


A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE MODELS OF THE EU AND CHINA

Zhao Chen

NFG Working Paper No. 13/2014



NFG Working Paper Series

Series Editor: May-Britt U. Stumbaum

The NFG Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research results of the NFG Research Group on „Asian Perceptions of the EU“. It seeks to enhance academic exchange with scholars working in Asia and Europe as well as strengthen the research on Asian perceptions of the European Union as a security actor. The NFG Working Paper Series provides a platform for academic analysis, policy papers and other theme-related publications. The NFG Research Group „Asian Perceptions of the EU“ is an Associated Project of the KFG Research College „The Transformative Power of Europe“ and funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research.

All NFG Working Papers are available on the NFG website at www.asianperceptions.eu or can be ordered in print via email to johanna.guenther@fu-berlin.de.

Copyright for this issue: Zhao Chen

Chief Editors: Garima Mohan, Jizhou Zhao

Layout and Design: Johanna C. Günther

Zhao, Chen, 2014: A comparative study in global governance models of the EU and China. NFG Working Paper Series, No. 13, December 2014, NFG Research Group „Asian Perceptions of the EU“
Freie Universität Berlin.

ISSN (Print) 2194-184x

ISSN (Internet) 2194-1858

This publication has been funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

Disclaimer:

The NFG „Asian Perceptions of the EU“ cannot be held responsible for the errors in this NFG Working Paper or for any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this Paper. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the NFG.

Freie Universität Berlin

NFG Research Group “Asian Perceptions of the EU”

BMBF-Initiative “Europa von Außen gesehen”

Ihnestr. 26

14195 Berlin

Germany

Fon: +49 (0)30- 838 59462

Fax: +49 (0)30- 838 57096

www.asianperceptions.eu

eva.schroeder@fu-berlin.de

SPONSORED BY THE



**Federal Ministry
of Education
and Research**

A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE MODELS OF THE EU AND CHINA

Zhao Chen

Abstract

Global governance is an ambiguous concept. Based on the generalization and summary of the definition and theory of global governance, this article identifies the lack of regional features of global governance studies in the present literature. Building a framework based on comparative politics, the author conducts a comparative study of the EU and China on the models of global governance, and summarizes three types of global governance concepts: constitutionalism based on human rights, hegemonic liberalism and egalitarianism based on sovereignty. In the end, it looks ahead to the developing trends of global governance, in the future.

The Author



Dr Zhao Chen is a Research Fellow and Associate Professor, Sub-Chief of European Politics Department, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). He received his Ph.D degree from the Graduate School of CASS, and his M.A. from Peking University, both in International Relations. Zhao Chen was a visiting scholar (2009-2010) at the University of Pittsburgh, the U.S., before which he was a visiting fellow (2006-2007) at the University of Mannheim, Germany. His research interests include European Politics and its external relations, Theories of European Integration, Democracy Theory and Global Governance. He has published several articles and commentaries in Chinese and English on European affairs and global governance. Contact: zhaochen@cass.org.cn

Keywords

Global governance, models, China, the EU

Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	5
2.	Is global governance a singular form? The discipline of International Relations (IR) or Comparative Studies (CP)	5
3.	The Global Governance Concept of the EU's Constitutionalism	8
4.	China's Egalitarian global governance concept	12
5.	Conclusion: Which world is more beautiful?	18
	 Bibliography	 20

1. Introduction¹

At present, “global governance” has become a trendy term; there are more and more books on it in the disciplines of economics, politics and international relations, but regional studies of global governance are rarely seen. As the author observes, there is no overwhelming authoritative opinion or “international standards” about what norms global governance should obey. On the contrary, it merits our attention that the major countries have raised their specific views on global governance as shown in their diplomatic, economic and social policies. Therefore, the paper attempts here to design a theoretical framework, observe and summarize the global governance concepts in different regions in an approach of comparative politics, and categorize and compare those global governance concepts and policies in order to draw readers a map of the quite diverse global governance views.

2. Is Global Governance a Singular Form? The Discipline of International Relations (IR) or Comparative Studies (CP)

Like the definition of “Governance”, “Global governance” is also an ambiguous concept. On one side, Global governance is seen as a description of the international cooperation taking place in the present era of globalization. International cooperation took on a different form during the Cold War, so the former needs to be reconceptualised/ replaced by a new term – governance. The actors of international cooperation today include governments, but are not limited to governments only. “Governance encompasses every institution and organization in society, from the family to the state”, and the state (political and administrative institutions), civil society organizations and the private sector are all the domains of governance (UNDP, 1997). The state’s monopoly on decision-making is broken, and the number of participants increased. Regarding approaches and methods, governance stresses that decisions are non-obligatory. Governments should adopt the new non-violate administrative means and, meanwhile, it is very important to explore ways of building the partnership between governments, NGOs, corporations and individuals, or the new form of self-management.

On the other hand, global governance is also a norm that some international relations theories believe the international society should develop to overcome the status quo anarchysituation. Given the anarchic state of the world, different than with the compulsory legal approaches, governance stressed that shared values and international regimes are more efficient approaches toward realizing consensus and binding agreements. In a world of globalization, many western politicians and scholars think that either shared values or jointly established formal systems or informal habits can promote actors such as the states in order to surpass the conditions of international anarchy and realize cooperation.

¹The author would like to thank Dr. May-Britt Stumbaum, Olivia Gippner, Garima Mohan, and Jizhou Zhao for their ideas and comments on earlier versions of this working paper.

