and whether the state fosters or restricts it. There were no official legal measures for family reunification in Berlin except for in the initial phase of reception when families already living in Berlin could apply for a visa obligation to take in their relatives seeking protection from the war. This was important as it aided the refugees in acquiring legal entrance to Berlin at the start of the war. While families taking in the incoming refugees were legally bound to cover the costs for the newcomers under this scheme, family members sometimes devised strategies to avoid having to cover these costs. Perhaps as a result of this, visa obligations were only granted as a legal option to the Bosnian refugees for a short duration before being curbed through changes in legislation.

Measures for family reunification in Chicago, in contrast, were conducive to integration as it encompassed more than just an emotional connection; it contributed in a number of practical ways as well. Multiple positive benefits result when governments enable family reunification, as it contributes in uniting families, respecting human rights norms, and strengthening migrant-support networks. My Chicago respondents generally applied for family reunification as soon as they had enough money to cover the expenses associated with this. Having a stable and sufficient income was the main indicator in the US for a positive decision on the application. Those living on welfare were ineligible. No pre-existing language requirements were imposed, but a long waiting period and a number of conditions and interviews needed to occur prior to a decision being made. After arrival, the incoming family member was eligible for naturalization under the same terms as the refugee host.

Refugees found that living in households with large extended families often resulted in greater economic success, since they tended to pool their resources. Gaining financial security also played a key role in the individual well-being and psychosocial adaptation process. By distributing tasks and household responsibilities to newly relocated (often elderly) relatives, live-in grandparents could assume the responsibility for child care, while their adult-age

children worked to cover the living expenses. "I am very fortunate that I have my mother-in-law, who was taking care of my son, so I could work, even today. So I did not have that problem on top of everything else." (Interview, Edna)

Retrieving elderly family members also proved to be instrumental in maintaining the center of the family core as their presence contributed in maintaining a base of support and guidance for the youth. Multigenerational family units contributed in providing consistency in care, adult guidance, and emotional support. Elaine Bauer and Paul Thompson (2006) contend that care of the elderly and of the children are common in transcultural contexts.

> "While the key axis of exchanges of help is between parents, children, and grandchildren, it is notable how the possibilities extend well beyond this. Aunts are common caregivers. Cousins are taken in to assist migrants. Remittances are sent not only to parents, but also often to siblings or in-laws. Temporary help with migration may extend to very distant kin, including even ex-in-laws." (Bauer/Thompson 2006:45 in: Watters 2008:19)

With the emphasis on family ties, relying on elderly parents/grandparents was readily described as an asset in Chicago due to the family reunification schemes and the greater likelihood of adult-age refugees working in Chicago and in need of household assistance.[188] In also recognizing the potential that comes from family support, the US clearly fosters a more flexible system of family reunification, since it was the family members who had to absorb the travel, health and related costs of sponsoring the incoming refugees, not the state. Even without employment bans and welfare dependency in Germany, family reunification remains more limiting as a result of the narrow definition of family, typically preventing elderly grandparents from joining for purposes of family reunification. This is partly attributed to the role of the welfare state system in Germany and fear of having to cover the the related costs.

5.3.4 Welfare State System and Economic Self-Sufficiency

Both government responses to the Bosnians were economic-based and entrenched in national interests as both countries assessed who is worthy of residence rights, but the process by which they did this was strikingly different. In having been *pre-selected* to enter the US as recognized European war refugees, the Bosnians were deemed to be *deserving* and thus allotted disability benefits, despite the fact that public assistance was not available to the

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[188] By enabling elderly Bosnian refugees the opportunity of accompanying their children or grandchildren to the US (or joining them later through family reunification schemes), the US government maintained its aim of providing humanitarian and durable solutions to vulnerable Bosnian refugees. Yet, the financial burden of supporting the elderly family members often fell to the younger refugees, who had generally been *selected* under the premise of their likely being self-sufficient, i.e. *useful* and able to contribute to society. This is indicative of the US response to providing durable solutions to the most vulnerable of the Bosnian refugee applicants.

entire population as a universal social right (Sainsbury 2006). Acknowledging that some transition support was necessary, the US government contributed generously to refugee resettlement services. A myriad of social services, including initial language courses and job training placement during the initial eight months was made available, as well as healthcare treatment for the first five years.[189] After this initial phase of orientation and resettlement placement, the funding was cut greatly, though still covering the primary expenses for the elderly or sick.

With a liberal welfare and inclusive immigration regime, the US resettlement program for the Bosnians was based on premises of "permanent residence and early economic self-sufficiency through employment". In a battle to become economically self-sufficient, the Chicago sample felt enormous pressure to work hard, resulting in their initially needing to work several jobs just to get by. The lack of public health insurance made it further vital to have a job with medical coverage, which was less likely in the low-skilled job sector. Since both the US immigration and welfare regimes were found to stratify the rights of the poor and non-poor, but with the result of offering lesser rights to the poor (Ibid), the background of the Bosnians placed them in a more privileged position in the US than other refugee and migrant groups (alluding to the importance of cultural capital). Although, the sample was treated equally relative to social policies, this resulted in their being equally poor as many US citizens. Some of the respondents never managed to conquer their fears related to this and of possibly losing everything once again due to the precariousness of the US welfare system.

The Berlin government, by comparison, limited the Bosnians' rights, movements, and access to essential resources from the start. Held in positions as *tolerated refugees*, the Bosnians in Berlin had been worn down in accessing the labor market and educational system, made dependent on welfare, and denied access to a number of essential activities and resources. In Germany, labor market participation has long been the nexus for eligibility to social benefits, family reunification, unemployment benefits, pensions, permanent residence, and citizenship options, evident now as well with the requirements of the *Bleiberechtsregelung*. Although governments often state their aims to eradicate poverty, the condition is related to one's ability to access the labor market and earn an income; it is related to the right to work (Harris 2002). Due to the labor market bans in Berlin, the government ended up paying years of social welfare, healthcare treatment, as well as costs for retraining the tolerated refugees after years of government-enforced inactivity. The Berlin response to

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[189] Due to pressures to work and become economically self-sufficient, many failed to take advantage of the mental health treatment available during the initial five years.

the sample was neither conducive for the sample nor for the government, where the opposite has generally been the case for the Chicago sample.

Connected to this and the relationship of dependency on a marginal subsistence year after year was the poor treatment the Bosnians experienced at the Foreigners Office, whose staff exacerbated their perceived loss of autonomy. Considered a threat to social welfare and *German culture*, Bosnians were suspected of misusing the right of asylum for personal gain. Consequently, many from my Berlin sample internalized the negative messages repeated to them on these visits, which led to several believing they were undeserving of protection, sufficient welfare support, or medical treatment. This resulted in turn in further lowering their self-esteem and their likelihood of adopting unhealthy coping strategies.[190] Moreover, the Bosnians had limited access to insurance benefits due to the vacillating conditions with regard to their right to work, resulting in their social rights being contingent on public assistance claims linked with PTSD diagnoses (cf. Sainsbury 2006).

Although the welfare amount allotted the Berlin sample was modest, this was at least steady, bringing them a semblance of financial security generally absent in the Chicago setting. Since other Bosnian refugees were living in similarly poor circumstances, the respondents' notion of poverty and wealth became vague, as it only "exists in relationship to known quantities or expectations" (Payne 1996:10). In both contexts, the diminution of my respondents' control over assets and the loss of access to income of their own labor greatly impaired their emotional well-being. This was made worse for those whose dependency on statutory support mechanisms were not time-bound (cf. Weernink et al. 2007). This implied that the duration and impossibility of changing their welfare dependency was perceived as permanent. Bandow (1996) suggests that while many people are no longer in desperate financial need, they are dependent on the government for their financial support. This is evident among the elderly and disabled refugees in Chicago and among the majority of traumatized and tolerated refugees in Berlin. The government programs focus mainly on material deprivation, thus actually exacerbating the other forms of poverty and creating dependency on welfare (cf. Bandow 1996).

Bandow would likely argue that the Bosnian refugees - while confronted with an unaccustomed level of poverty - are still able to meet their basic needs through the support offered them with government assistance. Payne, in contrast, would likely argue that despite any financial support, many essential resources are still lacking. Payne's working definition of poverty is "the extent to which an individual does without resources" and these resources

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[190] For instance, many failed to pursue mental health support despite evidence of depression.

consist of financial resources, emotional resources, mental resources, spiritual resources, physical resources, support systems, relationships/role models, and knowledge of hidden rules (Payne 1996:10).

While the issue of poverty and a lack of essential resources emerged in both contexts, greater institutional constraints are evident in the agency of my working-age Berlin respondents, as they have experienced the double risk of being poor and remaining poor. In contrast, the majority of my Chicago sample was expected to end their welfare reliance after just eight months, resulting in many eventually moving out of welfare dependency. Payne would likely describe this situation in Chicago as a form of situational poverty, as most of my respondents – with time – were able to attain social mobility. Reminiscent of Bourdieu's concept of cultural commodities, Payne's notion of situational poverty also draws on important additional resources, such as family or community support, which aid in an individual's ability to move out of poverty.

Because integration success is often assessed from the perspective of economic status in relation to personal achievement (cf. Kosic 2006:116), those faring economically worse in the receiving society than previously in Bosnia generally perceived their post-migration experiences in more negative terms than those who had achieved economic and social mobility in the receiving society. For those faring worse, being able to improve their financial situation and that of their family was often linked with a positive view of migration as this kept them busy, enabled them to develop personally, and fostered their self-esteem. Depending on the context in which the refugees were received tended to influence the length of time and the likelihood of my respondents remaining trapped in a culture of poverty. The labor market needs in the receiving society influenced the speed by which this transpired.

5.3.5 Labor Market Needs, Early Employment and Job Retention as Variables
Because immigration is typically closely connected to labor market needs, many countries have consistently implemented parallel policies to recruit the skilled and needed professions required by government and employers. Both supply and demand factors play important features in the labor market incorporation of the Bosnian refugees. With any market, capital accumulation is at stake, making economic capital inherently important for refugees (and migrants) as well as for host societies (Bourdieu 1990; Hagan 2004). The supply side, in both the sending and receiving countries, signifies the reliance on human and social capital to access jobs and to achieve social mobility in the receiving society context. The demand side generally constitutes three social actors: the employers, who are dependent on immigrant labor; worker council representatives, who act as middlemen between employers and workers'

needs; and state policy makers, who are responsible for regulating the nations' labor markets and migration patterns (Pfohman 2011a). Portes and Rumbaut (1996) suggest that conditions of labor market integration are one of the three most significant variables for migrant reception and incorporation contexts.

While the behaviors of the demand side actors largely influence how migrants and refugees are incorporated into the receiving society (Hagan 2004), depending on how a market is structured and organized institutionally, determines whether more or less inequality is produced, leading to greater or lesser stratification. According to Massey, "It is not the market competition that determines how the pie is divided up, but the nature of the institutions that undergird the market and make competition possible" (Massey 2007:preface). This, he explains, is due to the "categorical mechanisms embedded within the infrastructure of the social institutions, cultural practices, and conceptual understandings upon which markets rest" (Massey 2007:preface). These, however, are not to be regarded as constant; rather the opportunities afforded under a modern market economy are dynamic (Boswick/Heckmann 2005:11). The extent to which migrants and refugees are incorporated into receiving society labor markets is thus dependent on the state of the economy, business cycle, and frequency of economic restructuring, among other market factors.

> "The changing demand for workers in the US determines the changing type, skill and gender of the immigrant workers who offer themselves for hire. Immigrant workers are bunched at each end of the range of skills – unskilled labour or professional and highly skilled." (Harris 2002:18)

According to Orrenius und Zavodny (2009), in the short-term perspective, immigrants are often more vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations, while in the long-term, immigrant workers are subject to the same global, national, and local forces that shape the fortunes of native-born workers (Terrazas 2011:8). As the gap in income earnings widens between rich and poor, and the highly skilled and low skilled, evidence points to the growing number of immigrants concentrated in the lowest-paid group of foreign-born workers (cf. Harris 2002). For instance, "Mexicans, had incomes 40 percent below the native equivalent in unskilled work" in the 1990s (Harris 2002:18). In the past, this gap narrowed depending on the length of residency in the US, as well as the educational background of the immigrant (Terrazas 2011). Yet, the findings of this study suggest, however, that length of residence bears less importance than having legal rights to access essential resources, such as the labor market. One respondent alludes to differences in the nature of institutional contexts and its impact on labor market access.

> "When you come here [to Chicago], you are like everyone else. You have your I-94 and

you know you are legally here, you are permitted to work if you want to work, I mean, you have that freedom of choice of what you want to do. But in Germany- and I completely understand why that was, you know, but they were just protecting us while the war was there. That's why we were given some money, a place to live, you know, you can stay there while the war is there, but when war is over, you will go home. So, I think that was the difference. I mean, we were not like there to stay there. So that's why we didn't have a chance to go to school, I mean to learn German, to look for jobs." (Interview, Behar)

Without necessary formal recognition in Germany, many were prevented from working at all. The few who were permitted labor market access in Germany were typically prevented from working in their fields of expertise or from earning salaried positions comparable to their previous qualifications from Bosnia, referred to as *brain waste*.[191]

As a collective group, only unskilled and semi-skilled were more commonly excluded than they were from the labor market. Lack of recognition of previous skills and qualifications added to the refugees' challenges in participating legally in the labor market. In Berlin, where labor market access was more restrictive and recognition of previous degrees and qualifications rather complex, the educational background of my respondents played a role in their ability to access the labor market mainly as it forced them to develop creative coping strategies to deal with labor market restrictions. They were also victims of steadily changing policies.

For instance, between 1998 and 2005, the Social Democrat and Green coalition government began considering strategies to fill the growing labor shortages in economic sectors, such as IT, and to consider a system for the regulation of immigration or the integration of migrant newcomers to Germany. Both the approach taken and the backlash from the conservative Right illustrated Germany's racist ideology. "In the spring of 2000, German employers argued that industry lacked 300,000 skilled workers… The German proposal was modest enough, particularly when compared to the American initiative. But it still provoked hostility among Christian Democrat opposition." (Harris 2002:99) The initial response was to offer five-year work visas particularly to IT experts from India. These policy suggestions were met with massive xenophobic publicity campaigns with rather emphatic public protest against proposals to allow double citizenship and to introduce voting rights for third country nationals (Miera 2009). Critics argued that German children ought to be trained in the IT field rather than recruiting foreigners, especially considering the high level of

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[191] Over time, re-qualification courses were offered for certain job sectors for those remaining in Berlin. For instance, a focus on qualification and further education assumed paramount importance with the *Bleiberechtsregelung*, particularly considering the number of long-term unemployed tolerated refugees. Yet, initially, trainings were rather offered as an incentive for their return to Bosnia.

unemployment in Germany at the time (Geddes 2003). Campaign slogans, such as *Kinder statt Inder*[192] were common during this period, as fears of the *other* were cultivated.

Since few foreign workers appeared to be interested in what many German politicians deemed a *prosperous opportunity*, the SPD and Green coalitions set up a Commission in 2001 to evaluate Germany's immigration policy. The result led to a long debate. After a preliminary draft of the new Immigration Act was introduced, based largely on a report released in June 2001 by the independent Süssmuth Commission entitled: "Zuwanderung gestalten – Integration fördern", there was an attempt to modernize the Foreigners Law and to incorporate the economic and demographic reality in Germany.

Progress slowed after Interior Minister Otto Schily first proposed this policy on Aug. 3, 2001 as a result of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, which served to reinforce the polarization between Islam and Western culture in public debate.[193] This also resulted in shifting the focus of the integration debate from *foreigners* to *Muslims* (Miera 2009). The emphasis on cultural differences thus took precedence over social problems.

Xenophobic sentiments guiding these discourses were eventually silenced (temporarily) as Christian Democratic Party Leader Friedrich Merz "accepted the need to 'move the focus of our policy away from those who need us to those whom we need'" (Harris 2002:100). With an aim of providing a legal basis for controlling and limiting immigration in line with Germany's economic, social and political interests, Germany's first ever nationwide integration program was introduced under the auspices of the new Immigration Act (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*), which entered into force on Jan. 1, 2005. This led to Germany publicly declaring for the first time its position as a country of immigration. With these first steps, German politicians not only admitted Germany's dependency on migrants; they also instigated further recruitment strategies for skilled laborers. Despite dissenting ideas on immigrant integration strategies, by Nov. 2005 the grand coalition of the Conservatives and Social Democrats signaled their intention to pursue integration as a top priority. With this, one of the main priorities intended

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[192] Author's translation: German children rather than Indians.
[193] This sparked a series of heated debates regarding honor killings, the wearing of headscarves in public, forced marriages, women's rights, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism. Muslims became linked with terrorists, a charge that still predominates today. One needs only to consider the instinctive response of the media and politicians to blame the bombings and shootings that took place in Norway on July 22, 2011 on Muslim terrorists, as evidence. The perpetrator was in fact a Norwegian national with links to conservative and right-wing populist movements, who was *waging a Christian crusade* against multiculturalism in Europe. Yet, before this was made known, the initial instinct by Angela Merkel and many other politicians was to suspect Muslim terrorists as the perpetrators.

to simplify the process for enabling highly qualified migrants to obtain a permanent resident status and a right to work in Germany.[194]

In an attempt to develop greater transparency, previous double approval proceedings were combined into just one, known as the one-stop government. The resident titles effective with the Immigration Act were also reduced to only two: the temporary right of residency and the right to settle permanently; and the scope of determination came under the responsibility of the Foreigners Office, which employed considerable diligence and effort in inspecting individual cases. By providing the Foreigners Office evidence of a specific job offer and meeting the conditions required with the *Vorrangprinzip*, a foreigner could be granted a work permit relative to that specific job and an extension of his/her residence rights. Proficiency in the German language and acquisition of an unlimited job contract sufficed as proof that an individual is willing to integrate.

This legal change represents a major shift in Germany's focus to an arena of social inclusion with an emphasis on acculturation programs supported by language and integration courses (Dienelt n.d.). This symbolized a new willingness to integrate and/or include Germany's foreign population. The newest trend thus became a greater demand for highly skilled migrants, deemed capable and necessary for filling current and future labor shortages.[195] So, while Germany attempted to recruit skilled and professional workers, attempts were made simultaneously to increase controls of illegal entries and to stop unskilled workers from entering (Harris 2002:17). At the same time, those foreigners already residing in the country, such as the Bosnians, remained far from the center of focus.

Eventually, this changed with the *IMK-Bleiberechtsregelung*, specifying conditions to qualify for a permanent right to stay. This was not easy for those who had been jobless for years or for those who failed to learn German or establish contacts other than through the black labor market, or who suffered from mental traumatizations.[196] One of my participants

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[194] To be eligible for permanent residency, a highly qualified migrant would need to earn a minimum yearly wage of 83,700 Euro. Independent self-employed freelancers need to be in possession of 500,000 Euro as a minimum investment. Foreign students should also be able to access the labor market easier and as such have a one-year duration following their studies to procure a permanent position. If they are unable to obtain a job during this time, their residence rights expire and they are to return to their country of origins.

[195] See "New Skills for New Jobs: Action Now." A report by the Expert Group on New Skills for New Jobs prepared for the European Commission, Brussels: European Union 2010. Nevertheless, the tendency is still to have both very high educated immigrants as well as very low educated immigrants due to the bifurcated education levels of newcomers.

[196] Based on the - for many people, difficult – criteria, only a portion of the estimated 50,000 tolerated asylum seekers qualifying for the temporary permit were expected to find regular employment and meet the remaining criteria to receive a permanent residency permit by the end of the first grace period (Leise 2007), which has meanwhile been extended numerous times.

gave a sobering answer in response to the question whether the new *Bleiberechtsregelung* would ease her right to remain in Berlin.

> "Ich glaube, ich muss wenigstens drei Jahre einen Aufenthalt hier in Deutschland haben, was ich immer noch nicht habe. Zweitens muss ich einen unbefristeten Arbeitsvertrag haben, was ich nicht habe. Und drittens, muss ich so viel verdienen, dass ich keinen Anspruch auf das Geld vom Jobcenter habe, und es kann sein, auch vom Wohnungsamt, oder Wohngeld darf man kriegen, das weiß ich nicht genau. Hauptsache ist: Ich muss noch arbeiten." (Interview, Mirna)

Securing an unlimited work contract, assuring an independent means to earn a regular income and health insurance coverage was and likely will continue to represent a particularly difficult task for many in my sample, particularly when considering the overwhelming number of precarious jobs with limited contracts in Berlin, plus the fierce labor market competition. Many of my respondents had never worked in all the years they lived in Berlin or had worked illegally or in temporary contracts, limited to part-time or mini jobs.[197] After so many years of waiting idly, being granted a chance to work legally caused a number of my respondents an initial shock.

> "Als ich meine Aufenthaltserlaubnis in 2002 endlich bekommen habe, war ich richtig schockiert, weil ich endlich eine Art Sicherheit bekam. Anfangs konnte ich aber nichts damit anfangen. Ich hatte plötzlich große Angst wegen der Arbeitssituation. Ich war überfordert: ich sprach kein Deutsch, hatte nicht gearbeitet usw. Als ich die Aufenthaltserlaubnis bekommen habe, war es ein Schock, dass ich jetzt doch ein Leben hier starten sollte. Es war sehr schwer für mich. Ich musste es schaffen. Wegen meiner Traumatisierung war ich sehr lange deprimiert. Ich konnte keinen Fuß fassen. Ich wusste nicht wie, wo, usw. Nach und nach habe ich einen Deutschkurs, einen Integrationskurs gemacht. Andere Bosnierinnen haben mir immer wieder geholfen. Dann habe ich die Schulung gemacht und auch erfolgreich bestanden. Ich arbeite jetzt als Stadtteilmutter." (Interview, Irena, 23 years old at time of arrival)

Several options became available to the refugees encouraging their participation in *Arbeitsbeschäftigungsmaßnahmen* (ABM) jobs and structural *Anpassungsmassnahmen.*[198] At least two of my respondents took advantage of these measures and completed trainings as *Stadtteilmütter*, teaching them to serve as integration mediators in school settings. Another of my informants completed an internship and begin an apprenticeship after previously being prohibited from working or completing a training program.

> "Ich arbeite jetzt im Hotel als Praktikant und dann im September werde ich eine Ausbildung machen. Es ist wunderbare Arbeit: sämtliche Service, ähnlich wie Kellner aber halt in der Küche, aber auch alle Zimmer kontrollieren, checken und alles machen

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[197] *Minijobs* cost the employers less money due to exemptions for employers from having to pay into the social security system. At the time, the Bosnians were able to earn up to DM 346 per month through these Minijobs, meaning minimum jobs, without incurring social security contributions (cf. ZDWF 1995; Blaschke/Sabonovic 2001).

[198] Author's translation: adaptation measures.

was sonst anfällt." (Interview, Adin)

Eager to work, this respondent describes his new training program in very positive terms. The expectation was that after being granted permission to finally access the labor market, the many tolerated refugees would be able to cover their own living costs and be in a position to *contribute* to society.[199] Thus, numerous examples highlight the significance of working as an essential factor for the respondents to normalize their post-migration lives and participate in society. Working further proved to be highly significant for the well-being of my interlocutors.

According to a report initiated by Günter Piening (2003), the Berlin Senate Commissioner for Integration and Migration, 8,993 individuals with a *Duldung* were in Berlin on Oct. 31, 2006. Of these, 3,098 applied for an extension according to the guidelines of the *Bleiberechtsregelung.* Of the 34.4 percent who applied for an *Aufenthaltserlaubnis*, only a small number of these applicants were actually recognized (Interview, JRS). By the end of August, only 583 of the initial applicants had been granted an *Aufenthaltserlaubnis*, while 466 applications had been denied (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2007b in: Amling et al. 2008). Why were so few recognized?

According to the first directive by the Interior Senators of Berlin from Dec. 4, 2006, which stipulated the terms and regulations for the Foreigners Office, the deadline for the application submission for tolerated refugees to pursue employment was Oct. 1, 2007. This deadline was moved forward, however, to May 18, 2007 in an amended directive from March 7, 2007. This change in date was not communicated directly by the Foreigners Office staff to potential applicants (Amling et al. 2008), which led to a number of eligible applicants missing the deadline. Critics questioned what the point was of implementing a policy to improve the intolerable conditions of the *Kettenduldung* only to *forget* to inform those affected of the changes in application deadlines. This confirms the lack of will needed by the government to come up with truly viable durable solutions.

5.3.6 Distancing and Language Acquisition

Host society language proficiency also signifies an essential variable influencing the economic and social incorporation of refugees and migrants. Generally, the younger my

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[199] The net income with the *Bleiberechtsregelung* was expected to cover at least the total amount of rent and living costs, in addition to the amount that would have otherwise been granted to each family member under unemployment benefits (ALG II). Benefits for children may only be claimed according to *Aufenthaltserlaubnis* § 23 Abs.1 AufenthG, which is then considered to be independent (own) income. Not considered as independent (own) income are housing supplement payments based on Asylum Seeker Benefits Law, social assistance or unemployment benefits (ALG II). Exceptions are only made temporarily for families with young children or juveniles during a job-training period (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2007a).

sample, the more able they were to learn the receiving society language. Nonetheless, a variety of discrepancies in my interlocutors' ability to master the receiving society language emerged, which varied depending on: the availability of formalized language classes, receiving society pressure, the extent of interactions with mainstream society and positive encouragement, educational background and previous knowledge in learning foreign languages, as well as the peace of mind to concentrate to learn the receiving society language, among other factors. The variable of language proficiency could have been just as readily categorized under the individual characteristics and socio-demographics of my respondents (finding 1), which is further affected by my interlocutors' mental well-being (finding 2). The variable of language proficiency seems most appropriate under the heading of institutional dimensions due to one major difference in the two receiving society contexts - namely, my Chicago sample was placed immediately into ESL classes as opposed to a complete lack of formalized language courses available for my Berlin sample.

The formal structure of language courses embedded in the refugee reception program in Chicago highlights the significance the state placed on the newcomers to master English. By making ESL courses mandatory, the government emphasized its expectations, encouraging employment and interactions with the host society. In Germany, a different scenario ensued. The most blatant reason attributed to the refugees' lack of proficient German language knowledge and application was related to the lack of formal structures encouraging their host society language absorption. The result of this absence delivered the message that language consumption was not relevant since the refugees were not expected to remain in the territory long-term. In reality, however, German language proficiency was to some extent expected of the refugees. The failure to offer formalized language classes, though, is indicative of the exclusionary process targeting the Bosnians. If a refugee is unable to speak the language of the host society, it will be difficult for him/her to interact with the host society, to advance his/her qualifications, to claim his/her rights, to ascertain the formal requirements required of the newcomer in the host society, or to acquire a job. This is a main critique of the German refugee reception program.

State-sponsored German as a foreign language (DAZ) courses, free of charge, have only been included as a viable instrument towards integration in Germany's reception package since 2005. This was when the federal government introduced with the 2005 Immigration Act a basic package of measures to foster the integration of immigrants by offering German cultural norms and language classes, since they were two hot topics in public discourses on integration. As a result, standardized state-sponsored integration courses were organized for

the first time in the history of Germany's immigration policy for foreigners, ethnic Germans and citizens of the EU.

Despite claims that this was an initial attempt to meet the linguistic and cultural needs of newly arriving migrants to Germany, necessary for functioning in German society, it has rather been used to sanction and reprimand the newcomers for failing to perform as expected. It is centered on the responsibility of the newcomer to adapt to German or Western culture, language, norms and values (Miera 2009) and to meet Germany's formal sociopolitical requirements, as each newly arriving immigrant is obligated to participate and be tested on language proficiency and integration.[200]

More recently, this has also been used in the form of pre-departure measures in the country of origin, which results in *pre-selecting* those more educated and most likely to pass the language tests, as well as those who are more financially secure, as the costs related to this are not inexpensive.[201] The pre-departure measures thus have the effect of restricting the issuance of visas to potential newcomers, in particular those who are illiterate, uneducated, poor, and unlikely to become self-sufficient in Germany. The fact that suggestions from the 1978 Kühn Memorandum are still being debated today, shows the lack of political will to develop truly durable solutions or participatory integration policies at the national level.

In the case of the Bosnians, the introduction of formalized language classes bore little impact, because they did not systematically incorporate the refugees (and migrants) already living for years in Germany. To this day, the classes available are for newly arrived migrants with only a basic understanding of German. Classes are absent for those already somewhat proficient in German, but whose German is not yet sufficient for a variety of skilled jobs. Furthermore, participants, coming from many different cultural backgrounds, learning experiences, literacy comprehension levels and other related characteristics are commonly placed in classes together, which make it particularly difficult for the teachers to respond to the special needs of each individual. While attempts are finally being made to meet the linguistic and cultural needs of migrants in Germany, these state-sponsored DAZ courses are often not designed to meet the contrasting learning and language needs of the diverse participants.

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[200] By borrowing from the previous integration model implemented to foster the German language proficiency of ethnic Germans, the first frame comprises 600 hours of compulsory language lessons as well as 30 hours of integration lessons for each newly arriving adult immigrant. In addition, there is a 45-hour orientation course in which basic knowledge of Germany's legal system, culture, and history are taught. It was intended that these integration courses contribute in fostering the integration of the foreigners living long-term in Germany (Federal Ministry of Interior Homepage).

[201] Germany only recognizes language courses offered by the Goethe Institute, which range in the *expensive* category.

In addition, being told from the start that they were to return to Bosnia as soon as the war ended proved to be a strong deterrent for many interlocutors from my sample to take the time and exert the energy to try and learn the language and Germany's social norms. Particularly in the face of voluntary return programs, exerting energy to learn German seemed senseless for those respondents expecting to be returned to Bosnia. Psychological factors further inhibited my respondents from learning German. In Berlin, where access to the labor market was accompanied with restrictions and exclusion, the advantages for learning the host society language were less tangible. A common argument is, "why would I want to learn the language of a society that excludes my full participation?" The government response of the destination country and interactions with native residents seemed to have an influence psychologically on my respondents' ability or willingness to learn the receiving society language. Many, consequently, internalized this perception and perceived the time spent learning German to be a luxury, a perspective especially apparent among those initially struggling with adaptation challenges, like traumatizations.

Trauma encompasses anxiety, which is known to debilitate task performance, particularly when attention and deliberate effort are required, such as when learning a foreign language (Kosic 2006). Generally, newcomers' initial preoccupation with their transitions to the destination country and dealing with their displacement and losses cause an impaired ability to focus on language learning. Many of my respondents struggled with concentration problems, which distracted them from absorbing the language. Elderly and traumatized refugees encountered the greatest challenges in learning the receiving society language and admitted their inability to apply a proper focus. They lacked the peace of mind necessary.

Additional factors, such as illiteracy, lack of previous schooling, time constraints, and/or a resulting lack of motivation were evident obstacles in both contexts that led to an inconsistent absorption of language consumption among my samples. Practically living in a *parallel world*, placed in accommodation facilities full of other Yugoslavians, prevented from working and interacting with members of the host society, many of my Berlin respondents simply encountered less opportunity to interact regularly with members of the host society, especially during their initial reception.

> "Schwierigkeiten habe ich immer noch, viele. [Ich] werde mich nie so wohl fühlen und ausdrücken können wie in meiner Muttersprache. Das ist leider so. Ich war schon 34 Jahre als ich hierher kam. Nach einem Jahr, man fühlt sich blöd, man ist 35 und ist nicht in der Lage im Bus zu sagen wenn man aussteigen möchte." (Interview, Zumra)

According to one refugee advocate social worker I interviewed, the elderly Bosnian women refugees in particular had few, if any, German friends and little direct contact with members of the host society. This, in her opinion, has been their greatest integration challenge.

> "Es war ein Problem: alles was ich damals in diesem Kurs gelernt habe, konnte ich gar nicht nutzen. Wir hatten überhaupt keinen Kontakt zu Deutschen, keinen. Nach einem Jahr war mir klar, man kann hier jahrelang, was ich vorher nie gedacht hätte, dass man hier jahrelang leben kann ohne ein Wort Deutsch zu lernen. Wir wurden in einem Wohnheim untergebracht, wo Bosnier sind, man hat weiter Muttersprache geredet. Man geht einkaufen und holt was man möchte, muss gar nichts sagen." (Interview, Mirna)

The social worker's view is that the Bosnians believe to be very different in mentality and behavior to the German mainstream, leading to their distanced stance towards befriending native Germans. But because the refugees are of European descent and could easily pass for native Germans based on their appearance, as soon as they open their mouths to say something it then becomes obvious that they are foreigners. "You can't pass for German if you can't speak the language and this is a question of attitude and *Verbundenheit.*" (Interview, Publicata) Implied is that if a foreigner has acculturated to German society, and speaks German, the person is treated as *German*, as *one of us*, as belonging. Some tried all the harder to fit in, to learn the language, and to be accepted - to *pass* for German, in other words. Few were, however, likely to pick up the language through informal exchanges outside the home setting as they tended to the family and household chores.

> "Als wir hier ins Haus gekommen sind, da gab es die Deutschen, aber alles was man gesagt hat war 'Guten Tag.' Erst nach Jahren, als ich dann angefangen habe, gemeinnützig erst mal und dann ehrenamtlich zu arbeiten, habe ich angefangen, Deutsch zu reden. So ein bisschen bei den Behörden, bei den Ärzten, aber das war einmal im Monat, dass man überhaupt ein deutsches Wort sagen sollte." (Interview, Mirna)

Over time, my Berlin respondents essentially proceeded along two paths: either avoiding the mainstream (which was not difficult), or purposely seeking out opportunities to communicate with members of the host society in an effort to learn the language (which proved more challenging). Some of the Bosnians even married Germans and learned the language faster through regular interactions with their spouses and friends. Some attempted to take classes.

One respondent, for instance, paid for German classes at a *Hochschule,* or type of community college, at her own expense, then she did volunteer work in an effort to interact with members of the host society. As a final strategy, she reduced her contacts with other Bosnians to a minimum. Her behavior exemplifies both her willingness to learn German proficiently. This also shows a common attitude assumed by *model* refugees and migrants, who are eager to adapt and integrate into the mainstream society through language proficiency.