Apart from the empirical studies on global governance in specific areas like finance, environment, water resource management, anti-terrorism and so on, the majority of the exploration and construction of global governance theories is undertaken by the IR scholars. Currently, in the school of western International Relations theories, International Institutionalism, Cosmopolitanism and Neo-medievalism are the three representative ideas, and they all are concerned with global governance. Affected by the rejuvenation of institutionalism in economics since the 1970s (March and Olsen 1989) and developed through the Neo-liberalism of International Relations theory (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977), International Institutionalism believes that international regimes, rules and institutions can tackle international affairs, or at least, are one of the major forces dealing with international affairs (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1977; Young 1999). International institutionalism still recognizes that the states are the most important actors of global governance, whereas Cosmopolitanism is more radical, attempting to build a world Constitution and international democratic polity based on the political philosophy of Kant's cosmopolitanism and human community saying (Held 1995). The global governance of Cosmopolitanism regards individuals rather than states as the subjects of international laws (Held 2002), in line with the principles of individualism, mutual recognition, and justice and rationality. Taking a middle stance between International Institutionalism and Cosmopolitanism, Neo-medievalism holds that multiple authorities are appearing in the current post-modern world, as in the Middle Ages, a time when religious authorities, kings, lords and guilds co-existed in Western Europe. The public owes multiple allegiances to the international institutions. The nation-states and cross-border market economy are competing for power in the globalization era. People are absorbed into a complex social recognition network. The concept of sovereignty is vanishing. Modern states have to share jurisdiction over their citizens with regional and global authorities as well as sub-state and sub-nation ones (Bull 2002; Friedrichs 2001).

IR studies describe and analyse global governance by emphasizing different factors (also debating the relative importance of institutions and norms), viewing the international society as a whole. Meanwhile, global governance, seen either as an isolated phenomenon or as the norm is too complex to just be observed on the global level. Firstly, a description of the outcome of international cooperation in the globalization era (or global governance) cannot replace an investigation into the reasons that negotiators or participants hold these standings and have such policies. It is necessary to understand how the specific state or region comes in to play to form global governance, vis-a-vis counter-research such as that undertaken by IR studies. Secondly, normatively, IR studies assume the global governance principles to be universal and fixed, and that all of them could be applied to all people in all regions. This is not realistic, however. Actors in global governance activities, either national governments, local governments, or NGOs, evidently have their individual characters and normative attitudes when participating in international cooperation. Whether their behaviour model may or may not be affected (or be called 'socialized') by international norms (Risse 1999, 1), still depends in large part on their interest and is restricted by the concepts originating from their particular history, geography and political culture.

The discipline of Comparative Politics could afford a new viewpoint from which to observe global governance and appropriately complement the shortages of the IR theories mentioned above. CP studies' research path is directed from the domestic politics to the

international system, while IR focuses on the actors' feedback into the system. In terms of the importance of analyzing the actor's motives and behaviour models that make up international cooperation, there exists a need to check the global governance with a Comparative Politics methodology against the background of globalization.

Politics has been defined as the art or science of government. Now, the concept of "governance" enriches the connotation of politics. A study of global governance through the discipline of comparative politics also needs to take into consideration the relationship between government and other global actors, such as international organizations, NGOs and multinational corporations. At the same time, global governance represents the vision and outlook of all sides towards a future world order, to some extent; meanwhile, many countries and regions in the world have developed their own views and models of globalization and global governance today. Therefore, the author thinks it is necessary to adopt a comparative approach to summarize their characteristics and identify their differences, so as to explore the possibility of cooperation. As summarized above, the actors and approaches are the two major components of global governance. In addition, the importance of global governance has been reflected in the normative study, and different values will usually lead to contradictory judgements, so that we can draw interesting conclusions by comparing how important the countries or regions think the different actors are, as well as their governance approaches and values. The governance actors can be states, inter-governmental international organizations and global non-governmental organizations, and different regional global governance models treat them all differently. As for global governance models, all actors recognize equality, democratization, and the development of institutionalized cooperation, but they have different opinions on the degrees of these values. There are two key points here; the first is how to regard state sovereignty, and the second is the use of force. Governance values represent the nuclear core values of different regions, and the author attempts to summarize the most representative values of different countries and regions.

This article attempts to conduct a comparative study of global governance models, and because it is plausible to assume that the concepts propagated by the most powerful economies will have the strongest impact on the actual design and implementation of global governance, the author investigates here the EU, the US and China (in the order of GDP value). Admittedly, it would be enlightening to study the state systems and social-political structures and the relations between the private actors and public actors, as these will evidently have an impact on the formulation of concepts. This study will, from the perspective of foreign policies, however, extract and summarize the global governance concepts by scrutinizing governmental statements of different kinds, and the writings of the representative scholars and political figures. Based on a comparative framework, Table 1 below lists the differences between the global governance models as propagated by and in the EU and China, and the following three sections will further explore the differences.