Situations in which my respondents perceived their treatment positively tended to improve their interaction style and their language proficiency. Generally, the more confident my respondents appeared in their communication style, the more positive attention they gleaned in interactions with the mainstream. Quite often survivors attempt to be the opposite of what others predict they will be. "This may result in the survivor trying to constantly please others and be a perfect person, even if it means hurting herself or denying her feelings. This is not healthy." (Bryant-Davis 2005:111) Despite this respondent's effort, her language knowledge will never be *perfect*, resulting in a decline in her self-esteem. This also highlights the attitude she perceived in Berlin of needing to be perfect - she may even expect more of herself than even the German mainstream expects of her.

Some of the refugees unable to speak German developed protective responses: "sie stellen sich darauf ein." (Interview, Publicata) They learned to prepare themselves to be treated as outsiders or as less worthy. This often resulted in the refugees feeling more timid to interact with native Germans. Feelings of insecurity, apparent most among the women, caused them to distance themselves most from the host society. This distancing response was thus closely intertwined with my respondents' interpretation of native Germans' responses towards them: they perceived the expectation from the host society that their own German should have been *nothing less than perfect*. One participant admitted being able to speak better German as a child than she could as an adult in Berlin, since she had learned it in school in Bosnia. She attributed this shortcoming to the pressure placed on her by the host society to learn German a second time.

> "Früher habe ich auch in der Schule Deutsch gelernt und mein Bruder hat Deutsch studiert; Philosophie und Deutsch. Manchmal habe ich mit meinem Bruder [auf Deutsch] gesprochen. Jetzt sagt mein Bruder mir, dass ich früher besser Deutsch gesprochen habe als heute. Als Kind ist das immer so. Und nicht immer dieses 'du musst, du musst.'" (Interview, Dubravka)

Those who sensed they were being treated respectfully in their attempt to speak German exerted a greater willingness to keep trying. If they were laughed at, criticized, or blamed for not knowing more, they tended to stop trying altogether. If they experienced institutional discrimination related to their language proficiency, they also seemed less willing to learn the language or to assimilate. Accounts of discriminatory treatment related to insufficient German language capability or strong accents were revealed in their attempt to access the school system or labor market.[202] Many confined their interactions just to members of the community

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[202] Many of the Bosnian refugee children in Berlin were denied access to the regular school system due to insufficient German language skills (or based on age limits). Those whose German language skills were not

of Yugoslavian refugees, since this was more comfortable than trying to interact with Germans in a language in which they were not proficient and where it was clear that they were *unwelcome*.

Nevertheless, quite a number of members of my Berlin sample have over the years become highly proficient in German. Several are immersed within diverse socio-cultural settings, interacting regularly with Germans, Bosnians as well as other population groups. Despite difficulties in learning the language, many of the elderly participants in my sample benefited from host society language classes offered by NGOs or VOLAGs. One social worker I interviewed described her elderly and traumatized Bosnian refugee clients "als nicht mehr so beholfen", who further argues that those able to go to their doctors' appointment by themselves and understand and be understood have achieved a major hurdle in the integration process. Overall, those able to learn German and overcome communication barriers tended to fare better in their host society interactions.

The path and impetus by which to learn the host society language was different among Bosnians in Chicago from those in Berlin. In addition to instruments being put into place to enable the social incorporation of the refugees and the ESL classes being part of the reception package, mainstream US society tends to respond more openly and accepting of different accents and English language competencies. Because the US proudly claims its status as a country of immigration, greater tolerance for newcomers in their attempt to learn English can be observed.[203] While such exchanges with the receiving society sometime resulted in frustration and intercultural differences, it also required my sample to engage and to practice their English, which was conducive to their learning. This was useful since they could experience firsthand the financial advantages if proficient in English. There was a clear distinction in income earnings for those proficient in English and those not, which was important for their further financial well-being.

Based on a 2003 survey conducted by ORR, the hourly wage of employed refugees proficient in English at the time of the survey totaled for the most part about $9.50 compared with $8.31 for refugees unable to speak English well, and $7.85 for refugees incapable of speaking English at all. Under closer scrutiny, 64 percent of the jobs that paid over $US 7.50 per hour were accounted for by refugees able to speak English well or fluently at the time of

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sufficient enough to maintain the same level as their native German counterparts were filtered into – if they were younger than 16 - special schools (*Sonderschulen*), where they were treated as if they had learning deficiencies.

[203] Yet, the country of origin of the newcomers influences the attitudes and responses of the government and mainstream response, as some migrant groups tend to be better received than others. In particular, white foreigners with English accents tend to pique the interests of US residents. They tend to be curious, friendly and readily engage in conversation.

the survey. For those unable to speak English well, only 29 percent had jobs that paid over $7.50 per hour; for those unable to speak English at all, only eight percent earned over $7.50 per hour (Office of Refugee Resettlement Homepage). This signifies the importance of English language proficiency in Chicago and underscores the likelihood of a refugee earning higher wages and achieving greater upward mobility with knowledge of the host language. This also highlights the emphasis placed by the US Refugee Resettlement Program on English language instruction as a means for promoting integration. In general, my respondents in Chicago - with the exception of the elderly - have learned English well.

Generally, the elderly in both contexts have only managed to learn phrases and expressions, communicating largely in broken German or English. Yet, even those unable to speak well continue to manage their situation. They have arranged strategies to compensate for any language deficiencies. For instance, social workers sometimes accompany refugees to various bureaucratic appointments, assisting them in reading official documents, translating their mail, and providing advice and counsel (Interviews, Publicata and World Relief Chicago).

Overall host society language proficiency played a significant role in both contexts, but differences in host society responses in fostering language acquisition further impacted my respondents in their language learning outcomes. These differences, which can be attributed to the general historical and social attitudes of the two nations toward foreigners, exacerbated by the respective immigration policies, clearly impacted my respondents' language absorption.

5.3.7 Educational Access

My respondents encountered challenges accessing the educational systems in the two contexts to different extents. In Chicago, educational immersion was possible but was wrought with challenges due to the youths' general placement in poor, inner city, interethnic schools. One interview partner assessed the placement of the Bosnian refugees in such schools as the major flaw of the entire reception and integration package. The refugees were confronted with such a vast array of structural problems in the school setting that many who had previously done well in Bosnia, were waylaid into truancy, fighting, drinking, drug use and drug dealing, gangs, car-theft rings, and trouble leading to their arrest, deportation and in some cases even death.[204] Dr. Weine said,

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[204] A major car-theft ring in Chicago run by Bosnian refugees was discovered in 2007. An 18-year-old Bosnian refugee killed five people in a shooting rampage at a mall in Salt Lake City in February 2007, before he was shot to death by the police (Clemetson 2007). The Piccolo Café, a favorite hangout for secular Yugoslavians is known to serve alcohol to those younger than 21years of age, which is illegal in the US, but not in Europe. I went there one evening but it seemed harmless.

"There are many young Bosnian people, especially young men, who left school and still have not found any stable ground or straight path to good, and I don't see who or what is really helping them process their experiences or get the kind of mentorship, support or education they need."

High school bilingual programs for Bosnians were cut because the Bosnian student population declined to participate, and the costs were too high. After the closing of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian American Community Center, even less support was available for the youth. Their parents were too busy working to understand fully the challenges the youth were facing. The idea emerged around this time to begin Bosnian clubs on a voluntary basis to promote academic excellence in high school. Involving parents of the troubled youth in workshops was also a key response by members of the Bosnian community and refugee advocates.

A rather different situation emerged in Berlin, where only the refugees younger than 16 years old were allowed access to the school system, while those older were prohibited. Those accessing the system were steered into either *normal* or *special* schools, depending on their levels of traumatization and newcomer status. Most of the refugees between the ages of 17 and 25 found themselves in a vulnerable position due to their systematic denial to access the German educational system, as this forced them into stagnation and educational limbo with few options. Far too often, the respondents were offered inadequate advocacy and consultation in regard to accessing vocational training or further education. Welfare funding schemes for those participating in such training programs were also typically low, and, as such, many struggled to finance themselves while participating in further re-qualification programs. Overwhelmed and lacking participant-oriented teaching methods, a number of unskilled and semi-skilled refugees dropped out of their training programs.

As a consequence, the refugee youth in both contexts were often accused of being unreliable, disinterested, unmotivated, etc. This may be attributed to, for instance, a calculated disproportion of investment and outcomes, or because from the perspective of teachers or trainers, the refugees and migrants were considered *too difficult*. This may also reflect the failure of teachers to consider in advance the learning experiences and skills of the migrants and suggests a discriminatory stance. Another reason may be attributed to placement assessment outcomes that result in steering individuals into certain trades or career paths partly in consideration of labor market needs, which exacerbated the already difficult situation for many seeking to participate in higher education measures (Pfohman 2011a).

In both contexts the goal to access an educational institution was deemed essential for attaining social mobility, learning the host society language, and integrating. Yet, despite the increasing attention attributed to on-the-job training and continued education programs with

the *Bleiberechtsregelung*, deficiencies in ongoing training and knowledge transfer continue in Berlin, particularly in the low-skilled sector. Much of this could have been avoided had long-term solutions been applied at the start.

5.3.8 Permanence of Legal Status, Naturalization Options and Citizenship

The premise at the start was that the Bosnian refugees would fare emotionally better in a pluralistic society that promotes cultural diversity and integration as a national goal. While Germany's response to the Bosnian refugees was to provide resettlement options on a temporary basis as long as the war transpired, the US, by contrast, offered the Bosnian refugees' permanent resettlement and options for equal participation. Overall, those granted permanent status with the possibility to naturalize generally exhibited a higher rate of integration (based on government indicators of integration) than those refugees granted only a temporary right to stay.

Evident by these results, my Chicago sample was granted more rights than those in Berlin, enabling permanent resident status and access to naturalization. The situation for those in Germany, by contrast, has been rather limited. To this day, the majority does not have a permanent resident status, and not until the introduction of the *Bleiberechtsregelung* in 2006 did labor market incorporation become a truly viable option for most of my respondents. Naturalization clearly impacts important domains, including access to the labor market, schooling, housing, civic participation in elections, unrestricted mobility rights, language, and sense of belonging. These have important implications for the social integration of newcomers. Generally, actors most likely to gain from naturalization in terms of better outcomes, tend to also be the ones most likely to naturalize (Liebig 2011). The aim of course is to attain citizenship - membership - and the various rights and privileges accorded with this, including rights to participate politically. T.H. Marshall (1963) was the first to identify the *social* in the different dimensions of modern citizenship. He believed there to be three dimensions to citizenship, namely, civil, political, and social, all of which incorporate distinct rights, involving three societal institutions - legal systems, democratic government systems and welfare systems – in order to develop and address and service these rights. Marshall maintained that the principles of citizenship are in conflict with the principles of capitalism, since the former operate to *civilize* the latter (Roche 2003).

Citizenship also embraces an "ethos of at least some willingness to exercise these rights in ways that contribute to the common good" (Smith 2003). There are a number of requirements - that vary from country to country - to attain citizenship. This generally includes length of residence, host society language acquisition, and adoption of the societal norms, which are

assessed in citizenship tests. Clearly, the different naturalization policies, practiced in the US and Germany, reflect my respondents' perceptions about the nature of integration and migration and refugee processes within their territories. Having a secure resident status in the receiving society was deemed a major factor of influence in my respondents' adaptation processes, particularly after witnessing the impact on those with only a temporary status and limited rights. In fact, one of the main differences evident in the two contexts of Chicago and Berlin revolves around this issue of temporary versus permanent status with an eventual right of citizenship as a main factor fostering or impeding refugee incorporation. The perception of those denied this level of security, of knowing they could stay, greatly influenced their post-migration life and future goals by the clarity of their imminent return.

> "Von einem deutschen Pass kann ich nur träumen! Bisher habe ich überhaupt nicht darüber nachgedacht, weil ich weiß, dass ich gar keine Chance habe. Ach Mensch! Das wäre ein ganz langer weg, einen deutschen Pass zu kriegen. Für die Kinder wäre das besser, weil ja natürlich guckt man da mal d'rauf, wenn man eine Arbeit sucht. Und außerdem kann man mit dem deutschen Pass überall reisen." (Interview, Zumra)

My findings thus emphasize the significance of citizenship as it relates to legal status, with or without accompanying rights. Citizenship entails a tension between inclusion and exclusion, as this incorporates the "role and power of the state and its institutional apparatus to guarantee the right to have rights" (Somers 2006 in: Bloemraad et al. 2008:155). The concept of citizenship allows an analysis of the "extent to which immigrants and their descendants are incorporated into receiving societies" (Bloemraad et al. 2008:154).

Due to the absence of the recognized resident title, none of my interlocutors had acquired German citizenship at the time of our interviews and few perceived the acquisition of German citizenship as a viable option. Despite the general sense of security and gratefulness that my interlocutors felt following the extension of their residence rights, a complete ease in their fears did not transpire, as is evident by the following excerpt: "Heute habe ich zum Glück drei Jahre bekommen, aber trotzdem habe ich immer noch Angst." (Interview, Sena) Whether my respondents meet the requirements of the extended *Bleiberechtsregelung* and acquire an extension of their residence rights or whether Germany will finally be successful in its pursuit to return them to Bosnia is unclear. This regulation has already been extended a number of times. Each time the individual needs to first pass through a series of evaluations to qualify for a residence extension. The next two-year grace period ended at the end of 2011 when the *Aufenthaltsstatus auf Probe* was reviewed. Only time will tell how this impacts my respondents, whether they are permitted to remain in Berlin with a temporary resident status or returned. Either way, they are far from meeting the requirements for naturalization.

By contrast, the Bosnian refugees in the US could apply to automatically become eligible for permanent residence after living in the US for one year. During their first year, the refugees were unable to obtain a US passport and were restricted from voting in elections, joining the military, or being employed in government jobs that required US citizenship. Travel within the US was permitted, but the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) required notification in case of a change in address. Permission to travel outside of the US was also required by USCIS. A return to Bosnia during this phase would have led to a rejected readmission to the US. Having gone through the overseas orientation program, my respondents were generally well informed of the legal process of becoming a US citizen.

> "I had a green card and then you can apply when you are here like for four years and nine months and that's what we did. We applied for that and then the whole process took about eight months and I got citizenship in 2004." (Interview, Anita)

Following a stay of five years in the US, they became eligible for permanent citizenship, a step the majority of my interlocutors pursued.[205] For eligibility, English language proficiency is required as well as knowledge of US history, government and the values and customs of US society, which are assessed in form of a citizenship test.[206] Special courses were also offered to assist in this process but were not implemented pre-arrival to the US. By law, naturalized citizens are able to enjoy the same rights as citizens born in the US (Center for Applied Linguistics Cultural Orientation Resource Center 2004).[207]

Allowing for their formal participation in political and civil life and treating the Bosnian refugees as future US citizens appeared to heighten my respondents' sense of belonging and contributed in strengthening their identification with the receiving society. "For many refugees adopting citizenship constitutes a major change in self-identity and frequently represents an admission of final defeat with regard to hopes of returning to the homeland." (Center for Applied Linguistics Cultural Orientation Resource Center 2004:550) Qualms of having to relinquish their own citizenship may have raised hesitations for some of my respondents. Potocky and McDonald (1996) argue that one's fear of no longer returning to his/her own country of origin is a strong inhibitor when seeking citizenship. Yet in the case of

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[205] All of my respondents, except for two, had already acquired US citizenship at the time of my interviews in the spring of 2008. Only one participant missed the deadline, which delayed his citizenship acquisition.

[206] Requirements for obtaining US citizenship include: being 18 years old or older; a lawful permanent resident of the US for the past 5 years without leaving the territory for trips of 6 months or longer, and able to read, write, and speak English; having a period of continuous residence and physical presence in the US; possessing knowledge and understanding of US history and government; being of *good moral character*; and adhering to the principles of the US Constitution (US Citizenship and Service Help Center Homepage). Applicants can buy and download software from the Internet to help them prepare for and perform practice citizenship tests.

[207] With a permanent resident status, the Bosnians could travel abroad and join the US military. Having just fled the war in Bosnia, however, none of my participants conveyed an interest in joining the military.

the Bosnian refugees, many were clearly not interested in ever returning home to live permanently. For others still unsure about their future locations, those in possession of US citizenship acquired greater freedom to travel between Bosnia and the United States as well as to other countries of interest, further making it advantageous to acquire US citizenship. "We need to understand more clearly that citizenship is not only a status of internal equality and entitlements within a polity, but also enables mobility across international borders. The core of external citizenship is an unconditional right to be readmitted to one's country of nationality." (Bauböck 2009:300)

Knowing they could come and go as they pleased, simplified their travels. Furthermore, possession of a permanent legal status provided a great deal of emotional and practical support as my respondents could plan and invest in their future in Chicago. Being able to claim identity to both the US and Bosnia and not have to choose between the two facilitated in their overall sense of well-being. Knowing they could remain was an impetus for many in purchasing homes, finalizing their stay in Chicago, accepting their fate and consciously starting over. Clearly, having a permanent right to stay with options to naturalize were important factors that influenced the integration success of my Chicago sample. US citizenship also enabled my respondents' flexibility and freedoms that were for the most part conducive to their overall sense of well-being.

Aleksander Hemon, a Bosnian refugee who made a name for himself as an American or bi-cultural author, commented of his own immigrant experience to Chicago in 1992, "You don't have to have grown up in this neighborhood to claim it as your own. My neighbors who were here before me don't say, 'You have to thank us for letting you in.'" By contrast to typical responses encountered in Europe, he explains, "Your identity [in the US] is not legitimized by blood and national identity. It's more complicated than that. It's legitimized by participation in society. I like that because I want to participate. I do not want to be assimilated. I want to be an American as a matter of choice and not unconditionally." (Kaminski 2008:D7). The ability to participate fully in society, to *choose* to be American, to naturalize and enjoy greater rights, freedoms and mobility were deemed positively, as humans should not be limited in their flexibility and rights to choose for themselves where to live, when to migrate, etc. Freedom of choice, after all, is a fundamental right that everyone ought to enjoy and which needs to be protected.

Since a migrants' legal status represents an essential precondition for possibly achieving a "selbstbestimmte Lebensgestaltung und –planung" (Mielast 2006), it has been criticized that with the *Duldung* status a political and legal stance was taken in Berlin to not establish any

integration measures or durable solutions for refugees from the former Yugoslavia (Mihok 2001b). Coming to terms with the challenges of being a tolerated refugee in Berlin under ambiguous circumstances, with limited rights and restricted access to resources caused a highly stressful situation for my interlocutors all these years. This symbolic violence saddened and angered most of my respondents as they felt *robbed* of the ability to regain control over their lives and begin anew. Considering their subaltern status, they perceived the political factors associated with their naturalization and integration options negatively. Furthermore, the looming threat of deportation often intensified the symptoms of PTSD among my interlocutors, despite exemptions for vulnerable refugees.

5.3.9 Duration of Residence and Proportion of Life in Country of Settlement

Another institutional dimension that influences integration processes is relative to the duration of residence in the country of settlement. Striking differences in meaning related to the length of residence emerged when comparing the two contexts of Berlin and Chicago. Those in Chicago managed to access more resources (permanent residence, employment, education, mobility, citizenship, etc.) than my Berlin sample, and in a shorter duration of time. Evident by the steady improvement in the economic, legal, political, and social situations among my Chicago sample, length of residence was identified as an important factor of influence, as their rights widened in scope the longer they remained in the US or until they attained US citizenship.

One bias of the US is reflected in the ease for highly educated migrants to enter the territory legally, while those less educated tend to enter through informal channels. This is not necessarily true in cases of forced displacement. Regardless, the expectation is that those less educated or their children eventually acquire higher qualifications and knowledge in the receiving society. "While this 'bimodal' distribution of immigrants by education level remains true for recent immigrants, research suggests that over time many immigrants are able to acquire skills and credentials and gradually move up the education continuum." (Terrazas 2011:7). (Refer to Appendix L for examples from the US context).

> "Different demographic groups have driven US labor force growth at various points during the past half century: Between the 1940s and 1970s, the entry of women into the work force drove labor force growth. Between the 1970s through 1990, the entry of the baby boom generation drove this growth, and during the 1990s and 2000s, immigrants assumed this role. Simultaneously, economic restructuring generated ample employment opportunities for better-educated workers and contributed to restraining real wage growth among the less educated." (Terrazas 2011:4)

It is precisely this outcome that inspires newcomers to work hard toward attaining the *American dream*.

The opposite was true in Germany. The results of this study suggest that length of residence plays a considerably less relevant role for my Berlin sample than other research on migration studies usually indicate due to the ongoing temporariness of my Berlin samples' legal resident title. Knowing from the start that long-term resettlement was not an option, with only limited possibilities for naturalization and integration, and an insecure legal status, my Berlin sample was negatively impacted. They were effectively limited in their social integration and equal participation. While this did not stop them, however, from setting goals for themselves, it did cause differences in the two cities regarding terminology on membership or belonging, which was influenced by the length of residence and ability to access resources. Due to the permanent residence and citizenship status acquired over time, the Bosnian refugees in Chicago speak of a *we*, while the Berlin respondents continue to speak of a *them*. This is not surprising considering that the Bosnians have been perceived as a so-called *integration challenge* for German society. This provides a nice backdrop for the subsequent analysis of the modes of refugee incorporation applied in Berlin and Chicago.

5.3.10 Modes of Refugee Incorporation

To distinguish the modes of refugee incorporation (or exclusion) applied in these two case studies, I draw on earlier discussions (see Chapter one) about alternatives to assimilation and dimensions integral to fostering integration, regardless of the social system in which they occur (Nestvogel 2006/Esser 2004). I also rely on the three positions of institutional response, proposed by Portes and Rumbauts (1996) that receiving societies commonly exhibit, namely, exclusion, passive acceptance or active encouragement. In fact, the table below, identifying the different modes of refugee incorporation practiced in Chicago and Berlin, is based on this.

The premise with refugee incorporation is that there is a willingness on the part of the government to ensure a system that fosters a newcomer's stable residency rights, access to the labor market, the educational system, and other societal activities, as well an independent financial base and knowledge of ones' rights in the receiving society. Such a system also strives to foster language and integration courses or orientation courses that transfer expectations about cultural norms in the receiving society, while at the same time, enabling newcomers the option of maintaining their own identity, religion and worldviews without being suspected of disloyalty. Finally, such a system fosters as well the newcomer's participation and membership on equal terms in crucial networks, clubs, and organizations. In cases where rights are infringed upon, the system enables legal proceedings that guarantee access to justice and the promotion of full participation.

Thus when speaking of refugee incorporation, the burden of responsibility is not intended to be placed just on the newcomer. Rather multiple receiving society actors and institutions are essential for facilitating the *placement* (*Platzierung*) of the newcomers in the receiving society context. All of these dimensions together (listed in the left column, and also known as integration indicators) reflect the realm in which an individual maneuvers and is able to rebuild his/her life in the receiving society context.

Table 1: Modes of Refugee Incorporation in Chicago and Berlin

Integration indicators / incorporation policies	Mode of incorporation in Berlin	Mode of incorporation in Chicago
Legal residence status	**= exclusionary** temporary and insecure residence status grant with *Duldung*; not recognized as refugees	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** permanent recognized refugee status granted upon arrival
Labor market access	**= exclusionary** inconsistent access to work – mainly denial to access work; resulted in welfare dependency and led to phenomenon of *vying for sympathy*	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** access to work
Job placement services	**= exclusionary** no formal assistance with job placement – eventually received aid from NGOs and job placement centers **= active encouragement by default** support of NGOs, not government led, but funded by government	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** formal assistance with job placement
Receiving society language assistance	**= exclusionary** no formal language classes – eventually received aid from NGOs **= active encouragement by default** support of NGOs, not government led, but funded by government	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** formal host language society classes
Mobility/freedom of movement	**= exclusionary** restricted mobility	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** flexible mobility
Welfare assistance	**= exclusionary / passive acceptance** most everyone denied labor access and forced to rely on welfare; high financial	**= passive acceptance** welfare assistance only for sick and elderly; based on capitalist system only

	costs for government; led to climate of welfare dependence and stagnancy as well as to phenomenon of *vying for sympathy*	those in need received support; others are forced to work; this led to phenomenon of *vying for sympathy*
Housing accommodation	**= exclusionary** inconsistent accommodation – mainly assigned placement in state-run, collective housing facilities; forced to move frequently, lacked self-determination and lacked interactions with host society	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** accommodation in privately-run apartments; benefitted from support of earlier wave of like-ethnic group; led to normalcy and more frequent interactions with host society
Educational access – high school level	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** for those under 16 years of age **= exclusionary** for those over 16 years of age	**= passive acceptance formally** unsafe environment **= exclusionary socially** due to challenges of inner city schooling and inadequate funding of teachers and school nurses; failure to support all students; negatively affects all youth not just refugees
Educational access - lifelong learning and continued training	**= initially exclusionary** **= inclusionary / active encouragement** with legal changes in residence status and labor market access, fostered by NGOs but funded by government	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** deemed key integration facilitator, providing an alternative to frequent problems completing first path (mainstream route) to education
Physical healthcare treatment in emergencies	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** access to emergency healthcare deemed vital **= exclusionary** experience shows healthcare was difficult to receive; long-term preventative healthcare was amiss, but necessary	**= passive acceptance** physical healthcare treatment dependent on welfare benefit status and job-related healthcare coverage, i.e. whether with medical insurance or not **= exclusionary** expensive US healthcare treatment led many to opt out of paying into health care system and insurance; the less money a person had, the more likely s/he was to have welfare-related health coverage
Mental healthcare treatment	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** initially difficult to establish need for mental healthcare treatment; became available based on need related to	**= passive acceptance** mental healthcare treatment available through government support during the first five years only

	extension of *Duldung*	**= exclusionary** individual required to pay for mental healthcare services following five year time limit; emphasis initially was on self-sufficiency, not well-being, making it difficult for respondents to meet expectations of adapting and recovering from trauma within first five years
Citizenship and naturalization rights	**= exclusionary** eligibility only for individuals with secure residence granted after eight years; due to majority in sample's insecure residence status, only those who married native Germans began accumulating years needed to acquire citizenship	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** citizenship right eligibility after five years of residency in US for recognized refugees; contributed to sense of belonging, participation in society, and mobility, allowing greater flexibility to travel to and from Bosnia
Sense of belonging	**= exclusionary** psychological terror of deportation threats incurred at Foreigners Office **= passive acceptance** over time interactions with wider society more friendly and accepting; government acknowledges their likelihood of remaining indefinitely **= inclusionary / active encouragement** certain individuals offered expansive support	**= inclusionary / active encouragement** refugee support services generally well received and welcomed; certain individuals offered expansive support, fostered affinity and connection **= exclusionary** interactions with certain individuals in wider society contributed to frustration, recalling refugees' outsider status

This highlights the tension between integration on the one hand, and restrictions and entitlements on the other. These different institutional factors have influenced my samples' perceptions of their ability to adapt and be accepted as equal members of the receiving society. They have also influenced their maneuverability in relation to the existing institutional possibilities and constraints within the receiving society contexts.

Expectations were imparted on my Berlin interlocutors about where they should live and with whom they should socialize (through assigned placement in accommodation facilities), where they could travel (through mobility restrictions), whether they could work or study (with education and work bans linked to the *Duldung*) and what they should buy (through the

chip card), among other examples of formal and informal demands imposed upon them. This resulted in my Berlin sample, overwhelmingly, feeling excluded, not because they are Bosnians (or Muslims[208]), but because of their status as temporary refugees. This resulted in stigmatizations and differences in welfare allotments, contributing to their unequal status in German society. This raises a primary concern that governments seem to forget when devising integration policies, namely, that there are consequences for both the newcomers and the receiving society when a refugee's agency is limited as a result of structural impediments and disempowering regulations.

In contrast, my Chicago sample enjoyed conditions more conducive to fostering their inclusion or active participation. My respondents' ability to access resources such as education, employment, language and citizenship courses, credit cards and health insurance was foremost contingent on the terms and conditions of the US refugee resettlement program. Other elements factoring into this included the economic environment, such as the availability of jobs, housing, social services, and local resources, the propensity in the receiving society context to recognize Bosnian degrees and qualifications, as well as the employment potential, health status, and child-rearing responsibilities of the interlocutors.

The lack of interest or understanding of the mainstream regarding the plight of the Bosnian refugees, the apparent lack of knowledge about Bosnia in general and the ethnic conflict and secular Muslim identities in particular resulted in some of my respondents feeling forlorn and despondent, particularly evident for those refugees on their own in Chicago. The mainstream response toward the refugees often resulted in cultural misunderstandings and, in some cases, led to distancing strategies and decreased motivation to integrate. This indicates the significance also of the socio-cultural dimensions. This also alludes to the attitudes of the wider society toward foreigners, which is framed in the nation-state building process of each country and the focus in the next section.

5.3.11 Nation-State Building Process of Receiving Country
Each nation's historic memory and own self-concept clearly influences the mode of refugee incorporation applied in each context. In reflecting on the wide range of sociological and political views on human action and the organization of societies in search of solidarity and consent among members, discussion on immigration or any analysis on the merits of immigration systems and models of integration inevitably coincide with issues of nation and identity. "How they are constituted, maintained and reinforced." (Tazreiter 2004:87)

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[208] As secular Yugoslavian Muslims, they were treated differently than Middle Eastern Muslims.

Developments in regard to the Bosnians are thus deeply entrenched in earlier developments and the two nations' responses to foreigners in general and refugees in particular. The one development cannot be understood in isolation from the other.

It is important, for instance, to acknowledge the significance of the periods of fascism in Germany during the 18th and 19th centuries. These periods generated nationalist ideas and the creation of a common German culture, a notion which is still pervasive today in debates on Germany's *Leitkultur*. With the *völkische Bewegung*, ethno-folk principles rooted in the idea of culture and native soil emerged, leading to the supposed construction of a homogenous national identity. This set the stage for the proliferation of the notion that Germany possessed a common political and cultural identity. Any divergence from this national homogeneity was perceived as threatening. As a result, any form of *otherness* was suppressed in the name of a higher good of ethnocultural homogenization and national advancement (Blaschke 2005).

Consequently, as a nation, Germany forms shared identity on the basis of cultural or ethnic preferences and codes, looking to "natural, organic codes of belonging, rather than political modes" (Kohn 1967:329-332). According to Etienne Balibar (1991), "Racism provides a construction of a pure race for construction of the nation." (p.11) Germany's legislation on asylum and immigration and its dealings with strangers (the *other*), falling under the sovereignty of the nation-state, lays bare its racist past and constructions of nation and identity, extending back to the 19th century.

With an avowed stance "Germany for the Germans," the rights of citizenship, for instance, have long been divided, delineating between citizens and noncitizens, or into first- and second-class citizens (Lenksi 1966, 1985). Germany's citizenship rights are based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, "the law of the blood."[209] This extends to 1913 when the German Reichstag passed a law making German nationality almost completely a function of having German "blood," a practice that continues still today (Fetzer 2000). *Jus sanguinis* provides citizenship rights based on the nationality of the parents (Goris et al. 2009), while *jus soli*, "the law of the soil," implies that those born in the territory of a country are provided the right of citizenship to that country (with a few exceptions such as children of diplomats). "While civic nationalism looks to law to bind a society together, ethnic nationalism situates attachments as inherited, not as chosen." (Ignatieff 1993:4-5 in: Tazreiter 2004:87-88) Germany has thus repeatedly confirmed its pursuit to uphold its reputation as an *ethnic*

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[209] With Germany's practice of jus sanguinis, all ethnic Jewish and Polish immigrants (among others) were excluded (Brubaker 1992).

nation, which frames Germany's response to the Bosnian refugees as well as to all perceived foreigners born in the country (Pautz 2005).

This nativist attitude is evident by Germany's contrasting response between the Bosnians and the ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe (*Aussiedler*), the German (*Übersiedler*) coming from the former East Germany, and the *Spätaussiedler* consisting of German expatriates who returned to Germany after 1989. In retrospect, and especially compared to later migrant groups that came to Germany, these ethnic Germans were entitled to relatively generous supportive services and fewer legal restrictions and constraints in acting autonomously. "Indeed, West German citizenship law did not even consider them immigrants." (Fetzer 2000:70). They quickly adjusted to the norms of West German society as they were perceived to share the same ethnic identity and cultural values. Considering variances in citizenship and residence rights, enabling some residents select rights, while denying others access or eligibility, the myth of a homogenous German identity prevailed until 2000, when demands were made for a revision in Germany's citizenship laws.

In contrast to Germany's long-maintained stance, "Wir sind kein Einwanderungsland," the United States – unlike many other societies – perceives itself as a country of immigrants. Immigration has assumed a decisive role in the initial populating of the US, indicating why the topic of *immigrants* occupies such an important place in the construction of the nation-state and American national identity (Noiriel 1999).

Because immigration to the US is closely connected to labor market needs, the US has consistently implemented parallel policies to recruit the skilled and needed professions required by government and employers. These policies simultaneously exclude, however, certain ethnic groups and refugee populations, while also limiting the number of undocumented workers. Evidence of ethnocentric biases and exclusionary practices targeting certain migrant groups highlight America's contested immigration past, a reality that is often forgotten or ignored. For example, when US immigration history began, it was with open borders and lack of legislation until the racial exclusion of Chinese and Japanese migrants transpired (Harris 2002).[210] By the 1920s, two laws[211] in particular set the precedent of US government response to immigration for the subsequent four decades (Alba/Nee 2003:168) at a time when xenophobia was most volatile, evident by rising membership in the anti-foreigner Ku Klux Klan in the early 1920s (Alba/Nee 2003). At that time, and still today, the degree of

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[210] Naturalization laws were eventually modified to allow the naturalization of Africans, yet Asians continued to be excluded, evident in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
[211] One refers to the quota-based Johnson Act of 1921 and the other was the more restrictive Johnson-Reed, or National Origins Act, of 1924.

foreignness in the US depends on many variables, but not necessarily notions of a common ethnic basis. Skin color, however, does have an influential role. "The United States desired not only that there be fewer immigrants but that, in the aggregate, they mirror the ethnic composition of American whites." (Alba/Nee 2003:168) The aim was to reconstruct "some historical US nation, whether 1890 or 1910 – cloning the American 'race'" (Harris 2002:17). (Further evidence of nativism and restrictive entrance policies are laid out in Appendix L).

Nativism in the US also increased dramatically following the two airplanes that flew into the World Trade Center Twin Towers in New York City on Sept. 11, 2001. A change in semantics and new definitions of terminology arose, with the impact of altering the meaning of individual acts of violence to being synonymous with *acts of war*. Implicit in this language was blame linking all Muslims with terrorist acts against the US, a trend that continues, albeit more subtly, still today, years later. Although it was clarified that this is not explicitly a war against the Islamic faith but a war against terrorism, the fact remained that a double connotation existed.[212] The language used in the media, in government reports, and legislative policy conveyed that terrorists were synonymous with Muslims. A forced *hidden* identity associating Muslims with terrorism consequently arose, especially in the weeks following the Sept. 11th attacks.

Around this time, an American in Texas shot and killed a man wearing a turban. It was presumed that he was Muslim and must either be connected to the Taliban or was just dangerous. In fact, the victim was from India and had been peacefully living in the United States for many years. There was absolutely no link to Bin Laden or any fundamentalist groups. This sort of racialized tension was highly rampant during this period and has spawned a wave of Islamophobic sentiment, made worse by notions of a *clash of civilizations*, which is still persistent in current discourses on immigration and integration policies (cf. Huntington 1996). According to recent FBI reports, anti-Muslim hate crimes shot up a staggering 50 percent between 2009 and 2010 (Iyer 2011). The result is a loss of civil rights and the erosion of democracy (cf. Sivanandan 2008). Evident by these examples and changing trends, nativism in the US has varied over time and according to particular migrant or refugee groups.

Generally, though, the US has evolved to promote a *melting pot* concept, allowing for varying cultural and linguistic particularities or a merging of identities. This is reflected in a multiplayer process, allowing newcomers to contribute to a similar extent as the institutions

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[212] President Obama, just months into his presidency, made a similar comment: "America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles of justice and progress, tolerance and the dignity of all human beings" (Iyer 2011).

and mainstream society themselves do in influencing the character and nature of society. Over the years, this image has played a role in shaping US immigration and refugee reception policies (as has its conception of wanting to be a *superhero* or world power). Thus, while the US exhibited evidence of an inclusive immigration regime with notions of nation embedded in the political and not necessarily in the ethnic arena (Sainsbury 2006), Germany maintained an exclusionary immigration regime with rights based on *jus sanguinis,* "law of the blood", or lineage. This has had a lasting impact on all of the factors of influence affecting the Bosnians' adaptation processes. The next chapter continues this analysis and concludes the study.

6. Conclusions

The implication of being a refugee is that one leaves his/her previous life behind. In analyzing whether becoming a refugee must also mean the diminution of one's future, and by applying the grounded theory method of constantly comparing the data, I have found that regardless of the context, whether Berlin or Chicago, my respondents identify themselves and are identified by others as refugees. Moreover, the likelihood of their being able to shed this label is largely dependent on their ability to earn, save and invest money and purchase valuable possessions. This chapter elaborates on this and further provides a comparative analysis of the two reception contexts by focusing on the symbolic capital my respondents were able to accumulate in Berlin and Chicago. Included also is a look at the symbolic violence, hindering their ability to participate fully and equally in the receiving society contexts and thus remained in positions of *refugeeness*.

This alludes to an essential consideration when analyzing refugee adaptation, namely, that power struggles frame the contexts and conditions of actions and interactions (what Bourdieu might refer to as *fields of power*), and where individuals subject themselves to power. Foucault's concept of power does not assume the consolidated domination by one individual, group or class over another. Rather power is embodied in a complex network of relations, capturing everyone within, the advantaged and disadvantaged alike. Foucault (1979) recognizes that power is relational and operational, and works gently by applying itself to the practical knowledge taught (or absorbed and otherwise learned) by men and women in the course of daily life (Lemert 2008). Power thus captured becomes a strategic action upon the action of others.[213] As such, when looking at the world and in analyzing my respondents' ability to manage their adaptation process, I acknowledge the significance of Foucault's view of power, one-sided power relations and inequality as important, and rely on Bourdieu's (1983, 1990) theory of *habitus* and capital as the main *set of lenses* used to code, interpret, and structure this concluding chapter.

6.1 Symbolic Capital

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[213] Foucault's perspective on power included the notion that "an individual cannot stand outside power and use it to achieve specific outcomes," that "knowledge is inescapably linked to power," that there is a relationship between power and identity, and there are limitations to resisting power (Hardy 2003:463). He challenged sovereign power concepts and "repudiated the idea of an isolated agent who possesses a battery of power sources that can be mobilized to produce particular outcomes (Deetz 1992a, 1992b in: Hardy 2003:464).

Bourdieu believes that all human action takes place within social fields or arenas in which individuals, institutions, and other agents try to distinguish themselves from others in their struggle for resources (Bourdieu 1983, 1990). He explains that the overall goal is to acquire capital that is considered useful or valuable in the given arena. Power, which can be produced, reproduced, and accumulated over time, exists in three forms of capital: cultural, social and economic (Bourdieu 1983). These forms of capital can also be interchanged and transformed over time.

Economic capital, according to Bourdieu, "is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights" (Bourdieu 1996 in: Ball 2004:16). Yet he further suggests that cultural and social capital may be converted into economic capital since economic capital is at the root of all other types of capital (Bourdieu 1989). For instance, cultural capital, institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications is - in certain conditions - convertible into economic capital. Social capital is one of the fundamental powers and forms that the species of capital assumes when it is perceived and recognized as legitimate (Ibid). Likewise, social capital, composed of social obligations (*connections*), is also - in certain conditions - convertible into economic capital. Social capital converted "may be institutionalized in the form of the title of nobility" (Bourdieu 1986 in: Ball 2004:16). This then becomes symbolic capital, incorporating honor and reputation. These capitals converted are disguised forms of economic capital, but are never entirely reducible to this definition. They assume a form of capital, once the category of consciousness has been considered, that recognizes the specific logic behind it (Bourdieu/Wacquant 1996:151). Symbolic capital in turn engenders a sense of duty and inferiority in others who look up to those who have power (Ibid).

Using symbolic power against another person results in what Bourdieu terms *symbolic violence* and may take the form of being dismissive, or judging the person as less worthy, being less equipped, and even worthy of suppression. Symbolic violence, or power, may be expressed wordlessly, using physical symbols and behaviors to exert authority over the person (Bourdieu 1989). It may also be conveyed through accepted norms and value orientations, which are common forms, used by the media in political rhetoric and in restrictive immigration policies. Integration success is often measured based on various indicators, i.e. high levels of residential and social mixing among immigrants and their families on the one hand and the rest of the population on the other. Yet, formally imposing this expectation on the newcomers would seem inappropriate, a misuse of power. In analyzing the symbolic capital my respondents were able to accumulate in Chicago and Berlin, a notion of the

symbolic violence used against them also emerges. A description of both the justification for maintaining the fields of power, as well as for legitimizing the symbolic violence used against the refugees, is thus provided in this section.

6.1.1 Symbolic Capital in Chicago

Every major refugee group initially has its own characteristics and challenges upon arriving and adapting to life in the US. One of the advantages identified in regard to the Bosnian refugees in Chicago was that a large majority lived a relatively western lifestyle prior to the war. Generally, this group had lived very comfortable lives in Bosnia. They had lived in apartment buildings or houses, many owned one or two homes. They drove cars, they had businesses or professional jobs, and many were educated, experiencing an upper middle class to at least a middle class lifestyle. This is true especially for those Bosnians who had lived in urban areas, though not necessarily for many elderly Bosnians who had lived previously in the countryside. Based on this accumulated human and cultural capital, something Bourdieu may have termed *cultural competencies*, a general expectation prevailed in the US that refugees coming from Europe would adapt more swiftly and with greater ease than other refugee populations, say, from Africa.

Evident by the multiple examples of inconsistent responses and the varying legal rights accorded the different refugees and migrants in the US over the last two-dozen years, the US expectations and cultural dimensions played an essential role in shaping the Bosnians' social mobility in Chicago. For one, the cultural competencies expected of them culminated in advantages that influenced their selection and refugee recognition process, necessary for resettlement to Chicago. If the refugees had lived similar lifestyles in Bosnia as American citizens, then their behavior in the US would not likely be different than Americans. This presumption inevitably resulted in the US Immigration Officers mostly selecting Bosnians with attractive backgrounds in accordance to the resettlement priority of self-sufficiency.[214]

During the pre-selection process, the US government clearly influenced the terms for refugee incorporation in Chicago, as this entailed several assessment interviews and an evaluation to determine vulnerability levels as well as an *informal* analysis of the likelihood of the respondents' eventual economic self-sufficiency in the US.[215] Expectations were clearly imposed on the refugees involved in resettlement in their pre-arrival orientation courses.

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[214] Many of the accepted elderly seniors came through family reunification programs, suggesting that no selection process was needed and family members would assume the costs borne by their arrival.

[215] Other pre-selection factors, such as the refugees' extent of vulnerability and being in a mixed ethnic marriage, also played a role in their further development in the US.

Because the refugees were required to participate in presettlement orientation courses, they learned the standards of expectation and their related *integration duties*. Borrowing from Joseph Carens' (2005) assessment of requirements, expectations and aspirations, the US clarified in advance the requirements and expectations of the newcomers.

> "These distinctions matter descriptively because they draw our attention to the range of formal and informal ways in which the receiving society responds to immigrants and they matter normatively because they may affect the moral quality of a policy or practice. For example, a demand that may be morally permissible if expressed as an expectation may be morally impermissible if constructed as a formal legal requirement." (Carens 2005:31)

Those who conformed to these expectations were later deemed *successful*, as they managed to meet the goals the receiving society had of them. One of my interview participants commented on the way the US *picked and chose* which of the Bosnians would be accepted to the US.

> "The Americans were pretty clever. In 1996 I think they started interviewing people at three interview posts in Germany and they [US] picked out the best ones [Bosnian refugees]. They didn't give refugee status to everybody of course. They just wanted quality and these they let go to the United States." (Interview, Nafiz)

This pre-selection, based partly on cultural capital, in turn shaped the integration potential of my sample, as well as their ability to access essential resources such as decent paying jobs. Not all of the Bosnian refugees, however, were ranked equally high or enjoyed equal degrees of social inclusion. Because the cultural capital or *market potential* of the refugees - meaning their professional skills, educational profile, language competencies, as well as their health – varied, this has had varying effects on each of my respondents' ability to find gainful employment, achieve socioeconomic mobility, and procure sufficient benefits and job security in Chicago in addition to even qualifying for resettlement. With expectations of self-sufficiencies, my respondents had ready access to the Chicago labor market.

Because the institutional priority was premised in self-sufficiency and English language proficiency, courses and money were made available to fund these services. Reception and placement services available to the refugees in Chicago included bilingual case management, medical case management, cultural adjustment and orientation, English language training, vocational training, employment services, children's activities, a refugee youth program, a women's empowerment program, an immigrant assistance program, senior service initiatives, and citizenship classes. An abundance of services and social support was made available for the refugees upon their arrival to ease their initial reception process. The State of Illinois also made state-level funds available to supplement the federal programs and refugee agency activities. The federal programs, however, were time-limited. Family members were generally

expected to compensate by covering the costs of the refugees, reliant on assistance. Historically, immigrant integration in the US occurs at the local level - through the efforts of families, employers, schools, churches, and communities.

"Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the US model of immigrant integration is the lack of public institutions mandated with enhancing immigrants' economic outcomes." (Terrazas 2011:3) Beyond the initial orientation courses available, including the ESL classes, interview training and job placement, and additional services available through the resettlement and placement (R&P) program, the main source of public policy programs aiding the Bosnian refugees following the initial eight months were contained in the 1960 antipoverty reforms. These were greatly limited with the transfer from federal to state support in the 1990s (Terrazas 2011). Against this background, the Chicago sample understood the terms for refugee reception, namely, to take advantage of the right to access essential resources and services, particularly, the labor market. In fact, the quicker my respondents managed to access the labor market and begin the process of becoming economically self-sufficient, the faster they managed to shed their refugee status and be considered *integrated*. Implicit with this, was that after the initial eight months of refugee resettlement support, the refugees were treated relatively equally to US citizens, as long as they ceased receiving refugee welfare assistance. Those unable to work due to their age, disability, or traumatization were eligible for welfare assistance. As such, the US mode for refugee incorporation generally placed the onus for integration on the individual and civil society, with minimal governmental assistance except during the initial eight months with the R&P program (cf. Terrazas 2011). Compared to the welfare system in Europe, the US tends to relinquish the state from providing social provisions, such as health insurance, employment, education, and housing. This is based on the argument that government regulation is too invasive and the free market is best suited to deliver such human needs (cf. Porfilio 2007).

Initially, the Bosnian refugees earned only minimum wage, sometimes having to work several jobs in order to cover their costs. With time, as their English improved, so did their positions and pay. The majority of younger, able-bodied respondents advanced to higher-skilled and higher-paying positions. Previous degrees did not necessarily steer the newcomers into the same job paths they had worked in Bosnia. Different from Germany, my Chicago sample was not necessarily restricted from a certain job or field despite an absence of qualifications specific to the new job. In fact, the jobs they acquired in Chicago often had little to do with their previous skills and qualifications. This was due to the greater flexibility of the US labor market and the simplified process of recognizing previous degrees and

skills.[216] One of my interlocutors, for example, with a high school degree from Bosnia, managed to open her own hair styling salon, where she now uses her experiences by catering in particular to the community of Yugoslavians living in Chicago. Another respondent, previously a lawyer in Bosnia, eventually procured a position in Chicago as the refugee resettlement program director for one of the refugee agencies. Several of the women in my sample found work in refugee advocacy agencies. Who better to counsel newly arriving refugees than someone who had experienced firsthand what it is like to be a refugee? This shows that the cultural capital of the Bosnian refugees selected for resettlement to Chicago was usually readily recognized in the US. This in turn fostered their self-esteem and well-being, despite the fact that employment in the *helping* sector typically pays less than positions in for-profit companies. Another respondent, previously employed as a mechanical engineer in Bosnia, opened up his own construction and remodeling company. An entrepreneurial spirit characterized my respondents in Chicago.

They typically had to work hard to reach the point they felt secure and had to make many sacrifices along the way, including sacrifices in their physical health, emotional state and social interactions. Many complained of not having any *free time* and feeling a constant pressure to succeed and get ahead. It was as if they did not trust their success. Many worried that everything they had worked for could be taken away from them due to the precariousness of the US social system. This resulted in their being *equally poor* due to the limits of welfare support for all US residents. Based on values of meritocracy, this approach functioned for the majority of my sample, as they struggled to achieve the American dream and come out as winners.

Since the state abdicated its role of providing long-term mental healthcare treatment or coverage of the costs of health insurance unless refugees were classified as disabled, many of my respondents lacked health insurance due to the high premiums and their financial constraints. While not conducive to ensuring well-being, this predicament is common to the status quo in America. Lack of health insurance and risk of falling into poverty affects native-born Americans just as easily. This is a common predicament of the volatile US system, which affects everyone who does not pay for health insurance but needs healthcare (except for the elderly who are eligible for Medicare). This essentially results in the demonization of impoverished peoples.

Single respondents tended to suffer from greater financial and emotional hardship than those accompanied by families. The elderly were less successful in achieving social mobility,

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[216] With the exception of doctors and lawyers who were required to be licensed in the US.

though they were eligible for social welfare benefits and many also relied on the support of their adult-age children. Those unable to learn English proficiently (typically the elderly) remained in similar financial positions as when they first arrived. They generally remained locked in the status of *refugee* as a result of their ongoing dependency on welfare. Thus, the symbolic capital attributed to the elderly, sick or disabled was embedded in their helplessness and *neediness*. However, among those taken in by family, their caretaking roles in the family household also signified symbolic capital as this enabled their adult-age children the time to focus on accumulating economic capital, as well as peace of mind, knowing that their children were in safe hands.

The receiving society's orientation or *threshold of tolerance* for perceiving and recognizing strangers was another variable that influenced the refugees' incorporation. The cultural identity of US residents tends to be diverse as a result of its nation-building process. Deemed a country of immigrants, US society is accustomed to foreigners. Against this background, my interlocutors acknowledged their ability to appropriate space and recognition in the receiving society and to intervene in various dimensions of the US social structure, particularly due to their being white, European immigrants. It was presumed that they could more easily hide their *foreignness* and their *refugeeness*, and that Muslim participants could hide their *Muslimness*, employing what Miskovic (2007:519) calls their *immigrants' racial invisibility*. This is similar to the East Indians and other educated migrants, who entered the US, willing to assimilate and quickly adopt the societal norms. The question is whether they successfully integrated because of the US expectations for them to excel or whether it is due to the generous US response and their ready access to resources. According to Bourdieu, the accumulation of cultural and symbolic capital affords privileges, which are often misrecognized as merit, while cultural heredity determines the survival of the most fit (Bourdieu 1990).

Despite these expectations, many of my respondents nevertheless related accounts of feeling isolated and disassociated from the mainstream. They criticized the average citizen's lack of intercultural competence and knowledge of other cultures and countries. Ignorant comments resulted in the refugees feeling frustrated, discontented, and genuinely homesick. This was particularly evident in regard to the many questions about their identity and religion, a possible impact of Islamophobic sentiment. The force of this varied greatly depending on the personalities of the respondents and their varying coping strategies. This influenced both their standing in society and their own perspectives about themselves. Some recognized the

racialized system placing them in either a superior or inferior ranking over other refugee groups, depending on their particular situation.

Generally, those who succeeded in overcoming the obstacles to functional integration via the labor market encountered additional mechanisms of social inclusion. This was evident as well for those who acquired citizenship, which resulted in eased mobility and greater rights. Eligible for naturalization after five years, the majority of the focus group has since acquired US citizenship, which has strengthened their sense of belonging. They generally feel proud to have learned English and passed the citizenship test. They also enjoy additional freedoms, such as greater mobility in traveling as US citizens with no need for visas or travel restrictions. After naturalizing and shedding their refugee identity, my respondents enjoy greater symbolic capital in the receiving society.

In Chicago, it was thus both allowed and expected that my interlocutors adapt, take advantage of the available resources, which were readily available, regain control over their lives by making long-term plans and, most importantly, become economically self-sufficient. Those unable to work or to free themselves of welfare assistance, however, usually the elderly and/or disabled and sick, remained in positions of *refugeeness*. The premise of *multiple opportunities* and possibilities for achieving the American dream thus prevailed. As history shows, the onus for achieving this was placed on the individuals themselves. With an emphasis on education, the notion was maintained that higher aspirations could be nurtured and integration achieved, particularly for the children, who were expected to succeed in attaining economic and social mobility in the receiving society context. As such, my Chicago sample enjoyed symbolic capital and relative equal opportunities.

6.1.2 Symbolic Capital in Berlin

Germany's intention to offer only temporary protection seemed to legitimize the lack of consideration to acknowledge the cultural capital skill set of the refugees. Although my Berlin sample possessed vast cultural capital, this was rarely utilized and thus devalued and void in its lack of recognition in the receiving society. While financial success is generally also a significant integration factor in Germany, the practice with the Bosnian refugees was nevertheless to restrict the labor market access of the sample, forcing them into positions of structural demotion and welfare dependency.

Ongoing policy changes, an exclusionary educational system, and restrictions related to work permit allocations and vocational training served to further freeze or reverse the previous recognition of my respondents' educational profile and professional skills. Forced to survive off a minimum existence, even their welfare benefits were less than native Germans.

They could not afford to invest in material objects, such as an apartment or a home. Economic capital was thus effectively denied (with some exceptions) as a result of labor market restrictions and legal policies initially in place. The terms of reception in Berlin served to dismiss the elderly and middle age Bosnian refugees, deeming them less worthy due to high labor market competition and suppressing them by failing to recognize and/or preventing them from accumulating economic capital.[217] Rather than their situations improving over time, the majority continues to face an imbalance in their ability to attain economic capital by means of procuring safe, secure, full-time employment, on-the-job training, and/or retirement benefits. Against this backdrop, the question then is whether my Berlin interlocutors' knowledge and flexibility can even be categorized as cultural capital when it was not used and viewed by the receiving society as such? In this regard, several of my informants attempted to understand why they had been denied access to the labor market and then blamed in public discourses for their dependency on welfare.

Accumulating social capital was also constricted in Berlin due to limited contacts with members of the host society. Lack of proficient German language knowledge and segregated living situations - a consequence of being assigned placements in refugee accommodation facilities - also contributed to divisions between the refugees and mainstream society. While interactions with members of the receiving society were limited, many benefits could nevertheless be gleaned through social networks and interactions with ethnic community members and care providers.

Many benefited from special rules implemented to improve the long-term integration of vulnerable groups in Berlin, including standards of response, specialized refugee services, and care to victims of torture, traumatized asylum seekers, and refugees (Comune di Roma 2004). As the confirmation of PTSD became grounded reasons for extending the residency rights of the Bosnian refugees, verification of ongoing psychological conditions became essential for prolonging instruments of protection.[218] Those warranted the legitimate status of *victim*, *sick*, or *traumatized* were permitted the *honor* and *recognition* of remaining in Berlin. This outcome was highly significant as it was the only form of symbolic capital – or the most evident form – for which my respondents were recognized in Berlin. "Man hat die ganze Zeit Leute aus Bosnien nur als traumatisiert, als Krank gesehen." (Interview, Zumra)

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[217] The Bosnian youth who entered the German school system and learned German proficiently have the best chances for attaining social mobility. As students, they are still in the process of accumulating economic capital; among the sample, these youth are most likely to become financially successful.

[218] Many refugees were not categorized as traumatized or were unable to confirm evidence of having sought out psychosocial therapy before 1998, resulting in a failed attempt at recognition as traumatized. In most cases, the consequence was deportation.

Only the truly traumatized, confirmed through rigorous assessments and interviews were recognized as worthy of remaining. "Da ich von einer Psychologin jahrelang behandelt wurde, wurde erstmal ein Attest geschrieben und dann bekam ich den Aufenthaltstitel." (Interview, Mirna) As a result of steady lobby work on the part of NGOs and care providers, the *traumatized* not only gained a right to remain, they also gained limited access to the labor market, as this was deemed therapeutic to their recovery. Except for three men, who married German women, my sample consisted overwhelmingly of those who had been recognized by the Foreigners Office to have a war-related psychological illness or PTSD, or were children of traumatized refugees, signifying their continued right to stay in Berlin due to exemptions from deportation and repatriation tactics set forth in the Interior Ministers' repatriation scheme. Their poor mental state, consequently, served as their main symbolic capital, an asset for them in their ability to extend their *Duldung* and access the Berlin labor market. This in turn enabled Germany to perceive itself as humanitarian, generous, and morally superior, extending protection to those *truly in need*. This illustrates the power of government actors to choose to assist some, but not all. "There is also a certain romanticism about being the one to offer refuge, a fantasy in which the other is impressed by and grateful for the generous nurturance they receive." (Mosselson 2006:xxii)

Variables relating to Germany's orientation or *threshold of tolerance* for perceiving and recognizing strangers have played a significant role in Germany's restrictive and seemingly racialized policy, making it difficult to incorporate the refugees. Based on its historical construction of the nation-building process, Germany has long denied the reality of the diversity among its inhabitants, despite the presence of multiple ethnic backgrounds and diverse languages spoken by Germany's residents. Since the guest worker movement, the cultural identity of the residents of Germany has been diverse, yet it was only in the last five to 10 years that Germany has gradually begun to acknowledge this reality, to admit its status as an immigration country, and to finally implement an integration policy. Nonetheless, German state policy makers influenced the incorporation of my Berlin sample most obviously by the terms set in Germany's national legislation and its categorization of varying legal statuses accorded different types of foreigners. Evident by the rights granted the German citizen and the rights denied the tolerated refugee, there was a striking imbalance in the legal positions of Germany's residents.

Refugee reception is hardly addressed in the new immigration legislation, allowing the government response toward the Bosnian refugees and other tolerated refugee populations to be fraught with institutional discrimination. This is evident in the refugee chip card, mobility

restrictions, differences in welfare payments among citizens, the hierarchical hiring process known as the *Vorrangprinzip*, among multiple other examples hindering the refugees in their equal participation in society. Against this background, my interlocutors acknowledged their inability to appropriate space and recognition in the receiving society or to intervene in various dimensions of Germany's social structure. They questioned why they should bother learning German when they were told repeatedly that they would only be permitted to remain for another three to six months. They were additionally confused as to why they were blamed for insufficient German proficiency when formal German classes had not been offered prior to 2005, at which point they were not even allowed since they were not newly arrived migrants. In addition, they questioned the reasoning for the systematic denial of those older than 16 years of age to access the educational system in Berlin or to finish their degrees (for those whose schooling was interrupted by the war). The calculated answers to these unanswered questions led to frustrations, disempowerment, stagnancy and often apathy as well. Many Bosnian refugees seemed to be trapped in a system that has prevented them from acquiring a trade, a recognized skill, completing any formal education, working, or striving towards integration. Beyond labor market and education bans, being confronted with deportation threats and terrified of a forced return, the Foreigners Office seemed to have purposely disempowered my Berlin sample, resulting in their feeling unwelcome and unwanted.

Consequently, despite their long-term settlement patterns, the Bosnian refugees in Berlin have not achieved a high level of formal inclusion. It has been difficult for them to earn a decent living wage or improve their economic status over time, especially compared to the Chicago sample. Exceptions exist for those who married German natives and transitioned into a more regularized legal status, opening up an array of new rights. This in turn makes evident the negative impact in achieving so-called *successful integration* when effectively denied access to resources and faced with persistent symbolic violence. Recognizing this reality, Germany finally attempted to amend these forms of institutionalized exclusion by revamping the 2005 Integration Act and later enabling access to the labor market.

Despite attempts to incorporate the Bosnian refugees into the labor market according to the rules of the *Bleiberechtsregelung auf Probe*, so far most of my interlocutors have encountered problems procuring regularized, full-time positions after years of stagnancy. Many have encountered difficulties due to the lack of formal recognition of previous degrees, insufficient German language skills and employers' hesitancy to hire them due to administrative and bureaucratic formalities. While this is attributed in part to recruitment strategies and labor market demands, it also encompasses institutional discrimination,

streamlining migrants and refugees into the types of positions that no German would consider taking. The fear is that few of my respondents will likely meet the requirements of working full-time and securing their costs of living and healthcare coverage to be permitted an unlimited residence right by the end of 2011.

The alternative option would be for those, who have been protected for humanitarian reasons attributed to traumatizations, to prove that they are so severely traumatized that there is no hope of ever recovering. This would require that they find a doctor willing to attest to their ongoing PTSD and to confirm that there is an absence of every hope for recovery. Few doctors are expected to make such claims, which is essentially what the law appears to be asking of them.

> "Die Bilanz des Jahres 2010 lässt jedoch deutlich werden, dass die Hoffnung auf Rechtssicherheit und damit verbunden die erwartete Verbesserung der prekären Lebensbedingungen nicht eingetreten sind. Ein Großteil der betroffenen Flüchtlinge konnte die erforderlichen Voraussetzungen für die Erlangung des Bleiberechts nicht erfüllen. Vor allem in Zeiten der wirtschaftlichen Krise stellt der Nachweis einer existenzsichernden Erwerbsarbeit Flüchtlinge vor eine kaum überwindbare Hürde. Der neu eingeführte Rechtsstatus 'Bleiberecht auf Probe' hat das Problem der rechtlichen Unsicherheit, drohenden Abschiebung und sozialen Prekarität keineswegs gelöst, sondern nur aufgeschoben." (Aus dem Vorwort von Prof. em. Dr. Peter Kühne in: Hentges/Staszczak 2011)

Germany (with the support of the EU) has developed a system, making it impossible for tolerated refugees to achieve their ambitions or their self-determination. Without a right of residence, the tolerated Bosnian refugees have been prevented from accumulating economic capital, securing their status and normalizing their situations.

In addition to remaining idle for years, unable to participate on equal terms as German citizens, many of the Bosnian refugees in Berlin still wait to secure a more permanent resident status and eligibility for naturalization. Only after they secure a resident status can they begin accruing the eight year residence minimum necessary for naturalization rights. Hence, few had acquired German citizenship at the time of our interviews.[219]

Considering Carens' (2005) understanding of expectations, requirements, and aspirations, Germany's expectation was that Bosnian refugees would return once the war ended. This was ensured – or at least attempted - through formal and explicit requirements. The idea behind this mode of reception, which can not truly be referred to as *incorporation* due to its restrictive nature, was to limit the conditions for reception so much that the applicants would decide to voluntarily return. Many of the Bosnian refugees did return - either voluntarily or

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[219] Those who have acquired German citizenship, or are close to doing so, include some who arrived as youth or who married German citizens.

forcefully - as a result of ensuing deportation requirements. This explains the inconsistency in treatment, the steady legal changes regarding the rights accorded the tolerated refugees in Berlin, as well as the ease for politicians, the media and other stakeholders in shaping public debate and fostering anti-refugee sentiment. It illuminates why the refugees were blamed for their lack of proficiency in German and their reliance on welfare, the resultant contempt targeting them and resulting in exclusionary processes. The message generally expressed was that the Bosnian refugees failed to meet their obligations or act on the expectations and aspirations society had of them, namely, to leave Germany when the war ended. Among those who managed to remain in Berlin, some have married German citizens, entered the educational system or managed to procure steady legal employment, improving their situation and status. Many, however, are still locked in positions of *refugeeness* and trapped in positions of dependency that emphasize their *sickness* and *traumatizations*. With the cutoff date at the end of 2011, whether they are able to regularize their legal status and achieve economic self-sufficiency will soon be known. Whether they may finally be returned to Bosnia after so many years, or whether the government will grant another temporary extension and avoid granting permanent residence rights to those potentially unable to procure economic self-sufficiency, also will be learned.[220]

6.2 Symbolic Violence – Being Made to Feel a Refugee or *Refugeeness*

Regardless of the context, whether Berlin or Chicago, my respondents identify themselves and are identified by others as refugees. This connotes a multitude of meanings, both useful to them, but also stigmatizing as well (examples of which are described above). While much attention has been placed on immigration, *refugeeism* has received less of a focus. "'Immigrate' is a verb, but there is no verb for refugee, suggesting a greater degree of reification and an impoverished understanding of it, or desire to understand, the way in which the dilemma of the refugee arises." (Mosselson 2006:xxii)

Political rhetoric eases the process of implementing restrictive asylum and immigration policies, as specific attributes related to asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants are identified and used as a base for racialized *othering* to occur. Because the cultural order defines who belongs to the in-group and who is castigated to the out-group, the *undeserving* group is often restricted to the status of victim as a means of oppressing them. These forms of oppression may be expressed both covertly and overtly by individuals or by institutional policies and

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[220] While the US response is also entrenched in socioeconomic advantages and expectations, the overriding difference is that the US welfare system covers fewer long-term than the German welfare system.

procedures. As mentioned, Berlin's response was overwhelmingly to only recognize the Bosnian refugees' mental health disorders and traumatizations rather than their cultural capital. The impact of this on the lives of the refugees, strangely, went largely undetected by the wider public, recalling the *ignorance is bliss* attitude. Yet, occasional surges of generosity towards the refugees abounded, as did instances of hostility (cf. Harris 2005).

One reason for this is reflective of the negative conceptions associated with refugees. "The debate concerning immigration controls has been the most powerful incitement to xenophobia and racism. It has focused on popular hostility (at least in the world of the popular newspapers) on illegal immigrants, and by extension, the cruelest cut of all, on asylum-seekers." (Harris 2005:125) Lisa Malkki (1997) acknowledges that scholarly literature has presented refugees themselves to be problematic, rather than the factors that led to their flight. Binder and Tošić also recognize that "refugees are always seen as a 'problem': a humanitarian, a legal or a psychological one" (2005:609). They further contend that refugees are typically perceived as a threat to nation-states. Arguments of *too many* migrants, *Muslim terrorists*, *illegal aliens* and *floods* of refugees, *abusing* and *misusing* our generous welfare programs, competing with us, introducing criminality and deviant behavior to our *pure* society, and taking that *what's ours*, are sentiments commonly used as a main source of legitimacy for politicians to enforce restrictive and exclusionist policies. The presence of refugees in our society is claimed to cause political instability and is a cause of racism and xenophobia. Politicians use these arguments to play on the fears of citizens, claiming that refugees and migrants steal jobs, resulting in the undercutting of local wage levels and lowering work conditions and competition for scarce public services (Harris 2002:5). Forms of dominance and subordination, rooted in *othering* as a social process of exclusion are thus applied, resulting in multiple disadvantages for the groups being *othered*. Mosselson (2006) contends that refugees are commonly perceived as *the other within the other*, the *ultra-other*, as the most suppressed fraction of the immigrant body, more marginalized even than other immigrants, and even more invested in self-concealment.

> "In the vast pool of candidates for immigration, refugees are the most storm-tossed, the most likely to be treated as detritus, to be left floating around. Striking us as neither one thing nor the other, they are often condemned to a liminal existence, sequestered in camps that can be as large as small cities, and that can take on a semi-permanent character (www.refugeecamp.org). In the ethnocentric, xenophobic imaginary, those seeking asylum are easily thought of as misfits or vagabonds: displaced or even deported persons, bearing the stigma of another country's waste. They are the future cab drivers, or perhaps delivery boys for ethnic restaurants. If they occupied privileged positions in their own country, they have to start over again at the bottom in our country." (Mosselson 2006:xxix)

Because an ideal society is one in which everything is controlled, certain powerful actors extend their control by reinforcing their own definitions of community membership based on their desire for self-determination. Refugees are consequently perceived to be different from the norm. This sort of construction reinforces the power relations between the dominant and those being dominated, since those with positions of power benefit from labeling, classifying, and defining who belongs to the in and out groups.