Table 1: Different models of global governance between China and the EU

		EU	China
Governance Actors	States	Moderately high	High
	Inter-governmental international organizations	High	Moderately high
	Global non-governmental organizations	High	Medium
Governance Approaches	Recognition of sovereignty	Call for humanitarian intervention	Maintain sovereignty integrity, disagree on human rights vs. sovereignty
	Military or civilian approaches	Civilian, but military when necessary	Civilian
Governance Values	The most important governance value	Constitutionalization	Equality

3. The Global Governance Concept of the EU's Constitutionalism

Europe is the most adamant advocate for global governance. The EU's governance practice has a bearing on European countries' viewpoints on global governance. The EU is a hybrid of an inter-governmental international organization and a quasi-federal state, known as a sui-generis polity, and highly supranational. The EU itself is a full demonstration of the concept of governance, in that EU members delegate their sovereignty to EU supranational institutions such as the EU Council, European Parliament, and European Court of Justice to a degree much higher than that of other international organizations or regional organizations such as the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Latin American Common Market. As the inventor of the concept of sovereignty, however, European countries place less emphasis on sovereignty than do other regions of the world. In the European integration process, for over half a century after World War II, through jointly setting up the European Common Market, EU member states delegated to EU institutions their exclusive powers of independently drafting trade and agriculture policies, establishing market rules and conducting market supervision. After the European Economic and Monetary Union was founded, they delegated their powers of issuing bank notes to the joint institution---the European Central Bank. As regards ideology and institution building, the EU is the pioneer of supranational governance. The EU makes decisions after the relative European institutions, member state governments and parliaments, different professional organizations, interest groups and NGOs, and sub-national actors widely participate in discussions, and negotiate and deliberate to reach agreements. After continued accumulation, it has formed a set of complicated mechanism systems, and it cannot maintain proper operation without

established rules. Likewise, negotiators and participants cannot reach consensus and compromises to advance European integration to its present depth without the same or similar beliefs and mindsets. In addition, another feature of the European integration is that EU laws have extended to many aspects of people's lives. The ECJ and member state courts have constructed a comprehensive coordinated judicial system. Currently, EU legislation has accounted for around half of the new legislations of European countries. Even for the UK, which is not fully committed to the EU, two-thirds of its economic and social legislation was formulated by British ministers along with other European peers in Brussels. For the EU's fundamental treaties, the drafting process is an important integration process. In 2005, France and the Netherlands vetoed a referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty, and as a result, the word "Constitutional" had to be deleted and the treaty had to be changed to the Lisbon Treaty to make it effective. However, some researchers on EU studies note that, since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, the EU has repeatedly revised it, and there have emerged more and more supranational legal cases and practices, all such development in itself being a constitutional process (Weiler 1998).

The concept evident in European governance is the original form of the global governance concept of EU and European countries. The famous German thinker Jürgen Habermas represents well the thinking of European elites. As for globalization, he sees a tension between nation states' activity and the requirement of globally integrated production, stating that as economics are getting more and more trans-nationalized, especially as the financial market and industrial production are trans-nationalized and labor markets are globalized, the governments of nation states realize that they have to forebear the fallouts, such as the increasing rise in unemployment rates and the marginalization of minority groups in order to keep their international competitiveness. If social welfare countries still want to keep high welfare, and the lower-classes are not abandoned, cross-border subjects are essential. Only cross-national integral subjects such as European Communities can exert influences on global systems through the coordinated interior mode. Under the pressure of market globalization, politics can only successfully build a sustainable infrastructure for a world-internal politics from a broader perspective, and politics must grow with the globalized market (Habermas 2001). The EU was merely a small test conjured by Habermas as "a global governance mechanism without world government", testing whether a clique composed of competent managers in world politics could enlarge a temporarily loose network of supranational polities in a changed world organization's framework, and whether it were possible to shift a world-internal politics in this direction but without a world government (Habermas 1999).

Here, Juergen Habermas is exploring a world political order and organizational form in the post-national era, and this world order is different from US strategic thinking. In May 2005, at the 22nd Conference of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy held in Granada, Spain, Habermas introduced, in his lecture "The Kantian Project of Cosmopolitan Law - And What It Means Today", Kant's idea of a "cosmopolitan condition", which Habermas identified as a "world republic" in which international law is totally constitutionalized. Constitutionalization of international law only evolved in the direction of Kant's idea after the end of World War II. However, with the end of bi-polar world order and the US becoming the only super-nation, as well as the birth of the neo-liberal world order concept, Kantian thought was criticized by both traditional realism and liberalism. Habermas termed such liberalism "hegemony

liberalism”, and argued that hegemony liberalism is problematic from the perspective of both norms and practice. He maintained that the UN as the core of international society is still of vital importance, and that its defect did not justify the abandonment of the Kantian project (Habermas 2005). Many European politicians also agreed with Habermas. For example, the former German Ambassador to Beijing Volker Stanzel explained the importance of international organizations such as the UN, and said that the reason for the international organizations functioning between the two super-powers during the Cold-War era was to avoid “disorderly” conflicts, which might cause a “hot-war” between the US and the USSR. But, in the post-Cold-War era, many institutional agencies malfunctioned or even broke up. The fact that all successive Secretaries-General of the UN tried hard to adapt the UN to the new situation has proven that if we want to shun the unaccountable risks caused by complex conflicts, we need a new world order, or at least new “Rules of the Road” (Stanzel 2008). He also emphasized the rule of international law, saying that “in order to realize a new world stability, and in order to build a new stable world order based on norms, which will define the norms for the future stable mechanism, to replace the collapsing Cold-War institution, the whole world should be more and more convinced of the importance of international law”, especially pointing out that “the most important is that the countries which are the new centre should be convinced of the importance of international law” (Stanzel 2008), by which he hoped to bring rising countries such as China into the bindings of an international law framework.

In general, Europe has placed less emphasis on nation states than other regions, reflected from the EU and European countries’ global governance plans. Europe is widely recognized as having entered a post-nation state era. Due to the influence of post-modern thought, the bitter lessons from the two world wars, and the supranational experience of European integration, the European public, especially the elites, voice a profound criticism of nationalism and scepticism of the concept of states. Of course, this is not to say that Europe has gone beyond the nation-state phase; the EU and their member states have a clear understanding of the role of states. In European governance mechanisms, states are still the core subject of governance, and in international affairs, it has been proven that the states are still the irreplaceable actors in the international community.