> "People are naturally prone to favor frames that give them advantages and privilege their own access to material, symbolic, and emotional resources. Although everyone may prefer a framing of social reality that serves their interests, people with power and resources have more influence than others, and their frames are more likely to be accepted and used in society." (Massey 2007:242-243)

In many cases, refugees are thus targeted for unjust treatment as governments promote a differential valuation in an attempt to balance the need of providing refugees' humanitarian protection while also ensuring economic and political security. Commonly, "victims fleeing persecution are turned into 'illegal immigrants' in the country to which they turn for safety… To deter those who want to work from pretending they are refugees, the regime governing asylum has to be as cruel as possible - including denying refugees the right to work and then bitterly complaining at the inevitable result of having to feed and house them." (Harris 2002:4) In order to deter more refugees from coming, the level of housing and welfare is thus lowered to such an extent as to weed out the true victims. "Refugees are seen as 'uprooted' because they do not have their 'own' place and territory, which they lost because of their expulsion." (Binder/Tošić 2005:609) Only those with nowhere else to go connote as true victims, since no one would *choose* such a restrictive option. In questioning what it means to be contained and dispossessed by the state, Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak (2007:5) judge that,

> "When and where a 'refugee' is expelled from one state, or forcibly dispossessed in some other way, there is often no place to go, even as one arrives someplace, if only in transit. It may be within the borders or a given state, but precisely not as a citizen; so, one is received, as it were, on the condition that one does not belong to the set of juridical obligations and prerogatives that stipulate citizenship or, if at all, only differentially and selectively. It would seem that one passes through a border and that one arrives in another state, but this is where we do not know whether the state at which one arrives is defined by its juridical and military power and its stipulated modes of national belonging under the rubric of the citizen, or by a certain set of dispositions that characterize the mode of non-belonging as such." (Butler/Spivak 2007:6-7)

Modes of non-belonging have become common, readily accepted by society, illustrating the "self-righteousness of citizens and governments" as draconian regime controls limit entry and access of asylum claimants (Harris 2002:2). Differentiating refugees and migrants between

the *worthy* and the *worthless* is the result of social stratification processes, deemed necessary to assuage the fears of the *other* by having the state enforce its right and duty to control migration (Fischer et. al. 2011). As long as powerful state actors are doing the controlling, then it seems perfectly natural to exert control on the *others* in order to maintain a sense of control over society. Up to a certain point, such forms of oppression were expressed by means of institutional policies and procedures. They were not even considered morally wrong, since those being oppressed are perceived as *animal* or *sub-human* by those applying the strictures (Rorty 1999). Such paradigms are convenient for continuing the privileges of members of local and national elites (Chetkow-Yanoov 1999). Since those deemed less worthy often internalize this message of *inferiority* and believe the paradigm of elitism. This process is made easier as leaders create language and legislation meant to limit some and empower others.

Whether conscious of being subjugated to the stratification process of the receiving society or not, all of my interlocutors in effect became classified as war survivors, who were uprooted and dislocated, and newly categorized as refugees in addition to a number of other identities. My data relates accounts of individuals, forced to flee their homeland, removed of their rights, possessions, social status, and reputation, forced into positions of reliance, recipients of social welfare, and dependent on the actions of the destination country.

> "Apart from identity and reflection and construction in exile, the self-conception of people with an experience of flight in the host country is burdened and challenged by another factor. The mere legal, but otherwise quite meaningless term 'refugee' or 'expelled' imposes a kind of uniform identity upon individuals in exile. All other aspects of identity such as cultural, ethnic, gender and - most important - personal identity are implicitly 'denied' by this term. Often, it is precisely this 'fight' against the personality-harming term 'refugee' that is much more difficult than the struggle for a more humane life in exile." (Binder/Tošić 2005:609)

In coming to *know their place*, or realize their positions in the social order, my respondents have been expected to adapt to the formal and informal rules of the host society in which they are offered protection. In so doing, they tend to have internalized the stratification, which inevitably reinforces their subjugation (Massey 2007:5-6). "We still live in a world order in which measures of protection exist only for citizens of a country within that country. Those that fall between countries are treated frequently as without rights, having no legitimate claims on rights, no defenses." (Harris 2005:128) Unconsciously affirming perceived ascriptions of *refugeeness*, one of my informants recalled feeling most like a refugee, most inadequate, during his initial reception phase in Chicago, as he was dependent on government support and funding during the initial eight months of his reception. Only after he managed to

achieve financial independence did his perception of being treated *like a refugee* by the US government subside.

> "In the beginning, the only thing that changed your refugee status was how the government treated you. Once you found a job then you weren't treated like a refugee anymore. I think the most like a refugee you can be is when you are on food stamps and when they pay $390 cash and your rent is $350. So you have like $40 plus for the store, but you can't buy toothpaste or soap with food stamps. All the essentials you have to buy with your $40. And that's not enough, so I guess you look for a job. That was the real refugee status in my opinion, but later on it was pretty good, pretty good." (Interview, Kemal)

This answers the question of whether a refugee, who has lost his/her previous life, must also lose his/her future. In Chicago, where the social processes promote economic self-sufficiency, the able-bodied, willing refugees could proceed to rebuild their future if they had attained jobs by the end of the initial eight months. Financial independence in Chicago made them both *worthy* and able to shed their *refugee* identity.

> "Identities use the resources of history, language, and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not 'who we are' or 'where we come from,' so much, as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves." (Hall 1996:4 in: Miskovic 2007:517)

The Bosnian refugees clearly experienced economic, social, and cultural marginalization relative to their positions as displaced refugees. "The element of social exclusion focuses on having no or only a marginal position in society, and being socially, politically, culturally and spatially isolated." (Weernink et al. 2007:8) This subjugation presents consequences for the subgroups as far as their encountering poorer job opportunities, health, housing, education, and permanent residency rights, among other necessary resources. This is attributed to the prevailing hierarchy, differentiating refugees from other migrant groups and classifying them as either helpless victims or as the *most alien* and different of all foreigners arriving at the borders. Thomas Holfeld argues that an individual is reduced to this status of refugee (*Flüchtling-sein*) until he/she is granted recognition of protection in the destination country, thus the overriding *tyranny of nations* (Noiriel 1994 in: Hohlfeld 2008:1), which is certainly valid for the tolerated refugees in Berlin.

While agreeing with this, I further contend that once an individual is classified a refugee, this becomes immersed into his/her identity construction, as one interlocutor suggests, "once a refugee always a refugee." (Interview, Nafiz) While an individual can influence the outcome, she/he cannot alter the events that have already taken place. Once classified as a refugee, an individual is not only perceived by the world as such, but she/he too views herself/himself as

such. Thus their perception of *otherness* is long-lasting (cf. Lucassen 1997), as is evident by the following excerpt.

> "My situation was a bit different than the other refugees. I was not really refugee from the beginning on. But then somehow you are a refugee. You still are. Once you leave your country, you're always a refugee. You stay a refugee for all your life. Like now, you interview me, I am still a refugee, because we talk about this, because once you are a refugee, you stay always a refugee. That's the point." (Interview, Nafiz)

Despite distinctions in legal and political status that differentiate recognized refugees from tolerated refugees, or migrants from citizens, which are applied to distinguish categories of *deservingness*, the impact for my respondents was nonetheless the same: They are *refugees* when they are in interactions that call them to be so. The more the receiving society considers the *refugeeness* of an individual by treating him/her and making him/her feel like a refugee, the more this label is maintained. One thing was certain in this regard, that "becoming and being a refugee is always embedded in local social and political relations, and made sense of within political and cultural frameworks provided by each context" (Malkki 1997 in: Huttunen 2005:180). Thus *refugeeness* is strongly interconnected and influenced by the institutional realm and socio-cultural reception context, clearly evident by the differences in my participants' accounts of their reception experiences in Berlin and Chicago.

Some refugees are able to shed their stamped identity at a faster rate than others. Some never free themselves from this label, regardless of how adept she/he is in mastering the values, expectations, normative standards (and tyranny) of the receiving society in the destination country, and regardless of whether the person's previous knowledge and skills are recognized and valued or if their legal status is changed to a more permanent one. This is due to the simple fact that social processes create and sustain the processes that create *refugees* (Bauman 2001b). "Depending on specific social contexts and political conjunctures, refugee status may be experienced as a protection or a constraint or something else. Refugee status as a legal status functions socially in complex ways. Its meaning as an experiential category can differ radically from context to context, from person to person." (Malkki 2002:358) As such, the extent to which a refugee is able to shed his/her identity of being displaced, exiled, and categorized as a refugee is largely dependent on the conditions in the receiving society and its nationalist influence. "The modern nation-state not only has a monopoly on legitimate violence, it also has a monopoly on defining membership within the societal community." (Kivisto 2003:21) Thus an outcome of this study shows that in the struggle for power, economic capital influences the speed by which actors were able to move out of positions of *refugeeism*, evident by the Chicago case, where the social processes promoted economic self-sufficiency, the able-bodied, willing refugees proceeded to rebuild their future at a faster pace.

Financial independence made them both worthy and able to shed their ascribed refugee identity. This may be an indication of economic capital outranking cultural capital in the struggle for power.

The justification for institutional domination over refugees is thus linked *symbolic violence*. This is affected by the complexities of politics and economics in determining immigrant statuses, and is reflected as a factor in my respondents' inability to obtain certain resources and capital during their post-migration adaptation and their maintained positions as refugees or merely tolerated refugees. The consequence of such stratification processes results in states and societies differentiating people according to their perceived *worthiness* to society, which seems bound in neo-liberal socioeconomics. The more expansive globalization becomes, the more forms of exclusion abound (cf. Habermas n.d.). According to the rules of capitalism and meritocracy, economic pressures and competitive markets effectively influence Western governments' immigration and asylum policies, categorizing degrees of *worthiness,* i.e. whoever fails to *win* or be innovative is categorized as *unproductive, useless*, and as a *burden* on society, and are consequently restrained in positions of disempowerment.

6.3 Concluding Remarks – Paradox of Modern Nation-States

This study took on a wide focus in its aim to analyze the factors that facilitated and impeded the Bosnian refugees as they attempted to manage their adaptation processes in the two contexts of Berlin and Chicago. It included a review to what extent my respondents were encouraged to actively participate in the resources, interactions and activities of the receiving society in a move towards equality, and an analysis of their perceptions and feelings in regard to this. It concluded with a grounded theory, confirming the complexity of integration processes, occurring across multiple domains.

By considering the maneuverability of actors in relation to institutional and social reception structures, while also bearing in mind the individual and collective dimensions influencing the actions, interactions, and assessments of my sample of Bosnian refugees, this study contributes to current integration and asylum debates and incorporation practices. While neither case presents the perfect solution to refugee incorporation and long-term durable solutions - alluding to the challenge of governments to resolve contemporary migration issues, ensure fundamental human rights protection, and foster a sense of belonging at the same time - lessons can nevertheless be drawn from the different experiences of the sample in the two contexts.

The key question raised reflects Hannah Arendt's (1978, 1986) questioning of having the right to have rights. This highlights the paradoxical position of the nation-state in seeking to

ensure the protection of fundamental human rights, abiding by multiple conventions and treaties, while at the same time seeking to ensure the security and protection of its citizens and compete in a globalized world. The pattern which emerges is that rich countries implement exclusionary legislation and limit *zones of asylum*. Malkki (2002) supports this, arguing that while around eight percent of those living in Europe are immigrants, the European Union is "most concerned with the mapping of principles of membership and exclusion," while the politics of xenophobia are hotly debated (p. 352).

This study confirms that receiving societies have a set of expectations, requirements, and hopes for newcomers, and that governments - despite a misuse of power (symbolic violence) - impose expectations on refugees and migrants through formal obligations and restrictive policies. These government-imposed policies are embedded in each nation's historic memory and own self-concept. Thus Germany's and the United States' responses to the Bosnian refugees in search of protection in the 1990s is not surprising considering the trajectory of asylum policies and migration trends deeply entrenched in earlier developments and the two nations' responses to foreigners in general and refugees in particular, laying bare their racist pasts and constructions of nation and identity.

When it comes to resolving the contentious situation of responding to refugees, it seems the only viable option would be to foster a welcoming atmosphere and to release impossible aims of controlling migration movements. Because of the complexity of integration processes with multiple players and domains, as well as the impossibility for governments to control global events or migration movements,[221] we must consider whether we are expecting too much from our governments.

We have come to expect governments to do increasingly more for us, to provide security for everyone – to cure the ills of the human condition. But is this feat not impossible and also dangerous to expect the government to try and carry out in our current globalized world, especially if it insists on pursuing national interests alone, despite our interwoven globalized realities? We may be placing too much responsibility on governments dependent on economic

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[221] For instance, despite the firm belief - at least initially - in the German government's ability to control the recruitment and residence of guest workers by establishing agencies in sending countries to facilitate recruitment and mediate between future employers and employees, and to alter their numbers as needed, according to domestic economic demand (Joppke 1999:65-66 in: BIVS 2002) by drafting temporary labour recruitment contracts derived from short-term labor demands and determined by industry - in the "corporatist context of the Federal Labor Ministry (the BfA) with representatives of employer's organizations, trade unions, and government" (Geddes 2003:81) – so key stakeholders - the impossibility of controlling migration became evident when the guest workers and their families refused to return to the sending countries. This is true of numerous other migrant populations across different countries. Hence, it is important to recognize the agency of the individual refugee or migrant in such discussions on migration management and control and acknowledge that governments can only attempt to manage migration movements, but are far from being able to *control* them.

growth and market competition, since the market appears to rule everything, to balance the need for security while at the same time respond to and protect against human rights violations. The consequence of acting on such expectations is evident in the typical Western governments' inconsistent responses toward refugees fleeing persecution. In picking and choosing who is *worthy* of protection according to indicators of potential integration or ability to *contribute* to society, the promises made following World War II to ensure protection for all in need, are effectively de-legitimized.

Already, we have witnessed failed attempts by governments to control migration, so the emphasis now is to manage migration (Harris 2002). Yet, governments continue to be limited in this pursuit. So the question remains, are we expecting too much from our governments?[222] Is it possible for our governments to ensure the protection of asylum, while at the same time, *compete* economically? Can governments resolve the widening division in income distribution in the world, the rise in poverty and the troubling conditions elsewhere, which motivate people to flee or to migrate, while at the same time ensuring the protection of fundamental human rights? Can governments truly foster bilateral understandings of integration and provide durable solutions for internally displaced people, when denying them the right to full participation in the social realm? Is not a truly global perspective necessary to also address the reasons for flight in the first place?

> "Our laws are supposed to protect us from being beaten up on the street. In even the poorest neighborhoods a police force is there to prevent attacks on innocent people. What is the difference between being beaten up and being deprived of good food, good teachers, and a clean bed to sleep in? Both destroy the body and kill the spirit. So the most powerful interference in people's lives can be not what government does, but what if fails to do." (Morre Pappé 1999:142-143)

In failing to be consistent in safeguarding all applicants seeking protection, Western governments are effectively discriminating against whole groups of populations. While the reasons behind this are clear (i.e. to reduce costs, to limit migration flows, to maintain a semblance of control, to avoid anticipated identity conflicts), the reality is that the rights of many population groups are consequently being denied.

This becomes particularly evident when, despite government claims of valuing and respecting basic human rights, North American and European countries behave in exactly the opposite way. They pursue a restrictive course of action, intending to keep refugees out rather

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[222] I am not suggesting, like neoliberalists, that the state should concentrate on making policy decisions and leave the delivery of services to an entrepreneurial system based on competition and markets (Bevir 2006). Rather, based on the results from this study, many positive aspects emerge from the involvement of NGOs, church organizations, and the civil service sector as a whole in replacing or carrying out state provisions of public services to the refugees.

than granting refugee status with an option of eventual citizenship. "Public opinion in Western countries has hardened against refugees and asylum seekers (Ingleby/Watters 2005). Quotas are being reevaluated, with more restrictive, draconian selection and repatriation policies." (de Ruuk 2003 in: Mosselson 2006:xxii) The complexity of this initiative becomes more pronounced in acknowledging the failure of governments to achieve this goal, evident by admitting those who are wanted and excluding those who are not (Harris 2002). Furthermore, by tightening controls, governments make legal migration close to impossible.

These tensions and challenges related to ensuring the fundamental rights of migrants and refugees will continue as long as national self-interests, coupled with financial decline, and xenophobic and racist attitudes dominate immigration reception and integration policies. "Both institutional control of entrance and resident permits, and classificatory power at work in every day encounters, produces divisions [between] 'us' and 'them,' which regulate life in public space." (Metcalf 1996 in: Huttunen 2005:179) These post-colonial patterns of *othering* are possible due to ongoing traditions of socialization and categorization, pitting one group against the other. Unfortunately, this will likely continue into the future, especially due to the lack of consideration of wider interrelated events and the potential risks of populism infiltrating mainstream parties in Germany, the US, and elsewhere in the world, as right-wing movements and populist sentiments spread with financial recession and result in restrictive rhetoric, and anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes and policies.

This situation ought to be particularly worrying for governments, such as Germany and the US, considering the falling population rates and the continuing scramble to fill labor market needs. Rather than restrict entry and access to the territory, it would make sense for the nation-states to begin conceptualizing reception systems that welcome migrants and refugees and avoid *policies of deterrence*. In order to compete economically with Asia, particularly Japan and China, Europe and North America are going to need immigration and integration policies that encourage newcomers to want to remain and invest in their future well-being in these countries.

Until now, the American dream has been a powerful pull factor as the US competes to attract migrants to fill its labor market gaps. Based on a medium-term projection for the US population, the US needs an increase of 80 million immigrants and a total increase of 124 million in order to reach its goal of having a population size of 387 million by 2050 (Harris 2002:99). As the number of people aged 65 and older increases, the number of US workers decreases, government financial support decreases, and political squabbles emerge about raising the debt ceiling and spreading the costs of the tax burden equally, meaning everyone

pays regardless of wealth accrued; migrants may begin asking themselves whether it's worth it to work so hard to achieve so little due to the unequal distribution of wealth in the US. This is especially important considering recent questioning whether the American dream can still be achieved or whether this has become an idealized fantasy, embedded in past migration and resettlement schemes and no longer a possibility? This, in addition to nativist sentiment, has made the US less inviting in reality.

The same is true of Germany. As warnings of demographic changes (i.e. lower birth rates and an increasingly older population) are becoming more pronounced, changes in policies and attitude are essential. As far as the growth and composition of Germany's population and future labor force are concerned, the role of *particular* immigrants has been gaining increased attention in past years (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration 2010). Evidence of this abounds in the variety of policy reforms that have been implemented to simplify the process for filling specific skill shortages and for devising a system to regulate the immigration and integration of migrant newcomers to Germany (cf. Pfohman 2011a). Currently, family reunification has the highest impact on immigration arrivals, which is not likely to lessen in the future (Rheinland Pfalz Ministerium des Innern und für Sport 2010). With the upcoming regulation of the freedom of movement within the EU, it is anticipated that migrants will be even more mobile in the future, not living in just one country, but moving around the EU as a result of their right to move freely. Complications related to pensions, unemployment benefits, and accessing the labor market (particularly for Romanians and Bulgarians), however, have not yet been resolved.[223]

In the meantime, the focus on monitoring and restricting future migration movements to Germany tends to target primarily third country nationals (TCNs) and certain *less favored* EU citizens such as Roma.[224] Hence, despite any progressive steps through the acknowledgement that Germany is indeed a country of immigration, many policies are still problematic as far as failing to ensure equal treatment or full participation options for migrants and refugees within the German territory. Increased attention, for instance, has been directed toward Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist links, and since the Arab Spring there is clearly a growing fear of new waves of refugees arriving to Europe. Condemnation of the treatment of Muslim

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[223] Statistics show that currently only 2.3 percent of EU citizens are taking advantage of this freedom of movement policy (Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs 2010). Third country nationals with secure resident statuses in one of the EU member states may end up relying more on this policy in the future than actual EU citizens (Rheinland Pfalz Ministerium des Innern und für Sport 2010:15). Roma EU citizens tend to face the greatest challenges in benefitting from free mobility rights within the EU.
[224] In the areas of asylum and family reunification there is little scope to monitor and steer migration to Germany on the basis of actual legal grounds (Rheinland Pfalz Ministerium des Innern und für Sport 2010:16).

women has also gained increased attention. Restrictive policies, with age limits, have been applied for family reunification measures to prevent forced marriages.

If both Germany and the US intend to remain economically competitive, practices to promote a welcoming context for immigrants will need to be promoted and low educated migrants must believe that living conditions in Germany and the US are better than in their home country. This is in fact true of every nation competing to remain economically viable, while at the same time, strategizing who is granted entry rights and who is prevented entrance rights.

Learning from this example, then, Western countries ought to embrace and promote the notion of a heterogeneous, inclusive society, which acknowledges and values diverse cultures, ethnicities, races, religions, genders, and other distinguishing characteristics of difference. Rather than erecting borders and instilling greater controls to prevent migrants and refugees from entering, Western countries ought to focus instead on developing strategies that foster the political, social, cultural, and economic incorporation of their potential future neighbors and labor force.

In so doing, the future focus should not just be on the economic values of migration and on the benefits of skilled workers. Rather, it should include the unskilled and low-skilled labor force and incorporate asylum seekers and refugees, who might just have the skills needed. But more importantly than the skill set of the newcomers, a focus must be placed on the many societal contributions of migrants and refugees beyond just economic benefits. The richness of diversity and advantages gleaned from intercultural exchange should be promoted and the positive benefits of migration emphasized. Regardless of potential demographic changes, viable solutions to future migration movements, entry conditions and citizenship rights must be considered to ensure the protection of human rights of everyone, including those deemed *less worthy*. Modifications in citizenship processes, allowing for transnational mobility, ought to be promoted as well since - evident by the Chicago sample - when granted citizenship rights, new opportunities emerge for people to "legitimately maintain loyalties and connections to both homeland and settlement nations" (Kivisto 2003:22).

No doubt, challenges will continue to loom until countries determine viable solutions to respond to the shrinking number of workers and the rising costs associated with aging populations. But "if there is any proven rule regarding population projections, it is that the pattern of the present cannot be projected indefinitely into the future, for they will change in unforeseeable ways" (Alba/Nee 2003:129).

Epilogue

"We witness the spiritual strivings of a downtrodden yet dignified people whose will to persist and prevail is so nobly evident. In the midst of such sadness and sorrow, these fellow human beings - refugees coping with so much misery - refuse to allow misery to have the last word. Such gestures of hope grounded in everyday struggle keep alive the most precious gems of life – love and faith. Let us pledge to remain in solidarity with such hope for refugees and displaced people around the world." (West 1997:xvi in: Mertus et al. 1997)

Related to these words of Cornel West (1998) I encourage that governments and receiving societies remain in solidarity with refugees and displaced people by providing them not only protection but also viable options to participate equally in society and on a permanent basis. Only then will they be able to resume hope for their futures.

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Personal Interviews with Experts in the Field

Berlin

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- 9 Aug. 2007, Martin Stark S.J., Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS)
- 12 Aug. 2007, Pari Padari, Antidiskriminierungsbüro im Haus der Demokratie
- 28 Aug. 2007, Elizabeth and Katarina, Heilig-Kreuz Gemeinde Asylberatung
- 29 Aug. 2007, Georg Classen, Flüchtlingsrat Berlin
- 6 Sept. 2007, Freihart Regner, XENION Psychotherapeutische Beratungsstelle für politisch Verfolgte
- 8 Sept. 2007, Frau Witterwall, Publicata e.V.
- 26 Nov. 2008, Rachel Fink and Siri Küminowski, Südost Europa Kultur e.V. (SOEK)
- 28 Nov. 2008, Pavao Hudik and Paul Watzlawick, Südost Europa Kultur e.V. (SOEK)
- 18 Jan. 2009, Christoph Rolle, Südost Europa Kultur e.V. (SOEK)

Chicago

- 14 April 2007, Merita Mila, Edgewater Community Council, Balkan Outreach Program
- 14 April 2007, Tom Hartman, Interfaith Refugee and Immigration Ministries
- 18 April 2007, Dori Dinsmore, Director, Midwest Regional Office, Amnesty International USA (previously Executive Director of World Relief Chicago)
- 21 April 2007, Thad Rydberg, Heartland Alliance
- 21 April 2007, Tom Robb, Executive Director of Care For Real
- 28 April 2007, Stevan M. Weine MD, University of Illinois, psychiatrist
- 29 April 2007, Gordona Kaludjerovic, World Relief DuPage
- 30 April 2007, Dr. Edwin Silverman, Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), State Refugee Coordinator, Illinois Department of Human Services
- 2 May 2007, Dr. Mary Elsbernd, Loyola University Chicago Professor: social ethics, pastoral studies
- 4 May 2007, Meagan Kennedy, psychiatrist and executive director of Sisters Empowering Survivors Through Resources and Action, a volunteer organization that counsels Bosnian refugees who resettled in the Chicago area
- 5 May 2007, Dr. Rita George, closely involved in Chicago Bosnian community through marriage
- 24 June 2007, Paul Tegenfeldt, NAVOS Mental Health Solutions

Appendices

Appendix A: Statement of Voluntary Consent

I, _____, hereby authorize Shannon Pfohman, PhD student of the Free University and Alice Salomon University of Applied Sciences in Berlin, Germany, to gather information from me with respect to her exploration on the factors that influence adaptation and incorporation processes in the host societies of Chicago and Berlin.

I have freely and voluntarily consented to participate in this study, with no coercion used to elicit my cooperation. I understand that both the information I provide and my identity will be kept confidential to the full extent of the law, through procedures explained to me by my researcher.

I understand that my participation will consist of a personal demographic survey and a 40-90 minute audio-taped interview, which will be analyzed and evaluated for the purposes of the researcher's PhD Thesis. Follow-up questions may follow in the form of a short questionnaire, telephone conversation, or follow-up interview.

I am aware that I can stop temporarily or discontinue participation in this study at any time. I realize that some personal issues may be addressed and that I might find this experience somewhat uncomfortable. I am advised that the researcher will be available to provide assistance should I find this necessary. In the unlikely event that I do experience some stress or anxiety, or have any questions, either during or after my participation Shannon Pfohman will be available for consultation at 030/69506130. I understand that the exploration of this kind may also be informative, enlightening and an instructive process. My increased awareness could contribute to my overall sense of well-being. Further benefits may accrue to society as well.

_____   _____

Signature of Participant   Date

_____   _____

Signature of Researcher   Date

Appendix B: Interview Guide with Bosnian Refugees (Chicago)

I.   Migration path /reception context:

1. Could you please tell me why and how you came to Chicago?
reasons
social networks
resettlement program, sponsors
important people

II.   Developments following arrival and initial reception?

2. How did things progress for you after your arrival to Chicago?
living situation
work situation
education and training opportunities
mobility
financial and social conditions
health, medicine, and insurance

III.   Intermediate assessment/events

3. What events were the most important in your life or since your arrival in Chicago?
attitude, sense of belonging, feelings, overall assessment of life in Chicago
developments of the situation (improvements or increasing difficulties)
exclusion/inclusion
experiences with discrimination
coping strategies

IV.   Future perspectives

4. What are your expectations or hopes for the future?

V.   Final Questions

5. What advice would you give to experts in the field of reception and asylum?
Did anything occur to you during this interview that you had not thought of before?
Is there anything you would like to ask me?

VI.   Individual history and background information

6.   Could you please fill out the confidential questionnaire?

Appendix C: Interviewleitfaden mit bosnischen Flüchtlingen (Berlin)

I.   Migrationsweg /Aufnahmekontext:

1. Könnten Sie mir bitte erzählen, wie Sie nach Deutschland gekommen sind?
Gründe
soziale Netzwerke
wichtige Menschen

II.   Entwicklung nach der Ankunft/Erstaufnahme?

2. Wie ging es nach Ihrer Ankunft weiter?
Wohnsituation
Arbeit
- (Aus-)Bildung
Mobilität
Finanzielle und soziale Rahmenbedingungen
Gesundheit, Medizin, Versicherung

III.   Zwischenbilanz/Ereignisse

3. Was waren für Sie die wichtigen Ereignisse seit Ihrer Ankunft in Deutschland?
Lebensgefühl, Einstellungen, Perspektiven/Bilanz des bisherigen Lebens in Berlin
Entwicklungen der Situation (Verbesserungen/Verschlechterungen)
Ausgrenzung/Inklusion
Diskriminierungserfahrungen – Verglich mit anderen Migrant/innen (auch mit ihnen aus Bosnien) und mit Deutschen
Überwindungsstrategien

IV.   Zukunftsperspektiven

4. Welche Erwartungen und Hoffnungen haben Sie im Bezug auf ihre Zukunft?
Bleiberechtsregelung

V.   Schlussfragen

5. Rat weitergeben
Ist Ihnen während dieses Gespräches etwas aufgefallen, woran Sie vorher nicht gedacht haben?
Gibt es noch irgendetwas, das Sie gerne fragen möchten?

VI.   Persönliche Geschichte und Hintergrunddaten

6. Könnten Sie bitte den Fragebogen ausfüllen

Appendix D: Standardized Questionnaire in Chicago

Interview partner:
Date:

No.	Question	Answer	Code
1.	Birth date		
2.	Gender	☐ female ☐ male	
3.	Marital status	☐ married ☐ single ☐ divorced ☐ widowed ☐ other: _____.	
4.	What is the country of origin of your partner (husband/wife)?		
5.	Do you have children?	☐ yes ☐ no	
6.	Number of children		
7.	Birth date and gender of children	_____ ☐ female ☐ male _____ ☐ female ☐ male _____ ☐ female ☐ male _____ ☐ female ☐ male _____ ☐ female ☐ male	
8.	Place of residence of the children | with me	in a different US city, namely in…	in the country of origin	elsewhere, namely in…
---	---	---	---
9.	Religious identity/association	☐ none ☐ Muslim ☐ Roman Catholic ☐ Orthodox ☐ Protestant ☐ Hindu ☐ Jewish	

		☐ Buddhist ☐ other: _____.	
10.	Ethnic identity	☐ Serbian ☐ Croat ☐ Bosnian ☐ Roma Sinti ☐ other: _____.	
11.	Citizenship/nationality	☐ American (*continue with question 13)* ☐ other citizenship, namely _____. ☐ stateless	
12.	What residency status or right to stay do you have?	☐ none ☐ asylum/refugee status ☐ temporary residency visa ☐ family visa ☐ work visa ☐ permanent residency visa ☐ green card due to asylum/refugee ☐ marriage to a US Citizen ☐ US Citizenship ☐ other, namely _____.	
13.	When did you leave your hometown / country of origin?	month _____ year_____	
14.	Do you arrive by legal means in the US?	☐ yes ☐ no	
15.	Did you apply for asylum?	☐ yes ☐ no	
16.	How would you describe your experiences with the authorities and officials in the US?	☐ very good ☐ good ☐ adequate ☐ bad ☐ very bad	
17.	What school or job training degrees/certificates did you complete in the former Yugoslavia?		
18.	What school or job training degrees/certificates did you complete in the USA?		
19.	Are you working in the field of work in the US for which you were trained?	☐ yes ☐ no	

20.	What is the field of work that you are you currently doing? What's your position title?		
21.	Are you …	☐ a civil servant ☐ an independent freelancer ☐ a permanent employee/staff member ☐ a temporary employee/staff member ☐ employed part-time ☐ employed part-time in several different jobs ☐ unemployed ☐ disabled and incapable of working ☐ retired ☐ other: _____.	
22.	Is your income in the USA higher then it was in your home country?	☐ yes ☐ no ☐ no difference	
23.	Has your financial situation changed since you have been living in Chicago?	☐ yes ☐ no ☐ no difference	
24.	In which part of the city are you currently living?	_____.	
25.	How would you describe your living situation?	☐ in a state-run accommodation facility ☐ with friends/family members ☐ in a rented apartment ☐ in a rented house ☐ in an apartment that I own ☐ in a house that I own ☐ other:_____.	
26.	How do you like your living accommodation?	☐ very good ☐ good ☐ adequate ☐ bad ☐ very bad	

Appendix E: Standardisierte Fragebogen in Berlin

Spitzname des Interviewten:
Heimatort:

Nr.	Frage	Antwort	Code
1.	Geburtsdatum		
2.	Geschlecht	☐ weiblich ☐ männlich	
3.	Familienstand	☐ verheiratet ☐ ledig ☐ geschieden ☐ verwitwet ☐ Sonstiges:_____.	
4.	Welche Herkunft hat ihr/e Ehepartner/in?	_____.	
5.	Haben Sie Kinder?	☐ ja ☐ nein	
6.	Anzahl Ihrer Kinder	_____.	
7.	Geburtsjahr und Geschlecht der Kinder	_____ ☐ weiblich ☐ männlich _____ ☐ weiblich ☐ männlich _____ ☐ weiblich ☐ männlich	
8.	Aufenthaltsort der Kinder <table><tr><td>Bei mir</td><td>in einer anderen Stadt Deutschlands, und zwar in</td><td>im Heimatland</td><td>Woanders, und zwar in</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>		
9.	Religionszugehörigkeit	☐ keine ☐ muslimisch ☐ römisch katholisch ☐ orthodox ☐ protestantisch ☐ hinduistisch ☐ jüdisch ☐ buddhistisch ☐ Sonstige:_____.	

10.	Ethnische Zugehörigkeit	☐ serbisch ☐ kroatisch ☐ bosniak ☐ Roma Sinti ☐ sonstige: _____.	
11.	Staatsangehörigkeit(en)	☐ deutsch (*weiter mit Frage 13*) ☐ andere Staatsangehörigkeit, und zwar_____. ☐ staatenlos	
12.	Welchen Aufenthaltstatus haben Sie?	☐ keinen ☐ Duldung ☐ Aufenthaltsgestattung ☐ Visum ☐ Aufenthaltserlaubnis ☐ Niederlassungserlaubnis	
13.	Wann haben Sie Ihre Heimat verlassen?	Monat _____ Jahr_____	
14.	Sind Sie legal angekommen?	☐ Ja ☐ Nein	
15.	Haben Sie einen Asylantrag gestellt?	☐ Ja ☐ Nein	
16.	Welche Erfahrungen haben Sie mit Behörden und Beamten gemacht?	☐ sehr gut ☐ gut ☐ adäquat ☐ schlecht ☐ sehr schlecht	
17.	Welchen Schul-, Berufs-, und (Aus-)Bildungsabschlüsse haben Sie im ehemaligen Jugoslawien erworbenen?		
18.	Welchen Schul-, Berufs-, und (Aus-)Bildungsabschlüsse haben Sie in Deutschland erworbenen?		
19.	Arbeiten Sie in Deutschland in Ihrem erlernten Beruf?	☐ Ja ☐ Nein	
20.	Welchen Beruf üben Sie aktuell derzeit aus?		
21.	Sind sie…	☐ Arbeitnehmer/in ☐ Beamter/Beamtin ☐ Angestellte/r ☐ Geringfügig Beschäftigte/r ☐ Selbständige/r ☐ ALG 1-Empfänger/in ☐ ALG 2-Empfänger/in	

		☐ Rentner/in ☐ Sonstige:_____.	
22.	Ist Ihr Einkommen in Deutschland höher als es in Ihrer Heimat war?	☐ Ja ☐ Nein ☐ kein Unterschied	
23.	Hat sich Ihre finanzielle Situation, seit Sie in Berlin leben, verändert?	☐ Ja ☐ Nein ☐ kein Unterschied	
24.	In welchem Ortsteil/Bezirk wohnen Sie?	_____.	
25.	Wie wohnen Sie?	☐ in einer Sammelunterkunft ☐ bei Freunden/Familienmitgliedern ☐ in einer Mietwohnung ☐ in einem Mietshaus ☐ in einer Eigentumswohnung ☐ in einem eigenen Haus ☐ Sonstiges:_____.	
26.	Wie gefällt Ihnen Ihre Unterkunft	☐ sehr gut ☐ gut ☐ adäquat ☐ schlecht ☐ sehr schlecht	

Appendix F: Upitnik

Ime ispitanika:
Datum:

No.	Pitanje	Odgovor	Code
1.	Datum Rodjenja		
2.	Pol	☐ zenski ☐ muski	
3.	Bracno Stanje	☐ ozenjen/udata ☐ neozenjen/neudata ☐ razveden ☐ udovac/udovica ☐ drugo: _____.	
4.	Koje je mjesto rodjenja vaseg muza/zene?		
5.	Dali imate djece?	☐ da ☐ ne	
6.	Broj djece		
7.	Datum rodjenja, I pol djece	_____ ☐ zensko ☐ musko _____ ☐ zensko ☐ musko _____ ☐ zensko ☐ musko _____ ☐ zensko ☐ musko _____ ☐ zensko ☐ musko	
8.	Mjesto stanovanja vase djece | Sa mnom	U drugom gradu u US…	U zemlji gdje je rodjen	Drugo negdje…
9.	Koja je vasa religija:	☐ nijedna ☐ Musliman ☐ Roman Catholic ☐ Orthodox ☐ Protestant ☐ Hindu ☐ Jewish	

		☐ Buddhist ☐ drugo: _____.	
10.	Etnicka grupa	☐ Serbian ☐ Croat ☐ Bosnian ☐ Roma Sinti ☐ other: _____.	
11.	Drzavljanstvo	☐ American (*nastavite na 13-tom pitanju)* ☐ Drzavljanin druge zemlje: _____. ☐ bez statusa	
12.	Kakav status stanovanja ili pravo da ostanete imate?	☐ nikakvo ☐ azil/izbjeglicki status ☐ privremenu visu ☐ porodicnu visu ☐ radnu visu ☐ stalnu visu/ zeleni karton ☐ zeleni karton na baziazila/izbjeglistva ☐ brak sa drzavljanom USA ☐ US drzavljanstvo ☐ drugo, objasnite: _____.	
13.	Kada ste napustili vasu zemlju?	Mjesec_____ godina_____	
14.	Dali ste legalno dosli u Ameriku?	☐ Da ☐ Ne	
15.	Da li ste trazili azil?	☐ da ☐ ne	
16.	Kako biste opisali vase iskustvo sa vlastima u US?	☐ vrlo dobro ☐ dobro ☐ prikladan ☐ los ☐ vrlo lose	
17.	Koju ste skolu/diplomu imali u bivsoj Jugoslaviji?		
18.	Koju ste skolu/ diplomu postigli u Americi		
19.	Da li radite u toj struci koju ste zavrsili	☐ da ☐ ne	

20.	U kojoj struci radite? Koju poziciju imate?		
21.	Da li ste….	☐ privatni pomocnik ☐ nezavisni kontraktor ☐ stalan radnik ☐ privremen radnik ☐ radite skraceno radno vrijeme ☐ radite skraceno u razlicitim radnim mjestima ☐ nezaposlen ☐ invalid, nesposoban za posao ☐ penzioner ☐ drugo: _____ .	
22.	Da li su vam prihodi veci nego sto ste imali u vasoj zemlji?	☐ da ☐ ne ☐ nema razlike	
23.	Da li vam se financijska situacija promijenila otkad zivite u Chikago?	☐ da ☐ ne ☐ nema razlike	
24.	U kojem dijelu grada trenutno zivite?	_____ .	
25.	Kako biste opisali vasu zivotnu sredinu?	☐ sa prijateljnima/clanovima porodice ☐ u zakupljenom stanu ☐ u zakupljneoj kuci ☐ u vlastitom stanu ☐ u vlastitoj kuci ☐ drugo :_____ .	
26.	Kako vam se svidja mjesto gdje zivite?	☐ veoma dobro ☐ dobro ☐ adekvatno ☐ lose ☐ veoma lose	

Appendix G: Interview Questions for Experts in the Field

I.   Could you please describe the general situation of the Bosnian refugees who fled the civil war and have remained in Berlin?

II.   What can you tell me about their status under the asylum law?

III.   Could you please describe the laws on their return with a focus on the legal grounds which form an obstacle to return and the legal responses, if any, by the state in such situations?

IV.   Could you please describe the legal entitlements available to Bosnian tolerated asylum seekers in Berlin in their ability to access public goods and services in terms of employment, healthcare, housing, financial support and food support in kind depending on their status.

Appendix H: Socio-demographic Characteristics

Table 1: Sample demographics

Respondent	City	Gender	Age	Age Category	Religion	Ethnicity	Origins	Marital Status
Nina	Chicago	Female	50	Age 4 (45-54)	None	Bosnian	Gorazde	Married, 2 kids
Arif	Chicago	Male	43	Age 3 (35-44)	Muslim	Bosnian	Sarajevo	Married, 1 kid
Mali	Chicago	Male	36	Age 3 (35-44)	None/Atheist	Bosnian	Velika Kladusa	Single
Rada	Chicago	Female	56	Age 5 (55 +)	Orthodox	Serbian	Dzepi	Widowed, 2 kids
Anita	Chicago	Female	29	Age 2 (25-34)	None	Bosnian	Prijedor	Married, pregnant
Nena	Chicago	Female	48	Age 4 (45-54)	R. Catholic	Croatian	Zavidovoci	Married, 2 kids
Edna	Chicago	Female	43	Age 3 (35-44)	Mixed	Bosnian	Prijedor	Married, 2 kids
Beba	Chicago	Female	74	Age 5 (55 +)	Muslim	Bosnian	Sarajevo	Widowed, 1 kid
Suzana	Chicago	Female	44	Age 3 (35-44)	Muslim	Bosnian	Sarajevo	Married, 1 kid
Dino	Chicago	Male	29	Age 2 (25-34)	Muslim	Bosnian	Stolac	Single
Meho	Chicago	Male	75	Age 5 (55 +)	Muslim	Bosnian	Sarajevo	Separated, 1 kid
Melisa	Chicago	Female	28	Age 2 (25-34)	Muslim	Bosnian	Kozarac	Single
Zina	Chicago	Female	40	Age 3 (35-44)	Muslim	Bosnian	Sarajevo	Single
Valten	Chicago	Male	26	Age 2 (25-34)	R. Catholic	Croatian	Sarajevo	Single
Kata	Chicago	Female	76	Age 5 (55 +)	Muslim	Bosnian	Bosanski Brod	Widowed
Zorak	Chicago	Male	48	Age 4 (45-54)	None/Atheist	Bosnian	Sarajevo	Remarried, 1 kid
Sara	Chicago	Female	33	Age 2 (25-34)	Muslim	Bosnian	Bratunac	Married, 2 kids
Ema	Chicago	Female	34	Age 2 (25-34)	Muslim	Bosnian	Mostar	Married, 1 kid
Behar	Chicago	Female	40	Age 3 (35-44)	Muslim	Bosnian	Capljina	Married, 2 kids
Kemal	Chicago	Male	38	Age 3 (35-44)	Muslim	Bosnian	Livno	Divorced, 2 kids
Adin	Berlin	Male	21	Age 1 (18-24)	Muslim	Bosnian	Ljesnicce	Single
Mere	Berlin	Male	28	Age 2 (25-34)	Muslim	Bosnian	Srebrenica	Single
Selma	Berlin	Female	27	Age 2 (25-34)	Muslim	Bosnian	Bratunac	Single
Irena	Berlin	Female	39	Age 3 (35-44)	Muslim	Bosnian	Vlasenica	Widowed, 1 kid
Slavco	Berlin	Male	55	Age 5 (55 +)	None/Atheist	Bosnian	Banja Luka	Remarried, 3 kids
Sena	Berlin	Female	43	Age 3 (35-44)	Muslim	Bosnian	Ljesnicce	Divorced, 3 kids
Dubravka	Berlin	Female	49	Age 4 (45-54)	R. Catholic	Croat	Banja Luka	Widowed, 2 kids
Zumra	Berlin	Female	47	Age 4 (45-54)	Orthodox	Serbian	Dzepi	Married, 3 kids
Mirna	Berlin	Female	49	Age 4 (45-54)	R. Catholic	Croat	Banja Luka	Separated, 1 kid
Slobadan	Berlin	Male	55	Age 5 (55 +)	Orthodox	Roma	Serbia	Married, 4 kids
Nafiz	Berlin	Male	43	Age 3 (35-44)	Mix of all	Bosnian	Sarajevo	Married, 1 kid
Bekr	Berlin	Male	42	Age 3 (35-44)	Muslim	Bosnian	Banja Luka	Separated, 1 kid

Appendix I: Travel Paths

Table 2: Routes of entry

Respondent	Depart Hometown	Migration Path	With whom?	DE first?	Arrival	Entry Gate
Nina	April 1992	DE 4 years	family	Yes	April 1996	Family Reunification
Arif	Sept. 1993	Zagreb 6 months	alone	No	March 1994	Refugee Resettlement
Mali	Aug. 1994	AU 2 years	alone	Austria	July 1996	Family Reunification
Rada	1993	Serbian camp 10 years	alone to family	No	2003	Family Reunification
Anita	Sept. 1993	DE 6 years	family	Yes	Aug. 1999	Refugee Resettlement
Nena	May 1995	Croatia w/ friends	family	No	-	Refugee Resettlement
Edna	Sept. 1992	DE 5 years	family	Yes	1998	Family Reunification
Beba	Nov. 1995	Zagreb camp 3 months	family	No	Feb. 2002	Family Reunification
Suzana	Nov. 1998	Croatia 2 years	family	No	Feb. 2002	Refugee Resettlement
Dino	April 1992	Croatia 2 years	family	No	Sept. 1994	Refugee Resettlement
Meho	Jan. 1992	*Special visa to enter US	alone	No	-	Political Asylum*
Melisa	April 1992	DE 5 years	family	Yes	Jan.1997	Refugee Resettlement
Zina	May 1993	DE 5 years, Croatia 3 months	alone	Yes	Sept. 1998	Refugee Resettlement
Valten	April 1992	Serbia 3 wks, Czech 2 months	w/ sister	No	June 1992	Family Reunification
Kata	March 1992	Croatian camp 4 years	family	No	1996	Family Reunification
Zorak	Sept. 1993	Croatia 2 years	alone to family	No, lived DE before war	May 1995	Family Reunification
Sara	July 1998	Went Croatia to apply	family	No	July 1999	Refugee Resettlement
Ema	May 1993	Croatia w/ aunt, Turkey camp	family	No	Sept.1994	Refugee Resettlement
Behar	April 1992	DE 6-7 years	family	Yes	Jan. 1999	Refugee Resettlement
Kemal	April 1996	Was in Croatia with parents prior to war.	family	No	April 1996	Family Reunification
Adin	March 1992	stayed w/ aunt in Italy first	family	N/A	July 1992	Humanitarian Protection
Mere	April 1992	Traveled with neighbors	w/ brother	N/A	April 1996	Humanitarian Protection
Selma	Feb.1995	Via Croatia, she came DE	w/ her mom	N/A	Feb. 1995	Humanitarian Protection
Irena	May 15, 1992	Zagreb, then Slovenian Camp	w/ son	N/A	May 1993	Humanitarian Protection
Slavco	Dec. 1993	Hid in niece's car trunk	alone to family	N/A	Jan. 1994	Humanitarian Protection
Sena	May 25,1992	Boat to Italy, Train Germany	family	N/A	July 1992	Humanitarian Protection
Dubravka	April 16, 1992	Family in Split & Zagreb	family	N/A	June 1996	Humanitarian Protection
Zumra	March 1993	Arrived illegally	family	N/A	March 1993	Humanitarian Protection
Mirna	July 1993	Applied for visa with family	family	N/A	-	Humanitarian Protection
Slobodan	Nov. 1991	Entered illegally through Serbia	family	N/A	-	Humanitarian Protection
Nafiz	April 1992	Tourist, Duldung	friends	N/A	April 1992	Humanitarian Protection
Bekr	April 1992	Duldung	brother	N/A	-	Humanitarian Protection

Appendix J: Historical Contextualization of Bosnian War

1. Myths Surrounding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession

A hyper production of literature - often inaccurate and controversial - has been dedicated to Bosnia and topics surrounding the wars of Yugoslav succession.[225] "The war in Yugoslavia severely affected views of individual media towards their internal and external enemies." (Panayi 1997:31) Making simple statements about who is to blame is not only dangerous, but it also tends to provide an inaccurate depiction. Many sought to blame or to reconstruct their own involvement in these happenings. Stevan Weine (1999), for instance, refers to material released by psychiatrists Jovan Raskovic and Radovan Karadzic, who recognized the power in retelling only parts of stories. In relating certain historical events, they withhold essential aspects, and as such, reconstructed their own politicized narrative.

The opinion, which spread rampantly in the media, was that the overwhelming impetus of the war was constructed in century old ethnic hatreds and that the Bosnian crisis was inevitable (cf. Miskovic 2007). Historian Noel Malcolm refers to this as the myth that was "carefully propagated by those who caused the conflict, who wanted the world to believe that what they and their gunmen were doing was done not by them, but by impersonal and inevitable historical forces beyond anyone's control" (Malcolm 1996:xix). The construction of such an embedded historical ethnic hatred - raging, yet suppressed, a by-product of the forces lying within Bosnian's own natural history - has been deemed by many theorists to be inaccurate as well as politically motivated. According to David Eller (1999), for example, the impetus of this conflict was related to questions of territory and battles for independence and sovereignty.

> "The problem is essentially a geographical one - which groups belong where and which land is the real and natural homeland of which groups and should be incorporated into which post-Yugoslavian state – and therefore the answer is essentially a geographical one: divide the land correctly and the problem is solved." (Eller 1999: 244)

Evident by these few examples, there is no one simple root cause to explain the escalation of animosity and violence in Yugoslavia. Rather, many factors prompted the war, such as the interconnectedness of the personal and the historical with the ethnic, religious, territorial as well as economic and political developments (Miskovic 2007). The actors involved, how history and culture were employed in prompting political tensions leading to the hostilities, and how internal

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[225] See, for instance, research with a historical focus (Donia/Fine 1994, Friedman 2004, Glenny 1993, Malcom 1996, Ramet 2006), an economic (Pugh 2002), a political (Ahmetasevic 2007, Brunner 1996, Chandler 2006, di Giovanni 2003, Eller 1999, Mesic 1994, Woodward 1995), cultural (Lovrenovic 2001, Miskovic 2007), religious (Bringa 1995, Žarkov 2007), as well as psychological (Durakovic´-Bello et al. 2003, Muftic´/Bouffard 2008, Weine 1999).

and external political and economic factors exacerbated the ethno-national conflict also need to be considered in seeking clarity.

Because the events leading up to the war of Yugoslav succession are convoluted and highly complex with multiple facets, I prefer not apportion blame and/or defense here due to the constraints of this study. Besides, to truly understand the dynamics and events leading to the war of Yugoslav succession it would be necessary to consider the five centuries of rule under the Ottoman Empire, half a century of Communist dictatorship, and the impacts these events have had on the identity formations of the inhabitants. Since the focus of this study is on the post-migration situation of the Bosnian refugees in Berlin and Chicago, I aim instead to provide a brief account here of essential historical background information, necessary for contextualizing the impetus spurring the exodus of thousands of people from Bosnia to safe third countries. I show that other factors such as economic and political ambitions, as well as external actors, contributed in escalating tensions in the region, leading to the war in Bosnia.

2. Contextualizing Historical, Economical, and Political Developments Prompting the War

According to Sabrina Ramet (2006:1), "Yugoslavia was a crisis-ridden state in all three of its incarnations." Like her, I have broken down the Yugoslav *incarnations* based on the following historical periods: The first incarnation reflects the interwar kingdom from 1918 to 1941. It was not called Yugoslavia until after 1929; the second incarnation refers to Communist Yugoslavia, which extended from 1945 to 1991; and the third refers to the *rump Yugoslav state* set up by Slobodan Milošević, from 1992 to 2003. Before I describe these incarnations, I refer to the context of the Napoleonic Wars when the situation in the region began to change dramatically.

> "Napoleon's sponsorship of an 'Illyrian' state, consisting much of present-day Slovenia and Croatia, provided encouragement to the development of national feeling among the people in those regions, while the outbreak of a rebellion among Serbs in 1804 led by Djordje Petrović ('Karadjordje'), marked the beginning of the Serbs' march to independence. The Illyrian episode in particular encouraged ideas about a South Slav, or Yugoslav state, and 'Yugoslavism' gained some articulate advocates in the course of the 19th century – most prominently, Josip Juraj Strossmayer, the Bishop of Djakova." (Ramet 2006:3)

The Habsburg and Ottoman empires broke up following the *Great War* of 1914 to 1918. In their place, conditions were established for the rise of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (as the interwar kingdom was called).

3. The Interwar Kingdom from 1918 to 1941

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip served as the impetus for the start of World War I. Due to mounting pressure exerted from external forces to curb the rising power of Russia, Austro-Hungary was persuaded to declare war against Serbia, one month after the assassination. "Without German pressure, the assassination at

Sarajevo would probably not have caused even a serious Balkan war – and certainly not a war in which all the Great Powers of the world became engulfed." (Malcolm 1996:157) Following this war, Bosnia became part of the South Slav state of Yugoslavia.

With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian state, anarchy and peasant uprisings occurred in the Croatian countryside where many larger estates were looted. As the violence spread to Bosnia, the Muslims, as owners of the wealthier estates, tended to be the targets of attacks. Eventually, the Muslims were able to organize themselves politically, easing tensions between the Serbs and Croats.

As is often the case throughout the history of Bosnia, threats to tolerance came from outside Bosnia's borders, as demands increased encouraging the breakup of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 1996). With the familiar plan to divide Yugoslavia into Croat, Serb, and Slovene spheres of influence, *permitting* Bosnia to decide whether to join Croatia or Serbia, both Serbs and Croats readily ignored or were willing to sacrifice "Bosnian territorial integrity and cultural identity" to advance their own ethnopolitical interests (Eller 1999:276). This was to be repeated numerous times throughout the history of Bosnia.

4. Communist Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1991

During World War II the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), known as a Nazi-puppet state, regained power in the region by carrying out campaigns against Jews, Serbs, and anyone else who that resisted the German occupation (Maners 1995). "Like many right-wing, Nazi-influenced Europeans of the time, the Croatian dictator Pavelic and his coterie were obsessed with racial purity" (Bell-Fialkoff 1996:131), stemming from fear and insecurity. Because the population of the German-sponsored Independent State of Croatia was highly mixed, the Croatian leadership took an uncompromisingly hostile position toward the Serbian minority (ibid).

> "The official narrative of the war claims that it was a war of liberation against the German fascists and a revolutionary class war. But the historical evidence indicates that it was a civil war that had even been provoked, aided, and abetted by the Nazis, and to a lesser extent by the Italians under Mussolini. The predominant historical view of the postwar era, however, kept the focus primarily on the dangers of fascism, not ethnic conflict." (Weine 1999:28)

According to Bell-Fialkoff (1996), the first account of ethnic cleansing carried out in Yugoslavia began in 1941. The kingdom of Yugoslavia was destroyed during World War II, leaving a "bitter after taste of ethnic vengeance" (Eller 1999). As a result, suggestions were made to divide Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia. Because the Serbs and Croats lived mixed throughout the territory and since the Muslims in the territory overwhelmingly declared their identity in the 1948 census as *Muslims with an undeclared nationality* (Malcolm 1996), this division was

shelved. Muslims refused to be categorized as Muslim Croats or Muslim Serbs.[226] In an effort to solve the nationality problem, the territoriality principle was introduced. At the end of the war, and following the Communist takeover of Yugoslavia, it was decided at the second AVNOJ[227] conference in 1943, under the authority of Tito Josip Broz, to create the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. With this, the southern Slavic people were to be divided with equal rights. Bosnia-Herzegovina was officially made one of six constituent republics in the new Federation. The other states, or rather republics, included Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and Serbia, as well as the two autonomous provinces of Voyvodina and Kosovo in Serbia. Absent of clear national ethnic borders, each of these states incorporated different nationalities, languages and religions (Brunner 1996).

"Beginning in 1941, a history was written that explicitly served the construction of the second Yugoslavia as a new Communist state." (Weine 1999:29) Evident by the Communist resistance against the Chetniks, Tito emphasized the centrality of economics and social relations, adhering to a strict ideology of a socialist, particularly Soviet, praxis.[228] "There was no other history other than that of the Communist state." (Weine 1999:29) Hence, the best guarantor of peace was to silence memories. Speaking of Utasha or Chetniks was not allowed, as this would "fan the flames of ethnic nationalism" (Ibid). Yugoslavia pursued fairly successful forms of *power sharing* during this period until the fall of Communism, (Panayi 2000:16) due to Tito's totalitarian rule and Communist ideology. The government structures he employed, forbidding alternative memories and interpretations fostered coexistence. "He has set the nation on a course that promised to move it away from its dark past, and in to a brighter future. As such, Tito acquired wide praise for his ability to maintain peace in Yugoslavia. For four decades, Tito and the state tolerated no divergence from the official narrative." (Weine 1999:29) Tito clung to a policy of having no history other than the Communist state. With his secret police, the Department for the Protection of the People (OZNa), Tito created political enemies, whether real or imagined, to "strike terror into the bones of those who do not like this kind of Yugoslavia" (Malcolm 1996:193). His totalitarian course of action was evident in the estimated number of people (250,000) who had been killed in his mass shootings, forced death marches and concentration camps between 1945-6. The more fortunate were busy working, rebuilding the

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[226] Later censuses removed the category of Muslim, offering instead *Yugoslav, nationality undeclared* - an identity with which an even greater number of residents associated with, only to be amended again in the 1961 census, when Muslims were finally allowed the category *Muslims in the ethnic sense* (Malcolm 1996). By 1971, one of the official ethnic categories in the census was "Muslim, in the sense of a nation" (Eller 1999).
[227] *Antifašističko V(ij)eće Narodnog Oslobođenja Jugoslavije* (Anti-Fascist Council for the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia).
[228] The Soviet praxis referred to here is based on the period prior to 1948 when the schism with Stalin took place (Eller 1999).

country and being forced to deny their religious associations in Stalin-like fashion. To Tito, power was more important than reconciliation, and so "Communist power was imposed on Yugoslavia at a very heavy price" (Malcolm 1996:193).

> "To Tito and the other leaders of the second Yugoslavia, the project of rebuilding one nation out of many peoples who had just inflicted unimaginable atrocities on one another necessitated the establishment of an especially strong narrative that would erase memories of ethnic atrocities and tell a very different story about the war." (Weine 1999:29)

Tito denied evidence of a civil war and instead propagated the idea of a struggle against Fascism and Communist revolution. Only in suppressing past memories could peace be guaranteed and *happier* future perspectives envisioned. This contributed to the improvement of the status of Muslims under Tito's leadership. Realizing that talk of equality and rejection of ethnic division brought international attention, and with it financial support, Tito altered his initial strategy and began an approach of balancing power and promoting equality (Malcolm 1996). It is this approach that made him popular. Tito became the "protector of the Yugoslav ideal," (Weine 1999:29) and was often referred to as "a liberal-minded, adherent to an independent, anti-Stalinist approach" (Malcolm 1996:194).

Postwar Yugoslavia experienced a period of prestige for its domestic policy that fostered the equality of all of its nations and nationalities and its foreign policy of nonalignment with the East and West. Not only did these policies contribute to the economic growth of Yugoslavia, but the country was also awarded international attention and *soft* loans from organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Maners 1995). According to Barbara Franz (2005), the involvement of the IMF, the World Bank, and other international lending institutions was precisely what influenced the social and economic conditions that prompted the ethnopolitical battle still to come.[229] She explains,

> "A rapid decline in Yugoslavia's economy became obvious in the early 1980s as the country struggled to meet payments to the IMF for industrialization loans contracted during the 1940s and 1950s. With much local intellectual and political backing – including the support of one-time bank director and neoliberal Slobodan Milošević – Yugoslavia adopted an IMF-guided stabilization program and implemented it in a stop-and-go fashion in the 1980s." (Franz 2005:17)

The idea behind this was to reduce internal demand by improving the country's trade balance. Compared to its more prosperous Yugoslav neighbors, Bosnia lagged behind in its economic development. By 1961 it had been officially declared *an under-developed region*. "Out of all of the Yugoslav republics, Bosnia had the lowest rate of economic growth over the entire period of

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[229] International associations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization, described as a de facto world government, have been criticized for paving the way for a new imperial age in which state intervention in favor of capital is the driving force behind the perpetuation of global capitalism and neoliberal practices (Porfilio 2007).

1952-68; Bosnia's national income, which was 20 percent below the national average in 1947, had fallen to 38 percent below average by 1967." (Rusinow 1978:100 in: Malcolm 1996:201-202) The oil shocks of the 1970s contributed greatly to the diminishing economic growth of the central Yugoslavian government (Franz 2005). An additional source of grievance and divisiveness resulted as heated debates and recriminations generated in regard to the federal budget and weak economic situation. Susan Woodward (1995) explains,

> "A critical element of this failure was economic decline, caused largely by a programme intended to resolve a foreign debt crisis. More than a decade of austerity and declining living standards corroded the social fabric and the rights and securities that individuals and families had come to rely on." (Franz 2005:17)

The forlorn economic and unstable political conditions served as the catalyst for the forthcoming war as economic tensions spread to political and cultural issues. These escalated as a challenge to Yugoslavian unity. Soon Serb and Croat nationalists began speaking openly of "carving pieces of ethnic territory off Bosnia and incorporating them in Croatia and Serbia respectively" (Eller 1999: 285).

Tito's efforts to maintain peace throughout the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia proved to be fragile, as harmony yielded to suppressed past resentments after his death in 1980 (Weine 1999). The political system he established could not survive without his personal authority to resolve concerns regarding the allocation of resources among the republics (Eller 1999). Over the next decade, the rotating system of government positions among the various republics gradually began to collapse (Maners 1995). With the rise of unemployment, a mounting national debt of 33 billion dinar, and an inflation rate of 250 percent in 1988, the pre-existing conditions for competition intensified among the republics for limited state resources (Eller 1999). After Slovenia began employing steps at the end of the 1980s to reach its goal of independence, followed closely behind by Croatia,[230] even greater competition among the republics emerged.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most ethnically and culturally diverse of the six republics composing Yugoslavia following World War II, with Bosnian Muslims marking the largest group in Bosnia. Based on the 1991 Yugoslav Census, the Bosnian and Herzegovina population amounted to 4.3 million, consisting of 43.7 percent Bosnian Muslims, 31.3 percent Bosnian Serbs, 17.3 percent Bosnian Croats, and 7.7 percent of others, comprised of Roma, Albanians,

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[230] Both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991 (Brunner 1996). The international recognition they in turn received triggered the Bosnian conflict.

Ukrainians, Poles, and Italians (UNHCR 2004).[231] This amalgam was further complicated by a growing number of people, who increasingly preferred the neutral *Yugoslav* nationality, the number of whom fluctuated from census to census, making it difficult to ascertain ethnic composition, but the trend was on the rise (Bell-Fialkoff 1996). According to Bringa (1993), concepts of ethnicity are often unable of being fully understood without considering nation and nationalism. According to Miskovic, "The major differences between nations and ethnicities appear to be in their relations to the state: Ethnic identity is linked to ethnic self-definition (what one thinks and feels one is); nationality is associated to one's belonging as ascribed by the state" (Miskovic 2007:517). Political leaders defined identities in an attempt to divide the land. The extent of differences among the Muslim, Croatian and Serbian-Bosnians was based on political ideologies that exploited a wide variety of geographic, historic, ethnic, religious, and class differences, and to some extent, variances in language as well (Franz 2003; Mertus et al. 1997). As conceptions of the Bosnians, influenced by outsiders, reduced them to an ethnic population, their own self-consciousness also changed. "Once a population sees itself in ethnic terms, perhaps in response to the identity others ascribe to it, it becomes an ethnic group." (Cornell/ Hartmann 1998:80-81)

5. The Yugoslav State under Control of Slobodan Milošević from 1992 to 2003

The dissolution of the united socialist Yugoslavia was quickened by Slobodan Milošević's rise to power in 1986. He became president of Serbia and later the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (comprising Serbia and Montenegro), and Serbia again from 1988 to 2000. "During times of economic stress, ethnicity as an explanation for deprivation or crisis is a tactic often resorted to by right-wing regimes in order to deflect criticism and attribute blame." (Mullen 1995:22) Milošević is criticized for having used the unstable situation in Yugoslavia to convince the Serbian people into believing in the necessity of creating a new national identity and political community. To counter the mounting shifts in the distribution of wealth and resources and to detract attention from the growing instability of the Federation, Milošević applied political rhetoric and propaganda to describe, justify, and explain policies with reference to the interest of the *nation*. Accounts of historical memories of suffering were rampant during this time. "Nationalistic intellectuals and political leaders picked up where the state's historians left off, and

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[231] Based on the 2002 UNDP Human Development Report, the ethnic breakdown of the population in Bosnia amounted to 48.3 percent Bosniaks, 34.0 percent Serbs, 15.4 percent Croats, and 2.3 percent other, implying the shifts that transpired with the war. According to a study conducted by the University of Belgrade, the number of people of mixed ethnic origin in former Yugoslavia at this time was 4 million, in a population of 24 million (Bell-Fialkoff 1996:123).

the public was overwhelmed with memories of the past, of World War II and earlier, and of previous association with ethnic nationalist grievances and aspirations." (Weine 1999:27)

For Yugoslavia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina presented a particularly complex problem. This was made worse by mounting tensions between the Serbian and Croatian factions. Despite attempts to maintain a political balance among the major ethnic groups, once Slovenia and Croatia had declared their independence from Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991, federal forces marched into Slovenia a day later. Slovenian forces, however, were well prepared and since few Serbs lived in Slovenia, the impetus to take over was not as strong (Eller 1999). As a result, the war in Slovenia, lasting less than a month, soon passed on to Croatia, where around 600,000 *ethnic Serbs* lived (Maners 1995; Eller 1999). With the Serbian rebellion in Krajina, the Serb-populated region in Croatia, a warring operative motive was launched in August 1990. Germany's unilateral diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was not only in direct contravention of the preferences of its European Community partners, this recognition is essentially what started the war.

With Bosnia being the only republic not based on a single ethnicity, the future of its independence had special bearing. Different from the Serbs and Croats, the Bosnian Muslims were the only nation in the socialist Yugoslavia that did not have their home republic, as they were never granted recognition as a republic or nation-state. Turmoil ensued after Bosnia declared its intention to seek independence from Yugoslavia on Oct. 15, 1991.[232]

> "Bosnian Muslims could not claim the 'blood ties' between a nation and a territory as all other nations in Yugoslavia did (Woodward 1995), since their status followed a complicated and confusing path from being recognized as Serbs or Croats, or 'Yugoslavs of undeclared nationality,' or Muslims as 'ethnic minority,' and finally, Muslims as a nation." (Miskovic 2007:518)

A two-day referendum was convened on February 29, 1992 by the Bosnian government to determine the state of Bosnia's independence. Despite the fact that the Bosnian Serbs, making up 32 percent of Bosnia's population at the time, boycotted the referendum, 99.4 percent of the other 63 percent of eligible voters voted for independence (Mertus et al. 1997). On March 1, 1992, Radio Free Europe reported that the first shots had been fired in Sarajevo as Serbian militants began retaliating, using armed force to divide the republic along ethnic boundaries.

The European Community and the US recognized the independent republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 7, 1992.[233] On the same day, the independence of both Croatia and

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[232] With independence, "Bosnia and Herzegovina could be conceived only as a three-people state, in which 81.1 percent of all Muslims (1,906,000), 16.1 percent of all Serbs (1,369,000) and 16.1 percent of all Croats (756,000) would have to get on with each other" (Brunner 1996:78). Bosnia's claim for sovereignty was preceded by Macedonia's announcement on September 8, 1991.