The EU and its member states have high expectations of inter-governmental organizations. They themselves are the biggest participants in international organizations, and they attach great importance to introducing their institutions and values to international organizations to bring their “soft power” into play. The EU and their member states are the largest force in peace-keeping campaigns of international organizations such as the UN, accounting for over half of peace-keepers in the world. Around 70 percent of foreign aid in the world is offered by the EU and EU countries. The EU advocates multilateralism in the international community, and maintains the authority of the United Nations. Even in the Libya crisis of 2011, France and the UK still worked hard to obtain the mandate of the UN Security Council. Besides inter-governmental international organizations, the EU and EU countries share a deep collaboration with a number of global NGOs. They attach importance to and borrow the network and human resources of global NGOs in information gathering, supervision and operation, and in reward, they provide the NGOs with funding and project set-up. Some European elites have raised the role of NGOs to a strategic level. During the Kosovo war, German scholar Thomas Risse commented that

the biggest military powers such as NATO and the US have to serve NGOs like Amnesty International (Risse 1999).

In global governance approaches, on one hand the EU pays attention to maintaining the effectiveness of international institutions and, on the other hand, lays stress on the normative influence, trying to promote the values of liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. On the relations between sovereignty and human rights, the mainstream opinion of European politics, academics and media is that the former should be subject to the latter. The Council of Europe established in 1950 by the Western European countries signed the European Convention on Human Rights, collectively ensuring and implementing some rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948. They also institutionalized these rights and freedoms by founding the European Human Rights Council and Europe Human Rights Court to mediate and rule human rights cases in the member states. During the Cold-War period, European countries attached importance to cooperation with international organizations to promote human rights in the world. For example, in the late 1980s, there were broad discussions with the NGOs as the core, led by France about whether to recognize the “right to humanitarian relief”. The UN General Assembly was responsive to the discussion, and loosened the principle requiring the consent of the recipient country in 1988, 1990 and 1991 to make foreign relief in natural disasters and hunger situations more effective. After the Cold War, especially after the Kosovo war, the principle of “human rights priority” in European international law and international politics has become more and more prominent. In 1999, at the seminar of “Incremental Governance” which Tony Blair and Bill Clinton both attended in Florence, Italy, the participants from both academia and governments fully discussed the legitimacy of humanitarian interference. The mainstream opinion held that it was necessary for the western countries to take action, civilian or military, because humanitarian crises are like “fires on the neighbours”. Thomas Risse, German scholar on international relations, said that wars can only be launched for humanitarianism in the post-Cold-War era (Risse 1999). But, he also emphasized that the UNSC was the only institution to endow humanitarianism intervention legitimacy, and is the standard whether the international community agrees or not, the Kosovo war being the only exception to the UN mandate.

The humanitarian intervention approaches of the EU and European countries are rational, taking the conditions and cost of intervention into consideration. If military intervention cannot stop a humanitarian crisis, military intervention should be avoided. Compared with the US, the EU focuses more on civilian means. It had once for quite a long time acted as a cleaning crew for US, in which case the US took the lead and Europe cleaned up the mess, undertaking the post-war rebuilding and peace-keeping. But the Libya crisis in 2011 has shown that under certain conditions, Europe can also be the pioneer. Currently, humanitarianism has become the dominant and primary concept in the minds of many Europeans. And European politicians have reached the consensus that in the era of globalization, people who violate international law and basic human rights should be punished, and the sovereignty of nation-states can be downplayed (Zhao 2011).

In general, Europe’s global governance plan is the enlargement of the EU’s constitutional design, and the continuation of the Kantian democratic community project. As for how

to overcome the chaos and wars brought about by anarchy in a world anarchic state, the EU and its member states place hope on the strengthening of international institutions and the application of international norms. Compared with any other region in the world, the EU puts more stress on international law to promote the institutionalization of international law, and is the most active advocate for setting up the International Judicial Court at the UN; it also hopes to promote the rule of law in other countries through legal aid and law training programs, and the abolishment of the death penalty and protection of civilian's political freedom is the core part. Therefore, global constitutionalism based on human rights is the biggest feature of the EU's global governance concept.

The most striking example of constitutionalism as the core value of Europe's global governance is the issue of universal jurisdiction. On June 18, 2001, a Belgian domestic court decided to put four Rwandese people into prison for genocide in Rwanda in 1994. This is the first time in the history of international law or international relations that universal jurisdiction was applied, breaking with the principle of territorial jurisdiction and national jurisdiction adopted by international criminal law. The crime was committed in Rwanda, the criminals were Rwandese, and the victims were Rwandese, all having no relations with Belgium. But, adopting the principle of universal jurisdiction, the Belgian court handled the cases having no relations with their countries or civilians. After that, many people cited the case to make charges against the state heads of other countries in Belgium. Under pressure from the US, Belgium repealed the law on universal jurisdiction, and introduced a new law on extraterritorial jurisdiction consistent with that of most other European countries (Dixon, Khan and May 2003). However, such an unsuccessful attempt has proven the depth of the global constitutionalism concept in Europe from the reverse perspective.