[233] By May 22, 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was admitted to the United Nations.

Slovenia were also recognized internationally. The declaration of Bosnia's independence caused Serb representatives to fervently oppose the outcome. "Approval of the referendum by a majority of voters resulted in international recognition for the new state and an undeclared war with heavily armed Serbia and its proxies." (Maners 1995:12) With the various ethnic groups spread throughout the Yugoslav republics, when the nationalist party won, the attempt to make an ethnically pure society thus began by dividing Yugoslavia along ethnic lines. "The people started to divide into two different types: those who think about living together and being together, and those who talk about separation and different religions and nationalities." (Weine 1999:40) This second type is clearly evident by the ensuing Serbian ethnonationalism.

With the aim of creating a *Greater Serbia* by uniting all the Serbs throughout the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within one contiguous state, (Maners 1995) Milošević embraced and promulgated a strategy of Serb ethnonationalism. The warning signs preempting the violence had been acknowledged with the restructuring of the Yugoslav army with Serbian nationalists. First came the brief battle in Slovenia in 1991, followed by the brutal fighting in Croatia (from 1991 to 1995), extending into the full-blown war in Bosnia (from March 1992 to November 1995). Because violence is often used as an economic and rational means to drive out competing groups (Fein 1993), the Serbian proxy army, consisting of local radical militias, gangsters, and *demobilized* soldiers of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army embarked on a campaign of *ethnic cleansing*, a form of genocide, aimed to eradicate all non-Serbs from larger Serbian-dominated areas (Maners 1995). The Bosnian Republic was transformed into a setting of fierce combat.

National citizens are said to be equal in times of war, as class boundaries are eroded in the communal struggle for national survival and greatness (Anderson 1991). While this communal feeling was evident among the Bosnian-Serbs, there was a sheer lack of communal identity for all the ethnic groups in Bosnia at the time. Consequently, what at first involved subtly influencing Serbs to fear and suspect the Croats (and later the Albanians to mistrust the Macedonians), the economic troubles eventually escalated into full-blown *ethnic* conflicts.

According to many historians, Milošević propagated historical controversies in the country as a means of legitimizing the suppression by Serbian military against the Bosnian Croats, and later against the Bosnian Muslims, until each group eventually retaliated against each other, each doing to other people exactly what had been done to them. They applied similar methods of oppression, seeming to validate Western claims of a civil war. Bell-Fialkoff (1996) refers to this as a "cyclical of mutual destruction."

While many observers understood the strategy of ethnic cleansing to be a byproduct of the war, Malcolm argues, "it was a central part of the entire political project which the war was

intended to achieve" (Malcolm 1996:246).[234] He argues that the exacerbation of fear was intentionally used to gain territory and power. His rule was authoritarian and nontransparent, possessing both formal and informal power, with devastating policies for the whole region (Micunovic 2007). With a systematic strategy to expand his power, Milošević, it is argued, was thus able to manipulate the link between nationalism and foreign policy.

I question whether this could have been achieved had Yugoslavia not been in a *state of permanent crisis*. Under Tito's rule, the country achieved a certain prestige, for instance, after defying the Soviets, and contributing to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement.[235] That Yugoslavia's style of *self-management* was considered a model for other countries to emulate was also significant.[236] Despite these successes, the three Yugoslavias never had what might be deemed a "normal, stable democracy" (Ramet 2006:1).

> "The interwar kingdom was undermined by the disinclination of the leading Serbian politicians, until 1939, to engage in political compromise, by the proliferation of armed militias, inspired by xenophobia, and by widespread political and economic corruption, among other things, leading to a sense of constant crisis. Communist Yugoslavia was subverted by the party's inability to transform itself into a democratic player (as per the Hungarian and Polish examples), by the evaporation in the years after Tito's death of such support for the system as there had been, by economic deterioration (which drove people onto the streets in protest), and by the federal system itself, which divided power in the name of unity in a self-contradictory formula which drew the fault lines along which the country would later break up. And the 'third Yugoslavia,' as Milošević's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has often been called, succumbed to the self-destructive policies of aggression and the deficit spending on which the Milošević regime had tried to establish itself." (Ramet 2006:1-2)

Overall, the conflict in Yugoslavia can be seen as having a variety of causes other than just the articulation of ethnicity and the internal manipulation of power (Janjic 1995 in: Kelly 2004). Additional factors contributed to the outbreak of war including, for example, financial constraints, the role of the West, and in particular, Germany's role in recognizing Croatia's independence (cf. Woodward 1998). This political act not only had the effect of renouncing the legitimacy of the existing Yugoslav state, but Germany further encouraged other EEC countries to follow its act. Anarchy and armed violence followed, resulting in the demise of the Yugoslav Federation.

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[234] Malcolm says that the goal of the war was "the creation of homogenous Serb areas which could eventually be joined to other Serb areas, including Serbia itself, to create a greater Serbian state" (Malcolm 1996:246).

[235] With this, Yugoslavia played an important role in coming together with states unwilling to align themselves with either the US or the Soviet Union (Ramet 2006).

[236] "Tito fashioned a system of workers' councils called 'self-management,' in which – it was claimed – workers managed their own factories and enterprises." (Ramet 2006:1) In order to study this concept of self-management and to see what lessons could be gleaned, delegations came from all over the world in the 1960s and 1970s.

6. The Role of the West (USA and Western Europe)

Despite the global attention focused on this war, much time passed before international powers became involved in an effort to end the brutal conflict that took place in Bosnia. It seems, with upcoming US presidential elections and his attention diverted to Iraq, US President H.W. Bush exhibited little interest in events taking place in Yugoslavia, instead being content to accept the argument of EEC leaders who had claimed from the start of the Yugoslav war that this *European problem* ought to be resolved by Europeans. European politicians, journalists and other actors observing the conflict believed it to be based in historical ethnic animosities. The Bosnian war has consistently been reduced, both by insiders as well as outsiders alike, to a *civil war*. Typically described, even in the early phases as a civil war, this conflict was "often likened to a 'tribal conflict' between two or more ancient enemies who have hated one another for centuries and who have been thrown together artificially in a republic (and then, unwisely, an independent state) and asked to live together in a fashion inimical to their primordial natures" (Eller 1999:243). All sides involved, including the Bosnian government were referred to as *warring factions*.

Some critics argue that the most telling symptoms of the West's inability to understand the political situation were in its continued efforts to solve all military problems with the establishment of cease-fires, which were continuously broken. This in turn was followed by a break-down in law and order (Malcolm 1996). By February 1992 the Security Council voted to send in 14,000 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers to Bosnia-Herzegovina (and Croatia) to monitor the cease-fire and protect the rights of civilians.[237] While the aim was to create peaceful and secure conditions necessary for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis (Resolution 743), the UN troops were not permitted to use force or open fire unless they were shot at themselves. This was due to their stance to provide *humanitarian solutions* to so-called *humanitarian problems*.

Instead the West believed the best approach to reduce the violence that had flared up would be the refusal to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government. The UN introduced the arms embargo in September 1991 against all of Yugoslavia, which was then still a single country. Although the UN recognized Yugoslavia's distinct and separate member states on May 22, 1992, it did not alter its policy in enforcing the embargo. As a consequence, Milošević and the Serbian forces maintained free reign and substantial time to pursue ethnic cleansing as a war strategy. The continued arms embargo resulted in limiting the power of the Bosnian defense forces.

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[237] In June 1992, UNPROFOR troops succeeded in reopening the airport in Sarajevo, which was significant for the many able to afford airplane tickets out of the country.

According to some scholars (cf. Brunner 1996; Eller 1999), Western politicians made the most essential mistake in their response to the conflict by reacting to symptoms of the war rather than addressing the causes. Malcolm views this as the "biggest single contribution by the West to the destruction of Bosnia" (1996:242). Many considered the war a military problem rather than a politically-motivated one. As such, the response of the West at this stage was to avoid direct involvement in the fighting. Rather than ease the embargo so that the Bosnian government at least could defend itself, the decision was made to move refugees into refugee camps outside of Bosnia. Blame was apportioned, it seemed, based on who was squeezing the triggers.

During the second part of 1992, private and public aid agencies began offering humanitarian aid, delivering food and medicine in convoys to Bosnia, which were protected by UN troops. Positioning the small and lightly-armed UN force in Bosnia, however, had negative repercussions as they began to be involved in hostage holdings, causing Western governments to exhibit even greater reluctance to become involved due to a fear of retaliation by Serbian forces (Malcolm 1996).

In late October 1992, an attempt was made by UN and EEC negotiators to propose a settlement to divide Bosnia among the Serbs, Croats and Muslims by establishing autonomous provinces or cantons, known as the Vance-Owen Plan. This failed, however, due to frustration over the division - the Muslims felt as if the Serbs were being *rewarded* – but greater frustration rose due to the ethnic labels placed on these cantons. The proposal further failed to unearth a final and encompassing solution to the problem of recognition. Malcolm argues that this was the second most important contributor by the West, following the arms embargo, in the destruction of Bosnia, as this stimulated the "development of a genuine civil war, and in so doing, broke down the Croat-Muslim alliance, which had been the only effective barrier to the Serbs" until then (Malcolm 1996:248). In other words, the introduction (by the West) of the Vance-Owen Plan is what legitimized the resulting *civil war*.

Both the arms embargo and the Vance-Owen Plan had the consequence of drastically weakening the military resistance to the Serbs. But the introduction of *safe areas* proved to be the final act. Suggestions were made by the West to have targeted Muslims congregate in safe areas, in which UN soldiers would guarantee their safety, yet only under the mandate that the UN soldiers were permitted to return fire if shot at, not, however, if the Bosnian-Muslims were shot at.

Even after the UN and Western governments began to comprehend by May 1992 the extent of atrocities being committed, largely by Serbian forces, realizing as well the number of Serb-run prisons and detention camps and admitting that there was *justification for action*, Western forces were still criticized for being reluctant. They were considered reluctant to become involved in a

civil war, not their own. "As war atrocities spread UNPROFOR watched on as an awkward bystander, its actions criticized by all sides." (Mertus et al. 1997:43) Refusing to employ rapid reaction forces, as they did not want to *unnecessarily* have any of their own troops killed, the UN presence was merely to *stage* peace. This became most evident after UN troops failed to prevent Bosnian Serbs from taking Srebrenica in July 1995, causing one of the greatest humanitarian disasters of the war.

Due to heavy Serb shelling and road blockades, there was a tendency for humanitarian aid supplies to take months before reaching the residents in need. In response, *safe havens* were created in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac. The aim behind the safe havens was to prevent mass migration movements by ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid and providing protection to the displaced persons in the region. Serb forces were supposed to withdraw from these safe areas to allow the arrival of humanitarian aid (Mertus et al. 1997:98). According to Stevan Weine (1999:54), "The safe haven zone was to be a zone of civility within a war zone, enforced by UNPROFOR." Thus, Srebrenica was designated a safe haven and served as the home to approximately 50,000 displaced persons, mainly Muslims, during the war. "This turned Srebrenica into a refugee holding cell. While aid trucks could get in with greater frequency, few humans could get out," (Mertus et al. 1997:98) which eventually was the cause of their demise. In line with its goal to stop unnecessary migration movements, the UN troops had earlier disarmed the Bosnian locals, discouraging them from fighting. The result was the UN troops prevented the locals from defending themselves, resulting in UNPROFOR to carry full responsibility for their defense (Weine 1999:54). "According to survivors and human rights investigators, thousands of men were separated out, taken to detention camps, and shot and buried in mass graves." (Mertus et al. 1997:98) Reports of mass graves near Srebrenica by the US media were not released until nearly two months following the massacre of thousands of Muslim men. NATO and UN presence was meant to deter further aggression, but unfortunately due to fears of large migration movements and an unwillingness to risk the lives of Western troops, a large humanitarian disaster, including UN soldiers being held as hostages, was the outcome.

In order to stop the genocide in Bosnia, the West would have done well to have first considered the main political actors involved, whether authoritarian or not, as well as the shakiness of the regime, whether a history of internal conflict has previously existed, whether one group in particular appeared to abuse the human rights of the other, whether economic instability and political insecurity were rampant, whether a shift in the power base was suddenly transferred to the military, whether media channels were controlled by a dominant power dedicated against a common enemy, and whether propaganda against an evil enemy was

distributed and encouraged in an effort to unite and suppress one people against another. Had all of these factors been more closely examined prior to UN and NATO involvement, perhaps the strategy of the external peacekeeping forces would have been different. Although external organizations did intervene to monitor the situation in Bosnia, they did little to stop the genocide from taking place. NATO peacekeepers consistently gave mixed messages, failing to follow through in actually enforcing threats made against Serb forces. NATO peacekeepers appeared non-committal and failed to apply non-coercive force by banning financial aid to Milošević or lifting the embargo.

The politicized situation was worsened by pressure to sign the Dayton Peace agreement, which Brunner describes as a mere "damage litigation exercise" (Brunner 1996:15). Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević finally agreed to sign a peace treaty in December 1995, in which plans were made to *carve* Bosnia roughly in half. With the signing of the constitutional 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, a ceasefire was enforced and the united country of Bosnia was split into two entities: the Serbian Republic and the Federation of Bosnia- Herzegovina, "with a weak and seemingly symbolic central government" (Mertus et al. 1997:166). A NATO force of 60,000 was to be employed to enforce the peace (Ibid). Under the agreement, each entity was to have its own government, parliament, police force and army. The central governing bodies for all of Bosnia composes a tripartite, rotating presidency, a parliament, and a council of ministers, which are responsible for monetary policy, foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs and immigration (Malcolm 1996). The separate entities are responsible for all other matters, such as education, and the media (Ibid) and close ties with neighboring countries (the Muslim-Croat federation with Croatia and the Serb republic with *reduced Yugoslavia* (Serbia and Montenegro) were encouraged (Mertus et al. 1997).

According to Brunner (1996), the former Yugoslavia missed its chance with Dayton to peacefully and harmoniously settle its nationality problems. As a result, political tensions in Bosnia continue today as requests for a restructuring of the tripartite political system and reconciliation of past memories are encouraged. Meanwhile Western attention on current developments in the area is directed particularly toward Bosnia's preparations for consideration to join the European Union.

Appendix K: Refugee and Immigration Reception Trends in Germany since 1945

Due to the richness in experience and data, the following depiction of Germany's attitudes and responses to its different immigration waves in the last two-dozen years is more of a social scientist analysis of the historical trends than an exact detailed chronology. It begins following World War II.

1. First Wave: Resettlers, 1945-1955

The first wave of post-war migrants to come to Germany comprised around 12 million Eastern European resettlers with German origins (*Aussiedler*), who arrived between 1945 and 1955 to flee persecution in Soviet bloc countries. They included individuals possessing "German nationality or who as a refugee or as an expellee of German descent or as their spouse or descendent had found residence in the territory of the German Reich in its borders of 31 December 1937." They were considered members of the German *community of fate*. Those who managed to survive the trek were granted automatic German citizenship upon their arrival in Germany, according to Article 116 of the 1949 Basic Law (Geddes 2003:80). By 1950, these refugees and expellees accounted for 16 percent of Germany's population (Geddes 2003). According to Fetzer (2000), these survivors were forced to restart "their lives from scratch in the war-devastated Germany" (p.69). From the perspective of native Germans, this caused a huge burden and hardship, as the Germans were compelled to receive the newcomers (p.69-70). "…in den ersten Jahren der Nachkriegszeit [ist] deutlich werdender relativ Unterprivilierung der Vertriebenen gegenüber den Einheimischen durch 'Unterschichtung' zu verstehen und verweist insofern auf die Traditionen der Ausländerbeschäftigung." (Herbert 2003:197)

In addition to the arrival of ethnic Germans, roughly four million East German *Übersiedler* escaped to West Germany prior to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, which caused an additional challenge for the West Germans to "integrate so many 'nonnatives'" (Fetzer 2000; Bade 1992b). According to Thomas Schwarz (1992), this situation led to Germany's first phase of developing policy on foreigners. In his view such a policy ensued mainly as a result of the need to address urban planning problems following the construction of the Berlin wall and due to Germany's "unique and difficult" economic and geographic condition at the time (Schmalz-Jacobsen 1993; Vertovec 1996). "Demographic and employment factors of migration were the key concerns of policy makers, and 'integration' was considered largely in structural terms." (Vertovec 1996:121-138)

With their newly acquired German passports, Germany's labor market need, and the relatively high education levels they had brought with them, this wave of ethnic German migrants and East German *Übersiedler* achieved economic incorporation quite quickly. With the ability to accumulate economic capital and due to their "Germanness," their "foreignness" was less apparent in the governing policies (Räthzel 1991). Sharing aspects prevalent in other migrant organizations, this group of expellees began their own expellee-formed organizations, which helped not only in establishing their own collective but also in creating group solidarity with other migrant milieus. This aided in their transition into German society by curbing their *Fremdheitsgefühl*, or sense of foreignness in the new setting. The expellee organizations further served as a political pressure group and culture of refuge (Herbert 2003).

Despite general belief today, the *Aussiedler* represented a group of migrants who exhibit *successful integration tendencies* in Germany. Additional factors suggest that they actively strive towards integration, which is evident in the improved status of the "*Aussiedler* born in Germany" compared to their parents born outside of Germany (Woellert et al. 2009). Their successful integration is also closely related to Germany's institutional response and the support accorded them, including advantages they enjoyed in having German citizenship rights.

This is clearly true of the *Übersiedler*, coming from the former East Germany, who quickly adjusted to the norms of West German society. It seems clear that the successful integration of the ethnic German resettlers confirms similar advantages in the adjustment process. This is tied into their economic incorporation and the advantages of having citizenship rights. This generally results in fewer legal restrictions and constraints in accessing essential resources and in acting autonomously.

2. Second Wave: Period of guest worker recruitment, 1955-1973

While the resettlers helped to fill the labor market gaps between 1945 and 1955, their numbers were insufficient. This generated a second wave of post-war immigration to Germany with the recruitment of guest workers. To counterbalance Germany's depleted workforce, Germany looked for laborers outside its territory. Initially, guest workers from Italy were recruited to carry out hard-to-fill jobs in agriculture and so it came that Germany's first bilateral agreement on labor recruitment was signed with Italy in 1955 (Herbert 2003).

Throughout the 1950s and '60s Germany's immigration policy was characterized by the active recruitment of guest workers. By July 1960, close to 280,000 guest workers (46 percent of whom were Italian) had been recruited to Germany (Geddes 2003). With renewed prosperity and an economic boom during the *Wirtschaftswunder,* or economic miracle, German public sentiment toward foreigners softened (Fetzer 2000). Labor recruitment agreements with Spain

and Greece followed in 1960 with additional agreements signed with Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and Yugoslavia in 1968. Labor recruitment contracts were not only being signed in West Germany but in East Germany as well. The German Democratic Republic signed labor recruitment agreements with other Communist countries in 1968, including Hungary, Poland, Algeria, Cuba, Mozambique and Vietnam (Bade 2000; Federal Ministry of Interior Homepage).

The first wave of guest workers consisted mainly of men, who worked overwhelmingly in jobs native Germans preferred to avoid. Many were employed in the food service industry, construction, mining, automobile, steel, and metalworking industries, located mostly in North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse (Federal Ministry of Interior Homepage). These men generally responded to recruitment in the hope of working and saving enough money to secure a comfortable living for their return home. Since many had left their wives and children behind, the majority worked to support their families back home. "Most left their home countries with the intention of returning after a few years of work abroad." (Parry 2006) Both the guest workers themselves and the German state expected their duration of stay to be limited.

At this time, there was a firm belief - at least initially - in the government's ability to control the recruitment and residence of workers, and to alter their numbers as needed, according to domestic economic demand (Joppke 1999:65-66 in: BIVS 2002). As a result of the labor recruitment contracts, the German government established agencies in the sending countries to facilitate recruitment and mediate between future employers and employees. Guest workers were granted a temporary right of residence in the receiving state, the duration of which was dependent on the expected duration needed to complete their assigned tasks. Recruitment policies were derived from short-term labor demands determined by industry - in the "corporatist context of the Federal Labor Ministry (the BfA) with representatives of employer's organizations, trade unions, and government" (Geddes 2003:81).

According to Heckmann (1995), approximately 2.3 million native Germans managed to increase their status from simple workers to technicians and civil servants between 1960 and 1970. This was made possible through the diligence of the foreign workers who filled the menial labor positions previously filled by Germans. The changing demand for foreign workers during this period did not, however, lead to a specific policy on foreigners or one to promote integration. Rather, the immigration process of guest workers was determined solely by the demands of the German labor market. Guest workers were accepted into the country for short periods of time for no other reason than to help rebuild Germany's infrastructure.

The guest workers played a significant role in the restructuring of Germany's social system. By paying taxes, they contributed to Germany's social security fund. Due to their short-term contracts, many were unable to take advantage of these social benefits.[238] Any problems that resulted were viewed and dealt with as *problems of the migrants,* implying an "absence of political will for an immigration policy" (Heckmann 1995:161). There never was a conscious debate and decision as to whether Germany needed foreign labor in the short run, the long run or permanently (Heckmann 1995). The acknowledgement coined by Swiss author Max Frisch (1911-1991), "Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte, und es kamen Menschen" is telling of the complexity of this labor recruitment period and the lack of government foresight regarding the ongoing well-being of the guest workers and their family members – also evident in Germany's failure to implement a migration policy.[239]

Germany experienced an economic boom during this post-war period thanks to the contribution of the thousands of guest workers. By 1964 in the wake of the *economic miracle*, an estimated one million foreign workers had entered the country. An atmosphere of tolerance for the thousands of foreigners in the country prevailed for as long as the German economy continued to thrive. The phase between 1961 and 1967 has often been referred to as the period of *uncontrolled expansion* (Esser/Korte 1985:169). While the Italian workers made up the biggest group of foreign workers in West Germany in 1969, by 1973 the Turkish foreign workers had them outnumbered. This came at a time when the economic situation started to teeter, hinting at forthcoming financial decline. As a result, German nativism targeted the Turkish population. "Scores of opinion polls, hundreds of anti-Turkish hate crimes, and the ubiquity of vicious 'Turkish jokes' all testify to the extreme public opposition that most 'Gastarbeiter' have faced in the Federal Republic." (Wallraff 1985:108-114 in: Fetzer 2000:70-71) The sizable number of Turkish guest workers (605,000) constituted the largest group of foreign workers in Germany (Bade 2000), which led to the third wave of migration to Germany.

3. Third Wave: Family Members of Guest Workers, 1973 – 1981

Prior to the oil shock of 1973, political debates on the number of guest workers and associated costs had already taken place and the political consensus was that guest workers were only to remain in Germany on a temporary basis - as long as they filled Germany's labor need (Similar to Berlin's response to the Bosnians). Responsibility for issuing residence permits came under the

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[238] Many guest workers, however, remained in Germany, bringing their families with them, so that 7.3 million migrants or individuals with a migrant background, consisting of second and third generation guest workers, continue to live in Germany today. The largest groups of non-nationals living in Germany today are Turkish (1.7 million), followed by Italians (half a million) and Serbs (half a million), then Poles and Greeks (BAMF 2008).

[239] Author's translation: We asked for a workforce, but human beings came.

jurisdiction of the federal states, which was further influenced by the political character of each federal state. The more conservative federal states tended to promote more restrictive policies. The conditions stipulating the issuance of residence permits for the guest workers were also linked to work permits. Both residence and work permits were subjugated to the economic interests of the Federal Republic. With the introduction of the new Foreigner's Law in 1965, intending to replace the 1938 Aliens Regulations, an explicit attempt was made to ensure state-governed *access* to as well as *exit* from the Federal Republic's territory (Esser/Korte 1985, Geddes 2003). (This is also similar to Germany's response to the Bosnians). In preparing for the guest workers' inevitable return home, the German state made its stance quite clear. Yet, an important aspect was forgotten with the Foreigner's Law, as it lacked a provision for family reunification. This *missing* provision later had lasting ramifications for Germany, as it simplified the family reunification process for the guest workers.[240]

With the economic recession of 1966-67, the expansion of guest workers slowed remarkably, as strategies were debated to either integrate or return the guest workers. It was acknowledged at this point that integration policies and measures for guest worker families, including the establishment of living spaces, school rooms and teachers, among other things would lead to high costs at the communal level. As the economy worsened, the advantages of recruiting guest workers to help fill the void in the labor market were called into question. With this came greater political resistance. Germany sought to reduce the number of new arrivals and limit the costs associated with the thousands of migrants already in the country. To avoid having to pay the costs of implementing integration strategies, the *rotation principle* was suggested (Herbert 2003). The idea behind this was to have guest workers only stay a few years in Germany before returning them and replacing them with newly recruited guest workers. The idea was for guest workers to come and go on a rotational basis.

Unions, churches and government parties objected to this proposal, as did federal economic corporations themselves. The latter of which argued against hiring, training and working with guest workers for a limited time period only to have to hire, train and restart the process with other replacement guest workers. They argued that this model would waste too much time, knowledge, manpower, and money (Herbert 2003). Unable to agree on a common strategy of response, when the oil boycott was imposed by the Arab oil producing countries, the *oil shock* was used as the grounds on which to curb the number of guest workers and, as such, to avoid implementing integration policies.

> "Tatsächlich aber war diese nicht mehr als ein verstärkendes Moment und zudem ein günstiger Anlaß, den Zustrom ausländischer Arbeiter ohne große Widerstände von Seiten der

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[240] A family reunification provision was not implemented until 1981 (Geddes 2003).

> Entsendeländer und ohne langwierige Diskussion in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit über die sozialen Folgen dieser Maßnahme einzudämmern und die Zahl der Ausländer zu senken." (Herbert 2003:229)

Under the guise of the *oil crisis*, the SPD-FDP government thus called a halt to organized labor migration (the *Anwerbestopp*), which resulted in a sharp drop in migrant employment. With this, the perspectives of the remaining guest workers "were swiftly transformed from a hitherto temporary group into a more permanent minority" (Green 2007:98).

Although the Federal Ministry of Interior stated that the number of guest workers leaving the territory in 1974 exceeded the number of foreign workers entering Germany (Federal Ministry of Interior Homepage), Heckmann (1995) concedes, to the surprise of most German politicians, that while remigration numbers fell sharply at this point, family reunification - that is immigration - rose sharply. A large number of guest workers managed to arrange for their wives and children to join them through the inadvertently simplified family reunification scheme, composing the third wave of post-war immigration to Germany. Simon Green argues, "Accordingly, and against general expectations, the number of non-nationals in West Germany did not decrease after 1973 as the remaining temporary workers returned home: on the contrary, numbers increased due to new migration for the purposes of family reunification" (Green 2007:98). The year, 1980, marked the peak for family reunification.

Heckmann (1995:159) clarifies, "A 'temporary,' mostly young male migrant population, changed into a 'normal' immigrant population." Through chain migration and the formation of ethnic self-organizations and ethnic colonies in the different national groups, new immigrant ethnic minorities became part of the social structure. Despite the official stance and expectation to curb labor migration, this period did not mark the end of immigration to Germany, which would have justified rethinking the paradigm of a non-immigration country, but did not.[241] According to Green, "such secondary migration itself quickly became a policy priority in terms of restriction and actively divided the main parties for much of the 1980s and, to a lesser extent, the 1990s" (Green 2007:98).

Nevertheless, a few innovative suggestions regarding the long-term integration of guest workers were considered during this period. "From the beginning of the 1980s, 'representative politics' (*Beauftragtenpolitik*) emerged as the central orientation of the Berlin government." (Green 2007:98) Berlin was the first federal state in 1981 to establish a position for a Commissioner for Foreigner's Affairs (*Ausländerbeauftragte*), inspiring other federal states to

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[241] Initially, problems arose in the German school system, as children of guest workers encountered learning disadvantages as a result of German language deficits. Results of the Pisa Study further attest to the differentiated access and advantages between migrants and natives in Germany's school system.

soon follow its example.[242] The main aim of this post was originally to create a liaison function among the multiple ethnic organizations and the local government. According to Thomas Schwarz (BIVS 2002), this should not be perceived as a turning point in the policy on foreigners (*Ausländerpolitik*), but rather as an "important further development" (Vertovic 1996), especially considering that at the time, Germany fostered a policy demanding that foreigners "integrate or return."

It was near this time that Heinz Kühn, SPD party member and first Representative Commissioner for Foreigners in North Rhine-Westphalia, composed the Kühn Memorandum in which he requested a number of strategies that would promote the integration of thousands of guest workers already residing in Germany. Some of his ideas included the dismissal of the term *Gastarbeiter* to be replaced with *immigrant*; political participation in local elections; access to lectures on Islam for Muslim immigrant children in German schools; and the allocation of German citizenship for foreign children born in Germany (Meier-Braun 2002). While these ideas continue to be debated today, Kühn proposed innovative strategies and advocated on behalf of the immigrant workers, arguing for a more realistic assessment of the situation of the guest workers at the time. He encouraged the preparation of integration strategies for thousands of guest workers not likely to stay for only a limited period, as the German government had initially planned (Herbert 2003).

The leading German welfare organizations that responded to the needs of the guest workers at this time were mainly the non-denominational Social Democratic Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO), the Catholic organization Caritas, and the Protestant Diakonie. These institutions advocated on behalf of the migrant workers. Additionally, the German trade union played a significant role in improving the working and living conditions of the guest workers and advocating on their behalf. This form of integration support had initially evolved from labor market recruitment and the obvious need of incorporating family members, particularly responding to the needs of the guest workers' children and assisting them into Germany's education system.

The counter response leading into the early 1980s was for conservative governments to increasingly focus on the many problems and costs associated with foreigners. The presence of guest workers in the Republic was increasingly viewed as a cause for social, political and economic strife. Foreign workers were deemed a social problem, causing greater economic instability and an ever-greater point of contention among members of the general public. At this time, political rhetoric emphasizing differences between constructions of Germanness and foreignness and the significance of the German nation-state attracted much attention. Germany's

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[242] Established as part of the Berlin Senate Administration of Health, Family, and Social Affairs, this post maintains considerable independence (Vertovic 1996).

CDU-led President Richard von Weizsäcker stated in a press release in November 1980 that, "Germany does not want to become an immigration country and will not be so. Family reunifications of immigrants and arrival of new foreign workers must be prevented by using all legal instruments in line with the German Constitution" (Bade 2001:77).

Restrictions on family reunification were thus imposed, as the legal minimum age for children of migrant families was reduced from 18 to 16 years. German authorities also assessed the income levels and living space of families applying for reunification schemes before granting entry permission to new immigrants. In curbing both the arrival of guest workers and instilling greater restrictions on family reunification, the government set precedence at this time to cut back on new arrivals by applying a restrictive stance on immigration.[243] Such attitudes signify the lack of willingness in Germany to acknowledge the emergence of its new position, an emerging immigration country. Instead an even greater focus has been placed on preventing the arrival of new immigrants and limiting ensuing costs related to integration. Restrictive policies resulted consequently in certain cities with the aim of curbing the number of foreign workers entering the Republic. Von Weizsäcker stated on June 2, 1981 that "foreigners should either decide to return to their countries, which shall be financially supported by the German state, or choose to stay in Berlin, which would inevitably mean that they decide to be German" (Meier-Braun 2002:50). By 1983/84 provisions supporting the return of foreign workers to their homeland were put into force, which were perceived by some migrants as beneficial, but many preferred having the freedom to make their own decisions.

Overall, however, this approach failed to reach its intended target: between 1970 and 1980, the Turkish foreign population had increased from 13 percent to 33 percent (Geddes 2003), marking the largest foreign population living in Germany. Between 1982 and 1998, under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the number of immigrants increased from 4.6 million to 7.3 million (Geddes 2003). This figure consisted of legal foreigners, composing nine percent of the population (Neto et al. 2005), and marking a 63 percent increase within 16 years (Meier-Braun 2002:60).

In discussions reflecting the *problem of foreigners* in German society, blame has commonly been steered to the *problem of Turks*. Based on his findings, Hönekopp (2010) showed that Turkish migrants in Germany encounter the highest disparity in labor market incorporation. With the exception of Turkey itself, the Turks constitute the single largest non-national group living in Germany, half of whom are younger than 30 years old (Green 2003). Despite their long-term settlement patterns, Turks in Germany have not achieved a high level of formal inclusion. The

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[243] Ongoing debates regarding family reunification persist still today, with the CDU/CSU parties arguing to further reduce the age of children arriving to Germany for purposes of family reunification.

high proportion of Turkish migrants without an educational degree and the high proportion of joblessness among young Turks are startling. In no other migrant group is the number of individuals without an educational degree (30 percent) and a higher education qualification (14 percent) so high (Hönekopp 2010). In politicized public discourse, Martin Neuffer, member of the SPD party, questioned in November 1986 whether Turks are capable of assimilating in Germany. He argued that the "boat is already full." This nativist stance undergirded Germany's response in the early 1990s to the fourth wave of new arrivals of refugees and migrants, when between 1983 and 1992, the number of asylum seekers in (West) Germany increased yearly with the exception of 1987 (BAMF 2006).

Appendix L: Refugee and Immigration Reception Trends in the US since 1945

Due to the richness in experience and data, the following depiction of the attitudes and responses of the United States to its different immigration waves in the last two-dozen years is more of a social scientist analysis of the historical trends than an exact detailed chronology. It begins with an account of two laws that set the precedent of the US government response to immigration for the subsequent four decades (Alba/Nee 2003:168).