4. China's Egalitarian Global Governance Concept

Global governance is a foreign phrase to China, taken into consideration the fact that the internationalization process of the People's Republic of China has taken around 40 years if China's entry to the UN in 1997 is reckoned as the start of China's internationalization. With the rise of economic globalization in the 1990s, especially after China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, China's economy has been deeper and deeper intertwined with the world economy, and China has confronted more and more international economic global governance problems. Therefore, after deliberation and discussion, the Chinese government recognized the necessity of global economic governance and defined China's fundamental position, viewpoints and goals. On December 11, 2011, Chinese President Hu Jintao said that China should resolutely be a participant in global economic governance at the high-level forum marking the tenth anniversary of China's entry into the WTO (Hu 2011). Earlier than that, State Council Dai Bingguo systematically expounded China's basic viewpoints on global economic governance in July of 2009 when attending the G8 and developing countries dialogue in L' Aquila as stated below:

I. *Goal of governance.* The fundamental goal of global economic governance is to push forward the development of the global economy in a balanced, universally beneficial and win-win manner. ‘Balance’ means taking into account the needs and balancing the concerns of both the developed and the developing countries. ‘Universal benefit’ means maintaining the interests and bringing tangible benefits to all the countries in the world and their people. ‘Win-win’ means combining the interests and linking the development of one country with all the others.

II. *Participants of governance.* Global economic governance should be participated in by all the countries around the world. Countries, no matter large or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are all parts of the global economy and should participate in the governance equally and enjoy relevant representativeness, voice and decision-making rights. Equal participation is reflected not only in form but more importantly in substantial content and decision-making. Only in this way can we ensure rationality and justice and guarantee the reputation and effectiveness of the global economic governance.

III. *Way of governance.* Global economic governance requires countries to solve the difficulties caused by economic globalization through consultations and cooperation. It is important to follow the democracy principle, listen to the opinions of all parties concerned, take care of and reflect the interests and demands of all countries, especially the developing ones. We should respect differences, take into consideration the different national conditions of countries and allow different approaches of the developed and the developing countries. We should insist on and advocate cooperation and encourage countries to strengthen communication and coordination and use their advantages respectively to address the common challenges.

IV. *Mechanisms of governance.* Global economic governance requires appropriate mechanism arrangements. The development of a world economy makes it hard for some mechanisms to fully reflect the demands of the international community. Representativeness needs to be expanded to effectively tackle the global challenges. Governance should be targeted at problems in different areas and at various levels. In terms of governance mechanisms, relevant international standards and rules should be formulated on the basis of equal consultations and consensus reached among all the interested parties. Experience and best practices should be disseminated and countries should intensify exchanges and cooperation to jointly build an effective global economic governance structure.

The Chinese government has realized that the world economy and economic globalization need to be managed, and has its own ideas of how to manage them. From the statements of Chinese leaders, “equality” is the key word of China’s normative requirement. The Chinese government believes that global economic governance should achieve the equal positioning of developed countries and developing countries and that the nations,

as the basic actors, should address problems on the basis of equal deliberation. On the one hand, this is a realistic consideration by China. As a developing country, China believes it is necessary to expand representativeness and the right to voice opinions of developing countries in international organizations and the international system, to allow the developing countries to get equally involved in decision-making of international affairs, to change the unbalanced South-North relations, and to change the situation in which western countries dominate a hegemonic international society. These are all conducive to improving China's international influence of power, in line with China's national interests. On the other hand, if we review China's 60-year diplomatic history, we will find the principle of equality has been China's consistent diplomatic value and norm. This is inseparable from China's modern historic experience of being bullied by foreign countries since the Opium War in the 19th century, when the Chinese for generations could not obtain equal standing in the world. Finally, through fierce, long-term struggles, the Chinese people overthrew the "old society" which contained certain kinds of unequal treaties. After terminating an old era that featured inequality, the Chinese people naturally harbour an ideal of a world order that is one with equality. Chinese future diplomacy, therefore, should fundamentally reflect the principle of equality, and equality has been internalized as China's diplomatic ethics. Such a concept, in the author's opinion, has a great impact on the forming of China's global economic governance principle.

In "high politics", such as the politics and security area, the Chinese government shows hesitation over the adoption of global governance. Its main concern is that the western countries will use this as an excuse to interfere in China's internal affairs, threatening China's sovereignty, integrity and diplomatic independence. After all, the theories of global governance all originated in the West, and the influence of developed countries far surpasses that of developing countries in the international organizations, no matter whether inter-governmental or global civil ones. The mechanism of global governance is mainly designed and formulated by the West, and reflects the values of the West. In addition, global governance has the tendency to weaken sovereignty, making it potentially become the theoretical groundings and rhetoric of interference in the internal affairs of other countries and regions². However, given the fact that globalization has spilled over from the economic field into politics, environment, culture, science and technology, police, non-traditional security, or even traditional security such as arms control, China has conducted multi-phase and all-round substantial cooperation with international organizations, social corporate, multi-national companies and local governments. If we only focus on the intergovernmental exchanges, quite a number of China's fresh diplomatic exchanges will be overlooked. Meanwhile, China should raise its own understanding and cognition of the global governance concept. Actually, for some people, global governance means establishing a world government and setting up laws and regulations, and for

² Some Chinese scholars pointed out the negative effects when they introduced the global governance concept and theories into China, such as Yu Keping and Cai Tuo (Yu 2002 and Cai 2004).

other people, it means setting up the mechanism which has the support of sovereignty states and promotes mutual understanding and operations. China's global governance concept is obviously different from that of the US or Europe, and presents its own ideas and features.

Chinese President Hu Jintao said in his report to the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress that "we maintain that the people of all countries should join hands and strive to build a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. To this end, all countries should uphold the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, observe international law and universally recognized norms of international relations, and promote democracy, harmony, collaboration and win-win solutions in international relations. Politically, all countries should respect each other and conduct consultations on an equal footing in a common endeavour to promote democracy in international relations. Economically, they should cooperate with each other, draw on each other's strengths and work together to advance economic globalization in the direction of balanced development, shared benefits and win-win progress. Culturally, they should learn from each other in the spirit of seeking common ground while shelving differences, respect the diversity of the world, and make joint efforts to advance human civilization. In the area of security, they should trust each other, strengthen cooperation, settle international disputes by peaceful means rather than by war, and work together to safeguard peace and stability in the world. On environmental issues, they should assist and cooperate with each other in conservation efforts to take good care of the Earth, the only home of human beings." These normative propositions have generally outlined the content of China's global governance concept. In political governance, China maintains that all countries should comply with the principles of international law and devote themselves to the democratization of international relations. The democratization of international relations means that "all countries, big and small, strong and weak, rich and poor, are equal. We respect the right of the people of all countries to independently choose their own development path. We will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or impose our own will on them." (Hu, 2007) The core value is equality. In the way of governance, China abandons the use of force, insists on deliberation, and maintains that a civil approach is the only choice for necessary international interference. Equality, tolerance and mutual assistance are the philosophical principles of China's global governance position, and expressed in its actual abroad operations. It is the cultural background of China's global governance concept to respect world diversity, respect the independent choices of all countries, and believe in the capacity of people in other countries to address their internal affairs. Therefore, in general, China has established a global governance concept which we can generalize as "an egalitarian global governance concept on the basis of state sovereignty".

Nation-states are the basic actors from China's global governance perspective, but China does not exclude the coordination, communication and management functions of inter-governmental international organizations in international affairs. According to the

statistics research of Canadian scholar Alastair Iain Johnston, during the mid-1960s to mid-1990s, China surged to accede to around 80 percent of the international organizations, a change from being totally isolated from international organizations. His research further showed that once entry to international organizations was gained, the Chinese government has not attempted to challenge the basic goals of the international organizations, nor the methods or policies of international organizations to better serve their interests (Johnston 2003). Indeed, China has showed great respect to the inter-governmental international organization system, with the UN as the centre. Upon signing or after formally joining an international organization, no matter whether in trade, environment, technology, arms control, human rights or peace keeping, China seldom withdrew or violated treaties like the US did. International treaties and international organizations have a far-reaching influence on China. For example, during the ten years of China's accession to the WTO, China's general customs duty level has dropped from 15.3 percent to 9.8 percent. Since then, the central government has reviewed over 2,300 domestic laws, regulations and departmental rules, and local governments have reviewed over 190,000 regional policies and regulations, according to the requirement of the WTO agreement (Hu 2011). Since the 1990s, China has gradually freed itself from passively adapting to international organizations and begun to actively and effectively take part in the activities of international organizations and the drafting of international rules. For example, it initiated and organized regional multi-lateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Basic Block, and participated in the G20. After the world financial crisis broke out in 2008, China proposed to speed up the structural reforms of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to establish a sound international financial regulatory regime, improve the international money system and expand its representativeness, and improve the voting rights of developing countries.

China is more cautious than Europe and the US when handling international NGOs. China's domestic social administration is led by the government, China's civil society organizations are under development, and the government administration is strict. According to the regulation released by the Chinese State Council in 1998, the Chinese government has two management principles concerning NGOs: one is that all NGOs should register at the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the second is that the Civil Affairs Ministry is in charge of registration and enrolment of NGOs and the department in charge of the particular business is responsible for daily management. Therefore, besides registration, international NGOs must find a Chinese partner, in most cases, a counterpart in the government if they want to operate in China (Zhou et. 2007). With the deepening of China's opening up and reform, many international NGOs have cooperated with Chinese government agencies to get deeply involved in the development of China's poverty reduction, healthcare, environmental protection, training, human rights and education. They provided funding, technology and experiences, brought about advanced ideas, and built up international networks. The then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao explicitly said that the Chinese government would like to be committed to the cause of

China's poverty reduction with international organizations, international NGOs and other forces at the global poverty reduction conference held in Shanghai in 2004. However, the Chinese government is very cautious of some international NGOs who have religious purposes and goals of penetration, westernization and subversion.

On the relations between sovereignty and human rights in the approaches to governance, China is a strong defender of the sovereignty equality principle of traditional international law, disagreeing with human rights beyond sovereignty. The following reasons can explain China's emphasis on the overwhelming position of sovereignty. Firstly, different from the western countries against the background of the birth of state sovereignty, the Chinese state sovereignty concept was generated from the escalating national crisis (Zhang 2002). Just like many developing countries which had gone through the colonial history, China values national independence and sovereign integrity very highly³. Secondly, China's non-violating principle of sovereignty also has realistic concerns of protecting China's Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and human rights issues from western interference. Thirdly, western countries are dominating in the present international system. No matter whether in economy, military power or ideology, the West is superior to China and other developing countries. China needs the protection of state sovereignty to protect from the erosion of mighty international market power and rhetoric power. The Laissez-faire policy in international relations is an abdication of responsibility to its country and the people. Fourthly, the sovereignty principle is also the natural extension of Chinese Confucian thoughts of "family-country-world" order, which stipulates that one should first manage its family affairs, then state affairs and finally world affairs. The Chinese believe in themselves, and they also believe the other countries can manage their own internal affairs. With family affairs managed and state affairs governed, the world will be made peaceful. China refuses to denounce countries which have governance problems. As for the regions in conflict, upholding the non-interference principle, China has been encouraging the countries to conduct peaceful consultations internally to reach mediation by themselves. China's global governance logic lies in the assumption that all countries are able to take responsibility in managing their economic, political and social affairs, and China believes this is the foundation for a harmonious world.