1. The US – an Immigrant Nation?

Americans appeared little concerned at the turn of the 19th Century about the many immigrants entering the country (Fetzer 2000). The early European settlers in America considered their new nation to be controlled exclusively by whites, evident in the naturalization laws passed in 1790, limiting citizenship to immigrants who were "free white persons" (Alba/Nee 2003:168). Around 1913, increasing entry restrictions began being enforced.[244] Both the quota-based Johnson Act of 1921, and the more restrictive Johnson-Reed, or *National Origins Act,* of 1924, resulted in drastically reducing the number of new migrants from southern and eastern Europe and Asia (Fetzer 2000). The 1921 Act was intended mainly to curtail the entry of Jews from Eastern Europe; the 1924 legislation "permanently prohibited immigration by Asian 'aliens ineligible for citizenship'" (Alba/Nee 2003:168).

This entailed a system of quotas based on national origin that favored immigrants from northern and Western Europe. "The United States desired not only that there be fewer immigrants but that, in the aggregate, they mirror the ethnic composition of American whites." (Alba/Nee 2003:168) It was deemed logical to favor those immigrants presumed most likely able to assimilate into American society, a premise that continues still today evident in the US pre-selection of the Bosnian refugees to resettle to the US. A review of the historical background leading up to such developments follows.

2. First Migrant Waves Following WWII, 1945 to 1965

World War II marks the start of contemporary immigration to the US. It came at a time when the ethnocentric and racially restrictive policies put forth in the 1920s were still maintained. By 1939, President Franklin Roosevelt - with apparent substantial public backing – forced hundreds of Jewish refugees aboard the *St. Louis* ocean liner to return to Nazi-dominated Europe, the fate of whom has well been documented (Fetzer 2000). The US clearly ignored its moral duty to

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[244] For instance, literacy tests were applied in 1917 to deny potential immigrants entry.

provide protection to Jewish refugees escaping Nazi persecution. During the war itself, between 1941 and 1945, there were only 34,000 new immigrants permitted per year (Alba/Nee 2003). Had the US government responded sooner, perhaps more lives could have been spared. The delayed response and limited number of European Jews protected by the US is largely attributed to anti-Semitic sentiment (Fetzer 2000). "Even after the war, when the horror of the Holocaust was known and Europe was awash in refugees (including millions of ethnic Germans driven from their Eastern homes), the United States was reluctant to lower its drawbridge." (Alba/Nee 2003:171)

The end of the war brought with it a wave of refugees, as a continued flow of Jews, intellectuals, and other refugees sought protection. Only 40,000 Jewish refugees were allowed entrance via quota systems set up at US consulates outside of Germany between 1946 and 1948. Only after the Displaced Persons Act passed through Congress in 1948 was a greater number of these refugees (around 410,000 displaced) allowed protection. "Ethnic considerations were not dropped even in this attempt to assist those who had been persecuted on ethnic grounds." (Ibid) The *moral failure* related to its inaction has haunted the United States ever since the end of the World War II, as the US prefers perceiving itself as a bastion of "democracy and human rights, in strong contrast to the openly racist regime they opposed" (Alba/Nee 2003:169).

The restrictive immigration response, extending back to the racist immigration policies of the 1920s, lasted until the 1960s. The US did not enjoy a post-war reconstruction boom like Germany. The US economy was relatively weak between the 1950s and 1960s (Harris 2002). Throughout this period the US continued to practice an inconsistent immigration response, as it imposed ethnocentric immigration policies, preferring certain migrant populations to others. For instance, Chinese citizens had long been unwelcome in the United States as immigrants until they joined the Allied cause. "The affront posed by the US immigration policy was symbolically unacceptable once the Chinese were fighting and dying on behalf of the Allied cause." (Alba/Nee 2003:169) With the aim of currying favor with its new wartime ally, Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943 and gave China a nominal quota of 105 Chinese immigrants per year, symbolically opening the door to China (Fetzer 2000; Alba/Nee 2003). Around the same time, Japanese Americans were being interned in camps along the West Coast, an unjust action supported by the Supreme Court. In 1952, the race-based ban was also implemented with the McCarran-Walter Act, referred to as the Immigration Act of 1952, which prevented Asians from immigrating to the US.

While Asians were targeted with exclusionary policies, the US entered into an agreement with Mexico, allowing Mexican seasonal workers to enter America on a temporary basis in order to fill labor market gaps, particularly in agriculture and the low-skilled sector following the war.

This guest worker policy was referred to as the Bracero Program and remained in place until 1964. Having observed the wealth of the United States, these seasonal workers spread the word, persuading many more Mexicans to immigrate to the US. The tendency was to enter the US illegally even though labor recruitment was supposed to take place in Mexico. "This early form of amnesty even had its own demeaning sobriquet: it was known as 'drying out the wetbacks,' 'wetbacks' being a derogatory name for Mexican illegals[245] (who were all imagined to have swum across the Rio Grande)." (Alba/Nee 2003: 173) This marked a period in which Mexican workers were consistently the largest source of immigrants entering the US, in part due to the absence of any numerical quotas. This also exemplifies the US' lax policy on illegal entry as long as it helped fill labor market needs.

The response of the authorities, however, is often not aligned with the attitudes of the mainstream. Despite the obvious need for agricultural workers, nativist sentiment nonetheless abounded. A 19-year old Mexican cherry picker, recruited through the US Bracero Program, was shot and killed in 1942 by a Michigan sheriff as a result of a practical joke the young man had played on a white female co-worker; young Chicanos were also stripped and beaten by white sailors "with the tacit approval or active collaboration of Los Angeles police" (Fetzer 2000:38); and by 1943, Mexico refused to send Texas any more *braceros*, since abuses there against Mexicans had become so severe. Extensive public opposition toward refugees and immigrants heightened at this time.

Throughout the Cold War era, US immigration policy came increasingly under scrutiny, as greater pressure emerged to become *ideologically superior* to Communist states. This meant that the apparent contradictions in public rhetoric on immigration and the actual unfair treatment of *racial* minorities began gaining more critical attention, with a resulting government duty to respond to balance policy and practice (Alba/Nee 2003). The race- and nationality-based policy began to raise doubts about the democratic and tolerant self-image the US had of itself.[246] This period also raised attention to America's inability to respond to the temporary waves of new refugees and further exposed the economic need for immigrant labor, especially in the low-skilled sectors (Alba/Nee 2003).

Eventually, by 1945, public sentiment toward immigrants had become more *sympathetic*, with a more *moderate* view of Chinese immigrants, a decline in anti-Semitism, and a general view that refugees should be provided temporary housing. "Mass nativism seems to have fallen

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[245] This is a direct quote. In my opinion, no person is illegal and references to them as such, should cease.
[246] The race-based ban in the McCarran-Walter Act, preventing Asians from naturalizing and immigrating, was rescinded at this time. As such, small quotas of Filipinos and Asian Indians became eligible in 1946 for naturalization.

steadily from 1946 to 1965." (Fetzer 2000:39) Discriminatory and racist propaganda, however, continued, with signs stating "No Japs Welcome," smear campaigns against Puerto Ricans and Mexicans claiming they are *uncivilized* and *infected with tuberculosis and venereal disease*, as well as ongoing opposition to displaced persons following the war (Fetzer 2000). Yet despite these cases, there was an overall reduction in mass nativism at this time, with even an easing of the entry restrictions, particularly for purposes of family reunification.

> "Asians born outside the United States were no longer 'aliens ineligible for citizenship' and annual quotas were established for the various Asian nationalities previously lacking them. The law further contributed to immigration from Asia by allowing American citizens to bring their spouses into the country outside of any national origins quota." (Alba/Nee 2003:172)

While this mainly affected Japanese and Korean women who had married American servicemen, an important outcome with long-term effects on the immigration system after 1965 emerged, namely, that "reunification of close family members with their US citizen relatives was not to be restricted by quotas" (Alba/Nee 2003:172). Entitled to greater privileges under this Act, migrants of Asian descent, particularly Chinese, Filipinos and Asian-Indians brought their family members as non-quota immigrants after they naturalized themselves. Family members of permanent residents composed the greatest number of newcomers during this period, as family members were exempt from numerical limitations (Fetzer 2000), and were given highest priority (Alba/Nee 2003). Immigration, mostly from Mexico and Puerto Rico, also expanded from "a fifth of all legal immigrants in the 1950s" to "two-fifths by 1965" (Fetzer 2000:39).

John Kennedy - an Irish Catholic from a previously targeted religious group - was voted in as President in 1960, marking a sea of change in public sentiments. The 1960s brought more optimistic and *racially progressive* changes. The civil rights movement pushed race relations forward and inspired significant changes in the field of immigration (Alba/Nee 2003:174). "The political parties' campaign platforms, moreover, gradually changed from being silent or anti-immigration in the early 1940s to praising immigration in the early 1960s." (Fetzer 2000:40) Beyond just praising immigrants, claims were made in 1960 by the Republican politicians no less, to *double* the number of immigrants accepted into the country each year. Ongoing attention was paid to making immigration policies more equitable (Simon/Alexander 1993:26 in Fetzer 2000:42). By 1965 Congress had dropped the national-origins system altogether. Between 1945 and 1965, the number of immigrants and refugees increased from around 38,000 to close to 300,000 legal immigrants annually (Fetzer 2000). Throughout the 19th Century, immigration to the US was thus driven largely by push factors in Europe, in addition to goals of "settling a largely unsettled territory" (Terrazas 2011:2).

4. Changes in Numbers and Origins of Migrants after the 1965 Immigration Act

There was a noticeable increase in immigration numbers and national diversity following the passage of the Immigration Act in 1965, which, following Kennedy's assassination, likely had as deep an impact on American society as the Civil Rights laws (Alba/Nee 2003). Also known as the Hart-Celler Act, the 1965 Immigration Act introduced the uniform annual quota of 200,000 for each country in the Eastern Hemisphere,[247] and did away with the system of national origin quotas, thus stopping the *cloning* of the single *American race* (Ibid). Family reunification was expected to compose 80 percent of the immigrant visa quota at this time (Harris 2002). By 1976, total immigration was capped each year at 170,000 for the Eastern Hemisphere and 120,000 for the Western Hemisphere (Alba/Nee 2003). This new era of mass immigration dramatically increased the diversity of ethnic groups in American society and contributed to the economic growth and development of the country. This fact is what continues today to shape the near *proud* stance of the US as an immigration country.

After the liberalization of the immigration laws in the 1960s, the number of European immigrants decreased (due to the abolition of the act's quota system and increased Western European prosperity). The proportion of Asian and Latin American immigrants grew dramatically (Terrazas 2011), as did the number of immigrants from the Caribbean (Alba/Nee 2003).[248] Not surprisingly, at this time nativism remained muted (Fetzer 2000). Despite the legal change in 1965, easing the entry of many immigrants, a politicized selection and exclusion process appears nonetheless to have existed during this period, which is evident by the variances in government and public responses toward the different immigrant groups entering US territory.[249]

The largest immigrant population to the US was composed first by Mexicans, followed by Filipinos and then Chinese. A considerable number of migrants also came at this time from the East and West Indies, Vietnam, Korea, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, El Salvador and Haiti. Generally, the trend was to enable more skilled workers access to the country, which was further influenced by the relations the US had with the immigrants' or refugees' countries of origin, their educational and socioeconomic background, as well as their reasons for coming - whether as

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[247] Quotas for the Western Hemisphere were introduced in the 1976 Immigration Act.

[248] In the 1970s, 59.7 percent of the immigrants came from Europe while 27.4 percent were Asian and Latin American immigrants. Close to 30 years later, only 12.7 came from Europe and 80.8 percent came from Latin America and Asia (Terrazas 2011).

[249] Despite the decrease of European arrivals, in the early 1970s Soviet Jews sought refuge in the US and many Irish immigrants overstayed their visas. The difference in government response to the undocumented Asian and Mexican migrants compared to the illegal Irish was that many of the Irish immigrants received an amnesty during this period (Fetzer 2000). The Irish benefited from their white skin color: they more readily "climbed the socioeconomic ladder and mixed residentially with other whites," resulting in the fading of their perceived distinctiveness from the majority (Alba/Nee 2003:132).

asylees, refugees, or labor, professional, or entrepreneurial migrants or via family reunification. The following overview of different migrations waves to the US and the different policy responses applied illustrate the ambiguities and inconsistencies of US policies toward the different groups of newcomers. It further displays the varying modes of integration possibilities attributed to the different ethnic groups.

Beginning with the largest ethnic group in the US, the main gate of entry for Mexican immigrants after the 1965 Immigration Act has been illegal border crossings. Between 1972 and 1996 Mexico was the source of 95 percent of unauthorized workers apprehended in the US (Portes/Rumbaut 1996). These large flows of immigrants from Mexico, both legal and illegal, show the difficulty of national governments to *control* migration movements, a trend that is likely to continue (Alba/Nee 2003). The attempt instead has thus been to *manage* migration movements. How seriously the government applies this strategy, however, is closely related to labor market needs at the moment.[250]

The main areas of settlement for this ethnic group were mainly in Los Angeles, followed by El Paso, and Houston, and Chicago. The second main entry channel has been through family reunification or marriage to US citizens or legal residents, as spouses are automatically entitled legal entry through marriage and are exempt from quota limits. The same is true for children or parents of US citizens. In 1987, 50,793 of the 72,351 (70.2 percent) Mexican immigrants arriving legally to the US were exempt from quota limits as spouses, children, or parents of US citizens. The third main route of entry for Mexican immigrants has been to move as contract laborers. As part of the provision to the 1965 Immigration Act, this allowed for the entry of domestic workers in times of high demand, after the Secretary of Labor confirmed the legitimate need for foreign workers, which was both maintained and liberalized by the 1986 reform (Portes/Rumbaut 1996).[251] Although nativism had decreased remarkably, by 1979 the FAIR campaign (Federation of American Immigration Reform) had crystallized, arguing the case to make English the official US language. In 1984 white blue collar workers rioted against Latinos in Massachusetts. Until 1986 even the liberal *New York Times*, usually taking a pro-immigrant stance, reported about the undocumented Mexicans, Haitian refugees, and immigration in general in restrictionist terms (Alba/Nee 2003; Fetzer 2000).

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[250] Considering the size and illegal entry to the US, serious doubt exists, questioning the earnestness of the US on illegal entry and irregular work.

[251] Immigration from Mexico and other Latin American countries became more difficult following the 1965 Immigration Act. Prior to this migration was initiated by US growers and railroad companies, leading to waiting lists to emigrate (Alba/Nee 2003). The Mexican immigrants tended to be young, ranging in age from 20 to 40, with low education levels. They made up a large share of the workforce, largely in agriculture and based primarily along the border, in Texas and California (Harris 2002).

Like other Asian immigrants to the US, Filipinos came as economic migrants with the intention of eventually returning home. Several waves of Filipino immigrants entered the US during this period, marking the second largest ethnic group to the US (Alba/Nee 2003). The first wave was employed mainly in agriculture, making up the foundation for migrant labor in agriculture and working as household servants.[252] They worked long shifts, established a reputation for being independent, and attempted to save as much money as possible. They did not send for their spouses to join them, nor did they move into self-employment, or join forces within the community to strengthen their own ethnic economy. "Instead they remained on the lowest rungs of the labor force, where few earned enough to accumulate savings that would enable them to return to the Philippines." (Alba/Nee 2003:206)[253] As was frequently the case, immigration resumed after the 1965 Immigration Act, which marks the second wave of Filipino immigration. This was composed of professionals and technical workers (many nurses and medical doctors), who were accompanied by their families and arrived with the aim of settling. Compared to the earlier wave of Filipinos this group assimilated quickly and easily, almost *invisibly*, acquiring mainstream jobs and living in suburbs. This has much to do with the labor market demands of the US and the Filipinos' ability to fill the gaps. This also implies the importance of education, as well as their willingness to adopt the norms and values of the receiving society as a means by which to become *successfully* integrated. Further examples of this US expectation of migrants are evident in the experiences of the later waves of Chinese, Koreans and East Indians.

After suffering years of discrimination and marginalization under the Chinese Exclusion Act, not until after World War II did Chinese immigrants begin to benefit from less restrictive legislation. This change was evident with the first quota during the war, the War Brides Act, (which permitted American-born Chinese veterans to unite with their spouses in China), the permanent residency offered Chinese students after the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, the McCarran-Walter Act in 1952, and especially the 1965 Immigration Act, which allowed more than 1.3 million legal Chinese immigrants to enter the US between 1968 and 2000 (Alba/Nee 2003). Prior to this, the Chinese were confronted with years of exclusionary entrance laws, prohibiting them from immigrating to the US and preventing those already in the US from

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[252] Filipinos acquired American national legal status after Spain ceded the Philippines to the US in 1896. While the Filipinos did not attain US citizenship, they were protected from the exclusionary legislation that targeted other Asian immigrants. As a result, following the exclusionary Immigration Act of 1924, single Filipino laborers arrived in the US to fill the labor gaps left as a result of the exclusion of the Japanese, Koreans, and South Asians.

[253] Violent riots with police forces, competition with white farm owners and laborers, and interracial marriages between white women and Filipinos generated anti-Filipino sentiment, culminating in the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934, which sought to stop Filipino immigration to the US (Fetzer 2000).

benefiting from naturalization rights.[254] "Moreover, as non-whites, they could not testify in court, a rule that increased their vulnerability to racist violence." (Ibid, p. 200) Prevented from most means by which to gain economic capital, Chinese men (few Chinese women had immigrated to the US) were concentrated in areas that presented no threat of competition to white businesses and workers; the Chinese began specialty shops, laundry businesses, domestic services and tourism (Ibid).[255] Their situation improved remarkably after the 1965 Immigration Act, starting the third largest immigration wave to the US. The new Chinese immigrants were more diverse than earlier generations, who had come largely from rural areas. The new migrants came from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and Mainland China. Many were highly educated professionals and many were able to attend US universities, find work in mainstream businesses and reside in suburbia. This wave is deemed as well integrated and exemplary migrants. Despite their success, cases of xenophobia also emerged targeting Chinese migrants, for instance, in 1982 when a Chinese American was beaten to death in Detroit.

A similar outcome emerged with the second wave of immigrants from India, which began after the passage of the 1965 Immigration Act.[256] By 2000, more than 800,000 Indians had settled in the United States; together with their children combined with the earlier wave. They constituted a group of more than 1.6 million (Alba/Nee 2003). Highly educated, fluent in English, these urban cosmopolitans have adjusted smoothly in the US, living in ethnically mixed neighborhoods, and easily passing on their human-cultural capital from one generation to the next. They work in finance, healthcare, hospitality, and retail trade, and they have further established niches in municipal bureaucracy (Ibid). According to researchers such as Chiswick (1978), and LaLonde and Topel (1990), after nearly 10 years of stay, the average earnings of educated immigrants in the US are expected to surpass those of natives (Enchautegui/Sparrow 1997). Having refrained from establishing visible ethnic communities, East Indians have made great effort to assimilate and mix with the mainstream, leading some researchers to examine

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[254] Initially, Chinese immigration to the US had been permitted and Chinese were welcome. Chinese miners and merchants began entering California after the gold rush in 1848, when they began building a "diversified ethnic economy" in San Francisco, working in retail, services and light manufacturing. The Chinese became active as labor contractors were in demand; they became the "mainstay of the workforce that built the transcontinental railroad from California through the Sierra Nevada into Utah, and Chinese labor developed California's early agricultural economy" (Alba/Nee 2003:200). Over 63,000 Chinese were living on the West coast by 1870. But after a period in which white gold miners complained about competition, a series of restrictive policies began against the Chinese, which intended to curb their entrepreneurialism, labor market competition and entrance to the US.

[255] After the destruction of their records in the 1906 earthquake, many Chinese immigrant men claimed that they had been born in the US, which enabled them to resettle their family members to the US. As a result, some families enjoyed multiple generations of *fake* relatives immigrating to the US.

[256] The first wave of Indians is composed of a small number of East Indians, residing in the US prior to the 1924 Immigration Act who tended to be male sojourners, working on farms along the West Coast and replacing the elderly Asian workers. Despite recognition of their Aryan origin, Indians were not recognized as white and thus became ineligible for naturalization. Without women, the Punjabi presence in California nearly died out by the mid-1960s (Alba/Nee 2003).

whether this is an essential variable for successful acculturation and/or integration in the US (Portes/Rumbaut 1996).

Korean immigrants have also been described positively as a result of their ethnic entrepreneurism. The number of Korean immigrants had remained small prior to the 1965 Immigration Act. From 1976 to 1990, however, an average of 30,000 to 35,000 Korean immigrants arrived annually to the US. By the late 1980s Koreans ranked among the top five immigrant groups (Alba/Nee 2003). Coming predominantly from middle-class families and highly educated with postgraduate degrees from Korea, these immigrants arrived with vast cultural capital. Encouraged to emigrate as a result of modern urbanization in Korea, they came mainly from Seoul. Their focus in the US was on exports, which contributed greatly to furthering economic development in Korea. They tended to remain within their tight knit ethnic community while in the US and are known for their high self-employment rate, concentrating in specific niches, such as dry cleaning, garment subcontracting, green groceries, liquor and food stores, etc. (Ibid). "For each of these niches, there is a Korean business association that provides valuable services for its members, including group insurance, tax advice, legal services, and business seminars. The business associations also promote ethnic solidarity." (Alba/Nee 2003:205) Despite their relative success in the US as ethnic entrepreneurs, as the South Korean economy grew, more than half the Korean immigrants returned to Korea in the 1990s (Ibid), illustrating circular migration.

Another example of the inconsistent government policies can be observed by the US response to the different waves of Vietnamese migrants. Following the 1965 Immigration Act, large numbers of Vietnamese began arriving to the US, particularly after 1975, coming as refugees from South Vietnam.[257] More than 86,000 Vietnamese were airlifted out of South Vietnam as the US military pulled out its forces. By 1985, there were 643,000 Vietnamese in the US, of which close to 130,000 came through the US refugee resettlement program (Alba/Nee 2003). This initial wave of refugees tended to be well-educated with some English fluency, and mostly Christian, which served to ease their transition and acceptance into the US mainstream. The contrast from this group was evident by the thousands of so-called *boat people*, who fled their Vietnamese villages and escaped Communist rule in 1977. This wave was composed mainly of urban middle-class, usually unable to speak English, and less Westernized than the earlier wave. Enroute to safety, many were attacked by pirates, their possessions plundered, the women raped, and the men killed. Many others drowned in storms at sea. Survivors ended up in refugee camps in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong, where they applied for resettlement to the US

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[257] Only 600 Vietnamese were living as students, diplomats, and language instructors in the US prior to 1965.

and Europe. After their arrival in the US, many found work and despite their odds, quickly adapted. Yet, in some regions of the US, outright hostility and racism broke out, targeting this second wave of refugees. For instance, in the early 1980s Vietnamese fishermen encountered violent opposition from white competitors in the Gulf of Mexico and the Ku Klux Clan also tried to mobilize anti-Vietnamese sentiment, raising rumors about new arrivals of Vietnamese refugees.

Yet another example of varying government policies can be found in the US response to the Anti-Castro Cuban refugees in the 1960s and again following the *Mariel boatlift* from Cuba in the early 1980s. Between 1959 and 1994 nearly all Cubans able to reach US territory were taken in as refugees and granted generous government assistance. The first waves of Cuban refugees able to take advantage of this tended to bring cultural capital with them, largely coming from Havana and other Cuban cities, with high educational levels. "They also tended to be light-skinned, a fact of no small significance, given the fateful role of skin color in the country they were entering." (Alba/Nee 2003:189) Their cultural capital contributed in helping them quickly gain economic mobility and success in the US. The Cuban Adjustment Act in 1966 contributed in their attaining permanent resident status with options to naturalize.[258]

The second wave of Cuban refugees arrived between 1965 and 1973. Not all of these refugees were granted entry, however, as both governments were regulating the selection process. Cuba watched to ensure that not all of its most skilled and/or young, military-age men were leaving, while the US mainly monitored whether candidates had relatives already living in the US. This preference to select Cubans with relatives already settled in the US was attributed in part to the anticipated practical and emotional support the newcomers would receive at little cost to the state (similar to the Bosnian refugees).

The third wave of Cuban refugees began in 1980, as Castro encouraged thousands of Cubans to move to US shores. "This wave was stigmatized in the minds of Americans by the allegations that the Cuban regime was using this means to get rid of many criminals and other undesirable elements." (Alba/Nee 2003:191) In many cases, criminalization and imprisonment in Cuba were related to political opposition to Castro's regime. Yet, this third wave also included black Cubans, who may have contributed to the stigmatization associated with this group. In the years following, Cubans continued to flee, risking their lives in so doing. By 1994, President Clinton reversed the policy, declaring that the US would no longer accept Cuban refugees.

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[258] The institutional realm greeting this first wave of Cuban's in addition to their high level of cultural capital is comparable to the situation of the Bosnian refugees. Even the Cuban Refugee Program seems similar to aid granted the Bosnians, as it provided 1.4 billion in resettlement aid to the Cubans, some of which was used as small business loans (Alba/Nee 2003).

The US was also reluctant to acknowledge the Salvadorans as refugees, despite the civil war that started in 1970 and lasted 22 years. "The war involved atrocities committed by both sides, often against the civilian population, causing many to flee the country. Consequently, during the 1980s the number of legal immigrants soared to more than 200,000 and the total immigration figure was considerably higher because of the large number of illegal immigrants known to have arrived." (Alba/Nee 2003:196) Seeking to bring US policy into line with international standards, the measure was intended with the Refugee Act of 1980 to eliminate the former practice of granting asylum only to escapees from Communist-controlled nations, to offer protection based on well-founded fears of persecution or physical harm. But the Reagan administration "continued to grant refugee status to escapees from Communism, primarily from Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, while making it difficult for others fleeing non-Communist regimes such as Guatemala and El Salvador" (Portes/Rumbaut 1996:23). Because El Salvador was a political ally of the US it was a political decision on the part of the US to offer the Salvadorans less protection than it did for the Cubans. As the fleeing Salvadorans learned of this, few applied for US asylum, knowing they had few chances for recognition. As such, many became classified as *illegal aliens*, forcing them to live precariously while in the US.

By the 1980s, a number of refugees from Central America were smuggled into the country with the help of the Sanctuary Movement. In defiance of what in their view was a politically biased US refugee policy, the members of the Sanctuary Movement sheltered the refugees in churches and synagogues (Fetzer 2000). After 1990, the US set up a review system in the face of lobbying by Central American advocates. This resulted in a slight increase in acceptances of Salvadorans, yet the number remained below 50 percent (Alba/Nee 2003). Eventually, around 150,000 undocumented Salvadorans already in the US were able to benefit from the amnesty provisions of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), allowing them to regularize their situation under law. This law aimed primarily to discourage the *surreptitious component* of the flow of legal and illegal migrant workers while "compensating employers by liberalizing access to legal temporary workers" (Portes/Rumbaut 1996:14). Once legalized, relatives could be brought in, resulting in the increase in Salvadoran immigrants in the 1990s (Ibid). This did not ensure protection for all of the Salvadorans in the US, however. Some remained undocumented, while others were continuously granted from 1990 to 1994 a temporary status with multiple renewals and extensions. Salvadorans are known to work in the underground service sector or on the margins of the legitimate economy in the US, doing landscaping, cooking, housekeeping, or working as janitors or child-care domestics (Alba/Nee 2003).

Another group that encountered restrictive access to the US was the Haitians. With requests for asylum, the first boat-full of upper class, educated Haitians, in opposition to the Duvalier

regime, arrived along the Florida coastline in 1963 only to be returned by the INS to Haiti. After Kennedy's death, the US response to Haitian immigrants became more restrictive as President Johnson focused attention on fighting Communism rather than dealing with human rights violations. Because Duvalier joined forces with the US in opposing Fidel Castro, the US *overlooked* the injustices taking place in Haiti and enforced a restrictive immigration policy against Haitians. Despite this, under the terms of the 1965 Immigration Act, around 7,000 Haitians each year became permanent US residents, while another 20,000 entered the US on a temporary basis. Many of these immigrants simply overstayed their visas as a result of the political tensions in Haiti (Alba/Nee 2003).

Meanwhile, boatloads of middle class Haitians set sail to US shores, many of whom never arrived or arrived only to be returned to Haiti by INS officials. Not until the late 1970s and early 1980s, did the new arrivals of Haitian boat people along the Florida coastline begin attracting public attention. Despite this and the steady new arrivals, political asylum was rarely granted. Rather, between 1991 and 1994, the US Coast Guard spent thousands of dollars daily in an attempt to intercept and return the Haitians to their homeland before they reached US shores. The legality of the Haitian interdiction program was resolved and endorsed by the Supreme Court, based on the inapplicability of the refoulement of refugees at sea (Legomsky 1998). The US response toward the Haitians exemplifies its attempt to control migration by concentrating efforts on interdiction programs, preventing immigrants and asylum applicants alike from reaching US territory, and thus avoiding investigation, adjudication, detention and removal (Ibid). This approach saved time and money but also attracted less negative public attention, as this inhumane response was less visible to the wider public when taking place at high seas. As such, many Haitians did not manage to reach the US territory. The few who did tended to by passively admitted, albeit illegally.

An additional strategy of the US was to raise public fear by alleging health threats linked to the Haitians. Similar to the tactics used to target Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, the Haitians were also rumored to have tuberculosis. They were also identified in the early 1980s by the Centers for Disease Control as one of the primary groups at risk for AIDS. Despite the eventual removal from this categorization, the Food and Drug Administration continued to refuse blood donations from those of Haitian origin. This led to biases and greater challenges for them in finding work in food and healthcare industries. Today, Haitians continue to face adaptation challenges in the US due to the restrictions in their legal status, coming from an impoverished nation, their black skin color and rampant class and racial discrimination. They are mainly populated in Florida, New York, Massachusetts and Illinois. They tend to fare better in the Northeast and Midwest than in Florida, but this tendency was called into question in 1997 after Abner Louima was

battered and sexually assaulted in a New York City police precinct. Many find strength in their religious beliefs and cultural values linked to their homeland (Alba/Nee 2003).

Like the Haitians, the Dominicans, also experienced exclusionary treatment. Despite the dictator regime in the Dominican Republic at the time, the Dominicans were not initially recognized as a legitimate refugee group. This resulted in limits in their legal immigration to the US throughout the 1960s. Not until 1969 were 10,000 Dominicans granted legal entry for the first time. By 1983, this number rose to 20,000 and remained close to 40,000 by the mid 1990s. This process appears to have been fairly selective with a preference for young, urban immigrants with a high educational background (Portes/Rumbaut 1996; Alba/Nee 2003). Despite their cultural capital, the Dominicans are known to have faced disadvantages in the US labor market. Reasons for this have been attributed in part due to their density in the New York area with frequent low-income pockets, their less than high educational average compared to other migrant groups in the US, their insecure legal status, and disadvantages related to their skin color (Alba/Nee 2003).

A similar restrictive stance was applied to West Indians and Jamaicans. "Race severely constrains the ability of Jamaicans and other West Indians to translate the initial economic advantages they attain as immigrants into residential advantages with long-run consequences." (Alba/Nee 2003:199)[259] In order to deal with prejudice and racism in the US, many first generation West Indians often relied on the values and identities anchored in their home countries. Yet by the 1990s, this protective mechanism had proven to be more difficult for second and third generation West Indians, as ties to their parents' or grandparents' country of origin were further removed. Overall, they tended to face a variety of obstacles in their settlement patterns in the US.

Evident by this overview of the main ethnic groups and migration waves to the US between the 1960s and 1990s, the US not only represents diversity[260] but also inconsistency in its immigration legislation and treatment of migrants and refugees. Throughout this era, a multitude of young, able-bodied immigrants, mainly men, willing to take on jobs, even low-skilled work, entered the US and remained.

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[259] Jamaican immigrants had to go through a hierarchical hiring practice to determine whether employing them would cause adverse affects on US natives (similar to Germany's *Vorrangprinzip*). Only after being certified by the US Labor Department were they eligible to fill labor market gaps. Women were more likely to be certified to work as domestics. Some accepted these roles as a means by which to enter the US, and later bring their families with them and attain jobs more in line with their skills and qualifications.

[260] According to the 2000 US census, the list of identifiable ethnic groups grew to include nearly every nationality represented in the United Nations, as well as subnational groups such as the Kurds. "This dazzling array of ethnic groups has made the United States arguably the most ethnically diverse country on the planet." (Alba/Nee 2003:214)

5. Evidence of Nativism and Inconsistent Treatment in the US

This section reviews the inconsistent immigration policies practiced by the US and the related nativism that emerged. Although the US promoted integration movements after 1965 and maintained low restrictionism between 1972 and 1978 (Fetzer 2000), the exception of claims in 1972 to halt the illegal entry of foreigners except for those *especially talented* clearly impacted a number of migration populations, particularly evident among the non-white migrants and certain refugee groups, who were less likely to be received. This tendency appears to be an ongoing policy response by the US to pick and choose who is allowed entry rights and legal access to resources, largely based on race and ethnicity, education levels and qualifications, and different expectations the US had about the migrant populations according to their countries of origin.

The main element influencing nativist responses to foreigners throughout this period seems to be closely interlinked with the US economic situation. Immigration was typically encouraged to fill labor market gaps but in times of financial decline, restrictivist, nativist tendencies frequently emerged. For instance, with the exception of the fatal beating of an Asian Indian in 1987, restrictionist trends changed into a phase of rapid growth to being more tolerant between 1986 and 1990. "Tax reductions, larger defense budgets (with correspondingly larger budget deficits), and low savings rates fueled steady economic expansion from late 1982 to 1990." (Fetzer 2000:43) As the US experienced a scarcity of workers in the 1990s, employers pressured the government to allow the entry of more skilled workers from abroad. In response, highly skilled workers were allowed temporary visas in line with the 1998 legislation, but these were quickly exhausted. "Since at least the late 19th century, growing public US investments in education have propelled a shift in labor demand toward skill-intensive industries." (Terrazas 2011:2) In the subsequent years, the visa allowance was increased, mainly in an attempt to fill the IT specialist gap needed in the Silicon Valley. "Twelve-and-a-half percent of America's immigrants in the 1990s had graduate degrees, compared to 10 percent of Americans." (Harris 2002:18) In connection to Congress' increase in the number of visas allotted to scarce skilled workers, around three percent of the visas were granted to people from Britain and the Philippines, four percent to Canadians, 10 percent to Chinese, and around 43 percent to Indians (Ibid), highlighting the ethnic backgrounds of the skilled immigrants.