In the way of governance, China has tried its best to take part in the civil operations organized by international institutions such as the UN. Since 1990, China has begun to participate in peacekeeping led by the UN, and by the end of 2011, China dispatched about 21,000 personnel on 30 UN peacekeeping missions, which is the highest number among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. However, China does not call for military intervention. Even if designated with international peacekeeping

³ Developed countries and developing countries have different understandings of sovereignty. The latter emphasize the independence of sovereignty and incline to take sovereignty as a fence for protecting its national interests, while the former focus on the interdependency of nation-states and believe this is the best way to maintain its benefits (Cheng 2002).

tasks, China still maintains essentially that a country's problem should be tackled by the people of the country, that regional affairs should be addressed by the regional countries for coordination, and that international society including the UN can only play a supplementary and pushing role. No matter in what form to be engaged, the UN must help maintain the integrity of sovereignty and territory of the countries involved, must respect the collective will of the people of the countries involved, must comply with the three principles of being neutral, using no force except self-defence and obtaining the agreement of the countries involved.

Even though the entities beyond nations have had greater and greater influence on the current world, and international organizations, non-governmental entities and various networks are reshaping the power structure of global politics, China still maintains that the country is the main actor in global governance, and the international relations of the 21st century are still on the basis of nation-states. The country, instead of the person, is the basic unit of governance, as the world is still far away from "Great Unity". In the bargaining process with globalization, China is constantly improving its government competency to adapt it to the requirement of globalization. On norms, China maintains the equality principle, believing that all sovereign states are independent and equal. "Par in parem non habet jurisdictionem": a country must not impose its will on others. This principle is different from that of the West. For example, in the process of aiding Africa, a Chinese researcher on African studies said that equality is the soul of China-Africa relations. China regards the aid to Africa as reciprocal, rather than one-sided. Chinese official aid records have never used "donors" or "donees", discarding the West-Africa relations of one being superior and one being inferior, and defining the equal relations between China and Africa (Li 2011).

5. Conclusion: Which World is more Beautiful?

As analyzed above, in the process of adapting to and leading globalization, and on the basis of their own historical experience, social model and world status, China, the US and Europe have developed different global governance concepts and models, enriching and substantiating the connotation and denotation of global governance. However, just as famous American international political scientist Kenneth Waltz said, like mankind, states can by no means be perfect (Waltz 1959). The approaches to global governance of the three actors all have shortcomings. The global constitutional governance of the EU and its member states which is based on human rights does not fully respect the autonomy and self-governance ability of the other regions and countries in the world. The US' global governance of liberalism on the basis of hegemony lacks a self-restrained sense of international responsibility, and has the tendency to free itself from international laws and norms. The Chinese equalitarian global governance concept based on sovereignty

cannot ensure effective cooperation between countries when the world is de facto in anarchy, nor the prevention of humanitarian disasters in special circumstances.

According to the international economics theory of liberalism, economic globalization has brought about the refinement and professionalization of labour divisions of international industries. The highly efficient allocation of resources will boost economic development, produce wealth and promote prosperity, but the political issue of social justice and fairness must be addressed and realized by governance. From this perspective, who can better resolve the social justice issue, who will occupy the moral high ground in the competition between global governance models and gain moral attraction? The current global governance sketched out by western countries has expanded the range of actors and softened the compulsion of policies, but has one fatal flaw, which is a “distorted global governance” as described by Tony McGrew. For the most part, it remains highly unrepresentative of the world community and scored by huge inequalities of power, influence, access and resources (McGrew 2002). Not only do such inequalities exist between countries of the South and North, but, due to objective reasons such as information asymmetry and power hegemony, inter-governmental international organizations and international NGOs do not have equal opportunities to realize the “equal and free competition” acclaimed by western global governance researchers.

China is the world’s largest developing country. It often represents the interests and image of the ones “being governed” in the old global governance map, and it is also the receiver of western global governance rules and concepts. But, through the summary of the existing policies and positions of the Chinese government and the practice of global governance, we can see that China’s egalitarian global governance with the nation-state as the basic unit has strong legitimacy and justification. In an unequal world, it is always the first choice to help yourself rather than waiting for others to help you when seeking equality. In China’s exchanges with other countries, China has implemented the whole governance concept, whether intentionally or not, and gradually formed models and rules. For example, during China’s aid to African countries in infrastructure construction, helping the development of the local economy without any political condition indirectly improved the governance capacity of the African countries. This was not only beneficial to African people’s lives, but also alleviated the immigration pressure of Europe, and was thus beneficial to the economic development and social administration of developed countries and regions.

Bibliography

- Albers, Detlev 2004, "The Globalization of Europe and Social Democracy", in Beck, Ulrich et. (ed.) 2004, *Global Politics and Global Governance: Globalization in Politics Area*, translated and edited by Shipeng, Zhang et., Beijing.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew 2005, "The Dilemma of the Last Sovereign", in *American Interest* 1, 37-46.
- Buchanan, Allen/ Keohane, Robert O. 2006, "The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions", in *Ethics and International Affairs* 4, 405-437.
- Bull, Hedley 2002, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York, 3rd edition.
- Bush, George W. 2005, "Second Inaugural Address", in <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4460172> [accessed: 15 March 2014]
- Cai, Tuo 2004, "The Chinese Viewpoint and Practice on Global Governance", in *Social Sciences in China* 1.
- Cheng, Xiaoxia 2002, "Intervene and International Intervene, The Evolution and the Standstill of International Law", in *Jurists Review* 5.
- Commission on Global Governance (CGG) 1995: *Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, Oxford and New York.
- Dai Bingguo 2009, "Speech in the G8 and G5 conference in L'Aquila, Italy", in http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/2009-07/10/content_946425.htm [accessed: 15 April 2014]
- Dixon, Rodney/Khan, Karim/May, Richard 2003, *Archbold International Criminal Court*, London.
- Friedman, Thomas L. 2005, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*, New York.
- Friedrichs, Jörg 2001, "The Meaning of New Medievalism", *European Journal of International Relations*, 7:4.
- Garret, Geoffrey 1998, *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*, Cambridge.
- Gilpin, Robert 2002: "A Realist Perspective on International Governance", in Held, David/McGrew Anthony (ed.), *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance*, Cambridge.
- Hasenclever, Andreas/ Mayer, Peter/Rittberger, Volker 1997, *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge.
- Keohane, Robert/Nye, Joseph S. 1977, *Power and Interdependence*, Boston.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1984, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton.

- Keohane, Robert O. 2001, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 'Presidential Address', 'American Political Science Association, 2000, in American Political Science Review, 95:1, 1-13.
- Held, David 1995, Democracy and the Global Order: from the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Stanford.
- Held, David 2002, Law of States, Law of Peoples, in Legend Theory 2, 1-44.
- Habermas, Jürgen 2001, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, in New Left Review, 11.
- Habermas, Jürgen 1999, The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization, in Blätter für Deutsche und Internationale Politik, April, 425-436.
- Habermas, Jürgen 2005, The Kantian Project of Cosmopolitan Law - And What It Means Today, in the 22nd conference of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, in Granada, Spain.
- Hartz, Luis 1955, The Liberal Tradition in America, New York.
- Hu, Jintao 2007, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive for New Victories in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all, Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on Oct. 15, 2007, Beijing, in <http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/229611.htm> [accessed: 25 May 2014]
- Hu, Jintao 2011, China's Opening-Up Strategy toward the Future, in People Daily, Dec.11.
- Ikenberry, G. John 2010, The Three Faces of Liberal Internationalism", in Alexandroff, Alan/ Cooper Andrew (ed.), Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance, Baltimore.
- Ikenberry, G. John/ Knock, Thomas J./ Slaughter, Anne-Marie/ Smith, Tony 2011, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century, Princeton.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain 2003, China and International Institutions: Observation from the Abroad", in Wang, Yizhou (ed.), Construction in Contradiction: A Multiple-insight into Relationship between China and Key International Organizations, Beijing, 347-351.
- Kennan, George F. 1951, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, Chicago.
- Li, Anshan 2011, Chinese Aid to Africa cares for African Peoples' Livelihood, in Chinese Social Sciences Today, July 7.
- March, James G./Olsen, Johan P. 1989, Rediscovering Institutions: the Organizational Basis of Politics, New York.
- McGrew, Tony 2002, Pacing for the Real Global Governance, in Marxism and Reality 1.
- Risse, Thomas 1999 (1), International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Area, Politics and Society, Vol.27, No.4, December 1999, p.529-559.

- Risse, Thomas 1999 (2), Democratic Global Governance in the 21st Century, in Progressive Governance for the 21 century, Conference Proceedings, Florence.
- Rosenau, James N./Czempiel, Ernst-Otto ed. 1992, Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge.
- Schneider, Volker 2004: State Theory, Governance and the Logic of Regulation and Administrative Control, in Warntjen, Andreas/Wonka, Arndt (ed.), Governance in Europe, Baden-Baden.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie 2004: A New World Order, Princeton.
- Stanzel, Volker 2008, "The EU and China in the Global System", in Shambaugh, David/Sandschneider, Eberhard/Zhou, Hong (ed.), China-Europe Relationship: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects, Oxon.
- Truman, Harry S. 1947, The Truman Doctrine, delivered 12 March, 1947, in <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/harrystrumantrumandocctrine.html> [accessed: 15 March 2012]
- UNDP 1997: Reconceptualising Governance, New York.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York.
- Wang, Jisi 2003, The logic of American Hegemony, in Chinese Journal of American Studies 3.
- Weiler, Joseph H.H. 1998, The Case against the Case for Statehood, in European Law Journal 4, 43-62.
- Woods, Ngaire 2002, Global Governance and Role of Institutions, in Held, David/ McGrew, Anthony (eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, Cambridge.
- World Bank 1991: Managing Development: The Governance Dimension, Washington D.C.
- Yu, Keping, 2002, Guide to Global Governance, in Marxism and Reality 1.
- Young, Oran R. 1999, Governance in World Affairs, Cornell.
- Zakaria, Fareed 2003, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, New York.
- Zhang, Baijia 2002, An Outline of Chinese Diplomacy during the 20th Century, in Social Sciences in China 1.
- Zhao, Chen 2011, The Duty to intervene and Libya Crisis, in Chinese Journal of European Studies 3.
- Zhao, Tingyang 2005, No World-view for the World, Beijing.
- Zhou, Hong/Zhang, Jun/Zhang, Min 2007, Donor in China, Beijing.