Despite the US attempt to manage migration flows by easing entry rights to educated, skilled, and particular *preferred* migrant groups, illegal migration movements soared at this time. There were nearly 12 million (8.8 million legal, and an estimated 2.8 million undocumented) immigrants living in the US by the 1990s, by which time immigrants made up about a quarter of the US workforce (Harris 2002). By 1993, 1.29 million migrants were identified as having

entered the country without inspection and without proper entry rights. The majority (97 percent) of these illegal border crossers were from Mexico (Portes/Rumbaut 1996).

> "By 1993, an identical 93 percent of the 69,784 legal Mexican immigrants who arrived in that year entered under family preferences or as immediate relatives of US citizens. An additional 56,777 were also legalized in 1993 under IRCA's amnesty provisions, of whom 69 percent were immediate family members who entered as 'legalization dependents' under a provision of the Immigration Act of 1990." (Portes/Rumbaut 1996:15)

The 1990 Gulf War caused increases in oil prices however, causing another recession that lasted until 1991 (Fetzer 2000). In response, opposition to low- and unskilled immigration rose again between 1991 and 1998. In 1994, California passed the anti-undocumented-immigrant Proposition 187 to combat the illegal entry of labor migrants by barring illegal immigrants' access to public services (Fetzer 2000; Portes/Rumbaut 1996).[261] According to David Martin (1998), if the US had a more effective deportation system and had improved related internal controls, much of the public backing would have subsided for Proposition 187, which epitomized the angry backlashes and immigrant scapegoating that accompanied the recession at the time.

After the implementation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), which was supposedly designed to curb migration from Mexico to the US by developing employment options in the south, the most draconian measures to stop illegal migration soon followed (Harris 2002).[262] Embodied in the 1996 Act, border patrols increased and the fortification of the border was strengthened. Yet, illegal migration was not eliminated. "The long boom in the US economy proved far more powerful in attracting workers from the south than the border controls in stopping them." (Harris 2002:108-9) [263]

For a long time, employers were also free from legal sanctions or liability for hiring undocumented workers, since the migrants themselves bore the consequences, including as well the dangers and expenses of their journeys. As such, thousands of undocumented workers continued to be hired and exploited with no penalties to the employers. Instead, the 1986 sanction schemes conveyed the message to employers that it was more problematic for them to discriminate than it was to employ unauthorized workers. Not until recently, with the Obama

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[261] President Clinton also ended the policy accepting all Cuban refugees at this time (Alba/Nee 2003).

[262] NAFTA is a perfect example of neoliberal policies that have had a disastrous effect on the lives of workers globally, as it cost millions of US workers their jobs in 1994, led to the intensification in wealth inequalities, increasing the poverty rate across Mexico, the United States, and Canada, and has further resulted in deforestation all over North America (Porfilio 2007).

[263] The character of Mexican immigration has not changed much in recent decades, as Mexican immigrants continue to represent the largest supply of low-wage labor coming to the United States (Alba/Nee 2003). Because their modest earnings consistently meet or surpass the average earning standard for the Mexican population (Portes/Rumbaut 1996) they continue to arrive with hopes of achieving the American dream, even if it takes them 20 years (Harris 2002).

Presidency has greater effort been taken to sanction employers who hire undocumented workers.[264]

Generally, as long as work is available in the US, new immigrant entries will continue, whether through legal means or not. Even Republican President George W. Bush admitted the need for unskilled or low-skilled laborers, including undocumented workers, when he proposed that an estimated nine to 12 million undocumented workers living in the US become eligible for green cards and an eventual amnesty. Although this led to immediate controversy, provoking negative press and rage especially among Republicans, who criticized the notion of *rewarding illegals* with amnesties, the President managed to convince his opponents of the value of both the low-skilled workers and such an amnesty to employers and the US economy.

There is a current debate today as well regarding undocumented youth. The focus is on whether efforts should be made to deport them or to grant amnesties. Supporters argue that as children, they were not involved in their parents' decision to enter the US illegally and should not be punished now. Republicans denounce policy suggestions that would allow them to remain, criticizing the Obama administration for enabling *backdoor amnesties* to *illegal immigrants*. White House officials emphasize the aim of reviewing individual cases - case by case - and not to grant relief to a whole class of people. Standards meant to distinguish low- and high-priority cases would be used for this, meaning, low-priority cases would be granted amnesties if they arrived to the US as children, know no other home, attended school here, and hope to pursue higher educations and contribute to society, as they are deemed potentially useful. The others who *pose a threat to society* would be quickly deported. The government will review 300,000 cases of people in deportation proceedings under the new policy in order to delineate between those qualifying for relief and those to be expelled (Pear 2011). Reasons why they may pose a threat to society remain vague, but it is likely connected to their financial situation, i.e. whether they are contributing into the system or potentially costing the government money.

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[264] Known for its many flaws in the design of employer sanctions and partly due to inconsistencies in responses toward undocumented and low-skilled workers, President Obama has been actively trying to change the US approach to illegal employment, so that employers are now penalized more than ever before.

Appendix M: Cultural Capital in Chicago

Table 3: Employment Developments of Chicago Interlocutors

Participant	Education / Previous job in Bosnia	First job in Chicago	Number of jobs while in Chicago	Current job
1. Anita	Completed high school in Germany	TJ Max department store, then lab assistant	2-3 jobs	Computer instructor
2. Arif	Complete medical school and was in training to become a vascular surgeon in Bosnia	Unloading trucks, then construction, house cleaning, then case management and translation work while learning English and studying	"All kinds of jobs"	Child psychologist
3. Beba	Cosmetic saleswoman and shop manager in Bosnia	-	-	Receiving disability benefits; retired since in US
4. Behar	BS as Civil Engineer in Bosnia	Medical billing	2-3 jobs	Senior caseworker for refugees
6. Dino	BS as Mechanical Engineer in Chicago	Started grade school upon arrival	Many odd jobs	Mechanical engineer is first full-time job.
7. Edna	BS Civil Engineer in Bosnia	Began her Masters in Chicago, interrupted it for her husband's studies	2-3 jobs	Instructional service coordinator
8. Ema	Completed high school in Bosnia	Assembler at Motorola	3-4 jobs	Immigration counselor
9. Kata	No schooling	-	-	Unemployed, on disability
10. Kemal	Some college in Bosnia	Construction, painting	3 jobs	Graphic designer / productionist
11. Mali	Completed electronic trade school in Bosnia	Printing job	2 jobs	CAD operator
12. Meho	Military university sports professor	Construction	2-3 jobs	Retired cleaner
13. Melisa	BS in Political Science in Chicago	Started high school upon arrival	Odd jobs	2 jobs: community organizer, real estate agent, making up first full-time work.
14. Nena	Completed high school in Bosnia	Housekeeping at O'Hare airport	2-3 jobs	Hair salon and beautician shop owner
15. Sara	College degree in Child Pedagogy in Bosnia	Children's daycare at refugee resettlement agency	1 job	Children's daycare at refugee resettlement agency
16. Suzana	Degree as music teacher in Bosnia	Undeclared	5-6 jobs	Mental health case manager for refugees
17. Rada	Middle school in Bosnia	-	-	Unemployed, cares for grandchildren
18. Valten	PhD student in Slavic studies in Chicago	-	-	PhD student with scholarship
19. Zina	Nursing degree in Bosnia. Currently taking university classes toward degree	Child care / housecleaning	Many odd jobs	Currently 2 jobs: caseworker with homeless, nightshift for mentally ill
20. Zorak	BS as Mechanical Engineer in Bosnia	Construction, painting	Many odd jobs	Small business owner: construction/ remodeling

Appendix N: Cultural Capital in Berlin

Table 4: Employment Developments of Berlin Interlocutors

Participant	Education	Previous job in Bosnia	Initial labor market access in Berlin	Current job
1. Adin	Realabschluss Berlin	Too young to work	Too young to work, entered school system	Internship in hotel as part of job training *Ausbildung*
2. Bekr	n/a	Family-owned business	Denied access; learned to be Seamstress (*Schneider)* in Berlin	Freelance exhibit technician
3. Dubravka	Finance	Administration for business in Bosnia	Denied access	Disabled; retired
4. Irena	High school Bosnia	n/a	Denied access	Involved in *Stadtteilmütter* Job Training Program
5. Mere	Studied Law in Berlin	Too young to work	Too young to work, entered school system	Lawyer in training
6. Mirna	Studied Finance and Business at university in Bosnia	Volunteer work, street cleaner, translations	Denied access	Administrative support for NGO
7. Nafiz	Studied Political Science and Sociology at university in Bosnia	Freelance photographer	Denied access; eventually completed 1 year digital media certificate	Freelance photographer
8. Selma	Studies Law in Berlin	Too young to work	Too young to work, entered school system	Law student and part-time student-job at university
9. Sena	High school in Bosnia	n/a	Denied access	Involved in *Stadtteilmütter* Job Training Program
10. Slavco	Water, electricity installation in Bosnia	Installation and building *Meister*	Denied access	Freelance construction/ installation
11. Slobodan	Completed 12th grade at technical trade school in Yugoslavia	n/a	Denied access	Integration mediator for NGO
12. Zumra	Cooking school in Bosnia	Cooking chef	Denied access	Cleaning lady

Appendix O: Post-Migration Adaptation Process in Berlin

Table 5: Overview of obstacles and coping strategies

Category of obstacles	Adaptation obstacles	Coping strategies	Category of strategies
Practical/ Institutional obstacles	- unknowledgeable of legal rights upon initial arrival - inconsistent and chaotic dissemination of information flows by authorities - lack of mastery of surroundings - difficulties mastering Berlin's bureaucratic reception system - lack of initial language knowledge or language absorption over time - insufficient number of translators - lack of formalized language courses offered adults - temporary existence and insecure existence with Duldung - reliant on extension of Duldung, regularly meeting with Foreigners Office authorities - confronted with ongoing deportation threats with Duldung - forced to endure ambiguity and inconsistencies by authorities as well as indiscriminate treatment by Foreigners' Office staff members - restricted access to labor market - dependent on social welfare - structural demotion - financial restraints and challenges since living costs exceed welfare - restricted access to schooling, job training, university access - previous qualifications, skills, degrees not recognized - restricted access to healthcare - tendency of doctors prescribing anti-depressants rather than addressing the trauma causing the PTSD - restricted mobility, unable to visit family and friends outside Berlin - children forced to translate on behalf of parents - lack of a uniform housing policy - restricted access to private accommodation - reliant on state-run accommodation, often in poor conditions, rampant intercultural conflicts - assigned placement in collective accommodation facilities - forced to move frequently - dependent on emerging policy changes - lack of info on legal rights, resident status, and eligibility to obtain certain material goods - lack of documents verifying	- benefit from humanitarian protection and *Gastfreundlichkeit* of Germany - learn how and where to access social and structural support - attain information in regard to visas, resident status, welfare advice and overall practical guidance in surviving as a refugee in an unfamiliar context - acquire essential details and knowledge about German system, legal rights, as well as tasks necessary for *functioning* in Berlin - rely on special translators to avoid having children hear disturbing details of parents' war experiences - benefit from social service activities in housing facilities - benefit from state-run and non-profit agencies - benefit from small rent subsidies, furniture vouchers, state-run housing accommodation, and social welfare to cover basic living costs - learn strategies necessary for *functioning* as a refugee in Berlin - set practical goals and work towards achieving them - stay abreast of ongoing legal changes - find legal ways to remain in Berlin - seek legal advice and legal redress - rely on NGO advocates to facilitate better living conditions - negotiate on own behalf to improve poor housing conditions - rationalize why Foreigners' Office administration fosters different internal orders - bend the rules - rescind refugee status - avoid contact with members of own ethnic community to disengage from speaking mother tongue - keep busy by renovating flat - work black - seek legal advice and legal redress - marry a German native - strive towards normalcy - know the system - save money, be thrifty - rely on unofficial information exchanges - benefit from essential details and knowledge about system, legal	Practical (problem-oriented) coping strategies

	achievements due to suddenness of flight - for some, lack of previous schooling, degree or trade limited labor market viability and ease in German language absorption	changes, legal rights	
Socio-cultural obstacles	- inconsistent interactions with host society authorities, initially encountering sympathy and kindness; later hostility and an unwelcoming response, causing immense fear - limited exchanges with host society members due inadequate common language proficiency, intercultural differences, and lack of interest - unhealthy spatial distribution in housing facilities; traumas evoked due to shared space with ethnic *other* - intercultural conflicts in housing facilities, lack of intervention, support, poor hygiene - insufficient healthcare related to cultural biases - inadequate language proficiency for interactions with host society - marital conflicts - interfamily conflicts - youth forced to translate for adults - associate police with expulsions, criminalization, fear, anxiety	- seek initial support from family members - rely on relatives and friends as pull factor for exodus to Berlin - rely on authorities for financial and material support - rely on financial support of family members - rely on relatives and friends for translation, housing, important reception information - rely on informal word-of-mouth exchanges within so-called *ethnic community* - establish connections to other people and resources - rely on unofficial contacts to reduce inconsistent and chaotic dissemination of reception information - create support network - benefit from social services activities in housing facilities - rely on NGO advocates to facilitate better living conditions - attempt to be perfect refugee to avoid deportation - pursue German language classes - seek out contact with members of host society - immerse oneself in German media (television, radio, etc.) - pursue German language classes - seek out contact with members of host society - continue speaking Bosnian and rely on inner-group community, avoiding comparisons and competitions - avoid contact with members of own ethnic community to disengage from speaking mother tongue - know to whom to turn for essential information - negotiate on own behalf to improve poor housing conditions - rely on charities and religious organizations to respond to societal needs - excuse inconsistencies in refugee reception policy - immerse oneself in German media (television, radio, etc.) - avoid interactions with police - seek *recognition* from mainstream = cosmopolitanism - accept losses - overcome loss of loved ones - decide what chair to sit on	Protective (emotion-oriented) coping strategies

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			- forgive and move forward - reconstruct meanings (of home, past, identity, religious association, etc.) - be independent, self-determined, make a home and keep busy	
Emotional/ Psychosocial Individual obstacles	- lack of self-determination or influence on accommodation (external locus of control) - difficult *normalizing* their lives during adjustment process - emotional hardship associated with war trauma, deaths, torture, etc. - forced to deal with past losses and displacement - interference of government in private matters, i.e. denied right to return home for a funeral of family member - impossibility of leaving Germany to visit Bosnia caused much hardships - PTSD, traumatization, depression - isolation, particularly for those on their own - loss of faith in humanity due to war - associate police with expulsions, criminalization, fear, anxiety - associate Foreigners Office with expulsions, criminalization, fear, anxiety	- learn and practice application of coping skills - recall degree of agency as coping strategy - sense of gratitude/fortune for welfare benefits and state assistance - sense of gratitude/fortune if able to influence housing situation, acquire private bathroom - rationalize why Foreigners Office administration fosters different internal orders - accept differences in treatment by Foreigners Office administration - accept the structures of command - excuse inconsistencies in refugee reception policy - revere in speaking Bosnian - avoid inner-group community comparison and competition - find meaning in the world again - rely on inner strength, carrying on, recognizing own resilience, survival instincts - establish connections to other people and resources and creating a support network to which one could turn for temporary relief from emotional and mental constraints - rely on kindness of certain individuals - rely in particular on family support - being thankful, sense of luck - trust in God or a higher power - turn to prayer or meditation - accept one's fate - distract oneself – keep busy - seek out therapy - learn about and apply new coping skills - apply positive and procedural self-talk - give back to others - dream about getting a German passport one day	Protective (emotion-oriented) coping strategies

		- apply non-rewarding coping strategies, i.e. suppressing emotions, denial, escapism, etc. - repress war memories by seeking contact to Germans and avoiding Bosnians - fail to learn host society language - continue speaking Bosnian and avoid interactions with host society - avoid therapy, persevere alone - suppress emotions, denial, isolation - self-medicate with alcohol and other addictive substances - abuse of others - compulsive behavior - dissociation (disconnection from self and surroundings) - turn to prayer or meditation - children fall into role as translators for parents, forced to assume adult roles - avoidance	Non-rewarding strategies

Appendix P: Post-Migration Adaptation Process in Chicago

Table 6: Overview of obstacles and coping strategies

Category of obstacles	Adaptation obstacles	Coping strategies	Category of coping strategies
Practical/ Institutional obstacles	- variances in services of refugee reception responses - poor housing situation (for some), no furniture upon arrival - welfare support available only eight months, unless eligible for additional support - structural demotion - financial restraints and challenges since welfare less than living costs - lack of initial language proficiency - rushed through ESL classes - extreme pressure to become self-sufficient - underemployed and underpaid initially - many needed to work several jobs to cover costs→ structural demotion - difficulty accessing health insurance - mental healthcare limited to first five years	- bend the truth, scheme for resettlement - participate in free ESL classes - learn English language - rely on authorities for material and financial assistance - adopt strategy of response towards self-sufficiency - set and work towards achieving practical goals - strive towards self-sufficiency and quick and successful adaptation - secure a job, work to balance live costs - absorbed in US television, radio, etc. to keep off of inner city streets (and to learn English) - cautious on city streets - become absorbed in US television, radio, etc. to keep off of inner city streets (and to learn English) - save money pay IOM debt for resettlement costs - save money to bring family members for reunification - save money to send remittances home - save money to buy property - strive towards normalcy - apply for US citizenship - knowing the system	Practical (problem-oriented) coping strategies
Socio-cultural obstacles	- reliant on refugee reception agencies, official authorities - interact with host society individuals, encountering culture shock and ignorance - insufficient healthcare related to cultural biases - expected to send remittances or apply for family reunification - marital conflicts - parents absent often due to work - transition in previous gender roles - interfamily conflicts - youth forced to translate for adults - youth testing power roles in search of autonomy - youth confronted with gangs, violence in school system - concern for physical safety	- rely on refugee agencies to attain first job - rely on MAA support - rely on charities and religious organizations to attain practical and social support - cooperate with refugee reception program and participate in ESL classes - rely on relatives and friends to assist with translations - disassociate oneself from certain kinds of people, purposely avoid them - assume responsibility to clarify the misinformed - tolerate ignorance and *othering* comments - trust that *othering* comments not intentionally spiteful - benefit from charities and religious organizations - excuse and defend exclusionary behavior, realizing that a lack of	Protective (emotion-oriented) coping strategies

		awareness is common	
		- attempt to understand why and how this evolves; apply empathy and intercultural understanding	
		- benefit from informal support networks and information exchanges	
		- share apartments with extended family members (other single refugees) to cover costs and save money	
		- benefit from generous financial and emotional support of Yugoslavian landlords	
		- benefit from Yugoslavian landlords by overseeing apartment maintenance	
		- be thankful for support of authorities for material and financial assistance	
		- adopt and apply instructed strategy toward becoming self-sufficient	
		- excuse and defend exclusionary behavior, realizing that a lack of awareness is common	
		- attempt to understand why and how this evolves; apply empathy and intercultural understanding	
		- disassociate oneself from ignorant people, purposely avoid them	
		- assume responsibility for clarifying, informing the misinformed	
		- expect ignorance and *othering* comments	
		- trust that *othering* comments not intentionally spiteful	
		- benefit from informal support networks and information exchanges	
		- share apartments with extended family members (other single refugees) to cover their initial costs and save money	
		- benefit from generous response of Yugoslavian landlords	
		- benefit from Yugoslavian landlords by overseeing apartment maintenance tasks to save money	
		- avoid gangs and troubled youth	
		- seek recognition from mainstream = cosmopolitanism	

| Emotional/ Psychosocial Individual obstacles | - isolation, particularly for those on their own
- dealing with past losses and displacement
- PTSD, traumatization, depression
- loss of faith in humanity
- geographical distance to Bosnia caused much hardships (expensive to go home)
- disillusioned and bitter after realizing that *American dream* was not achievable
- pressure to be self-sufficient | - forgive the exerted pressure of reception agency workers rushing through ESL classes
- flexible, willing to adapt, and eager to start new lives
- optimistic about opportunities available in US
- working to achieve the *American dream*
- accept losses
- overcome loss of loved ones
- decide what chair to sit on
- forgive and move forward
- reconstruct meanings (of home, past, identity, religious association, etc.)
- be independent, self-determinism, make a home and keep busy
- apply coping strategies to overcome cultural shock (accept *ignorance is bliss* mentality)
- be patient with others
- rely on family as both practical and emotional support
- reunify with family
- rely on prayer or meditation
- give back unto others
- children taking precedence
- actively shape sense of belonging of adolescents, children and youth
- reconstruct past and attempt to comprehend hesitancy
- compensate *for not having anyone else* by engaging with other single refugees; form own network
- seek out therapy
- learn and practice application of coping skills
- set new goals
- find meaning in the world again
- dream of retiring in Bosnia
- dream of reuniting with separated family members
- reconstruct meaning of homeland | Protective (emotion-oriented) coping strategies |
| | | - fail to learn host society language
- rely on children as translators, forcing them to assume adult roles
- suppress emotions, avoidance, denial
- self-medicate with alcohol and other addictive substances
- compulsive behavior
- isolation
- dissociation (disconnection from self and surroundings)
- abuse of others | Non-rewarding (avoidance-oriented) strategies |

Appendix Q: Lebenslauf

Mein Lebenslauf wird aus Gründen des Datenschutzes in der elektronischen Fassung meiner Arbeit nicht veröffentlicht.

Due to reasons of privacy, my CV is not accessible on the internet version.

Mein Lebenslauf wird aus Gründen des Datenschutzes in der elektronischen Fassung meiner Arbeit nicht veröffentlicht.

Due to reasons of privacy, my CV is not accessible on the internet version

Appendix R: Liste der Veröffentlichungen

Publikationen

Pfohman, Shannon (2011): Immigration and Employment: Best practices of professional incorporation programs. In: Institut d'etudes et de Recherche Europe-Méditerranée (IEREM) (ed.): Crisis and Employment: Toward a new productive model. Paris: France.

Pfohman, Shannon (2010): One State Various Borders (Or East Meets West): Various locations in Israel. In: Remaking Eastern Borders in Europe: A network of exploring social, moral and material relocations of Europe's eastern peripheries (ed.): COST Action IS0803, http://www.eastbordnet.org/photography/about/documents/Israel_Photography_Report_Pfohman.pdf

Amling, Stephan/Götz, Michel/Hannig, Tilmann/Kieser, Annette/Meyer, Irena/Pfohman, Shannon/Yazar, Serder (2008): Expertise zur Umsetzung des IMK-Bleiberechtsbeschlusses vom 17. November 2006 für das Nationale Thematische Netzwerk Asyl in der europäischen Gemeinschaftsinitiative EQUAL. Berlin: Zentrum für Kultur, Politik und Forschung, http://www.zpkf.de/mediapool/53/533651/data/IMK-Beschluss-Expertise_21_2.pdf

Adler, Harry/ Büchner, Janos/Doyé, Andreas/Pfohman, Shannon (2005): Maßnahmen zur Vermeidung von Diskriminierung aufgrund der Herkunft, Hautfarbe oder Religion im beruflichen Alltag in Berliner und Brandenburger Unternehmen. Berlin: EditionParabolis.

Mächler, Sabina/Meyer, Irina/Stang, Alexander/Pfohman Shannon (2005): Maßnahmen zur Vermeidung von Diskriminierung in Schulen und im beruflichen Alltag in Großbritannien. Berlin: EditionParabolis.

Pfohman, Shannon (2005): Participation in Elderly Care. In: Blaschke, Jochen (ed.): Evaluation of Migration and Ethnicity Related Projects in the 4th and 5th Framework Programme. Berlin: EditionParabolis.

Pfohman, Shannon (2005): EMDGS Report on Education in Germany. In: European Managing Diversity Gold Standard Course. German Support Material. Diversity Enabling Framework. Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Hallam University.

Blaschke, Jochen/Pfohman, Shannon (eds.) (2004): Decentralisation of Asylum. Refugee Reception Procedures in the European Union. Berlin: EditionParabolis. (Innerhalb dieses Buchs bin ich die Autoren oder Co-Autoren von 14 der 16 Artikel).

Pfohman, Shannon (n.d.): Legal Instruments at the European Union for Asylum and Refugee Protection. In: Jochen, Blaschke: An Overview of Immigration, Integration and Asylum Policies in the European Union. Berlin: EditionParabolis.

Pfohman, Shannon (2003): Barriers of Necessary Considerations for the Implementation of Diversity Trainings: Factors that influence receptivity and resistance. MA Thesis Arbeit. (nicht veröffentlicht).

Appendix S: Deutsche Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse

Ziel dieser Studie ist in erster Linie, die Anpassungsmöglichkeiten, Erfolgs- und Exklussionsmodalitäten einer Stichprobe von Flüchtlingen aus dem Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegowina, die in den frühen 1990er Jahren in Berlin und Chicago Schutz suchten, zu erfassen und diese anschließend miteinander zu vergleichen. Ein Vergleich dieser beiden Städte ist relevant, da beide Städte den Großteil von Bosniern und Bosnierinnen im Schutz vor dem Krieg aufnahmen. In den 90er Jahren empfing Berlin ungefähr dreißigtausend bosnische Flüchtlinge, während fast vierzigtausend Bosnier und Bosnierinnen nach Chicago migrierten.

Der Schwerpunkt dieser Studie lag darin, die Aufnahmebedingungen in beiden Städten zu erforschen. Es wurde untersucht, in welcher Weise die sozialen und institutionellen Strukturen der Aufnahmegesellschaften die Gesprächspartner und Gesprächspartnerinnen in ihren Fähigkeiten einschränkten oder unterstützten, sie auf Ressourcen/Hilfsquellen zugriffen, sich ihrer neuen Umgebungen und Rahmenbedingungen anpassten und Kontrolle über ihr Leben zurückgewannen. Die Ergebnisse sind nicht repräsentativ. Sie sollten als Momentaufnahme verstanden werden, da sie den Integrationsprozess zum Zeitpunkt des Interviews festhalten.

Anhand des Ansatzes der Grounded Theory wurde die Wahrnehmung der Befragten hinsichtlich ihrer Handlungen und Interaktionen analysiert. Dabei wurden ihre Möglichkeiten auf institutionelle, soziokulturelle Ressourcen in den beiden Kontexten zuzugreifen, untersucht und verglichen. Es ergab sich aus der Analyse ein Aufbau von sieben Hauptkategorien mit mehr als zwanzig Unterkategorien. Diese beinhalteten zum einen die Kategorie Flucht und Durchreise; des weiteren *Agency* in der Entscheidung zu migrieren und Erwartungen an das Aufnahmeland; drittens die erleichternden Faktoren und viertens die Hindernisse, die dazu beitrugen, *wie* und *wie einfach* sie sich an die aufnehmende Gesellschaft anpassten; fünftens die Handlungs- und Bewältigungsstrategien die sie entwickelten und anwandten, um das Ziel der *Normalität* zu erreichen und ihr Leben neu aufzubauen; sechstens ihr allgemeines Wohlbefinden und Zugehörigkeitsgefühl, und letztlich, die Kategorie *Idealtypen* in Bezug auf die Beurteilung ihrer Anpassungsfähigkeiten in beiden Städten.

Insgesamt zeigt die Studie, dass sowohl Deutschland als auch die USA politische Entscheidungen über Flüchtlinge treffen, die auf Überlegungen der Sicherheit und ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen beruhen In diesem Zusammenhang spielen kulturelle Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede bei der Aufnahme ebenso eine große Rolle, wie die Erwartungen, welche die Gesellschaft an die Neuankömmlinge stellt.
Die Gesamtbetrachtung führt zu drei Hauptaussagen. Erstens, der gesetzliche Geltungsbereich und die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen, die die Aufnahme der bosnischen Flüchtlinge

prägten, beeinflussten die unterschiedliche Integrationsmodalitäten in beiden Kontexten. Die institutionellen Faktoren, die am einflussreichsten für den Adaptationsprozess der Bosnier und Bosnierinnen waren beinhalten: Herkunftsland und Ethnie, Umsiedlung und Ausreisemaßnahmen, Dauerhaftigkeit des Aufenthaltsstatus und Staatsbürgerschaftsoptionen, Länge des Aufenthalts im jeweiligen Aufnahmeland, die Landessprache zu können, eine frühe Beschäftigung, eine Arbeitserlaubnis, ökonomische Selbstversorgung, Bildungserfolg und Familienzusammenführung.

Die zweite Hauptaussage ist, dass die individuelle und psychische Verfassung der einzelnen Befragten sowie ihre Belastbarkeit und ihre 'Fähigkeit', die Vorteile der institutionellen Ressourcen zu erzielen, beeinflusste. Besonders deutlich ist dies bei jenen stark durch posttraumatische Belastungsstörung beeinträchtigten oder seelisch erkrankten Befragten der Fall. Eine generelle Erkenntnis zeigte auf, dass es für die Genesung der Befragten grundlegend war, sich Raum und Zeit zu nehmen um ihre Situation zu akzeptieren und darum, um ihre kriegsbezogenen Verluste zu trauern. Dies wiederum wurde durch die Gesundheitsversorgung / medizinische Betreuung beeinflusst, die in beiden Kontexten gegeben war.

Der dritte Befund hebt die Wechselwirkung zwischen den institutionellen und individuellen Dimensionen hervor. Je nachdem, wie die Befragten die situationsbezogenen Stressfaktoren empfanden und interpretierten (oft von Psychologen als primäre Einschätzung genannt), und auf strategische Ressourcen diesen Stressoren zu begegnen vertrauten (Sekundärbewertung), wurde ihre gesamte Wahrnehmung und ihr Wohlergehen in der Aufnahmegesellschaft enorm beeinflusst. Vier soziodemographische Charakteristiken wurden identifiziert, welche die Wahrscheinlichkeit beeinflussten, ihr Leben im Kontext der Aufnahmegesellschaft aufzubauen: altersspezifische Aspekte, geschlechtsspezifische Charakteristiken, Familien- und Haushaltsrollen sowie der Bildungshintergrund der Befragten. Diese wiederum wirkten auf ihre Fähigkeit zu Handeln und Vorteile aus den vorhandenen Ressourcen zu ziehen ein. Dieser Einfluss auf die individuellen persönlichen Charakteristiken der Befragten und deren Fähigkeit auf Bewältigungsstrategien zurückzugreifen, bewiesen sich als essentiell und hoben die gegenseitige Wechselwirkung der individuellen und institutionellen Dimensionen hervor. Letztlich war es nicht möglich, eine endgültige Aussage darüber zu treffen, welche der beiden Dimensionen - institutionell oder individuell - von größerer Bedeutung als kollektiver Einflussfaktor auf die Integration der Untersuchungsgruppe war.

Diese Ergebnisse wurden am Schluss zusammengeführt, um einen genaueren Blick auf die spezifische Frage zu ermöglichen: War es für die Fokusgruppe möglich in den beiden Kontexten kulturelles, soziales, wirtschaftliches und symbolisches Kapital zu akkumulieren und wenn ja, wurde es als solches wahrgenommen? Einhergehend werden die verschiedenen

Antworten der bosnischen Flüchtlinge in Hinblick auf den Grad der *symbolischen Gewalt,* der gegen sie angewendet wurde, näher beleuchtet. In dieser Hinsicht ziehen es die USA vor, ein Bild gegenüber ihren BürgerInnen und der Welt zu vermitteln, dass mit moralisch zulässigen Standards operiert, wonach ImmigrantInnen willkommen geheißen werden und jedem Neuankömmling die gleiche Basis geboten wird, um für den amerikanischen Traum zu eifern, während Deutschland weniger besorgt erscheint ein migrantenInnenfreundlichen Eindruck aufrechtzuerhalten. Die psychologische Wirkung, der Gleichbehandlung und des Willkommenseins (in Chicago, soweit sie am Wettbewerb teilhaben konnten und als *Gewinner* oder *Stars* Erfolg hatten), oder benachteiligt und als nicht willkommen wahrgenommen wurden (in Berlin), mündete, je nach Fall, in Gefühlen von Ansporn oder Entmutigung unter den Befragten, die Landessprache zu erlernen und Bräuche/ Gewohnheiten, Normen u.a. Dinge zu übernehmen, die für eine gelingende Integration erwartet werden. Als Konsequenz zeigte die Berliner Untersuchungsgruppe weniger Autonomie als die Chicagoer und erfuhr größere Einschränkungen in ihrer Handlungsmöglichkeit auf essentielle Ressourcen zurückzugreifen, die für ihre Genesung und Integration sehr hilfreich gewesen wären. Darüber hinaus hat die Berliner Gruppe weitaus länger gebraucht ihren Flüchtlingsstatus abzustreifen und somit auch den ausgesetzten Pauschalisierungen und damit einhergehenden negativen Zuschreibungen zu entgehen. Trotz der Diskriminierung wollten die interviewten MigrantInnen längerfristig in Berlin bleiben.

Insgesamt trägt diese Studie zur derzeitigen Integrations- und Asyldebatte bei, indem es die Handlungsspielräume der AkteurInnen in Bezug zu den institutionellen und sozialen Aufnahmestrukturen analysiert und diese auch unter Berücksichtigung der individuellen und kollektiven Dimensionen, welche Handeln, Interaktion und Interpretation aufzeigt. Die Studie schließt mit einer kurzen Diskussion über die Herausforderungen, die mitgegenwärtigen Migrations- und Flüchtlingsfragen verbunden sind, wobei auch an die Notwendigkeit erinnert wird, den Schutz der Menschenrechte zu gewährleisten, indem auf einige potenzielle Forschungsbereiche für die Zukunft hingewiesen wird.

Certificate of Authenticity

I, Shannon Colleen Pfohman,

herewith certify that the above presented PhD is true

and accurate to the best of my knowledge. I further certify,

that I have researched and written this study

without any outside help. Should I have had assistance,

this is acknowledged appropriately.

Brussels, January 2012